The Making of China's Maritime Security Policy: Policy Actors, the Fragmented Authority, and Implications

Home , 2008 Tibetan unrest, Beilun River, Chen Bingde, Chen Zhimin, China Coast Guard, Cui Tiankai

The Making of China’s Maritime Security Policy: Policy Actors, the Fragmented Authority, and Implications

Chia-Yu Huang

A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW Canberra

2014

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Surname or Family name: Huang

First name: Chia-Yu Other name/s:

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School: School of HASS Faculty: UNSW Canberra

Title: The making of China's maritime security policy: policy actors, the fragmented authority, and implications

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis aims to examine the decision-making process of China's maritime security policy. In particular, it addresses the question of what factors have led to the inconsistent nature of China's maritime security policy, a phenomenon as yet little examined. In contrast to existing studies regarding China's maritime power which have implied that there is a clear driver dominating China's maritime security policy, this thesis highlights inter-agency competition in the policy process. It argues that due to the fragmentation of its decision-making authority, China does not have a clear driving force dominating the making of its maritime security policy. Instead, its policy is influenced and shaped by various loosely coordinated actors in the policy process and is a product of extensive bureaucratic bargaining. Consequently, even though Beijing has an overarching policy guideline to build the country into a maritime power (haiyang qiangguo), relevant decisions on specific maritime security issues are made disjointedly and slowly, which contributes to the inconsistent nature of its maritime security policy.

The theoretical foundation of this thesis is the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model which is one of the most important analytical frameworks for the study of Chinese politics and decision-making process. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: Beijing's policy on the East China Sea dispute, its policy on the South China Sea dispute, the Chinese aircraft carrier program and China's counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. They help explain the roles played by policy actors in the decision-making process of China's maritime security policy when the country confronts various security challenges.

This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis to explain the inconsistent nature of China's maritime security policy and, on a broader level, offers new thoughts for the future study in relation to China's foreign and security policy. In addition, it extends the FA framework by dividing policy actors into two groups, prirnary and marginal, according to the weight of their influences on policy outcomes.

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Date ...... og /to/ -zotU.. T...... TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract iv Acknowledgement vi List of Figures and List of Tables viii Abbreviations ix Chapter One Introduction 1 1.1 Objectives of This Study 1 1.2 Literature Review 9 1.3 Main Argument of This Thesis 25 1.4 Research Methodology 31 1.5 Structure of Thesis 34 Chapter Two The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Policy Actors in the Making of China’s Maritime Security Policy 37 2.1 The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model 38 2.2 Impacts of the Fragmentation of Authority on Policy Outcomes 45 2.3 Strengths and Limitations of the FA Model 48 2.4 Policy Actors in the Decision-making Process of China’s Maritime Security Policy 53 2.5 Concluding Remarks 78

Chapter Three The Evolution of China’s Maritime Security Policy 80 3.1 The Early Years of the PRC under Mao Zedong 81 3.2 The Era of Deng Xiaoping and the Economic Reform 91 3.3 The Era of Jiang Zemin 100 3.4 The Era of Hu Jintao 108 3.5 Latest Development of China’s Maritime Security Policy under Xi Jinping 119 3.6 Concluding Remarks 121

i Chapter Four The Decision-making Process of Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute 124 4.1 The East China Sea Dispute: Competing Claims and Strategic Significance 125 4.2 Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute 132 4.3 Policy Actors’ Roles in Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute 143 4.4 Key Features of the Policy Process 160 4.5 Concluding Remarks 170 Chapter Five The Making of Beijing’s Policy on the South China Sea Dispute 172 5.1 The South China Sea Dispute: An Overview 173 5.2 Beijing’s Policy on the South China Sea Dispute 183 5.3 Three Selected Issues: Factors behind the Decisions 192 5.4 Concluding Remarks 214

Chapter Six China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Factors behind the Prolonged Process 217 6.1 China’s Long March to Its First Aircraft Carrier 219 6.2 The Decision-making Process of China’s Aircraft Carrier Program 233 6.3 CCP’s Decision to Begin Carrier Construction and Undetermined Future Trend 253 6.4 Concluding Remarks 258 Chapter Seven Policy Process of China’s Escort Operations in the Gulf of Aden 261 7.1 China’s Counter-piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden: An Introduction 262 7.2 Existing Studies of China’s Somali Campaign 273 7.3 Policy Actors’ Roles in the Decision-making Process 277 7.4 Impacts of a Fragmented Structure of Authority on the Escort Operations 289

ii 7.5 Concluding Remarks 297 Chapter Eight Conclusion 300 8.1 Summary of Major Findings 301 8.2 Implications of the Findings for Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific 305 8.3 Significance of This Thesis’ Argument and Areas for Future Research 307

Bibliography 311

iii ABSTRACT

The theoretical foundation of this thesis is the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model which is one of the most important analytical frameworks for the study of Chinese politics and decision-making process. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: Beijing's policy on the East China Sea dispute, its policy on the South China Sea dispute, the Chinese aircraft carrier program and China's counter- piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. They help explain the roles played by policy actors in the decision-making process of China's maritime security policy when the country confronts various security challenges.

iv primary and marginal, according to the weight of their influences on policy outcomes.

v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am deeply indebted to the many people who have assisted me to complete this PhD thesis during the past four years. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Jian Zhang, for his clear guidance and enthusiasm about my research. In particular, I thank him for committing so much time and effort to correct my draft chapters and make detailed in-text comments. Additionally, Professor David Lovell, my co-supervisor, also gave me strong support regarding my field research trip to China in 2011 and provided valuable feedbacks at the final stage of my research.

Administrative staffs of the School of HASS at UNSW Canberra, Bernadette McDermott, Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Shirley Ramsay, contributed to the completion of my PhD study as well. They provided me with a friendly environment to conduct research and were always willing to solve problems I had encountered. I thank UNSW Canberra for financing my studies in Australia. The staffs of the Research Student Unit were keen to give me on time and caring assistance when I applied for scholarships and travel funds. I also want to give thanks to Denise Russell who voluntarily copy-edited my thesis. Her feedbacks were very helpful to the clarity and accuracy of my expression.

Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ross Babbage, Managing Director of the Strategy International, and Associate Professor Kuo- Hsiang Sun at Nanhua University in Taiwan who gave me insightful instructions and suggestions regarding thesis topic and research design at the beginning stage of my PhD study. Interviewees in Beijing, Qingdao and Taipei also provided me with valuable information required to support my arguments. I appreciate the time and assistance they contributed. To my other friends in Canberra, Taiwan and China, I thank them for their friendship and encouragement. Particularly, my housemate and officemate, Ying Chan Ho, has been the most supportive during the past four years.

vi Through constant discussions with him, I have always been able to generate some new thoughts regarding my research.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Rosalia, my mother, Emily, and my siblings, Anita and Stanley. It would not have been completed without their love, encouragement and understanding.

vii LIST OF FIGURES

4.1 The East China Sea Dispute 127

4.2 Chinese Patrols in the Diaoyu Islands Waters 139

4.3 ADIZs over the East China Sea Region 140

5.1 Competing Claims in the South China Sea 178

5.2 Occupied Features in the Spratly Islands (2008) 181

LIST OF TABLES

4.1 Chronology of the East China Sea Dispute, 1969-2013 133

5.1 Beijing’s Administrative Approaches in the South China Sea, 1950-2013 179

6.1 Timetable of China’s Aircraft Carrier Development,1928-2013 220

6.2 Senior CCP Leaders’ Remarks on Aircraft Carrier, 1950-1970s 223

6.3 Liaoning’s Sea Trials, 2011-2013 232

7.1 The PLAN’s Escort Missions in the Gulf of Aden, 2008-2013 266

7.2 Selected Port Calls Conducted by the PLAN Task Forces 269

8.1 Four Case Studies in This Thesis 301

viii ABBREVIATIONS

ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARATS Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

C4ISR Command, control, communication and computer intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

CASS China Academy of Social Science

CCG Chinese Coast Guard

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CCTV China Central Television

CICIR Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations

CIIS Chinese Institute for International Studies

CIISS Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies

CIMA China Institute for Marine Affairs

CMC Central Military Commission

CMS China Maritime Surveillance

CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation

CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation

COC Code of conduct

COSTIND Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence

CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation

ix CSSC China State Shipbuilding Corporation

DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea

EEZ Exclusive economic zone

FA Fragmented authoritarianism

FLEC Fisheries Law Enforcement Command

GAC General Administration of Customs

GAD General Armaments Department of the PLA

GDP Gross domestic product

GNP Gross national product

GSD General Staff Department of the PLA

ICG International Crisis Group

IMB International Maritime Bureau

IT Information technology

LNG Liquefied natural gas

LSG Leading Small Group

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MLR Ministry of Land and Resources

MOT Ministry of Transportation

MPB Maritime Police Bureau

MPS Ministry of Public Security

MSA Maritime Safety Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NDRC National Development and Reform Commission

x NDU National Defence University

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NOC National oil company

NPC National People’s Congress

NPG Natural petroleum gas

NSC National Security Commission

NTA National Tourism Administration

PAPB People’s Armed Police Bureau

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Navy Aviation Force

PRC People’s Republic of China

PSC Politburo Standing Committee

RMA Revolution in military affairs

RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative

ROC Republic of China

ROK Republic of Korea

SEF Strait Exchange Foundation

SIIS Shanghai Institute of International Studies

SLOC Sea line of communication

SOA State Oceanic Administration

SOC State Oceanic Commission

xi SOE State-owned enterprise

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

USGS United States Geological Survey

VSTOL Vertical and/or short take-off and landing

xii CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Objectives of This Study

China’s growing power poses a significant diplomatic and security challenge in the twenty-first century. The widely perceived Chinese assertiveness in protecting its maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters in recent years has made foreign countries worry about regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. However, in addition to the perceived Chinese assertiveness, evidence shows that China’s maritime security policy is to a certain extent characterised by inconsistency, which the existing literature fails to explain. This thesis looks at the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy. In particular, it discusses how various actors in the policy process can exert their influences on the policy outcomes under a fragmented Chinese authority. Applying the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model which focuses on the structural allocation of decision-making authority and inter-agency bargaining behaviours, this thesis aims to answer some interrelated questions: What factors have led to the inconsistent nature of China’s maritime security policy? Is there a clear driver dominating the making of China’s maritime security policy? How do policy actors in the decision-making process influence the policy outcomes?

China has achieved exceptional success in its economic development since the introduction of the economic reform in the late 1970s. In the meantime, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces have also had significant growth in terms of both quality and quantity. At the present time, China’s has the largest force of surface warships and

1 submarines in Asia.1 According to the U.S. Defence Department’s 2013 report on China’s military development, the PLAN has more than 79 principal combatants, 55 diesel and nuclear attack submarines, 55 large amphibious ships, and 85 small missile combatants.2 Despite the fact that the PLAN is facing some technological difficulties at present (in particular, the lack of full system interoperability within PLAN fleets is its Achilles’ heel),3 it is an increasingly formidable force in Asia. Meanwhile, with the ongoing conflicts between China and neighbouring countries over maritime sovereignty and resources in disputed waters off the Chinese coast, China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces have also been entitled to larger budgets and more resources since the late 1990s. In early 2013, these non-military law enforcement forces had acquired more than 47 1,000-ton-class patrol vessels in total. They are expected to obtain another 20 large ships by 2015.4

Moreover, a growing Chinese assertiveness in undertaking naval operations and bolstering the country’s maritime claims has been widely observed by regional countries during the past few years. Regarding the assertiveness of China’s naval operations, since PLAN fleets’ first passing through the Tsugaru Strait in October 2008, the PLAN has undertaken more and more assertive operations on the waters in the western Pacific.5 For instance, in the year 2011, PLAN fleets passed through the Miyako Strait five times. The number of the PLAN’s controversial operations reached 12 times in 2012.6 The Miyako Strait is a strategic waterway in terms of global geopolitics because it is one of few international waterways for the Chinese

1 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2013), 6. 2 Ibid. 3 James C. Bussert and Bruce A. Elleman, People’s Liberation Army Navy: Combat System Technology, 1949-2010 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 175. 4 Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “New Fleet on the Block: China’s Coast Guard Comes Together,” The Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/03/11 /new-fleet-on-the-block-chinas-coast-guard-comes-together/ (accessed March 12, 2013). 5 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “The Japanese Archipelago through Chinese Eyes,” China Brief 10, no. 16 (2010): 10. 6 Global Times, “Riben Jinding Zhongguo Haijun Xitai Yanlian [Japan Keeps Close Watch on Chinese Navy’s Exercise in the Western Pacific,]” February 1, 2013, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-02/3606561.html (accessed February 5, 2013).

2 naval fleets to access the Pacific Ocean.7 The PLAN’s operations indicate that Beijing has been trying to normalise its exertion of military strength away from home during the past few years, as the arena for the PLAN’s operations has been gradually expanding beyond the first island chain to the second island chain, both of which are strategic defence frontiers for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the western Pacific.8

On the issue of China’s maritime disputes with regional countries, since 2009, an increasing amount of maritime disputes between China and other South China Sea claimants, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have also been witnessed.9 In particular, the most notable case in relation to the South China Sea dispute is the 2012 Sino-Philippine standoff over the ownership of the Scarborough Shoal, which sparked a strident diplomatic row between Beijing and Manila.10 Even though there has been no full-scale military confrontation between China and other South China Sea claimants to date, these maritime frictions significantly spoiled China’s ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours which accused Beijing of unilaterally changing the status quo in the South China Sea region.11 In the region of the East China Sea, Chinese assertiveness can also be observed from the stressful Sino-Japanese maritime confrontation during the periods of 2012 and 2013 when the PLAN and Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement forces undertook numerous belligerent patrol operations in the waters approaching the disputed Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands). China’s high-profile operations around

7 Huai Chang, “Fengsuo Gonggu Haixia Weibei Guojifa [Blockading the Miyako Strait is an Act against International Law],” Legal Weekly no. 194 (2013), http://www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Ind ex/article/id/3934 (accessed January 2, 2014). 8 For instance, see National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2011 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2012), 9-12. 9 Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” International Journal of China Studies 2, no. 3 (2011): 556-575; Vaudine England, “Why Are South China Sea Tensions Rising?” BBC News, September 3, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific- 11152948 (accessed July 2, 2011). 10 Kit Danway, “The Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” Current Intelligence 4, no. 2 (2012): 1-3; Jason Miks, “China, Philippines in Standoff,” The Diplomat, April 11, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/the- editor/2012/04/11/china-philippines-in-standoff/ (accessed October 20, 2013). 11 For examples of these accusations, see Roberto Tofani, “Hidden Depths in South China Sea Tensions,” Asia Times, April 13, 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ND13Ae03.h tml (accessed May 20, 2012).

3 these uninhabited islets were regarded by both Tokyo and Washington as an ambitious attempt of Beijing to secure its claimed maritime territory off China’s eastern coast.12

The perceived Chinese assertiveness considerably deepens regional countries’ concern about the implications of China’s rapid rise for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, a report published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service notes that China’s military modernisation, including its naval programs, is pursuing additional goals, such as protecting the country’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in distant waters, displacing the U.S.’s dominant role in Asia, and upholding China’s international status as a major global power.13 Japan’s Defence White Papers also reveal Tokyo’s wariness of China’s growing military power, particularly the PLAN’s evolving aircraft carrier program.14 In response to China’s assertiveness, regional countries, such as Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia, have accelerated their own naval modernisation programs in recent years. 15 In particular, Japan, which has the most hardline attitude against Beijing, is seeking to take a leadership role in Asia to counter the rapid rise of China’s power. For instance, as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claims, “there are concerns that China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by rule of law,” and “Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front, but also in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific.” 16 Mr. Abe in early 2013 also initiated an alleged strategy to encircle China, aiming to enhance Japan’s cooperation with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations

12 Peter Wood, “China-Japan Relations Worsen as Chinese Air Force Flies through First Island Chain,” China Brief 13, no. 22 (2013): 3-5. However, Beijing claims that the 2012-2013 round of dispute is due to Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara’s proposal of buying the contested islands. 13 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities– Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2012), 5. 14 Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan 2012 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defence, 2012), 26- 47; Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan 2013 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defence, 2013), 30-49; Jiang Xun, “Diaodao Fengyunji: Zhongri Hangmu Jingsai [The Diaoyu Islands: The Sino- Japanese Aircraft Carrier Competition],” Yazhou Zhoukan 24, no. 38 (2010): 34-35 15 Zhang Jian, “China’s Pursuit of Sea Power: Trends, Drivers and Policy Challenges,” in Ocean Law, Society and Management, ed. Xu Xiangmin (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2010), 150. 16 Reuters, “Abe Says Ready to Counter China’s Power,” October 26, 2013, http://www.nuclearno.com/text.asp?17562 (accessed October 26, 2013).

(ASEAN) countries, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia to counteract Beijing’s endeavours to expand its sphere of influence southward.17

Nevertheless, taking a closer look at Beijing’s maritime security policy on island disputes in China’s neighbouring waters and the modernisation of the PLAN, one can observe that this policy is not simply becoming assertive. Instead, it is characterised by a certain degree of inconsistency. This inconsistency is threefold. Firstly, the inconsistency exists when China is involved in some specific maritime disputes, such as that regarding its sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Albeit it is indisputable that assertive patrol operations made by Chinese vessels have caused a series of diplomatic battles between China and Southeast Asian countries, China’s relevant approaches to manage this issue have varied since the late 2000s. At times, it held a moderate position favouring regional cooperation on the sovereignty dispute while sometimes undertaking aggressive operations to increase its presence in the South China Sea region. 18 Clearly, Beijing’s policy on this issue is quite conflicting in nature because a conciliatory Chinese stance at one time can be easily followed by a more hostile stance later.

Secondly, the inconsistency can be seen from Beijing’s policies on different maritime disputes as well. According to the Chinese government, regarding the protection of China’s territorial integrity, “in no way will the country abandon its legitimate rights and interests.”19 Therefore, Beijing’s stance on different maritime disputes should logically be quite consistent because these disputes are all in relation to China’s maritime sovereignty. However, it is puzzling that Beijing’s stance on the respective South and East China Sea disputes are to a certain extent conflicting even during the same period. For instance, since early 2013, Beijing has

17 Alexander Martin, “Japan PM Takes Careful Approach to China,” The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2013, http://www.headnine.com/world/asia/2013/01/20/japan-pm-takes-careful- approach-on-china_s_3986423.html (Accessed January 25, 2013). 18 A more detailed discussion on this issue will be presented in Chapter 5. 19 Xinhua News, “Xi Advocates Efforts to Boost Maritime Power,” July 31, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-07/31/content_29589836.htm (accessed November 6, 2013).

5 significantly softened its attitude towards the South China Sea issue and initiated a series of senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ visits to ASEAN countries20 while maintaining a much more antagonistic attitude towards Japan over the Diaoyu Islands dispute. In particular, China’s 2013 Defence White Paper “The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces” noticeably accuses Japan for the first time of “making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.” 21 Moreover, since 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been observed in the airspace of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese Self-defence Air Force which has been considering shooting down hostile UAVs to protect Japan’s public safety.22 At the end of this year, Beijing’s creation of a new air defence identification zone (ADIZ) covering the disputed Diaoyu Islands and a large part of the East China Sea further exacerbated the tense Sino- Japanese relationship.23

In addition to maritime disputes, the inconsistency can be observed from Beijing’s policy on the development of the PLAN’s advanced combatants and its maiden aircraft carrier. On the one hand, the Chinese navy has commissioned numerous large surface warships and advanced submarines, such as the Luyang II- class (type 052C, the Chinese Aegis”) guided missile destroyers and its new version Luyang III-class (type 052D) destroyers − the Jin-class (094) nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines and the Shang-class (type 093) nuclear- powered attack submarines. They were developed by the PLAN as early as the late

20 These senior CCP leaders are Chinese President Xi Jinping, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. 21 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013- 04/16/c_132312681.htm (accessed April 17, 2013). 22 For relevant reports on the issue, see Japan Daily Press, “Japan Considering Shooting down Drones That Infringe into Airspace,” September 17, 2013, http://japandailypress.com/japan- considering-shooting-down-drones-that-infringe-into-airspace-1736030/ (accessed November 6, 2013); Ankit Panda, “Japan to Shoot down Foreign Drones,” The Diplomat, October 22, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/10/22/japan-to-shoot-down-foreign-drones/ (accessed November 6, 2013). 23 Robert Dujarric, “China’s ADIZ and the Japan-U.S. Response,” The Diplomat, December 7, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-adiz-and-the-japan-us-response/ (accessed January 3, 2014); David Cohen, “East China Sea Air Defence Moves: What for and Why Now,” China Brief 13, no. 24 (2013): 1-3.

1980s.24 On the other hand, the development of China’s maiden aircraft carrier is considerably protracted. Albeit the aircraft carrier program was also initiated in the 1980s, relevant researches of the program were marginalised to a certain degree by the Chinese government during much of the 1990s. Until the first decade of the 21st century, the Chinese leaders had been more willing to support the building of an aircraft carrier. 25 It took China more than three decades to commission its very first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which commenced its maiden sea trial in mid-2011.26 As one Chinese naval strategist argues, the course of the development of China’s aircraft carrier program during the past three decades was quite troubled, always being a curved rather than straight line.27 It is very intriguing why the development of China’s aircraft carrier program has experienced such protracted process during the past three decades while the development of other large and advanced PLAN warships is much prompter during the same period.

In short, although China’s assertiveness in relation to protecting the country’s maritime interest and territorial integrity has been observed by regional countries during the past few years, Beijing’s maritime security policy is also to a certain extent inconsistent in nature. Moreover, while existing studies of China’s maritime power and relevant policies are abundant,28 the inconsistent nature has not been fully examined so far. Therefore, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining the factors which lead to the inconsistent nature of China’s maritime security policy.

24 For instance, the feasibility research of the Shang-class submarine was initiated in 1983. 25 For on the development of the Chinese aircraft carrier program, see Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark and Gabriel B. Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (2012): 15-55; Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth form Rumours,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 (2004): 76-93. 26 The Chinese people have long been thinking of obtaining aircraft carriers for over 80 years. Even if the utility of aircraft carrier was firstly debated in China in the late 1920s, constructing aircraft carrier had been rhetoric for a long time. 27 Ye Biao, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu [China’s First Aircraft Carrier],” Military Industry and Culture no. 4 (2013): 60-63. 28 See section 1.2 for more details.

Before going further, the term “maritime security policy” should be clarified as this concept is used loosely in the existing literature and its definition often changes depending on the individual who applies it. Based on Geoffrey Till’s research, the term “maritime security” should cover the safety of a country’s legitimate activities at sea. These activities include the protection of a country’s maritime shipping, maritime sovereignty, marine resources (notably petroleum, natural gas, and fish) as well as actions against maritime terrorism and other forms of sea-based crime in both coastal and distant waters. 29 Therefore, in light of Geoffrey Till’s point of view, this thesis defines the term “maritime security policy” as a country’s policy in relation to security issues at sea, including safeguarding maritime transportation, protecting maritime resources, upholding the integrity of maritime territory, and coping with non-traditional security threats. In addition, the concept of “maritime security policy” is also different from that of “naval policy.” This is because “naval policy” only refers to a country’s policy for developing and utilising its naval force. In this thesis, I look at the roles of not only the PLAN but also China’s civil maritime law enforcement forces and other policy actors. Consequently, instead of using “naval policy,” “maritime security policy” is a more appropriate term used in this thesis.

In the following parts, this chapter is organised into four major sections. Section 1.2 provides a detailed review of two main schools of thought on the subject of China’s growing maritime power from the existing literature and discusses why the existing scholarship fails to explain China’s current policy and behaviours regarding the protection of its maritime interests and territorial integrity. Section 1.3 presents the main argument of this thesis and the strength of the argument. Section 1.4 introduces the research methodology. Section 1.5 outlines the thesis structure.

29 Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making? (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 177-178.

1.2 Literature Review

Existing studies of China’s growing maritime power are abundant, and in general, two main schools of thought can be identified: the Mahanism School and the Nationalism School. Both schools of thought share one common perspective which implies that there is a clear driver of China’s maritime security policy today. According to the Mahanism School, the logic of Captain Alfred T. Mahan’s Sea Power Theory is the main driving force. Alternatively, the Nationalism School argues that China’s policy on naval modernisation and maritime disputes are primarily driven by its strong nationalistic public opinion. In addition, albeit these two schools of thought have different stances on what the key driver is, they both believe that if China continues its current assertive policy to expand its power seaward, this may lead to a more unstable regional order in the Asia-Pacific.

The Mahanism School 30

The Mahanism School argues that China is currently practising Mahan’s lessons, particularly his Sea Power Theory.31 Broadly speaking, there are four key points in this school’s claims: (1) China’s policy to protect its maritime interests and SLOCs in distant waters is following the classic logic of Mahan’s theory; (2) in terms of China’s policy on maritime disputes, Beijing’s current stance to bolster its claims to the South China Sea is similar to that recommended by Mahan for the

30 For more on Mahan’s works, see Alfred T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660- 1783, 12th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949); Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effects upon International Policies (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900). 31 In addition, Mahan’s theory also had significant influence on the Imperial German Navy, the Imperial Japanese Navy, as well as the British Navy. For relevant studies, see Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 39-62; R. H. Beadon, “The Sea Power of Germany and the Teaching of Mahan,” The RUSI Journal 68, no. 471 (1923): 499-507; William R. Sprance, “The Russo-Japanese War: The Emerge of Japanese Imperial Power,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 6, no. 3 (2004):1-24; Greg Russell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist,” Geopolitics 11, no. 1 (2006): 119-140.

United States of the 1890s in the Caribbean Sea; (3) in terms of the popularity of Mahan’s theory in China, Mahan’s lessons prevail over senior military persons’ remarks; and (4) official documents published by the Chinese government, China’s Defence White Papers in particular, to a certain extent disclose China’s Mahanian outlook. This school concludes that China, influenced by Mahan’s legacy, will possibly change the maritime status quo in Asia, resulting in more maritime confrontations between China and foreign nations in the future. These points will be discussed in more details in the following.

Firstly, this school contends that although it is impossible for people outside the Chinese decision-making circle to understand how precisely Mahan’s theory has influenced Chinese decision makers, evidences show that China has been following Mahan’s lessons to develop a more assertive maritime security policy. For instance, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara argue that in terms of the strategic thinking of China’s decision makers, preoccupied with economic development, these decision makers’ endeavours to protect imported oil and maritime trade via maritime channels in distant waters are in accordance with the classic logic of Mahan’s theory. 32 With similar observation, when analysing China’s effort to enhance its military presence in the Indian Ocean region, Robert Kaplan claims that China has been adopting Captain Mahan’s thoughts to protect Chinese maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region. Kaplan uses an example to support his argument: the alleged Chinese string of pearls strategy which refers to the networks of Chinese military and commercial facilities in the Indian Ocean littoral. 33 Kaplan contends that this strategy clearly reveals Beijing’s desire to secure its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, which indicates that Mahan’s logic has been

32 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 27-47; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 14-21; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “History Rhymes: The German Precedent for Chinese Sea Power,” Orbis 54, no. 1 (2010): 14-34; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Ambitions in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008):367-373. 33 Robert D. Kaplan, “Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Actors in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 22.

