sign in sign up
<<
Home , Billy Mitchell, Bombing of Tokyo, Doolittle Raid, Generalissimo (30 Rock), Jimmy Doolittle, Task Force 16

Queen City Heritage

Thomas C. Griffin, a resident of Cincinnati for over forty years, participated in the first bombing raid on Japan in World War II, the now leg- endary . (CHS Photograph Collection) Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La Navigating from Shangri- La: Cincinnati's Doolittle Raider at War

Kevin C. McHugh served as Cincinnati's oral historian for "one of America's biggest gambles"5 of World War II, the now legendary Doolittle Raid on Japan. A soft-spoken man, Mr. Griffin Over a half century ago on April 18, 1942, characteristically downplays his part in the first bombing the Cincinnati Enquirer reported: "Washington, April 18 raid on Japan: "[It] just caught the fancy of the American — (AP) — The War and Navy Departments had no confir- people. A lot of people had a lot worse assignments."6 mation immediately on the Japanese announcement of the Nevertheless, he has shared his wartime experiences with bombing of ."1 Questions had been raised when Cincinnati and the country, both in speaking engagements Tokyo radio, monitored by UPI in San Francisco, had sud- and in print. In 1962 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary denly gone off the air and then had interrupted program- of the historic mission, the Cincinnati Enquirer highlight- ming for a news "flash": ed Mr. Griffin's recollections in an article that began, Enemy appeared over Tokyo for the " Strike from Carrier Recalled."7 For the fiftieth first time since the outbreak of the current war of Greater anniversary in 1992, the Cincinnati Post shared his adven- East Asia. The bombing inflicted telling damages on schools ture in a full-page article entitled, "A Veteran Remembers and hospitals. The raid occurred several minutes past noon on ... 30 Seconds Over Tokyo."8 The Historical Society, Saturday. The invading planes failed to cause any damage to which has a taped interview with Mr. Griffin in its archives, military establishments? recently invited him to speak to museum-goers9 and spot- Reporters wanted information. But lighted his part in the raid with a display in the "Cincinnati Americans, starved for good news from the Pacific, seized Goes to War" exhibit. But Mr. Griffin's experiences in that the early reports, dismissed the enemy propaganda, and war include more than that single mission, no matter how celebrated their first significant victory in the war against memorable. They have particular value because they mirror Japan. The next day, in fact, newspapers all over the coun- the experiences of the generation who shaped the present, try fed the following naively optimistic headline to their a generation that diminishes in size as the anniversaries hungry readers: "Allied Offensive Indicated By U.S. Air climb in number. Those experiences also serve as a lens Attack On Japan."3 The euphoria of the day was under- through which a new generation of Cincinnatians can dis- standable. America was reeling from a series of defeats: cover that the history of some fifty years past is more than had been surprised, Wake Island and Guam just the events and dates of textbooks but the flesh and had fallen; in the , Bataan had just surrendered blood of real people like themselves. in the worst defeat of American military history, while sur- Thomas Griffin was born in Green Bay, vivors clung precariously to "The Rock," the little island , in 1916. He grew up there and then attended fortress of Corregidor in Manila Bay. But the retaliatory the University of Alabama, graduating in 1939 with an A.B. bombing of Japan, the Doolittle Raid, as it came to be degree in political science and economics — and an ROTC called, changed all that. It had come, President Roosevelt commission as a in the later volunteered somewhat impishly, "from our secret Army because he saw that "war was coming." By 1939 base in Shangri-La" (the fictional Utopia of James Hilton's Hider had seized and turned up the propa- Lost Horizons)} The daring attack caught the imagination ganda blitz that preceded the real invasion of of the American people and made them feel less impotent. . Lt. Griffin — serial number 0377848, he remem- Cincinnatians knew that history had been made. One wit- bers without hesitation10 — first served with the anti-air- nessed it first-hand. craft batteries of the 61st Coast . He soon volun- Since his arrival in Cincinnati over forty years teered for the air , however, because he "didn't want ago, Bridgetown resident Thomas Carson Griffin has to be standing on the ground shooting up." Griffin's apti-

Kevin C. McHugh, a fellow of the Ohio Writing Project and English department chairman at Finneytown Jr./Sr. High School in Cincinnati, has an M.A. in English from the University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada. Queen City Heritage

tude for mathematics steered him to navigator's school, Northwest" — often at dubious risk to themselves due to which the Army conducted in Coral Gables, , in the the area's treacherous weather, especially the fog. During "flying classrooms" of Pan American Airways' Commodore one such dangerous anti-submarine patrol just twenty-five flying boats. By 1941 Lt. Griffin had been stationed with miles off the mouth of the Columbia River, on Christmas the 17th Bombardment Group at Camp Pendleton, Eve 1941, Holstrom and the crew of his B-25 are credited Oregon. At that time the air corps had begun replacing with destroying a Japanese submarine, the first of the that unit's lumbering, twin-engined B-18 Bolero Bombers to be sunk by an American aircraft.12 (military derivatives of the once revolutionary DC-2 airlin- About the same time as Lt. Griffin's unit er) with the faster, twin-engined, twin-ruddered B-25B underwent its first engagement with the enemy, President Mitchell bomber.11 This changeover, in fact, proved crucial Roosevelt was urging the soonest possible retaliation to Griffin's participation in the first and most famous of his against Japan, a bombing attack against the Japanese home many World War II exploits. islands, to boost American and Allied morale. He pressed Because the Japanese attack of December 7, his recommendation in the following weeks, particularly in 1941, had left much of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet resting light of repeated Allied disasters in the Pacific theater.13 At in the mud of Pearl Harbor, near-panic swept the West that time, only the navy had the capability of carrying out Coast. "There was simply no capability, no air defense and, such attack. To do so, however, would put at risk the with the exception of a few National Guard companies, no American aircraft carriers that had narrowly avoided ground defense," recalls fellow Tokyo Raider and 17th destruction at Pearl Harbor. (America had four carriers in Group , "Brick" Holstrom. "An enemy carrier force the Pacific at that time; the Japanese had ten.) Bringing could have bombed [the U.S.] at will . ..." As a result, those vessels within their aircrafts' limited 300-mile range the 17th, the "only combat-ready medium bomb group in would put them within striking distance of the Japanese the country," and the only fully B-25 equipped unit, was home fleet, as well as land-based aircraft — which had ear- ordered "to protect the shipping and coastline of the lier proved their effectiveness by sinking the British battle-

