Academia and Chinese Foreign Policy Decision Making

National Chengchi University Diplomacy Department

Master’s Thesis

Academia and治 Chinese 政大立 Foreign Policy Decision學國

Making: ‧

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a y t A Case Studyt of China’s EUi Policy i s o r n e 中國大陸學界與中共外交政策決策關係之研究a i v l C n hen hi U ─以中共的歐盟政策為例gc

Supervising Professor: Lu Yeh-Chung Student: Nicola C. Dean

September 2013

Abstract

This thesis discusses the role of academia in foreign policy-decision making in the People’s Republic of China, considering in particular the case of European Studies academia and China’s European Union policy, which merits greater scrutiny by outside observers. Faced with ever more complex foreign relations, the structure of Chinese foreign policy making is incorporating a growing number of external actors at both formal and informal levels. Academic circles are a case in point; as foreign policy research institutes evolve, diversify and optimise, their potential influence within policy making processes and circles is expanding in scope, and academics and their respective institutes are able to consolidate the impact of their research through a range of pathways, levels, and sources of influence. The European Studies field in China is robust and certain noteworthy experts are regularly called upon for advice and comment. What’s more, China’s only ever foreign政 policy 治paper in 2003 dealt with European Union policy, demonstrating the significance of Sino-European大 relations. In addition to applying the framework of 立 academic influence identified herein to the case of the European Studies field, this thesis also provides a preliminary學 investigation of some of the field’s key research國 issue areas and current academic discourse, as well as connections with China’s European Union policy decisions in practice.

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‧ N Key Words: Academia, Chinese Foreign Policy Decision Making, European Studies, a y t European Union, Policy Influence,t Research Institutes i i s o r n a e l i v C n hengchi U

摘要

本論文旨在論述中國大陸學術界在中共外交政策的決策過程中所扮演的角色，並聚焦在值得外界特別關注的個案─中國大陸的歐洲研究學界與中共的歐盟政策。在面對愈來愈複雜的外交關係環境下，無論是在正式或非正式的層面，有更多外圍組織或人員被納入中共的外交決策結構之中，其中最貼切的例子就是學術界。隨著中國大陸地區外交相關科系或研究機構的演變、多元性和優質化的發展，其對外交政策之決策過程與範圍的潛在影響力正在增長。學者與其相關的研究機構透過各種可能影響的途徑、層次和來源，來鞏固其研究的影響力。中國大陸歐洲研究的領域目前正蓬勃發展，有些傑出的專家經常被約見來提供建言或評論。除此之外，2003 年中國政府公布了中共的歐盟政策官方文件，這是中共有史以來唯一宣布過的外交政策文件，其展現中歐關係的重要性。本研究除了將論文中所界定的學術影響力框架應用於治該歐洲研究的個案之外，也提供學界對此一領域主要研究範圍和學術論述政大的一個初步調查，以及其對中共的歐盟政策決策上實務性的關聯。立學國關鍵詞：學術界、中共外交決策、歐洲研究、歐盟、研究機構

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a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction………………………………………………………………1

1.1 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………2 1.1.1 The Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy…………………………………3 1.1.2 International Relations Academia in China…………………………………5 1.1.3 China’s Relations with the European Union………………………………8

1.2 Research Structure…………………………………………………………………………..11 1.2.1 Research Puzzle……………………………………………………………………….12 1.2.2 Research Questions………………………………………………………………12 1.2.3 Research Design………………………………………………………………………12治 1.2.4 Scope……………………………………………………………………………………1政大 3 1.2.5 Limitations立………………………………………………………………………………14 1.2.6 Expected Contributions……………………………………………………………15學 1.2.7 Thesis Composition…………………………………………………………….17 國

Chapter Two: Practitioners and Decision Making ‧ in China’s Foreign

‧ PolicyN ……………………………………………………………………….19

a y 2.1 A Brief History of China’s Foreign Policy Decisiont Making……………..20 t i i s o r 2.2 China’s Foreignn Policy Decision Making…………………………………………e .23 a i v 2.2.1 Formal Structuresl C ……………………………………………………………………23n 2.2.2 Informal Mechanismshen………………………………………………………………31chi U g 2.3 Peripheral Actors in Chinese Foreign Policy…………………………………...35

Chapter Three: China’s Evolving International Relations

Academia…………………………………………………………………40

3.1 The Evolution of International Relations Academia in China………….41

3.2 Classifying China’s International Relations Research Institutes…….50

3.3 China’s International Relations Research Institutes: Roles and Functions………………………………………………………………………………………….56

Chapter Four: Mechanisms of Academic Influence on China’sForeign Po licy ………………………………………………………… .62

4.1 Models of Research Utilisation………………………………………………………...63

4.2 Pathways of Research Utilisation in China……………………………………...68

4.3 Factors of Policy Influence………………………………………………………………71 4.3.1 Levels of Influence…………………………………………………………………...72 4.3.2 Sources of Policy Influence……………………………………………………….74 4.3.3 Differentiated Sources of Influence…………………………………………..81

4.4 An Illustrative Case…………………………………………………………………………治 .86 政大 Chapter Five: Academic立 Influence and China’s Policy towards the European Union………………………………………………………92學國 5.1 China’s Policy towards the European Union……………………………………94

‧ 5.2 Identifying Influential Actors in the European Studies Field………102

5.2.1 The‧ European Studies Field……………………………………………………103 5.2.2 EuropeanN Studies Research Institutes……………………………………..106 a y 5.2.3 Individual Academics……………………………………………………………t ..110 t i 5.2.4 Majorio Publications…………………………………………………………………s 115 r n e 5.3 Europe and Chinaa on the Global Stage…………………………………………v ..116 l i Ch Un 5.4 Problems in China-EU eRelationsngch……………………………………………………i 123

5.5 Learning from the European Union………………………………………………130

Chapter Six: Conclusion……………………………………………………………..141

Appendix I…………………………………………………………………………………………149

Appendix II………………………………………………………………………………………150

References………………………………………………………………………………………152

ii List of Abbreviations

ASEAN +3 Association of South-East Asian Nations +3 (China, Japan, South Korea) ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting CAES Chinese Association for European Studies CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CASS IES Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of European Studies CCP Chinese Communist Party CESRUC Centre for European Studies at Renmin University CEUA China-EU Association CFAU China Foreign Affairs University CFAU ESC China Foreign Affairs University, European Studies Centre CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary政治 International Relations CICIR IES China Institutes of Contemporary International大 Relations, Institute of European Studies立 CIISS China Institute for International Strategic Studies學 CIIS China Institute國 of International Studies CIIS ERS China Institute of International Studies, European Research Section CMAC Central Military Affairs Commission (PRC) ‧

CPPCC Chinese People’s‧ Political Consultative Conference CSEUS Chinese NSociety for European Union Studies a y CSSCI China Social Sciences Citation Index t t i ECSA European Communityi Studies Association s o r EU European Unionn e a i v FALSG Foreign Affairs Leadingl C Small Group n FISS Foundation for Internationalhen Strategicgchi StudiesU ILD International Liaison Department MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC) MofCOM Ministry of Commerce (PRC) NCCPC National Congress of the Communist Party of China PLA People’s Liberation Army SASS Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (PRC) SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SIRPA School of International Relations and Public Affairs (Fudan University) SSCI Social Sciences Citation Index

iii Chapter 1 Introduction

China’s unprecedented rise is presenting the rest of the world with an enigmatic new great power, making its presence indelibly felt across the globe. And yet, many outsiders remain prone to misunderstanding or misinterpreting many of modern China’s manoeuvres and objectives on the global stage. In order to overcome this obstacle, it is imperative to construct a better understanding regarding a range of aspects of China’s 治 engagement with the outside world. With政 this in mind, 大this thesis will attempt to make a certain contribution to ‘unravelling立 the mystery’ of China’s foreign policy dynamics by 學 considering one specific國 topic in particular. As China’s domestic politics become more

diverse and decentralised, and its external relations simultaneously‧ flourish and

‧ complexify, there is moreN leeway for non-governmental domestic actors to influence

a y t foreign policy decisiont making. As this study will demonstrate,i China’s evolving io s academia is beginning to don just this. Growing progressively r in scope and influence, a e l i v international relations research C institutes, university n departments, and individual hengchi U academics are increasingly making their voice heard among foreign policy practitioners and wielding a real impact on policy decisions. Closer examination of international relations academia and its research output can thus shed light onto much of the thinking behind China’s foreign policy choices. This thesis will look in turn at China’s foreign policy decision making (Chapter Two); China’s evolving international relations academia (Chapter Three); and the mechanisms of academic influence on policy

(Chapter Four). Finally, Chapter Five will illustrate the insights of the preceding three chapters with the example of the European Union, offering a preliminary exploration of

1 the case by identifying the key players in European Studies in China, the prominent debates within the field and the potential influence of academia on China’s policy towards the EU.

Both China and the EU have become major actors in the world as a whole, and are also of great importance to each other both economically and strategically. However, although Chinese scholars keep careful watch over European analysis of China’s manoeuvres, European observers perpetually overlook the crucial and influential research output of China’s academics. This thesis will take the first preliminary steps to revealing key trends in the analysis of Europe,治 evaluating not only which information 政大 academia supplies to China’s立 decision making practitioners, but also which academics’ 學 work is most worth scrutinising. 國

It is hoped that this thesis will ultimately highlight why ‧ it is important to look

‧ ‘behind the scenes’ at Nthe influence of the diverse actors beginning to stamp their mark

a y t on China’s policy decisions,t as well as boosting the insights i of future research by i s o r explaining how to narrow researchn targets down to those academicse and institutes with a v l i the most influence. C n hengchi U

1.1 Literature Review

In order to gain a broader understanding of the issues approached in this research and inform the generation of relevant research questions, related literature will now be briefly considered, in three categories: the formulation of China’s foreign policy; international relations academia in China; and China’s relations with the European

Union.

2 1.1.1 The Formulation of China’s Foreign Policy

In the past, China’s foreign policy was decided almost solely by the country’s top leaders, in particular figureheads such as Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and was relatively restricted due to both domestic and international conditions, such as the rigid Leninist political structure and the global ideological cleaving of capitalism and communism. (Wills, 2011) However, over time, the creation of Chinese foreign policy has become more and more diversified. (Deng and Wang, 2005) “The advent of Deng

Xiaoping’s reform and opening up policy in the late 1970s marked the beginning of a 治 gradual transformation of China’s regional政 and global大 role from a passive ideological 立 observer to that of an active, more pragmatic participant.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 學

597) Following this, from國 the era of Jiang Zemin (江泽民) to the leadership of Hu Jintao

(胡锦涛), great strides have been made in the development of ‧ Chinese foreign policy,

‧ not least the enteringN into multilateral international institutions and the widening of a y t China’s foreign policy scopet to include more peripheral states.i (Roy, 1998) China is i s o r growing in confidence and ntaking more initiative in formulatinge active foreign policies, a i v l C n rather than following a simply ‘responsive’hen stancegch asi before.U (Feng, 2004)

However, for analysts and outsiders, as noted by Marc Lanteigne (2009): “the decision-making process which guides the development and paths of Chinese foreign policy has been difficult to observe.” (p. 19) It is important to first note which actors are formally involved in the process of constructing China’s foreign policy. Primarily, analysts look to the make-up and behaviour of the Politburo Standing Committee, including President Hu Jintao (now Xi Jinping (习近平)), and under it the larger

Politburo, as well as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and its subsidiary

International Liaison Department. (Lu, 1997; Bachman, 1998; Lanteigne, 2009) On the

3 whole, these high ranking organisations create policy for major states or actors such as the European Union, United States and Russia. (Rozman, 2013) Underneath these are various related ministries with lesser responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs generally handles policy toward smaller, more marginal states.

(Lanteigne, 2009)

Analysis of foreign policy decision making is not restricted to formal structures alone. Analysing any country’s foreign policy involves more than institutions, but must also take into account more informal approaches such as individual preferences and decision making dynamics, as well as outside治 influences. (Hudson, 2007) In particular, 政大 Chinese decision making is 立 infused with informal hierarchies in which those that are 學 implicitly junior follow the lead of more senior practitioners, often in subtle deference 國 within formal structures, or in behind-the-scenes negotiations. (Lu, 1997) Informal

‧ hierarchies are thus also an important consideration in the overall policy making

‧ N dynamic. a y t t i i s o r In addition, the influencen of peripheral actors is of particulare interest to this a v l i research. The Chinese military, theC People’s Liberation Armyn (PLA), has always been an hengchi U influential actor in terms of foreign policy, sometimes in its own right and sometimes as an official actor within the decision making structure. (Roy, 1998) In addition, as the private sector grows and globalisation spreads, Chinese businesses are beginning to gain a foothold in foreign affairs. (Lai, 2010) As pioneers of Chinese development, the interests of large businesses are of immediate importance to China and the government.

One of the newest influential actors is civil society, including NGOs and social interest groups. (Lanteigne, 2009) Chinese awareness of civil society is on the rise in general, but this began at a very low starting point as the participation of general society in

4 politics has historically been greatly marginalised in modern China. This is beginning to change, but civil society as yet has nowhere near the influence seen in other countries.

(Deng and Wang, 2005) Finally, and most importantly for this research, China’s foreign policy is increasingly influenced by academics, official research institutes, and university departments. Well-educated academics are beginning to wield their influence over China’s foreign policy direction and it is thus important to take into consideration their views and analyses when considering China’s foreign relations.

政治 1.1.2 International Relations Academia大 in China 立學 The world of international relations academia in China is flourishing. China’s 國 international relations research institutes now overwhelm those of the USA and Europe

‧ in terms of number and size. (Leonard, 2008) It is the responsibility of these research

‧ N institutes, as well as academicsa hailing from China’s most powerfuly universities, such as t t i i s Beijing, Qinghua, and Shanghaio Fudan, to analyse China’s internationr al image, measure n e a v Comprehensive National Power,l and consider potentialn outcomesi of policy decisions. Ch U (Leonard, 2008) As such, many idease aren g mootedchi during consideration and research which occasionally give rise to new guiding philosophies for China’s continued international development, as well as for policies targeted at individual countries and regions. As Shambaugh (2002) explains, in recent times, “Chinese IR think tanks have evolved in their functions, responsibilities and influence. Cumulatively, they have gained in importance (although there are exceptions to this generalisation) and today they must be considered important actors in the foreign policy making process in the PRC.”

(p. 581)

5 In the past, during the politically-charged eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, research institutes were tightly controlled and often functioned only as representatives of the various Party organisations to which they were affiliated. (Shambaugh, 2002; Zhu,

2013) However, Tanner (2002) argues that now a newer generation of research institutes have begun to spring up in China. Many scholars in research institutes today are free to pursue relatively unlimited topics and even to criticise existing government policy. (Zhu 2009; 2013) As the world of academia grows in size and influence, the ideas debated within these research institutes may reach the attention of policy makers.

There are many ways in which the work治 of academics may influence policy. On 政大 occasion, policy makers will立 actively solicit the advice of academics, either through 學 informal consultation or by commanding the organisation of conferences and research 國 groups to address specific policy questions. Academics may also have opportunities to

‧ submit unsolicited research products to leaders and thereby influence policy (Glaser

‧ N and Saunders, 2002; Zhu,a 2009) In addition to this, there are alsoy indirect methods of t t i i s garnering influence. Theo debates and discussions gainingr traction in the freer n e a i v intellectual environment in Chinal C may also add to the generaln understanding of decision he i U makers on any given topic. (Weiss, 1979;n g Glaserch and Medeiros, 2007; Zhu, 2013) As such, academics may also collectively influence policy making by indirectly shaping general opinion about an issue.

For outside analysts wishing to gain a greater comprehension of the dynamics of policy making in China, considering policy after it has already been made does not tell the whole story. The source of many prevalent ideas in the foreign affairs field can be traced to the world of academia. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Leonard, 2008) Studying the output of research institutes can provide clear insights into the debates and schools

6 of opinion which eventually come to shape the thinking of policy makers – before policy is made. Tanner (2002) argues: “Since their emergence in the early 1980s, China’s growing networks of government affiliated research institutes (colloquially referred to as ‘think tanks’ by most foreign analysts) have become some of the most important windows through which foreign analysts can observe China’s usually opaque policy- making system.” (p. 559) This is corroborated almost word-for-word by Zhu (2009):

“These institutions are usually regarded as windows through which foreign scholars can take a peek at the closed policy process of Chinese politics, though few such observers have actually looked inside the mechanism at their治 behaviour and function.” (p. 356) 政大 Zhu’s final point rings立 particularly true. There is thus far only a very restricted 學 body of literature on China’s research institutes, and even less in the English language. 國 In 2002, China Quarterly ran a special issue dedicated to China’s research institutes,

‧ which outlined general explanations of the system and the potential influence of

‧ N scholars, but little has beena added since. In addition to an understandingy of the world of t t i i s academia itself, externalo observers are sorely lacking comprehensionr of the actual n e a i v output of China’s many researchl C institutes. In light ofn Leonard (2008)’s claim that he i U “China’s ideas on world order… will have nasg dramaticch an effect on our foreign policies as its cheap exports had on our economic ones,” (p. 117) it is imperative that analysts begin to take note of the work of Chinese academics.

As Tanner writes, “A final, universal concern among these [China Quarterly special issue] authors is that Western researchers, especially governments, are not using the vast amounts of unique research materials from think tank sources to anything like maximum advantage… The unprecedentedly wide-open policy debate that takes place in these unclassified journals is a rich and greatly under-utilised database on

7 the range of policy opinions inside the Chinese government, and scholars who have exploited it have reaped a rich harvest.” (p. 574) In short, better and deeper analysis of

Chinese research institute output can only add to the accuracy and insightfulness of foreign observers’ analyses.

1.1.3 China’s Relations with the European Union

As this brief review will demonstrate, the European Union is an appropriate selection for a case study due to its significant and growing治 importance to China, as well as the 政大 overall magnitude of the Sino-立EU relationship on the global stage. In addition, given the 學 constant interest in Sino-US relations, the burgeoning Sino-EU relationship offers 國 greater unexplored ground for research.

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The European Union‧ (then the European Economic Community) and China first N

a y th t established diplomatic relationst in 1975. On May 6 2010, the twoi parties celebrated io s the 35th anniversary of PRC-EUn relations. According to Michael rYahuda, writing in 1994, a e l i v “Since neither Europe nor China hasC impinged much uponn the other in terms of security hengchi U or economic relations, it is appropriate to consider the relationship as secondary from

China’s point of view.” (p. 266) However, even in such a short time, this situation has now fundamentally changed. For example, the PRC’s Department of Policy Planning, in its China’s Foreign Affairs 2004 Edition, states “Constantly developing China-EU relations is a key component of China’s foreign policy.” (p. 331) Narramore (2008) even reports that “China’s relations with both the European Union and its individual member states have drawn so close over the past decade that some scholars refer to an emerging

China–Europe ‘axis.’” (p. 87)

8 In particular, China and the EU share extensive economic ties which are crucial for both parties. Trade between the two actors is huge: according to Europa, the EU’s official website, the EU is China’s largest trading partner, and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner. Trade in goods and services from the PRC to the EU amounted to 227.7 billion Euros in 2009, and the equivalent from the EU to the PRC amounted to

99.7 billion Euros, in addition to 5.3 billion Euros of Foreign Direct Investment. It is thus in the economic interests of both countries to also maintain stable political ties to ensure smooth transactions and mutually beneficial policies.

During the annual summit on 28th November治 2007, China and the EU established 政大 a High Level Trade and Development立 Dialogue. This was an important step in tightening 學 relations economically. In 2010, a High Level Strategic Dialogue was established. This is 國 a particularly important step that will address shared foreign policy and common

‧ strategic concerns for the bilateral partnership. (Europa) China-EU ties are split into

‧ N sectoral dialogues. Issuesa concern a range of subjects, such as Educationy and Culture, t t i i s Environment, Customs Co-operation,o Regional Policy, Employmentr and Social Affairs, n e a i v Nuclear Energy, Trade, Economicl C and Financial Issues, andn Political and Human Rights he i U Dialogues. (Europa) ngch

Zhu Liqun, in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou (2008) provides many informative insights into Chinese scholars’ perspectives on the European Union. Zhu concludes that “Scholars… take a positive, straightforward and non-ideological approach to looking at the EU and China-EU relations.” (p. 169) In particular, many scholars believe that the positive relations between China and the EU will combine forces to balance US hegemony and establish a multilateral international system. Qiu

Yuanlun, cited by Zhu, posits that “In recent and future years, the first power that can

9 challenge the United States seems to be the EU, which is determined by the EU’s position in international economy and politics.” (p.150). In this regard, Lanteigne (2009) considers the Chinese policy approach: “Further European engagement was beneficial to Beijing as a means of tacitly balancing American power as well as encouraging multipolarisation in the international system.” (p. 129) It is clear that, at least as far as the Chinese are concerned, Europe and China are two of the most important players on the world stage.

For this reason, Chinese scholars such as Song (2008) also take a positive view on the expansion of the European Union: “For治 most Chinese specialists, EU enlargement 政大 provides more opportunities立 than challenges.” (p. 182). He explains “a stronger EU is 學 also good for the further development of China-EU relations, as well as China’s position 國 in the world community.” (p. 183) This point of view reflects the stance that co-

‧ operation between the European Union and China is beneficial not only bilaterally, for

‧ N example by economic advantages,a but also that increased co-operationy with the EU is t t i i s strategically important foro China on a global scale. r n e a v l i Song Xinning (2001) neatlyC sums up: “The unremittingn rise of both China and the hengchi U EU in the international political economy is an undeniable fact.” China and the European

Union have both become major global actors in the space of mere decades. As such, understanding the interplay of China-EU relations is of international significance.

10 1.2 Research Structure

1.2.1 Research Puzzle

As the literature review has demonstrated, firstly, the structure of the decision-making of China’s foreign policy has been shown to be somewhat complex and opaque, though it is evident that the actors involved in the entire foreign policy process are diversifying.

Secondly, the world of academia within China is growing rapidly and is in a position to influence China’s policy. As such, analysis of Chinese academia’s research output is increasingly important. Finally, the relations 治 between China and the European Union 政大 are now of huge importance立 to both parties, both economically and strategically. It is 學 argued that China and the EU may create an ‘axis’ to offset US hegemony. This makes the 國 relations of these two actors extremely significant globally, and well worthy of greater

‧ research.

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a y So what is the connection between these three aspects?t This research will t i io s attempt to tie these three n aspects together. By separately analysingr the structure of a e l i v China’s foreign policy decision making, C the evolution of nChina’s international relations hengchi U academia, and the ways in which academics stand to influence foreign policy, it will be possible to better understand the relation between scholarly research and China’s ultimate policy decisions. This thesis will then provide a preliminary, exploratory case study of the example of European Studies in China, employing the insights of the previous chapters to identify the most influential academics and consider the debates and analyses of their research.

It is hoped that by creating a systematic understanding of the mechanisms of influence employed by Chinese international relations academia in terms of China’s

11 foreign policy, it will be possible for further research to utilise these insights to conduct more in-depth empirical studies of specific research output and policy fields.

1.2.2 Research Questions

Primary Research Question:What is the role of academia in terms of China’s foreign policy decision making?

Expanding on this primary research question,治 this research further encompasses three 政大 secondary research questions:立學

國 1. How is foreign policy formulated in China, and by whom is it decided?

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2. How is China’s evolvinga international relations academia y structured, and what t t i role and function doesi it play? s o r n e a v l ni Ch U 3. To what extent does Europeane Studiesngc academiahi exert influence over China’s

policy towards the European Union?

1.2.3 Research Design

This research will begin by reviewing literature on the formulation of China’s foreign policy in practice, establishing the potential role of external actors within the foreign policy decision making structure. In light of this investigation, one such external group of actors will be identified, namely the world of academia and research. The structure of

12 this group will be analysed due to its potential effects on net policy influence. Next, relevant literature on the mechanisms of influence employed by Chinese academia will be considered, taking into account differentiated mechanisms related to the unique structure of the Chinese research institute system.

Once the assumptions of differentiated mechanisms of influence have been identified it will be possible to apply this model to any academic within the Chinese system. After considering China’s current policy towards the European Union, this study will then apply these assumptions to the European Studies field, identifying the key influential actors with access to the widest mechanisms治 of influence. Literature review 政大 and discourse analysis of the立 debates voiced by these identified actors will follow, 學 highlighting the main areas of concern within China’s relations with the European Union. 國 Although at this stage of preliminary research, a direct ‘cause and effect’ influence

‧ cannot be empirically proven, this analytical model enables this study to infera link

‧ N between the Europeana Union’s policy in practice and the discoursey of scholars within t t i i s European Studies academia,o which can be built upon further withr subsequent research. n e a i v The study will be carried out qualitatively.l C n hengchi U

1.2.4 Scope

1. This research will only consider the structure of China’s foreign policy decision

making, and not the content of the foreign policy itself, in addition to mechanisms of

academic influence, and not the content of the academic discourse itself – both with

the exception of the case study of China’s policy toward the European Union.

13 2. The thesis will also be limited in scope to Chinese scholars’ discourse on the

European Union, and China’s foreign policy toward the European Union. One

purpose of this study is to provide an insight into Chinese thinking for European

audiences, and therefore the European stance towards China is not relevant for the

purpose.

3. This thesis is limited to only ‘academic’ research institutes. The conditions and

policy relevance of military research institutes fall outside the scope of this thesis.

These units exist to serve the purposes of the People’s Liberation Army and thus hold sway via the PLA’s own mechanisms治 of influence on China’s foreign policy, as 政大 opposed to through the mechanisms立 analysed herein. 4. The policy discussed in this thesis refers generally to large-scale,學 macro-policy as

opposed to micro-policy國 decisions. It is assumed that micro-policy decisions will

‧ follow general macro-policy lines.

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a y t t i i s o r 1.2.5 Limitationsn e a v l ni Ch U 1. This research may be limited by a elackn ofg reliablechi material on both the structure of

China’s foreign policy decision making, long an opaque topic, as well as the

mechanisms of influence available to Chinese scholars. There is little literature on

these topics in English; however, by collating both English and Chinese language

sources, it is possible to draw a fairly clear picture of the operational structure.

2. A further limitation is that whilst China has a growing body of academic work

available for public scrutiny, much of China’s politics and decisions occurs behind

closed doors and is not made available to the general public, and perhaps the most

insightful and influential academic work is delivered via confidential channels. In

14 order to address this limitation, this study will consider the discourse of a range of

scholars and pick out the most clearly emerging themes and standpoints, in the

assumption that these will best reflect the content of internal reports. In this regard,

carrying out interviews would be a helpful direction for future research.

3. Finally, this research will be qualitative in nature, which has some inherent

limitations. For example, qualitative work has been criticised for lacking

measurability and generalisability. However it is argued that this approach is most

appropriate for a study into the influence of a specific academic field over policy, in which generalisability is not a key concern.治政大立學

1.2.6Expected國 Contributions

‧ Primarily, this research aims to take the first steps to bridging a specific gap in the

‧ N literature on the influencesa behind China’s foreign policy. The researchy takes as its t t i i s premise the issue that whilsto Chinese academics are beginningr to wield real influence n e a v over China’s thinking and manoeuvresl on the world stage,ni outside observers are still a Ch U step behind. One of the tasks of Chinesee researchngch institutesi and major media agencies is in fact to systematically digest the research output of other countries, and even to pass this information to China’s leaders for reference. (Shambaugh, 2008) But the same cannot be said for the opposite direction. Despite their growing influence domestically,

Chinese research institutes are overlooked and their work is rarely consulted or reviewed by analysts.

But for Chinese scholars, traditional IR theories and insights do not ring true for

China’s own conditions and worldview. There is therefore a significant perception gap

15 between the analysis of China’s own academics and those from elsewhere. Recognising and engaging with the key ideas of China’s most influential academics will enlighten observers of the source of many of the actions and decisions of Chinese policy makers.