10 dominating Beijing’s maritime security policy to protect its maritime interests overseas.34

In addition to the protection of China’s sea lines in distant waters, the Mahanism School points out that China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is another example of the influence of Mahan’s theory on China. This school argues that today’s China is confronting a “distantly preponderant navy” commanded by a global super power, the United States, although the PLAN still has the locally superior force to contend with the U.S. Navy in Asia. This situation is similar to what Mahan suggested the U.S. Navy to do in the late 19th century despite its overall inferiority to the British Navy.35 Additionally, this school asserts that like Washington’s policy to treat the Caribbean Sea as its national preserve and enhance America’s presence in the Caribbean basin a hundred years ago, Beijing today also regards the South China Sea as its national preserve. 36 To protect its national preserve, as this school contends, Beijing endeavours to bolster its presence in the South China Sea region by not only sending more patrol vessels but also enhancing the defence capacity of Chinese naval outposts in this disputed region, regardless of whether these belligerent actions would possibly lead to more maritime clashes between China and other regional claimants.37

Thirdly, this school also argues that Mahan’s theory prevails over the remarks of senior Chinese military figures, which is good evidence proving that China is a

34 Ibid. For more on the string of pearls strategy, see Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006); Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 1 (2008): 1-39; C. Raja Mohan, “Between Rising and Naval Powers: A Broad Strategic Overview,” in Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power, ed. Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 9-21; Probal Ghosh, “Sea Dragon at the Doorstep: PLA(N) Modernisation and the Indian Navy,” in The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 113-119; Jae-Hyung Lee, “China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (2002): 552-557. 35 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review 14, no.1 (2006): 88. 36 Holmes and Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, 52. 37 Ibid., 52-53.

11 follower of Mahan. This school illustrates two examples to support its point. The first example is the remarks of Admiral Liu Huaqing, the iconic PLAN Commander-in-chief (1982-1988) who had significant contribution to the modernisation of the Chinese navy. According to this school, Liu Huaqing’s memoir and relevant remarks not only eulogise Mahan’s works but also reveal that he adopted Mahan’s theory when considering how the PLAN should better protect China’s maritime frontier.38 As Holmes and Yoshihara put it, “in any case, several theoretical and policy-relevant observations can be distilled from a summary of Liu’s memoir… the admiral’s analytical framework displays the unmistakable imprint of Mahanian thinking.”39 In addition, this school of thought claims that remarks presented by other senior Chinese naval officials are also good examples to support its point of view. For instance, by reviewing statements made by former PLAN Commander-in-chief Shi Yunsheng (1996-2003) and serving PLAN Commander-in-chief Wu Shengli (2006- present), Bernard Cole argues that both PLAN admirals apply a classic Mahanian model in relation to the goals of the PLAN’s future development. This is because the key points of their strategic thinking concerning the protection of China’s overseas SLOCs on which the country is dependent is quite compatible with the logic of Mahan’s theory introduced a century ago, claims Cole.40

38 Jeffery B. Goldman, “China’s Mahan,” Proceedings 122, no.3 (1996): 44-47; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 24, no. 1 (2005): 28. In addition to Mahan’s theory, Liu Huaqing and the PLAN were heavily influenced by Russian Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. As a matter of fact, Admiral Gorshkov himself was also a prominent follower of Captain Mahan. For more on this, see Sergei Chernyavskii, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 281-308; Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Bernard D. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, ed. Andrew S. Erickson and others (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 22-27; Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 117-131. 39 Holmes and Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, 33. In his memoir, Admiral Liu also made a personal explanation for the relationship between his idea and Mahan’s theory. See Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu [The Memoir of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), 432. 40 Bernard D. Cole, Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy Security in Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 120.

Fourthly, this school contends that, to a certain extent, the wordings of China’s Defence White Papers adopted Mahanian language. Based Holmes and Yoshihara’s research, the first use of Mahanian language can be found in the 2004 edition because this white paper “evaluates China’s surroundings in terms that would have been familiar to Mahan.”41 In particular, this school points out that China’s 2004 Defence White Paper clearly demands the PLAN to acquire more advanced warships to support the country’s bid for “command of sea, or sea control (zhihaiquan)” – a genuine terminology used by Mahan.42 As this school indicates, even though China’s 2006 Defence White Paper drops the Mahanian language found in the preceding edition, this does not simply mean that Beijing has foregone the idea. Instead, according to the Mahanism School, the 2006 edition still inherits Mahan’s strategy because the concepts of “security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting” and “securing China’s seaborne transportation in distant waters” can still be found in this document. These concepts still echo Mahan’s theory.43

In short, the Mahanism School concludes that influenced by Mahan’s legacy, China seeks to protect its SLOCs in distant waters as these sea lines are important gateways for the shipping of China’s maritime trade and imported energy. Given that economic development is the keystone of China’s state power as well as its quest for a more prosperous future, this school believes that in the foreseeable future China is expected to allocate more resources to the development of its maritime power to cope with any security challenges at sea. Moreover, China will possibly change the maritime status quo in Asia.44 Also, some warn that more China-India maritime confrontations could be sparked in the future. This is because the PLAN’s power projection is expected to be south-westward along its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean region and China’s increasing presence may cause a possible arms race between China and India which tries to protect its vested interests in this

41 Holmes and Yoshihara, “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea,” 84. 42 Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific, 22-23. 43 Ibid. 44 Holmes and Yoshihara, “China’s Ambitions in the Indian Ocean,” 369.

13 region.45 As Kaplan states, “the Indians and the Chinese will enter into a dynamic great-power rivalry in these waters, with their shared economic interests as major trading partners locking them in an uncomfortable embrace.”46

Even though the Mahanism School provides some insightful analysis, this thesis finds that its argument fails to explain properly what China has been doing during the past few decades. For instance, according to this school, protecting the imported energy and maritime trade transferred via SLOCs in distant waters should be the primary task of a Mahanism-driven Chinese policy. Given the fact that the Chinese economy has been increasingly dependent on maritime trade since the introduction of the economic reform in the late 1970s and become a net oil importer in 1993 and net crude oil importer in 1996, 47 Beijing should have endeavoured to enhance the PLAN’s far-reaching power-projection capabilities capable of securing China’s maritime trade both in coastal and distant waters. In particular, the Chinese government should have fully supported the construction of large surface warships, especially an aircraft carrier which has long been regarded by Chinese strategists as the best platform to project China’s power far away from home.48

Nevertheless, the reality has not been this. Albeit the development of Chinese aircraft carriers was initiated in the mid-1980s, it was largely shelved during much of the 1990s when China’s defence budget was largely committed to the development of advanced submarines and ballistic missiles which are not ideal weapons for defending a country’s overseas SLOCs. 49 Moreover, much of

45 Kaplan, “Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century,” 32. 46 Ibid. For more on Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, see David Walgreen, “China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 25, no. 1 (2006): 55- 73; You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 3 (2007): 467-489. 47 International Energy Agency, Oil and Gas Security: People’s Republic of China (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012), 6. 48 For examples, see Zhang Zhaozhong, Bainian Hangmu [The Centennial Aircraft Carrier] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Publishing House, 2011), 308-337; Zhang Wenmu, Lun Zhongguo Haiquan [On China’s Maritime Power], 2nd ed. (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2010), 97. 49 Thomas J. Hirshfeld, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: A Virtual Dragonfly?” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 10, no. 1 (1998): 141-153.

Beijing’s attention also focused on China’s coastal waters around the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s when a series of the PLA’s missile tests were conducted against Taiwan, a retaliatory Chinese counter-measure against Taiwan’s pro-independence policies which had been gradually implemented in the 1990s.50 Protecting China’s overseas SLOCs was to a certain extent marginalised.

In addition, the Mahan School sometimes have problems in providing credible evidence to support its claims. For instance, the so-called string of pearls strategy used by this school to prove the predominance influence of Mahan’s theory in China has never been confirmed. Instead, evidence indicates that this strategy is more likely a myth, not a real Chinese policy for enhancing the country’s military presence in the Indian Ocean region. According to the alleged string of pearls strategy, China aims to use numerous ports (pearls) in the Indian Ocean region, the Port of Sittwe in Myanmar and the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan in particular, as military outposts despite the fact that Port of Sittwe was primarily financed and constructed by India, not China.51 Nevertheless, the Chinese investment in the expansion of Port of Sittwe and relevant oil refineries is for business purposes only.52 Moreover, the PLA reportedly questions the value of the Port of Sittwe.53 There is no sign showing that Beijing is building naval facilities in the Port of Gwadar or any other places in the Indian Ocean region.54

Both the Chinese and Indian government officials have also denied the existence of China’s string of pearls in the Indian Ocean region. For instance, when answering journalist’s questions regarding the reported Chinese military base in Pakistan at a press conference on October 28, 2011, Yang Yujun, the Chinese

50 Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire (Sydney, NSW: The University of New South Wales Press, 2003), 210-213. 51 Eric Draitser, “Race on for Ports, Pipelines in Myanmar,” Asia Times, March 28, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-280313.html (accessed May 10, 2013). 52 Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream: The Reality and Strategic Consequences of Seaborne Imports,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (2010): 99-101. 53 See Wangyi News, “Zhongmian Youqi Guandao Huoshou Zhanzheng Qinrao [China-Burma Oil Pipelines Is Vulnerable to War],” June 16, 2013, http://money.163.com/13/0616/19/91GUTHDA002 53B0H.html (accessed June 18, 2013). 54 Alex Vines, “Mesmerised by Chinese String of Pearls Theory,” The World Today 68, no. 1 (2012): 34.

Defence Ministry spokesperson, clearly discounted both this so-called strategy and other relevant military projects in the Indian Ocean region, stating that “all reports on string of pearls strategy are nothing but newspaper stories.” 55 Government officials in New Delhi also tried to dampen the Indian media’s strident reports on this issue by sending high-ranking Indian officials to dismiss the alleged ulterior Chinese motives.56 For instance, in 2009, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon denied the existence of China’s string of pearl strategy, claiming that “there are no Chinese bases in the Indian Ocean region today, despite talk of the string of pearls, which by the way is a pretty ineffective murder weapon as military enthusiasts will tell you anything about it.”57

The Nationalism School

The second school of thought claims that nationalism, rather than security, is driving China’s maritime security policy. It argues that China’s assertive stance towards bolstering its maritime territorial claims as well as its naval modernisation program is driven mainly by the country’s blossoming nationalistic public opinion. This school makes four major argument to support its point of view: (1) acquiring large surface warships, especially aircraft carriers, to protect China’s SLOCs in distant waters is not a cost-effective choice for China; (2) during the past two decades, there has been widespread nationalistic sentiment in China supporting the

55 Caixun News, “Guofangbu Fouren Jian Haiwai Junshi Jidi [Defence Ministry Denies the So- called Construction of Overseas Military Base],” October 28, 2011, http://international.caixun.com/content/20111028/CX01u59f.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 56 Sun Lizhou “Yindu Fouren Youtiao Zhenzhulian [India Denies String of Pearls Strategy],” China News, September 15, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com/gj/gj-zwgc/news/2009/09-15/1868015.shtml (accessed November 10, 2013). 57 Quoted in Robert Neff, Is China’s Fabled “String of Pearls” Strategy Becoming a Reality, http://www.rjkoehler.com/2010/01/31/is-chinas-fabled-string-of-pearls-becoming-a-reality/ (accessed November 10, 2013). Additionally, some Chinese scholars believe that it is impossible for China to follow Mahan’s lessons. See Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, “Dui Zhongguo Haiquan Fazhan Zhanlue De JiDian Sikao [Some Thoughts on the Development of China’s Maritime Strategy],” Studies of International Politic no. 3 (2005): 9-10; Ye Zicheng, Luquan Fazhan Yu Daquo Xingshuai [The Development of Continental Power and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers] (Beijing: New Star Press, 2007), 114-117.

16 development of a blue-water navy, in particular the acquisition of aircraft carriers; (3) Chinese leaders have to be responsive to this rapidly emerging nationalistic public opinion to sustain the CCP government’s legitimacy; and (4) a nationalism- driven Chinese policy may not only lead to more naval competition between Beijing and Washington in the western Pacific but also politicise the agenda for U.S.-China cooperation in the future. These arguments will be discussed in more details in the following.

Firstly, this school argues that developing heavy surface warships, especially aircraft carriers, to safeguard China’s SLOCs is not a cost-effective solution to China’s security needs. This is because, as Robert Ross claims, China is a traditional land power and shares long land borders with fourteen countries.58 In particular, even if the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, a revived Russian ground force and the prospect of Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia demand more Chinese efforts to prepare for possible tensions. 59 Therefore, this school claims that the security threat from the continental Eurasia still exists. In addition to the need to secure China’s interior borders, this school argues that Chinese economic growth is still domestically-driven and its dependence on seaborne oil imports for its overall energy consumption will remain marginal for the foreseeable future.60 As a result, this school indicates that although the PLAN’s budget is expected to increase in the near future, it is not the best choice for the Chinese government to develop a budget-consuming blue-water navy as other services in the Chinese military which, in the meantime, are demanding more resources to protect China’s vulnerable interior borders.61

Secondly, the Nationalism School contends that the Chinese people’s nationalistic sentiment, while not reflecting China’s real needs, drives a widespread

58 Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 55. 59 Ibid. 60 Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders and Robert S. Ross, “Correspondence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 171-172. 61 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 58.

17 demand for the construction of aircraft carriers as well as a tougher government stance on the protection of China’s maritime territory. In terms of the demand for aircraft carriers, as the school argues, the support for the construction of an aircraft carrier in the past few years has become widely welcomed by military personnel as well as civilians, such as scholars, students, political elites, industrialists, and the public. This is because Chinese nationalists believe that aircraft carriers can symbolise China’s pride and prestige. 62 Apart from the construction of aircraft carriers, this school argues that Chinese nationalists also support a more assertive policy on the recovery of China’s “lost territories” in disputed waters and that the diplomatic row over some disputed islands, such as the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is increasingly a nationalistic issue in China.63 Nevertheless, this school believes that Chinese nationalists’ assertions fail to perceive China’s real security needs. This is because these assertions constantly feature “expansive definitions of Chinese global security interests, extreme assessments of the threats to Chinese interests, and grand expectation of China’s ability to develop expanded military power to protect Chinese interests.” 64

Thirdly, the Nationalism School asserts that Chinese decision makers cannot resist the pressure from the nationalistic sentiment as public support has become increasingly important to CCP’s domestic legitimacy in recent years.65 When the domestic environment in China has become more nationalistic than it used to be in the 1980s and 1990s, as this school argues, how to respond to the Chinese people’s growing nationalistic sentiment has become a thorny task for the CCP leadership, especially when dealing with issues which are symbols of China’s great-power status in the world.66 In particular, according to the Nationalism School, Chinese leaders realise that CCP’s legitimacy can no longer rely solely on the country’s

62 Ibid. 62-63. 63 Ibid., 71. 64 Ibid., 69. 65 Ibid., 64-65. 66 For example, Robert Ross believes that the 2008 Beijing Olympic properly symbolises China’s emerging world status. See Ibid., 63-64. For more on the 2008 Olympics and China’s burgeoning nationalism, see Zhao Suisheng, “The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism,” China Security 4, no. 3 (2008): 48-57.

18 economic success.67 Instead, they have increasingly bolstered their prestige with high-profile programs. 68 Following this logic, the CCP leadership believes that constructing a Chinese aircraft carrier would be a good symbol of China’s great success which can be used by CCP to solicit more domestic support.69 To support the above points of view, Ross illustrates numerous interviews he conducted in China, arguing that a wide spectrum of Chinese observers acknowledge that the CCP leadership has already succumbed to Chinese people’s nationalistic demands.70

In light of the preceding analysis, the Nationalism School concludes that even though constructing aircraft carriers is not a cost-effective solution to protect China’s security interests, the policy-making in China is now “a reflection of the leaderships’ growing reliance on appeasing widespread nationalist sentiment to maintain its popular legitimacy and the security of the Chinese Communist Party.”71 As a nationalism-driven policy indicates that top CCP decision makers are forced to comply with Chinese people’s nationalistic demands, this school warns that Beijing could make more assertive policies which may lead to a naval arms race between China and the United States in the future. In addition, this school of thought asserts that even if a Chinese aircraft carrier will not pose a significant challenge to U.S. maritime security, strident U.S.-China competition may further politicise the full agenda for U.S.-China cooperation regarding a series of important issues, such as the independence of Taiwan, nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and other economic and social issues. This phenomenon would make regional order in the Asia-Pacific more unstable, claims the Nationalism School.72

67 Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot (accessed March 2, 2013). 68 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 63 69 Ibid., 64-65. 70 Ibid. 71 Glosny, Saunders and Ross, “Correspondence,” 174-175. 72 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 79-80.

On the other hand, critics of the Nationalism School argue that this school’s analysis is problematic. Critics identify three aspects of the weakness of the Nationalism School. Firstly, critics claim that this school fails to accurately capture the nature of China’s security needs: on the one hand, it overestimates the importance of the inland security threats; on the other hand, it underestimates the fundamental change in the Chinese economy as maritime interests have become a critical issue regarding China’s economic development and national wealth since the introduction of the economic reform in the late 1970s.73 As an alternative, critics argue that “Chinese leaders and researchers regularly acknowledge the growing importance of ‘overseas interest’ (haiwai liyi) as a result of increases in trade, overseas investment, Chinese companies ‘going out’ (zouchuqu), and Chinese citizens living abroad.”74 As critics contend, the issue of maintaining a secured maritime environment is much more significant in China than what the Nationalism School expects.75

Secondly, from critics’ points of view, the Nationalism School’s argument stating that Chinese nationalism has the overriding influence on Beijing’s maritime security policy is problematic because it “offers no explicit definition of nationalism and appears to lump all supporters of Chinese efforts to build an aircraft carrier in the nationalist camp.” 76 Similarly, critics contend that the Nationalism School cannot provide convincing evidence in support of its argument which is based mainly on personal speculation rather than insider knowledge of the actual policy process.77 Critics do acknowledge the existence of the “naval lobby” group initiated by PLAN officers who constantly quest for more budgetary funds and domestic prestige for the navy. However, critics claim that even though the “naval lobby” group may play some roles in the decision-making process, it is just

73 Glosny, Saunders and Ross, “Correspondence,” 161-163. 74 Ibid., 163-164. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 164-165. 77 Ibid., 166.

20 one part of a domestic coalition which pushes for the development of a more capable PLAN.78

Thirdly, according to critics, the Nationalism School’s argument suggests that the pressure of Chinese citizens’ nationalistic sentiment can actively push the government to make some assertive policies. However, critics charge that the active role of China’s nationalistic public opinion demanding more assertive and belligerent policies to a certain extent contradicts the dominant interpretation of Chinese nationalism as reactive and a constraining influence on Beijing’s foreign policy. 79 In addition, critics assert that this school’s interpretation of Chinese nationalism departs from the literature of international relations which points out that “public opinion can constrain policy by setting limits on possible options, but rarely if ever drives or determines policy.”80

Apart from the above arguments made by critics, this thesis finds three additional weaknesses of the Nationalism School. Firstly, this school’s argument is based on an assumption overestimating CCP leaders’ vulnerability to the pressure from Chinese people’s nationalistic sentiment. It is true that Chinese public opinion has become increasingly nationalistic since furious Chinese people launched several xenophobic protests in major Chinese cities in the early 1990s.81 Under the pressure of such nationalistic public opinion, CCP have to be more willing to respond to Chinese people’s nationalistic sentiment and may find themselves less room to deal with sensitive issues.82 However, the Chinese government has never

78 Ibid., 168. Some claim that nationalism is not an independent driver shaping Chinese policy but could be associated with the interests of some other key drivers. See Erica S. Downs and Philip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 114-146; Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does Public Opinion Matter?” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 151-187. 79 Glosny, Saunders and Ross, “Correspondence,” 165. 80 Ibid. 81 Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 1-12. 82 Zhao Suisheng, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 544.

21 been as vulnerable to the nationalistic public opinion as the Nationalism School asserts. Albeit this school indicates that Chinese nationalism has been driven by two forces from opposite directions (the Chinese government from the top and the populist societal forces from the bottom), it omits one fact that the CCP government not only acts passively in response to the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese people but also actively controls and manipulates public opinion.83 In fact, Beijing still maintains its rigorous control over the public media, such as television, newspapers and the internet. A tight government control on media remains in place, and Chinese government’s media censoring agencies are still able to tighten the control when they decide to do so.84

The second weakness of the Nationalism School is that its argument cannot fully explain the protracted process of China’s aircraft carrier program. According to this school of thought, China’s aircraft carrier program was largely propelled by the widespread nationalistic desire for possessing aircraft carriers.85 It argues that since President Jiang Zemin approved the research of the capability to build an aircraft carrier in mid-1995, the pace of this effort has been increased under a domestic political environment which favours the construction of aircraft carriers, due to the growing nationalism.86 Nevertheless, this school does not explain why Jiang Zemin made such an important decision and appears to indicate that the decision was driven by nationalism. In addition, as discussed previously, the development of China’s aircraft carrier program is not as smooth-going as this school argues. This school overlooks the fact that China experienced a longstanding debate over the feasibility and desirability of building aircraft carriers during much of the 1990s and 2000s when the Chinese nationalism burgeoned

83 Ibid., 537-539. 84 Author’s interview in Beijing, November 3, 2011. Also see He Qinglian, The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China (New York; Hong Kong; Brussels: Human Right in China, 2008), 22-43; Isabella Bennett, “Media Censorship in China,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders, January 24, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515#p3 (accessed March 10, 2013). 85 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 64. 86 Ibid., 61-63.

22 rapidly. 87 Instead of facilitating the construction of China’s first aircraft carrier, this lasting debate significantly hindered the progress of the aircraft carrier program. As a result, supposing that there is a Chinese consensus favouring this program and China’s policy makers must be responsive to public opinion, then the enduring debate should not have existed or, at least, should have been concluded earlier.

More importantly, even though China purchased the incomplete ex-Varyag, a former Soviet aircraft carrier, from Ukraine in 1998, this ship had been left in the Dalian Shipyard without much reconstruction works in the first three years after being towed to China in 2002. 88 As some Chinese researchers point out, the warship was largely neglected by the Chinese government during this period. 89 This phenomenon clearly contradicts the Nationalism School’s viewpoint which argues that Chinese leaders have started to strengthen CCP’s prestige with high- profile programs since the late 1990s. 90 Based on this school’s argument, reconstructing the former Soviet aircraft carrier is clearly a high-profile project which can attract much attention from the Chinese audience and bolster CCP’s prestige domestically. Following this logic, the Chinese government should have more actively conducted relevant rebuilding works. Nevertheless, this school of thought cannot explain why Beijing instead paid little attention to ex-Varyag for some times after it arrived in China.

87 You Ji, “The Debate on China’s Aircraft Carrier Program,” China Brief 5, no. 4 (2005), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3719 (accessed March 9, 2012). Also see Andrew F. Diamond, “Dying with Eyes Open or Closed: The Debate on a Chinese Aircraft Carrier,” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 18, no. 1 (2006): 35-58; Shu-Cheng Chang, “Zhonggong Haijun Juecei Jieceng Zhi Paixi Fenxi [Analysis of PLAN Factions and Its Decision-making],” Defence Journal 23, no. 1 (2008): 72-82; Sing-Lie Wang, “Discussion on the Development of the PRC Navy Aircraft Carrier,” Prospect and Exploration 8, no. 6 (2010):52-75. 88 Ex-Varyag was purchase by China in late1998. After a long voyage, this ship was towed to the Dalian Shipyard in March 2002. 89 Chen Wenzhong and Chen Runzhi, Zhongguo Hangmu [China’s Aircraft Carrier] (Beijing: China Development Press, 2012), 111-112. A more detailed discussion on the purchase and rebuilding of ex-Varyag will be made in Chapter 6. 90 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 63.

Short Summary

This review of the relevant literature reveals a rich body of the existing research on the drivers behind China’s current maritime security policy. The two schools of thought reviewed above provide some useful insights for the understanding of the making of China’s relevant decisions on specific maritime security issues. They imply that there has been a clear factor, either Mahanism or Nationalism, driving China’s maritime security policy over the past decade or so. Nevertheless, both schools of thought’s arguments are unpersuasive because they sometimes cannot properly explain the China’s relevant behaviours regarding the protection of the country’s maritime interests and territorial integrity. In addition, they also fail to provide credible evidence which can adequately support their points of view.

Furthermore, although both schools attempt to identify the key driver of Beijing’s maritime security policy, their analysis is based on an assumption that China’s polity is a unitary entity. Nevertheless, they fail to capture a longstanding political phenomenon in China, the fragmentation of the Chinese decision-making authority. This unique phenomenon was examined by Kenneth Lieberthal, David Lampton and their colleagues in 1992. By introducing the “Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA)” model, they examined how policy actors in China are able to exert their influence on policy outcomes through intense bureaucratic bargaining under a fragmented decision-making system.91 This thesis will employ the FA model to examine China’s maritime security policy-making process.

91 See Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Implications,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 2-12. Also see David M. Lampton, “A Plum for A Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 33-58; Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). The terminology of “Fragmented Authoritarianism” was firstly introduced in a conference on China’s bureaucratic practice in Tucson, Arizona, on June 19-23, 1988.

1.3 Main Argument of This Thesis

This thesis takes an alternative approach to understand the drivers of China’s maritime security policy and its implications for future course of China’s rapid rise and regional order in the Asia-Pacific. Taking into consideration that the fragmentation of authority is an enduring feature of China’s political system, this thesis underlines the part of the fragmentation of authority in the Chinese political system in determining its maritime security policy as well as the influences of various actors in the decision-making process on the policy outcomes. To this end, this thesis focuses on the inter-agency competition and bargaining in the policy process as well as the impact of the fragmentation of Chinese authority on policy outcomes.

Applying the FA model as the theoretical framework, this thesis argues that China does not have a clear and dominant driving force dominating the making of its maritime security policy. Instead, due to the fragmentation of China’s decision- making authority, this policy is influenced by various loosely coordinated actors in the policy process and is a product of bureaucratic bargaining. Even though Beijing has an overarching policy guideline to build China into a maritime power (haiyang qiangguo) for the protection of its mounting maritime interests, this policy guideline still lacks details and should be supported by more specific decisions on relevant maritime security issues. Nevertheless, due to the bargaining-driven policy process and the lack of a functional policy-coordinating mechanism in China, decisions are often made disjointedly and slowly, not only failing to sufficiently support the policy guideline but also contributing to the inconsistent nature of its maritime security policy.

The above principal findings are elaborated in the following. Firstly, this thesis finds that an overarching policy guideline to build China into a maritime power has existed since the early 1990s while how Beijing should specifically fulfil the aims of this policy guideline is still unclear. The economic reform has not only

25 changed China’s economy and society but also shifted the government’s focus to the protection of its emerging maritime interests, as highlighted by Chinese leaders. In 2002, for the first time, Jiang Zemin argued that “building China into a maritime power” is a historical mission of the Chinese government as well as the Chinese people in the new era.92 The task for building China into a maritime power was later included in Hu Jintao’s special report to the 18th CCP Party Congress held in 2012, stating that “we should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.”93

Although China’s ambition is evident, how the Chinese government should specifically protect the country’s maritime interests and the integrity of it maritime territory remains considerably unclear. As a result, “building China into a maritime power” can be interpreted as an overarching policy guideline (fangzhen) of the Chinese government. In China, it is general practice that, even if a policy guideline is issued, it is not, in itself, sufficient to produce substantial results because this policy guideline has to be supported by concrete policies (zhengce).94 Following the same logic, in the case of “building China into a maritime power,” a supporting maritime security policy is needed.

Secondly, this thesis argues that China’s maritime security policy is determined by a set of policy actors in the decision-making process rather than a dominant actor. Since the introduction of the economic reform, China’s foreign and security policy-making has experienced a significant change, with the process now becoming both more professional and pluralised.95 Likewise, even though the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) retains the ultimate power, the

92 Gao Xinsheng, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 1949-2009 (Beijing: Shishi Publishing Press, 2010), 292. 93 Xinhua News, “Hu Calls for Efforts to Build China into Maritime Power,” November 8, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/c_131959403.htm (accessed August 22, 2013). 94 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 26. 95 David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-making Process: Is It Changing and Does It Matter?” in The Making of Chinee Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 1-36.