Griffin joined the ROTC while is fourth from the right; attending the University of Thomas C. Griffin Collection) Alabama because he saw that "war was coming." As a ROTC cadet he learned to load anti-aircraft guns. (Griffin helping load the gun Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La ships Repulse and Prince of Wales in the Gulf of Siam on carrier deck before. And no one had ever lifted a fully- December 10. Only army bombers had the range to reach gassed, fully armed B-25 from one either.18 That the man- Japan while leaving the naval forces sufficiently distant to ufacturer's specifications called for a minimum of 1,200 feet avoid probable detection and destruction. The only of runway provided little comfort. Unlike airfields, howev- bomber with the capability and dimensions making it theo- er, carriers could be turned into the wind. This, planners retically suitable for a carrier takeoff was the B-25B — hoped, plus the ship's forward movement, would provide though it had never been done before. The challenge thus the necessary lift to get the heavily loaded planes airborne. fell to the 17th Bombardment Group and Thomas Griffin. To complicate matters even further, however, the Hornet's "They asked us to do something," said flight deck was narrower than the nearly sixty-eight foot Griffin who described how the air corps called for volun- wingspan of the B-25.19 To avoid collision with the ship's teers from the 17th for what planners would only describe island (its "control tower"), pilots would have to take off as an "extremely hazardous mission."14 "Air corps crews with their left wing hanging over the edge of the ship, the were needed . . . ," Griffin remarked matter-of-factly. left landing gear and nose wheel following white lines "Why were we there? Why were we trained?" By February painted on the deck.20 Nevertheless, Col. Doolittle 27, 1942, twenty-four crews began arriving at Eglin Field, resolved to add the sixteenth plane to the complement. Florida, for special training. There, in the first week in "Of course, Doolittle [intended to take] the first plane off, March, navigator Tom Griffin and the others met their and that made us all very . . . confident that maybe we mission commander, , a small could do it, too." Though "apprehension about taking off man with the stature of a Lindbergh, already famous as a . . . was rife," sub-buster "Brick" Holstrom, pilot of num- result of his aviation feats and firsts. "The selection of ber four, "had no fear, no qualms . . . primarily because of Doolittle to lead this nearly suicidal mission was a natural [his] faith in Doolittle. He had insisted that it was feasible, one," said Henry "Hap" Arnold, Chief of Staff of and that was that."21 the Army Air Forces, in retrospect. "He was fearless, tech- Technical problems plaguing the B-25s, nically brilliant" — earning one of M.I.T.'s first doctorates some quite serious, added to the crews' uncertainties. in aeronautical engineering — "a leader who not only While the army bombers might manage to leave the carri- could be counted upon to do a task himself if it were er, they could not return: they were too large, they lacked humanly possible, but could impart that spirit to others."15 the arresting hook required to snag the cables used to At the end of March, after brief training at "catch" Navy planes during landings, and the tail sections Eglin, the special force flew to the McClellan Field at of the bombers would likely snap off upon impact with a Sacramento, California, and from there to Alameda Naval heaving flight deck.22 This meant that the planes would Air Station where the aircraft were lifted by crane onto the have to be flown to land bases, leaving only two options. deck of the Navy's newest carrier, the Hornet. Griffin's B- The first, shortest, and therefore the safest proposal would 25, The Whirling Dervish, became plane number nine of route the planes northwest from Japan to the the sixteen that eventually made the flight. Though Col. where the crews could surrender their ships as part of the Doolittle had originally hoped for an attacking "force of Lend-Lease program. But the Soviets had their own mis- 18" aircraft, "it was decided that only 15 could be handled givings — in this case a fear of antagonizing the Japanese safely" aboard ship.16 The colonel had some misgivings as with whom they were not at war. Despite the fact that the he examined the Hornet's flight deck for the first time: Soviet naval attache to Japan had been supplying data Knowing some of the crews were apprehensive about potential air strike targets to American intelligence, about taking off when they saw the short deck space, I asked Soviet Premier Josef Stalin denied the Americans permis- [ship] Captain [Marc] Mitscher if we could have a sixteenth sion to land in the U.S.S.R. after bombing raids on 23 B-25 loaded. After we were about 100 miles at sea, I thought Japan. The alternative required the planes to turn south- two of the pilots . . . could take off to show the rest of the crews west toward airfields in Nationalist (Allied)-controlled it was possible.17 areas of — well beyond the normal 1400 mile range The volunteers had plenty of reasons for of a B-25B.24 There, the planes would be turned over to their own misgivings. While they had practiced short-dis- the newly formed 10th and 14th Air Forces in the China- tance takeoffs from a carrier painted on the tarmac at Burma-India Theater of Operations. Because top-secret Eglin, none of them had actually flown from a pitching information within the Chinese command had previously Queen City Heritage reached the Japanese with near postal-service regularity, Japan, if anyone wanted to drop out — without question American planners never briefed Nationalist Generalissimo or consequence. No one did. As for the mission itself, writ- Chiang Kai-shek about the actual attack. When asked in ers have detailed the events in great detail, beginning with general terms about providing such forward landing fields pilot Ted Lawson's now classic account, Thirty Seconds over for American bombers for an attack upon Japan itself (pre- Tokyo, made into a propaganda film in 1943 (starring Van sumably flying first through China), Chiang balked, fear- Johnson as Lawson and as Doolittle). More ing retaliation by the Japanese — a fear that later proved recently Stan Cohen's updated pictorial history, justified. Ultimately he conceded in principle to the Allied Destination: Tokyo, Carroll Glines' and Duane Schultz's request, but not until March 28.25 The China route had books, both entitled The Doolittle Raid and released in already been chosen, nonetheless. 1988, provide specifics about the attack itself. Glines' and To extend the range of the Mitchell bomber, Schultz's books also succeed in capturing the feeling of the Doolittle ordered considerable modifications to the plane. participants, using extensive first-hand recollections — He had the defensive belly turret removed from each ship including those of navigator Griffin. Most noteworthy in to reduce weight. In its place, an extra gas tank was added. understanding the mettle of Col. Doolittle, Lt. Griffin, and Other tanks were installed, one in the upper part of the the seventy-eight other Doolittle Raiders (as they came to bomb bay (reducing the bomb load to 2000 pounds26) and be called), are the other last-minute complications that fur- a collapsible "balloon" in the crawlway between the nose ther jeopardized their lives and the mission. and tail sections. Since even these changes couldn't guar- Since the success of the endeavor depended antee adequate range, each plane carried an additional fifty almost entirely upon the element of surprise, planners and gallons, in five gallon cans, in the tail — the fuel to be crews would have been stunned to learn that the Japanese poured into the belly-gun tank by the gunner during the were expecting the American counterattack. When, on flight to Japan.27 But the newly installed tanks leaked and April 10, their naval intelligence monitored radio U.S. needed constant repair. In fact, some were still leaking at Navy transmissions, author Duane Schultz reveals that the takeoff.28 To compound the danger, the sheer volume of Japanese had correctly surmised the location of the aviation gas within each B-25 obviously increased the risks, American ships headed their way and that the American too. A single tracer bullet or a hot shell fragment might force included as many as three U.S. carriers. Actually, the ignite the entire plane. What's more, the removal of the Japanese, who could assemble over 200 planes, nine sub- plane's belly guns left only the dorsal (top), power-operat- marines, ten , six heavy , and five aircraft ed turret with two .50 caliber machine guns and one cum- carriers, were looking forward to delivering the knockout bersome .30 caliber machine gun in the plexiglas "green- blow to the American Pacific Fleet — when it reached its house" nose as a defense against enemy fighters. 300 mile operating range on April 19.32 To assure them- The new power turrets failed chronically, another "glitch" that was not resolved by launch date.29 In addition, the new .50 caliber machine guns, fresh from the manufacturer, jammed after only four or five shots. In the production rush at the outset of the war, the guns arrived at Eglin Air Field with critical firing mechanisms rough and unfinished. So, instead of the sharpening their shoot- ing skills during the few weeks of training, gunners spent most of their training ironing out problems with their "shooting irons."30 In fact, in hopes of warding off Japanese attackers, two broomstick handles, painted black, were attached to the small plexiglas "blister" at the tail of the plane, a tactic that proved surprisingly effective over Japan.31 Such snags undoubtedly passed through the minds of volunteers like Tom Griffin when Doolittle asked the crews, as he did throughout training and on the trip to