One major contribution of this thesis is the identification of the most influential actors in, specifically, the European Studies discipline within Chinese academia, as well as an initial overview of the biggest debates in the field. This overview offers translation of Chinese language sources which are inaccessible to many Europeans, but is by no means a comprehensive analysis of all the work of European Studies scholars. Instead, this thesis narrows down the field to the most 治influential voices. 政大立 What’s more, the identification of a model of mechanisms of academic influence 學 combined with an understanding國 of the structure of Chinese academia can be seen as apreliminary framework to a more systematic and wide-ranging‧ analysis of policy-

‧ influential research outputN in any discipline, not just European Studies. Understanding

a y t through the eyes of Chineset thinkers and policy-makers, and identifyingi which of these i s o r many actors wields greatern influence, is imperative for a deepere understanding of China a v l i and its policy manoeuvres – an issueC preoccupying not nonly academics, but also many hengchi U decision-makers and the public in the world today.

In addition, this study will make a contribution to the large body of literature concerning Sino-EU relations. As the European Union is a fairly new consolidated actor in global politics, it has only recently become a topic for research in terms of foreign policy. Furthermore, much of this research is carried out from within the European

Union and looking outwards. This research will provide new insights by bringing into account new perspectives and ideas from within Chinese academia.

16 The research is valuable and significant as a result of these contributions, and is important because it focuses on relations between two major world powers, both of which carry huge influence around the world both politically and economically. As a result, the current relations between China and the EU, as well as China’s future intentions for relations with the EU, are significant for other powers in the world such as, in particular, the United States, amongst others.

1.2.7 Thesis Composition 治政大 Following the introductory Chapter立 One, this thesis will be divided into Chapters Two to 學 Six. 國

Chapter Two will outline how Chinese foreign policy is ‧ made today. It begins

with a brief overview of‧ the history of China’s foreign policy decision making, followed N

a y t by a detailed explanationt of the current decision making structure.i Finally, this chapter i s o r introduces the growing rolen of periphery actors in foreign policy.e a i v l C n Chapter Three will explainh thee n evolutiongchi ofU China’s international relations research institutes, providing a detailed breakdown of the unique Chinese system of research institute classifications. Lastly, Chapter Three lays out the roles and functions of China’s international relation research institutes.

Chapter Four will investigate and outline the precise mechanisms of foreign policy influence associated with the world of academia in China, explaining how the output of China’s international relations research institutes and individual academics can be brought to the attention of decision makers. The chapter will first identify classic models of research utilisation, followed by pathways to policy influence in China, and

17 then a more specific discussion of factors of influence. The chapter will conclude with an illustrativeestablished example of academic policy influence in action.

Chapter Five forms a preliminary exploration of the specific case of Europe to illustrate the insights of Chapters Two, Three and Four. This chapter will begin by outlining China’s current policy towards the European Union, and will then move on to identify the most influential actors in the European Studies field. Next, the chapter is divided into individual sections, each discussing the writings of academics on different issue areas in the European field. The chapter will conclude with a summary of extent of the link between European Studies academia and治 policy towards the European Union. 政大立 Finally, Chapter Six will consolidate the investigations of the previous chapters to 學 conclude the study. This國 chapter will summarise the findings of each preceding chapter and argue that, as evidence of the growing influence of China’s ‧ academia strengthens,

‧ the study’s conclusionsN inspire a clear recommendation for interested parties to pay

a y t greater attention to the outputt of China’s academics and research iinstitutes. i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

18 Chapter 2

Practitioners and Decision Making in China’s Foreign Policy

China’s foreign policy decision making process involves an interplay between formal, institutionalised bureaucratic structures, informal mechanisms of hierarchy and personal preference, and peripheral actors with a growing voice. When considering any analysis of the dynamics of various factors of influence on Chinese foreign policy, it is 政治 first imperative to foster a good grounding of the process大 of decision making. It is 立 therefore important to first examine China’s foreign policy decision making structure 學 before attempting to assess國 any influence from external actors.

‧ This chapter will provide an overview of the processes and key practitioners in

‧ N the field of foreign policyin order to better understand the general context of Chinese a y t t i policy making. The chapteri begins with a brief outline of the historys and evolution of o r n e China’s foreign policy decisiona making during the eras ofv Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu, l i Ch Un providing a backdrop for the understandingeng c of h thei modern system. The next section looks in greater detail at the system of current foreign policy decision making in China, considering first the hierarchy of formal structures established to not only make policy, but also to consult, implement, and supervise; before moving on to discuss the informal mechanisms which also play a crucial role, working in tandem with formal, institutionalised processes. The final section of the chapter turns to look at the peripheral actors beginning to accumulate influence over foreign policy, including the military, civil society, and academia, revealing that the process of creating foreign policy is not limited to just Party and government structures.

19 2.1 A Brief History of China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making

Modern China’s foreign policy decision making has gone through several stages of evolution since the country was first founded in 1949, the legacy of which have left their mark on foreign policy decision making today. (Robinson and Shambaugh, 1994; Sutter

2013) These stages, each with distinctive differences, include the eras of Mao Zedong

(毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and Jiang Zemin (江泽民), before moving into the leadership of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛)in 2003. Although changes have occurred over time, the role of China’s top leader remains pivotal政 in 治terms of foreign policy decision making, and a highly centralised and personalised decision making大 style prevails. 立學 During the periods of Mao and Deng, foreign policy decision making followed a 國 ‘strong-man model,’ based around the country’s paramount leader. (Wills, 2011) Mao

‧ Zedong was China’s paramount leader from 1949 until his death in 1976, and was

‧ N followed by Deng Xiaoping,a who managed to wrest power and instally himself securely as t t i i s the country’s new paramounto leader by 1980. During these eras,r decision making was n e a v characterised by an extreme l degree of personalism. (Hamrin,ni 1994) What’s more, Ch U China’s foreign policy during these periodsen gtendedchi to involve one overarching strategy or even ideology laid down by the paramount leader (Marxism-Leninism under Mao, and opening up and peaceful development under Deng), by which all other macro and micro policies were decided. (Lanteigne, 2009) Hamrin (1994) writes, “The paramount leader was usually actively involved in setting guidelines for overall foreign policy… He retained ultimate authority… while delegating pieces of this authority to others.” (p. 83).

Mao had the ultimate say over China’s strategic foreign policy, but during his leadership he delegated to different bureaucratic organs or even individuals. For example, in the

1950s, the International Liaison Department handled policy, but in 1958, the Central

20 Foreign Affairs Small Group (中共中央外事小组, Zhonggong zhongyang waishi xiaozu) was created, supervising the new Foreign Affairs Office under the State Council General

Office. The Central Foreign Affairs Small Group was headed by Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩

来) and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陈毅) and contained five other members, and the

Foreign Affairs Office was responsible for delegating administrative tasks to appropriate government organs. (Lu, 1997) Despite this initial step towards greater institutionalisation, during the upheaval of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), foreign policy decision making became even more restricted, tending to reside solely in the hands治 of individuals, such as Premier Zhou 政大 Enlai, Mao’s close propaganda立 supremo Kang Sheng (康生), and Mao himself. Only when 學 the excesses of the Cultural Revolution began to recede in the early 1970s was the role 國 of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group re-fortified. (Lanteigne, 2009)

‧

‧ During the timeN of Mao, the range of foreign policy was markedly reduced by a y t China’s ‘leaning to one t side’ (一边倒, yibiandao) – an overwhelmingi partiality to the io s n r Soviet Union – followed by an acute isolationist status broughte about by the Sino-Soviet a i v l C n Split, and subsequently the radicalismhe ofn theg cCulturalhi U Revolution. (Sutter, 2013) After Deng Xiaoping took power, the direction of China’s foreign affairs changed dramatically, as he began to pursue the policy of Opening Up and Reform, engaging with many new diplomatic partners around the world. (Lampton, 2001) As a result of this expansion,

“Foreign affairs became much less manageable by a tiny elite; co-ordination and delegation of authority became both more necessary and more difficult.” (Hamrin, 1994)

In 1985, a decision was made to focus more on foreign economic relations; with this in mind, the Foreign Affairs Office was newly consolidated, subordinate to both the State

Council and the CCP Central Committee. This office contained members of various

21 important units, including the government, Party, and military, and was the staff office of the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group, now re-named the Foreign Affairs Leading

Small Group (FALSG) (中央外事工作领导小组, zhongyang waishi gongzuo xiaozu).

FALSG was headed first by Li Xiannian (李先念) from 1981-1988, and later Premier Li

Peng (李鹏) from 1988-1993. (Lanteigne, 2009) Despite the re-organisation of these foreign affairs organs, the paramount leader still held sway: “Deng Xiaoping could make almost any foreign policy decision on his own, although he tended… to build consensus through consultation.” (Hamrin, 1994: 83) 政治 Jiang Zemin became President of the PRC in 1993,大 but the time of paramount 立 leadership was now over; as Lu Ning (1997) points out, after Deng Xiaoping, the 學 subsequent generations國 of Chinese leadership have lacked “both authority and charisma

to dominate foreign policy decision making.” (p. 3)Overall, the Chin‧ ese regime sought to

‧ actively pursue some degreeN of decentralisation, as well as democratic centralism (民主

a y t 集中制, minzhu jizhong zhit ), a form of collective decision making iin which decisions are io s n r made on the basis of consensus. The foreign policy administrativee structure was a i v l C n retained from the end of the Deng era,he andn gfurtherch iinstitutionalised; U Jiang was installed as leader of the FALSG. (Lu, 1997) Although Jiang Zemin did not keep the same personal

‘monopoly’ over policy as his predecessors, he did put his own personal stamp on foreign policy, characterised by an emphasis on improving relations with neighbouring countries and great powers, as well as far greater interaction with international institutions, most notably acceding to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.

(Sutter, 2012)

Hu Jintao took over the Presidency in 2003, and by now the structure of the

Foreign Affairs Office and the FALSG have been unquestionably institutionalised and

22 stabilised. The structure in place today will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.

Hu’s guidance offoreign policy seems to have been the continuation and expansion of foreign policy under Jiang, but with far greater focus on previously under-emphasised areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Europe. (Sutter, 2012)

2.2 China’s Foreign Policy DecisionMaking

2.2.1 Formal Structures 治 China’s foreign policy structure has政 been institutionalised大 since the reform period initiated by Deng Xiaoping.立 Although the entire process of Chinese foreign policy 學 decision making has never been particularly transparent, and has even been 國

purposefully cloaked in secrecy during certain eras, the basic hierarchy‧ of the structure

is now relatively more ‧ clear. N

a y t Firstly, it is importantt to note that, as explained by Lu i Ning (1997), “Foreign i s o r affairs… [has] long been considern ed one of the most sensitivee areas that demand[s] an a i v l C n even higher concentration of decisionhe makingngc power.”hi U (p. 8) In other words, although China’s system in general is now far less centralised and the era of ‘strong-man’ monopolisation of decision making has drawn to a close, foreign policy decision making is of such importance and sensitivity it remains more centralised than other political areas.

It is thus instructive to consider China’s foreign policy decision making in a hierarchical structure. This structure is shown in Figure 1 on page 30. In terms of decision making in China, “With regard to major policy orientation, principles and guidelines, and to implementation planning and supervision, government organs and

23 their Party groups have the power to make recommendations. But the decision making power belongs to the Party Centre.” (Zheng et al., 1988, in Lu, 1997) In other words, the central Party authorities maintain ultimate decision making power, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. This is indeed the case for foreign policy decision making.

In the formal structure of Chinese foreign policy decision making, the ‘Party

Centre’ is represented by the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest formal foreign policy decision making body. Under Hu Jintao, the Politburo was made up of nine members, and since the 18th National Congress, the Politburo has consisted of just seven members. The Standing Committee may allow治 debate over certain issues in the larger 政大 Politburo, but with 25 members,立 the Politburo is too large for efficient decision making. 學

Although the Politburo國 Standing Committee retains absolute decision making power, the foreign affairs sector is overseen by the Foreign Affairs‧ Leading Small Group

‧ (FALSG). FALSG, also knownN as the National Security Leading Small Group (国家安全工

a y t 作领导小组, guojia anquant gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) is officially i classed as a decision i s o r n e making consulting body (决策咨询机构a , juece zixun jigouv), and is bureaucratically l i Ch Un subordinate to the Politburo Standinge Committee,ngchi the Party’s highest echelon. FALSG also maintains administrative links to the State Council, which commands the Chinese government, as well as the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. (Lu, 1997; Lanteigne,

2009; Rozman, 2013)

FALSG isresponsible for coordinating and supervising all foreign affairs and national security-related work. It is not a not a standing institution; in other words, it has no physical office or fixed staff per se. Instead, the group, made up of important officials in the field of foreign affairs, meets when necessary to supervise foreign affairs

24 work, as well as to discuss relevant issues and put forward policy proposals for the

Politburo Standing Committee to decide upon if necessary. (Rozman, 2013) However, according to Lu (1997), “As the [FALSG] provides a forum for the top decision makers… to meet face to face, the policy preferences and recommendations by [FALSG] are likely to have an important impact on the outcome of the final decision. Therefore the Foreign

Affairs Leading Small Group in fact plays a pivotal role in the decision making process.”

(p. 12) He later expands on this further, explaining that although FALSG is not officially a decision making organ, “Some decisions are in fact made in the [FALSG] meetings. The ratification of these decisions by the central leadership治 is but a formality. Other times 政大 decisions are made by the central立 leadership based on the recommendation of [FALSG] with minor modifications.” (p. 108) 學國 The influential sway of FALSG is a direct result of the high-ranking politicians

‧ and bureaucrats constituting the group. Always led by a chosen high-level Standing

‧ N

Committee member, FALSGa was headed by President and Generaly Secretary Hu Jintao t t i i s from 2002 to 2013. As Vice-President,o Xi Jinping (习近平) wasr second in command n e a i v during this time and became thel headC of FALSG when he nascended to his role as General hengchi U Secretary and President in 2013. His second in command is now Vice-President Li

Yuanchao (李源潮). In addition to Hu and Xi, there were 14 other members during Hu

Jintao’s time in command of FALSG. (360.com) Their names and roles at the time are listed below (the positions of each were altered during the Eighteenth National

Congress personnel shake-up in 2012-2013): the then director of the Central

Committee’s International Liaison Department Wang Jiarui (王家瑞); Minister of

Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪); Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Zenghuai (乔

宗淮); Minister of Commerce Chen Deming (陈德铭); Minister of State Security Geng

25 Huichang (耿惠昌); Minister of Propaganda Liu Yunshan (刘云山); Minister of National

Defence Liang Guanglie (梁光烈) (who was also a member of the Central Military Affairs

Commission); Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱); director of the Taiwan

Affairs Office Wang Yi (王毅); director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Liao

Hui (廖晖); director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Li Haifeng (李海峰); director of the State Council Information Office Wang Chen (王晨); and director of the PLA

General Staff Office General Ma Xiaotian (马晓天). The fourteenth member, State

Councillor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国), was the Secretary-General of FALSG (since 2013, that 政治 role has been taken over by Yang Jiechi, the Minister大 of Foreign Affairs during Hu’s 立 presidency). As can be seen, the FALSG members include學 the Ministers of all the government ministries 國and offices which are closely linked to foreign affairs, as well as representatives of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army‧ (PLA). The Communist

‧ Party is also representedN by the director of the International Liaison Department (ILD), a y t the Party’s own foreignt affairs organ. This combination of government,i Party, and i s o r military elite thus forms then central body for supervising foreigne affairs work. Together, a i v l C n these sixteen officials constitute theh mainen foreigngch i policy U consultants, supervisors, and practitioners in China.

The next rung down on the ladder is the Foreign Affairs Office, which is the executive ‘working office’ for FALSG. Lu (1997) describes the Foreign Affairs Office as the ‘CPU’ of FALSG, liaising “between the decision makers and the implementing organs in the Party, government and military systems.” (p. 12) All decisions from above are passed down through this Office, which is responsible for delegating tasks to the appropriate units for implementation. In turn, recommendations, queries, and decisions beyond the scope of these units are passed upwards through the Foreign Affairs Office

26 to be handled by the higher decision making body. FALSG and the Foreign Affairs Office are thus charged with policy coordination and delegation, supervision, and consultation.

Below these two in the hierarchy are ministerial level (部级, bu ji) units responsible for implementing FALSG’s decisions within their own sector, as well as recommending policy directions when necessary and appropriate. (Lu, 1997) These units are roughly equivalent to the ministries and offices represented by their leaders in the FALSG: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM),

Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Propaganda, Ministry of National Defence, 治 Ministry of Public Security, Taiwan Affairs政 Office, Hong大 Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office,立 and the State Council Information Office (which is 學 responsible for propaganda directed overseas). In addition, the Central Committee 國 International Liaison Department (ILD) represents the Party. The ILD, formerly in

‧

charge of relations with‧ other Communist parties, is now mainly responsible for N

a y handling visiting dignitaries and retaining links with other politicalt parties, and has t i io s therefore weakened in importance since the time of Mao. On behalfr of the military, the n e a i v PLA General Staff Departmentl isC also involved in the n structure, as well as the PLA hengchi U General Political Department. They are joined by units which supply information and research, such as Xinhua News Agencyand the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

(CASS) – the only academic institution at ministerial level – as well as the State

Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), which is administratively under the government Ministry of Industry and Information, and represents the Chinese defence industry.

These ministries and offices are not responsible for making large scale, macro foreign policy decisions, but rather for implementing the decisions of the FALSG or

27 Politburo Standing Committee, conveyed to them by the Foreign Affairs Office.

(Lanteigne, 2009) The ministries and offices, in much the same way as the overall political structure, delegate further down the chain to the relevant sections and divisions under their jurisdiction. In the opposite direction, ministries also send their recommendations and queries back ‘up the ladder,’ once again through the Foreign

Affairs Office up to the higher rung of decision makers. The minister is the chief executive of each ministry, and is therefore responsible for delegating. In this sense, small scale policy implementation decisions are indeed made at this level; this is the responsibility of the minister. Under the concept治 of democratic centralism, where 政大 collective decision making is立 favoured, the minister may call a conference in order to make these decisions. Lower level officials are charged with day-學 to-day affairs only, but even these micro decisions國 may be sent ‘up the ladder’ to the minister to ratify the

‧ decision. (Lanteigne, 2009) Ministries also have regional offices in provinces and

‧ municipalities, which dealN with foreign affairs on an ever yet reduced scale. a y t t i i s Most of the ministrieso thus implement decisions made rby the FALSG, delegated n e a i v to them by the Foreign Affairsl Office.C The Ministry of n Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has a he i U slightly more central role, and is consideredng toc beh consistently growing in influence in recent years (Shambaugh, 2002; Lanteigne, 2009, Wills, 2011). MoFA is “charged with interpreting and often substantiating policy decisions made by the country’s leadership.”

(Lanteigne, 2009: 26) With round-the-clock surveillance of international news, MoFA also supplies important publications to the higher leadership, providing briefings and analysis of current world affairs. MoFA’s responsible unit, the Information Department, thus “in a significant way influences the perception of the decision makers in the ministerial and central leadership.” (Lu, 1997: 27)

28 The final rung on the hierarchy are the official research and study institutes attached to these ministerial ranking units. (Lu, 1997) Affiliated academic institutes are one rung lower in bureaucratic ranking, putting them at bureau ranking (局级, ju ji).

(Zhu, 2009) This includes CIIS (China Institute for International Studies) and the China

Foreign Affairs University, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CICIR

(China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations). In the military sector can be found CIISS (China Institute for International Strategic Studies) and FISS (Foundation for International Strategic Studies) both under the PLA General Staff Department; and the Centre of Peace and Development, associated治 with the PLA’s General Political 政大 Department.Being part of the立 military structure, these are classified at division level, equivalent to bureau level. (Gill and Mulvenon, 2002) These學 academic and research 國 units are evidently not decision making bodies, but do play their part in the decision

‧ making process, by sending research products and recommendations up the ladder,

‧ N where they may ultimately influence the decisions made by the highest rung of the a y t t i hierarchy. This practice iwill be discussed in great depth throughs Chapters Three and o r n e Four. a i v l C n hengchi U

29 Figure 1: China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Structure

Politburo Standing Committee

Central Politburo

Foreign Affairs Leading Small State Council 治 Central Secretariat Group政 (FALSG) 大立 Foreign Affairs Office 學

國

‧

‧ N

a y t

t i

i s o r n e ASS

C a

Affairs v Defence Security Security l i SASTIND Commerce Ministryof Ministryof Department Department Department n Propaganda Affairs OfficeAffairs Affairs OfficeAffairs C HK andHK Macao

MinistryofState U

h PLAGeneral Staff OverseasChinese Ministryof Public i MinistryForeignof e MinistryNationalof

n h InternationalLiaison PLAGeneral Political Xinhua News Xinhua Agency Affairs Taiwan Office gc

Centre for Peace CFAU CIISS CIIS CICIR & Development

Direct Supervision State Council Administration Office Central Committee Department Administrative Link State Council Institution State Council Ministry People’s Liberation Army Funding Link

Diagram source: compiled by author. 30

2.2.2 Informal Mechanisms

Chinese foreign policy decision making has moved on from the days of monopolisation of power by one strong-man paramount leader, and yet the legacy of personalistic decision making lives on. Although there is a clear hierarchy of bureaucratic organs and a recognised pattern of decision making which includes coordination, consultation, supervision, delegation, and ratification up and down the ladder, it is impossible to overlook the fact that decision making is still in the hands of individual practitioners.

What’s more, due to the relatively more centralised decision making process in the 治 sector of foreign affairs, there is also政 more leeway for personalistic大 decision making. Lu (1997) writes, “The most important立 characteristics of China’s foreign policy decision 學 making are that it is highly centralised and that in terms of key decisions it is very much 國

personalised.” (p. 76) Despite the ever-increasing institutionalisation‧ of China’s

governance and Party, ‧ personalism and hierarchy of seniority remain prevalent. N

a y t As mentioned previously,t China follows the method of democratici centralism io s n r when decision making, which calls for majority consensus.e However, as Lu (1997) a i v l C n points out, for the most importanth decisions,engc h consensusi U alone may not be enough; unanimity may be required. Furthermore, for some contentious issues, it may not be possible to achieve unanimity or even consensus at first. In these cases, often behind- the-scenes informal consultation and negotiation can lead to the issue being resolved. If the issue cannot be resolved in this way, the final decision falls to the most powerful decision maker. This demonstrates that, crucially, collective decisions are not made by a group of equals. An informal system of personal hierarchy also runs through the decision-making system.

Firstly, over and above the highest rung of the formal hierarchical structure, at the very apex, is the ‘decision making nucleus.” In essence, this nucleus is led by the most powerful decision maker in China. Lu Ning (1997) considers the most powerful decision maker to be the chairman of the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), as he is backed up by the armed forces. Since Jiang Zemin stepped down as the leader of the CMAC, yielding his position to Hu Jintao, this position has been associated with the presidency. Together with his closest supporters, Hu Jintao thus represents this decision making nucleus, and retains veto power over foreign affairs decisions. (Rozman, 2013) The decision making nucleus治 is demonstrative of the mix of 政大 institutionalised bureaucracy立 and personalism prevalent in the Chinese foreign policy decision making structure. Technically speaking, the nucleus學 is not included in any official account of the 國 structure. The highest official body is the Politburo Standing

‧ Committee, but the decision making nucleus nevertheless represents the most

‧ influential decision makersN within that already select elite of state leaders. a y t t i i s Wittkopf and Joneso (2008) identify three different leadershipr styles adopted by n e a i v top foreign policy practitionersl internationally,C includingn the formalistic model, where he i U leaders rely on institutionalisation to avoidng personalismch in decision making; and the competitive model, in which leaders actively induce competition between advisers in order to hear a range of opinions. These two models can be considered to be at odds with typical Chinese foreign policy decision making: firstly, although formal structures are in place, it has been identified that the field of foreign policy is so sensitive, it retains greater personalism than most other policy processes. Secondly, the Chinese political system increasingly emphasises consensus and collective leadership, with a watchword of ‘harmony’ currently pervasive. The third and final model is the collegial model, in

which the top leader aims to promote collective decision making, which matches the

Chinese approach. As such, Hu Jintao may be likened to “the hub of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisers and agency heads.” (Wittkopf and Jones, 2008: 501)

This is an appropriate reflection of the importance of the decision making nucleus in terms of informal mechanisms. Although the formal structure appears somewhat monolithic and technocratic at the outset, informal hierarchies are also at play, with the president at the core.

The informal hierarchical arrangement is not limited to just the decision making nucleus. In addition, a similar pattern can be治 seen within FALSG itself. Firstly, the 政大 officials in the group are ranged立 between the top three levels of leadership in China: full 學 state leader (正国级, zheng guo ji), deputy state leader (副国级, fu guo ji), and full 國正部级

minister ( , zheng bu ji). This creates a hierarchy within‧ the group. But even

amongst apparent equals‧ – in terms of rank – there remains a hierarchy of seniority. N

a y According to Norman Stockman (2000), Chinese society is informallyt based around t i io s hierarchies of authority, includingn within the family and withinr wider society. The a e l i v seniority of a person in this hierarchy C is derived from a numbern of factors which are not hengchi U stated explicitly but rather are implicitly understood. Respect for this order of authority is inlaid into the functioning of Chinese society, and decision making in China can also be seen in terms of this custom. Even amongst formal equals, there is an implicit, intangible understanding of the ‘pecking order’ of authority. As Lu (1997) points out, in general within democratic centralism: ‘When the most authoritative person makes his opinion known, the rest of the members tend to concur… junior members generally would refrain from voicing a different opinion once the opinion of the most authoritative person is known.” (p. 16-17) This is typical of the hierarchy of seniority

within Chinese society: those with more seniority wield an unspoken authority which tends to be rarely challenged.

Understanding this informal mechanism of hierarchy is crucial when attempting to fathom the process of decision-making in China. Knowledge of the official, formal system is not the full story. The hierarchy within groups of important policy practitioners is also a key to the entire procedure – although it is notoriously difficult for outsiders to clearly construe. Nonetheless, when attempting to understand why a particular policy decision may have been made, it is useful to identify the key decision makers where possible. 治政大立 Considering the top leaders’ personal preferences is also helpful. According to 學

Wittkopf and Jones (2008),國 “Decision makers’ inner traits influence how they respond to different situations.” (p. 492) Past experiences and educational‧ background all

‧ contribute to a leader’simageandN perceptions of the world (Levine, in Shambaugh,

a y t 1994); for example, it hast been pointed out that the current topi decision makers in i s o r China, including Hu Jintao,n his predecessor Jiang Zemin, ande his successor Xi Jinping, a v l i have been mostly educated as engineers,C thus potentiallyn taking a relatively ‘scientific,’ hengchi U technocratic view of the world. (Lanteigne, 2009)

Furthermore, and crucially for this research, these informal aspects have an impact for those actors on the periphery of the decision making structure – such as academics.Attempts to sway those lower down the hierarchy will be largely irrelevant if in opposition to those more senior, and unlikely to succeed if the viewpoints espoused are at odds with the preferences of the practitioner in question. (Lu, 1997) Similarly, when analysing the influence of an outsider on policy decisions, identifying with whom this outsider has close relations is an insightful consideration. Those with connections

to the highest decision makers are far more likely to be able to apply influence, and even more so if their opinions match these practitioners’ preferences. (Glaser and Medeiros,

2007)

2.3 Peripheral Actors in Chinese Foreign Policy

In past eras, characterised by far greater centralisation and personalised decision making than now, peripheral actors in Chinese foreign policy decision making could be 治 cast aside as almost entirely irrelevant,政 with the exception大 of the People’s Liberation Army, long an influential actor立 within Chinese politics. (Roy, 1998) However, since the 學 earlier phases of China’s foreign policy decision making, “The number of actors involved 國 in developing China’s foreign policy has grown considerably… with more governmental

‧

and non-governmental‧ actors having a real or potential voice in the process.” (Lanteigne, N

a y 2009: 20) In other words, not only has the formal system of decisiont making expanded t i i s and institutionalised overo time, drawing in more Party and governmentr actors than ever n e a i v before, non-governmental actorsl Care also on the increase,n both in terms of number and hen hi U also degree of influence. gc

This evolution is as a result of both reforms within China’s own political and bureaucratic mechanisms, as well as a growing complexity in global affairs, leading to a more diverse and complex backdrop against which policy makers are obliged to navigate. Glaser and Saunders (2002) put it succinctly: “As a consequence of the changed internal and external environment, a larger and more diverse set of Chinese actors now operates in a competitive and pluralistic milieu to analyse international affairs and influence foreign policy.” (p. 598) This is a new trend and it is shaping and

evolving at present. As Zhu (2009) remarks, “There has been no mature market for consultancy services in policy making until now.”In other words, the demand for foreign policy consultation is now growing, and many actors are now stepping in to supply this service.