26 professionalisation and pluralisation of the decision-making process is also evident in the making of China’s maritime security policy, as more policy actors have been involved in the policy process during the past few decades.96

In particular, based on current studies which have identified a set of state and non-state actors regarding China’s foreign and security policy-making,97 this thesis further divides them into two groups given their bureaucratic/individual influences on policy outcomes: the primary actors and the marginal actors. On the subject of the primary actors, unsurprisingly, the top CCP leadership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the PLA, which are the traditional Chinese foreign and security policy makers, play important roles in the making of Chinese maritime security policy. Additionally, despite not directly responsible for foreign affairs in theory, China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces have also been playing an increasingly salient role in China’s maritime disputes with neighbouring countries since the mid-2000s.

In terms of the marginal actors, other state and non-state agencies have been influencing the making of China’s maritime security policy in recent years, albeit they do not necessarily seek an active role in maritime security policy and cannot wield influence over the primary actors. These marginal actors are CCP Publicity Department, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), local governments, public media and Chinese netizens, and academic institutes. In some cases, the influences of these marginal actors are actually by-products of their expanding demands for profits and economic interests, such as the state-owned oil company’s drilling projects in the East China Sea gas fields and the Hainan provincial government’s decision to encourage local fishing ships to fish farther into waters off the disputed Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. To a certain degree, these profit-driven activities have complicated Beijing’s policy regarding

96 However, the fragmentation of Chinese authority had existed before the economic reform. More discussions on this issue will be provided in Chapter 2. 97 See Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26 (2010): 1-51; Lai Hongyi and Su-Jeong Kang, “Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 294-313.

27 its maritime disputes with regional claimants during the past few years despite the fact that these agencies and companies initially had little intention of damaging China’s relations with other foreign countries.

Thirdly, this thesis contends that the fragmented structure of authority has led to disjointed outcomes of China’s maritime security policy as well as the phenomenon that decisions are slow in coming. In China, policy actors involved in the making of maritime security policy normally have approximately equal bureaucratic ranks with one agency unable to force the others to do what it wants.98 For instance, provincial governments and MFA are both at ministerial level in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Additionally, although the newly reconstructed State Oceanic Administration (SOA) supervises the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and is heavily involved in China’s maritime disputes with regional countries, it reports to the Ministry of Land and Resources, not MFA. Therefore, decisions are often made through extensive bureaucratic bargaining and consensus building. In addition, with the absence of a functional policy-coordinating mechanism at the centre, the diverse bureaucratic preferences of policy actors frequently prevent the government from adopting consistent policies. In particular, as more government agencies have been involved in the decision-making process in recent years, MFA has been gradually diluting its structural influence in the policy process.

The phenomenon that decisions are slow in coming is especially evident in the case of China’s three-decade-long aircraft carrier program. Throughout the process of China’s aircraft carrier program, it is clear that, to a large degree, intense factional competition within the Chinese military and bureaucratic bargaining among government agencies have delayed the process of China’s aircraft carrier program. For example, since the early 1990s, there had been a fervent debate over constructing aircraft carriers between the PLA’s carrier faction and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) School, which lasted for more than a decade. In addition, even if a decision to commence the construction of the maiden Chinese aircraft

98 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 142-143.

28 carrier was made by top CCP leaders in 2009, 99 a detailed plan for the future development of this program is still unclear and expected to be made through another round of extensive bureaucratic bargaining which again may last for a very long time.

The above principal findings have two strategic implications for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. On the one hand, a fragmented structure of Chinese authority with the involvement of numerous policy actors bargaining with one another implies that China will require more time to determine its next step towards implementing the “building China into a maritime power” policy guideline. An ambitious Chinese attempt to break the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific is not as imminent as some sceptics have warned. This can buy regional countries more time to adopt appropriate policies in response to China’s rise. On the other hand, the lack of a functional policy-coordinating mechanism in China also implies that decisions may be made at the expense of considered deliberations. As a result, unpredictable Chinese policies are likely to be observed in the near future. Such uncertainty will not only deepen neighbouring countries’ mistrust of China but also possibly hold back any international efforts to enhance regional stability in the region of Asia-Pacific.

The contribution made by this thesis is threefold. Firstly, it not only makes a comprehensive analysis to explain the inconsistent nature of China’s maritime security policy, a phenomenon as yet little examined, but also challenges current scholarship which implies that there is a clear policy driver dominating China’s maritime security policy. This thesis, on a broader level, provides new thoughts for the future study in relation to China’s foreign and security policy, such as the

99 Dai Xu, Hai Tuteng: Haiyang Haiquan Haijun Yu Zhong Hangkong Mujian [China and 21st Century Sea Power] (Hong Kong: New Point, 2011), 168.

29 scholarly debates about China’s peaceful development rhetoric100 and the well- known China Threat Theory.101

Secondly, this thesis applies the FA model to enhance understanding of China’s maritime security policy decision-making by focusing on the role played by loosely coordinated actors involved in the policy process. Even though there are some studies analysing the fragmented decision-making process for China’s maritime security policy, they have only addressed Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute and yet provided a more comprehensive analysis of other issues relevant to China’s maritime security interests. In particular, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has attributed Beijing’s assertive claims on its sovereignty rights in the South China Sea to the lack of an overarching policy guideline, the country’s fragmented policy-making structure and bureaucratic overlaps, and intense competition for political credits for performance.102 Although the ICG’s analysis is certainly valid and provides this thesis with valuable insights, it overlooks the difference between fangzhen and zhengce while making a simplistic argument that there is no overarching policy guideline in China for dealing with its maritime issues. Instead, this thesis argues that China does have such an overarching policy guideline, but the fragmentation of decision-making authority makes it difficult for the Chinese government to make consistent policies to support this guideline.

100 In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao introduced the concept of “peaceful rise” under the support of Chinese President Hu Jintao. This concept was later converted to “peaceful development” and became the principle diplomatic rhetoric in China. Following the logic of “peaceful development,” Beijing claims that it will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future. For full text of “peaceful development,” see People’s Daily, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress,” October 15, 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/629012 0.html (accessed January 10, 2011). Also see John Lee, “The Fantasy of Taming China’s Rise,” Foreign Policy Analysis no. 3 (2010): 3-4. 101 China Threat Theory has been studied by American scholars and officials, especially the neo- conservatives. Three different logics are constructed to substantiate the “China threat” thesis. First, ideological and cultural factors make China a threat; second, geo-political and geo-economic factors; third, the collapse of China. 102 For more on the ICG’s analysis, see International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1) (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012).

Thirdly, this thesis extends the FA framework. When introducing the concept, one major concern of Lieberthal & Lampton was to identify the policy actors (bargainers) as well as determine where and when bureaucratic bargaining occurs. In addition, Andrew Mertha’s 2008 research added some new policy actors (including non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and individual activists) to the FA model, arguing that the policy process has been increasingly pluralised.103 However, the above research studies failed to discuss the weight of the policy actors’ individual influences. Based on the foundation Lieberthal & Lampton and Mertha provided, this thesis extends the FA framework by dividing policy actors into two groups, primary and marginal, according to the weights of their influences on policy outcomes. It not only identifies these policy actors but also argues that not everyone enjoys the same power in shaping policy outcomes, with some becoming more influential while others playing secondary roles.

1.4 Research Methodology

This thesis takes a case-study approach to examine the influences of policy actors in the decision-making process. To test the validity of its main argument, this thesis conducts four case studies relevant to China’s maritime security policy: Beijing’s policy on the East and South China Sea disputes, the Chinese aircraft carrier program, and the PLAN’s counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. These cases are selected on the basis that they are able to explain the roles played by policy actors in the decision-making process when China confronts different security challenges at sea. In some cases, such as the East China Sea dispute, Beijing is facing a potential maritime standoff against Japan which is also a regional power in Asia and the third largest economy in the world.104 In other cases,

103 Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 4-6. 104 CNN News, “Japan: Economy Slips to Third in World,” February 14, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/02/13/japan.econmy.third/ (accessed June 2, 2012).

31 such as the South China Sea dispute, China is involved in disputes with some medium-and-small-sized counterparts, the ASEAN countries. In addition, some cases, the East and South China Sea disputes for instance, include not only political and security considerations but also more complex sovereignty disputes. Other cases, such as China’s aircraft carrier program and its counter-piracy escort missions in the Gulf of Aden are highly related with the modernisation of the PLAN as both cases symbolise a milestone regarding the development of the its blue-water operational capability.

The research information relied on by this thesis is obtained from Chinese primary materials, English books and journal articles, and author’s interviews. Chinese primary materials used in this thesis include official documents of the Chinese government (e.g. reports, annals, and white papers), Chinese leaders’ remarks, the comments of Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry’s spokespersons at press conferences, official and non-official news reports, and research papers produced by Chinese think tanks having close ties with the government. Chinese primary materials provide this thesis with useful insights that English-written literature sometimes cannot fully interpret, although English works also form an important source of research information. In particular, given that Chinese decision makers have been more responsive to public opinion in recent years, China’s television programs (in particular, news talk shows) and popular online forums on military and foreign issues are valuable sources of primary information on which this thesis relies. Information obtained from the internet and TV programs is used to discuss how various policy actors have made use of public opinion to quest for more individual interests in the bargaining process.

Interviews were conducted during the author’s field research trip to Beijing and Qingdao between 2nd - 29th November 2011. Interviewees were contacted and advised of the interview questions prior to the meeting with the author. Given the political sensitivity of this subject, interviews were conducted anonymously at the interviewees’ request. Some Chinese scholars interviewed by the author have close

32 connections to the Chinese government even if they do not directly participate in daily decision-making. For example, some interviewees often participate in Chinese Foreign Ministry’s special internal meetings on the topics related to China’s foreign and security policy. The information provided by the interviewees includes some insightful personal perspectives as well as first-hand observation of the decision-making process in China, as they can access some insider information which people outside the decision-making circle can hardly collect.

While focusing on how a fragmented political system in China can influence its policy outcomes, I acknowledge that other factors such as changing dynamics in the international environment could also influence China’s policies. These issues could be the topics for further research. Moreover, it is undeniable that with no direct access to the central headquarters of CCP and Chinese State Council, it is difficult for the author, or indeed any foreign and Chinese researcher, to provide concrete information disclosing a direct link between the policy actors’ behaviours and the change that have occurred in China’s maritime security policy. This is a common limitation for a research study of the decision-making process of a government, especially a non-democratic regime. As Robert Ross argues, “decision-making in all authoritarian countries and in many democratic countries is not sufficiently transparent to allow detailed research into policy-making……” 105 Nevertheless, the analysis of these case studies has its merits. It verifies that the fragmentation of authority and extensive bureaucratic bargaining have, to a large extent, led to the inconsistency of China’s maritime security policy.

105 Glosny, Saunders and Ross, “Correspondence,” 172.

1.5 Structure of Thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research objectives of this study, a review of the existing literature, its main argument, its research methodology, and an overview of this thesis’ chapters.

Chapter 2 introduces the Fragmented Authoritarianism model, the theoretical framework of this thesis, which guides the empirical analysis presented in the main body of the thesis. In the first part, this chapter gives a detailed review of the FA model and discusses why the FA model is valuable for analysing China’s maritime security policy. The second part identifies the primary and marginal policy actors in the policy process, and examines the dynamics between various policy actors and the top decision makers in order to demonstrate the fragmented structure of Chinese authority.

Chapter 3 sets the context for the case studies conducted in Chapters 4 to 7. This chapter examines the evolution of China’s maritime security policy and changes in its legal regulations and organisational arrangement relevant to the protection of its maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed water. This chapter is organised in a chronological order: the CCP leadership under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. It also looks at the latest development regarding China’s maritime security policy after Xi Jinping took office in late 2012 as well as discusses some future challenges China is going to face.

Chapter 4 presents the first case study, an analysis of China’s policy on the East China Sea dispute. Unlike China’s ties with other states, historical animosity between China and Japan has always further damaged the Sino-Japanese relations when a maritime dispute emerges. In addition, as both countries are regional powers in Asia, worsening bilateral relations may have significant impacts on the balance of power in this region. This chapter finds that, rather than a deliberate

34 plan, diverse bureaucratic preferences and extensive inter-agency competition have caused the assertive Chinese stance towards the East China Sea dispute. Also, manipulating Chinese people’s anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment is a good strategy for some policy actors to solicit more budgetary funds and bureaucratic prestige.

Chapter 5 is a case study of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute. Although both this chapter and Chapter 4 discuss the decision-making process of managing territorial disputes at sea, this chapter contributes in a different way. The decision-making process of Beijing’s South China Sea policy is arguably more pluralised than that for its East China Sea policy. In particular, the roles of provincial governments in China’s south coastal area in the policy process of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute are much more salient, but no noteworthy behaviours in relation to the East China Sea dispute have been made by provincial governments in China’s east coastal area.

Chapter 6 looks at the decision-making process of China’s aircraft carrier program. This chapter particularly shows one key implication of the fragmentation of authority in China for the policy process and the outcomes of that process – decisions are slow in coming through a protracted policy process. To this end, this chapter examines the factors behind the prolonged process of the program, arguing that intense bureaucratic competition within and outside the Chinese military has not only reflected a fragmented structure of Chinese authority but also held back the program’s development. In addition, the analysis made in this chapter generates some new insights regarding the future path of China’s aircraft carrier program, such as the quantity, size and type of the forthcoming aircraft carriers.

Chapter 7 presents the fourth case study, an analysis of China’s policy on its counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Unlike in the preceding case studies, Chinese policy actors have been unanimous in support of the decision to send escort task forces to Somalia as it is a good Chinese action in support of its

“peaceful development” rhetoric and demonstrates Beijing’s determination to become a responsible stakeholder. Examining the decision-making process for this naval campaign contributes to the understanding of whether Beijing can deliberate a coordinated policy on its counter-piracy operations especially when main actors in the policy process support it commonly.

Chapter 8 synthesises major findings of the empirical analysis of China’s maritime security policy conducted in this thesis. In addition, it discusses some implications of these findings for regional order in the Asia-Pacific. At last, it addresses the significance of this thesis’ argument and areas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Policy Actors in the Making of China’s Maritime Security Policy

This chapter introduces the theoretical foundation of this thesis − the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model − and the roles of key policy actors in the decision- making process of China’s maritime security policy. Since the late 1980s, the FA model has become one of the most important analytical frameworks for the study of Chinese politics and decision-making processes, especially regarding China’s economic projects. Due to the fragmentation of authority in China, policy actors are able to exert their individual influences on policy outcomes through intense bureaucratic bargaining. In particular, analytical framework of the FA model is not only applicable to discussing the making of China’s economic policy. It also captures some key features of the country’s maritime security policy at the present time, that is, relevant decisions have been made by a set of loosely coordinated policy actors through a process of extensive inter-agency competition and bargaining.

This chapter is organised into two major parts. In the first part, this chapter introduces the FA model. It examines the key features of this model, the impacts of the fragmentation of authority on policy outcomes, the strengths and limitations of the FA model, and its applicability to the making of China’s maritime security policy discussed. In the second part, this chapter further modifies the FA model by examining two groups of policy actors regarding the making of China’s maritime security policy, primary and marginal actors, with particular emphasis on how they can exert their individual influences on the policy outcomes. A short conclusion is made in the final part.

2.1 The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model

Introduced by Kenneth Liberthal and his colleagues to examine the policy- making involved in China’s economic projects,1 the FA model argues that the decision-making authority below the peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented. The fragmentation of authority is structurally based and enhanced by the economic reform undertaken in post-Mao period. 2 Most of the time, in principle, decisions are first made and then resolved through a complex process of bureaucratic bargaining and consensus building which involves a large array of loosely coordinated government organs.3 As the bureaucratic bargaining “involves negotiations over resources among units that effectively have mutual veto power,” the fragmentation of authority has encouraged a search for consensus building among various policy actors in the decision-making process.4 In particular, given that the bargaining process and its results are quite unpredictable, complex and time-consuming, there is no guarantee that policies made from one bargaining process are consistent with those from another.5 Moreover, even if a decision is

1 In the 1980s, relevant studies on the fragmentation of Chinese authority and its impact on policy- making had been made. For example, Michael Oksenberg, “Economic Policy Making in China,” China Quarterly no. 90 (1982): 165-195; David M. Lampton, “Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill,” Issues & Studies 23, no. 3 (1987):11-41; David M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 2 It is worth mentioning that the bureaucratic bargaining among Chinese government agencies had been an enduring political phenomenon in Mao’s era because the parallel and loosely coordinated bureaucracies at both the central and local level had existed since 1949. For more on the Chinese politics in Mao’s era, see James R. Townsend, Politics in China, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 82-137; Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949-57,” in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5-86; Robert Weatherley, Politics in China since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 15-40; Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 11-39. 3 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 216. 4 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 6-9. 5 David M. Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 37.

38 made, often its implication will still be influenced by various government agencies acting on their own interests. As David Lampton puts it, “policy outcomes result from incorporating the interests of the implementation agencies into the substance of the policy itself” and “policy outcomes are often at considerable variance with the initial goals of the policy makers at the top.”6 Several key features of the FA model are discussed in the following.

Structural Division of Authority

According to the FA model, the Chinese authority below the peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented, although the system is authoritarian in nature. Structurally, China’s political system is characterised by the division of authority among various players in the decision-making process due to its multi- level massive bureaucratic hierarchy. In China, the making of a policy must seek coordination both vertically (between the centre and localities) and horizontally (between different government agencies at the same or approximate administrative levels). For instance, if an environmental pollution issue is under discussion, it must be considered vertically (between the Ministry of Environmental Protection in the centre and environmental protection departments at each level of the political system) and horizontally (through coordination among other government agencies in related to the issue of environmental pollution within each political jurisdiction).7

The Chinese people use a special terminology to describe this special crisscrossing jurisdiction: tiao (lines − the vertical bureaucratic system) and kuai (pieces − the horizontal coordinating bodies at different levels). The relationship

6 Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5. 7 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York; London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004), 186-188.

39 between them is called tiao kuai guanxi.8 With a number of reporting lines in its political system, China’s authority is to a large extent fragmented. Also, these intertwining bureaucratic relationships contribute to the particular phenomenon that, in practice, government officials have several “bosses” they have to report to.9 For example, the education department of the Jiangsu province is subordinate to both the Ministry of Education and the Jiangsu provincial government.10 Moreover, the latter two have same administrative ranks.

In addition, the relationship between different government organs can be interpreted as “leadership relationship (lingdao guanxi)” and “professional/business relationship (yewu guanxi).” Where a leadership relationship applies, the superior organ can issue a binding order to its subordinate. It also has a powerful voice in relation to issues, such as the appointment of officials and budgets decisions for the subordinate organ. 11 On the other hand, a “professional/business relationship” exists among agencies in interrelated areas of activity. It refers to the frequent interaction among government units which may or may not have formal superior- subordinate relationships. When a “professional/business relationship” exists between agencies without a formal channel between them, the interactions between them require frequent consultation and negotiation.12 In particular, even though the “professional/business relationship” exists between a superior and a subordinate,

8 For more discussion of the tiao kuai guanxi, see Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s Soft Centralisation: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The China Quarterly no. 184 (2005): 791-810; Lieberthal, Governing China, 186-188. 9 Liu Meiru, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-making Process and Economic Development after Mao: Reinventing Chinese Government (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 23-24; Lieberthal, Governing China, 187; Yang Guangbin, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Fazhan De Zhanlue Xuanze [The Strategic Choice of China’s Political Development] (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2011), 220-21. 10 For more discussion on the central-local relationship in China, see Sheng Yumin, “Central- provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions, Management and Empirical Trends,” The China Quarterly no. 182 (2005): 338-355; Huang Yasheng, “Central-local Relations in China during the Reform Era: The Economic and Institutional Dimensions,” World Development 22, no. 4 (1996): 655-672; Ka Ho Mok and Wu Xiaofang, “Dual Decentralisation in China’s Transitional Economy: Welfare Regionalism and Policy Implications for Central–local Relationship,” Policy and Society no. 32 (2013): 61-75; Yang Yong, “Zhongguo Waijiao Zhong De Difang Yinsu [Local Factors in Chinese Diplomacy],” International Review 88, no. 4 (2007): 42-47. 11 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 148. 12 Ibid.

40 the former normally provides latter with guidelines, instructions and non-binding directives which can be later revised or even disregarded.13

Consensus Building and Bureaucratic Bargaining

Consensus building has become a more important issue for policy-making in China in the reform era. The increasing importance of the consensus building is due to two reasons. Firstly, the economic reform has revitalised not only China’s economy but also its administrative functions.14 Since the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) top leaders have reduced the use of coercive approaches usually used in Mao’s era against those who failed to follow orders. Instead, the professionalisation of Chinese bureaucrats and their active cooperation with all the major parties concerned have been regarded by CCP leaders as good strategies for economic development. 15 Following this logic, the economic reform has encouraged the central government to reduce its administrative interference with significant de facto powers decentralised to local governments. 16 As a result, government officials, at both central and local levels, can enjoy more liberty to set their own agendas, bargain for their own preferred policies and make policies what they consider favourable to their interests without being fully constrained by the coercive apparatus of the state.17 Since government officials have been less willing to undertake state-mandated activities and top leaders have been more willing to cooperate with their subordinates, the importance of consensus building in making decisions has become more salient.

13 Ibid., 149. 14 He Zengke and others, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu [Study on the Reform of Chinese Political System] (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2004), 206-208. 15 Thomas Fingar, “Implementing Energy Policy: The Rise and Demise of the State Energy Commission,” in Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 213. Also see Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 23. 16 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 107. 17 Andrew C. Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralisation in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China Quarterly no. 200 (2009): 997.

Secondly, identical to all large-scale organisations and governments worldwide, there are usually tensions or conflicts among government agencies in China. Nevertheless, given the complex tiao quai guanxi, it is often necessary to achieve certain agreement or consensus among these government agencies with conflicting interests, particularly when no single agency has authority over any other.18 For instance, a major project may involve conflicting interests of a set of territorial administrations and vertical functional organisations at the same level of the political hierarchy. However, since ministers at the centre and provincial governors have no direct authority over one another, this situation therefore encourages bargaining and consensus building among them if they want to make things done.

Reaching a consensus among government agencies generally requires officials to negotiate with other relevant officials. Therefore, policy-making in China is characterised by bureaucratic bargaining among an array of government officials competing with one another to achieve their individual interests.19 To make this worse, this bargaining is undertaken mainly by government officials of equal rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. For example, a provincial governor normally bargains with his/her counterparts who are governors of other provinces, ministers or heads of agencies of equal bureaucratic rank. In addition, to some extent, one government official can also bargain with persons one level above or below in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 20 For instance, officials in a prefecture-level city (dijishi) government can bargain with those in governments of counties (xian) and county- level cities (xianjishi) immediately below as well as its superior provincial government.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and other primary central commissions in the State Council are the primary arenas for

18 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 22-23. 19 Lieberthal, Governing China, 191. 20 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 50-51.

42 bargaining and consultation among provinces and ministries.21 Nevertheless, one practical fact in China is that disputed issues or policies that cannot be solved at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy are frequently sent to a higher level for further consultations. For instance, in the bureaucratic bargaining process, if participants cannot reach consensus on issues under debate at the level of NDRC or other central commissions, these issues will be subsequently sent to the State Council or CCP Politburo for final resolution. To a large degree, this phenomenon leads to the problem that, from time to time, Chinese leaders at higher levels are overwhelmed by squabbling subordinates.22

In terms of the strategies for bargaining, the bureaucratic bargaining usually involves various give-and-takes among bargainers over the distribution of resources and information.23 It is worth mention that even though the reforms gave local governments more budgetary independence, they also created a greater central-level control over economic information and relevant skills. Therefore, albeit the localities have enjoyed a greater autonomy in the reform era, they still need the assistance from relevant ministries at the centre in order to pursue local economic development efficiently. 24 Government officials at the centre can therefore use their controlled information and skills to bargain with the localities to obtain localities’ support and cooperation in return.25

In addition, during the bargaining process, the utilisation of personal networks (renji guanxi) is also important. This is because Chinese political culture has long

21 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 51-52. The National Development and Reform Commission which was formerly called as the State Planning Commission (1954-1998) and the State Development Planning Commission (1998-2003) is a macroeconomic management agency under the supervision of State Council of the Republic of China. NDRC has broad administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy. Its functions are monitoring and adjusting the performance of the national economy, studying and formulating policies for economic and social development, guiding restructuring of China’s economic system, formulating plans for the development of China’s energy sector, and managing national oil reserves. For more information of this agency, see NDRC’s website: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/default.htm. 22 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 51-52. 23 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 157-158. 24 Lieberthal, “Introduction,” 12-13. 25 Ibid.

43 highlighted the importance of interpersonal relationship. Interpersonal relationship is informal, particularistic, and without specific norms. It is often built upon loyalty, mutual trust, and fulfilment of personal commitment. These traditional virtues still exist within the framework of China’s political system.26 Put simply, one’s success in the bargaining process may rely on one’s connections with important figures and extensive personal networks.27

General Policy Guideline (fangzhen) and Incremental Policy Process

Top CCP leaders understand that, as the fragmentation of authority is a key element of China’s political system, the making of a certain policy, especially regarding disputes among various government organs, may be quite difficult if this policy is expected to be carried out by unenthusiastic local and lower-level officials. For example, the construction of Guangzhou-Zhuhai railway, a project initiated in 1985, experienced numerous difficulties in route designs due to the lack of local’s strong support.28 To make local and lower-level officials more willing to support a certain disputed policy, top decision makers usually try to avoid making a clear or specific decision. To this end, an overarching policy guideline is firstly made. In the next phase of the decision-making process, a whole string of mutually reinforcing decisions is required to encompass opinions and initiatives from all bargainers at different levels. 29 Put simply, a policy guideline is supported by concrete policies made later. These concrete policies are normally made after

26 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 157. 27 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 56. 28 For more analysis of this railway project, see Xu Jiang and Anthony Yeh, “Inter-jurisdictional Cooperation through Bargaining: The Case of the Guangzhou-Zhuhai Railway in the Pearl River Delta, China,” The China Quarterly no. 213 (2013): 130-151. 29 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 25-26.

44 rounds of bureaucratic bargaining. This especial policy process is therefore similar to the combination of numerous political guerrilla wars.30

In practice, fangzhen is the policy guideline for further consultation with no specific policies and plans. To smooth the process of decision-making and mobilise support from subordinates, top leaders may first announce that a certain project has been initiated albeit, in fact, no such thing has happened. Research and bureaucratic bargaining are subsequently conducted to make zhengce (concrete policies) as well as determine how best to implement them.31 Moreover, one should be aware that, despite fangzhen being designed for future resolutions, final decisions may never be reached if bureaucratic bargaining can’t achieve a well-accepted consensus among policy actors in the policy process. In other words, fangzhen is only a general direction for further bureaucratic activity but is unable to guarantee when zhengce will eventually be finalised. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg put it, a policy guideline does not necessarily mean that all the substances of the guideline will truthfully and fully be implemented. Consequently, the search for a specific timing for a particular policy is often misplaced as decision-making is an incremental process.32

2.2 Impacts of the Fragmentation of Authority on Policy Outcomes

There are three major impacts of the fragmentation of Chinese authority on policy outcomes. Firstly, policies are made slowly. As examined in previous parts, since the introduction of the economic reform, a new process of consultation and negotiation among government organs at various administrative levels has taken place. Nevertheless, although consensus building has been more important to the policy-making in China, the process of reaching a consensus could take a very long

30 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 57. 31 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 26. 32 Ibid., 25.