The crew of plane number Eldred V. Scott, engineer- nine, The Whirling Dervish, gunner; Lt. James N. Parker, as they appeared on the Jr., co-pilot; Sgt. Wayne M. Hornet before the attack. Bissell, bombardier. All sur- (Left to right:) Lt. Thomas C. vived the war. (USAF # Griffin, navigator; Lt. Harold 94608) F. "Doc "Watson, pilot; T/Sgt. Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La •HI

i selves an adequate warning, they had already stationed a a one-way trip to Japan, so long as it lay within the farthest line of early-warning picket boats some 600-1000 miles to limit of the bombers' range. Under such extreme circum- the south and east of their islands, a measure that was stances, Tom Griffin and all the B-25 crews knew that they unknown to American naval intelligence. One of these were expendable. The most optimistic of eventualities saw radio ships discovered , as it was named, them winding up as POWs — a prospect made less palat- under Admiral "Bull" Halsey at dawn on April 18, 1942. At able due to the reports all had heard of the brutalities this point Halsey's ships numbered just five cruisers and inflicted upon prisoners in China, Malaya, and the two carriers, the Hornet and the Enterprise}3 Bad weather Philippines. The naval intelligence aboard the had forced the admiral on April 17 to take an extra risk to Hornet, Lt. Cmdr. Stephen Jurika, told the men that, "if avoid possible delay. He left behind his slower screening they were captured . . . , the chances of their survival force of eight destroyers (and two oilers) for a high-speed would be awfully slim, very, very slim." In reality he approach to the launch point.34 Aware that, if his attacking thought they "would be tried by some sort of kangaroo force were lost, the United States would have "virtually no court and probably publicly beheaded."37 Halsey knew all Pacific Fleet,"35 Halsey correctly decided to launch the this, too, and he knew that his orders multiplied the odds bombers immediately — not from the 400-450 miles out as against all the fliers — among them, navigator Lt. Thomas planned, but from nearly 600-650 miles.36 Hypothetically Griffin. speaking, this was far from a worst-case scenario. In the The discovery of the American presence and event of an even earlier discovery, planners had decided Halsey's prompt decision nevertheless caught everyone by that, if need be, the Hornet should launch the bombers on surprise. Everyone in the task force had assumed that the

Wartime censors obliterated James Doolittle chats with the squadron insignias on the Capt. , the fliers jackets to prevent the skipper of the Hornet. Griffin Japanese from learning what standing in the second row, groups were involved in the third from the right, and raid. In the left foreground other army fliers look on. mission commander Lt. Col. Queen City Heritage

attack would not be mounted until that evening,38 the would plough through the thirty-foot seas crashing over Japanese thought the following day.39 When at 8:00 A.M., the bow and into the trough of the wave. the klaxon on the Hornet sounded, and the intercom Some, like Tom Griffin, "dealt with things as called, "Army pilots, man your planes," Lt. Griffin was in they came." In contrast, pilot "Brick" Holstrom won- the wardroom, eating an orange. He hit the deck and was dered, "What the hell do we do now? Whatever it was, we nearly blown overboard by the wash of the propellers from were headed straight for it, but I resolved to give Tokyo the planes ahead of him. Griffin's pilot, "Doc" Watson the worst within my power. I had trained for this moment found his plane incapable of flying because he had given for months and wasn't going to let the opportunity slip flight engineer-gunner, T/Sgt. Eldred Scott, permission to from my grasp."42 Doolittle had expressed similar, even service the plane. "I found all the cowling [engine cover] stronger sentiments earlier when one of the raiders had off the left engine and all the plugs out! The last piece of asked him at a briefing what the colonel would do if his cowling was snapped in place as the ship ahead started its own plane were critically damaged over Japan. engines."40 The early launch time also precluded the night "Each pilot must decide for himself what he attack that had been planned with Doolittle's number one will do and what he'll tell his crew to do if it happens. I plane arriving over Tokyo at dusk to mark with incendiary know what I intend to do." bombs the targets for the raiders who were to follow. It The same raider posed the follow-up ques- also forced the inadequately armed planes over hostile air tion. The colonel replied: space in broad daylight, and it meant that the B-25s, if their I don't intend to be taken prisoner. Fm 45 gas held out, would be arriving over primitive and, as it years old and have lived a full life. If my plane is crippled 41 turned out, unmarked and unlit airfields in China at night. beyond any possibility of fighting or escape, Fm going to have There was still the question of the takeoff, my crew bail out and then Fm going to dive my B-25 into the made more complicated by gale-force winds and a lurching best military target I can find. Tou fellows are all younger deck. Special care had to be taken to launch each plane as and have a long life ahead of you. I don't expect any of the the Hornet reached the peak of each wave; if not, the B-25 rest of you to do what I intend to do.43