Whilst the key decision-makers are governmental and Party bodies, in particular the upper echelons, there is an increasingly diverse range of military and non- governmental actors influencing the creation of foreign policy. Major actors still include the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), which tend to promote issues of security: “the治 PLA appears especially sensitive to what 政大 may be construed as challenges立 to Chinese sovereignty or indirect threats to national 學 security.” (Roy, 1998: 72) In addition to its direct role in decision making, denoted by 國 the presence of PLA leadership in FALSG, the PLA plays an additional peripheral role as

‧ an ‘interest group’ in its own right, also boasting of several research institutes designed

‧ N to provide informationa and analysis. (Gill and Mulvenon, 2002) However,y the influence t t i i s of the PLA is perhaps relativelyo reduced in comparison to earlierr decades (Lanteigne, n e a i v 2009); a cause of deep consternationl C for the military. n hengchi U With the prominent growth of both civil society interest groups and the private business sector in China, the voices of actors such as businesses and NGOs are also being increasingly heard, promoting the interests of the markets as well as civil concerns.(Deng and Wang, 2005; Lai, 2010) Civil society generally tends to influence domestic approaches, with knock-on impacts on foreign policy. And as globalisation turns the world ‘flat’, Chinese enterprises are increasingly involved in international affairs. The concerns of big successful Chinese businesses may also hold sway for foreign policy decision makers. (Lanteigne, 2009; Lai 2010) Although the Chinese

authorities are particularly sensitive about certain subjects, in particular calls for democratisation or Westernisation, the scope for civil society groups to proffer their viewpoints is on the increase. (Lai, 2010) Even the Chinese public are beginning to garner some influence, particularly through the explosion in internet usage which gives netizens more access to foreign policy actions and a platform to debate ideas and collectively influence the perceptions of the Chinese leadership. (Lanteigne, 2009)

Finally, well-educated academics and analysts are increasingly wielding their influence over China’s foreign policy direction. This is also a relatively new trend in foreign policy decision making; research products治 by even large academic institutes 政大 such as CASS were rejected 立as largely irrelevant by many analysts of Chinese foreign 學 policy. (Zhu, 2009) Historically speaking, intellectuals have been much-maligned in 國 China, and even up to the era of Deng Xiaoping the leadership demonstrated mistrust of

‧ academics. (Lu, 1997) This has shown a marked change in recent years, and it is now

‧ N important to take into aconsideration academics’ views and analysesy when considering t t i i s China’s foreign policies. Shambaugho (2002) notes, for example,r that “ministerial level n e a i v officials increasingly turn to theirl C affiliated think tanks forn policy research and advice.” he i U (p. 575) Some academics are better-placedng thanch civil society and business groups to influence foreign policy decisions and perceptions due to their formal affiliations with policy making bodies.

As Lanteigne (2009) summarises, “As China further assumes its place in the international system, the number of non-governmental actors, including individuals and groups, who are involved with, influence or are knowledgeable of foreign policy has continued to grow.” (p. 28) Although these actors are on the rapid increase, as Glaser and Medeiros (2009) point out, they began at a very low base. As such, despite this

growth, external, non-governmental actors may currently wield less influence than their counterparts in other countries. In particular, civil society interest groups remain marginal. However, the military, enterprise, and academia are now beginning to really make their presence felt. In order to truly understand the Chinese foreign policy decision making process as a whole, it is no longer possible to overlook these peripheral actors and the part they play in the entire decision making process. An in-depth look at different peripheral actors is invaluable for a better understanding of the dynamics of

China’s foreign policy.

治政大立 This chapter has given an overview of China’s foreign policy decision making. After the 學

PRC was established in 國1949, decision making in all fields has followed an evolutionary path from high centralisation and personalism to a greater degree‧ of decentralisation

‧ and institutionalisation.N In terms of institutionalisation, foreign policy is created within

a y t a hierarchical structure;t the CCP Politburo Standing Committeei is at the pinnacle, i s o r followed by the FALSG (Foreignn Affairs Leading Small Group).e Although the Politburo a v l i Standing Committee retains the C ultimate decision makingn power, whereas FALSG is hengchi U technically classified as a policy consultation organ, it is in fact FALSG which is mainly responsible for foreign policy decision making, as well as delegating tasks such as implementation and micro policy making through its ‘CPU’ – the Foreign Affairs Office.

Tasks are implemented to the many ministries and offices which have an impact or interest in foreign affairs, including such important bodies as the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (MoFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM). In turn these organs pass on information and recommendations to decision makers through the Foreign Affairs

Office. As such, when analysing the dynamics of foreign policy decision making, taking note of this ‘up the ladder’ and ‘down the ladder’ institutional arrangement is crucial.

Nevertheless, although these formal, institutionalised structures have been put in place in foreign policy decision making, this sensitive field still remains one of the most personalist and centralised within political decision making. During the time of

Mao and Deng, the paramount leader was able to make policy decisions almost single- handedly; whilst this era is over, the informal hierarchy of seniority prevalent in the

Chinese culture and engrained into the bureaucracy means that, despite institutionalisation, ‘juniors’ in the hierarchy治 will generally defer to senior decision 政大 makers. At the apex of this informal立 hierarchy is the decision making nucleus, revolving 學 around the president Hu Jintao. Thus, in addition to understanding the formal structure, 國 analysis of foreign policy influences and dynamics involves taking into account the

‧ effect of this personalism and hierarchy.

‧ N

a y t Finally, this chaptert has outlined how Chinese foreign policyi decision making is i s o r becoming more diversified,n with an increasing number of externale actors now playing a v l i their part in the overall dynamics.C These players includen the military, civil society, and hengchi U academia. The specific role of academia will be discussed in great detail in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3

China’s Evolving International Relations Academia

Amongst the growing number of actors beginning to exert influence on the formulation and exercise of China’s foreign policy, one of the most notable groups hails from the world of academia. In this research, ‘international relations academia’hereafter refers collectively to research institutes, colloquially referred to as think tanks (思想库, sixiang ku, or 智库, zhiku)1 and relevant university治 departments, as well as individual 政大 academics pursuing research立 in fields associated with international relations, all of which may wield certain clout in terms of the policymaking 學process. This chapter will 國 first explain the evolution of China’s international relations academia, describing how

‧ the system has passed through several phases since its beginnings, and highlighting the

‧ N differences between the Chinese system and its Western equivalents. Next, a more a y t t i detailed breakdown of thei system is provided, detailing the differents classifications of o r n e research institute in China. a Finally, this chapter lays out v the roles and functions of l i Ch Un China’s international relations researchen institutesgchi, demonstrating that providing the leadership with information and policy advice is the key function of these contemporary institutions.

1 Although the common term ‘think tank’ is widely used by many scholars in both Chinese and English language research, some of whom are cited herein, this thesis deliberately favours the more neutral ‘research institute’ (except, unavoidably, in citations). This is because certain connotations are attached to the role and nature of the ‘think tank’ in Anglophone countries, which do not necessarily ring true for their Chinese counterparts. This key difference is discussed in greater detail on pages 45-46, and drawn upon again on pages 52-55.

3.1 The Evolution of International Relations Academia in

China

By comparison with China, the systems of international relations research institutes in

Western nations are relatively well-understood and clear. Research institutes in the US and UK, for example, have been identified as responsible for providing data collection and analysis, as well as impartial and objective advice to decision-makers in the foreign affairs discipline. (McGann and Weaver, 2000; Rich, 2004; Abelson, 2009) As global politics becomes increasingly integrated and治 complicated by an upsurge in players, 政大 including states, organisations,立 and transnational MNCs, policy makers are inundated with situations and challenges requiring not only their immediate學 attention, but also 國 accurate and relevant information in order to assist their decisions. McGann (2002)

‧ highlights that: “Policy-makers need basic information about the world and the societies

‧ they govern, how currentN policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely a y t t i costs and consequences.”i All too often, various interest groupss will attempt to sway o r n e government stances by feedinga decision makers partial, subjectivv e messages. (Abelson, l i C Un 2009) Policy makers thus need reliablehe sourcesngc ofh objectivei information, whichresearch institutes are poised to provide. What’s more, rather than simply offering reams of information, research institutes also have an analytical, explicatory, and parsing role.

Experts are positioned well to determine which material is of most relevance, to deconstruct complex data, and to locate abstract information in a substantial context for the sake of pressurised decision makers with little time to spare. (Medvetz, 2012) “In short, policy-makers and others interested in the policy-making process require information that is timely, understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful.” (McGann,

2002)

In the Chinese context, due to the historical, ideological, and systemic legacy of

Soviet-based policy making mechanisms (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992), the role of international relationsresearch institutes has been less clear-cut, and has shifted and evolved over time. Tanner (2002) divides the phases of China’s research institutes into three generations – the first generation, with very close supervision by the government; the second generation of relatively more autonomous institutes spawned by the reforms in the 1980s, and the third generation, which are “characterised by even more ambiguous links to sponsoring leaders and institutions, greatly expanded commercial links, greater exposure to Western theories and治 techniques, and the gradual emergence 政大 of wide-ranging ‘policy communities.’”立 (p. 559) 學 After the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the initial 國 bureaucratic structure was imported almost wholesale from the Soviet Union.

‧

(Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992) As discussed in Chapter Two, policy makers were

‧ N restricted to the Party’sa elite. This rigid decision making structure ymeant that there was t t i i s little call for outside influenceo or even consultation. China’s decisionr makers would seek n e a i v advice from the Soviet Union ratherl C than home-grown analysts.n However, this began to he i U change after 1956. In this year, uprisingsn g occurredch in Poland and Hungary, and the

Soviet Union stepped in to quash protests; Nikita Krushchev made a secret speech during the 20th Party Congress denouncing Stalin’s cult of personality. From this year onwards, cracks appeared as Communist countries began to diverge ideologically. Mao

Zedong, taken by surprise at this turn of events and increasingly at odds with the

Soviets, quickly recognised the need for greater expertise in foreign affairs. In 1956 he ordered the establishment of China’s first international relations research institute, the

Institute of International Relations (now the China Institute of International Studies

(CIIS)), as well as a Bureau of World Economics. (Shambaugh, 2002) From this point on, various international research and analysis institutes began to spring up in those government departments with a stake in global issues; by the mid-1960s, China also boasted several educational institutes dedicated to international affairs, including international relations departments at Beijing, Renmin, and Shanghai Fudan

Universities. The system was essentially shut down during the Cultural Revolution, but had been brought back to life by the late 1970s. (Zhu, 2013) The research institutes of this era constitute the first generation. Although they gradually increased in number, these institutes were unrecognisable from their治 independent Western counterparts. 政大 “Policy research institutes 立 were tightly bound to particular ministries and their institutional missions.” (Zhu, 2009: 333) In other words, each學 was created within the hierarchy of a government國 department or ministry, and existed to serve the purposes of

‧ the supervising unit. During this time, as Shambaugh emphasises: “Analysis… had to

‧ support policy, ratherN than vice versa.” (Shambaugh, 2002: 579) The highly-charged a y t t i ideology of the Mao era alsoi dominated the rhetoric of decision makerss and researchers o r n e alike. As Glaser and Saundersa (2002) note, “Information wasv tightly controlled, reports l i C Un were vetted for conformance with h thee n dominantgch i political line, and dissenting views were rarely published… Analysis… tended to be couched within a Marxist framework and to support official policy pronouncements.” (p. 598)

The second generation of research institutes grew out of the reform era. It is generally considered that China’s international relations research institutes first began to evolve away from their rigid Soviet roles after the introduction of Opening Up and

Reform policies, which began to gradually transform the landscape of Chinese decision making from the beginning of the 1980s. (Shambaugh, 2002; Glaser and Saunders, 2002;

Zhu, 2013) What’s more, the open, reformist China was facing the challenge of integrating into a globalising world order. Tanner (2002) rightly argues: “[Key central leaders] required policy options that were more empirically-based, less ideologically and bureaucratically hidebound, and more innovative and cosmopolitan.” (p. 560) The second generation of research institutes were often created by individual leaders and still retained (sometimes unclear) administrative links to government agencies, but were more autonomous in their roles and structure. (Tanner, 2002) In terms of this

‘hybridity,’ Shambaugh notes:“Many of China’s IR institutes are the stepchild of the imported Soviet system, although their development治 since the 1980s has been spurred 政大 by an increased appreciation立 of the role played by think tanks in the United States and other nations.” (Shambaugh, 2002; 576) Nevertheless, the學 leadership had a “deep lingering ambivalence 國 concerning policy research.” (Tanner, 2002: 560) Although

‧ decision makers were aware of the need for more autonomous and creative policy

‧ consultation as they tookN shaky steps towards reform, they also remained wary of a y t t i totally independent politicali research. This ambivalence was reflecteds in the ambiguous o r n e links between government bodiesa and research institutes. However,v this ambiguity was l i C Un vital during the reform era – innovationhen wasg cpossible,hi but government agencies could distance themselves from overly radical ideas.

As China forged a steady path to reform following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern

Tour in 1992, foreign policydecision making went on to become even more diverse and pluralised. (Sutter, 2013) This more favourable domestic environment, as well as decision makers’ continuing need for advice in their navigation of a more complex international landscape, opened the doors for international relationsresearch institutes

(and, indeed, institutes in other disciplines) to expand the scope of their roles and

functions even further. The combination of domestic and international factors, in addition to a greater emphasis on academic integrity and rigour, have accelerated the evolution of international relations research even more since the early 1990s, which continues to grow in scope to the present day. Glaser and Saunders explain this evolutionary backdrop: “The shift to greater pragmatism [in the reform era], increased reliance on the bureaucracy, and policy-making by consensus that followed Beijing’s decision to open up to the outside world set the stage for a radical increase in the role and influence of Chinese foreign policy research institutes.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 598) This third generation of research institutes治 enjoys more autonomy and freedom to 政大 collaborate with peers and foreigners,立 as well as to pursue independent academic life to an unprecedented level. (Tanner, 2002; Zhu, 2013) Although學 academics are linked to their respective research國 institutes, there has been arecent boom in what Naughton

‧ (2002) terms ‘public intellectuals’ – perhaps the closest China has to political pundits.

‧ Perhaps the most famousN example in the foreign policy field is Yan Xuetong (阎学通), a y t t i who makes regular appearancesi in the domestic and foreign media,s has written several o r n e best-selling books, and wasa named in Foreign Policy’sv World’s Top 100 Public l i Ch Un Intellectuals list in 2008. According to eTannerng c(2002),hi over the space of five years up to

2001, Yan Xuetong carried out at least 118 interviews with foreign media.

It is important to make the observation that, when considering the role and function of Chinese international relations research institutes, foreign scholars are often prone to become pre-occupiedby characteristics defined as integral to research institutesor ‘think tanks’ in the West, particularly those in the US or UK which are those most discussed in the rich English language research on the subject. These characteristics include in particularnon-profitability, and autonomy or even total

independence from government and politics. Stone (2001) defines research institutes

[think tanks] as “relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of government, political parties, and pressure groups.” McGann (2002) considers ‘think tanks’ to be “independent public policy research and analysis organizations.” However, as Medvetz astutely points out, these definitions “privilege the historical case of North American and British think tanks, which are more likely than their Asian, African, and continental European counterparts to assert their independence.” (Medvetz, 2008: 2) Chinese research institutes are certainly not liable to profess total independence治 from politics. According to Zhu, 政大 “Strictly speaking, there are立 no such [independent] organisations in China because of the existing one party-dominated system, and almost all 學 Chinese think tanks are government-funded or 國 have a degree of government connection.” (Zhu, 2009: 337)

‧ Shambaugh corroborates: “it is important to understand that there is no such thing as

‧ an independent IR thinkN tank in China.” (Shambaugh, 2002: 579). In other words, in the a y t t i Chinese context, attemptingi to study the independence of a researchs institute is scarcely o r n e relevant; assuming autonomya is also erroneous. It can bev taken as read that any l i C Un research institute worth its salt willh e haveng institutionalisedchi government connections. Even individual academics, who may put forward their own views independently of their affiliated research institute, are likely to draw upon governmental connections to secure their influence, either formally or informally. Despite the fact that political independence is not an integral characteristic of academia in China, this does not detract from the significance of its increasing role and influence on foreign policy decision making. In fact, many of the most highly influential research institutes in China draw their sway over policymaking precisely from their bureaucratic affiliation with the

CCP. The importance of the relationship between government decision makers and academia will also be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

However, this blurry affiliation poses one key problem when analysing the discourse of scholars in CCP-affiliated academic institutes, summed up succinctly by

Mark Leonard (2008): “The Chinese like to argue over whether it is the intellectuals that influence decision-makers, or whether groups of decision-makers use pet intellectuals as informal mouthpieces to further their own views.” (p. 17)These doubts reflect the historical legacy of decision making processes in China. The unique administrative and personal links of the Chinese system make 治 it difficult to calculate the direction of 政大 influence, especially in the evolving立 system. For example, Tanner (2002) points out that 學 “the growing personal and professional autonomy that marks the third generation is 國 forcing foreign analysts to work much harder to determine when these think tank

‧ scholars represent themselves or some larger entity.” (p. 572) However, he goes on to

‧ N state that amongst thea academic staff of China’s researchinstitutesy , there is a “fairly t t i i s strong consensus… that o China’s vast socio-economic changesr and the loosening ties n e a i v among leaders, factions, institutions,l C and analysts have greatlyn eroded old assumptions he i U about when an analyst might ‘speak for’n certaingch departments, factions, or leaders.” (p.

572)

Although it is accepted that during the Mao era academics were restricted –if not entirely controlled –in their roles, following the introduction of sweeping reforms by

Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China’s increasingly complex and pluralised international relations have created a very real need for expert advice. As Glaser and

Saunders explain: “Beijing’s increased involvement in the international community created demand for in-depth research and analysis to aid Chinese leaders in making

informed foreign policy decisions… Over the past two decades research institutes have played an increasingly important role in providing information, analysis and advice to

Chinese government and Party leaders.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 597-8) Rather than academic and research institutions being called in to lend advocacy to decisions or stances already taken, their expert, informed advice has in fact become necessary and influential.

The system of international research institutes is continuing to evolve, with some key trends emerging. The growth and diversification of the system and the fact that there is now a very real possibility of influencing治 the country’s policies has led to 政大 more intense competition between立 institutes to catch the eye of decision makers. (Zhu, 學 2013) In some cases this may simply involve submitting a report on an emerging issue 國 faster than competitors; it may be a case of producing a larger volume, higher quality, or

‧ more innovative research output; it may also involve leveraging sources of influence to

‧ N one’s own favour. This acompetition also means that academics havey more opportunity t t i i s to move between institutes,o and express themselves more freely.r (Glaser and Saunders, n e a i v 2002) The competition for policyl C influence has led to then commercialisation of the field, he i U with even first generation style research ninstitutesgch become more market-oriented. (Zhu,

2009) Tanner (2002) corroborates: “Even for institutes that remain subordinate to traditional bureaucracies, these socio-economic changes have greatly lengthened the organisational ‘leash’ that controls the scholars that work in them.” (p. 562)

Another trend concerns the research itself. As Glaser and Saunders (2002) put it:

“Chinese researchers in foreign policy institutes are on the whole more highly-educated than they were a decade ago.” (p. 602) Many of the younger generation of scholars are determined to make genuine academic contributions to their fields and are bringing in

new theories and techniques. The former ideological, Marxist rhetoric is being phased out in favour of either Western techniques and concepts, or the continued push to build a Chinese theory of international relations which weaves in traditional ancient Chinese thought. (Song and Chan, 2000) Where research institute analysts used to merely

‘parrot’ the words of the government, now there is a real emphasis on improving research value. In addition, research topics are expanding and there is a growing emphasis on transnational issues as opposed to regions.(Shambaugh, 2002)

One interesting trend is that the role of universities is growing. Now many academics take on visiting professor roles in the治 big international relations departments 政大 of Beijing, Qinghua, and Shanghai立 Fudan Universities, and many have chosen to leave 學 their posts in official and semi-official institutes in favour of university jobs. Some big 國 names, such as Yan Xuetong and Chu Shulong (楚树龙), have ‘jumped ship’ (both from

‧

CICIR to the Institute ‧ of Modern International Relations founded in 2010 at Qinghua N

a y University). (Glaser and Saunders, 2002) These posts “pay substantiallyt more than jobs t i io s at traditional research institutes and provide greater opportunitiesr for independent n e a i v thinking.” (Glaser and Saunders,l 2002:C 603) Also, some decisionn making bodies are now hengchi U specifically requesting supplementary information from university professors seen as more expert in their field than broad-based researchers in their own units. Glaser and

Medeiros (2007) write “While [university scholars] used to be completely marginal to foreign policy debates, much has changed in the last decade.” (p. 307) It is expected that the role of university professors and departments will continue to follow this upward trend.

Finally, despite the strict compartmentalisation of the system, wherein the research units of different departments did not share any contact, there is now a

marked trend toward horizontalisation. Glaser and Saunders (2002) give an example:

“Seminars and conferences often bring together experts from various research institutes to discuss a particular subject or an important international event.” (p. 600)

Communication between units is on the increase, as well as communication with foreign peers, bringing all the benefits of collaboration and research dynamism. The growth of the university role is contributing to this trend. Nevertheless, Tanner (2002) maintains that “Evolution toward more regular horizontal ties among fellow researchers is proceeding very slowly, and relatively free-wheeling Western-style policy communities are still far off.” (p. 563) 治政大 In conclusion, the system立 of China’s international relations research institutes 學 has been evolving ever since its inception in 1956. The growth and development of the 國 system has built it into a potent force for policy influence. Over time, from humble

‧ beginnings as faithful adjuncts to government departments, China’s system of

‧ N international relationsa research institutes has diversified, improved,y and thus t t i i s consolidated its influence.o r n e a v l i C n hengchi U 3.2 Classifying China’s International Relations Research

Institutes

Modern China’s network of international relations research institutes were originally based on their Soviet counterparts, entrenched entirely within the governmental bureaucracy and devoid of practically any autonomy or academic legitimacy. Since their beginnings, China’s research institutes have been used as advocates for various policy stances, butthe genuine need for useful and objective information is now clearly

outweighing this former function. Scholars such as Tanner (2002) and Zhu (2009; 2013) identify three generations in the evolution of China’s research institute system.

Nevertheless, despite thesedevelopments, the system of China’s international relations research institutes retains certain evident legacies of its Soviet-based origins.

The main legacy affecting the system is the embedding of research institutes in associated governmental units and departments, maintaining the separation of research institutes according to their departmental affiliation, as opposed to the broad division between government and academia seen in other nations. (Shambaugh, 2002; Tanner,

2002; Zhu, 2013) This is known as ‘stove-piping,治 ’ a term which evokes the rising of 政大 smoke through a purely vertical,立 hierarchical mechanism, involving no interaction with 學 other units. This compartmentalisation of research institutes is largely considered 國 detrimental by outsiders as it prevents horizontal interchange and interaction of

‧ academic ideas, which would create a more dynamic and astute research environment.

‧ N

Tanner (2002) arguesa that as a result of stove-piping, “Researchy continues to be t t i i s compartmentalised, redundanto and steeped in the biases of individualr bureaucracies.” n e a i v (p. 563) However, in terms of lanalysing C policy influence,n a compartmentalised, closely he i U affiliated academic structure can give greaterng insightch into which research institutes have greater institutionalised sway in the decision making process.

Official international relations research institutes in China are closely associated with their affiliated government bureaucracy. In fact, Shambaugh states categorically that “All operate within administrative hierarchies under either a State Council ministry, a Central Committee department or one of the general departments of the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA).” (Shambaugh, 2002: 579) However, other scholars draw more detailed classifications of China’s international relations research institutes in order to

demonstrate certain key bureaucratic variations. Assessing and classifying research institutes is important because, as Gill and Mulvenon (2002) point out, “The institutional affiliation of a given unit is a highly correlated indicator of the focus and even world-view of a given research organ.” (p. 618)

An instructive division of different institute types is provided by Zhu (2009), and partly mirrors Tanner’s three generations. Zhu corroborates that “China’s official policy research institutes are founded within government agencies.” (p. 337) However, the key word here is ‘official.’ Zhu takes into account the legal categorisation of work units under China’s Civil Law, which includes gov治ernment agencies, public institutions, 政大 enterprises, social groups, 立 and civilian non-profit institutions. ‘Official’ research 學 institutes are, by this definition, those with the legal classification of ‘government 國 agency,’ which fall under the bureaucratic organisation of a government ministry or

‧ department. These reflectTanner’s first generation type of institute. Zhu argues that

‧ N such institutes are so closelya affiliated with government departmentsy that their lack of t t i i s autonomy should excludeo them from classification as ‘think tanks’r in the Western sense: n e a i v “China’s official policy researchl C institutes function n as immediate actors of the he i U government policy process, and not as ‘externalngc brains.h ’” (p. 337) Significant units which fall into this category include CICIR –China Institutes of Contemporary International

Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院, Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiuyuan), which is funded by the Ministry of State Security and subordinate to the the Foreign Affairs

Office of the CCP Central Committee, itself under the high-level decision making body the FALSG – Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (外事工作领导小组, waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu). CICIR is considered by many to be an intelligence unit, with direct access to classified information and direct reporting routes to FALSG. (Shambaugh,

2002; Glaser and Saunders, 2002; Zhu, 2009) Another key unit is CIIS –China Institute of

International Studies (中国国际问题研究所, Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo), which is the Foreign Ministry’s own research arm, and is growing in importance as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins to play a greater role in foreign policy decision making.

(Shambaugh, 2002)

According to Zhu’s argument, focus should be concentrated instead on two other different types of research unit. The first he labels ‘semi-official think tanks.’“Semi- official think tanks are the most important components in the policy research and 治 consultation system outside the Chinese政 government.” 大(p. 338) Semi-official think tanks are those formally and legally立 categorised as ‘public institutions.’ These research 學 institutes maintain certain government connections under their more specific 國 classification as ‘supervised’ or ‘affiliated’ units; they are government-funded and their

‧

leadership is government‧ -appointed. As such, they are not entirely free from N

a y government influence, hence their designation as ‘semi-official.’ Nevertheless,t they are, t i io s legally speaking, independent entities, and unlike their fully officialr counterparts which n e a i v must only pass information tol their C affiliated unit, semin-official research institutes are hengchi U permitted to provide policy guidance to different government and non-government bodies. According to Zhu, this makes semi-official institutes the closest equivalent to the

Western concept of ‘think tanks.’ In large part, this type represents Tanner’s second generation. The best-known example is the huge CASS conglomerate– Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学学院, Zhongguo shehui kexue xueyuan) which has over

4000 staff and 50 research centres. (CASS website)

Zhu’s second category is civilian units. This can include organisations associated with enterprises and non-profit agencies, as well as university institutes and

departments. Civilian research institutes are subject to even less government intervention (although Zhu points out that some are supervised by government departments). The academics of these institutes are perhaps more free to escape the system of stove-piping, creating horizontal linkages through their interaction with other scholars and offering alternative, competitive services in the growing ‘market’ for policy consultation. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007; Zhu, 2013) These institutes generally fall into the third generation, and in terms of foreign policy include the important international relations departments at Qinghua, Beijing, and Shanghai Fudan Universities.