45 period.33 For instance, according to Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s research of the Three Gorges Dam project, this project experienced protracted negotiations among Chinese bureaucrats when the proposal of this project re-emerged in the 1980s.34 Generally speaking, it is quite difficult for such a big hydropower project to achieve a win-win situation among interested parties because constructing the Three Gorges Dam not only requires the relocation of residents who live in the reservoir area but also concerns the distribution of benefits generated from this project, such as electric power and flood control. 35 To reach a resolution, government organs at various administrative levels bargained over issues, such as identifying the major beneficiaries and victims of the project, distribution of the electricity generated from the power plant and relocation of residents in adjacent areas.36 Due to the complexity of this massive water project, negotiations took a very long time which meant that decisions were made slowly. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg conclude,

the economic reforms exerted a mixed impact on the Three Gorges project……the further diffusion of authority, the resulting stress on reaching consensus among bureaucratic units, and the more competitive domestic economic situation within China impeded Beijing’s ability to make a firm decision on the project and to build it on schedule.37

The second impact is inconsistent policy outcomes. In the process of bureaucratic bargaining, the consensus building coexists with an understanding that

33 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 57. 34 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 269-338. The time of the earliest proposal of constructing the Three Gorges Dam can be traced back to the 1950s, albeit no significant progress had been made for a long time. After a long debate, this project was finally approved by National People’s Congress in 1992. The dam project was completed and fully functional in 2012. 35 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 158. 36 David M. Lampton, “Water: Challenge to a Fragmented Political System,” in Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 170. 37 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, 338. In addition, some also make additional study on the applicability of the FA model to the making of the Three Gorges Dam project and the Qinghai-Tibet railway project. See Chien-Min Chao and Wen-Shuen Tsai, “Party-state Interests or Bureaucratic Interests? Example of Decision-making Processes for Three Gorges Dam and Qinghai- Tibet Railway,” Mainland China Studies 53, no. 2 (2010): 39-71.

46 everyone should benefit from the negotiation or at least no one should lose too much.38 Guided by this understanding, bargaining takes place because government officials know that the policy process should take care of every individual’s interests through repeated negotiations as well as the fact that more can be gained by mutual accommodation than unilateral actions. On the other hand, the effort to accommodate individual interests could make the formulation of policy through an unpredictable and subjective case-by-case bargaining process which possibly makes policy outcomes quite inconsistent.

The third impact of the fragmentation of Chinese authority on policy outcomes is that concrete policies are possibly made against the original directive of a policy guideline. It could be caused by subordinate organs’ intentional or unintentional failures in properly translating the original directive of a policy guideline into specific policies. Several reasons can explain this phenomenon. The first reason is the problem of inter-agency communication: subordinate officials may not properly interpret principle guidelines into substantial policies due to the lack of sufficient information passed on to them.39 In particular, Chinese officials at the lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy often argue that a proper translation of the top leaders’ principle guidelines would be a difficult task as they find themselves far away from the top leaders. The second reason is the distortion of the original directive: throughout the protracted bargaining process, each level of the bureaucratic system may slightly change the contents of the policy favouring its own interests. Consequently, if there are multiple levels of the bureaucratic system, the cumulative distortion of the original directive of the policy guideline could be significant, 40 making it possible that concrete policies which are supposed to support the policy guideline are made against intended outcomes of the original directive.

38 Susan L. Shirk, “The Chinese Political system and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 76. 39 Fingar, “Implementing Energy Policy,” 214. 40 Lampton, “A Plum for a Peach,” 57.

2.3 Strengths and Limitations of the FA Model

The FA model provides useful conceptual framework which seeks to put better perspective into two well-developed schools of thought regarding China’s policy-making after 1949. The first school of thought conceives a rationality model for the understanding of the policy-making in China, arguing that the top Chinese leaders still possess superior authority in the political system and can elicit compliance from subordinates at lower levels about almost any policy at any time. In addition, top Chinese leaders can feel free to rationally identify problems as well as generate solutions from their own preferences or power needs.41 The second school of thought focuses on the extent to which China has become a cellular society. It asserts that policies proposed by the top leaders in Beijing bear little resemblance to the reality at lower levels, and that such a “cellular economy and polity” will consequently make the Chinese chain of command largely ineffective.42

Although the FA model acknowledges the insight offered by these two schools of thought, it provides a new approach to study the policy-making in China. Highlighting the importance of bureaucratic bargaining, the FA model aims to explore the fragmentation of authority in the Chinese political system, the incentives of key players in the decision-making process, and the types of resources and strategies these organs use to bargain with one another. It examines the structure of bureaucratic authority and realities of bureaucratic practice that affect the elite and the basic building blocks of the system.43 This model does not argue that rational problem solving does not take place in China but addresses different dimensions of the political system which are not properly captured in a

41 For example, see Harry Harding, Organizing China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981); Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981). 42 For example, see Audrey Donnithorne, “China’s Cellular Economy: Some Economics Trends since the Culture Revolution,” The China Quarterly no. 52 (1972): 605-619. 43 Lieberthal, “Introduction,” 11.

48 straightforward application of a rationality model.44 Furthermore, it explores not only how decision makers try to formulate their policies but also how the opponents of a policy can exert their veto powers in the decision-making process.45 As a result, the FA model can help one gain a greater understanding of the ways in which the bureaucratic structure influence the policy-making in China.

More importantly, the FA model is particularly useful for explaining the formulation of China’s maritime security policy, albeit this model was initially used to explain the dynamic of the making of China’s economic projects. This is because this analytical framework also captures some key features of China’s maritime security policy-making. Firstly, the structural division of authority is evident in the decision-making apparatus in relation to this policy. A unique phenomenon of “five dragons stirring up the sea (wulong naohai)” in China is a good example. 46 The term “five dragons stirring up the sea” means that due to the lack of a functional inter-agency coordination mechanism, five Chinese government organs in charge of managing maritime affairs and the enforcement of law at sea − the Maritime Police under Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) under the Fishery Bureau of Ministry of Agriculture, the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) under State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) under Ministry of Transportation (MOT), and General Administration of Customs (GAC) − constantly compete with one another. This phenomenon has significantly undermined China’s efforts to protect its maritime frontier and interests.

44 Ibid., 10. 45 Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors, 155. 46 For more on this issue, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Five Dragons Stirring up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime enforcement Capabilities,” China Maritime Studies no. 5 (2010): 5-20; He Zhonglong and others, Zhongguo Haian Jingweidui Zujian Yanjiu [Study on the Development of Chinese Coast Guard Force] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), 39-40; 36-48; Li Yangyang, Zhongguo Haishang Wulong Naohai Zhenjing Haiwai [China’s “Five Dragon Stirring up the Sea” Astonishes the World], http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/1076/52984/10475876.html (accessed June 10, 2011); Li Baiqi and Quan Yongbo, ed., Lanse Guotu De Guanli Zhidu [Managerial System of the Blue Territory] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2008), 133-137.

Some observers further indicate that the problem of “five dragons stirring up the sea” could be a more complicated. “Nine dragons stirring up the sea” means that in addition to the five maritime law enforcement organs, the foreign ministry, the Chinese military, the environment ministry, and state owned oil companies have also played some roles in “stirring up” China’s seas.47 In short, regardless of how many “dragons” have existed in China, this particular phenomenon indicates that China encounters a thorny problem in coordinating its various government organs having approximately the same ranks in the bureaucratic hierarchy in terms of deliberating its maritime security policy. This is a good example of the structural fragmentation of the Chinese authority featured in the FA model.

Secondly, inter-agency competition and bureaucratic bargaining can also be observed in the making of China’s policy regarding its maritime disputes with regional countries. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter one, some observers argue that Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute involves extensive competition for more bureaucratic prestige or budgetary funds, and, to a great extent, relevant decisions regarding protecting its maritime interests and territorial integrity are products of extensive bureaucratic bargaining.48 In addition, China’s efforts to reconstruct its loosely coordinated civilian maritime law enforcement forces have also involved intense competition for more bureaucratic power between China’s foreign policy community and civilian maritime law enforcement forces,49 clearly a feature of Chinese policy-making captured by the FA framework.

Nevertheless, critics of the FA model argue that the framework is to a certain extent flawed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Zhao Suisheng claim that even though the

47 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1) (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 201), 8. Also see Li Jie, “Jiulong Naohai Yijing Yingxiang Haiquan Jueqi [Nine Dragons Stirring up the Sea Has Influenced the Rise of China’s Maritime Power],” Phoenix News, March 16, 2009, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/200903/0316_342_1062847.shtml (accessed June 10, 2011). 48 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 19-24; Zou Wentao, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Security: Lofty Ambition, Little Progress,” RSIS Commentaries no. 7 (2014): 1-2. 49 Li Mingjiang and Zhang Hongzhou, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law Enforcement: Impact on Regional Security,” RSIS Commentaries no. 50 (2013): 2-3.

50 model instructively provides a new way of understanding Chinese politics in the reform era, it overlooks China’s complicity in power devolution and mistakenly describes its centre as possessing weak leadership. Moreover, they argue that the FA model provides vague conceptions of political structures which weaken the applicability of this model to the Chinese political system. As Hamrin and Zhao argue,

Fragmentation captures the disorderly nature of the Chinese bureaucratic system, which resulted from the decades of weakened central power under Mao Zedong followed by an incomplete reconstitution of the central party- state in the early 1980s… The focus on economic dynamics leads to a rather vague conception of the state structure, as reflected in the suggestion that China is in transition from a traditional hierarchical system towards a more modern, market-orientated system.50

However, these critics’ arguments are unconvincing. Firstly, Hamrin and Zhao mistakenly argue that the FA model overstates the weakness of the Chinese centre. As a matter of fact, this model highlights the interactive relationships among various players in the policy process as well as how these interactions can shape the final policy outcome, not the power devolution in China.51 There is nothing within the FA model suggesting that the centre is weak but, rather, it indicates that, even though a more fragmented process of decision-making has emerged in the reform era, the centre is still very powerful and has strong capability to bargain with the local. In other words, as Lieberthal claims, Chinese leaders at the centre continue to hold some “serious cards” in their hands when negotiating a certain policy with subordinates.52

50 Carol Lee Hamrin and Zhao Suisheng, “Introduction: Core Issues in Understanding the Decision Process,” in Decision-making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Zhao Suisheng (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), xxvii. 51 Mertha, China’s Water Warriors, 159. 52 Lieberthal, “Introduction,” 20.

Secondly, Hamrin and Zhao argue that the model’s focus on economic dynamics leads to a vague conception of a state’s structure. However, the limitation of the FA model is not its vagueness but it is static: the FA model is not a dynamic and evolving framework when it was conceptualised in the late 1980s. 53 As Michael Oksenberg argues, “Fragmented Authoritarianism offered a detailed but static description of how the core state apparatus worked in the mid-to late 1980s, and, to a considerable extent, still works. As a static model, however, it did not anticipate the changes of the 1990s.” 54 Moreover, the FA model could have captured the revitalisation of the Chinese society and state-society interactions during the reform era.55

The FA model was derived more than twenty years ago and is somewhat incapable of fully capturing recent political reality in China because more individuals, including state and non-state actors, have been able to exert their influences on the decision-making.56 Nevertheless, even though the FA mode has its limitations, as Andrew Mertha’s 2008 research of China’s hydropower projects indicates, with some revisions, it remains applicable to the decision-making process in China in the 21st century. Observing a more pluralised decision-making process in China nowadays, Mertha argues that “rather than indicate the obsolescence of the FA framework……non-traditional members of the policy- making process in China, local (that is, sub-provincial) officials, the media, non- governmental organisations (NGOs), and individual activists have successfully

53 Mertha, China’s Water Warriors, 159. 54 Michael Oksenberg, “China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century,” The China Journal no. 45 (2011): 28. 55 Ibid. For some good analysis of China’s state-society interactions in Post-Mao era, see Elizabeth J. Perry, “Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-society Relations,” The China Quarterly no. 139 (1994): 704-713; Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 1979- 1989 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 56 For instance, see David L. Shambaugh, “The Dynamics of Elite Politics during the Jiang Era,” The China Journal no. 45 (2001): 101-111; Lucian Pye, “Jiang Zemin’s Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolise Power and Settle for Limited Effectiveness,” The China Journal no. 45 (2001): 45-51; Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Xu Zhiyuan, Wei Chengshou De Guojia: Biange Zhong De Bainian Gongguo [An Immature Nation] (Taipei: Baqi Culture, 2010), 121-195.

52 entered the political process precisely by adopting the strategies necessary to work within the constrain of the FA framework.”57 Introducing a new term “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0,” Mertha argues that, with more non-state players playing roles in the policy process, the decision-making process in China still reveals a nature characterised by the FA model.58

2.4 Policy Actors in the Decision-making Process of China’s Maritime Security Policy

To properly analyse the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy, it is necessary to identify its major actors in the policy process. Existing studies on China’s foreign and security policy-making provide this thesis with some clues to identify these policy actors: the top leadership at the CCP Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), civilian government agencies at the central level, the Chinese military, local authorities, and public media and netizens.59 In terms of government agencies at the central level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), CCP Publicity Department, civilian maritime law enforcement forces, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are involved in the making of Beijing’s policy on foreign affairs and maritime disputes.60 In addition, recent studies have shown the growing roles of Chinese academic institutes given the

57 Mertha, China’s Water Warriors, 157. 58 Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0,” 995. 59 See relevant chapters in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Also see Hao Yufan, George Wei and Lowell Dittmer, ed., Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalisation and the Next World Power (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009); Liu Guoli and Hao Su, “Civil Society and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 169-186; Qi Jianhua, Yingxiang Zhongguo Waijiao Juece De Wuda Yingsu [Five Drivers of Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making] (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2010), 165-260. 60 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 8-13; Linda Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), 13-14; Lai Hongyi and Su-Jeong Kang, “Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 298-306.

53 increasing presence of Chinese scholars’ in China’s foreign and security policy- making apparatus. 61 In short, policy actors in the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy include state and non-state players. The diversified natures of them support Mertha’s argument that there have been more non-state players in China’s fragmented political framework.

These policy actors can be further categorised into two groups: the primary and marginal actors. In terms of the former, they include traditionally government organs in charge of China’s foreign and security policy, such as the CCP Politburo and PSC, MFA and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).62 Additionally, while not serving as traditional agencies responsible for foreign and security policy, Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement agencies have been increasingly playing roles that are more significant in maritime disputes between China and regional countries.63 Many of these primary policy actors have the institutional authority to influence the final decision outcomes despite their diverse perceptions of the best way for China to protect its maritime interests and territorial integrity.

Also, to a certain extent, China’s maritime security is shaped by some marginal actors outside the traditional decision-making apparatus such as the CCP Publicity Department (zhongxuanbu), SOEs, local authorities, academic institutes and public media and Chinese netizens. 64 These actors are not necessarily interested in playing an active role in the making of China’s maritime security policy. Nevertheless, they still influence, either intentionally or unintentionally, the

61 For example, see Liao Xuanli, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006); Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper 5, no. 5 (2010): 1-32; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (2009): 85-86; Zhao Quansheng, “Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 519, no. 1 (1992): 170-171. 62 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26 (2010): 1. 63 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 14. 64 Additionally, the Ministry of Public Security had a partocular role in Beijing’s policy regarding the South China Sea dispute given its 2012 decision to issue a new version of Chinese passport. See Chapter 5 for more information.

54 decision-making process. These primary and marginal actors in the making of China’s maritime security policy are discussed as follows.

2.4.1 Primary Policy Actors

CCP Politburo and PSC

The political power at the peak of Chinese authority remains strong. Given that the party-led political system in China is still prominent, major decisions are finalised by leading CCP leaders.65 The twenty-five-member CCP Politburo and seven-member PSC are the supreme organs in China’s political hierarchy. The members of the Politburo consist of CCP leaders both at centre and from local governments, and the ultimate decision-making power belongs to PSC which is relatively smaller in terms of size but meets more regularly. 66 PSC members normally include Secretary-general of CCP, Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), State President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),67 Premier of the State Council, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).68These CCP leaders normally have experiences in serving as heads of local governments and ministries in Beijing. They have the

65 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 4. 66 Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in The Making of Chinee Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 41-42; Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” 67- 68. 67 Since the era of Jiang Zemin, the three positions of CCP Secretary-general, Chairman of CMC and State President of the PRC are practically held by one person. 68 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 9-10.

55 power to nominate senior party and government officials which serves as an important mat for them to consolidate their political authority.69

As the ultimate decision organ in China, the main task of PSC is to give final approval to proposals or recommendations provided by subordinate government organs.70 While a major decision needs the support from the CCP Secretary-general, it is normally made by all PSC members through consensus building.71 PSC is also an arena in which unsettled disputes among subordinate agencies should be considered. Consensuses which cannot be reached at lower levels are expected to be settled here. In addition, PSC members are also leaders of various CCP Central Leading Small Groups (LSGs) which serve as forums, supported by ministers and advisors from policy research organs, for exchanges of ideas among members of the Politburo and the deliberation of major policies.72

Like his predecessors, since taking office as the CCP Secretary-general, Xi Jinping has chaired the Foreign Affairs LSG and Taiwan Affairs LSG.73 Since 2013, Xi Jinping has also led two newly established LSGs, the Maritime Rights LSG (zhongyang haiyang quanyi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) and Comprehensively Deepening Reforms LSG (zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu).74 Recommendations and opinions put forward by either the Party’s research organs or subordinate government organs are discussed and negotiated in the meetings of LSGs. Finally, in late 2013, CCP established another party organ, the CCP National Security Commission (NSC), which aims to consolidate political

69 Guo Sujian, Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology, and Organisation (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 135-139. 70 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 4. 71 Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 42-43; Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 4-5. 72 Carol Lee Hamrin, “The Party Leadership System,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 114. Also see Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor no. 26 (2008): 1-21; Chong-Hai Shaw, “CLSG: Definition and Status in the CCP,” Mainland China Studies 48, no. 3 (2005): 1-23. 73 Wenwei Po, “Meiti Pandian Xi Jinping Ren Zuzhang De Lingdao Xiaozu [Analysis: CCP Leading Small Groups headed by Xi Jinping],” December 31, 2013, http://news.wenweipo.com/2013/12/31/I N1312310011.htm (accessed January 5, 2014). 74 Ibid.

56 leadership of all the security apparatus, especially when China has been confronting more security challenges from both the ocean and its interior in the past few years. Even though it is reported that this new commission is chaired by President Xi Jinping, with Li Keqiang (Premier of the State Council and member of PSC) and Zhang Dejiang (Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and member of PSC) as deputies, its substantive functions are still unclear.75

It is worth mentioning that no PSC member has an exclusive policy portfolio, even though each is in charge of certain policy issues. 76 Consequently, both government officials in the Chinese foreign policy community and other interest groups outside it can try to influence any given PSC member involved in the process of consensus building. Even though this provides government officials at lower levels with more opportunity to influence top CCP leaders’ final decisions, it, from time to time, makes the decision-making process quite disorderly and ineffective.77

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Despite the fact that a final decision is made by the top CCP leaders, it cannot be arrived at without specialised analysis and recommendations provided by Chinese bureaucrats. Regarding China’s maritime security policy, MFA, which has a large pool of professional diplomats and experts, traditionally plays a key role in the policy formulation and consultation process. There are two major bureaucratic functions MFA has. Firstly, it participates in the making of major policies in relation to foreign and maritime affairs through its seat on the CCP Central Leading Small Groups, especially the Foreign Affairs and Maritime Rights LSGs. In

75 Ankit Panda, “What Will China’s New National Security Council Do,” The Diplomat, November 14, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/what-will-chinas-new-national-security-council-do/ (accessed January 24, 2013). 76 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 5. 77 Ibdi.

57 practice, these two LSG are composed of the same group of senior CCP figures, which is a common phenomenon in China − “one identical institution under two different names (yige jigou liangkuai paizi). 78 As the Chinese foreign minister is one of the primary members of these two LSGs, this provides MFA with a direct channel for influencing the decisions made by top CCP policymakers.

Secondly, MFA is also a policy research and executive organ. In terms of its research functions, it processes diverse information received from overseas and then provides top decision makers with analysis and policy recommendations. 79 In practice, MAF receives reports from Chinese diplomats stationed in China’s embassies overseas. These reports are about the latest development of important foreign issues taken place in local countries. After receiving these reports, the MFA staffs in Beijing are responsible for differentiating, processing and analysing the information as well as making proper policy recommendations to their superiors. In addition, MFA is China’s chief executive organ responsible for making relevant foreign policies in support of policy guidelines made by the top leaders. For instance, major issues reviewed by the PSC are resolved in principle or broad policy guidelines, with MFA’s task to convert them into specific policies or binding regulations. In other words, if a policy guideline deliberated by PSC is the “bone of the policy,” MFA’s mission is adding “flesh and blood” to it. 80

On the other hand, even if MFA has still been China’s primary government organ in charge of China’s relationship with foreign countries, its role and authority on most foreign and security policy issues has been waning in recent years. This is because its policy-making functions have to a certain degree been bypassed by

78 Duowei News, “Yang Jiechi Jieti Dai Bingguo Churen Zhongyang Waiban Zhuren [Yang Jiechi Replaces Dai Bingguo as Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group],” August 26, 2013, http://china.dwnews.com/news/2013-08-26/59321896-all.html (accessed January 4, 2014). 79 Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 50-52. MFA has various departments responsible for regional affairs, consular affairs, press information, international organisation and treaties. See June T. Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernisation and Tradition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 307. 80 Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 50.

58 those of other government organs.81 The declining role of MFA is largely due to China’s expanding international role during the past few decades. As China’s role in the international community becomes more and more diversified, MFA can no longer depend on its own expertise to cope with foreign issues which have become much more complicated. In the meantime, there has been a growing trend of professionalisation in China’s decision-making apparatus since the economic reform.82 Government officials have become experts in specialised issues which Chinese diplomats cannot handle without opinions provided by them. Therefore, MFA officials are placed in to a difficult situation as they have to rely on other officials’ expertise while, at the same time, competing with them for influence. 83

The People’s Liberation Army

The PLA is both historically and currently an important policy actor in relation to China’s foreign and security policy. It is true that the political role of the PLA has gradually faded since the economic reform. Moreover, no senior military officer has been able to hold a seat on the PSC since the retirement of Admiral Liu Huaqing in 1997. 84 However, the PLA today still actively participates in

81 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 12; Lai and Kang, “Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 302. 82 Hao Yufan, “Influence of Societal Factors: A Case of China’s American Policy,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 7. 83 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 8. 84 The professionalisation of the PLA was introduced in the early 1980s, see James Mulvenon, Professionalisation of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997); Jonathan D. Pollack, “Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 151-180; Yitzhak Shichor, “Defence Policy Reform,” in Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, ed. Gerald Segal (London; New York: K. Paul International for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 77-88; D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behaviour Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” China Leadership Monitor no. 36 (2012): 2-5.

59 negotiations and bargaining with other civilian government agencies over some foreign and security issues.85

In terms of the approaches the PLA utilises to shape policy outcomes, the most straightforward one is attending meetings of CMC which is held normally six times a year.86 As CMC is chaired by the CCP Secretary-general (who is also the CMC Chairman), it is an important channel through which the PLA can express its viewpoints to the supreme Chinese decision maker. 87 In addition to the CMC meetings, like MFA, the PLA can exert its bureaucratic influence on the decision- making process as well as bargain for more bureaucratic interests through its seats on the LSGs, especially the Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs LSGs on which the PLA currently holds one seat and two seats respectively.88 When participating in the consultation and consensus-building processes, the PLA delegates can bargain with other civilian CCP leaders based on their own military expertise and experiences.

Secondly, the PLA constantly acts as a principal opinion maker in China through channels beyond the bureaucratic system, such as books, TV programs, and online blogs and forums.89 A good example of the PLA’s influence on the decision-making through public media is one of the best-selling books in China, the China Dream, written by Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu at the National Defence University (NDU). In this book, Senior Colonel Liu advocates a belligerent defence policy, asserting that China should generate a new strategy of “military rise”

85 Tai-Ming Cheung, “The Influence of the Gun: China’s Central Military Commission and Its Relationship with the Military, Party and State Decision-making Systems,” in The Making of Chinee Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 90. 86 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 13. 87 Lai and Kang, “Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 305-306. 88 After the 18th CCP Party Congress, General Chang Wanquan Has held a seat in the Foreign Affairs LSG. General Ma Xiaotian and General Guo Boxiong have secured two seats in the Taiwan Affairs LSG. 89 Zhao Quansheng, “Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 130.

(junshi jueqi) to pursue its goal of global leadership.90 Senior Colonel Liu’s book had led to a fervent discussion about China’s future security strategy, both domestically and internationally, and attracted the attention from the Chinese government.91 Clearly, acting as the opinion-maker in China has become a good approach for the PLA to enhance its influence on the policy process.92

TV programs are also good channels for the PLA exert its influence. Like Western television channels nowadays, several Chinese news channels conduct regular news talk shows to discuss current major foreign and national issues. These talk shows frequently invite commentators with military backgrounds to analyse issues in relation to China’s military modernisation, China’s relationship with regional countries and territorial disputes in China’s neighbouring waters. For example, Major General Luo Yuan and Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo are popular guest commentators on China’s news talk shows.93 Even though most of their comments are outspoken and hawkish in nature, 94 they are quite welcomed by Chinese audiences and provide the PLA with a new way of exerting its power in shaping the

90 Li Cheng, “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012 (Part 3: Military Leaders),” China Leadership Monitor no. 33 (2010): 4; Chris Buckley, “China PLA Officer Urges Challenging U.S. Dominance,” Reuters, February 28, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa- military-exclusive-idUSTRE6200P620100301 (accessed June 18, 2012). However, Philip Saunders argues that hardliner views such as those of Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu will be a voice in debate, but are not likely to be dominant. And despite voices of these military hardliners, a fundamental change in China’s security strategy is unlikely to be seen in the near-to-medium term. See Philip C. Saunders, “Will China’s Dream Turn into America’s Nightmare?” China Brief 10, no. 7 (2010): 9- 12. 91 For some reports of this book, see Bill Gertz, “China Rhetoric Raises Threat Concerns,” The Washington Times, March 5, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/05/harsh- words-from-chinese-military-raise-threat-con/ (accessed June 18, 2012); Yang Junbing, “Xi Zhu Qiangguo Zhilu [Xi’s Super Power Plan],” Want Daily, March 14, 2013, http://news.chinatimes.com/wantdaily/11052101/112013031400146.html (accessed April 15, 2013); Chito Romana, “Does China Want to Be Top Superpower?” ABC News, March 2, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/china-replace-us-top-superpower/story?id=9986355 (accessed June 18, 2012). 92 Some further argue that PLA strategists’ outspoken claims are indicators showing that the PLA seems to dictate the decision-making of China’s policy concerning certain major foreign issues. See Bhaskar Roy, “Readjusting China’s Foreign Policy,” SAAG Papers no. 3723 (2010), http://www. southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3723.html (accessed June 18, 2012). 93 For instance, General Luo and General Yin are guest commentators on news talks show “Focus Today” and “Global Watch.” Their comments are widely studied and quoted by both Chinese and foreign scholars. 94 For example, they are active advocates of a more hardliner Chinese position on maritime territorial disputes with neighbouring countries and the independence of Taiwan.

61 opinions of the public and, subsequently, generating a new form of pressure on top leaders when they are making major policy decisions.95

Nevertheless, a problem of inter-agency coordination between the PLA and other civilian government organs can be observed. Structurally, the PLA reports directly to CMC and is not subordinate to the State Council or any other civilian branches in the bureaucratic system.96 Therefore, the Chinese military can enjoy a certain degree of freedom to undertake its favourite operations without the consent of other civilian government organs, an autonomy which constantly leads to problematic inter-agency communications between the PLA and other government organs, the foreign ministry in particular. Even though the Foreign Affairs LSG has policy coordination functions and includes delegates of the PLA and MFA, the mechanism does not necessarily ensure functional policy coordination between these two organs.97 As Peking University Professor Wang Yizhou claims, in recent years, the Chinese navy’s military exercises in the waters beyond the first island chain have been mainly based on the military’s own agenda without sufficient advance coordination with MFA, which reveals a fact that inter-agency coordination in China is to a certain extent problematic.98

China’s Civilian Maritime Law Enforcement Forces

China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces have been playing an increasingly important role in the government’s endeavour to protect China’s

95 National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2012 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2012), 30-32. 96 Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” 72. Also see Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-military Relations,” in Chinese Civil-military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army, ed. Li Nan (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 25-39; You Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy: Unravelling Myths about the Military Role in Foreign Policy Making,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 236-254. 97 National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2012, 28. 98 Wang Yizhou, Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2011), 102-103.