B-25 Mitchell bombers planes' left wings dangled assembled at the stern of the over the ship's side. (Thomas Hornet. Pilots steered their C. Griffin Collection) planes along white lines painted on the deck to avoid colliding with the carrier's island. During the take off the Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La

Fortunately, Doolittle never had to fulfill his Tokyo and we saw Jap[anese] cruisers up ahead and steam- pledge. The stiff headwinds provided more than enough ing toward Tokyo. And we turned . . . and were about 10 to lift for all the planes to climb off the deck,44 but not with- 15 feet above the water. . . . They spread out [and] . . . we out incident. As deck handlers, called airdales, muscled could see what they were doing and we got too close to them plane number sixteen into place along the white lines, one and they opened up on us. [One of the cruisers] was a sheet of of them slipped. The wash from the preceding bomber flames. . . . We were flying through columns of water that sent him into the buzz-saw prop of number sixteen. The they [the shells] were throwing up at us. I just know I was mishap cost him an arm. As for Holstrom and his B-25, scared. That was the first time. "This is dangerous business. [I intercepted by nine Japanese fighters and with an inopera- realized.] This is scary I" That's the part of the action I tive gun turret, he ordered the bombardier to jettison their remember most vividly. bombs (over Tokyo Bay45), the only one of the raiders to To conserve fuel, [pilot "Doc"] Watson [had] do so. He gunned the throttle and managed to lose the throttled back. . . . Finally and reluctantly [he] pushed the fighters in an overcast.46 Eventually, he and his crew throttles forward and got out of there. I think if we hadn't reached China. Another plane, however, consuming too prodded him he would have gambled on riding it through. much fuel, headed for an unauthorized landing in He had fuel consumption on his mind.51 , U.S.S.R. There, the crew was interned for "He did the best job of conserving fuel" of "the duration." They escaped thirteen months later.47 any of the pilots — reaching 300 miles inland. "He was the Tom Griffin's plane found and hit an indus- finest pilot I ever flew with," reminisces Tom Griffin, trial target, what Griffin recalls as a tank factory in the remembering his friend and comrade who died recently. Kawasaki district of Tokyo.48 He described his reaction as The Whirling Dervish neared the drop point: "We were surprised and shocked to realize that the small black clouds we were seeing [over the target] were flak [anti-aircraft fire]. They were shooting at us."49 But that isn't what Griffin remembers the most. Two memories stand out: Oddly enough, the one [thing] I remember more than anything else [occurred] after we had bombed the factory that was our target. We made a sweeping left turn and we flew at rooftop level right over [Emperor of Japan] 's house. And I enjoyed that. [I] looked down at a big , sort of in a park-like area . . . We scared old Hirohito. But we couldn't touch him. Prior to the mission, in fact, Doolittle had made it clear to all the raiders that they were not to make the same mistake in attacking the emperor that the Japanese had made in attacking Pearl Harbor: On one occasion, I heard a couple of the boys talking about bombing the emperor's palace — the "Temple of Heaven." I promptly jumped into their conversation. "You are to bomb military targets only," I told them. ccThere is nothing that would unite the Japanese nation According to engineer-gunner T/Sgt. more than to bomb the emperor's home. It is not a military Eldred Scott's recollections, this encounter with the target! And you are to avoid hospitals, schools, and other Imperial Japanese Navy took place some time before when nonmilitary targets." 50 plane number nine swooped low over : "There I Griffin's other memory marks his initiation into what some was, firing back with a .50 caliber machine gun. Might as writers refer to as the "brotherhood of war": well have had a cap pistol."52 I was never frightened because I didn't have The Whirling Dervish, Griffin's plane, came sense enough to be until we were two or three hours south of through the anti-aircraft fire safely, but the crew's experi-

On April 18, 1942, one by one the heavily laden bombers staggered into the air from the carrier's deck.(Thomas C. Griffin Collection) 10 Queen City Heritage