Zhu’s classifications are certainly importa治nt, not least because he goes on to 政大 draw up a model of academic立 policy influence with these distinctions forming a key 學 variable. Zhu’s model of influence will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four, 國 where it will be demonstrated that the bureaucratic distinctions between institution

‧ types has a close association with the sources and pathways to influence policy making.

‧ N

Despite the value of thisa distinction, Zhu’s dismissal of official internationaly relations t t i i s research institutes is lesso beneficial for this study. Zhurejectedr official units from his n e a i v own investigation in the hope ofl consideringC only those Chinesen research institutes that he i U most approached classic Western definitionsng ofc ‘thinkh tanks,’ in order to measure which of a range of variables would most affect policy-influencing mechanisms. The bureaucratic proximity of official research institutes to decision making bodies and the implied clear policy influence was seen to negate the validity of including these institutes in the investigation. However, that is certainly not the case for this study, which is not concerned with the legitimacy or ‘purity’ of the definition of ‘think tanks’ per se; what is significant is which institutes most affect policy decisions and directions, and how they do so. As stated previously,Chinese research institutes’ lack of academic

independence does not detract from the significance of their increasing role and influence on foreign policy decision making.Therefore, the clear policy influence of official research institutes means that the output of such academic bodies will conversely be of even greater interest to those hoping to understand policy stances through the lens of academic influence.

As such, another distinction between categories of research institutes is also of interest. Liu (2005) also defines two different types of research institute. The first is functional department research units (职能部门研究单位, zhineng bumen yanjiu 治 danwei). The second is academic research政 institutes (学术性研究机构大 , xueshuxing yanjiu jigou). Functional department立 research units are basically the equivalent of Zhu’s 學 ‘official research policy research institutes,’ and include those research units which are 國

located within the hierarchical bureaucracy of functional government‧ departments such

as the Ministry of Foreign‧ Affairs or the Ministry of State Security – such as CIIS and N

a y CICIR respectively. Liu argues that this type of research institutet have rich practical t i i s o r experience and are thus highlyn capable in their work. e a i v l C n The second type is academic hreseearchng institutes.chi U This broad category covers both of Zhu’s semi-official and civilian research institutes. However, the denotative emphasis here is that these institutes are more academic in nature than functional department research institutes, which are, as stated, more practical in description. Academic institutes could include university departments and also semi-official institutes such as

CASS, and even the Central Party School. This latter example illustrates the difference in emphasis of Zhu and Liu’s classifications: the Central Party School is closely affiliated with the Communist Party and is a direct conduit for the Party’s message as well as a training centre for the Party elite. (Shambaugh, 2008) There need be no debate over the

Central Party School’s autonomy from political influence. Instead Liu is more concerned with the functional definition of the institutes in question. Liu considers these academic institutes to constitute a research body with more a more wide-ranging arsenal of disciplinary understanding and increasingly vigorous exchange with other academics.

Institutes in both of these categories are in a position to influence policy making.

Liu maintains that the combination of the two types and their different perspectives provides the opportunity for more balanced and comprehensive policy advice. Like Zhu,

Liu also states that the varying functional roles, research tasks, and levels of autonomy of the different categories of research institutes治 are closely related to their distinct 政大 institutional nature and location立 in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As the following Chapter 學 Four will discuss in detail, the categorisation of a research institute within the 國 bureaucratic hierarchy has a definitive impact on policy influence.

‧

‧ N a y t t i i s o r 3.3 China’s Internationaln Relations Researche Institutes: Roles a i v l C n and Functions hengchi U

In many ways, the role of Chinese international relationsresearch institutes is drawing ever nearer to the generally accepted role of those in the West. The key functions of

Chinese institutes are now commonly identified as pursuing genuine academic research and transmitting the findings and conclusions ‘up the ladder’ to provide information for policy decision makers. In addition to this, Chinese research institutes are increasingly expected to engage in Track II diplomacy, which refers to the informal engagement of non-official actors (including but by no means limited to scholars) in communication of

diplomatic relevance. Dialogue between academics across national borders can allow for the exchange and debate of ideas, as well as bringing opportunities to potentially influence outcomes in a more delicate manner and iron out miscommunications and misinterpretations of official rhetoric. As the advantages of Track II diplomacy garner greater support in Chinese circles, it follows that academics are being given a longer leash to interact with their foreign counterparts. (Zhu, 2013)

Glaser and Saunders (2002) lay out five main roles of foreign policy research institutes in contemporary China. Their first and foremost role is to “provide information, analysis and advice to the leadership.”治 As will be discussed in greater detail 政大 in Chapter Four, there are立 various ways in which research institutes and their 學 academics can convey information to decision makers. On occasion leaders will directly 國 request information as they require; but there are also many indirect routes to

‧ informing the leadership. In fact, according to McGann (2002), “in developing and

‧ N transitional countries, thea basic data needed to make informed decisionsy often does not t t i i s exist and must be collectedo and analysed and put into a r form that is usable by n e a i v parliamentarians and bureaucrats.”l C China, which classifiesn itself as a developing nation, he i U is indeed laying increasing emphasis on theng needch for useful, functional information and ever more regularly seeks it out from informed experts.

Secondly, research institutes “conduct academic research.” Rather than simply acting as suppliers of information for policy makers, scholars also strive to achieve rigorous academic quality in their work. Although this may seem axiomatic, in fact the push for increasing academic legitimacy in Chinese research institutes is only recently gaining ground as significant over and above policy support and advocacy. In fact, as

Shambaugh (2002) points out, some renowned research institutes such as CASS

(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and SASS (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) do not consider policy relevance to be their predominant objective, but rather an occasional complement to the academic work with which they are concerned. As such, these institutes tend to place greater emphasis on theoretical perspectives and less on immediate generalisability and practicality.

Thirdly, Glaser and Saunders explain that Chinese academics “provide domestic education,” both through publications and media appearances, and by delivering lectures and speeches to various audiences in academia, industry, and government. On occasion this is done on behalf of the authorities;治 Shambaugh (2002) refers to this as 政大 “policy testing/dissemination立 for the Chinese government.” (p. 576) However, as 學 Tanner (2002) points out, there are now “many profitable venues that are not under the 國 control of their work units.” (p. 562) He considers some prominent academics to be

‧

“speak[ing] only for themselves.” (p. 563) Although this is a relatively secondary role for

‧ N research institutes, anda a very new trend in Chinese academia,y these functions are t t i i s valuable sources of bankrolling.o As will be seen in Chapter Fourr , public prominence is n e a i v now also one manner in whichl C academics can securen greater likelihood of policy he i U influence. ngch

The fourth identified role of research institutes is to “gather information from foreigners,” and the fifth to “influence foreign views of China.” These two can be seen as related as both are functions of Track II diplomacy. Chinese academics are able to garner further information from their foreign contacts and visits, and are regularly required to report on their insights in order to assist decision makers in need of more subtle perceptions than official diplomacy can feasibly provide. According to

Shambaugh (2002) “They often meet foreign specialists and officials and provide a

steady stream of information and intelligence feedback into the system.” (p. 576) Their unofficial status and their similitude with overseas counterparts give academics a doorway to greater understanding and companionable exchange. In turn, Chinese academics, now a key feature of China’s soft power drive to enhance positive perceptions of China throughout the world, also act as representatives of the nation and are well-positioned to constructively influence foreign views as well as argue the case for the Chinese official stance when necessary. (Shambaugh, 2002) In fact, Chinese academics are occasionally explicitly tasked with passing important but potentially sensitive messages on to counterparts in order治 to create a secondary communication 政大 track and avoid unconcealed立 and costly misinterpretations, in a process known as ‘signalling.’ Citing in particular the regular flare-ups in the學 precarious Taiwan-USA-

China balance, Glaser and國 Saunders state that: “The past few years are replete with

‧ examples of efforts by Chinese institute researchers to communicate specific messages

‧ to the United States andN other governments through contacts with foreign scholars.” a y t t i (Glaser and Saunders, 2002:i 606) In short, in addition to providings policy makers with o r n e information and advice, and educatinga the public, academicsv also act as messengers and l i C Un communicators outside of official h channels,eng c aidinghi policy makers in another, more subtle dimension. However, “Signalling constitutes a very small percentage of their interactions.” (Tanner, 2002: 572)

Interestingly, a Chinese language source summarises the role of Chinese research institutes somewhat differently. In an editorial for Contemporary World journal (当代世

界, Dangdai Shijie), Liu Wanzhen (2005) also outlines five responsibilities of Chinese international relations research institutes. The primary role given is indeed the provision of quality information to assist policy makers. This corroboration indicates

that this is undoubtedly the foremost broad function of Chinese research institutes.

However, Liu then goes on to provide four additional, more specific responsibilities.

Firstly, the Chinese government has denoted the first two decades of the 21st century as an ‘important period of strategic opportunity’ (重要战略机遇期, zhongyao zhanlüe jiyu qi); the role of research institutes is to carry out progressive, strategic-minded research to fulfil the needs of this period. This reveals a far more targeted, purposive research stance than reflected in outside analyses of Chinese international relations research institutes. Similarly, research institutes are expected to support the development of strategic thinking (战略思维, zhanlüe siwei) 治 and theoretical thinking (理论思维, lilun 政大 siwei), which are seen as the立 prerequisite for the strategic policy making favoured by 學 the Chinese government. Thirdly, research institutes are tasked with providing 國 guidance and explaining the advantages and disadvantages of different policy tactics

‧ and manoeuvres, again an essential component of strategic policy making. That these

‧ N closely related functionsa are divided into three and consideredy individually t t i i s demonstrates a clear o predilection for the significance ofr comprehensive and n e a v overarching strategy and a reflectionl on the role of academiani in ensuring a strategically Ch U conceived foreign policy. The final rolee n thatg Liuch pointsi to is the academic analysis of major and profound questions within the field of international relations. Examples given include ideological trends, basic global contradictions, and leftist movements, as well as multi-polarisation in the international political system and developments and impacts of economic globalisation.

In conclusion, whilst the role of Chinese international relations research institutes can be framed in different ways, there is no doubt that amongst more secondary functions, the predominant responsibility of contemporary Chinese research

institutes is to provide information, analysis, and advice to policy makers, and to assist with the formation of a strategically calculated foreign policy. Unlike other actors with far more blatant biases, such as civil society interest groups or the PLA, research institutes are now increasingly expected to offer objective and practically-applicable insights. Nevertheless, the potential of research units to retain academic autonomy, as well as to wrest policy influence, are dictated in great part by the design and development of the system in which they are located, in particular by both institutionalised and informal affiliations.

治政大立 This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of China’s 學 international relations 國 research institutes. From 1956 until the present day, the development of China’s research institutes can be divided into three‧ generational styles,

‧ all of which remain inN operation today. Taken together, these three types of research

a y t institute and their stafft constitute China’s current internationali relations academia. i s o r Administratively, China’s researchn institutes may be official,e semi-official, or civilian, a v l i depending on their location withinC the overall bureaucracyn of the system and the hengchi U proximity of their connection to government bodies. China’s international relations research institutes have many roles, but their foremost function is to provide policy- relevant information, as well as advice, analysis, and recommendations to China’s foreign policy decision makers. And as the world of academia in China continues to evolve and grow, the policy influence available to academics marches in parallel.

Chapter 4

Mechanisms of Academic Influence on China’s Foreign Policy

As shown in Chapter Three, China’s international relations academia is continuing to evolve and it is now collectively growing into a potent force for policy influence.

Decision makers are increasingly relying on the research of experts and academics to inform their policy choices. However, the output of Chinese international relations 治 academia is vast and varied. How do政 some academics 大get noticed and influence policy decisions ahead of their peers?立 Glaser and Saunders (2002) astutely argue that 學

“understanding the sources國 of policy influence and the pathways through which

influence is exercised is important to help identify which analysts‧ and think tanks are

most influential and where‧ their influence is felt within the Chinese system.” Chapter N

a y t Four will therefore outlinet the precise mechanisms of foreigni policy influence io s associated with the world nof academia in China, explaining howr the output of China’s a e l i v international relations research institutesC and individualn academics can be brought to hengchi U the attention of decision makers. This chapter will firstly provide a classic model of research utilisation in policy making, taking into account Chinese utilisation preferences, in order to reveal some of the ways in which research output can theoretically be employed in the policy making process. Secondly, this chapter will move on to consider some of the concrete pathways to policy influence available to Chinese academics in practice. Next, this chapter will go into further detail on factors of influence. This section will be split into three: levels of influence; sources of influence; and differentiated sources. Differences in the bureaucratic structure of China’s research institutes mean

that academics draw their influence at different levels and from different sources.

Finally, the chapter will conclude with a well-known illustrative example of academic policy influence in action.

4.1 Models of Research Utilisation

In a seminal work entitled ‘The Many Meanings of Research Utilisation,’ Carol Weiss

(1979) outlined seven key ways in which social sciences research could ultimately make 治 an impact upon policy. Although 政 the work was written大 decades ago, it remains extremely on-point and relevant立 for pathways to policy influence today, and can offer 學 insights into the evolution of international relations research institutes’ mechanisms of 國 influencing foreign policy. These models will be considered in the context of research

‧

utilisation in Chinese decisionmaking.‧ N

a y t The first model, t the ‘knowledge-driven model,’ refers toi the manner in which i s o r expanding knowledge can leadn to new policy innovations, bute tends to occur only in the a i v l C n fields of science and technology. A secondhen model,gch thei U‘tactical model,’ takes place when the very existence of research, or occasionally certain content of research, is used by governments or interested parties to defend against criticism or curry favour. These two approaches are largely irrelevant in terms of this study. However, the remaining five models are of great interest.

Firstly is the ‘problem-solving model.’ Weiss explains that in this model, a policy goal already exists, but there remains a knowledge or information gap which must be filled in order to identify appropriate solutions or best ways to fulfil this policy goal.

Within this model, there are two ways in which research can be utilised. The first is that

the research already exists but the policy maker is not originally aware of it; relevant research comes to their attention, either deliberately or fortuitously, and is employed to resolve the policy problem. Secondly, the research may be commissioned by the policy maker specifically to fill in the knowledge gap and allow them to make an appropriate policy choice. In this model, it is expected that policy makers have clearly defined what information they are missing and actively seek it out, and that the research provides this information. Interestingly, Weiss remarks: “Implicit in this model is a sense that there is a consensus on goals… policy makers and researchers tend to agree on what the desired end state shall be.” (Weiss, 1979: 427)治政大 The second model of立 interest is the ‘political model.’ Within this model, policy 學 makers have already chosen their policy direction: “For reasons of interest, ideology, or 國 intellect, [policy makers] have taken a stand that research is not likely to shake.” (p. 429)

‧

Instead, social sciences research is employed as ‘ammunition’ for the cause. As Weiss

‧ N writes, “Partisans flourisha the evidence in an attempt to neutralisey opponents, convince t t i i s waverers, and bolster supporters.o Even if conclusions have to ber ripped out of context… n e a i v research becomes grist to the l mill.” C (Weiss, 1979: 429)n She goes on to point out that he i U whilst this approach is often seen as an illen gitimategch by academic purists, it does ensure that research has strong policy relevance – even if the policy decision antedates the research itself.

Taken together, these two models cast insight into the traditional use of academic research by policy makers in China before the rapid evolution of the system began to take place in the 1990s. As mentioned in Chapter Two, policy was decided by a small, select core of decision makers, who were certainly guided by notions of ideology and interest. It was often the case that a policy would be formulated for purely

ideological reasons. (Wills, 2011) Furthermore, research institute employees were on a tight rein and were often selected for their loyalty to the Communist Party (Zhu, 2013), with little freedom to pursue their own research agenda instead of the Party’s – in other words, just as in the problem-solving model, policy makers and researchers did have a consensus on goals. Often researchers would scrabble to provide the information the leadership needed to press ahead with a policy which was already decided upon.

Researchers were not free to follow their own research agenda and were employed to respond to research tasks laid out by their supervising units. (Shambaugh, 2002; Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) It could therefore be argued治 that during this period of time, the 政大 relationship between research立 and policy making could be characterised by a mixture of the problem-solving and political models. Interestingly, though,學 due to the one-party dictatorship and the almost國 total absence of political opposition at the time, there was

‧ little need to ‘neutralise opponents’ or ‘convince waverers.’ Instead, the existence and

‧ use of apparently relevantN research outcomes could be used to bolster not only a y t t i supporters but also the Pai rty’s legitimacy and correctness. s o r n e a i v Since this time, the processl C of policy making has undergonen huge changes, and as he i U the number of actors involved has pluralisedng andch diversified, so have the paths to policy influence. The political and problem-solving models certainly still exist; as Glaser and

Saunders remark, some policy makers “actively solicit analysis that addresses current policy issues or supports their views.”(p. 614) However, there are also three other models which demonstrate some of the newer ways in which Chinese researchers are influencing policy making. Firstly is the ‘interactive model.’ Weiss explains, “Those engaged in developing policy seek information not only from social scientists but from a range of sources – administrators, practitioners, politicians, planners, journalists, clients,

interest groups, aides, friends.” (p. 428) This mirrors the increasing number of actors involved in the more pluralised Chinese policy making processes in contemporary China.

These various groups interact with each other and through this process, enough knowledge is gleaned to make an appropriate policy. China’s international relations researchers would therefore be one piece of a complex, interconnected jigsaw of actors all playing their part in influencing the decision making process. Importantly, this model reflects how decision makers actively seek out the information they need or desire, but draw it out through the interaction of a range of different players.

Secondly is the ‘enlightenment model,’治 in which policy makers are ‘enlightened’ 政大 by research: “It is the concepts立 and theoretical perspectives that social science research 學 has engendered that permeate the policy-making process.” (p. 429) Weiss continues to 國 explain that decision makers do not seek out information, but come to make use of it

‧ passively. “Social science research diffuses circuitously through manifold channels –

‧ N professional journals, thea mass media, conversations with colleagues…y In the long run, t t i i s along with other influences,o it often redefines the policy agenda.”r (pp. 429-430) What’s n e a i v more, importantly: “Unlike thel problem C -solving model, thisn model of research does not he i U assume that, in order to be useful, researchng resultsch must be compatible with decision makers’ values and goals.” (p. 430) This model also closely reflects some of the changes in Chinese decision making. No longer do policy makers accept only those findings which back up their research or fulfil their goals; instead, they are open to alternative viewpoints and may be influenced by ideas despite not actively seeking them out. (Zhu,

2013) Chinese academics are also airing their views via more channels, including the media and through personal networking. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)

The final model is referred to as “research as part of the intellectual enterprise of society.” In this model, as societal trends change over time, so does the direction and scope of research. “Research is one part of the interconnected intellectual enterprise.”

(p. 430) Increasing attention to certain research topics attracts the interest of policy makers, who may boost funding, thus attracting more research. This model demonstrates the benefits of the intellectual or academic pursuit of knowledge. In China, growing emphasis is placed on improving academic excellence and building a firm base of high-quality research – one part of the intellectual enterprise of society, as it were. (Shambaugh, 2002; Glaser and Saunders, 2002)治 Once certain ideas are mooted, greater 政大 funding may be supplied to build立 up understanding of the concepts involved. Research centres such as CASS, with a stronger emphasis on academic rigour,學 reflect this model in action. 國

‧

The combination of these five models – problem-solving, political, interactive,

‧ N enlightenment, and intellectuala enterprise – forms the basis of mechanismsy of research t t i i s utilisation prevalent in Chinao today. In other words, internationalr relations research n e a i v influences policy making via thesel C five means. These modelsn are certainly important to he i U consider when assessing the impact of researchngc onh policy; measuring influence is not as simple as merely investigating which research policy makers have actively sought.

Research which has reached decision makers’ eyes and ears through other channels must also be taken into account.

4.2Pathways of Research Utilisation in China

The models of research utilisation are informative yet abstract. In the Chinese context, in what concrete ways does research reach decision makers and subsequently have the opportunity to influence policy? These concrete ways, which combine features of the different models of research utilisation, are referred to as ‘pathways’ by Glaser and

Saunders (2002). Zhu (2009) also outlines direct and indirect pathways to influence.

Zhu (2009) points out that, in terms of direct pathways to influence, “expert consultation by the Chinese government has治 been institutionalised… The Chinese 政大 government not only seeks and立 sponsors think tank consultants to conduct long-term research projects but also invites them to government meetings學 and seminars on more 國 immediate policy issues.” (p. 340) This combines a problem-solving and interactive

‧ approach; often policy makers are unsure of the most appropriate direction to take and

‧ N consult with expert academics to gain the information needed to make the choice. a y t t i Occasionally policy makersi instead hope to gain initial viewpointss from a range of o r n e sources, including researchers,a to build a foundation upon vwhich to better understand l i Ch Un policy concerns. Academics with relevanten researchgchi interests are invited to put forward their views and recommendations during small group (小组, xiaozu) meetings with policy decision makers, or to submit reports on specific issues when required. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002)

A similar approach also involves policy makers seeking out information: “Policy makers occasionally solicit opinions and advice on policy issues from research institute analysts.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 607) However, in this case, these consultations are informal in nature. Both Zhu and Glaser and Saunders note that this pathway is

really only available to those academics with connections to policy makers (关系, guanxi), or to those who have caught the attention of policy makers through other means.

One of the key ways in which policy makers can become aware of the work of academics is through internal reports (内部参考, neibu cankao), considered by Glaser and Saunders to be “the most regular means through which foreign policy analysis reaches senior leaders and policy makers.” (p. 607) Zhu explains that news agencies are responsible for filtering information from a range of sources and collating it into 治 internal publications for review 政 by senior leaders.大 Internal reports arehighly confidential edited news reports立 circulated only to the highest leadership. There are 學 different levels of clearance within the CCP; each level is allowed access to an 國

increasingly restricted amount of sensitive information, which in‧ addition to basic facts

and news reports, may‧ also include policy recommendations and comments by N

a y academics. (Grant, 1988) As such, any research selected for inclusiont in these top-level t i io s internal reports is likely to ngain a boost in potential influence; inr this pathway, decision a e l i v makers do not seek information Cactively but have it presentedn to them through other hengchi U sources. In the case that a specific policy dilemma has arisen, this information may help resolve the issue, as in the problem-solving model. However, it may be instead that information included in these internal reports ‘enlightens’ policy makers who later incorporate these ideas into their decisions.

The more prominent a researcher or a research unit, the more likely their work is to be transmitted to decision makers. There are many ways academic bodies can achieve prominence, including through official status or personal affiliations. One other effective way is by raising their public profile. Glaser and Saunders note that

“appearances in Chinese or Western media” are an important pathway to influence, pointing out that “Quotations in an article by an important foreign journalist can place an analyst’s words directly on the desks of senior policy makers and analysts the next day.” (p. 607) In other words, if academics catch the attention of the media or the public, the likelihood of their message being conveyed to policy makers grows exponentially.

Glaser and Medeiros (2007) contend that as the media continues to liberalise, this pathway will become more widely and openly available to academics, who will be able to build their influence greatly if they know how to ‘work’ the media.

One rapidly developing pathway falls治 squarely into the interactive model: 政大 internal conferences. According立 to Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese think tanks sometimes 學 hold internal conferences that bring together experts on a particular subject to 國 exchange views.” (p. 607) These conferences allow research institute academics to

‧ interact with their peers and is a sign of the trend of horizontalisation across the

‧ N academic sphere in China,a cutting across the rigid stove-pipey system. Conference t t i i s reports may be passed ono to policy makers, gaining influential currency.r n e a v l i Finally, academics can secureC influence through theirn publications and research hengchi U output. Depending on how research products come to be utilised by policy making actors, this pathway can incorporate problem-solving, interactive, enlightenment or even political models, as well as contributing to intellectual enterprise in general.

Successful publication in the academic world may also on occasion lead to greater public presence and media attention, especially when concerned with pertinent or controversial issues, increasing the likelihood that policy makers will hear tell of their work. Once publications have come or been brought to the attention of policy makers,

or academics’ ideas have percolated opinion on certain policy-relevant topics, the groundwork is laid for their research to influence policy in practice.

4.3 Factors of Policy Influence

As discussed in section 4.1, there are various established ways in which academics’ work can come to be used by policy makers, whether directly or indirectly. Section 4.2 considers some of the concrete ways in which the research of Chinese academics may be 治 conveyed to decision makers. But there政 remains another大 piece to the puzzle: within China’s vast and ever-expanding立 international relations academia, how and why do 學 certain research units and individual academics carry greater sway than others? 國

‧ As Glaser and Saunders (2002) explain, “Policy influence requires both a

‧ pathway to reach policyN makers and reasons for policy makers to pay attention to an a y t analyst’s views.” (p. 608)t In other words, studying the concrete waysi in which research io s n r may be conveyed to decision makers is not enough; it is also importante to consider why a i v l C n a decision maker would choose to acknowledgehengc handi evenU follow the recommendations of any given academic and overlook others. There are, in fact, various different sources of influence. Some are related to the individual academic in question, and some to the status of the academic’s associated research institute. In turn, different institutes and different academics draw their influence from various sources. The influence of a research institute can be passed on to their academics, but individual academics are also able to build up influence outside of their work unit. In short, there is no one clear single way in which a research institute or researcher can build up their policy influence.

4.3.1 Levels of Influence

In order to analyse this in more depth, it is important to consider that the influence of

China’s academics (and entire research institutes) can be built up at different levels.

This thesis argues that, firstly, researchers can garner direct influence on decision makers. Secondly, researchers can build up influence within their own circle and amongst their peers. Thirdly, researchers can command a public presence and media connections which boost their influence.

Dividing these levels of influence in this way ties in closely with the mechanisms 政治 of research utilisation suggested by Weiss (1979) as well大 as the concrete pathways of 立 research utilisations compiled from Glaser and Saunders (2002)學 and Zhu (2009). For example, if an academic國 or research unit has direct influence at the decision-making level, they are more likely to draw their policy influence from‧ problem-solving and

‧ interactive pathways inN which they engage directly with the decision maker(s). In turn, a y t decision makers may directlyt solicit their advice through pathwaysi such as policy io s n r meetings and consultations, or requests to write a policy-relevante report. This can apply a i v l C n to entire research units or individuals.h engchi U

Secondly, building up influence amongst peers can involve raising esteem established through peer networks or academic excellence. Logically, the larger a researcher’s network of academic counterparts, the greater their odds of wielding influence. In addition, scholars may be respected for the quality of their work, the length and breadth of their experience in the field, or their educational background. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002) Some research institutes can rely on their established reputation and size to gain this respect. (Zhu, 2013) Many factors can increase researchers’ prominence within academia, which may then translate into greater policy influence.

Respected academics might be invited to attend a greater number or a higher ranked conferences, or publish more research in more highly ranked publications. Their work stands a greater chance of being conveyed to policy makers through internal reports or the briefings passed on from academic conferences. (Zhu 2009; 2013) This route to influence strongly reflects the interactive and enlightenment models – interaction between different parties can eventually influence decision makers, or enlighten them to new ways of thinking.

The enlightenment model works when decision makers come to certain ways of thinking after being stimulated by research which治 they may come across from a number 政大 of channels; they may not 立 even be aware of the source of the research, but it has 學 percolated their conscious. The third level of influence also falls into the enlightenment 國 model. Building up greater prominence at a public level, especially via the media or

‧ through best-selling books, boosts the likelihood that research will gain currency in the

‧ N zeitgeist of thinking anda will stand a chance of percolating into the yconscious of decision t t i i s makers. o r n e a v l i In fact, each of these levels Cof influence can give academicsn leads into other levels. hengchi U For example, a scholar with a high level of influence within academic circles may be sought out for interviews or comments by the media, thus building up public influence, or consulted by a policy maker, therefore building influence at the decision maker level.

Or those academics or research institutes more regularly called on by decision makers may catch the attention of the public, or of academic counterparts. Glaser and Medeiros

(2007), for instance, consider academics to be both opinion-makers and conveyors of public opinion. That is to say, in addition to influencing the public with their own ideas,

they also act as a bridge bringing public discussion to the decision makers, and decision makers’ ideas to the public – thus crossing between levels of influence.