62 maritime territory and resources in recent years. Albeit China’s “five dragons” are responsible for patrolling China’s claimed waters, CMS and FLEC have played particularly significant roles in recent maritime disputes between China and regional claimants. 99 On the other hand, Maritime Police and GAC are seldom involved in maritime disputes given their limited capability to undertake law enforcement operations in disputed waters away from home.100 Additionally, even though MSA possesses several large patrol vessels, it is concerned mainly with the safety of seaborne transportation and port control.101

Even if CMS and FLEC are subordinate to SOA and Agriculture Ministry respectively, their duties are quite overlapped. The main missions of CMS are defending China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), maritime crime fighting, maritime search and rescue, and conducting research into marine resources and geography. 102 With similar duties, FLEC is in charge of safeguarding China’s claimed waters and EEZ, regulating the domestic fishing industry, protecting and rescuing Chinese fishers, and expelling foreign vessels fishing in the waters claimed by China.103 Also, both agencies have three regional branches in charge of law enforcement operations in different areas of China’s coastal waters: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Additionally, both agencies initiated regular patrol operations in China’s coastal waters in the late 1990s and early 2000s.104 It is clear that, in terms of duties and areas of responsibility, to a large degree, CMS and FLEC had conducted the same job.

99 Lin-Jian Huang, “Defend the Senkaku Islands,” Defence International, no. 315 (2010):38-39; Samantha Hoffman, “Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Rising amid Scarborough Standoff,” China Brief 12, no. 9 (2012): 14-15; Hu Ben, Wulu Zhuhou Jingzhu Zhongguo Haishang Guanliquan [Five Vassals Compete for the Authority to Manage China’s Maritime Affairs], http://club.china.com/data/thread/1011/2718/19/28/4_1.html (accessed May 6, 2011). 100 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 13. 101 Huang, “Defend the Senkaku Islands,” 38-39. However, MOT has had a significant role in the making of China decision to dispatch naval escort taks forces to Somalia. See Chapter 7. 102 See SinoDefence, “China Maritime Surveillance (CMS),” March 14, 2009, http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/marine-surveillance/default.asp (accessed January 10, 2013). 103 See SinoDefence “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command,” March 14, 2009, http://www.si nodefence.com/navy/fisheries/fisheries-law-enforcement.asp (accessed January 10, 2013). 104 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 478-483.

In 2013, a reconstruction of SOA was carried out by the State Council to solve the longstanding problem of the duties of China’s diverse civilian maritime law enforcement organs overlapping. According to the reconstruction plan, while still being supervised by MLR, the reconstructed SOA integrates the functions of CMS, FLEC, the Maritime Police and GAC. In addition, a new organ “Maritime Police Bureau (MPB)” is instituted under SOA. MPB’s patrol vessels are painted white with blue stripe and the wording “Chinese Coast Guard (CCG).” According to the State Council, the development of CCG is aimed at “solving the problems of low efficiency in maritime law enforcement, improving the protection and use of oceanic resources, and better safeguarding the country’s maritime rights and interests.” 105 The reconstruction of SOA was part of institutional reform launched by Xi Jinping in 2013.

However, despite the fact that the newly reconstructed SOA aims to unify China’s loosely coordinated maritime law enforcement forces, this institutional reform is still far from accomplished. Firstly, even if the administrative authority of SOA is enhanced significantly, no mention is made of whether MSA, another “dragon” under MOT, will be placed under SOA’s control. 106 It seems that MSA has been excluded from the 2013 reform and whether there will be another round of institutional reform to integrate it with SOA is unknown. Secondly, while CCG is subordinate to SOA, at the same time, it comes under the supervision of MPS for actual law enforcement operations. As the complicated “leadership relationship” and “professional/business relationship” still exists, how China can effectively coordinate its competing agencies remains unclear.107

105 Xinhua News, “China to Restructure Oceanic Administration, Enhance Law Enforcement,” March 10, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132221768.htm (accessed May 15, 2013). 106 Lyle J. Morris, “Taming Five Dragons? China Consolidates Its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,” China Brief 13, no. 7 (2013): 8. 107 Zou, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Security,” 2.

2.4.2 Marginal Policy Actors

CCP Publicity Department

The CCP Publicity Department, also known as the Propaganda Department, is an internal division of the Communist Party. As its name suggests, the Publicity Department’s main mission is to propagandise and publicise information. Domestically, it is responsible for propagating the ideology of socialism and upholding the legitimacy of the CCP regime while, internationally, it seeks to articulate China’s foreign policy and the nature of its “soft power.”108 In addition, this department has a direct leadership role in the Chinese media control system as it supervises several official news agencies, such as the Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV), People’s Daily and the party’s theory journal “Seek Truth” (qiu shi). In recent years, following its directives, the Xinhua News Agency and CCTV have become two of the main actors in publicising and clarifying Chinese policies to the public.109

Apart from publicising and clarifying policies, the Publicity Department constantly exerts its influence on China’s policy-making through its controlled media. With its widespread global network, the Xinhua News Agency is one of the most important providers of primary information presented to the Chinese decision makers when considering issues relevant to maritime security policy. It issues a classified publication called “Reference Materials (cankao ziliao)” which is a collection of daily reports from foreign newspapers and journals globally.110 In practice, Xinhua’s local branches overseas collect raw materials for this publication on a daily basis. These raw materials are subsequently translated and edited in

108 Ching-Chang Hsiao and Timothy Cheek, “Open and Close Media: External and Internal Newspapers in the Propaganda System,” in Decision-making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 76- 78; Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” 84. 109 Lai and Kang, “Domestic Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 305. 110 Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 53.

Beijing.111 Although the exact circulation of the “Reference Materials” is unknown, they are passed on to top CCP leaders and relevant foreign policy makers through bureaucratic channels within the government, providing the timely information CCP decision makers require.112

State-owned Enterprises

Even though Chinese businesses are not frontline actors regarding China’s foreign policy, some large Chinese SOEs are involved in the decision-making process to a certain extent given their extensive overseas activities. In the case of China’s maritime security policy, the roles of China’s national oil companies (NOCs), including China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), are observed given their investments in oil fields located on the seabed in disputed seas.113 CNPC and Sinopec are the largest and second- largest NOCs in China respectively, with the former accounting for more than two-thirds of China’s crude oil production and the latter controlling more than half China’s refining capacity.114 In addition, despite its relatively smaller business scale, CNOOC is specialised in offshore oil exploitation. Structurally, heads of large NOCs, such as CNPC and Sinopec are normally accorded vice-ministerial rank in the political hierarchy. These companies are also the primary contributors to the Chinese

111 Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supra-ministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” 53. 112 Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China, 118-119. 113 Some Chinese state-owned shipbuilding companies also played some marginal roles in the policy-making process for China’s aircraft carrier program. More analysis of this issue will be made in Chapter 6. 114 Zhao Suisheng, “China’s Global Search for Energy Security,” in China’s International Relations in Asia, ed. Mingjiang Li (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 124.

66 government’s annual tax revenue. As a result, heads of these oil companies can enjoy political prestige comparable with those of Chinese ministries.115

In terms of the roles played by these oil conglomerates in issues relevant to China’s maritime security policy, they have not only advocated for a more powerful navy to protect China’s imported energy but also contributed to the search for supply and logistic networks for the Chinese naval fleets’ counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. 116 In addition, these NOCs have played increasingly important roles in China’s maritime disputes in recent years. In particular, CNOOC’s role is most salient given that it has the capacity for both research and deep-water drilling which helps it undertake more drilling projects far away from the Chinese coastline.117 In fact, CNOOC’s drilling projects in disputed areas in the East and South China Seas have caused diplomatic frictions between China and neighbouring countries. For instance, in March 2012, CNOOC’s announcement of a new batch of oil-exploration blocks inside the Vietnam-claimed EEZ subsequently led to a spat between Beijing and Hanoi. 118 CNOOC’s controversial drilling projects in disputed eaters may further deteriorate the stressful situation in the South China Sea region, especially if it creates more deepwater drilling projects in disputed areas.

Local Authorities

The economic reform has reshaped the central-local relationship in China and made local governments, especially those on the coastal provinces, more interested

115 Erica S. Downs, Energy Security Series: China (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006), 22. 116 Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (2011): 66. Also see Chapter 7. 117 For instance, CNOOC initiated the research of deepwater drilling in 2006. 118 Bloomberg News, “Vietnam Says CNOOC’s South China Sea Bids Violate Territory,” March 16, 2012,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-16/vietnam-says-cnooc-s-south-china-sea-bids-viol ate-territory-1-.html (accessed June 1, 2012).

67 in economic liberalisation and the promotion of trade relations with foreign governments or companies. 119 This therefore has led to local governments’ increasing interest in China’s foreign affairs. In particular, the bureaucratic bargaining among ministries and local governments has been prevailing since the 1990s.120

There are various channels through which local governments can pass their opinions or preferences on to the top decision makers. The best channel is the meetings of CCP Politburo and PSC. For instance, provincial leaders hold 10 of 25 seats in the 17th CCP Politburo and 2 of 9 seats in the PSC.121 In addition to having direct access to top CCP leaders, local leaders constantly participate in bureaucratic bargaining and relevant policy debates in meetings of the CCP Central Committee, the NPC and the CPPCC. In addition, the CCP government occasionally convenes special conference to seek consensus among various government agencies on certain major foreign issues, such as the 2006 CCP Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs. Provincial governors and party secretaries were invited to attend this noted congregation, along with all the members of the CCP Politburo, central government ministers, approximately 60 Chinese ambassadors, officials from key SOEs and senior Chinese military generals.122

119 Chen Zhimin, “Coastal Provinces and China’s Foreign Policy Making, in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 190-192; Yang Deshan and Su Haizhou, Zhongguo Gongchandang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Minzhu Zhengzhi Jianshe [Chinese Communist Party and China’s Contemporary Democracy Development] (Beijing: CCP Party History Publishing House, 2008), 194-195. Also see Li Mingjiang, “Local Liberalism: China’s Provincial Approaches to Relations with Southeast Asia,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 275-293. 120 Gong Li, Honghua Men and Dongfang Sun, “Zhongguo Waijiao Juece Jizhi bianqian yanjiu [Study on the Development of Chinese Foreign Policy-making Mechanism],” in Xin Zhingguo Waijiao Liushinian [China’s New Diplomacy, 1949-2009], ed. Zhao Jinjun (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), 265. 121 Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratisation (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 86. Two of the 17th PSC members were Xi Jinping (Shanghai Municipality) and Li Keqiang (Liaoning Province). 122 For more information on this conference, see Bonnie S. Glaser, “Ensuring the ‘Go abroad’ Policy Serves China’s Domestic Priorities,” China Brief 7, no. 5 (2007), http://www.asianresearch.org/artic les/3010.html (accessed June 19, 2012).

Local governments in Chinese coastal areas have their particular development agendas and their own maritime resource exploitation projects. They also supervise local maritime law enforcement organs, such as provincial fishery departments. Due to the fragmentation of authority in China, provincial governments enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. Having administrative strength, autonomy and the incentives to conduct maritime activities, they are inclined to adopt an “act first, ask questions later” principle when making decisions.123 For instance, in recent years the Guangdong and Hainan provincial governments have been eager to develop local fishing industry due to the depleted marine resources in China’s coastal waters. They encourage local fishers to reduce near-sea fishing activities and do deep-sea fishing in the disputed waters off the Paracel and Spratly Islands instead. To facilitate this policy, these governments have undertaken a serious of actions, including sending more local patrol vessels to protect local fishing vessels in the South China Sea.124

Albeit local fishers have been benefited from this new policy, Chinese fishing activities in this disputed region on the other hand may have some negative impacts on regional stability. For instance, in late 2013, the government of Hainan Province issued controversial fishing regulations covering not only the disputed waters off the Paracel Islands but also international waters in the South China Sea over which China has no legal jurisdiction. As Carlyle Thayer claims, the Hainan provincial government has attempted to “expand legal jurisdiction over waters for which China does not have entitlement to under international law. The new regulations provide a licence to hunt, board and seize the cargo of fishing vessels and survey ships operating legally in international waters. This could be viewed as an act of state piracy.” 125

123 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 22. 124 Ibid. 125 Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: Hainan Province All at Sea,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 10, 2014, 2.

Chinese Academic Institutes

Not only has the number of academic institutes in China increased but also has their influence on China’s foreign and security policy-making since the 1980s.126 Some of them are government funded while others enjoy greater freedom from the government’s financial control.127 In terms of China’s think tanks related to foreign and maritime security policy, China Academy of Social Science (CASS), Chinese Institute for International Studies (CIIS), Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) and China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) are the most prestigious institutes. CASS is a ministerial-level agency under the supervision of the State Council and is China’s supreme academic institute for study in the field of social sciences. CIIS, formerly known as Institute of International Relations, is MFA’s think tank while CICIR is bureaucratically subordinated to CCP Foreign Affairs LSG as well as under the administrative control of Ministry of State Security. 128 CIISS is affiliated with the military as it has direct links with the Defence Ministry and the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD)129 while CIMA is SOA’s subordinate research institute.130

In addition, research centres in Chinese universities have also been playing greater roles given that some university academics are now invited to join the process of policy deliberation. 131 For instance, Peking University’s School of International Studies is one of Chinese influential academic institutes as it is

126 David L. Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” The China Quarterly no. 171 (2002): 575; Bondiguel and Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” 9. 127 In particular, Murray Tanner argues that since the 1990s, the “third generation of Chinese think tanks” have become more independent and market-oriented. For more discussion, see Murray S. Tanner, “Changing windows on a Changing China: The Evolving ‘Think Tank’ System and the Case of the Public Security Sector,” The China Quarterly no. 171 (2002): 559-574. 128 Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks,” 581-582. 129 Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 124. 130 See CIMA’s official webpage: http://www.cima.gov.cn/_d270421662.htm. 131 Author’s interviews in Beijing, November 7 and 24, 2011; Author’s interview in Qingdao, November 19, 2011.

70 headed by Wang Jisi, a well-known scholar and advisor to the State Council.132 Another influential think tank outside Beijing is Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). This institute serves both MFA and local municipal government.133 While the staff number of SIIS is relatively smaller that of SIIS’ counterparts in Beijing, its research quality is higher.134

Due to the increasing number of Chinese academic institutes in the past twenty years, these institutes have been more actively competing for influence on the policy makers than previously. 135 In the meantime, there has been a clear division in perspectives on China’s policy among government-funded think tanks given their diverse institutional preferences. This situation implies that scholars from these institutes, like other government officials, have to compete with one another for more budgetary funds and prestige. In particular, the division between the military think tanks and civilian institutes is salient. 136 For instance, in comparison with the position of civilian think tanks, institutes with military backgrounds have taken a more hawkish stance on various issues, such as the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the impact of the US.-Japan alliance on China’s maritime interests in the western Pacific.137

In terms of how Chinese academic institutes can influence policy outcomes, there are two main approaches. The first approach is personal influence. Some individual Chinese scholars have personal influences on the policy process at the peak level of the authority given that top decision makers would consult them, formally or informally, when making major decisions. For instance, former Chinese President Hu Jintao constantly invited several foreign affairs experts from

132 Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making Processes under Hu Jintao,” 86. 133 National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA’s World Directory of Think Tanks, 2005, http://www.nira.or.jp/past/ice/nwdtt/2005/DAT/1071.html (accessed April 3, 2013). 134 Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” 593-594. 135 Bonnie S. Glaser and Philip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly no. 171 (2002): 602. 136 Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan, 139-140. 137 Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes,” 602; Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan, 131-134.

71 universities and research institutes to participate in small and close door meetings to access government foreign and security policy.138 The CASS’s serving president, Wang Weiguang, also has personal channels to President Xi Jinping. 139 Furthermore, SIIS is believed to be one of the institutes which can influence top leaders in Beijing because it is headed by Yang Jiemian, the brother of Yang Jiechi, currently state councillor and director of the CCP Foreign Affairs LSG office.140

The second approach used by scholars in Chinese think tanks to pass their opinions on to decision makers is providing research reports. As Zhao Quansheng argues, “there are long-established channels through which scholars may submit research papers and notes for policy recommendation to various levels of policy makers, including, from time to time, the top leaders.”141 These reports are not only platforms for intellectual-government communications but also important reference materials for the top CCP leaders. Regarding reports from academic institutes on maritime security issues, CIMA publishes a series of regular ones, such as “China’s Ocean Development Report” and “Report on China’s Maritime Law Enforcement.” In particular, these reports not only highlight the strategic implications of ocean for China’s economic interests and national security but also emphasise the achievements of SOA patrol operations and the necessity to develop a stronger maritime law enforcement force.142 Publishing these reports has helped SOA obtain

138 A good example is former Vice President of CCP Party School Zheng Bijian’s “peaceful rise” theory. Zheng is believed to be a close associate and advisor of Hu Jintao. See Wu-Tien Rong, “Dui Hu Jintao Zhongyao Zhinang Zheng Bijian Fangtai De Qiwang [Expectations of Hu Jintao’s Primary Brain Master Zheng Bijian’s Visit to Taiwan],” United Daily, November 10, 2009, http://blog.udn.com/rong3827/3478347 (accessed June 17, 2011); Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology for Foreign Policy-making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of Peaceful Rise,” The China Quarterly no. 190 (2007): 291-310. 139 Radio Free Asia, “Sheke Yuanzhang Weihe Shi Wang Weiguang [Why Is Wang Weiguang the President of CASS],” May 2, 2013, http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/yehuazhongnanhai/m050 2gx-05022013101335.html (accessed January 7, 2014). 140 China Review News, “Zhongguo Zhiku Fabu 2020 ZhongguoYafei Zhanlue [Chinese Think Tank Publishes China’s Asian-African Strategy of 2020],” January 7, 2009, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crnwebapp/mag/docDetail.jsp?coluid=26&docid=100851067&pa ge=1 (accessed June 18, 2011). 141 Zhao, “Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy,” 127. 142 See State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2012 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2012); State Oceanic Administration, 2010 Report on China’s Maritime Law Enforcement,” http://www.soa.gov.cn/soa/hygb/xzgb/webinfo/2011/05/1304230574019625.htm (accessed May 20, 2012).

72 more bargaining chips in the decision-making process as CIMA, based on its professionalised knowledge and expertise, can act as an important provider of valuable information required by decision makers.

In summary, with their professionalised experiences and knowledge, think thank experts can negotiate with other government officials or persuade decision makers to undertake policies they favour. On the other hand, it is worth noting that even though Chinese academic institutes currently have a greater capacity to influence CCP’s decision makers, there are still significant differences between academic and policy-oriented positions.143 This could lead to more debates over disputed issues and cause the decision-making process to become more protracted or even never-ending.

Public Media and Chinese Netizens

Analysing the intertwined relationship between public opinion and policymakers, Stuart Soroka argues that it is general practice around the world that “the mass media are the primary conduit between the public and policy makers. Policy makers follow media reports on public opinion, and the media are the public’s chief source of information on what policy makers are doing.”144 Such type of correlated interactions can also be observed in the policy-making process in China, albeit the CCP government is an authoritarian regime. On the one hand, the Chinese government today still imposes strict control over public media and internet. Government officials also manipulate the nationalistic public opinion as a bargaining chip when negotiating with their counterparts, either domestically or

143 Mark Beeson and Li Fujian, “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations,” Journal of contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012): 38. 144 Stuart N. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 8, no. 1 (2003): 28.

73 internationally.145 On the other hand, the distribution of the information has been no longer fully dominated by the CCP, the Chinese government’s decisions, to a certain extent, have been influenced by public media and Chinese netizens which have increasingly flourished in the past twenty years.146

In particular, the internet has become the most important platform for communication in China. The number of Chinese internet users has considerably been growing since the internet was firstly introduced to China in the mid-1990s. The first official statistic of Chinese internet users was issued in 1997. In that year, the number of Chinese netizens was about 620,000. This number reached to 220 million in 2008, making China the world’s largest internet user, with the United States in second place.147 Since mid-2013, China’s online population has surpassed 600 million and is expected to rapidly expand in the near future.148 Such a rapid change in the dynamics of communication in China not only makes it more difficult for the government to control public opinion but also provides interests groups and individuals with a good platform for influencing one another.149

Identical to political leaders in other countries, top Chinese leaders must seek support from the public. They understand that public opinion can be used as a good tool for supporting the government or vice versa.150 Therefore, CCP leaders have been forced to be more sensitive to public opinion when making major policy decisions, even though this does not mean that they are unconditionally obliged to follow it. 151 For instance, nowadays, nationalistic sentiments supporting the

145 Zhao Suisheng, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 537-538. 146 Lucian Lu, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Age of the Internet,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 112-113. Also see Wang Jianwei and Wang Xiaojie, “Media and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 216-235. 147 Qi, Yingxiang Zhongguo Waijiao Juece De Wuda Yingsu, 244. 148 Xinhua News, “China Has World’s Largest New Media Market,” May 15, 2013, http://english.sina.com/china/2013/0514/590709.html (accessed January 7, 2014). 149 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 41. 150 Yu Yanmin, “The Role of the Media: A Case Study of China’s Media Coverage of the U.S. War in Iraq,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 84-85. 151 Ibid.

74 development of a stronger navy and a tougher government stance against foreigners who violate China’s maritime territory are prevailing over TV and radios programs and the internet. Consequently, when making decisions relevant to China’s maritime disputes with foreign countries or operations of the People’s Liberation Navy (PLAN), decision makers need to pay additional attention to how the Chinese audience sees these disputes and how the government should respond to the public.

In terms of the methods the Chinese government uses to access opinions of the public, the simplest way is monitoring them. For instance, one important job for officials in the foreign ministry is to collect daily commentaries from TV programs or China’s leading online forums. Information collected from the media is regarded by MFA officials as important references for their deliberations on policy recommendations to be sent to their superiors. 152 In addition to government bureaucrats, senior CCP official are also willing to go online to obtain general opinions on both domestic and foreign issues.153 For example, in a CCP Politburo group study session in early 2007, Hu Jintao concluded that the internet has made a considerable contribution to the development of inter-personal communication in China and requested the government to make the internet a new platform for public service.154 Moreover, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao also opened their personal online dialogue forums to the public in 2003, believing that such inter-personal communication is a useful way to understand what the Chinese people think and desire. 155 Until mid-2013, more than 31 senior government officials at the ministerial level have opened their personal online blogs. Even though these political leaders may not have enough time to manage these blogs personally,

152 Qi, Yingxiang Zhongguo Waijiao Juece De Wuda Yingsu, 245-246. 153 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Super Power (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 100. 154 For Hu Jintao’s full remarks, see http://www.12371.cn/special/lnzzjjtxx/. 155 Liu Yujing, “Hu Jintao Kaitong Wanglu Minyi Zhitongche [Hu Jintao Opened His Online Dialogue Forum],” China News, June 22, 2008, http://www.chinanews.com/hr/hwbz/news/2008/06- 22/1288973.shtml (accessed June 20, 2011).

75 public opinion is still an important source of information to which CCP leaders refer when making decisions. 156

The influence of public media and Chinese netizens on Chinese leaders’ decision-making is evident, especially when Beijing is dealing with some diplomatic crisis with foreign nations. The 2001 EP-3 incident is a good example. This incident was a mid-air collision between a PLAN-J8 fighter and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft about 110 km away from the Hainan Island on April 1, 2001. The Chinese J-8 pilot was killed in the incident.157To avoid a repeat of China-U.S. confrontation over the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade which significantly spoiled bilateral trade, the Chinese government’s initial response to this incident was quite low-keyed and the top CCP leaders wished to solve this issue as soon as possible.158 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of this incident, there was a landslide of anti-American opinions posted online. U.S. government websites were hacked and major Chinese online forums were flooded with postings criticising America’s barbarian behaviours.159 One China’s leading online forum “Forum on a Stronger China (Qiangguo Luntan),” for example, had more than 800 postings on this issue in first two days. 160 In response to the nationalistic Chinese sentiment, the Chinese leaders changed their initial stance on the crisis and outlined several hardline principles of managing this incident on April 4.161 One of these principles were “you apologise; we release the crew (ni

156 China Review News, “Zhonggong Lingdaoren Pinfan Chuwang [Chinese Communist Party Leaders Constantly Keep in Touch with the Internet],” June 25, 2013, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1025/ 9/7/3/102597360.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102597360 (accessed January 3, 2014). 157 Shirley A. Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessment and Policy Implications,” CRS Report for Congress no. RL30946 (2001):1; James Mulvenon, “Civil-military and the EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis,” China Leadership Monitor no. 1 (2002): 2. 158 Wu Xinbo, Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 16; Paul H. Godwin, “Decision-making under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China’s Belgrade Embassy and the EP-3 Collision,” in Chinese National Security: Decision-making under Stress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 176. 159 Wang Jun, Cyber Nationalism and China’s Foreign Affairs (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2011), 54. 160 Lu, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Age of the Internet,” 116. 161 Epoch Times, “Beijing Shuo Juebu Xiang Meiguo Shiruo [Beijing Claims It Never Concedes the Americans its Rights],” April 4, 2001, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/1/4/4/n72576.htm (accessed December 18, 2011).

76 daoqian; wo fangren).”162 Clearly, Chinese netizens’ nationalistic sentiment to a certain extent reduced moderate policy options for the top leaders and forced them to make a hawkish position against Americans.163

The interaction between China’s netizens and policy makers can be also observed from online forums discussing the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. For instance, in April 2004, the friction between China and Japan over their sovereignty claims of the Diaoyu Islands ignited massive anti-Japan nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese netizens. Nationalistic commentaries prevailed over Chinese online forums and blogs which demanded a more hardline government stance against the Japanese. In response to nationalistic Chinese netizens, the Chinese government was forced to replace its initial low-keyed position with a tougher tone towards Japan.164 As a matter of fact, Chinese netizens’ xenophobic sentiment has repeatedly been aroused should there be new rounds of territorial disputes between China and other foreign countries in the past few years. Nationalistic public opinion imposes a certain degree of pressure on the Chinese decision makers when they deliberate how the government should properly act in respond to its nationalistic netizens.165

In short, the implications of the burgeoning public media and netizens for the decision-making in China are twofold. On the one hand, nationalism sometimes facilitates the government’s efforts to unite the Chinese people and consolidate CCP’s political legitimacy. Government agencies are also good at manipulating Chinese netizens’ nationalistic sentiment and make it a useful tool to quest for

162 Michael D. Swaine, Tuosheng Zhang and Danielle Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 396-397. 163 Li Wanlai, “Zhonggong Heping Yu Duikang Zhengce Fanfu Xianxian Neibu Quanli Weiding [An Oscillation between Policies of Peace and Confrontation: Manifestation of Power Instability within Chinese Communist Party],” Epoch Times, May 17, 2001, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/1/5/17/n8 9689.htm (accessed January 8, 2012). 164 Hong Junhao, “The Internet and China’s Foreign Policy Making: The Impact of Online Public Opinions as a New Societal Force,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 100-101. 165 Ibid., Wang, Cyber Nationalism and China’s Foreign Affairs, 208-209; Lu, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Age of the Internet,” 115-117.