ence raises questions about the Doolittle's "official" Japanese fishing boat and capture it. Glines does capture account that the raiding force met little enemy opposition. what was undoubtedly, for Tom Griffin, one of the most Looking back at the events, Griffin admits a different view: privately stressful moments of the attack. While the weath- It's sort of a bone of contention [between er over Tokyo was ideal, it had been terrible for takeoff Doolittle and myself]. Fve heard the General [Doolittle was and it was just as bad for landing. As the raiders turned for promoted following the attack], who was in plane number 1 China, they encountered a terrible storm and fierce head- say that there wasn't much opposition. I've never had the winds. For a time, in fact, it appeared that all (except for courage to contradict him. But I was in plane number 9 that the plane that flew to the U.S.S.R.) would wind in the Sea came in over the target about 45-50 minutes later [after of Japan, a hundred miles or more from land. Then, in the Doolittle's plane number 1 dropped the first bombs]. And "last real navigating" he did, Griffin took a wind drift to there was a lot of flak .... [He] had stirred up a hornet's find that the wind direction had changed, that the storm nest. . . . He wasn't entirely accurate. had now created a tail wind. It was this wind change that At one point, an enemy fighter fired tracers enabled the fifteen crews to reach landfall. That reading that passed over the left engine of Griffin's plane before was Tom Griffin's last of the flight: the weather closed in engineer-gunner Scott drove him off. Holstrom's B-25, and prevented any of the navigators from "getting a fix" says Griffin, "actually had eighteen pursuits [fighters]" on their positions. "I felt like baggage," says Griffin. after it. However, hope springs eternal. It was at this Tradition holds, too, that — so secret was moment a rift appeared in the clouds overhead and a lone this mission — the volunteers had no idea where they were star shone through! Four sets of eyes turned on me. 'Griffin! headed until Task Force 16 had put to sea. True, Doolittle A star! Get a fix!' Their eyes told me that this was to be our had cautioned the utmost secrecy, telling the airmen at salvation — if I could produce. Eglin (and played up by Hollywood) that the F.B.I, would ... J [did not] attempt to point out that in take care of anyone who asked too many questions about celestial navigation at least two heavenly bodies must be used their training. Nevertheless, Tom Griffin counters that, in to obtain a fix .... With those four sets of eyes on me it did about ten days, the volunteers had pretty much put not seem the moment to start a class in elementary naviga- together the clues of the mission — a carrier outlined on tion. I . . . picked up by octant [navigational instrument] the landing field, for one. He knew the destination, as did wondering what I was going to do. . . . After several moments Lt. Davy Jones, the pilot of plane number five and naviga- of sighting, the storm once more entirely engulfed the plane. tion-intelligence officer for the raid. Both had been The star appeared no more. I was off the hook and once more ordered to Washington where they and army intelligence excess baggage.55 spent a week pouring over classified maps of the target Lost, in darkness, unable to find airfields that areas. Their job was to select the necessary charts, which had neither been supplied nor marked by radio beacons as were copied, crated, and shipped to California. Navigators, planned, the planes made emergency landings sputtered after all, needed detailed maps to prepare for their part of out of gas and the crews bailed out. the job. When Griffin and Jones returned to Eglin, they Four B-25s, like Ted Lawson's Ruptured 53 remained "very closemouthed" about their absence. To Duck, ditched along the coastline, in some cases killing and maintain the tightest possible security, General Marshall injuring some of the airmen. Lawson, for one, nearly died 54 even chose not to tell President Roosevelt about the raid. as the result of the injuries he sustained. Chance spared Tom Griffin's recollections include much him when the outfit's only surgeon, Harvard graduate Dr. more. In his book historian Carroll Glines contends that, (Doc) Thomas White — who had first to qualify as a gun- contrary to Col. Doolittle's specific instructions, navigator ner before Doolittle agreed to his being taken along — Griffin and the crew of number nine had determined, if came down near The Ruptured Duck. In emergency crippled over Tokyo, to hurl The Whirling Dervish into surgery with the most rudimentary equipment and sup- Hirohito's palace rather than crash or bail out over Japan. plies, White amputated Lawson's badly infected leg. One Though such a scenario makes good reading, it never hap- gunner was killed outright when his failed to pened, Griffin claims. He does, however, acknowledege open. Two others were killed in ditching. Eight fell into that the crew had devised one emergency plan: if forced Japanese hands. These prisoners were subsequently tor- down over water, they had agreed to ditch next to a tured, forced to sign "confessions," written only in •:

:

•-»*,.

mm

Japanese, that they had indiscriminately massacred civilians, release from their Japanese captors.56 and — ignorant of the charges brought against them — The crew of The Whirling Dervish was lucky. "tried" as war criminals in the kangaroo court Lt. Jurika Watson had nursed his B-25 farther inland than any of the had foreseen. Three were executed, the others receiving other planes. Fifteen and a half hours into their flight, the "clemency" through the personal intervention of the twin engines sputtering, the crew dropped through the emperor. Their experiences became another Hollywood hatches into the darkness and the storm. Tom Griffin propaganda film, , in 1944 and the subject of remembers what it was like bailing out: "It was a peculiar Carroll Glines' book Four Came Home. "I've been led to sensation. ... I was in a big pendulum. . . . until "[my believe," says Tom Griffin, "that Hirohito himself went parachute] hung up on the tops of some bamboo trees and over the trial records and said, 'Shoot these three and put I was lowered to the earth with the greatest of ease." All the others in solitary.'" Of the remaining prisoners, one five of Griffin's crew survived. But they were not yet safe. eventually died in captivity of malnutrition. The four sur- The next morning he, co-pilot Lt. James Parker, and gun- vivors were rescued in August 1945, when OSS (special ser- ner-engineer T/Sgt. Eldred Scott met in a Chinese village vices) men parachuted into Peking and negotiated their where the three were held prisoner by armed Chinese sol-

Few photos of the Doolittle hand corner is the spinner of Raid survived the ditchings the plane's left propeller. and crash landing that fol- (Thomas C. Griffin Collection) lowed the raid. However, one showing a pilot's eye view of the Naval Base did. The "knob" in the lower left- 12 Queen City Heritage diers until Catholic missionaries identified them as [Tom Griffin's] crew's escape, Japanese forces killed thou- Americans. "Doc" Watson joined them two days later — sands of Chinese peasants for assisting the Americans. It with a shoulder injury so severe that he flew nothing but a was later estimated that 250,000 innocent Chinese paid desk for the rest of the war. Bombardier Wayne Bissell was with their lives for helping us."59 the last to be reunited with his crew. He had been cap- What had Tom Griffin's mission accom- tured by Chinese bandits who apparently intended to hold plished — particularly in light of the awful cost? On April him for ransom. But, Griffin recalls "he escaped by the 19, the day following the raid, the Cincinnati Enquirer simple expedient of running away." Generally, however — headlines proclaimed, "Fire and Explosive Bombs Do with the exception of one crew turned over to the Japanese Widespread Damage, Axis Accounts Hint." The accompa- — the Chinese treated the American fliers as heroes and nying article reported: "The very fact that the Japanese helped them escape. radios shouted officially that the 'imperial family is safe' In retaliation for the raid, Tokyo ordered the suggested a disaster, because only at times of great Chinese airfields taken and the American "war criminals" emergency are such assurances given." The article cited captured. "The Japanese seemed to know where all our INS sources: "Japan, shaken by the impact of bombs on crews were," says Griffin. "Their Zeros flew over the town her own soil for the first time in the war, prepared franti- we were in and circled us at low altitude. . . . [They] later cally ... to meet an openly expected renewal of raids car- wiped that town out."57 So ruthless were the Japanese in ried out . . . against four of her leading cities by bombers their reprisals against the Chinese who had assisted the identified in Tokyo as American." Americans, that they did the same to many such places. A Even neutral Switzerland cheered the news: Belgian missionary described what happened to the man Bern, April 19 — (AP) — The was who had aided Lt. Watson: "'They wrapped him up in described as a demonstration of the "spirit of the offensive some blankets, poured the oil of a lamp on him and oblig- now animating the Anglo-Saxons" by the newspaper La ed his wife to set fire to the human torch.'"58 Doolittle Suisse, Geneva, today. recorded in his autobiography: "All told, in the wake of The Swiss newspaper, in a front-page editori-