4.3.2 Sources of Policy Influence

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the system of Chinese research institutes has evolved differently to classic Western systems. The distinctions also pass through into sources of influence. Unlike Western (particularly US and UK research institutes), which regularly build up their influence through wealth, resources,治 and competition, Chinese research 政大 institutes draw their influence立 from distinct conditions such as the Chinese tradition of 學 personal networks or the unique bureaucracy of the Chinese research system. The ways 國 in which academics and research institutes can build up their influence at different

‧ levels derive from different sources. Once again Glaser and Saunders (2002) provide

‧ N some invaluable insights,a dividing the sources of policy influencey into four: positional, t t i i s expertise, experiential, ando personal, corroborated by Zhu r (2009), who offers the n e a v comparable delineations of administrativel linkages, expertni knowledge, and personal Ch U ties. engchi

Positional influence is one of the most important sources of influence. Research institutes build up positional influence, and the academics working within these units draw upon this influence to their own advantage. In fact, so important is this source, the leaders of research institutes with high positional influence “have opportunities to influence policy regardless of their qualifications.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 609)

The system of Chinese research institutes was described in detail in Chapter Three.

There are official research institutes, legally classed as ‘government agencies,’ which are administratively under government ministries or departments; semi-official units

classed as ‘public institutions,’ with some limited affiliation to government bodies; and civilian institutes, which can be university departments or organisations working for industry or non-profit agencies. These classifications are important when evaluating the positional influence of a research institute. “Positional influence can be based…on an organisational relationship with particular policy-making bodies.” (Glaser and Saunders,

2002: 608) Zhu (2009) explains that these administrative links are important in terms of the pathways to research utilisation available to certain organisations. He argues: “In many cases, a think tank is able to influence policies… mainly because its experts can submit their research reports and ideas to 治 decision makers through administrative 政大 linkages.” (p. 341) 立學 Every research institute in the Chinese system answers to a higher authority. 國 (Shambaugh, 2002; Zhu, 2009; 2013) This may be a government body, as in the case of

‧ official and semi-official research institutes, or an enterprise, organisation, or university

‧ N in the case of civiliana research institutes. All institutes in y China are assigned t t i i s bureaucratic rank. (Zhu, 2009)o In essence, “The higher the supervisingr unit’s rank, the n e a i v better the administrative linkagel C a think tank can develop.”n (Zhu, 2009: 341) When he i U evaluating the positional influence of ann academicgch or a research unit it is therefore instructive to work ‘up the chain,’ identifying the supervising unit and their ranking within official bureaucracy. In fact, Zhu notes that research units are themselves assigned ranks, usually one rank lower than the supervising unit. Official research institutes which are supervised by government departments or ministries directly involved in the policy making process are likely to draw the greatest positional influence by dint of their own rank and their proximity to the policy makers. In addition, as the importance of a government unit waxes and wanes, so does its affiliated research

arm. Shambaugh (2002) points out that as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gets a greater footing in the policy making process, its associated unit, CIIS, is growing in influence.

The growing influence of CIIS may be beginning to push CICIR, previously the most preeminent policy-influencing research institute, on to the back foot. (Shambaugh, 2002)

Another aspect of positional influence is which pathways are officially open to a unit. “Regulations stipulate which research units can use certain channels to submit papers to the leadership.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: 608) Some units, such as CIIS and CICIR, are permitted to submit reports through confidential channels directly to decision makers, vastly increasing the likelihood治 of their work being utilised. This work 政大 may closely resemble published立 work, but include details that are judged too sensitive 學 to discuss openly. Other research units – particularly civilian units and university 國 departments – do not have the permission to pass work on through official channels and

‧ may have to rely on either unofficial connections or building up their prominence in

‧ N other ways. That said,a even if a research unit is allowed y to directly pass on t t i i s recommendations, this byo no means ensures that work will definitelyr be paid heed by n e a i v decision makers. It merely vastlyl C increases the chances ofn the work being noticed, as it he i U is a direct pathway to influence. ngch

One further aspect is access to information. “Positional influence can [also] be based…on access to classified information through institutional channels.” (Glaser and

Saunders, 2002: 608) The position of a research unit within the system dictates its access to information and intelligence. Naturally research units and academics with access to more information are able to draw more accurate and credible analyses than those lacking information. The key example here is CICIR, which, in its position as a research unit funded by the Ministry of State Security, has open access to a wide range

of classified material which is unavailable to other units. Awareness that certain academics can draw on more information as a consequence of the bureaucratic position of their associated research unit would logically lead decision makers to opt to utilise their research output in preference to the less well-informed. That said, the growth of the internet and the increasing freedom to information in China may be beginning to erode this advantage. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002)

The reputation of the research unit or expert can also be built up via sources of expertise and experience, which together correspond to Zhu’s category of expert knowledge. As he writes, “after cumulated years治 of education, training, and researching 政大 in particular policy fields, many立 of China’s think tanks are able to attract the attention of 學 officials and prompt them to adopt policy suggestions.” (Zhu, 2009: 340) This source of 國 influence is growing as the emphasis on academic excellence is redoubled within

‧

Chinese academia. Those research units and individual academics of high repute in

‧ N certain policy fields area evidently more likely to be called upon byy decision makers to t t i i s offer expert advice than thoseo of relatively nondescript reputations.r n e a v l i This source of influence C can be reinforced by n the circulation of research in hengchi U respected publications. In addition to the China Core Journals Index (中文核心期刊,

Zhongwen Hexin Qikan), which covers all journal subjects,China has its own social sciences index known as the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI).2This is the domestic equivalent tothe global Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and functions by assigning a rank to academic journals based on impact factor.Institutes issuing high ranking publications, or academics with work accepted by higher ranked publications,

2 See Appendix II on page 150 for a full list of the 39 journals in the Politics category, in ranking order. The Politics category includes International Relations and individual Area Studies (such as European Studies or American Studies) as well as Politics and Public Administration, and is therefore the category relevant for this research.

are able to build up their academic merit. (Glaser and Saunders, 2002; Zhu, 2009) In addition to this institutionalised form of academic merit, there are also more informal ways of building up this influence, such as media exposure as an ‘expert pundit,’ though it must be noted that the media tends to prefer sensationalist viewpoints which catch their audience’s attention. (Tanner, 2002)

In addition to the expertise reflected in the publication of research, academics and research institutes can also draw upon experiential influence. In the case of entire institutes, this can include the historical significance of the unit in question – Zhu (2009) remarks that “generally speaking, the longer 治the history of an institute, the greater its 政大 influence.” (p. 347) Once again立 CICIR and CIIS are ahead in the rankings in this regard, 學 as two of China’s oldest research institutes. The cumulative experience of the 國 researchers employed by an institute, in particular the leadership, also contributes to

‧ this source of influence. For individual academics, “As the Chinese foreign policy system

‧ N becomes more professionalised,a university degrees, foreign travely or study, and t t i i s personal connections witho foreign experts are becoming r increasingly important n e a i v credentials.” (Glaser and Saunders,l C 2002: 613) Experiencen of studying abroad and he i U networks of foreign counterparts, as welln asg anc outstandingh educational background at respected universities, are not enough to create influence on their own, but can bolster the respect an academic receives within the system. Further to this, experience of policy consultation in the past, or even previous work in diplomatic or government roles, are other ways in which an academic can boost experiential influence. Finally, the influence of those who have already spent a long period in an influential role continues to redouble over time.

One source of policy influence which is particularly ‘Chinese’– or distinct from

Western – in nature is that of personal ties. Personal ties (关系, guanxi) penetrate every aspect and walk of life in China, creating an informal and unofficial system of influence on a personal scale in the academic context. As Glaser and Saunders (2002) point out,

“Personal relationships are arguably the most important source of policy influence in the Chinese system and also the hardest to document.” (p. 612)

In fact, so important are personal ties that often promotion to high positions can be secured by the command of an extensive personal network; the personal ties of 治 research institutes’ leaders are the政 main source of大 the personal influence of the institutes themselves: “Deputy立 or executive directors of large think tanks are sometimes 學 deliberately chosen to expand the organisation’s expertise and policy networks as a 國 whole.” (Zhu, 2009: 356) Shambaugh (2002) also notes that the influence of Chinese

‧

international relations‧ research institutes varies “as a result of the relative personal N

a y influence and connections (guanxi) of institute directors or occasionat lly individual staff t i io s members.” (p. 581) r n e a i v l C n These personal relationshipsh canen beg builtch i up U into very complex systems, and therefore do not necessarily entail a direct link between an academic and a policy maker, although these associations do exist. Essentially, the larger an academic’s network the greater the likelihood that their work will reach a decision maker. Personal networks may span the levels of influence: the most influential academics may have personal affiliations with decision makers in government, their peers in academia, and others in the public sphere, such as the media or publishing world. In terms of personal networks, it is not only the number of contacts that one can call on that matters, but also whether these contacts have any position of influence of their own. (Gold et al., 2002)

However, it follows that the larger a personal network, the more opportunity to build influence through personal ties. Personal relationships can infiltrate any of the identified models and pathways of research utilisation. Those with close personal relationships to other influential actors may be directly sought out by contacts in preference over others, or may be able to push their own agenda either directly or indirectly through other contacts who can ‘pull strings’ when necessary. Shambaugh

(2002) points out that “connections often enable a think tank to circumvent normal bureaucratic channels and processes.” (p. 581)

These ties can be built in any number of治 ways. For example, former colleagues or 政大 schoolmates, students with 立 teachers, employees with superiors, family members, and 學 shared experiences may all lead to the creation of ties. (Stockman, 2000) However, the 國 extensive nature of guanxi poses certain problems when analysing the influence

‧ garnered from this source. Although it is occasionally possible to identify implied or

‧ N possible ties by consideringa the biographical information of thosey concerned, this is by t t i i s no means watertight. (Glasero and Medeiros, 2007) What’s more,r this approach cannot n e a i v trace the convoluted nature of lguanxi C as ties are also builtn through mutual introduction he i U by other contacts. (Gold et al., 2002) Awarenessngch of the existence of this factor when evaluating influence is important. For example, in his empirical study of policy influence,

Zhu (2009) acknowledged this difficulty and chose to use self-reported evidence of the extent of personal networks to overcome this obstacle, whilst simultaneously admitting that this was empirically weak.

4.3.3 Differentiated Sources of Influence

When measuring the influence of different categories of research unit, Naughton (2002) argues that as the system of academia develops, although “open competition may be creating pressure for stronger, higher quality… analysis,” the greater independence of civilian institutes “may well have come at the price of decreased policy influence” when compared to official and semi-official units. However, following empirical analysis, Zhu

(2009) conversely concluded that statistically, “Civilian think tanks are about as influential as semi-official think tanks in… total influence.” (p. 348) As such, one of the 治 most important things to draw from政 the review of sources大 of policy influences is that different sources take precedence立 for different types of research institute, and for 學 individual academics themselves.In short, the levels of influence of different types of 國

institute are basically equal, but sourced differently. ‧

‧ Positional influenceN is clearly an extremely effective source of influence – for a y t those institutes which possesst it. Official and semi-official researchi institutes clearly io s n r benefit from this source of influence, due to their bureaucratice affiliations with a i v l C n government bodies. Lu (1997) explainshen g thec relativehi U influence of theseunits thus: “bureaucracy-affiliated institutions have better access – a) to processed, often confidential information generated through the bureaucratic system… and b) to top decision-makers through the well-established bureaucratic channels.” (p. 131)

Academics in these institutes are able to convey their research output to policy decision makers directly through official channels, can access more extensive sources of information, and gain respect by proxy as a result of the bureaucratic rank of the institute itself. In other words, it is the research institute itself which has built up

positional influence; individual academics in these units are then able to use it to their advantage.

However, civilian research institutes and their academics admittedly cannot draw on positional influence in this way. Civilian research institutes cannot access classified information easily or make use of official channels to connect directly with decision makers. According to Zhu (2009), “There is a prevalent opinion in society that civilian think tanks are at a disadvantage when they try to influence the government.” (p.

347) Further to this, Glaser and Medeiros (2007) also emphasise that outside research on the relationship between research institutes治 and foreign policy used to focus solely 政大 on official units, as “Debates 立were for the most part initiated and concluded within such 學 circles.” (p. 307) This stemmed from the fact that civilian research institutes lack 國 positional influence overall. However, now, the importance of semi-official and civilian

‧ research institutes is growing, and cannot be ignored. In particular, lack of positional

‧ N influence does not meana that individual academics from civiliany research institutes t t i i s categorically wield less influenceo than their counterparts in r official and semi-official n e a i v institutes. Instead, these academicsl C must draw on othern sources of influence, namely he i U their expert knowledge and personal networks.ngch “Semi-official think tanks are… more able to influence policies through administrative linkages, while civilian think tanks demonstrate their influence through the efforts of individual researchers.” (Zhu, 2009:

343) As Glaser and Medeiros (2007) argue, “New foreign policy ideas and strategies can be injected from outside the formal central government bureaucracy, albeit by actors who have channels to the leadership and extensive knowledge of the right buttons to push within the Party and government systems.” (p. 309)

What’s more, it may be that academics from civilian research institutes are actually able to draw far greater influence than those in official and semi-official research institutes at the public and peer levels of influence. For instance, one identified drawback of the Chinese research system is the serious stove-piping, in which different research units do not interact much with one another. However, this problem of stove- piping is more severe amongst official units, which are hindered in any effort to create horizontal links by the compartmentalisation and regulation of the system. (Zhu, 2009;

2013) More and more horizontal linkages are being built up, but as Shambaugh (2002) points out, “this contact remains informal and 治personal rather than institutionalised.” (p. 政大 580) That is to say, those able立 to overstep the traditional bureaucratic strictures and engage more flexibly in personal interaction are those able學 to draw the benefits of increased horizontal collaboration.國 It is scholars in civilian units who are best placed to

‧ take advantage of the growing trend of horizontalisation and thus build up more links

‧ amongst peers, as wellN as improve their research output through exchange of ideas. a y t t i (Glaser and Saunders, 2002;i Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) In s addition, academics in o r n e civilian research units may bea more free to engage in contactv with both domestic and l i C Un foreign media, and air their views throughhen gsensationalistchi statements and publications, thus building up their public prestige. Academics in official units are traditionally far more closely guarded in the statement of their ideas in public (though there are trends of change in this regard).(Tanner, 2002)

In an empirical study designed to identify which variables affected the influence of Chinese research institutes, Zhu (2009) carried out regression analysis to pinpoint which combination of factors would boost influence. Using research institute executive directors to represent the institutes as a whole, he discovered that the variables of

personal networks and expert knowledge had statistically significant effects on the overall level of influence of research institutes of all classifications. Greater personal networks with decision makers increased influence specifically at this level. In terms of expert knowledge, educational background did have a somewhat positive effect on overall influence levels; experience overseas, in itself, did not have any clear impact.

Nonetheless, time abroad increased the extent of personal networks, thus generating an indirect impact.

The study also concludes that the wealth and size of research institutes seems less relevant than it would be for ‘think tanks治’ in a Western system. In fact, the study 政大 concluded that although civilian立 research institutes were seen to be ‘disadvantaged’ in 學 terms of size and funding, this simply did not make a difference to their overall 國 influence. Zhu explains that [unlike in Western countries], “In contemporary mainland

‧

China, where there is no mature market for consultancy services on policy making and

‧ N no sufficiently free environmenta for policy idea discussions, the y relationship between t t i i s money and influence mighto not be close.” (p. 356) r n e a v l i Most importantly, the regressionC analysis concludedn that, when controlling for hengchi U other mitigating variables, personal networks and expert knowledge both had a statistically more significant effect on the influence of civilian research institutes than semi-official ones. On the other hand, the administrative links of semi-official institutes had a greater impact than the links of civilian institutes. As such, “semi-official think tanks are consequently more able to influence policies through administrative linkages, while civilian think tanks demonstrate their influence through the efforts of individual researchers.” (Zhu, 2009: 342-3) This indicates quantitatively that China’s research institutes, and therefore their associated academics, draw their policy influence from a

combination of different sources. An academic’s manner of leverage will depend on which approach is more advantageous to him, a consideration largely dictated by where the academic is located within the overall system of research institutes in China. As

Glaser and Saunders (2002) summarise, although positional influence retains its great importance, within the evolving system of international relations academia, “Analysts with policy expertise, national reputations or personal connections with policy makers can exercise policy influence even when working outside traditionally influential research institutes.”(p. 614)

There remains one final point to make.治 The influence academics may come to 政大 wield over policy influence is立 rarely accidental. Academics that are keen to have their 學 views heard deliberately leverage their sources of influence to their favour, making use 國 of their personal contacts or administrative links in particular. (Weiss, 1979; Glaser and

‧

Medeiros, 2007) What’s more, “Scholars increasingly take the initiative to propose

‧ N conducting research ona subject areas they judge to be importanty for Chinese policy t t i i s makers.” (Glaser and Saunders,o 2002: 605). Glaser and Medeirosr (2007) argue that n e a i v while these ‘interventions’ havel beenC relatively commonn within the field of economics, he i U this is a fairly new trend in the field of n foreigngch policy. This trend can be expected to continue to grow over time. China’s academics are not passive analysts without agenda of their own. Many indeed hope that their research will help shape the future direction of China’s foreign policy, and work hard to make that happen.

4.4 An Illustrative Case

One of the most well-known and oft-cited examples of policy being influenced by academia is the case of Zheng Bijian (郑必坚) and his idea of China’s Peaceful Rise (和平

崛起, heping jueqi). This case illustrates the models, pathways, levels, and sources discussed in this chapter.

Zheng Bijian was named one of Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers in

2010.He has previously worked as vice-director of CASS, vice-Minister of the

Propaganda Department, vice-president of the治 Central Party School, and then as a 政大 member of the Chinese People立’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing 學 Committee, as well as chairman of the China Reform Forum and dean of postgraduate 國 Humanities and Social Sciences studies at CASS. (China Vitae)Zheng was also Deng

‧ Xiaoping’s speechwriter of choice during the beginning of the reform period. (Leonard,

‧ N

2008) As such, Zhenga’s roles have combined academia with somey political work, t t i i s enabling him to understando the Party system first-hand and maker a range of influential n e a v contacts. He is a well-knownl and highly esteemedn i academic, with impeccable Ch U credentials. engchi

Zheng first came up with the idea of the Peaceful Rise after a trip to the USA in

2002. Following his interaction with foreign officials and academics there, he found that there was a deep sense of unease amongst Americans regarding China’s growing role on the world stage. This interaction with foreign counterparts thus began the germination of the policy idea. (Zheng, 2011a) On his return from the trip, and fully understanding how to manoeuvre within the Party, Zheng submitted a report under the name of the

Central Policy Research Office to the then President Hu Jintao – who also happened to

be a close associate of Zheng following their time working as colleagues at the Central

Party School. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) Zheng requested funding to research the implications of China’s rise; the funding was granted, and a xiaozu task force of academics were assembled to collaborate and research together. This group outlined the concept of the ‘Peaceful Rise,’ a policy recommendation which stated that China’s development would be institutionalised and balanced, and that China would actively and positively engage with the outside world and eschew the hegemony and expansionism seen in many rapidly rising countries throughout history, such as Nazi Germany or pre-WWII Japan. (Zheng, 2005a)治 Zheng also argues that China’s rise will 政大 bring about benefits for the 立entire region and even the world. Pursuing a Peaceful Rise is intended to demonstrate that China is a status quo and學 not a revisionist power.

(Zheng 2005a; 2011a) 國

‧

Once the concept had been formulated, in November 2003 Zheng gave a speech

‧ N at the Bo’ao Forum fora Asia – an international platform to expressy visionary ideas to t t i i s academics, politicians, ando business leaders alike, and a sure-firer way of propelling the n e a i v idea into the orbit of key decisionl C makers and the media.n (Zheng, 2005a) Soon after, the he i U concept received an even bigger boost whenng Huc Jintaoh promulgated the Peaceful Rise in a Politburo collective study programme in February 2004. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)

According to Tsai and Dean (2013), “Whatever topics are studied in these Politburo collective programmes are extended as topics of learning for all the Party.” As such,

Zheng was able to transmit his idea throughout the entire Party by way of his guanxi with the influential Hu Jintao, and it soon became entrenched in Party parlance. Next, just as in the model “research as part of the intellectual enterprise of society,” discussed in Section 4.1, the trend towards the Peaceful Rise meant that funding was granted to

research this topic and learn more about its potential implications and dimensions.

Horizontal internal conferences were held to study the concept. It became a hot topic for both academia and the media. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) By April 2004, Xinhua news concluded that Peaceful Rise had become China’s national strategy. (Xinhua, 2004)

In short, as Glaser and Medeiros (2007) summarise: “Zheng’s professional experience, Party credentials, credibility in the Chinese system, and guanxi network are all central to understanding the evolution of the Peaceful Rise… [his] experience and connections were critical to propagation of the idea.” Zheng had positional, expertise, experiential, and personal sources of influence治 at his disposal. In terms of pathways to 政大 research utilisation, he used 立formal and informal consultation, research of the topic in a 學 xiaozu task force, internal reports, academic conferences, and the foreign and domestic 國 media. He raised awareness of the topic at the three levels of influence: amongst the

‧ decision makers themselves, amongst fellow academics, and in the public arena. As an

‧ N academic working in aa range of units, but not including an officialy research institute, t t i i s rather than submitting hiso initial report through an official channel,r he passed it on to n e a i v President Hu by making use of lhis C guanxi and reputation.n hengchi U As mentioned previously, this collection of events was no happy accident; this was the result of Zheng’s own ‘marketing’ of his idea. He brought the concept to the attention of high-level decision makers because he was aware of its importance to

China’s strategic foreign policy after discussion with foreign contacts. “He leveraged his relationships with senior leaders, his knowledge of the Party system and his credibility as a Party theorist to inject Peaceful Rise into the system at the highest levels.” (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)

This case demonstrates how an academic brought his policy idea into the limelight and helped it on its way to becoming China’s strategic policy. But that was not the end. Even as soon as a few days after Xinhua’s report that Peaceful Rise had become national strategy, it began to be eschewed by the leadership. It was not long before the term Peaceful Rise was replaced with Peaceful Development (和平发展, heping fazhan) in Party vernacular. The reason for this was that many in the world of academia

(including official, semi-official, and civilian units, as well as military academics) began to contest the appropriateness of using the term ‘rise,’ as well as many facets of the concept itself. According to Glaser and Medeiros,治 the debate within academia shaped 政大 policy makers’ decision to modify立 the term. Academics employed various channels to reach policy makers, including formal and informal direct學 contact, as well as the 國 publication of articles in journals and the media. What’s more, “university-based

‧ scholars and think tank analysts were amongst the most vocal.” (Glaser and Medeiros,

‧ N 2007) This underlines the growing importance of civilian analysts to policy debate. a y t t i io s In conclusion, the progression of this policy was almostr entirely in the hands of n e a i v academia. Firstly, “Zheng Bijianl identifiedC the need for a newn policy, solicited scholars to hengchi U conduct preliminary research, coined a new phrase, publicised it, presented the research findings to China’s top leaders and deftly manoeuvred to have them publicly endorse his term.”(Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) Following this, academic debate was influential enough to bring about a change in the terminology of the concept even after official endorsement – an unheard of outcome in the pre-reform era. This case is thus a comprehensive illustration of the effect of an evolving, influential academic sphere on the formulation – and modification – of China’s foreign policy.

This chapter has shown that when evaluating the work of an academic, it is important to understand the interplay of various considerations. “An understanding of potential sources of influence is… useful in interpreting the significance of the statements or writings of a particular analyst.” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: p. 608)Whether policy makers choose to take notice of an academic’s viewpoint will depend on a range of factors, including the policy makers’ own preferences and the timing and relevance of the policy recommendations. As Glaser and Saunders (2002) and Glaser and Medeiros

(2007) state, timing, domestic and external events, and general context all matter. But in particular, the likelihood of a decision maker治 paying heed to an academic will hinge 政大 initially on whether the academic立 in question can be deemed credible and worthy of regard. This assumption will in large part be based on the influence學 an academic can wield. 國

‧

When attempting to identify whether the viewpoints of a certain scholar have

‧ N potential policyinfluence,a it is instructive to consider the experty knowledge and t t i i s personal ties of the scholar,o as well as the positional influencer of their associated n e a i v research institute, in order to l clarify C which levels of influencen they are able to draw he i U upon. This in turn uncovers which pathwaysngc andh models of research utilisation are available to the academic. As Glaser and Saunders explain, some academics have very few available pathways, whereas others can draw upon multiple pathways and sources of influence. “These analysts are more likely to be able to reach policy makers with their opinions, and to have policy makers pay attention.” (p. 614) Once the academic’s potential for influence has been evaluated, it is much easier to assess the likelihood that their work will be conveyed to and noticed by policy makers. It is possible to ‘work backwards’ to comprehend how a particular academic was able to influence decisions

already made. But more importantly, discussions and viewpoints of influential academics can act as a window into China’s policy debates and give analysts a chance to better understand opaque internal deliberations over current policy choices.

治政大立學

國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

Chapter 5

Academic Influence and China’s Policy towards the European Union

China’s foreign policy decision making was discussed in Chapter Two, elaborating not only the formal structures and informal channels of policy practitioners, but also the growing influence of external actors, including the world of academia. Chapter Three then moved on to outline the evolution, structure, and classification of foreign policy- 治 related academia in China. Finally, Chapter政 Four gave a大 detailed elucidation of the many factors at play in Chinese academia’s立 influence over foreign policy decision making. It 學 was argued that by following國 a model of mechanisms of academic influence, it is

possible to recognise which academics hold the most sway amongst‧ policy makers by

identifying which levels,‧ sources, and pathways of influence are available to them; this N

a y t narrows down the vast fieldt of academia to those with the most iinfluence. The work of io s these academics in particularn is the best window into ther policy debates and a e l i v deliberations occurring in China today.C Outside analysts nof a particular subject field can hengchi U use this model to narrow down which academics’ work is most worthy of note, and begin to draw links between academic research output and actual policy decisions.

Chapter Five will now illustrate precisely that, by considering the example of the

European Union. Although by no means comprehensive, this chapter offers a preliminary, exploratory case study of the influence of the Chinese European Studies field over China’s EU foreign policy in order to demonstrate the insights of Chapters

Two, Three, and Four in action. The European Union has been selected in particular for preliminary exploration not only due to the significance of Sino-EU relations in terms of

economics and global political importance, but also due to the weight attached to the

European Union by China itself, which in 2003 released its EU policy paper – the only foreign policy paper published by China to date. Despite this unique demonstration of

China’s estimation of the importance of Europe, China’s relations with the United States have long received far greater attention by analysts the world over.In spite of the clear magnitude of the Sino-EU relationship, it has been somewhat overlooked and under- explored in research circles. Nevertheless, the European Studies field in China is growing andthis, combined with the significance of the Sino-EU relationship, presents a suitable case for preliminary exploration. 治政大 The chapter begins by立 briefly outlining China’s current policy towards the EU, as 學 laid out in China’s European Union policy paper of 2003. As subsequent analysis of 國 Chinese scholars’ arguments will demonstrate, much of the policy paper’s content is

‧ reflected in academic research.Next, this chapter will employ the framework of

‧ N mechanisms of influenceshowna in Chapter Four by establishingy which academics t t i i s possess the most influenceo according to the pathways, levels,r and sources identified. n e a i v This section will first describe lthe C overall conditions of then European Studies field, then he i U move onto identifying the most influentialn researchgch institutes and individual academics in turn. The section concludes with a brief outline of the major publications of the

European Studies field in China, as this is where the most influential research work will be published.