77 more bureaucratic interests. However, if nationalistic public opinion goes extreme, it could also push the decision makers into a difficult situation: whether to undertake hawkish actions at the expense of national interests in the long run or not. With the rapid development of China’s comprehensive national power, especially its military power, it would be more likely to see new waves of nationalist sentiment desiring a more powerful status of China in the world. This could easily impose great pressure on Chinese policy makers. As Susan Shirk summarises, “the CCP’s ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time as the country’s military capabilities are improving. And these two trends combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China’s honour.”166

2.5 Concluding Remarks

The fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority has caused a significant influence on China’s policy-making process. Even though top CCP leaders still enjoy ultimate political power, a structural division of authority below the peak of the political hierarchy is prominent, making inter-agency competition and bureaucratic bargaining salient characteristics of the formulation of Chinese policies. In practice, top leaders usually try to avoid making a clear or specific decision at once but instead give the subordinates a broad policy guideline for further consultation. Reaching a consensus among government agencies generally requires rounds of bureaucratic bargaining among an array of competing government officials. The incentives of the bureaucratic bargaining come from diverse individual interests of policy actors which do not directly report to one another. Consequently, the impacts of a fragmented structure of authority on policy outcomes are evident: policies could be made slowly, inconsistently, and against the original directive of a policy guideline.

166 Shirk, China: Fragile Super Power, 104.

The making of China’s maritime security policy also shares the same nature as its decision-making process concerns negotiations and competitions among various state or non-state policy actors. Some of them play more significant roles while others play as marginal actors in the policy process. Even though the CCP Politburo and PSC control the supreme power of decision-making, top Chinese decision makers still need to consult and cooperate with their subordinates, providing Chinese bureaucrats more advantage to influence the final policy outcomes. The economic reform has provided some non-traditional foreign policy makers with more incentives and opportunities to exert their influences on the making of China’s maritime security policy, even though the pursuit of individual may at times leads to more frictions between China and foreign countries. Finally, as China has entered the information age in the 1990s, more non-state players, such as public media and Chinese netizens have somewhat exerted their influences on the decision-making process. In particular, thriving Chinese netizens’ nationalistic sentiment is at times good tool for both Chinese leaders and bureaucrats to win more public support while may possibly make it difficult for them to formulate adequate policies.

CHAPTER THREE

The Evolution of China’s Maritime Security Policy

This chapter provides a discussion of the overall development of China’s maritime security policy since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It sets the context for the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 4 to 7. In particular, it aims to answer the following questions: What are the factors contributing to the evolution of China’s maritime security policy under different generations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership? What are the key features of this policy under different CCP leaders? What changes in its legal regulations and organisational arrangement are relevant to the protection of its maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters? What challenge has the Chinese government had encountered?

This chapter argues that, in general, the nature of China’s maritime security policy can be characterised by four features under the leadership of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao respectively. In Mao’s era, it was subordinate to protecting China’s interior security and political struggles. In Deng’s years, it served the goal of economic reform. In Jiang’s era, while protecting China’s maritime frontier became one of its key tasks for national development, efforts to fulfil this goal were still subject to some other major security concerns, such as the Taiwan issue. Not until Hu’s era did the Chinese government fully devote itself to expand its power seaward. Additionally, although the evolution of China’s maritime security policy during the past six decades shows that the strategic significance of the ocean has been rapidly increasing, how the Chinese government can cope with the problem of lack of functional inter-agency coordination remains a thorny issue for today’s CCP leadership under Xi Jinping.

This chapter consists of six sections in chronological order. From Sections 3.1 to 3.4, it makes a detailed analysis of the evolution of China’s maritime security policy under the four generations of CCP leadership since 1949: the early years of the PRC under the paramount leader Mao Zedong, the era of Deng Xiaoping and economic reform, Jiang Zemin’s time during the 1990s, and Hu Jintao’s China in the 21st century. In Section 3.5, the latest development in relation to China’s maritime security policy after Xi Jinping took office in late 2012 is addressed; and, finally, section 3.6 provides a short conclusion.

3.1 The Early Years of the PRC under Mao Zedong

Prior to discussing China’s maritime security policy in the early years of the PRC, this section firstly makes a brief review of China’s continental culture as it deeply influenced the Chinese leaders’ strategic thinking for thousands of years, including during Mao’s era. As a longstanding continental power the civilisation of which was cultivated around its inland alluvial plains along the Yellow River, ancient Chinese regimes seldom paid attention to the ocean, believing that the country was the centre of the world. 1 Additionally, Chinese emperors focused primarily on the integrity of the Chinese empire. They spent a great deal of resources on land warfare against nomads in northern and central Asia. These nomads included Xianbei (4th century BCE to 6th century AD), Huns (3rd century BCE to 1st century AD), Qidan (4th-12th century AD), Tujue (5th-10th century AD), Dangxiang (8th-13th century AD), Nuzhen (11th-13th century AD) and Manchu (16th-17th century AD) etc.2 Consequently, governments of ancient dynasties, such as the Qin, Han, Tang, Song and Yuan did not undertake any outstanding maritime

1 For more on the history of China’s maritime heritage, see Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 15-32; Zhang Shiping, Zhongguo Haiquan [Chinese Sea Power] (Beijing: People’s Daily Press), 116-121; Yu Xuebiao, ed., Haiquan: Liyi Yu Weixie De Shuangrenjian [Maritime Power: Interest and Threat − A Double-edged Sword] (Beijing: Hai Chao Press, 2008), 217-223. 2 For more on China’s military history, see David A. Graff and Robin Higham, ed., A Military History of China (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2012).

81 expeditions or naval campaigns. Even though naval engagements did occur, they took place mainly on rivers, lakes and China’s coastal waters.3

The period from 1405 to 1433 is widely regarded as the high point of maritime expeditions in ancient China.4 Endorsed by the Ming Dynasty’s Emperor Yungle, Admiral Zheng He initiated seven naval campaigns off the Chinese coastline. His voyages, consisting of more than 27,000 men, visited several littoral states in Southeast Asia, India, the Persian Gulf and East Africa.5 Nevertheless, the glory of Admiral Zheng’s unprecedented expeditions did not last for long given the lack of support from Emperor Yungle’s successors who reaffirmed the ideal of insulation and shelved maritime contacts and expeditions.6 Two hundred years later, in 1644, the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty replaced the Ming Dynasty as China’s ruling regime. However, despite this change of rulers, the continent-orientated mindset remained.7

Not until the invasion of the Western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, a period regarded by China as the “century of humiliation,”8 was China’s destiny

3 In 1274 and 1281, the Mongolian Emperor Kublai Khan organised two naval campaigns against Japan, first with 23,000 men and later with 140,000 men. Nevertheless, these two invasions failed and the Mongols lost up to 75% of their troops. For more on these naval campaigns, see George Samson, A History of Japan to 1334 (London: Cresset Press, 1958), 442-449. 4 Yuan-Kang Wang, “Managing Regional Hegemony in Historical Asia: The Case of Early Ming China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 2 (2012): 129-153; Edward L. Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty 1405-1433 (New York: Longman, 2007); Shi Ping, Zheng He Shidai De Zhongguo Haiquan [China’s Maritime Power in Zheng He’s Era] (Kunming: Chenguang Press, 2005); Andrew R. Wilson, “The Maritime Transformation of Ming China,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 249-251. 5 Ji Guoxing, Zhongguo De Haiyang Anquan He Haiyu Guanxia [China’s Maritime Security and Maritime Jurisdiction] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press, 2009), 14; Shi, Zheng He Shidai De Zhongguo Haiquan, 32-34. 6 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 3-4. 7 John K. Fairbank, “Introduction: Maritime and Continental in China’s History,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, Republican China, 1912-1949, pt. 1, ed. John K. Fairbank and Dennis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 18-19. 8 In China, this terminology is normally used to portray China’s miserable experience of ceding its territory and sovereignty rights to Western imperialists during the period between 1840 (the 1st Opium War) and 1949 (the foundation of the PRC). The first use of this term dates back to the 1920s.

82 drastically altered as it provided China with an opportunity to revisit its enduring continent-orientated strategic thinking. Nevertheless, both the Qing and Republic of China (ROC) governments still missed the window of opportunity to generate a more ocean-going mindset due to the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, the civil war among Chinese warlords in the 1910-1920s, the Japanese invasion in the 1930-1940s and the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists in the late 1940s.9

Even though China entered a new era in 1949, its continental culture still deeply influenced Mao Zedong and his revolutionary comrades. As a matter of fact, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was, in nature, a ground force. The victory of CCP’s “long march” campaign and the Chinese 1947-1949 civil war can be attributed to army soldiers. As Bernard Cole argues, “the Communists’ victory in 1949 was an army victory, not a navy one.” 10 Additionally, Mao’s strategic thinking still highlighted the notions of a “people’s war” and “luring the enemy in deep” which were continent-orientated in nature.11 Therefore, even though Mao Zedong pointed out in the early 1950s the importance of the ocean for China’s development and national security and expressed his expectations of having a stronger naval force to build a wall at the sea (haishang changcheng),12 he was still deeply influenced by China’s continental culture.

Apart from its cultural tradition, two additional factors influenced the development of China’s maritime security policy during Mao’s era. The first one

9 For more on China’s maritime heritage during the century of humiliation, see Bruce A. Elleman, “The Neglect and Nadir of Chinese Maritime Policy under the Qing,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 288-317; Shi Diansheng, “Zhongguo Jindai Haijun zhanlue Zhanshu Sixiang De Yanjin [The Revolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Doctrine in Modern Times],” Military History Research, no. 1 (2000): 122-129. Ju Hailong, The Strategy of Chinese Sea Power (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2010), 12-14. 10 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 7. 11 For more on the two notions, see Li Nan, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From Near Coast and Near Seas to Far Seas,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 146-147. 12 Gao Xinsheng, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 1949-2009 (Beijing: Shishi Publishing Press, 2010), 101-102; Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu: Xuji [The Memoir of Xiao Jinguang: Part II] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Publishing House, 1989), 2; Liu Zhongmin, World Maritime Politics and Ocean Development Strategy of China (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2009), 368-371.

83 was the external security environment. In the early years of the PRC, Beijing focused mainly on the protection of China’s southeast coastline which was constantly harassed by the ROC Navy’s small-scale naval raids.13 Even though the ROC government had fled to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek still constantly sent small groups of naval and amphibious forces to attack several small islands located off China’s southeast coastline. For instance, the Battle of Nanri Island in 1952 14 and the Battle of Dongshan Island in 1953 15 were two prominent experimental battles for Chiang Kai-Shek’s plan of counter-attack against mainland China. In the meantime, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 not only drastically changed China’s attitude towards cooperation between China and the United States but also, to a large degree, shifted its focus from the preparation for military confrontation against the ROC Navy to its involvement in the land warfare between the two Koreas.16

Albeit the Korean War had ended in 1953 and the ROC Navy had stopped sending naval force to harass the mainland’s eastern coast since the mid-1950s, threats to China’s security along its land borders never reduced. Instead, during the 1960-70s, the external security environment deteriorated again under several campaigns along China’s land borders.17 For examples, the Sino-Soviet split which began in the late 1950s and the Sino-Indian border conflicts over the disputed Himalayan border in 1962 substantially deteriorated Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian

13 Doug Thomas, “Warship Developments: The Chinese Navy,” Canadian Naval Review 5, no. 1 (2009), 38; Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Strategy,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 12 (2000): 2038. 14 For more on the 1952 Battle of Nanri Island, see Phoenix News, “Yijiu Wuer Nian Guojun Gongzhan Nanri Dao [ROC Navy Attacked Nanri Island in 1952],” March 25, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/history/phtv/dsy/detail_2013_03/25/23480231_0.shtml (accessed January 9, 2013). 15 For more on the 1953 Battle of Dongshan Island, see China Times, “Chenfeng De Dongshan Dao Zhanyi Zhenxiang [The True Story of the Dongshan Island Battle],” October 5, 2013, http://news.chinatimes.com/reading/1105130308/112013100500361.html (accessed January 9, 2013). 16 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 7-12. 17 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 43-46; David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 62-67; Bernard D. Cole, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” in People’s Liberation Army after Next, ed. Susan M. Puska (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 289.

84 relations. 18 Consequently, during much of the 1960-70s, the issues of solving disputes over the country’s north-western and south-western land borders constantly preoccupied Chinese leaders.

Another factor influencing the development of China’s maritime security policy in Mao’s era was the radicalisation of Chinese politics in the 1960 and 1970s which was shaped by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966- 1976)19 and the Gang of Four − Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen.20 Notably, the Cultural Revolution led to a more politicised and less professional Chinese military because the main task of the PLA at that time was to serve as Mao’s tool to consolidate his personal authority. For example, a newspaper article published by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) once claimed that “[t]he current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is advancing victoriously in the direction pointed out by Chairman Mao Zedong. We must be one with the masses and thoroughly expose, criticise, and repudiate the bourgeois line…… and resolutely defend the proletarian revolutionary line presented by Chairman Mao, in order to carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end.”21 Clearly, bolstering Mao’s political campaign was the main task of the PLAN.22

Influenced by China’s continental culture, the external strategic environment and domestic political power struggles, China’s maritime security policy in Mao’s era was, in general, at the service of land security and political struggles. In

18 Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), 187-209. 19 For more on Mao Zedong’s political campaign during the Culture Revolution, see Tsou Tang, The Culture Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Paul Clark, The Chinese Culture Revolution: A History (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Suzanne Ogden, China’s Unsolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture, 2nd ed. (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 48-58. 20 For more on the “Gang of Four” and the succession issue in the 1970s, see Jurgen Domes, “The Gang of Four and Hua Kuo-Feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76,” The China Quarterly no. 71 (1977): 473-497; James R. Townsend, Politics in China, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 165-167; 283-286. 21 Quoted in Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2001), 177. 22 Benjamin C. Ostrov, Conquering Resource: The Growth and Decline of the PLA’s Science and Technology Commission for Defence (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 36-37.

85 particular, it was characterised by three key features. Firstly, protecting China’s maritime frontier was in principle subordinate to securing the country’s land borders, as evidenced by the inferior bureaucratic status of the PLAN in comparison with the PLA ground force. As previously mentioned, the PLA was traditionally an army force. Even though the PLAN was officially established in May 1950, it was inferior to the ground force of the PLA during much of Mao’s era. The supremacy of the ground force can be observed from both the organisational structure of the PLAN and the formation of the naval commanders – early PLAN leaders were then mainly army generals. 23 As one observer has pointed out, “political thought with a strong continental mindset dominated military and strategic thinking, and the navy was considered to be an extension of the ground forces.”24 The PLAN neither attracted much attention from the political elites nor enjoyed the bureaucratic prestige which the ground force could take pleasure in.25 Defending China’s maritime frontier, a task for the PLAN, was logically serving the protection of China’s interior which was the PLA ground force’s primary mission.

The second feature of China’s maritime security policy in the 1950-1970s was its passive nature. This nature was due to China’s external environment during this period. In the early 1950s, given Chiang Kai-Shek’s plan of counter-attack against mainland China, China’s maritime security policy was developed mainly in response to the ROC Navy’s small-scale naval raids.26 It was unlikely that Beijing would undertake an ambitious policy to expand its power seaward. The deteriorating situation on China’s north-western and south-western land borders in the following two decades again prevented the Chinese government under Mao

23 Alexander Chieh-Cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defence Strategy: Conceptualisation and Capabilities,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (1994): 8; David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 15. 24 Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 71. 25 Ibid. 26 Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 1949-2009, 79. Also see Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and International Development (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Dept. of Intl. Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, ANU, 1998), 59-65.

86 from implementing and active or aggressive policy to secure its maritime frontier. As an alternative, how to better defend China’s land borders and build up a strong PLA ground force were higher prioritised tasks.27

Despite the passive nature of China’s maritime security policy during Mao’s years, there was still one notable naval campaign actively launched by China − the PLAN’s successful naval campaign against the ROC Navy-controlled islands off China’s eastern coast in 1954-1955 which is also known as the first Taiwan Strait crisis. After two failed attempts in late 1954, on 8 January 1955, the PLAN initiated the Battle of the Yijiangshan Islands. The strategic significance of the Yijiangshan Islands is evident. They lie thirty kilometres off the eastern coast of Zhejiang Province and control some important waterways in the region of Taizhou Bay. Moreover, they are also an outpost of the Dachen Islands, the headquarters of the ROC government’s 14,000-man counter-attack force (fangong jiuguojun) in eastern China. Supported by air cover and land-based artillery, the PLAN’s amphibious forces successfully secured these Taiwan-controlled islands after a two-day brutal battle.28 After the PLAN seized the Yijiangshan Islands, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to recall its naval force deployed in the Dachen Islands and other neighbouring features. In late February 1955, the ROC Navy lost its capability to initiate small-scale naval raids against China. 29 The Communists subsequently took all ROC-controlled islands in the Zhejiang area.30

27 Bernard D. Cole, “More Red than Expert: Chinese Sea Power during the Cold War,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 326- 327. 28 More than one thousand ROC soldiers were killed or captured. Some Chinese and Taiwanese historians call this battle as “the Chinese Battle of Iwo Jima.” 29 For more on the Yijiangshan Islands Battle and its impact on the ROC Navy’s deployment in East China Sea, see Yang Guihua, “Yijianshan Dao Denlu Zuozhan Jiqi Shengli De Yiyi Han Yingxiang [The Victory of the Battle of the Yijiangshan Islands and Its Implications],” People’s Daily, January 18, 2005, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/42964/3126070.html (January 9, 2013). 30 In addition to the Battle of the Yijiangshan Islands, a maritime skirmish took place between the PLAN and South Vietnamese navy in the Paracel Islands in January 1974. However, from Beijing’s point of view, the skirmish was not an active operation launched by the PLAN but a self-defence measure against South Vietnamese provocations. Additionally, in terms of the scale of battle and casualty, the 1974 Paracel Skirmish was much smaller than the Battle of the Yijiangshan Islands.

Thirdly, China’s maritime security policy in the early years of Mao Zedong was, at times, the victim of a power struggle between the radicals and moderates in CCP.31 For example, the proposal to develop the PLAN’s ocean-going capability was scrapped due to a struggle between the Gang of Four radicals and Deng Xiaoping and other CCP moderates. From the radicals’ point of view, Deng’s proposal was the moderates’ excuse for sustaining their political status and must be rejected. Following this logic, they accused Deng of making a “counter- revolutionary effort” to oppose Chairman Mao’s principle of maintaining the independence of Chinese technology as the moderates’ proposal was to develop China’s domestic industry by introducing foreign techniques and equipment. 32 Clearly, due to the radicalisation of Chinese politics in the 1960-1970s, policy- making was, to a large extent, left in the hands of “the reds” rather than experts.33 Not until the collapse of the Gang of Four in 1976 did Deng Xiaoping and his moderate CCP colleagues resume full political power and led China into the reform era. As one review of Chinese military development has pointed out, the modernisation of the PLAN was retarded for approximately two decades by China’s drastic political struggles.34

Given that China’s maritime security policy in Mao’s era was subject to internal security and political struggles, the development of relevant legal regulations and institutional arrangements was incomplete and slow. The first example is the adolescent legal regulations in relation to China’s seaborne affairs and maritime boundary. From 1950 to the mid-1970s, the Chinese government issued some legal regulations to enforce the rule of China’s maritime transportation,

31 Additionally, the development of China’s shipping and shipbuilding industry was also a debated issue between the CCP radicals and moderates. The inter-faction struggle considerably prevented China from making a clear policy regarding developing its shipbuilding industry. The development of this industry was consequently delayed. For more on this, see Yann-Huei Song, “Shipping and Shipbuilding Policies in PR China,” Marine Policy 14, no. 1 (1990): 60-63. 32 Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 271. 33 George Lauriat, China Shipping: The Great Leap Forward (Chichester, UK: Lloyd’s of London Press Limited, 1983), 88-89. 34 John R. O’Donnell, “An Analysis of Major Developmental Influences on the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Their Implication for the Future” (Masters diss., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 42.

88 exploitation, and management. These regulations included: the 1954 “Regulation of Port Management,” the 1961 “Common Rules for the Examination of Import and Export Maritime Goods,” the 1964 “Regulation of Managing Foreign Non-military Vessels passing through the Qiongzhou Strait,” and the 1974 “Temporary Regulation of the Control over Coastal and Marine Pollution” which dealt with the regulation of port controls and customs processing. 35 Even if these regulations formed the foundation of the Chinese legal framework, they were quite immature in terms of both quantity and quality.36

In terms of the delimitation of China’s maritime boundary, China formulated the “Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea” in 1958, the first official Chinese document regarding its claim on sea territory. 37 Based on this document, the Chinese government drew the baseline of Chinese territorial sea from the Yalu River (on the border between China and North Korea) in the north to Beilun River (on the border between China and Vietnam) in the south. 38 Nevertheless, this declaration only declared China’s position on its sea territory in principle while making no further detailed regulations or policies. For instance, while this document claimed China’s right to the South China Sea islands (the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands), it did not draw the baseline of them. 39 In addition, no subsequent legal documents regarding China’s maritime boundary was drawn up by the Chinese government during the remainder of Mao’s era, once again, indicating that maritime affairs was considered by the CCP government under Mao Zedong to be a secondary issue.

35 Gan Yanping and Liu Xiaowei, Haiyang Quanyi Yu Zhongguo [Maritime Rights and China] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 148. 36 Jin Yongming, Study on the Ocean Issues vol. 1 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 368. 37 Li Baiqi and Quan Yongbo, ed., Lanse Guotu De Guanli Zhidu [Managerial System of the Blue Territory] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2008), 91. 38 For more on the declaration, see Guo Yuan, “Issuing the Declaration of the Territorial Sea and Maintaining Interests in the South China Sea,” Journal of Zhejiang Ocean University (Humanities Science) 27, no. 3 (2010): 13. 39 Xinhua News, “Zhuanjia: Zhongguo Shangwei Gongbu Nansha Linghai Jixian [Expert: China Hasn’t Drawn the Baseline of the Territorial Sea of the Spratly Islands],” March 13, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-03/13/c_122827389.htm (accessed December 9, 2013).

In addition, the organisational change in Chinese institutions in charge of maritime patrol was more problematic. Albeit China established some local patrol forces to defend its coastline in the early 1950s, the decision to institute these agencies to a large degree reflected the passive nature of China’s maritime security policy at that time. For instance, in August 1950, the Department of Public Security of the Guangdong provincial government first instituted the Bureau of Border Control (bianfangju) which had the primary mission of controlling smuggling and maritime crime in the waters off China’s southern coast.40 Nevertheless, within half a year, the Guangdong authority subsequently established two other agencies with some overlapping functions − the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (shuishangju, under the supervision of the Department of Transportation of the Guangdong provincial government) and the Bureau of Island Affairs (haidaoju, under the direct supervision of the Guangdong provincial government).41 This was because, after instituting the Bureau of Border Control, the Guangdong authority subsequently found that two additional issues they had failed to notice six months before − regulating maritime transportation and managing local affairs in offshore islands − were also important. Therefore, it had to establish additional organs in charge of them.42 Clearly, decisions were made with the passive approach of “treating the head when the head hurts, and treating the foot when the foot hurts (toutong yitou jiaotong yijiao).”

Such a passive approach can also be observed from the constant change regarding the authority responsible for maritime patrols in the 1950s and 1960s, which had been changed at least four times during this period.43 In 1951, CCP decided to place all Chinese agencies responsible for maritime and border control under the PLA’s command. This system was revised in 1959, with Ministry of

40 Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 106. 41 For more on these agencies, see Party History Research Office of the CCP Guangdong Party Branch, Zhongguo Gongchandang Guangdong Lishi Daishiji [The Chronicle Event of The History of CCP in Guangdong], http://www.gddsw.com.cn/dstd/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=254 (accessed December 9, 2013). 42 Ibid. 43 Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 107-108.

Public Security (MPS) and its People’s Armed Police Bureau (PAPB)44 placed in charge of relevant patrol operations. Two years later, nevertheless, given that PAPB had failed to perform its duty properly, CCP leaders decided to place it under the supervision of both the PLA and MPS in 1961.45 This dual command system was again replaced by a centralised PLA-led command system after Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution given the Chinese military’s active role in this massive political campaign and Mao’s need for support from the PLA.46 These constant changes in the command system significantly restrained the Chinese government from constituting a functional administrative framework responsible for law enforcement in Chinese coastal waters.

3.2 The Era of Deng Xiaoping and the Economic Reform

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform not only changed China’s economic policy but also facilitated the Chinese people’s endeavour to look seaward. Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government had abolished the policy of pursuing relatively autarkic trade and maintaining a self-reliant economy, which had served as a guiding principle of the Chinese economy during most of Mao’s tenure, except for the period of burgeoning Sino-Soviet trade in the early 1950s. 47 Instead, CCP

44 The origin of the Armed Police in Chinas can be traced back to 1949 when the PLA was responsible for both defending the country from foreign invasion and internal security. After numerous name and institutional changes, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) was reconstituted on June 19, 1982. For more on this, see David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 170-173; June T. Dreyer, “Domestic Implications of an Emerging PLA,” in Chinese Military Modernisation, ed. C. Dennison Land, Mark Weistenbloom, and Dimon Liu (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), 198-206. 45 Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 107. 46 Ibid., 108. For more discussion on CCP-PLA relations in the early years of the PRC, see You Ji, “Unravelling the Myths about Political Commissars,” in Civil-military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Christen Gunness (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 147-151. 47 Alexander Chieh-Cheng Huang, “Chinese Maritime Modernisation and Its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and beyond” (PhD diss., The George Washington University, 1994), 55-56.

91 leaders had been more willing to revisit China’s national interests as well as re- evaluate how important the ocean was to its economy.48

Three factors influenced the development of China’s maritime security policy in Deng’s era. The first is China’s increasing dependence on the ocean. Deng Xiaoping was clearly aware that, to a large degree, the success of China’s economic reform relied on how the country valued and utilised the ocean. For instance, in August 1979, Deng Xiaoping claimed that “the ocean is not a city moat. Countries in the world today have already regarded the ocean as a focal point of a country’s technological development, economic growth and strategic planning. We must pay more attention to this matter as China cannot pursue a greater national power without going to the sea.”49 In particular, China’s economic development had begun to rely on the performance of its coastal economy since the 1980s as the infrastructure for economic development had been established in China’s coastal regions which contributed the largest share of its overall national income.50 In the meantime, Chinese oil companies initiated drilling projects in gas fields in China’s coastal waters and Chinese shipbuilding industry entered the global market. Consequently, the economic reform had a substantial effect on making Chinese decision makers more willing to look seaward, which created a more favourable environment for the Chinese government to develop relevant policies to protect its maritime frontier. As some argue, “a government may, for the sake of other national objectives, pursue certain economic and defence policies which would concurrently lead its national development in a maritime direction.”51

Secondly, China’s evolving external environment also provided the Chinese government with more opportunities to adjust its previous continent-orientated strategic thinking. On the one hand, albeit the Sino-Soviet confrontation over

48 Yu, Haiquan: Liyi Yu Weixie De Shuangrenjian, 256-258; Wang Lirong, “Lun Deng Xiaoping De Haiquan Sixiang Jiqi Shijian [On Deng Xiaoping’s Sea Power Thinking and Its Practice],” Journal of CCP Party School Zhejiang Campus no. 1 (2012): 42-47. 49 Quoted in Wang, “Lun Deng Xiaoping De Haiquan Sixiang Jiqi Shijian,” 46. 50 Paul An-Hao Huang, The Maritime Strategy of China in the Asia-Pacific Region: Origins, Development, and Impact (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), 214. 51 Huang, “Chinese Maritime Modernisation and Its Security Implications,” 51.