Pictured here is the now famous photo of Jimmy Doolittle, thoroughly dejected because he feared the mis- sion had failed, seated near the wing of his wrecked B-25 in China. (Thomas C. Griffin Collection) Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La 13 al entitled "From Defensive to Offensive," said the raid damage. "Two and a half years later," concedes Griffin, brought the war home to the people of Japan for the first "two B-29s carried more tonnage than all sixteen [raider] time since last December 7 [Pearl Harbor].60 planes." But, historians agree, it was a great psychological The reported "Doolittle boost for the American people and just as great a shock for Did It!"61 And the Nome, Alaska (Doolittle's home town) the Japanese. They (like their German counterparts) had Nugget dared the following headline, "Nome Town Boy been assured by their leaders that no Allied plane could Makes Good."62 So, as far as some of the press was con- ever violate Japan's airspace.67 In fact, on April 16 Japanese cerned, the Doolittle Raid was an unqualified success. radio had dismissed as ludicrous a Reuters report that three Navigator Griffin and the rest of the American planes had bombed Tokyo. Radio Tokyo boast- Doolittle Raiders came to an entirely different conclusion: ed that it was '"absolutely impossible for enemy bombers "When we [the crews] got together in China and com- to get within 500 miles of Tokyo."68 After all, ever since pared our notes and realized we'd lost all our planes, our 1281, when a fierce storm had miraculously destroyed an initial feelings were that we thought we'd made a mess of invading Mongolian fleet, Japan had been protected by the the whole thing. We had an assignment, which was to kamikaze, the divine wind.69 As the news of the raid sank bomb military and industrial targets and then deliver in, so did feelings of shock and disbelief. Ramon Muniz planes to Chiang Kai-shek." None of them had completed Lavalle, an attache assigned to the Argentine embassy in the second part of their mission. A now famous photo of Tokyo, witnessed the Japanese reaction at the time. Later Doolittle shows the colonel, dejected, seated on a Chinese he concluded, "That raid by Doolittle was one of the mountainside, staring at the remains of his shattered B-25. greatest psychological tricks ever used. It caught the "I felt lower than a frog's posterior," he recalls. "This was [Japanese] by surprise. Their unbounded confidence began my first combat mission. ... I was sure it was my last."63 to crack."70 "'It's been a complete failure,'" he told his engineer-gun- Some historians, such as Edwin P. Hoyt in ner S/Sgt. Paul Leonard.64 his 1990 book The Airmen, contend that the raid was "pri- As I sat there, . . . Leonard took my picture marily valuable as propaganda." However, this interpreta- and . . . tried to cheer me up. He asked, ccWhat do you think tion oversimplifies and underestimates its effects. In The will happen when you go home, Colonel?" Pacific War John Costello states, "The most far-reaching I answered, Well, aI guess they'll court-mar- impact of the Tokyo Raid was the psychological effect it tial me and send me to prison at ." had of the [Japanese] Imperial General Staff. The generals Paul said, aNo, sir. I'll tell you what will hap- and admirals had suffered a tremendous loss of face, and pen. They're going to make you a general." their angry overreaction eventually brought a of I smiled weakly and he tried again. "And strategic disasters."71 They became obsessed with what they're going to give you the Congressional ." Costello and John Keegan in The Second World War char- I smiled again and he made a final effort. "I acterize as "victory disease."72 The raid, says Keegan, know they're going to give you another airplane and when "might have been judged a fiasco had it not registered they do, I'd like to fly with you as your crew chief." with the Japanese high command." There was great It was then that tears came to my eyes.65 embarrassment over the attack and a fear for the emperor's All three of Paul Leonard's predictions well-being.73 A mortified Admiral Yamamoto, who had proved true66. For their heroism Lt. Thomas Griffin and all planned the Pearl Harbor attack, retired to the cabin of his the Tokyo Raiders were awarded medals from the Chinese flagship, leaving the pursuit of Halsey's Task Force 16 to government and the Distinguished Flying Cross from the his chief of staff.74 But he and the Japanese naval command air corps. A modest Tom Griffin responded to the sugges- "resolved to save face"75 by drawing the remnants of the tion that he had done anything "heroic." "If the American American Pacific Fleet into a showdown at which Japanese people and everyone thought we'd done a great job, we numerical superiority would prevail. Yamamoto pressed for weren't going to argue with them." As for the results of Japanese expansion to the east, against the wishes of the the raid, he replies with understatement: "It had some army, who preferred a southward drive toward Australia. very fortunate results. . . . Sometimes you have to do little The army now acceded to Yamamoto's plan — in part to things to get the pot boiling." remove the now ever-present potential of airstrikes on Tactically the Doolittle Raid did little bomb Japan by eliminating America's westernmost outpost: 14 Queen City Heritage

Midway Island. Costello describes the feelings of the time: China, Charles Greening of plane number eleven summed The members of the naval staff were over- up the mission of his plane, the Hari-Carrier:ul think whelmed with a sense of shame. Navy Chief Admiral they'll call this mission a success anyhow. But there's one Nagumo, who had been having second thoughts about the thing we'll have to admit." forthcoming Midway operation, now accepted Tamamoto's "What's that?" [his crew] asked in unison. view that unless priority was given to capturing the mid- "It was a mission that will go down in the Pacific islands to extend Japan's defensive frontier, the wholeofficial report listed under the heading, 'Not as Briefed.'"77 Imperial Navy would soon be on patrol to prevent future car- How ironic, too, that in the fiftieth year after 76 rier raids on Japan. the historic flight, as Esther Griffin, Tom's wife of almost The rest, as the expression goes, is history. fifty years, acknowledges that sometimes, "when you ask Just six weeks after the bombing of Japan, the U.S. Navy someone what a Doolittle Raider is, they say, 'Is that a struck back at Midway. Forewarned of the attack by professional basketball team?'" Undeterred, Cincinnatian American intelligence — who had cracked the Japanese Tom Griffin tells his story and, in so doing, reminds code — U.S. Navy fliers turned the tide of the Pacific War. Americans of the sacrifices of his friends. And, whenever This is, Tom Griffin agrees, the "biggest thing that the possible, he attends the annual reunions of the Doolittle Doolittle Raid did." The pot, indeed, had been stirred to Raiders, possibly for the reason given in the introduction the boiling point. to : "Old soldiers get together because Ironically, shortly after bailing out over once, when they were young, they faced death together —