This chapter will then outline the research conclusions of European Studies scholars, particularly those identified as most influential. The analysed scholarly discourse is limited in scope to only the three most significant potentially policy- relevant issue areas within the field, and should therefore not be seen as a fully

comprehensive analysis of all research output relating to Europe in some way.The first issue area concerns Europe and China on the world stage; the second discusses the problems in China-EU relations; and the third section considers China’s opportunities to learn from the European Union. Although this final section admittedly does not demonstrate the influence of academics on foreign policy formulation, it does illustrate how foreign affairs scholars can convert their insights from abroad into domestic policy decisions. What’s more, this is one of the most important and commonly raised issue areas debated by academics with regard to the European Union, and as such, is worthy of inclusion in this analysis. 治政大立學 5.1 China’s Policy國 towards the European Union

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Many Chinese scholars‧ believe that the Sino-EU relationship is the most successful and N

a y robust of all China’s foreign relations: “EU-China relations aret regarded by many t i i s Chinese international relationso specialists as the best bilateralr relationship in all of n e a i v China’s foreign relations.” (Song,l C 2008: 184) One clearn sign of this is the release on hen hi U October 13th 2003 of China’s European g Unionc policy paper (中国对欧盟政策文件,

Zhongguo dui Oumeng zhengce wenjian). Not only is this China’s first policy paper concerning the European Union; in fact, it is still the first and only foreign policy paper that China has ever published. (Feng, 2006) This in itself speaks volumes for the official stance of the Chinese authorities in terms of the importance of relations with the

European Union.

Nevertheless, since this time China has not released any subsequent policy papers, neither towards the European Union nor towards any other actor or state. The

2003 policy paper remains China’s sole foreign policy paper. This may be because

China’s first foray into foreign policy making did not yield the expected results, but it is also likely thatas the outline of the policy decisions has not changed over time, China’s practitioners have seen no real incentive to release a new version. It is also possible that updates to the policy paper have been halted in response to the lack of progress on certain issues hampering China-EU relations (notably Europe’s refusal to grant China

Market Economy Status, as well as the ultimate failure to lift Europe’s arms ban sale to

China despite a significant move to do so in 2005). As such, the 2003 policy paper remains the clearest indicator of China’s policy治 towards the European Union in practice. 政大 The content of the paper立 (MoFA) outlines China’s plans for the subsequent five 學 years of relations between the two powers, but has not since been updated and 國 therefore remains the best indication of China’s current policy stance. The paper states

‧ that China’s EU policy objectives are:

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a y t  “To promote a soundt and steady development of China-EUi political relations i s o r under the principlesn of mutual respect, mutual truste and seeking common a i v l C n ground while reserving differences,hen andgc contributehi U to world peace and stability;

 To deepen China-EU economic cooperation and trade under the principles of

mutual benefit, reciprocity and consultation on an equal basis, and promote

common development;

 To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the

principle of mutual emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and

promote cultural harmony and progress between the East and the West.” (pp.

491-2)

These policy principles are broad and on a macro level, setting the background for the many micro policy decisions which are made under this framework. The positive language of benefit and mutuality demonstrates the constructive approach of Chinese leaders towards relations with the EU. In addition, many notable key words are used which reflect not only China’s hopes for the European Union, but its definition of positive foreign relations in general, in particularly the regular references to mutuality, seeking common ground while reserving 治 differences, common development, and 政大 harmony. These terms are common立 in China’s general foreign policy rhetoric, which 學 emphasises that although other nations may have cultural, political, or historical 國 differences with China, it is more important to find points of similarity. Each of China’s

‧ leaders have generated an overarching approach to foreign policy, beginning (and still

‧ N continuing) with Mao’sa Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, andy followed up by the t t i i s contributions of Deng o Xiaoping’s Building a Cooperative r Pattern and Peaceful n e a i v Development, Jiang Zemin’s Harmonyl C but not Sameness,n and Hu Jintao’s Peaceful Rise he i U and Harmonious Society. These concepts nareg differentch mutations of the same basic idea: it is in everybody’s benefit to co-exist peacefully and harmoniously even in the face of differences. (Vang, 2008)

This long-standing approach to international relations is one of the key reasons why China-EU relations are looked upon so favourably by Chinese scholars. The EU, itself originally an economic construct, tends to favour the pursuit of mutual economic benefit in its international relations, and tends not to intervene in states’ internal affairs.

(Smith, 2002) Unlike the United States, the European Union is considered by many

scholars to not take an ideological stance towards relations with China. In other words, the EU and China share a commitment to pragmatic relations despite certain key divergences, such as regime type, ideology, and negative historical legacies. As China’s

EU policy states: “There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. However, given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues. Nevertheless China-EU relations of mutual trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides address their治 disagreements in a spirit of equality 政大 and mutual respect… The common立 ground between China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 學國 China breaks down its policy towards the EU into five broad sectors: political;

‧ economic; education, science and technology, culture, and health; and social, judicial

‧ N and administrative; anda military. In terms of the education, sciencey and technology, t t i i s culture, and health aspect,o the emphasis is on cooperation. Chinar calls for ‘multi-level n e a i v and all-dimensional’ cultural exchange,l C between both governmentaln and civilian actors, he i U stating its aim to build cultural centres n in g Europech to spread word of China’s culture; cooperation in education, including student exchange, language teaching, and scholarships; and cooperation on the R&D of technologies and equipment, as well as support for non-governmental actors engaged in the science and technology industry. In addition, personnel exchange between Europeans and Chinese citizens, both people-to- people and non-governmental, with China poised to actively encourage Chinese people to choose Europe as a tourist destination – if the EU relaxes visa impediments on

Chinese nationals. The policy paper also outlines China’s aims for greater health and

medical cooperation, especially for establishing a mechanism of mutual notification and support in the case of emergent hazards. Finally, China wishes to advance press exchange, stating: “Chinese and EU media agencies should be encouraged to enhance mutual understanding and give comprehensive and unbiased reports of each other.”

China’s image in Western media is a particular bugbear for its attempts at grounding a positive international reputation. (Cui, 2011a)

The focus in the social, judicial and administrative sector is also on cooperation.

The paper details China’s plans for cooperation in police affairs, in terms of information sharing and case handling, as well as UN peacekeeping治 work; cooperation in labour and 政大 social security, in particular 立regarding social insurance, and migrant workers and legal 學 immigration; and cooperation in public administration, largely experiential knowledge 國 exchange in terms of personnel, administrative, and human resources management, as

‧ well as the development of the civil service and governmental functions. Finally, the

‧ N paper calls for the continuationa and deepening of legal and judicialy exchange, including t t i i s a potential annual summito of judicial officials. r n e a v l i The policy paper handles theC military aspect perfunctorily,n right at the end of the hengchi U document, briefly affirming the aims of continuing high-level military exchanges of experts and training, and establishing a security consultation mechanism. The final sentence of the entire policy paper reads: “The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to

China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and technologies.” The EU’s ban on arms sales to China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 remains one of the most contentious aspects of the China-EU relationship. This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.

In terms of the major topic of economics, the paper outlines seven main concerns.

The policy paper writes of continuing transport cooperation, mainly maritime coordination for the sake of trade, as well as exchange on highways and aviation; IT cooperation, particularly EU participation in and support for China’s IT development and strengthening of exchange in intellectual property rights and industry standards; energy cooperation, in regard to clean and renewable energy development and energy- related technological exchange; agricultural cooperation, including the intensification of exchange in the fields of sustainable development and production, as well as encouragement for European agricultural enterprises治 and educational institutes to 政大 invest research and funding in立 China’s agricultural land; and environmental cooperation, referring to the establishment of Sino-EU environmental protection學 cooperation, and the construction of new國 mechanisms to enable greater exchange in this field. The final

‧ two aspects are financial cooperation and economic cooperation and trade. In terms of

‧ the former, China statesN its aims of launching a ‘high-level financial dialogue mechanism’ a y t t i and increasing exchange ibetween central banks. Great emphasiss is laid on encouraging o r n e EU financial services firms toa enter the Chinese market, withv the Chinese side promising l i C Un improvements in financial regulationshe andn gsupervision.chi The most important aspect of the economic sector is economic cooperation and trade. Here, the policy paper points to many of the key issues affecting China-EU relations: “It is important to:… properly address irrational restrictions and technical barriers, ease restrictions on high-tech exports… grant China a full market economy status at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against China… and compensate the Chinese side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement.” These issues will be discussed further in subsequent sections. This section also notes China’s hope for more European development aid and human

resources assistance; the importance of strengthening mutual investments; and reinforcing product safety and environmental protection in trade. Finally the 2003 paper states China’s hope to establish a China-EU customs agreement; according to the

EU’s Europa website: “In 2005, the EU-China Customs Cooperation and Mutual

Administrative Assistance Agreement entered into force.” (2010)

The sector of politics is of greatest interest to this study, as it represent policies created and carried out in largest part by the government, as opposed to by the military or through representative actors such as judicial, education, or public sector employees.

In addition, the section of the policy paper dealing治 with political aspects covers some of 政大 China’s fundamental core interests立 (核心利益, hexin liyi), which are emphasised in all of 學 China’s foreign relations (Hu Jintao’s Political Reports to the 17th and 18th NCCPC): strict 國 adherence to the one-China principle, namely total non-recognition of Taiwan in

‧

international affairs at‧ any level, as well as promotion of the EU’s understanding of N

a y Tibet, which entails the EU avoiding contact with Tibet’s governmentt -in-exile and the t i io s Dalai Lama, and encouragementn of stronger ties with Macaur and Hong Kong in a e l i v accordance with the ‘one country, C two systems’ (一国两制n , yi guo liang zhi) principle. hengchi U The policy paper also calls for the increase of high-level exchanges and political dialogue, including making full use of the annual China-EU summit and deepening relations with all EU members, old and new, in order to “maintain stability and continuity in the overall relationship.” This section also mentions human rights, with the disclaimer that

“There are both consensus and disagreements between China and the EU on the question of human rights.” (This will be examined in section 5.4) Nevertheless the paper asks for continued dialogue, exchange and cooperation in this area “on the basis of equality and mutual respect.” Next, China outlines its policies of reinforcing dialogue

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between Chinese and European legislative bodies (ie. between China’s National People’s

Congress and the European Parliament, as well as the parliaments of individual member states); as well as increasing exchange between the Chinese Communist Party and domestic political parties within EU member states, on the all-important conditions of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs. Finally, the paper turns to strengthening international cooperation, in terms of coordination on major global issues, joint reinforcement of the UN’s international role, and working together to combat terrorism and safeguard the arms control and non-proliferation global regimes. Interestingly, the paper mentions Asia-Europe治 region-to-region cooperation, going so 政大 far as to state that ASEM (Asia立-Europe Meeting) should become “a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic學 order.” This statement is slipped in with little fanfare,國 but is certainly extremely worthy of note; more attention

‧ will be given to this issue in section 5.3.

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In conclusion, China’sa 2003 policy paper is the most indicativey document of t t i i s China’s stance towards theo European Union, covering a very wider range of aspects and n e a i v outlining policies of both Trackl C I and II diplomacy. n In general, the policy paper he i U maintains a positive tone, encouraging n mutualgc h cooperation and exchange. However, some statements, when seen in the greater context of China’s foreign policy interests, reveal some of China’s concerns and greater ambitions for the trajectory of China-EU relations. These various aspects will be considered in sections 5.3 to 5.5, and summarised in section 5.6.

This study posits that China’s foreign policy is influenced to a certain degree by the work and recommendations of academics. Chinese experts abound in every foreign policy field and bilateral relationship; accordingly, the Chinese academic field boasts

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many dedicated European Studies scholars and institutes. By considering the models of influence laid out in Chapter Four, the following section will identify which of these many actors are of particular note when analysing the policy influence of European

Studies scholars.

5.2 Identifying Influential Academic Actors in the European

Studies Field 政治 Chapter Four of this thesis identified the many ways in 大which an academic or a research 立 institute’s influence can be built up and identified. Firstly, there is a division between 學 semi-official and civilian國 research institutes. Semi-official research institutes take much of their influence from their position within the hierarchy of the ‧ political structure; this

‧ allows for access to moreN comprehensive materials, enhancing the credibility of the

a y t research output, as wellt as direct channels by which to influencei policy practitioners. i s o r These established positionsn also bring embedded historicale legacy, wealth, and size, a i v l C n contributing to the positive reputationhe ofn thesegc hinstitutesi U within policy making circles. Academics employed by these institutes are able to draw on this source of positional influence. Civilian research institutes, conversely, tend to draw their influence from the academics themselves. Scholars in civilian institutes wield the influence of extensive personal networks and highly expert knowledge. In addition, they may have more leeway to explore topics freely, thus presenting insights that extend beyond semi- official academics’ research limits. In addition, civilian institute scholars are also less constrained in building up peer and public influence by participation in academic

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coordination efforts and engagement with the media. Some of the most fortunate scholars are able to draw on multiple sources of influence.

This section will identify some of the key players within the European Studies field in China. By considering the positional, experiential, and expertise sources and related pathways of influence available to scholars and institutes within this field, it is possible to conjecture which wield the most influence over China’s policy towards the

EU. Although it is difficult to establish the personal ties of individual academics, a combination of high positional and expert influence carries a greater likelihood of larger personal networks amongst policy practitioners治 and academic peers, which indicates a 政大 greater source of personal influence.立 By identifying the most influential institutes and 學 academics, those wishing to better understand the relationship of academia with policy 國 making in the European Studies field can narrow their search to the research output of

‧ those with actual sway.

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a y t t i i s o r n e 5.2.1 The Europeana Studies Field i v l C n hengchi U Before going on to outline the most influential actors, this section begins by outlining the general conditions and status of the European Studies field in China. Historically the

Chinese European Studies field has been largely underdeveloped when seen in relation to research on the United States and Russia. After China established diplomatic relations with the European Community, the fledgling manifestation of the European Union, in

1975, the field drew more attention, and continued to expand throughout the 1980s and

90s. Currently Chinese scholars are showing a renewed interest in the European Union, largely because it represents a never-before-seen international actor, with rich research

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potential in terms of regional integration, economic, legal and social programmes, and multilateralism.

According to Dai Bingran (2008), 1850 articles appearing in 598 journals, as well as 285 theses and 307 books, were published on European Studies between 1994 and

2005, written by 1283 different authors. Although by Chinese standards, the European

Studies field is relatively small and underdeveloped (Dai, 2008), this represents a large body of Chinese language academic output to analyse, and of these 1283 authors, 2442 published works and 598 journals, by no means will most wield any discernible policy influence. Since Dai’s study, carried out in 2008,治 European Studies have continued to 政大 develop. A simple search for立 reference to the term ‘European Union’ in the public CNKI 學 site (China Integrated Knowledge Resources Database) revealed 22,336 hits with a 國 massive emphasis towards economics: 7204 articles registered on the subject of

‧ economics and trade, 4642 on industrial economics, 1225 on agricultural economics,

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1049 on economic a reform, 1593 on economic managemeynt and sustainable t t i i s development, and 699 ono finance, but just 2060 on politics. r The articles are further n e a i v categorised: the biggest three l typesC are the 9608 articlesn based on specific industry he i U guidance, 4256 considered ‘fundamental nresearch’,gch and 1935 classed as policy research.

These articles make at least one reference to the European Union within their content. A more specific search of the fee-paying CNKI journal database returned 2760 articles with the word ‘European Union’ appearing in the title from 2005 to the present day.

In terms of the general content of European Studies’ research output, as

Shambaugh (2008a) astutely points out: “There is a remarkable homogeneity, uniformity, and conformity in Chinese perceptions of Europe and Sino-European relations.” (p. 128) Lacking different ‘schools of opinion,’ in general European Studies

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scholars present very similar analyses of Europe, with the difference in the details as opposed to the overall standpoint. As it stands, policy makers actually have very little to choose from regarding different approaches to the European Union amongst academics.

What’s more, analysts such as Shambaugh (2008a) and Zhu Liqun (2008a) point out that Chinese European Studies scholars suffer from – as is clear to outsiders – ‘cognitive dissonance:’ many academics conclude what they already wish to be the case, as a result of strong pre-conceptions or hopes. This means that some conclusions reached by successive academics are arguably falsely construed, which may influence the awareness of Chinese policy makers about different治 European affairs. Sections 5.3 to 5.5 政大 will discuss some of the main立 issue areas discussed by European Studies scholars. 學 Dai (2008) writes: “It is still difficult to make an assessment of the actual impact 國 of European Studies on China’s decision making and foreign policy towards Europe and

‧ the EU. The influences are there, to be sure… Except for the few very privileged, an

‧ N ordinary academic coulda only guess if he has influenced policy.” (pp.y 113-114) However, t t i i s he goes on to point out o that the situation is beginning to showr signs of change, as n e a i v European specialists have beenl C called on ever moren increasingly by the Foreign he i U Ministry to provide consultations and n conductgch seminars. He also points out that

“Whenever something occurs between China and Europe, Europe specialists can expect to get calls from newspapers or television correspondents, asking for comments or interviews.” (p. 111) In other words, China’s European specialists are beginning to make inroads in the public, peer, and decision making spheres.

As Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Hong (2008) write: “While there is a robust community of ‘Europe Watchers’ active in China today… the views and writings of this community are virtually unknown outside China.” (p. 4) As the European Studies field

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grows within China, outside observers can benefit from becoming familiar with some of the ‘big names’ in this community.

5.2.2 European Studies Research Institutes

China has several institutes dedicated to European Studies. The most important few can be identified by way of the sources of influence models introduced in Chapter Four. In terms of official and semi-official units, the three most important are the Institute of

European Studies (欧洲研究所, Ouzhou yanjiu治 suo) at CICIR (China Institutes of 政大 Contemporary International 立Relations); the Institute of European Studies (IES, 欧洲研學究所, Ouzhou yanjiu suo) belonging to CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences); and 國

the European Research Section (欧洲研究部, Ouzhou yanjiu bu) ‧ at CIIS (Contemporary

‧ Institute of InternationalN Studies).

a y t t i CICIR’s influence i derives from its position. The institute,s China’s oldest foreign o r n e affairs research institute, a is bankrolled by the Ministryv of State Security but l i C Un administratively located directly underhe theng Centralchi Committee’s Foreign Affairs Office (Shambaugh 2002; Leonard 2008) CICIR, widely considered a civil intelligence organ, is the only research institute known to submit a daily brief to the central authorities.

(Glaser and Saunders, 2002) The institute has access to classified Party, government, and military materials, and has “several direct channels to all the members of the

Standing Committee of the Politburo” (Glaser and Saunders, 2002: p. 599), in particular through the institute’s right to submit papers directly to senior leaders. In addition,

CICIR is large, with nearly 400 researchers, and well-funded. (Shambaugh, 2002) The

Institute of European Studies is one of seven regional affairs institutes. (CICIR website)

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Although CICIR has excellent positional influence, it could also be argued that the research is skewed towards practical and relevant ‘intelligence’ as opposed to theoretical or general topics. This may be useful for rapid decision making but perhaps adds relatively little to the academic discipline of European Studies.

CASS is a ‘research conglomerate,’ made up of thirty eight independent institutes, under the guidance of the Foreign Affairs Office. (CASS website) The Institute of

European Studies (IES) is one of these, and is considered to be the most comprehensive in its research into European affairs. (Dai, 2008) It covers politics, economics, society and culture, and international relations of Europe治 . (Shambaugh, 2002) Quite on the 政大 contrary to CICIR, as Shambaugh立 states: “policy relevance and policy influence is not 學 their primary function… CASS researchers consider themselves and their research to be 國 scholarly.” (p. 595) CASS is not permitted to routinely issue papers to the Party

‧ leadership, but instead draws upon its huge reputation and size, as well as the personal

‧ N and expert sources of influencea available to its individual scholars. y(Glaser and Saunders, t t i i s 2002) One reason why theo CASS IES is particularly influentialr is because the Chinese n e a i v Association for European Studiesl C (CAES, 中国欧洲学会n, Zhongguo Ouzhou xuehui) is hengchi U based there. (CAES website) CAES is the national professional association for European

Studies scholars, made up of research committees concerned with different areas of expertise within the field, including the history of integration, law, economics and politics of the EU. (Dai, 2008) The association president is always the director of IES. In addition to this, CASS IES edits the most important European Studies journals (see section 5.2.4). As such, IES wields huge influence at the peer level in the academic field of European Studies.

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The final one of the three research institutes with greater influence in the

European Studies field is the European Research Section at CIIS. CIIS is the research arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as such has direct positional influence over the decisions made by MoFA. (Lu, 1997) However, as discussed in Chapter Two, MoFA is but one of the many governmental organs which create policy. Nevertheless, CIIS’s positional influence is notable, and as MoFA has grown in importance in policy making, so has the reputation of CIIS. (Shambaugh, 2002) In addition, CIIS is tasked with Track II diplomacy on behalf of MoFA, gifting scholars with outside links and experience abroad. (CIIS website) CIIS itself claims to be “focused治 primarily on medium and long-term 政大 issues of strategic importance.立” (Shambaugh, 2002: 584) This is in contrast to CASS’s theoretical bent, and CICIR’s strong tendency towards short-term學 practical intelligence. 國 In addition to these three institutes, there are also many university departments

‧

(classified as civilian research institutes) with European Studies departments. Of these,

‧ N

人民大学a y Renmin University ( , renmin daxue) and the China Foreignt Affairs University t i io s (外交学院, waijiao xueyuann) in Beijing, as well as Fudan Universityr (复旦大学, fudan a e l i v daxue) in Shanghai, are considered C some of the more reputablen departments as a result hengchi U of the universities’ well-established histories and the reputation of the many renowned scholars found working there. (Dai, 2008)

Renmin University has a Centre for European Studies (CESRUC, 欧洲问题研究中

心, Ouzhou wenti yanjiu zhongxin) which is considered the Ministry of Education’s epicentre of European Studies, and labelled a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence3for the first time in 2005. (Dai, 2008) The China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) is actually

3 According to the European Union’s official website, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence is an institute specialising in European integration studies, funded in part by grants from the European Union (Europa).

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under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; if CIIS is the research arm of MoFA, then the China Foreign Affairs University is the educational arm.

As such, unlike other civilian institutes, this university can also claim positional influence. CFAU has a well-reputed European Studies Centre (欧洲研究中心, Ouzhou yanjiu zhongxin). Finally, Fudan University’s Centre for European Studies (复旦大学欧

洲研究中心, Fudan daxue Ouzhou yanjiu zhongxin) was the first to be established nationwide. When international studies first took root in China, Fudan University was designated the role of researching the capitalist world, which came to include the

European Community. Fudan’s Centre for 治 European Studies has maintained its 政大 reputation for excellence in studies立 related to the European Union, granted Jean Monnet 學 Centre of Excellence status in 2004. (Dai, 2008) In addition to this, the Chinese Society 國 for European Union Studies (CSEUS, 中国欧盟研究会, Zhongguo Oumeng yanjiu hui) –

‧

similar to CAES in its‧ role as an umbrella academic association, but with a focus N

a y specifically on EU integration – has been based in Fudan University,t Shanghai, since t i i s 1984. CSEUS organises biennialo conferences and retains membershipr to the global ECSA n e a i v (European Community Studiesl Association)C on behalf n of Chinese European Studies hen hi U scholars, generating more links with expertgc peers from around the world. (CSEUS website)

There are many other dedicated university departments for European Studies around the country, including at Wuhan, Beijing, Nankai, and Shandong Universities amongst others. Lacking the positional influence of official and semi-official research institutes, these university departments must rely on other sources of influence in order to have their voice heard. This in particular includes influence amongst peers, as well as

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freedom to engage in academic conferences and associations such as CSEUS, and the all- important personal networking –guanxi.

5.2.3 Individual Academics

As mentioned previously, Dai (2008) pointed out that it is practically impossible for most individual academics to know whether they have had any direct influence on policy. It is even more difficult for outsiders to establish this. However, it is possible to consider an individual’s pathways to influence治 and thus conjecture the likelihood that 政大 their research output will reach立 the desks of the policy practitioners. Even this, in itself, 學 is not enough to prove that practitioners will necessarily take on the ideas of the 國 academics in question; nevertheless, according to the models of research utilisation

‧ discussed in section 4.1, on some occasions, policy makers actively request the help and

‧ N advice of individual ora collected groups of academics, and otherwise,y the body of t t i research turned out by researchersio can ‘enlighten’ policy practitionerss to a certain way n r a e of thinking. i v l C n hengchi U It is not feasible to present lists of all the academics who may wield influence over policy. Therefore this section presents brief biographies of the seven key scholars, whose names pop up again and again in the European Studies field, both academically and publically, and occasionally in both Chinese and foreign language sources.

The first, perhaps the most prolific European Studies researcher, is Feng

Zhongping (冯仲平). Feng is the acting vice-director of CICIR and recently director of

CICIR’s Institute of European Studies, (CICIR website) granting him immediate and direct positional influence by dint of the institute’s place in the political hierarchy, as

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well as the right to access confidential materials and to submit his research to the Party leadership through direct channels. Feng began working at the Institute of European

Studies in 1994, meaning that he has been in the position for a long time, with the potential to build up a network of peers as well as links with policy makers. (CICIR website) According to his personal profile on 71.cn, Feng studied both his MA and PhD in International Relations at Lancaster University in the UK, adding to his experiential influence and potential foreign contacts. In addition to his work at CICIR, Feng is also a visiting professor at Renmin University and the University of International Relations in Beijing, tapping into the advantages of civilian治 research institutes, and a member of the 政大 CASS IES research faculty. (71.cn)立 Feng is also called on to act as a media pundit, evidenced by numerous examples of television commentary學 and opinion pieces, including in the Communist國 Party’s official mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. This will raise

‧ his profile at the public level. In short, Feng Zhongping’s positional, experiential, and

‧ expert sources of influenceN are second to none, and it can be assumed that his personal a y t t i networks follow this patterni as a result. s o r n e a i v Feng is joined in the ranksl C of influential individualsn by his second-in-command, he i U the vice-director of CICIR’s Institute of n Europeangch Studies, Zhang Jian (张健). (CICIR website) Information on Zhang is far harder to come by; his public profile is considerably lower than that of Feng Zhongping. Nevertheless, he is still able to draw upon similar levels of positional influence, as well as the advantages of CICIR’s direct channels to the leadership and supply of confidential information. Zhang Jian is also increasingly being called upon by the media to supply punditry on European affairs. For example, after Li Keqiang (李克强) became Premier of the PRC, he took an official tour to Europe in May 2013. An interview with Zhang Jian on the importance of the tour

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appeared on chinanews.com, re-reported in other influential online press such as Sohu.

Another opinion piece written by Zhang appeared in the People’s Daily online version.

Searches of academic journal databases demonstrate that Zhang is currently also one of the most productive writers of academic articles. (cnki.net)

The third identified academic is Zhou Hong (周弘), the director of CASS’s IES. She graduated with a PhD from Brandeis University in Massachusetts in 1992 and began working in IES in 1993, (CASS IES website) accumulating long-term experiential influence. In her role as IES director, she is automatically also the president of CAES, 治 thus wielding positional and expert政 influence. However,大 as noted, CASS does lack the direct channels of influence available立 to CICIR scholars. Zhou is also a prominent writer 學 of English language analyses of China’s take on European Studies. Her CASS faculty 國 profile reports that her main research foci are China-EU relations, welfare states,

‧

foreign aid, and European‧ modern history. (CASS IES website) Her work appears in N

a y popular mainstream media as well, including chinanews.com andt a speech at Beijing t i io s International Hotel, organised for leading experts to give opinionsr on current hotspot n e a i v news. As such Zhou Hong wieldsl clearC sway at the peer andn public levels of influence. hengchi U The fourth scholar is Cui Hongjian (崔洪建), who is the current director of the

European Research Section at CIIS. Cui previously worked at the Chinese embassy in

Jamaica and the consulate in Mumbai, India. (CIIS website) These positions offer experiential influence, as well as the opportunity to build up personal networks amongst Chinese ambassadors and consuls. Cui has written editorial pieces for Xinhua and Sina news portal in 2013 alone, boosting his public profile in terms of European concerns. Most importantly, as the director of MoFA’s European research institute, Cui will be the Ministry’s first port of call for European issues.