China’s north-western land borders persisted, the stressful bilateral relationship had gradually eased in the early 1980s.52 From 1982 to 1986, Beijing and Moscow initiated nine rounds of dialogues which, even though no major agreement was reached, were still the foundation of the normalisation of the Sino-Soviet relationship in 1989.53 On the other hand, territorial disputes in the South China Sea region became a hotly debated issue between China and regional claimants as they had begun to enhance their presence in this disputed region since the late 1970s and early 1980s.54 In March 1988, a small-scale naval skirmish took place between the PLAN and the Vietnamese naval force over the South Johnson Reef. Despite the fact that it was the only military action the PLAN used against a foreign navy in the South China Sea in the 1980s, China still obtained a window of opportunity to expand its presence in this disputed region after defeating the Vietnamese naval force. This is because it successfully occupied six reefs and atolls in the Spratly Islands by the end of 1988.55

Thirdly, in comparison with the turbulent political situation in the 1960-1970s, the domestic environment in China was relatively more stable under Deng’s pragmatic reforms.56 This environment assisted the decision makers in developing policies that better served China’s economic and security interests. During this period of time, economic performance was the primary issue in Chinese politics as Deng frequently articulated his “cat theory (mao lun),” saying that “it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it can catch a mouse (buguan heimao

52 Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiaoshi [Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing Group, 2011), 302-303. 53 Ibid., 306-307. 54 B. A. Hamzah, “Conflicting Maritime Claims in the South China Sea: The Scope for Solution,” in Maritime Change: Issues for Asia, ed. Ross Babbage and Sam Bateman (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin in association with the Royal Australian Navy and Australian Defence Force Industries Ltd, 1993), 96-99. 55 Ke-Chin Shen, Nanhai Zhudao Zhuquan Zhengyi Pingshu [Comments on Sovereignty Disputes over South China Sea Islands] (Taipei: Student Books, 2009), 146-148; Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer Verlag, 2009), 154. 56 However, there was still competition between the moderate reforms and the radical reformers in the 1980s. The former primarily focused on the economic reform while the latter indented to change the political structure. See Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 70-95.

93 baimao, neng zhuodao laoshu jiushi haomao).”57 This theory implied that, as long as the country’s national wealth was growing, whether China should adopt a socialist or capitalist system was not important. 58 Following Deng’s logic, the struggle of political ideology was replaced by competition to find the best way to expand the nation’s wealth. As Harry Harding puts it, “the norms governing the resolution of political disputes have become stronger, and the stakes of political conflicts have become much lower, than at the time of Mao’s death.”59 Benefiting from the placid political environment during the reform era, rather than being preoccupied with political power struggles, Chinese leaders were able to spend more time on revisiting China’s real interests.

As Deng Xiaoping thought highly of the ocean, China’s maritime security policy during his tenure was quite different from that in Mao’s era and had two key features. Firstly, the most prominent feature was that decisions were made primarily in response to economic development and the country’s increasing maritime interests. Deng’s economic reform replaced Mao’s revolutionary agenda with a new nation-building project of the Four Modernisations − modernising industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defence.60 In addition to the aim to maximise China’s national wealth, this project also encouraged an independent and professional armed force as it recognised the fact that professional expertise was indispensable for building a new Chinese nation. 61 As the Chinese bureaucrats and military soldiers had been increasingly professionalised in the reform era, the analysis and policy recommendations they presented to Chinese

57 Deng Xiaoping’s first use of the “cat theory” can date back to the 1960s. It was a maxim in the 1980s. For more on this, see Li Yanzeng, Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi Heimao Baimao Lun Beihou De Gushi [The Story behind Deng Xiaoping’s Cat Theory], http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/85037/8530 953.html (accessed December 10, 2013). 58 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 21-23. 59 Harding, China’s Second Revolution, 276. 60 The Four Modernisations project was firstly introduced by Zhou Enlai in 1963 and enacted by Deng Xiaoping in1978. For more on the Four Modernisations project, see Barry Naughton, “Deng Xiaoping: The Economist,” The China Quarterly no. 135 (1993): 491-514. 61 Li Nan, Chinese Civil-military Relations in the Post-Deng Era: Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernisation (New Port, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 2-3. For additional analysis of the influence of economic reform on the change in Chinese civil-military relations, see Li Nan, “Political-military Changes in China, 1978-1989,” Security Studies 4, no. 2 (1994): 426-458.

94 authority would be less ideological or politicised which would help the Chinese decision makers deliberate a maritime security policy responsive to the country’s needs for economic development.

For instance, the development of a modernised navy with a limited defence scope to protect China’s maritime interests in coastal areas was to a certain degree carried out in response to the country’s need to secure its flourishing coastal economy.62 In particular, the design of “near sea active defence (jiji zuozhan jinhai fangyu),” the doctrine of the PLAN’s modernisation introduced by Admiral Liu Huaqing in the mid-1980s, had five practical aims: (1) reunifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland; (2) restoring China’s lost and disputed maritime territories; protecting China’s maritime resources; (3) safeguarding China’s maritime communications in the near seas; (4) deterring foreign aggressors from the sea; and (5) exerting China’s nuclear deterrence power. 63 Even though Liu Huaqing’s strategy was somewhat nationalistic, particularly its irredentist aim to recover China’s lost territories, it still underlined the importance of protecting China’s maritime resources and maritime communication in the near seas which were key elements for the development of China’s coastal economy in the 1980s.64

The second feature of China’s maritime security policy in Deng’s era was that, in general, it was subordinate to the government’s agenda for economic development, even though China had been more willing to look seaward since the late 1970s. Deng’s policy guideline for shelving maritime disputes is a good

62 Additionally, the external strategic environment also contributed to the development of a Chinese armed force with limited defence scope. This is because the military balance between two superpowers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, had reached equilibrium. This new situation made it unlikely for one superpower to launch a full-scale world war against the other. Therefore, China understood that a new type of military conflict in the world should be intense but with limited scope and the Chinese military must be capable of winning a modern and limited war in the future. 63 Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities,” 150-151; Shi Xuechang, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing [Admiral Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Changzheng Publishing House, 2013), 111- 113. 64 For more on the China’s military use of the ocean, see Yann-Huei Song, “China and the Military Use of the Ocean,” Ocean Development and International Law 21, no. 2 (1990): 213-235; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Modernisation in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 213-217.

95 example. Even though maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas had existed since 1949 and even earlier,65 not until the late 1970s did the Chinese government make a general policy guideline for its maritime disputes with regional countries – “shelving disputes and carrying out joint development for areas over which China owns sovereign rights (zhuquan zaiwo, gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa). 66 This policy guideline had four key elements: (1) sovereignty of the territories concerned belongs to China; (2) when conditions are not ripe to bring about a thorough answer to a territorial dispute, discussion on the issue of sovereignty may be postponed; (3) the territories under dispute may be developed in a joint way; and (4) the purpose of joint development is to enhance mutual understanding through cooperation and create conditions for the eventual resolution of territorial ownership.67 This guideline highlighted the importance of creating a more stable maritime environment by shelving sovereignty disputes and undertaking joint development of maritime resources. From Deng’s point of view, as exploiting maritime resources was a more urgent issue than solving the sovereignty issue, the policy for solving maritime disputes should not infringe on Beijing’s effort to develop the Chinese economy in general, despite the fact that small naval skirmishes between China and regional claimants still occurred in a couple of events.

The defence budget’s diminishing share of central government expenditure in the 1980s was another example which demonstrated that the need to better defend China’s maritime frontier was inferior to the country’s primary task of economic development. For instance, when chairing a Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in June 1985, Deng stated that “in terms of how to take the four modernisations project into practice, we have our priorities. As the realisation of military modernisation is the product of a fully-developed economy, we (PLA) must wait for a few years… We will purchase more weapons after we become

65 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, 106, 140. 66 Wang, “Lun Deng Xiaoping De Haiquan Sixiang Jiqi Shijian,” 45. 67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, Set aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18023.htm (accessed July 29, 2013).

96 wealthier.”68 Deng’s remarks highlighted that due to China’s financial difficulties, government budgets were primarily committed to economic projects. Although China’s defence spending increased over time in the 1980s, the average growth in military spending was only about 4.16 percent per year.69 Moreover, the defence budget’s share of central government expenditure dropped significantly in the 1980s. The PLA’s share of the national budget was 16 percent in 1980 but dropped to only 8.6 percent in 1986 and fluctuated around 8.5 percent until the early 1990s.70 It is evident, that during the first decade of the economic reform, the PLA did not gain full financial support from the CCP leadership under Deng Xiaoping. Given this unfavourable environment, even if Deng Xiaoping endorsed Liu Huaqing’s “near sea active defence” strategy, the development of a modernised naval force capable of defending China’s maritime frontier was still regarded by the government as a secondary task.

As China’s economic development had been dependent on the performance of its coastal economy in the reform era, relevant legal regulations related to China’s maritime affairs significantly increased. About a dozen new laws promulgated in the late 1970s and 1980s, such as the Interim Regulations for Fishery Management (1979), the Maritime Environment Protection Law (1983), the Regulations for Environmental Protection of Offshore Oil Exploitation (1983), the Regulations for the Management of Ocean Dumping (1985), the Fishery Law (1986), the Marine Traffic Law (1986), the Marine Mineral Resource Law (1986), the Land Management Law (1986) and the Water Resources Management Law (1987), a total surpassing that of the previous three decades.71 In particular, China signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. This document indicated that the legal endorsement of a country’s merchant and military

68 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Vol. 3 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66612/4488765.html (accessed December 12, 2013). 69 Joseph Fewsmith, “China’s Defence Budget: Is There Impending Friction between Defence and Civilian Needs?” in Civil-military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 204-206. 70 Wang Shaoguang, “Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources,” The China Quarterly no. 147 (1996): 895. 71 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 84-85.

97 use of ocean had been on Chinese leaders’ agenda for national development. This was also a milestone regarding the development of a legal structure regulating China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.72

On the other hand, even though China participated in the negotiation and conclusion of UNCLOS in 1982, not until May 15, 1996 was it finally ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC).73 In addition, it also took China more than a decade to enact relevant Chinese maritime laws, such as the Law of Territorial Sea and Adjacent Area in 1992 and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in 1998.74 As one Chinese observer claims, albeit the Chinese delegates signed the UNCLOS in 1982, at that time, Beijing was not fully satisfied with its provisions, especially those in relation to the definition of the continental shelf and delimitation of the EEZ between opposite and adjacent countries. 75 China’s discontent was to a certain extent related to the maritime territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea gas fields.76 Therefore, Beijing required more time to study and ratify proper regulations.

Additionally, the protracted process involved in developing China’s maritime laws was also due to two additional factors. Firstly, there were multiple actors in the decision-making process; and secondly, it took a long time for resolutions to be achieved from bureaucratic bargaining among policy actors with diverse perspectives.

In terms of the multiple players in the decision-making process, although, in theory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was the primary government organ responsible for the review of the UNCLOS and delimitation of Chinese maritime

72 Zou Keyuan, “China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf: Developments, Problems and Prospects,” Marine Policy 25, no. 1 (2001): 72; Song, “China and the Military Use of the Ocean,” 215-216. 73 Yang Wenhe, Chen Bouyong, and Wang Hui, Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Haiyang Yaoshi [China’s Maritime Affairs in the Twentieth Century] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2003), 524. 74 Ibid., 518, 523. 75 Zou, “China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf,” 72. 76 Ibid., 73.

98 boundaries,77 in practice, it was not the sole player. Instead, the PLA and other civilian government organs also exerted some influence on the decision-making process. For instance, as some contend, the Strategic Research Institute of the National Defence University is an influential institute in China as it can directly influence top CCP leaders through its report submitted to the CMC.78 According one study, as early as the 1980s, it claimed that China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea region was in danger and urged the government to implement active policies to protect China’s interest. In the 1990s, its warning caused alarm among Chinese leaders who were deliberating the drawing of China’s maritime boundary. 79 Additionally, senior PLA generals, such as Zhang Zhen and Liu Huaqing also personally participated in the decision-making process regarding enacting the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and their attitude towards the delimitation of China’s maritime boundary was highly valued.80

Secondly, the time-consuming inter-agency bargaining can be seen in the diverse positions of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and MFA during the decision-making process for rectifying the UNCLOS and making relevant maritime laws in relation to delimiting China’s maritime boundary. SOA had professional knowledge of these issues as its subordinated institute, the National Marine Data and Information Service (NMDIS), not only took charge of the management of national marine data and information resources but also conducted extensive studies of the delimitation of maritime boundaries and relevant issues undertaken by foreign nations.81 Therefore, based on its professional knowledge of maritime affairs, SOA provided supports, in terms of both hardware and software, to MFA.

77 Li Linghua, 1982 Lianheguo Haiyangfa Gongyue Yu Zhongguo Haiyang Huajie [1982 UNCLOS and the Delimitation of China’s Maritime Boundary], http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.php?c=articl e&id=2479&q=1 (accessed May 8, 2013). 78 Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-making (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 66; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “Chinese Military-related Think Tanks and Research Institutions,” The China Quarterly no. 171 (2002): 623. 79 Song Zhongwei, “The Structural Influence of the Military in China’s Foreign Policy-making,” Asian Studies Review 24, no. 1 (2000): 89. 80 Ibid. 81 For more on the missions of NMDIS, see official web page, http://www.coi.gov.cn/nmdisenglish/.

In addition, SOA officials attended meetings of the task force responsible for rectifying UNCLOS and drawing up China’s maritime boundary. Nevertheless, SOA delegates and MFA had diverse positions on what was the best approach to delimit China’s maritime boundary. From the latter’s point of view, it should be drawn on the principle of “straight baseline,” in the belief that doing so could maximise the scope of China’s territorial sea. From a different point of view, SOA argued that the “straight baseline” principle was not applicable to China because using it may possibly violate the UNCLOS and cause international legal disputes. Instead, SOA suggested that MFA should adopt the “normal baseline” principle.82 To reach a consensus, rounds of time-consuming negotiations between MFA and SOA had been conducted, which lengthened the legalisation process.83

3.3 The Era of Jiang Zemin

In 1989, Jiang Zemin became leader of the 3rd generation of the CCP leadership, representing that China entered a different phase regarding its national development agenda. 84 After more than ten years of economic reform, China had a more open and thriving economy than in the early years of the PRC. For instance, its foreign trade increased considerably in the 1990s. According to Chinese government statistics, China’s total export/import volume increased from about 40 billion US Dollars in 1980 to 115.4 billion in 1990. The number was quadrupled in 2000, with an immense number of 474.3 billion.85 On the other hand, China also deepened it reliance on imported energy and became a net oil importer in 1993 due

82 Li, 1982 Lianheguo Haiyangfa Gongyue Yu Zhongguo Haiyang Huajie. 83 Ibid. 84 Jiang Zemin was inaugurated as CCP General Secretary on June 24, 1989 and became the Chairman of CCP Central Military commission on November 9, 1989. Jiang then was sworn in as President of the PRC on March 27, 1993. 85 Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Total Export and Import Volume, 1978-2002, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/200405/20040500218163.shtml (accessed January 6, 2014).

100 to the climbing domestic consumption of energy. Its dependence on foreign trade further increased. 86

In the meantime, China’s external strategic environment also experienced a drastic change. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union not only relieved its obsessive concern over the Soviet threat along its north-western continental boarder but also helped CCP leaders reconsider China’s position in global politics in the post-Cold War era.87 On the other hand, Taiwan’s democratisation process catalysed the rise of the pro-independence political movement on the island since the early 1990s.88 To adjust to the evolving strategic environment, under its third generation of CCP leadership, China not only followed Deng Xiaoping’s steps to bolster the economic reform but also committed more resources to preparations for dealing with any security challenges at sea.89

Apart from the evolving external environment and China’s growing reliance on imported energy, domestic politics in China under the 3rd generation of CCP leadership also favoured the country’s efforts to manage its maritime security issues, especially the rapid development of its naval force. For instance, the 3rd generation of CCP leadership indicated that long-march veteran leaders, Mao

86 For more on China’s economic development in the 1990s, see David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 78-83; Ross Garnaut and Song Ligang, ed., China: Twenty Years of Reform (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 1999). 87 Elizabeth Speed, Chinese Naval Power and East Asia Security (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, 1995), 4. Also see Bates Gill, “China as a Regional Military Power,” in Does China Matter: A Reassessment, ed. Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 126-127; David L. Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China’s Challenge to Asia Security,” Survival 36, no. 2 (1994): 48-51; Zhao Suisheng, “Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment in the Post Cold War World,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 11, no. 3 (1992): 70-83; Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions,” Asian Survey 33, no. 3 (1993): 256-261; Yang Gongsu and Zhang Zhirong, Contemporary China Foreign Relations: Theory and Practice (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009), 318-321. 88 Sheng Lijun, China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue (London; New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 18-35. 89 Ross Babbage, “The Changing Global Strategic Environment,” in Maritime Change: Issues for Asia, ed. Ross Babbage and Sam Bateman (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin in association with the Royal Australian Navy and Australian Defence Force Industries Ltd, 1993), 25. Also see Larry M. Wortzel, “China Pursues Traditional Great-power Status,” Orbis 38, no. 2 (1994): 157- 175.

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Zedong and Deng Xiaoping for example, no longer ruled China. Jiang Zemin did not have any prominent or legendary achievement like his successors given his technological and bureaucratic background.90 To a certain extent, support from the PLA became conditional because military generals no longer unreservedly complied with the new civilian CCP leader.91 To consolidate his authority over the military, Jiang encouraged the PLA to become a highly educated, well-trained and professionalised force, as well as gave it larger budgets and more autonomy.92 As a result, even though the PLA ground force still had the largest share of manpower of the armed forces in China, Jiang’s efforts created a better atmosphere for accelerating the development of the PLAN’s which required more professionalised soldiers. 93

Shaped by both Deng Xiaoping’s plan to protect the country’s maritime interests as well as the new external and domestic environments, China’s maritime security policy in Jiang Zemin’s era was portrayed by two key features. Firstly, protecting China’s maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters was valued by the Chinese government as one of its key tasks for national development.94 As Jiang claimed, “we must comprehend the ocean from a strategic

90 Ellis Joffe, “The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics: Factors and Phases,” in Chinese Civil- military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army, ed. Li Nan (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 15; Yu Bin, “The Forth-generation Leaders and the New Military Elite,” in Civil-military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 79. 91 For more analysis of the PLA’s compliance with CCP leader, see You Ji, “The PLA, the CCP and the Formulation of Chinese Defence and Foreign Policy,” in Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Zhang Yongjin and Greg Austin (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), 105-131; James Mulvenon, “China: Conditional Compliance,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 317-335. 92 Yu, “The Forth-generation Leaders and the New Military Elite,” 80; Ellis Joffe, “The Military and China’s New Politics: Trends and Counter-trends,” in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 22- 47. 93 Anthony H. Cordesman and Martine Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernisation: Force Development and Strategic Capabilities (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2007), 39-44. Even though PLA ground force, in comparison with the PLAN, PLA Air Force and the PLA Second Artillery Force, has always been the predominant service in PLA since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, its manpower significantly has reduced since the mid-1980s. For instance, in 1985, PLA ground force’s share of the total PLA force was about 83% percent. Its share continued to decrease in the following two decades and dropped to 75% in 2005. 94 Also see Liu, World Maritime Politics and Ocean Development Strategy of China, 384-392.

102 angle (cong zhanlue gaodu lai renshi haiyang).”95 In 1992, he highlighted the importance of safeguarding China’s maritime frontier in his report to the 14th CCP Party Congress, arguing that “we must emphasis on the quality of the PLA’s modernisation and comprehensively enhance our defence capability which can better fulfil the mission of safeguarding China’s land, air, and maritime sovereignty as well as its maritime interests.”96 This was the first time a CCP Secretary-general had included the mission of protecting China’s maritime interests and sovereignty in disputed waters in his report to the Party Congress. This mission was again included in Jiang’s reports to the 15th and 16th CCP Party Congress.97

Jiang’s reports and remarks revealed that safeguarding China’s maritime frontier was not simply a task for the PLAN or other relevant agencies but one of the top priorities on national development agenda − a mission for all CCP party members and the Chinese people.98 More importantly, China’s maritime security policy was no longer regarded by the 3rd generation of the CCP leadership as secondary to economic development policy. As Jiang Zemin stated at the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the PLAN in 1997, “economic development cannot be successful without the protection of a capable defence force. The modernisation of national defence is a key issue on the agenda of the modernisation

95 Xinhua News, “Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Guanxin Renmin Haijun Xiandaihua Jianshe Jisji [Notes of Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Remarks on the Progress of PLA Navy Modernisation],” May 27, 1999, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2000-12/31/content_485930.htm (accessed December 21, 2013). 96 Xinhua News, “Jiang Zemin Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Shangde Baogao [Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 14th CCP Party Congress],” October 12, 1992, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697148.htm (accessed December 20, 2013). 97 For full text of Jiang’s reports to the 15th and the 16th CCP Party Congress, see People’s Daily, “Jiang Zemin Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiwuci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Shangde Baogao [Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 15th CCP Party Congress],” September 12, 1997, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html (accessed December 21, 2013); People’s Daily, “Jiang Zemin Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiliuci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Shangde Baogao [Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 16th CCP Party Congress],” November 8, 2002, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429125.html (accessed May 21, 2013). 98 Liu Xinhua, “Zhongguo Fazhan Haiquan De Zhanlue Xuanze [The Strategic Choice of the Development of China’s Maritime Power],” World Economics and Politics no. 10 (2013): 106; Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Communist Party’s Leading Group, 290; Gan and Liu, Haiyang Quanyi Yu Zhongguo, 153.

103 of our country, and we must develop our economic and defence forces synchronously.”99

The second feature of China’s maritime security policy in Jiang Zemin’s era was the introduction of a new concept for solving maritime disputes between China and other regional countries – “starting with the easy part and getting difficult gradually, and partitioning the maritime disputes for resolution (xianyi hounan, fenqu jiejue).”100 This new concept introduced by Jiang Zemin not only inherited its foundation from Deng Xiaoping’s general policy guidelines for maritime disputes but also added some new elements regarding how to solve them more efficiently.101 Like his predecessors, protecting China’s sovereignty was still the primary task of Jiang Zemin. For instance, when commenting on China’s relationship with regional countries, Jiang pointed that “we emphasise maintaining good relationships with our neighbours. However, this does not mean that we have given up our principle and determination regarding the protection of our sovereignty rights and territorial integrity. We must uphold our position on sovereignty issues and fight for our national interests in a well-planned, proper, and patient manner.”102 Without a doubt, neither Jiang Zemin nor any other Chinese leaders would be willing to cede China’s maritime territory to foreign countries.

To put this Jiang’s strategy into practice, the Chinese government attempted to avoid direct confrontation with other regional claimants over sovereignty issues which would not be solved within a short period of time. As an alternative, in response to the new situation after the UNCLOS came into force in 1994, Beijing firstly undertook the easy part by focusing on the development of maritime

99 Xinhua News, “Jiang Zemin Zai Qingzhu Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Jianjun Qishi Zhounian Dahui Shangde Jianghua [Jiang Zemin’s Remarks on the Aggregation Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of PLAN],” July 31, 1997, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002- 03/03/content_2644264.htm (accessed December 21, 2013). 100 Guo Lulu and Zhu Xiaosheng, “Zouyi Dangdai Zhongguo Haiyang Qiangguo Zhanlue [On the Strategy of Building China into a Maritime Power in Modern Times],” Theory Horizon no. 2 (2013): 43; Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Party’s Leading Group, 1949- 2009, 331-332. 101 Guo and Zhu, “Zouyi Dangdai Zhongguo Haiyang Qiangguo Zhanlue,” 43. 102 Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Vol. 3 [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Vol. 3], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/180139/10818585.html (accessed December 21, 2013).

104 resources and regulations of maritime activities in China’s coastal areas.103 In the meantime, the Chinese government also partitioned its disputes in the East and South China Seas. Beijing treated these disputes as independent issues and differentiated its negotiation agendas because it believed that adopting a case-by- case approach would be able to reduce the complexity of solving territorial disputes.104

Nevertheless, while lifting the protection of China’s maritime frontier to one of the key tasks for national development, Beijing’s efforts to expand China’s power seaward had largely been compromised by the turbulent cross-strait relationship in the mid-1990s. Since the end of the Cold War, both sides of the Taiwan Strait initiated some semi-official dialogues in the early 1990s, especially the notable meeting between heads of the PRC’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the ROC’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1993 − the Wang-Koo Summit.105 It was also the first public meeting between mainland and Taiwanese figures with government authorisation. Nevertheless, Taiwanese President Li Teng-Hui’s pro-independence moves, such as his personal visit to the United State in 1995 and the Taiwanese presidential election in 1996 were regarded by Beijing as an attempt to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s separatist policies constantly preoccupied the CCP leadership under Jiang Zemin. 106 In particular, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crises significantly switched China’s primary aim from being capable of projecting its

103 Liu Yonglu and Xu Lushan, “Cong Linghe Duikang Dao Hezuo Shuangying: Zhongguo Tese Haiyang Anquanguan De Lishi Yanjin [From the Zero-sum Confrontation to the Win-win Cooperation: The Historical Evolution of The Ocean Concept with Chinese Characteristics],” Military Historical Research no. 4 (2011): 129-130; Du Yiping, “Dang De Sandai Lingdao Hexin Haijun Jianshe Sixiang De Lishi Kaocha [A Historical Research of the Three Generations of CCP Leaderships’ Thought for Naval Development ],” Military History no. 4 (2001): 11. 104 Huang Jinsheng, Tang Fuquan and Xu Mingshan, “Zhonghua Minzu Maixiang Xinshiji De Haiyang Zhanlue Siwei [Chinese People’s New Maritime Strategic Thinking in the New Century],” Ocean Development and Management no. 1 (2000): 7-8. 105 The Wang-Koo Summit took place in Singapore from April 27-29, 1993 106 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 189-196.

105 naval power far away from home to a less ambitious one of denying the U.S.’s intervention in a possible Taiwan contingency.107

In terms of changes to organisational arrangements in relation to law enforcement at sea, the administrative functions of China’s civilian maritime patrol forces considerably increased in the 1990s. This was because, after ten years of rapid economic development, China encountered some new challenges regarding the management of its maritime affairs, such as environmental pollution, overfishing, smuggling and the deteriorating condition of maritime traffic in China’s coastal waters.108 To cope with these new challenges, Beijing launched a series of institutional reforms in relation to its maritime law enforcement organs between the mid-1990s and early 2000s. In 1995, the State Council expanded MPS’s Maritime Police in terms of labour and budget given that the country had suffered from increasing numbers of maritime crimes in its south-eastern coastal area since the late 1980s.109 Then, in 1998, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) and the Anti-smuggling Bureau under General Administration of Customs were restructured. Two years later, the central command centre of the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) was subsequently established. After these waves of institutional reforms, Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies gained more duties and administrative authority. 110

107 Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLAN’s Submarine Challenge (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2006), 44-45. 108 Yang, Chen, and Wang, Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Haiyang Yaoshi, 525-533. 109 He Zhonglong and others, Zhongguo Haian Jingweidui Zujian Yanjiu [Study on the Development of Chinese Coast Guard Force] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), 39-40. 110 For more on the restructuring of these maritime law enforcement organs in the mid and later 1990s, see State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011, 477-490. Also see Bai Junfeng, “Zhongguo Haiyang Jingcha Jianshe Gouxiang [Developing Chinese Maritime Police],” Ocean Management no. 3 (2006): 36-37; He and others, Zhongguo Haian Jingweidui Zujian Yanjiu, 36-39; Xiao Le and Li Mingshuang, “Zhongguo Yuzheng Zhihui Zhongxin Zhuren Chen Yide Tan Shierwu Yuzheng Shiyei Fazhan [Director of FLEC Command Centre Chen Yide’s Comment on the Development of China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement in the years of the 12th Five Year Plan],” China Fisheries no. 8 (2011): 5-8; Yang, Chen, and Wang, Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Haiyang Yaoshi, 527.