A series of sketches drawn by Randy Renner illustrated scenes of the Doolittle raid. This one recreates a view of the cockpit just before take off. (Illustration courtesy Randy Renner) Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La and survived."78 One of the raiders, fellow-navigator Griffin returned to China in 1983, shortly William Bower of Ravenna, Ohio, recalls nostalgically: after that country opened its doors to outsiders, hoping to "Oh, it was the greatest, the wildest bunch of men that I photograph the places he remembered from his Doolittle have ever been associated with. There was something days. The Chinese government did little to help him, prob- about that Seventeenth Group, about of ably because the current regime wants nothing to do with people that were in it, that I have never experienced long-discredited Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. since."79 Griffin is currently at work on his latest project associated At the annual of the Doolittle with the Doolittle Raid. In light of recent political devel- Raiders, held as close to the anniversary date as possible, opments, the Raiders Association has asked him to the living toast their fallen comrades. They raise their silver approach the American and Russian governments about goblets — there are eighty of them, each inscribed with securing the release of the last possible "prisoner" of the their name of a raider. And there is a bottle of 1896 Doolittle Raid on Japan, plane number eight, interned cognac, the year of General Doolittle's birth — to be along with its crew in the U.S.S.R. If it survives, Griffin shared eventually by the last two survivors. "I personally maintains, B-25B number 40-2242 would make an historic hope I'm not one of the last two because," Tom Griffin addition to the Smithsonian Institute in Washington or the says, "I don't like cognac." Air Force Museum in Dayton. He adds that General

This sketch shows a B-25 on the flight deck preparing for take off. (Illustration courtesy Randy Renner) 16 Queen City Heritage

Doolittle — "The Boss" as he is known by the raiders — 1."Tokyo Bombed, Report," Cincinnati Enquirer, April 18, 1942, p. is, at the time of this writing, still alive and living in 1:1. 2. Enquirer, April 18,1942. Carmel, California with his son. He is ninety-six years old. 3. "Allied Offensive Indicated by U.S. Air Attack on Japan." In 1991 Doolittle completed his autobiography, I Could Cincinnati Enquirer, April 19,1942, p. 1:1. Never Be So Lucky Again. 4. James A. Cox, "'Tokyo Bombed! Doolittle Do'od It,'" World War II did not end for Lt. Thomas Smithsonian, June 1992, p. 118. 5. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N. (Ret.) et al, And I Was Carson Griffin after the famous attack on Tokyo. He There: Pearl Harbor and Midway — Breaking the Secrets. (, returned from China, was assigned to the 319th 1985), p. 380. Bombardment Group, and flew twenty-three missions over 6. Thomas C. Griffin, Interview with the author, May 6, 1992. Hereafter, references to this interview will be 1992 Interview. North Africa and the Mediterranean. Promoted in August 7. Paul Lugannini, "Member of Doolittle Tokyo Raid Now Lives In 1942, Captain Griffin was shot down twice. The first time, Cincinnati," Cincinnati Enquirer, April 15,1962, p. 6-A. he wound up "in the drink." The second time he bailed 8. Nick Clooney, "A Veteran Remembers ... 30 Seconds Over out of his burning plane and was captured by the Germans, Tokyo," Cincinnati Post, April 17,1992, pp. Cl-2. 9. Illness prevented Tom Griffin from speaking in 1992. who imprisoned him in the POW complex made famous 10. Thomas C. Griffin, Interview obtained by the Cincinnati by the book and movie, The Great Escape. But that, as the Historical Society, December 5, 1989. Hereafter, references to this saying goes, is "another story." interview will be cited as 1989 Interview.

Another sketch by Renner loons were designed to pre- illustrates a lone B-25 gaining vent low-level attacks such as altitude after dropping its the one made by Doolittle's payload. In the background fliers. (Illustration courtesy explosives and incendiaries Randy Renner) darken the skies over Japan. The tethered barrage of bal- Winter 1992 Navigating from Shangri-La 17

11. 1992, 1989 Interviews. The bomber was named after General 29. Doolittle, p. 272. William "Billy" Mitchell, an early and outspoken proponent of strate- 30. Doolittle, pp. 246-247. gic air power who was, ironically, court-martialled by the U. S. Army 31. Schultz, p. 46. Air Corps in 1925. 32. 1992 Interview; Schultz, pp. 109-110. 12. Horace S. Mazet, "On the raid that electrified America — and 33. Glines, p. 75. Foretold Japan's ultimate fate," World War II, March 1992, p. 8. 34. Schultz, p. 14. 13. James H. Doolittle with Carroll V. Glines, An Autobiography of 35. Schultz, p. 84. General James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle: I Could Never Be So Lucky 36. There is some confusion about figures — probably the result of the Again (New York, 1991), pp. 230-231. use by some of statute miles and nautical miles by others. (A nautical mile 14. 1992 Interview; Doolittle, p. 242. is 6076 feet.) The Air Force Museum in Dayton, Ohio, uses the follow- 15. Carroll V. Glines, The Doolittle Raid: America's Daring First ing: a planned launch from 450-650 miles out, an actual launch from Strike Against Japan (New York, 1988), p. 16. approximately 800 miles. Ironically, the report of the Japanese radio ship 16. Doolittle, p. 255. seems least confusing. It reported "three enemy carriers" at a distance of 17. Doolittle, p. 255. 650 nautical miles from land's end on the eastern tip of Island — 18. At the outset of the planning, to determine the feasibility of the pro- about 800 miles from Tokyo. ject, two B-25s had safely taken off from the Hornet and returned to 37. Schultz, p. 103. Norfolk, Va. But the first plane nearly struck the island. The painted lines 38. Glines, p. 114. described in the article were added to prevent an accident like this from 39. Schultz pp. 109-110. In an interesting anecdote, Schultz tells how a occurring. surprised Prime Minister Tojo "met the enemy for the first time." His 19. 1992 Interview; Cox, p. 116. plane was approaching an airfield near Tokyo when a B-25 passed by — 20. Cox, p. 120. so close that his secretary first realized that the "unusual-looking" plane 21. 1992 Interview; Ben Warner, "The Doolittle Raid Remembered," Air was American when he saw the pilot's face (Schultz 159). Classics, May 1992, p. 66. 40. Glines includes an extensive interview with Thomas Griffin on pp. 22. Glines, p. 22. 114-118. 23. Doolittle, pp. 265, 3. 41. U.S. efforts to keep the mission secret backfired in China. By the time 24. Cox, p. 116. of the attack, no radio homing beacons, flares, or high-octane aviation gas 25. Duane Schultz, The Doolittle Raid (New York, 1988), p. 81. had been supplied to the forward Chinese air bases. Even more surprising, 26. Schultz, p. 26. American planners did not take the international date line into account 27. Doolitde, pp. 240-241. when they asked that everything be in place by April 20. According to the 28. Doolittle, p. 272. original timetable, then the planes should have been arriving in China on