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Chen Zhimin (陈志敏) is the fifth individual academic identified. Chen is the vice- head of Fudan University’s Centre for European Studies, as well as the university’s Dean of International Relations and Public Affairs. (Fudan School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA) website) In this sense, although Chen’s position lacks the same degree of administrative linkage as the aforementioned academics at semi-official research institutes, his expert role would still be highly respected amongst his peers. He is also a visiting fellow at Renmin University, (CESRUC website) as well as vice- chairman of the China National Association of International Studies (中国国际关系学会,

Zhongguo guoji guanxi xuehui), and a consultant治 to foreign language journals such as the 政大 Hague Journal of Diplomacy 立and Asia Europe journal. (Fudan SIRPA website) It can be 學 seen that Chen has the freedom to work for these external publications in his capacity as 國 civilian research institute scholar. What’s more, according to his Fudan University

‧ research biography, Chen is also a prominent writer of English language pieces, turning

‧ N out a number of both booksa and articles on a regular basis. (Fudany University website) t t i i s Chen is thus well-knowno by foreign students of China-EU relations;r as mentioned in n e a v Chapter Four, foreign media andl press exposure is anotherni indirect source of domestic Ch U influence. engchi

Song Xinning (宋新宁) is the director of Renmin University’s Centre for

European Studies, and also worked as vice-director of the Politics Department at

Renmin University. (CESRUC website) Song has worked as executive director of the

Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, as well as taking a post as visiting professor at the United Nations University in Bruges. (Shambaugh et al., 2008) Song thus has a strong presence in Europe, based in the centre of the European Union administration, Belgium, building his experiential influence, as well as compelling

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expert influence. Amongst many international relations research interests, Song is also an expert in European politics and diplomacy, as well as China’s foreign policy and relations (Renmin University website). As such he is well-placed to analyse the implications of potential policy choices for both the Chinese and the Europeans.

Similarly to his Fudan University counterpart Chen Zhimin and IES’s Zhou Hong, Song

Xinning is also well-known for his English language contributions, with a clear profile for offering Chinese insights into European affairs.

The seventh and final academic is Zhu Liqun (朱立群), the head of China Foreign 治 Affairs University European Studies政 Centre (ESC), as大 well as vice-President of the university and assistant to the立 President of CFAU, the renowned international relations 學 expert Qin Yaqing (秦亚青). Zhu began working at CFAU in 1995, teaching international 國

relations theory and history, international security studies, and‧ European Studies.

(CFAU ESC website) Outside‧ of her CFAU roles, Zhu is also Secretary-General of the N

a y China National Association of International Studies and directort of the China-EU t i io s Association (CEUA, 中国欧盟协会n , Zhongguo Oumeng xiehui), r which aims to promote a e l i v greater exchange, cooperation, C and understanding betweenn China and EU member hengchi U states. This can be seen as a key non-governmental Track II diplomatic organ for the

European field. Once again, Zhu is also well-known amongst foreign scholars of

European affairs due to her many English language contributions, currently holding the post of vice editor-in-chief of Foreign Affairs Review journal. (Shambaugh et al, 2008)

Zhu is also called upon by the Chinese media to offer commentaries, for example in a

People’s Daily piece in which she reiterated that her recent major research focus is Sino-

European relations. In short, Zhu Liqun possesses strong influence both amongst peers and the public, mainly as a result of expert and experiential sources.

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Joining the ranks of these seven influential career academics, there are also other notable voices in European Studies, including other scholars at the aforementioned research institutes and university departments, such as Fudan’s Dai Bingran (戴炳然) and CFAU’s Zhao Huaipu (赵怀普). In addition, many former employees of embassies and consulates in European countries have forged careers as academics and political pundits. In this category, two important names are Ruan Zongze (阮宗泽) who has worked in the Chinese embassies in the United Kingdom and the United States, and Mei

Zhaorong (梅兆荣), former ambassador to East Germany. 政治大立 5.2.4 Major Publications 學國

In addition to identifying which research institutes and individual‧ academics are of

‧ particular note in theN European Studies field, in order to better follow their (public)

a y t research output, it is alsot crucial to be aware of the main Chinesei language journals i s o r which publish articles on Europeann affairs. Much of academics’ most influential output a e l i v will reach decision makers via internal C channels. Nevertheless,n public offerings are still hengchi U able to offer an insight into the general arguments of these scholars.

Perhaps the most important is [Chinese Journal of] European Studies (欧洲研究,

Ouzhou yanjiu). This publication is edited by the CASS IES and issued once every two months, dedicated solely to the European Studies field. (CASS IES website) Secondly is the Europe Yearbook (欧洲发展报告, Ouzhou fazhan baogao). This publication, also referred to as the ‘Blue Handbook of EU Affairs’ has been compiled annually since 1997, also by CASS IES. (CASS IES website) Another journal which exclusively handles

European affairs is European Integration Studies (欧洲一体化研究, Ouzhou yitihua

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yanjiu), edited by Fudan Centre for European Studies and CSEUS. However, this publication is for internal circulation only and is not open to the public. (Dai, 2008)

In terms of publications which are not European Studies exclusive, but still regularly include topics related to the EU, one of the most well-known is Contemporary

International Relations (现代国际关系, Xiandai guoji guanxi), edited by CICIR and published monthly. (CICIR website) Another is CIIS’s International Studies (国际问题研

究, Guoji wenti yanjiu), published on a bi-monthly basis. (CIIS website) In addition to their specialist European Studies journals, CASS also edit the renowned World 政治 Economics and Politics journal (世界经济与政治, Shijie大 jingji yu zhengzhi), a bi-monthly 立 publication, which features articles about the European Union.學 (CASS Institute of World

Economics and Politics 國(IWEP) website) Finally, another notable publication is Foreign

Affairs Review (外交评论, Waijiao pinglun), edited by the ‧ China Foreign Affairs

‧ University and releasedN every two months. (CFAU ESC website) a y t t i i s Whilst articles containingo references to the EU appearr in a range of different n e a v publications, European Studiesl scholars aim to submitn i their work to these major Ch U journals. Those wishing to review thee moreng influentialchi writings of Chinese European

Studies academics should thus begin with these publications.

5.3 Europe and China on the Global Stage

This and the subsequent two sections take a look at what Chinese scholars of European

Studies have been discussing vis-à-visthree different major issue areas, which may ultimately affect decision making practitioners’ outlook on Europe and subsequently

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influence policy. Only research published after the year 2000 is taken into account; although the turn of the millennium is a neat but fairly arbitrary cut-off point, it is also considered that examining research work from more than three years before the publication of China’s European Union policy paper in 2003 may well decrease the likelihood of a link between the research and the subsequent policy stance.

The first issue area is Europe and China on the global stage; that is to say, how

Chinese scholars consider the role of Europe globally, and what this might mean for

China’s own position. Firstly, in accordance with Shambaugh’s observation that Chinese analyses of Europe derive from their own standpoint治 on world affairs, which leads to a 政大 ‘cognitive dissonance’ in their立 conclusions – European Studies scholars often conclude 學 what they already hope to be the case about Europe – it is first instructive to outline 國 what this established standpoint may be.

‧

‧ In short, there areN some key and unbending tenets of China’s foreign policy: non-

a y t hegemony, multipolarity,t multilateralism, economic globalisation,i and non-interference. i s o r (Hu Jintao’s Political Reportsn to the 17th and 18th NCCPC) Thee official Chinese stance is a v l i that no country should be allowedC world hegemony. ‘Unofficially,n ’ this is targeted at hengchi U what many in China see as a USA-dominated world order. Rather than a unipolar or bipolar world, which Chinese international relations academia has roundly rejected as unstable and unbeneficial for the world as a whole, multi-polarity is largely seen as the most stable system for the world – in particularly a triangular, tri-polar system. China also praises the proliferation of multilateral institutions in global affairs, and considers multilateralism the core of responsible global governance. In terms of globalisation,

China’s foreign policy stance is pro-economic interdependence, but not at the cost of sovereign power over the domestic economy and protectionism when necessary. For

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China, economic interdependence is not the Anglo-Saxon free market model, but the opportunity for mutual benefit and growth backed by the right to guard the state from rampant free markets. Finally, China takes a particularly firm stance on sovereignty and non-interference, believing that all political decisions are internal affairs of a state and therefore not open to question by outside actors. Despite support for multilateralism, globalisation, and global institutions, Chinese leaders reiterate time and time again that nothing trumps state sovereignty, and no other states may interfere in another state’s domestic affairs. (Lanteigne, 2009)

With this in mind, China’s European 治 Studies scholars often weave these key 政大 principles into their analyses.立 In terms of multi-polarity, academics make no secret of 學 the fact that two of these poles would be the USA and China itself. The third pole, 國 however, is more up for question. Scholars of the European Union regularly argue that

‧ the European Union would make the ideal ‘third pole’ in this Chinese vision of world

‧ N affairs. (Song, 2001; Dang,a 2008; Zhao, 2008; Zhu, 2008b; Feng,y 2009c; Zhou, 2009; t t i i s Chen, 2010) For example,o Chen Zhimin (2010) states unequivocally:r “In today’s rapidly n e a i v multipolarising international relations,l C China, the USA, andn Europe, represented by the he i U European Union, are becoming the threen majorgch power centres of the global political economy.”

The summary of a conference organised by CFAU to celebrate the 50th anniversary of China-EU relations argues: “Currently, the conditions are in place for a

China-EU-US ‘great power coordination.’ The first is the adjustment of US-EU relations, particularly concerning the problems of Iran and the Near and Middle East; the second is that major security and economic problems are appearing which need the three-way coordination of China, the US and the EU, such as Iranian and North Korean

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nuclearisation, Middle Eastern conflict, problems with global finance and resources, international terrorism and so forth; the third is the need to enhance mutual trust between China, the US and the EU. A China-EU-US ‘new strategic triangle’ itself can become a platform for the three stakeholders to build consensus and a sense of cost- sharing, construct norms of major power behaviour, and correct the USA’s tendency towards unilateralism.”

From a more historic perspective, Zhou Hong (2009) explains that: “China recognised that Europe, a continent regaining its former important status in the international system after abolishing the old治 tradition of colonialism, was a potential 政大 force to balance out the Soviet立 Union and United States. In the future multipolar global 學 structure, the European Community would be an independent centre of economic and 國 political power, and also possibly a central force for the promotion of world peace.”

‧

‧ It can clearly beN seen from scholars’ wording that an almost universal consensus

a y t is that Europe itself alsot wishes to become a third pole (this is ani example of possible i s o r cognitive dissonance on then part of Chinese scholars). Zhao Huaipue (2008) writes that: a v l i “China and Europe are two majorC world forces; the n development of their mutual hengchi U relations not only accords with the fundamental interest of both sides, but also promotes the trend of global multipolarisation. This is a fundamental consensus between the two sides, constituting an important political foundation of the Sino-

European strategic partnership.”

In the eyes of these academics, the EU-US-China triangle will thus bring about the multipolar world order that the Chinese authorities wish to see.Although to outsiders, this is still merely conjecture, there is no doubt that it is the resounding collective

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opinion in the Chinese European Studies field, and thus the opinion most likely to reach the top leadership.

Importantly, the rise of the European Union is seen in positive terms by Chinese

European Studies scholars. This is due to many reasons: firstly, academics consider

Sino-EU relations to be flourishing, and the China-EU strategic partnership to be an important aspect of China’s overall foreign relations. China and Europe are considered to be free from direct conflicts of interest, and thus ideal strategic partners. (Song, 2001;

Dang, 2008; Zhou 2009) Scholars also argue that together, China and the EU represent a strong force for global peace and cooperation.治 For example, Zhu Liqun (2008b) states: 政大 “China increasingly sees the立 European Union as an independent power, an important 學 component in the development of global multipolarisation. China attaches great 國 significance to the progress of the China-EU strategic partnership, and has repeatedly

‧ reiterated that China and the European Union are important contemporary forces for

‧ N the promotion of developmenta and maintenance of peace in the world.y Comprehensive t t i i s development of the long, ostable and mutually beneficial cooperativer relations with the n e a i v EU and its member states is an limportant C facet of China’s nforeign policy.” hengchi U Secondly, many believe that China and the EU share close views on multilateralism, mutual benefit, and dialogue and communication. (Feng, 2007c; Dang,

2008; Chen et al., 2012) The EU is itself a multilateral institution, and the EU engages with other global and regional institutions with its watchword of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which is seen to match China’s approach to foreign relations. Zhu Liqun

(2007) analyses: “In general, in terms of normative principles, China emphasises equality, mutual benefit, and win-win; the EU emphasises contact, influence, and equality. The two have many points in common, but also have different foci. In terms of

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similarities, both China and the EU attach great importance to dialogue and communication: China emphasises dispute settlement through peaceful negotiation; the

European Union also has a preference for multilateralism, dialogue, and mediation.”

Thirdly, some scholars, such as Zhu Liqun (2008a) even believe that the EU’s preference for multilateralism will help constrain the USA: “Europe’s multilateralism stands in stark contrast to the USA’s unilateralism, leading to the international community’s expectation that Europe will check and balance the USA’s power. The EU is thus a unique new type of power, whose culture of peaceful cooperation constitutes a constructive influence on the international system.”治政大立 Fourthly, European Studies scholars place great emphasis on the differences in 學 the EU and the USA’s approaches國 to China. The European Union is seen to be more practical and less ideological than the USA, and therefore more ‧ willing to compromise

‧ with China despite fundamentalN differences which are thorns in the side of Sino-US

a y t relations, such as humant rights and currency appreciation. (Dang,i 2008; Chen, 2010) i s o r The EU’s approach is oftenn contrasted with the USA’s heavy-handedness.e Song Xinning a v l i (2001): “The main difference betweenC the EU and the USA’sn policies towards China is hengchi U one of form. In the United States, some people place more emphasis on the conflict within Sino-US relations, seeing China as the USA’s potential future enemy. In Europe, because no obvious conflicts exist within Sino-European relations, more people are focused on mutual cooperation.” He expands on this further: “It can be seen from the

EU’s recent China policy paper that there is a major difference in the China policies of the European Union and the new Bush administration: [the European approach] places a far greater emphasis on cooperation with China in all fields, as opposed to competition.

Although the EU’s policy towards China differs from the USA’s nominally, rather than

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fundamentally, it still places certain constraints on the USA, demonstrating the increasing autonomy of the EU’s foreign relations and foreign policy. Specifically, the

EU’s emphasis on cooperation in its China policy derives from… the broad common interests of China and the European Union.” Zhou Hong (2009) agrees that Europe recognises the opportunities offered by China-EU relations: “US-EU relations cannot replace China-EU relations. The European Union’s established policy is still committed to the improvement and strengthening of relations with China. As far as the European

Union is concerned, the more lively, dynamic China develops, the more opportunities the EU stands to gain.” 治政大 Finally, in contrast to 立the positive relations of China and the EU, Chinese analysts 學 see the US-EU relationship to be rapidly faltering as tensions grow over issues such as 國 the war on terror and gradual mutual alienation since the end of the Cold War. (Chen,

‧

2007; 2008; Zhao, 2008) In short, the weakening of the US-EU relationship, the constant

‧ N rivalry of the Sino-US a relationship, and the increasing strengtheningy of the Sino-EU t t i i s relationship lead to a multi-facetedo approach to reducing US r hegemony on the world n e a i v stage – both China and the EU lare C building up independencen from US interference and he i U intervention, and can assist each other inn doinggch so by constructing a steady, mutually beneficial partnership.

These views are reflected in Chinese foreign policy towards the EU, as witnessed by the European Union policy paper. One key insight is that the paper makes reference to Chinese European cooperation as being the driving force between “the establishment of a new international political and economic order.” (EU Policy Paper) This statement is a clear reflection of academics’ stance that the EU and China can forge a multipolar

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world together, against what is seen as the USA’s ruling political and economic hegemony.

5.4 Problems in China-EU Relations

Although relations with the European Union are seen as China’s best bilateral foreign relationship, there are some thorny issues which Chinese analysts see as plaguing the partnership. These include a ban on arms sales, the EU’s refusal to grant China Market

Economy Status (MES), and the ongoing human治 rights dialogue and debate. 政大 The EU has had a long立-standing ban on sales of weaponry to China ever since the 學

Tiananmen Incident of 國June 1989. However, the arms embargo takes the form of a one

page, non-legally binding statement issued hurriedly in a critical‧ response to the

Chinese government’s ‧ actions at Tiananmen, and has since never been given legal basis N

a y t or altered in any way. t In addition, the actual fact of the matteri is that individual io s European Union member statesn have continued to sell weaponsr to China in spite of the a e l i v ban. (Niblett, 2004) In 2005, the C European Union preparedn to lift the embargo, but in hengchi U the face of international (mainly US) pressure, the ban remained in place, and the EU has shelved discussion of the issue for the foreseeable future.

For Chinese academics, the European Union’s failure to lift the ban carries great weight. Firstly, the issue is one of the only problems in the relationship and therefore receives a great deal of attention. Aside from this issue, there are very few points of real contention in the China-EU partnership, and many academics argue that this should be ironed out. (Dai, 2005; Feng, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009)

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Secondly, in the reviewed texts, all academics that mention this subject wrote that the European Union tabled the issue in response to pressure from the USA. (eg.

Chen, 2006; Feng, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009; Zhou, 2011) For example, Chen Zhimin

(2006) states: “The strongest opposition came from the USA’s strategic thinking… the

USA and its closest allies within the European Union blocked the rapid decision of the

EU regarding the arms embargo.” Feng Zhongping (2006) writes: “The European

Union’s about-turn on its decision to lift the embargo was not because it accepted or agreed with the USA’s analysis of the consequences of lifting the ban, but rather because the EU was not willing to run the risk of further治 worsening relations with the USA in the 政大 wake of the Iraq war.” Following立 on from the discussion of the previous chapter, it is clear to see why this is an unwelcome conclusion for Chinese學 scholars. Chinese academics are arguing 國that the European Union hopes to gain independence from the

‧ USA to become a world pole in its own right, and that there are strains in the EU-USA

‧ relationship which meanN that the EU will come to favour China. However, the EU’s a y t t i bending to American pressurei flies in the face of these arguments.s Zhou Hong (2009) o r n e states rather bitterly: “After spendinga many years cultivatingv a partnership of broad and l i C Un deep strategic cooperation with China,hen theg c actionshi of this ‘strategic partner,’ the European Union, instead proved to the world that the partnership shared with the USA is, in fact, more strategic than the one with China.”

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the very existence of the ban is seen by many as a smack in the face to China. The ban itself is hardly effectual, so retaining the embargo despite this reality is seen as a political decision rather than a practical one.

Analysts also argue that China has undergone a lengthy and steady period of reform and development. The country, particularly human rights, have come a long way since the

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events of Tiananmen which triggered the bans on arms sales 24 years ago, and the embargo is therefore out of date. Keeping the embargo in place despite the developments of China is seen by the Chinese as an insult, which signals that the EU does not maintain mutual respect and equality in this bilateral relationship.(Feng, 2006;

Chen, 2006; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009) The CFAU 50th anniversary conference document

(2007) reads: “For Chinese people, the European Union’s refusal to lift the arms embargo is actually a political statement, demonstrating that the EU simply does not see

China as an equal cooperative partner.” Chen Zhimin (2006) corroborates this view: “The European Union has an arms embargo in治 place for only a few countries, namely 政大 China, Zimbabwe and Burma.立 Even North Korea is not subject to an embargo. Lumping China in with these other embargoed states is evidently inappropriate.”學國 These points of view are the standpoints taken by most academics discussing the

‧ arms embargo. However, it cannot be avoided that from a European perspective, none

‧ N of these views are particularlya helpful or insightful. EU member statesy disagree amongst t t i i s themselves about the efficacyo and point behind such a ban, andr yet it remains in place n e a i v for a range of reasons. Blusterling C from China about hown unfair the ban is will hardly he i U swing the European Union round to a newn pointgc ofh view.

This attitude is fairly similar when debating the second major issue in China-EU relations: Market Economy Status (MES). The European Union refuses to grant China

MES, which would allow greater and freer access to the European markets. Chinese analysts are also angered by this refusal, which once again is seen as an insult to China in spite of its developments and reforms (Feng, 2006; 2009b; Zhao, 2008; Zhou, 2009).

Nations such as Russia have been allowed MES, and Chinese academics argue that the

Chinese economy is more marketised than Russia’s at this point.For example, Feng

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(2006): “China often raises the example of Russia to question the European Union’s logic, asking the EU to explain why Russia, still refused entrance into the WTO, has been granted Market Economy Status. … One of the important reasons why the EU has refused to recognise China’s MES is to restrict Chinese imports into European markets through the employment of anti-dumping measures. Granting China MES would greatly reduce the effects of anti-dumping measures.”

As Feng Zhongping correctly acknowledged, one of the key reasons the EU refuses to grant this status to China is as a form of protectionism against an influx of

Chinese products which will undercut home-治grown offerings to the European market. 政大 Chinese scholars have recognised立 this but do not seem to recognise this reasoning as 學 excusable; the European Union should recognise China’s unequivocal and objective 國 right to be seen as a market economy. Although it is understandable why the Chinese

‧ may feel affronted by this decision, the rigid attitude shown by scholars towards the

‧ N

EU’s own decisions anda its own interests appears fairly hypocriticaly to outsiders when t t i i s compared to China’s owno insistence on non-interference andr sovereign power – n e a i v including on global economic l issues C which affect the domesticn economy, such as the he i U appreciation of the Chinese renminbi. Chinesengc h European Studies scholars place total blame on the European Union for this ‘transgression’ – not an attitude which will sit well with European policy makers in negotiations.

The third issue is human rights. It is well-known that China clashes over human rights in almost all its relationships with Western countries. This is largely because many Western powers and citizens have adopted the idea of universal human rights, arguing that intervention in another country’s internal affairs is justifiable for the sake of upholding these fundamental rights. Many diplomats feel it is their duty, and the

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expectation of their electorate, to bring up the issue of human rights with China at every opportunity. (Chan, 2006) Chinese thinkers, on the other hand, argue that human rights are viewed differently in China. A common refrain is that in the years of recent development, the Chinese government has granted millions the right to a full stomach, and a roof over their heads, and that these rights are more fundamental than any other.

The Chinese also argue that the process of securing human rights for every citizen is a slow process, which took hundreds of years in the West and will not happen overnight in China.

The CFAU 50th anniversary conference治 summaryargues at length: “In reality, the 政大 human rights problem in Sino立-European relations is rooted in the fact that, after 學 undergoing several hundred years of ruthless industrial exploitation and countless 國 aggressive wars, the now-flourishing Europe has already forgotten its painful past.

‧

European people indulge themselves in the superiority of their own cultures and

‧ N systems, and do not a empathise with China’s history, transformation,y and current t t i i s conditions. In the absenceo of this empathy, the advances of the pastr few decades of Sino- n e a i v European dialogue have beenl veryC limited. There are n a few factors leading to this he i U situation: firstly, to the Chinese, only too nawaregc ofh the events of the Opium War and the ransacking of the Summer Palace, the European criticism of China’s human rights record smacks of hypocrisy. Secondly, in the eighteen years since the [arms sale] ban,

Chinese human rights conditions have undergone sweeping changes – and Europeans are not unaware of this fact.”

Specifically in terms of the EU, there is no doubt that China considers the

European approach to human rights far less meddlesome than that of the United States.

(Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2010) Nevertheless, the EU and many individual member states do

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bring up the issue with China regularly, especially in relation to Tibet. In particular, many former Communist states of Eastern Europe continue to eye China warily and push the European Union to respond to the issue of human rights. (Shambaugh, 2008a)

Some Chinese analysts even infer that many of the problems that occur between China and Europe can be put down to Europeans taking an unfair attitude on the basis of their conclusions about China’s human rights record. This in itself is seen as an affront to

China, which should not go ignored. Once again, there is no suggestion of any blame on the part of China, only that the EU’s push for human rights does not harmonise with China’s firm policy of non-interference. The 治 Chinese resent any interference in what 政大 they see as unequivocally their立 internal affairs.(Feng, 2009a; Zhou, 2011) 學 Scholars offer thinly veiled criticisms of the EU’s interference: Zhu Liqun (2007) 國 argues, “China focuses on equal treatment for both sides and mutual respect, in

‧ particular respect for differences in values and belief systems; thus requiring a spirit of

‧ N equality. Europe insteada focuses on influencing and regulating China,y placing greatest t t i i emphasis on equality ino terms of responsibility, duty, and benefit,s and essentially n r a e i v th pursuing China’s emulation of thel C European Union.” CFAU’sn 50 anniversary conference he i U summary argues: “[Another] problem is nthatg thech two sides differ on the point of ‘non- interference in internal affairs.’ China emphasises the diverse nature of different national development models as well as mutual respect for different cultures, thus steadfastly adhering to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. But Europe instead believes that the promotion of values is the true meaning of diplomacy, and that it is acceptable to engage in swift and strong interference when necessary.”

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In conclusion, the analyses of Chinese European Studies scholars towards these three problem areas are in total consensus: the blame is on Europe. This thesis posits that, to a certain degree, Chinese policy practitioners are influenced by the views and advice of academics. It is also clear that little progress is being made on many of the sticking points in the China-EU relationship – arms sales, Market Economy Status, or human rights. The arms embargo has been in place for twenty-four years; the EU has put off discussion of China’s MES until at least 2015, when China will receive WTO MES; human rights continues to be an issue brought up in reference to China almost without cease. Here a significant point can be argued: 治to an outside eye, nothing constructive is 政大 mentioned in almost all Chinese立 academic articles about these problem areas. Or to put it another way, the European Union decision makers will學 not be swayed by the arguments of Chinese scholars;國 they are largely repeating the same points, claiming

‧ unfairness and lack of empathy; and universally blaming the European Union wholly

‧ unilaterally for all the Nproblems in the relationship. Whilst these claims may have some a y t t i basis in truth, they are noti helpful for negotiation. If, therefore, nothings constructive can o r n e be found in the literature, it ais highly believable that Chinesev policy practitioners have l i C Un no foundation upon which to build whenhe nattemptinggchi to broach these issues with the EU. Without clear-headed, logical, and two-sided analyses of the issues at hand, as well as valid solutions or approaches to the problems, by expert European Studies academics, then policy practitioners are in even less of a position to construct viable and balanced tactics, and move past these constant problems.

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5.5 Learning from the European Union

This final issue area departs from the basic premise of this thesis in that it is not a foreign policy issue. However, it is of such importance to Chinese European Studies scholars that it cannot be comfortably overlooked. Briefly, one of the key reasons for

Chinese academic interestin the European Union – as stated by the scholars themselves

– is to learn from its experiences in order to put them to use for China’s benefit. (Dai,

2008; Zhu, 2008a; Song, 2008; Zhou, 2009) As Dai (2008) writes, “To serve domestic needs has always been what the individuals engaged in European Studies are asked for 治 and are committed to.” (p. 113) 政大立 In other words, Chinese scholars hope to draw out lessons學 from which China can learn, and as Dai (2008)國 intimates, are even expected to do so by policy practitioners hoping for inspiration. European Studies scholars pick out valuable‧ lessons from the

‧ European experience N and present them to the leadership;these lessons may be a y t subsequently incorporatedt into China’s own domestic policies, ori policy toward other io s n r global actors. Learning from the experiences of other countriese and regions is hugely a i v l C n important to China. According to Tsaih anden Deangc (2013),hi U “It is widely understood that the CCP adopts a variety of methods to strengthenits governing ability, including studying the experience of other countries or regions.” The Chinese government has been carrying out continuous reforms for decades, and often draws upon adaptations of examples from other countries, or in the case of the European Union, other political bodies. However, the government needs academics to bridge this gap for them. In general, it is only through academic analysis and research reports that practitioners are informed of European experiences and how they can be reproduced in a Chinese context. As such, although this section of the study does not specifically relate to

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academic opinions on China’s foreign policy towards Europe, it makes up such a significant aspect of the insights European Studies scholars pass on to policy practitioners, through the same mechanisms laid out in Chapter Four, that it is worthwhile investigating.

In the view of Chinese scholars, there are many lessons to be learned from the

European Union experience. Song Xinning (2008), for instance, identifies four categories, which include regional cooperation, social and economic development, political reform, and the ‘peaceful rise’ of Europe.Zhao Huaipu (2008) corroborates, stating: “[China’s] aim is to achieve a market economy, civil society,治 and political pluralism, and in all these 政大 respects the Europe Union can立 offer a wealth of experience for China to draw upon, 學 including the historical experience of Europe’s welfare societies and the more recent 國 experience of assisting regime transformation in Eastern Europe after the end of the

‧

Cold War.”

‧ N

a y t In terms of regionalt cooperation, the European Union makesi the ideal role model. i s o r The EU represents the mostn integrated regional political body eever seen in the history of a v l i the world. European Union memberC states have sacrificedn a certain degree of national hengchi U sovereignty and transferred these rights to a multilateral regional organisation in the belief that this is in their best interests. For the Chinese, who retain a firm belief in the values of national sovereignty, this is a curious phenomenon which has drawn much attention from analysts. A current trend amongst Chinese international relations scholars is the promotion of regional integration; European Studies scholars are responding to his trend by offering insights from the European experience. (Zhang,

2008; Zhu, 2009) If China wishes to be at the helm of an Asian regional integration process, then learning from the European Union may be one of the best ways to do so.

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Zhu Liqun (2009) explains: “[The EU] is the world’s first successful model of regional integration, thus possessing a strong appeal. The EU became the world’s most stable and tight regional union through economic, political, and social cooperation. Its developmental model draws in neighbouring countries like a lodestone, and possesses a wealth of experience of regional cooperation for other regions to learn from.” Zhang Jian

(2008) writes: “Europe has achieved long-lasting peace and common prosperity. The success of European integration has therefore had a strong demonstrative effect in many other regions of the world. The EU is also happy to promote its successful experiences of integration. This has come to 治constitute an important facet of the EU’s 政大 soft power.” 立學 China’s Peaceful Rise has already been discussed in section 4.4. The concept itself 國 has proven problematic, but the real issue lies in China’s rise itself. There is no question

‧ that the development of China has created a massive impact on practically every aspect

‧ N of international life, anda there are many powerful actors – especiallyy the United States – t t i i s that do not welcome this ochange. China meets with the oppositionr of the USA on many n e a i v fronts, and often accuses thel USC of deliberately attemptingn to block and slow its he i U development or create direct and indirectn threatsgch to China’s security.

After WWII, the European continent was devastated. It only really began to return to former glory after massive inputs from the Marshall Project, which enabled the embattled European economies to get back on their feet and bring themselves into a state of stability. The Marshall project, funded by the USA, also heralded the beginning of European cooperation. (Smith, 2002) To the Chinese, there are definite similarities in the rise of Europe from the ashes of the Second World War and the rise of China from the century of humiliation and the excesses of Maoism. Zhou Hong (2009): “Both new

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China and new Europe were relatively weak to begin with. China had just cast off the shackles of colonial rule, working hard to construct a modern state; Europe had but a slight experience of integration. At that time, the principal European actors were still just nation-states attempting to recover from the wounds of war.”

However, the response of other countries in the world appears markedly different. Chinese European Studies scholars debate the differences in the development of China and the EU, and consider what they can learn from these experiences. Mostly, academics have identified the importance of maintaining a positive relationship with the status quo hegemon through the formation治 of a bond of key interests and economic 政大 interdependence. In addition,立 the European Union participated actively in international, 學 multilateral organisations. This added to the credibility and trustworthiness of the EU 國 as a responsible global actor. In addition, the European Union has offered a great deal of

‧ assistance to former colonies; although China cannot directly imitate this approach, the

‧ N importance of engaginga with the developing world, as opposedy to constricting its t t i i s development, would bringo about greater support for a growingr power. Finally, the n e a i v European Union is seen to possessl C great soft power. Rathern than rising through military he i U strength or domination, the European Unionng tookch an economic route, and brought with it a blend of culture, technology, and flourishing social models which inspire rather than coerce on the path to power.

Song Xinning (2004) argues:“It can be said that the European Union achieved a peaceful rise, both in terms of economics and politics, but it did not threaten the USA’s hegemonic status, nor lead to drastic change in the international system. Europe’s peaceful rise is based on its careful handling of three types of relations: 1) relations with neighbours and other regions. Europe’s integration bound together many of the

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continent’s countries into one actor, allowing Europe to achieve peaceful development within its own borders. 2) The relationship with the ruling hegemon – the USA. Europe was able to bandwagon on security and economic fields by entering into an alliance with the USA. 3) Relations with the rest of the world, in particular developing countries, playing an important role in bridging the world’s North-South division. The European

Union’s peaceful rise offers us a good model of experience.” Zhu Liqun (2008b)adds:

“The European Union’s growth into the world’s biggest soft power has had an irreplaceable constructive effect on the world system. Europe has contributed to the world the fundamental concept of effective治 multilateralism and the culture of 政大 consultative cooperation, which立 emphasises common benefit and power-sharing, on the condition of cooperation and adherence to binding regulations.”學國 Chinese scholars also consider the social, economic, and political development in

‧

Europe. Firstly, it is widely concluded that the European Union presents subtly, but in

‧ N fact vastly different modelsa of social, economic, and political developmenty than the t t i i s United States. (Zhang Jianhua,o 2001; Zhang Jianxiong, 2001; Tian,r 2005; Zhou, 2006) n e a i v The European Union not onlyl tiesC together its twenty n eight member states, but also he i U gives space to elected representatives fromng thec manyh different political parties present within these states. The entire union is thus made up of members with varying political beliefs, and yet manages to function nevertheless, through complex collective decision making systems. For the Chinese, with a one Party regime, this political harmony is of interest. European Studies scholars consider how the European Union’s political experience and decision making mechanisms could provide models for successful political reform within China itself. What’s more, the European Union guarantees basic social welfare to its citizens that goes far beyond the safety nets offered by the United

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States. (Song, 2008) China is a country sorely lacking in social welfare, but as a rapidly developing country, this is one of the next steps to be taken. China’s authorities must provide for over 1.3 billion citizens; an unviable system is not an option. The European

Union also offers infrastructure investment. For instance, Zhang Jianxiong (2001) claims that: “It is worthwhile for China’s Western regions to take many of the methods in the

EU’s policy of structural funding as a model in their quest for large-scale development.”

Studying the experiences of different countries can offer China some models to adapt – and the European model is considered to be one of the most successful models in the world. 治政大 Signs of these ‘lessons’立 can already be seen in Chinese policy. Although there is 學 no way to know whether Chinese policy decisions have been made purely on the 國 recommendations of scholars learning from the European system, there is no doubt that

‧

China has begun pursuing policies of engagement with developing countries,

‧ N strengthening of soft a power, increased regional cooperation andy integration, and t t i i effective participation witho multilateral organisations. (Hu Jintao’ss Political Reports to n r a e th th i v the 17 and 18 NCCPC) The lEuropean C Studies field is nalso continuing to grow and is he i U well-funded, largely in the hope that analystsngc ofh Europe can offer insights which will benefit China itself in the long run. (Dai, 2008)

This chapter has firstly discussed China’s official policy towards the European Union, as outlined in its 2003 policy paper. Next, the chapter moved on to consider the state of

European Studies in China today. By taking into account the mechanisms of influence examined in Chapter Four, the most influential institutes and individual academics, as well as the key journals for European Studies, were identified. The chapter then

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revealed the general views of Chinese scholars with regard to three different major issue areas, namely China and the EU on the global stage, problems in China-EU relations, and the possibilities for China to learn from the EU.

Comparing China’s policy with the work of academics reveals clear similarities.

For example, much of the literature on the European Union refers to its growing importance in the world and the possibility that the European Union will become one pole in a new multipolar order. China’s own rise is much-discussed and generally accepted as a concrete fact by Chinese academics. Academics regularly moot the idea that China and Europe can become two constructive治 poles in this world order. This is 政大 emphasised by their identified立 similarities with regard to multilateralism and dialogue. 學 The statement in the policy paper declaring that the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) 國 should become “a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political

‧ and economic order” are signs of this way of thinking in action.

‧ N

a y t Secondly, there t is a great deal of work on the problemsi in the China-EU i s o r relationship, including the nongoing arms embargo, China’s Markete Economy Status, and a v l i clashes in the human rights dialogue.C Although scholarsn discuss these issues at length, hengchi U they conclude that the problem is with the European side, notably its lack of empathy and fairness, notwithstanding the issues with internal disagreement amongst member states. Regardless of whether this has any element of truth, the approach of academics does not appear to provide any concrete solutions or measures that the Chinese leadership could take to directly address these issues. This standpoint is mirrored in the statements given in the policy paper. For example, the paper simply states that “it is important to… grant China a full market economy status at an early date.” No reasoning is given as to why, and nor are any policies outlined to detail how the Chinese can earn

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Europe’s understanding in the matter. In another example, on 28th January 2010,

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhouxu (马朝旭) informed a press conference that:

“The EU’s arms embargo, in nature, is political prejudice against China, which runs counter to world tides and China-EU all-round strategic partnership.” This is an almost word-for-word reflection of the arguments of Chinese scholars, and once again engages in blame and criticism without any nod to constructive resolutions.

Finally, in terms of learning from Europe, in this case it is other policies which must be considered, not China’s policy towards the EU. Scholars offer many ways in 治 which China can learn from the EU,政 including, for example,大 regional integration and rising peacefully. China is currently立 taking great strides towards regional integration 學 and collective regional security with efforts targeted mainly towards the Shanghai 國 Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN +3. (Wu, 2008) With regard to Europe’s ‘peaceful

‧

rise,’ analysts such as Song‧ (2004) and Zhou (2009) identify the ways in which Europe N

a y developed from its low point after WWII into a major world t power, including by t i i s establishing good relationso with different states in the world: rneighbouring countries, n e a i v the ruling hegemon, and developingl C countries. Once againn this is seen in China’s foreign hen hi U policies: China’s regional cooperation effortsgc may represent attempts to ameliorate relations with those in the Asia-Pacific. In recent years China has also made great inroads into diplomacy with the developing world, engaging in projects across Latin

America and Africa. (Alden, 2007) It is considered by many that China is in a race for resources in these areas; nevertheless, China has begun to mould itself into a ‘champion’ of developing countries, consolidating their interests and wielding its own power on their behalf. (Xinhua, 2009) Finally, although Sino-US relations are beset with constant

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problems, China and the USA are now pursuing an official Strategic and Economic

Dialogue. (US Department of State)

In addition to these three major issue areas, there are in fact essentially no areas touched upon in the EU policy paper that have not been discussed by academics previously or since. China’s ‘Europe Watchers’ have covered the gamut from the role of

Europe in the new world order, to the minutiae of Track II diplomacy via various industries and the importance of soft power and cultural understanding. Most importantly, with the exception of the mentioned problems, a tone of positivity runs through almost all of the academic work regarding治 China-EU relations, a tone which is 政大 matched in official policy statements.立學

In one of the more國 conclusive examples of the way academic research appears to have influenced policy, in July 2001 CICIR Europe analysts collectively‧ wrote a report on

‧ China’s relations withN the European Union. (CICIR EU Research Group, 2001) In

a y t addition to explicitly statingt that Europe “is a major collaboratori for China to push i s o r forward the move towardn global multipolarity,” the papere also elaborates on the a v l i important pillars of economic, political,C and strategic interestsn tying the EU and China hengchi U ever closer together. The report recommended that China follow a long-term strategy in its engagement with the EU, as opposed to making only responsive policies when issues arise, advising the government to write a policy paper for the European Union. Finally, the report carefully detailed seven key policy suggestions for the next 5-10 years:

1) In terms of economics, China should: pay greater attention to European SMEs;

increase efforts to attract European investment in China; specifically attempt to

attract technological investment and collaboration; increase the quality of

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agricultural exports in order to increase market share in Europe; anticipate the

economic consequences of Eastern enlargement and make contingency plans.

2) In terms of politics, China should: positively assess the EU’s principles of

dialogue, cooperation, and assistance; support the EU’s efforts to become a global

pole; communicate and work together on global issues of importance.

3) China should also strengthen cooperation over Eurasian affairs, eg. crime,

migration.

4) China should set up coordination groups to handle and respond to the EU’s 60 point policy plan towards China and propose治 joint plans to achieve these aims. 政大 5) China and the EU should立 work together actively to promote their respective cultures to one another, including through cultural exchange學 and culture centres.

6) Despite their differences,國 China and the EU should maintain positive dialogue

‧ over human rights (identified here as the largest issue in bilateral relations).

‧ 7) China and the N EU should increase non-governmental exchange and Track II a y t t i diplomacy. i s o r n e a i v Just two years after thisl reportC was published, Chinan issued its first and only he i U policy paper. The wording of the policyng paperch is immediately notable as being practically identical to the CICIR report, and the policy decision makers appear to have followed each and every suggestion to the letter. CICIR released an English language version of the report, but it is important to remember that CICIR is also the only research institute with several classified channels directly to the central leadership.

Undoubtedly a Chinese language version of the report, with more sensitive or explicit details included, would have been conveyed to the top foreign policy decision makers.

Although, admittedly, there remains the possibility that CICIR were instructed to write

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this report by policy makers who had already dictated its content, to all intents and purposes, and given the evidence that academics are increasingly free of government influence, the report seems to indicate a direct link between the work of influential academics and actual policy output by decision makers.

治政大立學

國

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Chapter 6

Conclusions

This thesis has analysedthe potential influence of the world of academia over China’s foreign policy making, with a preliminary case study of the field of European Studies and China’s policy toward Europe. Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.

This chapter will first address the three secondary research questions in turn, before finally drawing together the insights of this study to conclude in response to the 政治 primary research question: What is the role of academia大 in terms of China’s foreign 立 policy decision making? 學

國

‧ 1) How is foreign policy formulated in China, and by whom is it decided?

‧ N

- China’s foreign a policy decision making involves both formaly structures and t t i informal mechanisms,io and is increasingly diversifying. s n r a e l i v According to the explanations C of Chapter Two, Chinan’s foreign policy making has hengchi U evolved since the days of ‘strongman’ decision making. Previously, leaders such as Mao and Deng wielded the ultimate decision making power with little input from other actors. However, after the reforms initiated by Deng, as well as changes in the world system, began to drastically alter China’s domestic and international conditions, this model of decision making was no longer effective. From this point on, foreign policy decision making, despite retaining a high degree of centralisation, began to diversify.

More and more governmental actors now play a part, culminating in a formal hierarchical structure pivoting around the powerful Foreign Affairs Leading Small

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Group (FALSG), made up of the most powerful voices in the foreign affairs field. This hierarchy involves mechanisms of delegation, implementation, recommendation, and ratification. However, laid over this formal system are informal mechanisms of traditional hierarchy and seniority, in which the wishes and preferences of more senior policy practitioners take precedence. Finally, Chapter Two pointed to the diversification and growing influence of non-governmental actors in the policy process. These actors include civil society, business and enterprise, and the military. Most importantly for this study, the influence of the world of academia on China’s foreign policy is growing considerably. 治政大立學

2) How is China’s evolving國 international relations academia structured, and what

role and function does it play? ‧

‧ - The main role N of China’s international relations academia, divided into official,

a y t semi-official, andt civilian units and their respective academics,i is to supply the i s o r leadership with informationn and analysis. e a v l i Ch Un Chapter Three investigated the structureen g ofc theh i foreign policy academia in China. Chinese research institutes have followed a different path in their evolution than their

Western equivalents. The output of the first research institutes in China was considered largely irrelevant as academia initially acted merely as a mouthpiece for Party leaders.

However, over time, Chinese research institutes have grown steadily closer to foreign counterparts, enjoying greater intellectual freedom and links with peers at home and abroad. In addition, the output of research institutes is now worthy of greater note, as academic standards have improved and the role of academia in the policy making process has grown.

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China’s academia can be divided into three key types: official, semi-official, and civilian research units. Official units are the adjuncts of particular Party departments and are generally restricted in their horizontal links with other academic units. Semi- official units are affiliated with Party departments, but generally only in terms of administration and funding. As such, these units are relativelymore free to follow their own agenda whilst simultaneously enjoying the benefits of Party affiliation. Civilian units, including university departments, are not affiliated with Party departments and are thus the least restricted of all research institute types.

Finally, although the historic evolution治 of China’s research institutes means that 政大 their roles and functions still立 retain some unique legacies – such as actively attempting 學 to influence foreign views on behalf of the Party –it was identified that the key function 國 of research institutes in China is to provide the leadership with the information and

‧ analysis neededto make policy decisions. With this in mind, the research output of

‧ N

Chinese research institutesa is thus an importance source of policyy decisions and t t i i s valuable for analysis. o r n e a v l i C n hengchi U 3) To what extent does European Studies academia exert influence over China’s

policy towards the European Union?

- Studying the work of the most influential European Studies scholars can give real

insights into future policy directions.

Chapter Five’s preliminary exploration of the European Studies field and its links to

China’s EU policy making is a specific case study designed to exemplify the models and mechanisms teased out through Chapters Two, Three, and Chapter Four in particular.

Drawing on both the established mechanisms of policy influence identified earlier in the

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research, as well as apparent clear links between the European Studies research output and China’s official EU policies, this research concludes that European Studies academia holds real, tangible influence over the views of China’s decision makers and thereby

China’s policy towards the EU.

Firstly, China’s policy towards the European Union calls for cooperation on a range of levels, including economic, political, industrial, as well as for greater people-to- people exchange and understanding between the two actors. China’s EU policy paper of

2003 is generally very positive in tone, with brief but rather abrupt allusions to some of the issue besetting China-EU relations. 治政大 After considering China’s立 policy toward the EU, Chapter Five then went on to carefully and thoroughly identify the most influential scholars學 and units in European

Studies. Influential research國 units included CICIR, CASS and CIIS’s European Studies

‧ institutes, as well as the European Studies departments at Renmin, Fudan, and China

‧ Foreign Affairs Universities.N The biographies of seven individual scholars were a y t t i presented, identifying thei pathways, levels, and sources of influences available to each. o r n e These included Feng Zhongping,a Zhang Jian, Zhou Hong, Cuiv Hongjian, Chen Zhimin, l i C Un Song Xinning, and Zhu Liqun. The workhe ofn thesegc scholarshi is especially worthy of note, as it is deemed the most likely to wield influence over policy decisions.

Three issue areas were looked at in turn: China and the EU on the world stage, problems in China-EU relations, and learning from the EU. The work of European

Studies scholars in each of these areas was considered, and it was found that firstly, most scholars in the field agree that the EU will come to represent a pole in a multipolar world order, shared by the USA and China, and that China and the EU will be able to cooperate effectively together by dint of the similarities in their approaches to the world system, as well as mutual pragmatism. Secondly, academics discussed the EU’s

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arms embargo, refusal to grant China MES, and obstacles in the human rights dialogue at great length, and tended to conclude that the problem lay with a lack of empathy and understanding on the part of Europe. Few constructive policy suggestions were found.

Thirdly, European Studies scholars argue that China can learn from the experience of

Europe, most particularly in terms of regional integration, a peaceful rise, and political, economic, and social affairs. Although the case study originally set out to specifically uncover the way in which European Studies academia influences China’s foreign policy towards the EU, it became clear that these scholars are also working toward the ramifications of European Studies research for治 domestic policy options. 政大 The obvious similarities立 between the output of European Studies scholars and China’s actual official policy toward the European Union suggest,學 if not a direct cause and effect condition, at the國 very least a close link. The wording of a policy report written

‧ collectively by some of the most influential European Studies scholars at one of the most

‧ influential European StudiesN research institutes – CICIR – appeared almost verbatim in a y t t i China’s 2003 EU policy i paper. This appears to be more than s coincidental, given the o r n e identified influence of CICIR anda the evidence of the increasingv reliance of foreign policy l i C Un practitioners on information and analysishen ofg China’schi international relations academia.

4) Primary Research Question:What is the role of academia in terms of China’s

foreign policy decision making?

- The main function of China’s international relations academia is to provide Chinese

policy makers with information and recommendations for their decisions; China’s

academia draws on diverse pathways, sources, and levels of policy influence and

holds increasing sway over China’s foreign policy decision making.

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Drawing on the background conditions of the structure of China’s foreign policy decision making and the evolution of China’s international relations academia established in Chapters Two and Three respectively, Chapter Four goes into great detail regarding the mechanisms of policy influence available to and employed by the world of foreign policy academia. Firstly, it is recognised that there are many models by which research may be utilised by practitioners, ranging from direct and active soliciting of policy information to fulfil established needs, to the preferences of policy practitioners being indirectly shaped by the collective output of research academia. In the specific case of China, there are many concrete pathways治 to influence available to academics, 政大 which match these general立 research utilisation models. These include formal and informal consultation, internal reports, conferences, and through學 public research output catching the eye of practition國 ers.

‧

Chapter Four then identified several factors shaping the extent of an academic or

‧ N an academic unit’s influencea over policy, including both levels andy sources of influence. t t i i s In terms of levels of influence,o academics can build up their reputationr at three different n e a i v levels: amongst policy makers, lwith C peers, and in public. nEach of these levels can lead to he i U greater influence at other levels, and increasengc theh probability that an academic’s work will get noticed. Sources of influence can be divided into four: positional, experiential, expert, and personal. Positional influence is related to the types of research institute identified into Chapter Three: in general, close affiliation to Party departments is an immediate source of positional influence. Experiential and expert influence refer to an academic or a research institute’s past experience and expertise in the field in question, including study abroad and highly ranked research output, and historical legacy and reputation respectively. Finally, and possibly most importantly, academics can draw on

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personal networks, or guanxi, to build up personal influence. The sources of influence available to academics also depends on which type of research institute they work in; those in official and semi-official units draw mostly on positional influence, whereas those in civilian units have little choice but to rely on personal networks and expertise in the absence of positional sway.

Taken together, Chapters Two, Three, and particularly Chapter Four tease out a clearer framework of the mechanisms by which China’s international relations academia influences policy making in reality. Chapter Five then outlines an illustrative preliminary case study of the European Studies治 field and China’s EU policy. Considering 政大 that the mechanisms of academic立 policy influence identified in Chapter Four cover 學 academia in general, there is thus reason to believe that the evidence of similarities in 國 academic research output and eventual policy decisions seen in the case of European

‧

Studies and EU policy can be generalised to other areas in the discipline of international

‧ N relations and foreign a policy, as well as, potentially, other disciplinesy entirely. This t t i i s encourages a potential futureo research direction: studying ther research output of the n e a i v most influential Chinese scholarsl Cmay offers insights inton the shape of future policies. hengchi U This research has ultimately shown that it is important for outside analysts to take the work of Chinese academics into account in order to gain a greater foothold on the many debates and ideas being discussed within academic circles poised to eventually influence real policy decisions. Although a true cause and effect condition cannot be proven empirically by the preliminary case study of Chapter Five, there is sufficient evidence of probable inference between academic research output and actual foreign policy that it is worthwhile for outside interested parties to pay far greater attention to Chinese academia and research output than has previously been the case.

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This thesis thus concludes with a recommendation, shared by David Shambaugh

(2008). Chinese analysts have long recognised the importance of foreign research output and systematically translate, gist, and convey to the Chinese leadership the information contained within overseas research to help inform their decisions.

Although the review of European Studies scholarship in this study is far from comprehensive, the initial findings, combined with the insights of Chapters Two and

Three and the clear mechanisms outlined in Chapter Four,all add great strength to the argument that not only the European Union, but also other states and actors, may benefit greatly bybeginning to conduct a similar治 systematic analysis of the work of 政大 China’s most influential internation立 al relations scholars, in order to better illuminate the standpoint of Chinese thinkers and practitioners and thus學 facilitate successful and responsive policy making國 through a more profound understanding of Chinese

‧ counterparts’ point of view.

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Appendix I

Major Chinese International Relations Research Institutes

 China Foreign Affairs University(CFAU) 外交学院, Waijiao xueyuan

 China Foundation for International Strategic Studies, PLA General Staff Department (FISS) 中国国际战略研究基金会, Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe yanjiu jijinhui

 China Institute for International Strategic Studies,PLA General Staff Department(CIISS) 治中国国际战略学会, Zhongguo政 guoji zhanlüe xuehui大立  China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 學中国国际问题研究所, Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo 國

 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR)‧ 中国现代国际关系研究院, Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiuyuan

‧ N a y  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) t t i 中国社会科学学院i , Zhongguo shehui kexue xueyuan s o r n a e  Fudan University School of International Relations andi v Public Affairs (SIRPA) l C n 复旦大学国际关系与共事务学院hen, Fudanch idaxue U guoji guanxi yu gongshiwu xueyuan g

 Qinghua University Department of International Relations 清华大学国际关系学系, Qinghua daxue guoji guanxi xuexi

 Renmin University School of International Studies 人民大学国际关系学院, Renmin daxue guoji guanxi xueyuan

 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 上海社会科学学院, Shanghai shehui kexue xueyuan

 Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) 上海国际问题研究院, Shanghai guoji wenti yanjiuyuan

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Appendix II

CSSCI Rankings for Politics Journals, 2010-2011

1. World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) 2. American Studies (美国研究, Meiguo yanjiu) 3. European Studies (欧洲研究, Ouzhou yanjiu) 4. International Politics (国际政治研究, Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu) 5. Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系, Xiandai guoji guanxi) 6. Youth Studies (青年研究, Qingnian yanjiu治) 7. Journal of Political Science (政治学研究政 , Zhengzhi大 xue yanjiu) 8. Party History Studies 立(中共党史研究, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu) 學 9. International Review (国际观察, Guoji guancha) 國 10. Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies (当代亚太, Dangdai ya tai)

11. Journal of China National School of Administration (国家行政学院学报‧ , Guojia

‧ xingzheng xueyuanN xuebao)

a y 12. Seeking Truth (求是, Qiu shi) t t i i s 13. Foreign Affairs Reviewo (外交评论, Waijiao pinglun) r n e 14. Northeast Asia Foruma (东北亚论坛, Dongbei ya luntani v) l C n 15. Journal of Central Party Schoolh (e中共中央党校学报ngchi U , Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao) 16. International Studies (国际问题研究, Guoji wenti yanjiu) 17. Southeast Asian Affairs (南洋问题研究, Nan yang wenti yanjiu) 18. International Forum (国际论坛, Guoji luntan) 19. Journal of Jiangsu School of Adminstration (江苏行政学院学报, Jiangsu xingzheng xueyuan xuebao) 20. Japanese Studies (日本学刊, Riben xuekan) 21. Journal of Shanghai School of Adminstration (上海行政学院学报, Shanghai xingzheng xueyuan xuebao) 22. Theoretical Investigations (理论探讨, Lilun tantao)

150

23. Russian, Central Asian and East European Studies (俄罗斯中亚东欧研究, Eluosi zhongya dong’ou yanjiu) 24. Journal of Beijing School of Administration (北京行政学院学报, Beijing xingzheng xueyuan xuebao) 25. Expanding Horizons (新视野, Xin shiye) 26. Collection of Women’s Studies (妇女研究论丛, Funü yanjiu luncong) 27. Party History Research and Teaching (党史研究与教学, Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue) 28. Party Literature (党的文献, Dang de wenxuan) 29. Truth Seeking (求实, Qiu shi) 30. South Asian Studies (南亚研究, Nanya yanjiu) 31. Deustchland-studien (德国研究, Deguo 治yanjiu) 政大 32. China Youth Study (中国青年研究立 , Zhongguo qingnian yanjiu) 33. Taiwan Research Quarterly (台湾研究集刊, Taiwan yanjiu學 jikan)

34. Theory and Reform國 (理论与改革, Lilun yu gaige) 35. Pacific University (太平洋学报, Taipingyang xuebao) ‧ 36. South Asian Studies Quarterly (南亚研究季刊, Nanya yanjiu jikan)

‧ N 37. Southeast Asian Studies (东南亚研究, Dongnan ya yanjiu) a y t 38. Probe (探索, Tansuot ) i io s n r 39. Journal of China Youtha University for Political Sciences e(中国青年政治学院学报, l i v Zhongguo qingnian zhengzhi C xueyuan xuebao) n hengchi U

Source: Wenku, Most Recent CSSCI Rankings. Available from http://wenku.baidu.com/view/88b02927ccbff121dd36831f.html [accessed July 2013].

151

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