A Renner sketch showing ber one. (Illustration courtesy plane number two as it skims Randy Renner) over Tokyo Bay, its prop rais- ing spray, illustrates how close to the water the planes flew. In the background is Jimmy Doolittle's plane num- Li Queen City Heritage

April 19, not April 20. The discovery of the task force caused the planes to executions. The emperor evidently wanted an example to be made, to act arrive at night on April 18. As it turned out, the issue of the deadline was as a deterrent against future bombing attacks. Prime Minister Tojo a moot point. Nothing had been done to prepare the fields. Even had the argued against execution. The law justifying the death penalty for the raiders' planes been able to put down at the airfields, without fuel they Tokyo raid was enacted after the fact (Schultz, 260-261). 1989 Interview. would have been "sitting ducks" for the Japanese air forces operating in 57. Schultz explains in a footnote on p. 158 that most raiders identified the area. attacking planes as "Zeros." Few Zeros, he notes, were stationed in the 42 1992 Interview; Mazet, p. 66. home islands at the time of the attack. Most home defense aircraft were 43 . Doolittle, p. 270. fixed landing gear, Nakajima Type-97s ("Nates") — highly maneuverable 44. Hollywood Director John Ford, an officer in the Navy during the war, planes but obsolescent with a top level speed of approximately 270 m.p.h. filmed the takeoff. This explains how the newer Mitchell was able, in many cases, to outrun 45. Glines, p. 94. the Japanese fighters. In addition, several of the much faster Kawasaki 46. Mazet, p. 11. Type 3 Ki-63 ("Tony") fighters rose to meet the raiders. 47. The Soviets, politically embarrassed by the raiders' presence, may have 58. Glines, p. 152. deliberately looked the other way, allowing them to escape into Iran. 59. Doolittle, p. 551. During the crews' captivity, the Soviet embassy in Washington presented 60. Enquirer, April 19, 1942, pp. 1:1-2. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., with monthly bills for 61. John Toland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor room and board and related expenses. Apparently Morgenthau called (New York, 1961), p. 335. Doolittle a number of times to complain, but none of the bills were ever 62. Glines, p. 148. paid. The Soviets, Doolittle felt, had kept the B-25 anyway. 63. Doolittle, p. 12. 48. Duane Schultz contends that The Whirling Dervish actually struck the 64. Schultz, p. 3. Tokyo Gas and Electric . 65. Doolittle, p. 12. 49. Schultz, p. 156. 66. Doolittle's promotion raised some eyebrows and antagonism among 50. 1992 Interview; Doolittle, pp. 265-266. some regular army officers. In 1930 Doolittle had resigned from the regu- 51. 1992 Interview; Glines, p. 115. lar army as a . He skipped captain when he assumed the 52. Schultz, p. 53. rank of major in the specialist-reserves. In 1940 he resumed active duty as 53. 1992 Interview; Schultz, p. 68. a major and soon became a lieutenant colonel. Then he again skipped a 54. Schultz, p. 67. rank, that of full colonel, when he was promoted to lieutenant general as 55. Glines, pp. 116. a result of the Tokyo raid. Paul Leonard became Doolittle's crew chief in 56. Cohen, p. 77. Schultz, p. 174. Shultz cites an extensive study by J. North Africa. After an air raid, the general found all that remained of his Merrill in his 1964 book, Target Tokyo: The Halsey-Doolittle Raid. In that friend, his left hand. "It was my greatest personal tragedy of the war," book, Merrill records "that six wards of a hospital, six schools, Doolittle writes in his memoirs (Doolittle, 335). 1992, 1989 Interviews. and numerous homes were damaged" in the raid (Schultz, 174). Most of 67. 1989 Interview; Schultz, p. 10. this (what today might be called) "collateral damage" resulted from fires 68. Schultz, pp. 112-113. set by 500 lb. incendiary cluster bombs that scattered upon release. One 69. Schultz, p. 10. school boy was apparently struck on the head and killed by one of these. 70. Schultz, p. 114. In conversations with the author, former Vietnam War F-4 reconnaissance 71. John Costello, The Pacific War (New York, 1981), p. 236. pilot, Col. Wayne Pittman (editor of the Air Force Museum's Friends 72. Costello, p. 236. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York, Journal quarterly), points out that the air corps did not yet understand 1990) p. 271. the extreme difficulties imposed by low-level bombing attacks. But 73. Keegan, p. 270. Merrill's study also contains a "partial list of the military and industrial 74. Costello, pp. 235-236. targets damaged in the raid [that] includes five electric and gas compa- 75. Layton, p. 357. nies, six storage tanks, five manufacturing plants, two warehous- 76. Costello, p. 236. es, a navy ammunition dump, an army arsenal, a navy arsenal laboratory, 77. 1989 Interview; Glines p. 122. an airfield, the government communication minister's transformer station, 78. Stan Cohen, Destination: Tokyo: A Pictorial History of Doolittle's Tokyo a diesel manufacturing plant, a steel fabricating plant, and the Nagoya Raid, April 18, 1942 (Missoula, 1992), p.78. aircraft factory" (Schultz, 174). Schultz also clarifies Hirohito's role in the 79. Schultz, p.57.

Four crew members (left to December 1945, in Miami. right) navigator Griffin; bom- Co-pilot James Parker was bardier Wayne Bissell, pilot not present.(Thomas C. Harold "Doc" Watson, and Griffin Collection) bombardier Eldred Scott attended a reunion of The Whirling Dervish crew in