106

On the other hand, with their enhanced functions, these maritime law enforcement agencies confronted a growing problem of ineffective inter-agency coordination. As discussed in Chapter 2, given the fragmentation of authority, the government functions had long been exercised largely on a sectoral basis. However, the inter-agency coordination problem was not significant in the years of Mao Zedong as these agencies had limited capability in managing maritime affairs when they were initially instituted. For instance, albeit SOA was instituted in1964, its primary functions in the early years were limited to conducting investigations into maritime resources and geography with no law enforcement duties. 111 Not until 1983 was SOA authorised by the State Council to carry out maritime law enforcement missions in China’s coastal waters. 112 Nonetheless, even though China’s maritime law enforcement forces had been playing more roles in managing its maritime affairs since the early 1980s, they still suffered from the lack of advanced law enforcement equipment until the end of the 1980s.113

As civilian maritime law enforcement forces were given more duties which, to a certain extent, overlapped, the problem of overlapping duties and functions among these government organs considerably worsened. In the meantime, quite a few problems, such as inefficient or disjointed maritime rescue operations subsequently emerged.114 This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the 1999 Dashun Incident. On November 24, 1999, a Chinese ferry, Dashun, with 312 people and 61 cars on board, tragically sank off the coast of Shandong’s Yantai City due to fierce weather.115 282 were drowned, marking this as the largest maritime disaster in the

111 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011, 449. 112 Yang, Chen, and Wang, Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Haiyang Yaoshi, 527. 113 Ibid.; He and others, Zhongguo Haian Jingweidui Zujian Yanjiu, 38-40. 114 Fan Zhijie and R. P. Cote, “Coastal Zone of PR China: Management Approaches and Institutions,” Marine Policy 14, no. 4 (1990): 307-308. Also see Wang Miao and others, “Woguo Xianxing Haishang Zhifa Tizhi De Biduan Yu Gaige Duice [Flaws and Reforming Measures of China’s Current Mechanism of Enforcing Marine Law],” Soft Science 20, no. 1 (2006): 81-86; He Xianchen, “Qianxi Woguo Xianxing Haiyang Zhifa Tizhi Wenti Yu Gaige Silu [Analysis of China’s Current Maritime Law Enforcement Mechanism: Problems and Thoughts for Reform],” Ocean Development and Management no. 4 (2004): 42-46. 115People’s Daily, “Yantai Haiyu Fasheng Teda Hainan Shigu [Major Maritime Accident in the Waters off Yantai],” November 25, 1999, http://www.people.com.cn/item/dsh/news/2604.html (accessed January 3, 2013).

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PRC’s history.116 Even though the ship sent an emergency message calling for maritime rescue when it was about to sink, no rescue team from the maritime law enforcement agencies could provide immediate assistance due to their lack of inter- agency coordination.117 The public harshly criticized China’s relevant maritime law enforcement organs and local governments and some senior government officials were forced to step down. For instance, the Chief of the Maritime Surveillance Bureau of Yantai City and the Deputy Chief of the Department of Transportation in the government of Shandong province were deposed. 118 In short, this tragedy revealed the problems faced by China’s maritime law enforcement organs at that time. Firstly, without a unified command system, any law enforcement operation, including maritime rescue, could not be efficiently operated. Secondly, the diversified authority could further lead to checks and balances among different organs. It would have taken longer than if a centralised force had been solely responsible.

3.4 The Era of Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as the 4th generation of Chinese leader in 2002. Unlike his predecessors, Hu emphasised a more active Chinese policy for protecting its maritime interests in both distant and disputed waters and was supportive of external-orientated naval operations.119 Some factors contributed to Hu Jintao’s ambitious agenda. The first was that China became much wealthier in the first decade of the 21st century than it had been in the 1980s and 1990s. For

116 Wang Kailing, “Daishunhao Hainanji [Memorizing the Dashun Disaster],” Phoenix News, December 4, 2006, http://phtv.ifeng.com/200612/1204_5_42973.shtml (accessed January 3, 2013). 117 Liu Yanfei, “Woguo Haiyang Xingzheng Zhifa Tizhi De Biduan Ji Gouxiang [Problems and Suggestions of China’s Maritime Law Enforcement System],” Ocean Development and Management no. 6 (2006): 38. 118 Some called the Dashun Incident as a “Chinese Sinking of the RMS Titanic.” 119 Paul H. Godwin, “The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 47-48; Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 182-186.

108 instance, its gross national product (GNP) climbed from $191 billion U.S. dollars in 1978 to $1.25 trillion U.S. dollars in 1998 and then surged to over 3 trillion U.S. dollars in 2008. 120 Despite the 2008-2009 world financial tsunami drastically affecting the global economy, China suffered relatively little from this economic downturn. During the period from 2010 to 2012, China’s economic development was still exceptional, with an annual growth rate of approximately 9 percent in inflation-adjusted terms.121

Benefiting from its fast-rising national wealth, China’s annual military budget also increased considerably. 122 According to the U.S. Department of Defence, China’s annual defence expenditure increased at an average of 12.1 percent in inflation-adjusted terms during the first decade of the 21st century.123 The defence expenditure of China in 2012 was estimated to be between 135 billion and 215 billion U.S. dollars. 124 The amount is very large in comparison with that for defence expenditure in 2000 which was about 40-60 billion U.S. dollars.125 Albeit there are no specific statistics indicating how much money each service of the PLA receives, it is a general practice that, as Bernard Cole claims, the PLAN normally receives more than one-third of the total Chinese defence budget.126 As a result, it

120 David Lai, “Introduction,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 10. 121 Xinhua News, “China 2012 Growth Eases to 13-year Low,” January 18, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/18/c_132111917.htm (accessed October 20, 2013). Also see National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistic Year Book 2012, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexeh.htm (accessed October 21, 2013). 122 For more on the growth of China’s defence expenditure in the 1990s-2000s, see Cordesman and Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernisation, 44-56. 123 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2011), 41. 124 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2013), 45. 125 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2006 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2006), 19. 126 The New York Times, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” April 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed June 9, 2013).

109 is logical that the PLAN has been entitled to more funds in the past decade.127 With more budgets, the PLAN can feel much freer to embark on a project it assumed fiscally impossible in the past, especially building large surface warships and undertaking long-range naval operations which would normally require not only hardware and technology but also immense amounts of budgetary funds.

The evolving external environment also contributed to the change of China’s maritime security policy under the 4th generation of CCP leadership, with a noticeable case being the concept of “Malacca Dilemma” introduced by Hu Jintao. Chairing a CCP economic work conference in November 2003, Hu Jintao noted that about 80% of China’s imported oil was transported through the Strait of Malacca that certain countries, the United States in particular, had long been interested in controlling. For that reason, according to Hu, China had to cope with this strategic predicament by developing a new policy adequate for protecting its interests overseas.128

The notion of “Malacca Dilemma” reflected Beijing’s concern over the new external environment it faced in the 21st century, especially Washington’s new foreign policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.129 This was because Washington’s new world-wide counter-terrorism campaign not only endeavoured to attack terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq but also to enhance its military presence in the area adjacent to the Strait of Malacca which had long been subjected to pirate

127 Also see Subhash Kapila, “China’s Increasing Defence Budget and Its Implication for India,” Southeast Asia Analysis Group Papers no.5644 (2013), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1453 (accessed January 9, 2014). 128 Shi Hongtao, “Zhongguo De Maliujia Kunju [China’s Malacca Dilemma],” China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2004-06/15/content_888233.htm (accessed August 13, 2010). For more analysis of the Malacca Dilemma, see Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the Malacca Dilemma,” Asian Security 4, no. 2 (2008): 143-144; You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 3 (2007): 467-489; Jacob, Pederson, China Leads Peers in Resolving Malacca Energy Shipping Dilemma, The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2013/05/13/chin a-leads-peers-in-resolving-malacca-energy-shipping-dilemma/ (accessed May 20, 2013). 129 Xu Jingyan and Sun Jian, “Lun Maliujia Haixia Zai Yatai Diqu Daguo Zhanlue Zhong De Diwei Yu Zhongguo De Zhengce Xuanze [Analysing the Strategic Importance of the Malacca Strait in the Eyes of Regional Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region and China’s Policy Choices],” Window of Southeast Asia no. 2 (2011): 1-2.

110 and terrorist attacks. 130 For instance, the United States successfully used the counter-piracy campaign in Southeast Asia as a platform to enhance its scope of influence in this region. Through its cooperation with regional governments, the U.S. Navy in 2004 launched its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), under which it planned to deploy marine and special force with high-speed gunboats to fight against pirates and other terrorist groups in the region.131 Such kind of cooperation significantly enhanced Washington’s diplomatic and military presence in the Southeast Asia region. On the other hand, Beijing regarded the U.S. Navy’s increasing presence in the Strait of Malacca region as a potential threat to China’s security interests as Washington could more easily control important checkpoints in strategic waterways in Southeast Asia.132 This was not a favourable situation for China, especially as it was increasingly becoming more dependent on imported energy transported through this region.

Additionally, since the mid-2000s, the situation in China’s neighbouring waters has become more turbulent, with territorial disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea islands constantly causing strident diplomatic conflicts and maritime standoffs. 133 Even if regional countries accused China of undertaking assertive operations in disputed areas, China’s policy on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, from Beijing’s point of view, was a proper response to foreign country’s attempts to violate its territorial integrity. Therefore, China

130 Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the Malacca Dilemma,” 144-146. For more analysis of the terrorism and maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, see Catherine Z. Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses,” RSIS Working Papers no. 89 (2005): 1-20; Mark J. Valencia, “Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Similarities, Differences and Their Implications,” in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses, ed. Derek Johnson and Mark J. Valencia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005): 98-123; Jonathan DeHart, “Pirates of the Southeast Asian Seas,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/pirates-of-the-southeast-asian-seas/ (accessed July 25, 2013). 131 Vijay Sakhuja, “Security Threats and Challenges to Maritime Supply Chains,” Disarmament Forum Maritime Security no. 2 (2010): 5; Martin Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 83-84. 132 Liu Lu, Bao Buruo and Ou Jibing, “Jiedu Maliujia Kunju: Shilun Zhongguo Shiyou Yunshu Anquan Zhanlue [The Malacca Sleepy Bureau: Tried to Discuss the China Petroleum Transport Security Strategy],” Journal of Brokerage no. 1 (2006): 79-81. 133 Alession Patalano, “Sea Power, Maritime Disputes, and the Evolving Security of the East and South China Seas,” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 6 (2013): 48-53.

111 believed that the deteriorating security environment in the East and South China Seas would demand more Chinese efforts to protect its interests in these disputed areas.134

In comparison with the 3rd generation of CCP leadership, the nature of China’s maritime security policy in Hu Jintao’s tenure was twofold. On the one hand, Beijing emphasised on the expansion of the defence scope of China’s maritime frontier. On the other hand, it advertised its commitment to the maintenance of regional stability in order to create an external environment favourable to the country’s future development, albeit such effort made little achievement as China had still engaged in numerous diplomatic rows with regional claimants over island disputes.

Regarding expansion of the defence scope of China’s maritime frontier, Hu Jintao urged the PLAN to go further into distant waters and actively undertake ocean-going operations overseas. This policy can be seen in the PLA’s “new historic missions” and defence white papers published by the Chinese government. In late 2004, when giving a speech to CMC members, Hu Jintao requested that the PLA was ought to accomplish a set of “new historic missions (xinde lishi shiming)”135 which included: (1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position; (2) providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests; and (3) playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and

134 For example, see Yu Zhirong, Donghai Weiquan: Zhongri Donghai Diaoyudao Zhizhen [Defending China’s Interests in the South China Sea: Sino-Japanese Disputes over the East China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands] (Shanghai: Wenhui Publishing House, 2012). Also see Wu Shicun, The South China Sea Dispute: Origin and Development (Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 2013). 135 People’s Daily, “Jianfu Renmin Jundui De Guangrong Shiming: Jinian Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Jianjun Bashi Zhounian [The Honourable Missions of the People’s Army: Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Foundation of the People’s Liberation Army],” July 31, 2007, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/6051435.html (accessed May 20, 2013); Zhou Ben, “2005: Chairman Hu Jintao Defines Historical Mission of PLA in New Period,” PLA Daily, October 8, 2008, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-11/27/content_1609747.htm (accessed October 20, 2013).

112 promoting common development. 136 The proposal of these new missions was driven by several new situations regarding China’s domestic and foreign interests in the 21st century and authorised the PLA to play more vigorous and global roles than in the 1990s to defend China’s national security. 137 Following this logic, Hu Jintao encouraged the PLAN to devote itself in creating a stronger naval force in order to fulfil the historic missions the PLA should achieve.138 As a result, they provided the PLAN with more legitimacy to develop its ocean-going capabilities.139

Correspondingly, for the first time, China’s 2006 defence white paper unveiled a tentative consideration to revise the PLAN’s longstanding “near sea active defence” strategy. In terms of the PLAN’s future defence scope, the white paper stated that “[t]he Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.”140 The notion of “strategic depth” revealed a changing mindset of the PLAN as it implied that China’s naval force should endeavour to create a greater strategic buffer zone at sea. Even though this white paper reiterated that China would continue its current defensive strategy, the operational scope of the PLAN still expanded seawards to a certain extent.141

136 James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and PLA’s New Historic Missions,” China Leadership Monitor no. 27 (2009): 1-2; Roy Kamphausen, China’s Military Operations other than War: The Military Legacy of Hu Jintao (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013), 1-8; People’s Daily, “Hu Jintao Urges Army to Perform Historic Mission,” March 14, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176695.html (accessed December 20, 2013). 137 Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and PLA’s New Historic Missions,” 1-2. 138 Xinhua News, “Hu Jintao Qiandiao Duanzao Shiying Lishi Shiming Yaoqiu De Qiangda Renmin Haijun [Hu Jintao Encourages the Development of a Strong People’s Navy Capable of Fulfilling the Historic Missions],” December 27, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006- 12/27/content_5539079.htm (accessed May 6, 2013). 139 For more on the analysis of historic missions and PLA’s development, see Corteza A. Cooper, The PLA Navy’s New Historic Missions: Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); Godwin, “The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape,” 45-98. 140 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2006), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html (accessed April 9, 2012). 141 Ibid.

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Furthermore, China’s attempt to develop a more powerful PLAN with a “far sea operation” capability was firstly revealed in its 2008 defence white paper. This document claimed that, since the early 21st century, “the Navy has been striving to improve in an all-round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations, strategic deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and countering non- traditional security threats, so as to push forward the overall transformation of the service.” 142 The above information, despite the specific definition of “distant waters” and the timetable for acquiring such capabilities not being clear, indicated that the CCP government endorsed the PLAN to pursue an operational capability which could fulfil blue-water missions in the future. Similarly, Beijing also started to expand its defence scope beyond the Taiwan Strait, which used to be a strategic barrier preventing the PLAN from going seaward to the western Pacific, even though the Taiwan issue was never removed from the list of flashpoints in East Asia.143

Benefiting from Hu Jintao’s support, the PLAN has had significant development in the power projection capabilities of both its surface and subsurface forces given the substantial growth in its budgetary funds. Some formidable PLAN warships, the Luyang I-class and Luyang II-class missile destroyers, Jin-class and Shang-class submarines, and advanced Russian-built Sovermenny- class missile destroyers for instance, had entered service since the early 2000s. 144 These

142 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm (accessed May 2, 2012). 143 David Lai and Marc Miller, “Introduction,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1-23. For more on the PLA’s mission beyond the Taiwan Strait, see Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Navy Today: Looking toward Blue Water,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 388; Dean Cheng, “Strategic Deterrence beyond Taiwan,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009),167-210; Michael A. Glosny, “Getting beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA Modernisation,” INSS Strategic Forum no. 261 (2011): 1-15. 144 James C. Bussert and Bruce A. Elleman, People’s Liberation Army Navy: Combat System Technology, 1949-2010 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 32-39, 69-70.

114 warships can perform certain missions of interests, in both coastal and distant waters, to the Chinese government. They are also capable of operating a wider array of maritime missions. 145 Nevertheless, although the PLAN’s operational capabilities have been significantly enhanced since the beginning of this century, the PLAN is still far from a matured blue-water navy now. In addition, it lacks a coordinated command and control system, and needs to enhance its capacity to supply warships in the waters far away from home.146

On the other hand, while the Chinese government under Hu Jintao actively aimed to expand the defence scope of the country’s maritime frontier, it also noticed the importance of pacifying regional countries which constantly expressed their concerns about China’s rapid rise. In order to advertise China’s friendly image globally and create an external environment favourable to its future development, Hu Jintao introduced another concept in relation to China’s maritime security policy − harmonious ocean – which was based on those of peaceful development and a harmonious world he introduced in 2004 and 2005 respectively.147 According to Hu, peaceful development is the strategic choice of both the Chinese government and Chinese people as it not only accommodates China’s peace-loving culture but also serves its national interest. Therefore, China must more actively participate in the world’s endeavour to enhance maritime cooperation and resolutely work towards the goal of creating a harmonious ocean.148

Even though the concepts of creating a harmonious world and a harmonious ocean have been in existence for a few years, specific policies supporting them have yet to be developed. In the meantime, maritime disputes between China and

145 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernisation,” in China’s Naval Modernisation: Background, Implications and Issues, ed. Jeremy F. Lynch (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011), 5. 146 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities- Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congress Research Service, 2012), 3-4. 147 Chen Young and Xiao Ding, “Zai Douzhengzhong Goujian Hexie Haiyang [Develop A Harmonious Ocean from Struggles],” Theoretic Observation no. 6 (2010): 65; Zhang Baoying and Li Hongtai, “Goujian Jiyu Hexie Linian De Haiyang Fazhan Zhanlue [Develop A Harmony-based Ocean Development Strategy],” Motherland no. 24 (2012): 48-49. 148 Xinhua News, “President Hu Meets Foreign Navy Delegations, Says China No Threat to Other Nations, April 23, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/23/content_11240705.htm (accessed May 13, 2013)

115 regional countries have frequently been witnessed in the East and South China Seas. As a result, the concept of building a harmonious world and a harmonious ocean is more likely diplomatic rhetoric than a concrete policy implemented by the Chinese government.

The Chinese government under Hu Jintao was clearly aware that undertaking assertive actions in response to maritime disputes would not serve China’s interests. However, it faced the problem regarding how to properly protect its maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters while searching for a stable regional order which could facilitate its economic development. 149 This was because internal politics could sometimes prevent the government from making a conciliatory maritime security policy aimed at easing the tense relationships between China and foreign countries. 150 As discussed in previous parts, the phenomenon of problematic inter-agency coordination among China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces became more salient when they bolstered their patrol operations in China’s coastal waters in the 1990s. This problem worsened in the 2000s as competing agencies, CMS and FLEC in particular, began to play active roles in China’s maritime disputes with regional claimants in the East and South China Seas.

The phenomenon of intense inter-agency competition can also be observed in the heated and prolonged policy debate over the issue of centralising China’s civilian maritime law enforcement organs. On the topic of how to develop a harmonious world and ocean, one key issue is about protecting China’s maritime interests more effectively through a coordinated maritime law enforcement mechanism. As Chinese scholars believe, maintaining a stable regional order depends on not only Beijing’s goodwill but also on its developing a capability to better protect its maritime sovereignty and interests should they be threatened by

149 You Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China Seas (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2013), 4. 150 Ibid.

116 foreign countries. Unifying China’s loosely coordinated maritime law enforcement agencies is the first step.151 Some Chinese scholars conducted preliminary studies regarding how to cope with this problem as early as the late 1990s152 and, since the beginning of the 21st century, the development of a centralised coast guard force has attracted much attention from both scholars and government officials in China.153 Nevertheless, debates over the feasibility of constructing a centralised coast guard force lasted for more than a decade.154 Looking more closely at this debate raises the critical question of who will be the leader of this new force. In other words, to a certain extent, why China has experienced this prolonged policy debate is competition over the leadership of a centralised coast guard.

Bureaucratic competition is evident in existing studies of this issue by different scholars/officials with different backgrounds. For instance, the People’s Armed Police Senior Captain Xu Kuanyou supports the construction of a centralised coast guard force. He claims that using the Maritime Police as the leading force of the coast guard would be the most economical and feasible option. 155 This is because, according to Xu, the Maritime Police has a more developed intelligence and logistic networks than other maritime law enforcement forces. There is no need to spend more money on developing such networks if the Maritime Police leads the centralised coast guard force.156 On the other hand, Ou Xianxin from the MSA Zhejiang Branch contends that China’s future maritime law

151 Li Jin, “Jiaqiang Haishang Weiquan Zhifa Tuidong Hexie Haiyang Jianshe [Enhance China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities and Propel the Development of a Harmonious Ocean],” Manager’s Journal no. 14 (2010): 263; Hu Desheng and Chen Yong, “Weihu Guojia Haiyang Quanyi Jianshe Hexie Haiyang Huanjing [The Countermeasure for Keeping National Oceanic Right and Building Harmonious Oceanic Circumstance],” Wuhan Marine 5, no. 1 (2010): 3-4. 152 For some relevant discussions in the late 1990s, see Li Guoqing, “Woguo Haiyang Zhifa Gaige Gouxiang (1) [Thoughts on the Revolution of China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Policy (1)],” Maritime Information no. 8 (1998):18-19, and Li Guoqing, “Woguo Haiyang Zhifa Gaige Gouxiang (2) [Thoughts on the Revolution of China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Policy (2)],” Maritime Information no. 9 (1998): 11-12. 153 Song Zenghua, “The Development Trend of Sea Power and the vision on China Sea Power Development Policy: The Influence on China Sea Power Development by the Rising of Maritime Force in Administrative Law Enforcement,” China Soft Science no. 7 (2009): 191. 154 The initial debate can be dated back to late 1990s. The debate lasted for about 15 years after the establishment of Chinese Coast Guard in 2013. 155 Xu Kuanyou, “Conformity and Construction on the Law Enforcement of Forces on Sea in China,” Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy 21, no. 1 (2005): 59-61. 156 Ibid., 61.

117 enforcement operations should be undertaken by a dual system: SOA is in charge of the research and development of maritime resources, and MSA supervises all law enforcement operations. 157 Both SOA and MSA, according to Ou, should report directly to the State Council.158 In other words, from MSA’s point of view, the hardware which will demand a large share of the budget, such as ships, aircrafts and crew members, should be under its command.

Competition between civilian maritime law enforcement forces and the military is also evident. For instance, Yu Zhirong from the State Ocean Development Centre, a research institute subordinate to SOA, asserts that there is no need for China to directly “copy” the U.S., Japan and South Korea’s examples of dispatching armed coast guard vessels and naval warships to patrol their claimed waters and EEZ. According to Yu, by doing so the Chinese government may never be able to protect its maritime interests but instead cause more maritime disputes with regional countries.159 As an alternative, he urges the Chinese government to avoid the PLAN’s direct involvement in maritime disputes in disputed waters and continue its non-military patrol operations led by CMS and FLEC vessels.160 Mr. Yu’s argument clearly tries to marginalise the military’s role in the maritime disputes. The position of Mr. Yu to a large degree contradicts those of some senior military officials who arduously stand up for a greater military presence in disputed waters as well as intimate cooperation between the PLAN and civilian maritime law enforcement forces. For instance, General Luo Yuan, Deputy Secretary-general of Chinese Association of Military Sciences, claims that the PLAN should provide the newly constituted Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) force with weapons that are

157 Ou Xianxin, “Tongyi Woguo Haishang Zhifa Zhuti [Unifying China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Organs],” Shipping Management 27, no. 6 (2005): 29-32. 158 Ibid., 32. 159 Yu Zhirong, “Zai Zhuanshu Jingjiqu Wuzhuang Zhifa Bukequ [Armed Maritime Law Enforcement Operation in EEZ is Unfeasible],” Global Times, December 10, 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2012-12/3360807.html (accessed January 20, 2013). 160 Ibid. Both CMS and FLEC patrol vessels are normally unarmed, albeit crewmembers may be allowed to take handguns on board under special circumstances. Nevertheless, since the State Council established the Chinese Coast Guard in March 2013, some of its China Coast Guard patrol vessels have been equipped with not only heavy water cannons but also some defensive weapons, such as machine guns. See People’s Daily, “Woguo Haijianchuan Muqian Bu Peibei Zhongwuqi [China’s Maritime Surveillance Vessels Are not Equipped with Heavy Weapons],” September 15, 2012, http://he.people.com.cn/n/2012/0915/c197034-17484925-2.html (accessed October 20, 2013).

118 more powerful. General Luo further contends that all the PLAN’s three fleets, namely the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets, should undertake joint patrol operations in the waters off the disputed Diaoyu Islands if necessary.161

In short, these examples indicate one fact that, to pursue the maximisation of bureaucratic interests, each government organ tries to bargain for its favoured policy outcome in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, as these government agencies do not report to each other, without an efficient policy coordinating mechanism at the centre, it is difficult and time-consuming to arrive at a final decision.

3.5 Latest Development of China’s Maritime Security Policy under Xi Jinping

The inauguration of Xi Jinping and other 6 elected members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in November 2012 indicates that China entered the era of the 5th generation of CCP leadership.162 When commenting on his blueprint regarding China’s future development two months after his inauguration, Xi Jinping claimed that “we will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests,” and “no country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests.”163 Xi also reiterated China’s commitment to

161 Global Times, “Luo Yuan: Sanda Jiandui Biyaoshi Ke Xingcheng Quantou Lai Lianhe Weiquan [Luo Yuan: The PLAN’s Three Fleets Should Undertake Joint Patrol Operation to Protect China’s Interest],” April 24, 2013, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-04/3869280.html (accessed May 3, 2013). 162Jeremy Page, “China Unveils New Leadership,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578118871289966366.html#printMode (accessed January 2, 2013). The other six members are Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli. 163 Xinhua News, “Xi Vows Peaceful Development While Not Waiving Legitimate Rights,” January 29, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/29/c_132136202.htm (accessed January 31, 2013).

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“peaceful development” during his later visits to the United States and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. 164 Consequently, following his predecessors’ steps and based on the foundation of China’s maritime development in the past thirty years, Xi is expected to continue China’s current path towards making China a great maritime power in Asia.

While pledging to maintain China’s current course of peaceful development, Xi Jinping has also demonstrated a more ambitious effort to protect China’s maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters in order to build the country into a maritime power, a strategic goal determined by CCP during meetings of the 18th CCP Party Congress in late 2012. One example is the establishment of the State Oceanic Commission (SOC) which aims to solve the enduring problem of the lack of a clear and coordinated maritime security policy. The National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the establishment of SOC in March 2013. According to the Chinese State Council, SOC was set up to make oceanic development strategies and coordinate important oceanic affairs among various government agencies.165 Under the direct supervision of the State Council, SOC is a high-level consultation and policy coordinating body and relevant law enforcement operations will be carried out by the newly established CCG under the supervision of SOA.166 In particular, according to some Chinese scholars, the birth of SOC was the product of the CCP leaders “top-level design (dingceng sheji)” to build the country into a maritime power. 167 As Chinese Academy of Social

164 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama Hold Joint Press Conference, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/xjpttcrmux/t1049545.shtml (accessed October 12, 2013); Xinhua News, China Committed to Regional Peace, Development: Chinese President, October 7, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/07/c_125490625.htm (accessed October 12, 2013). 165 People’s Daily, “Ma Kai: Ni Chongzu Guojia Haiyangju Sheli Guojia Haiyang Weiyuanhui [Ma Kai: Reconstruct State Oceanic Administration and Establish National Oceanic Administration],” March 11, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0311/c164113-20743165.html (accessed March 20, 2013). Also see Li Mingjiang and Zhang Hongzhou, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law Enforcement: Impact on Regional Security,” RSIS Commentaries no. 50 (2013): 2. 166 International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), 40. 167 Jinghua Times, “Fenxi Cheng Sheli Haiyang Weiyuanhui Xi Haiyang Qiangguo Zhanlue Dingceng Sheji [Analysis: The Establishment of National Oceanic Commission is a Top-level Design of the Strategy of Building China into a Maritime Power],” March 11, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-03-11/035526490746.shtml (accessed March 20, 2013).

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Sciences (CASS) researcher Ye Hailing argues, SOC will become the Chinese brain in charge of the formulation China’s maritime security policy. Consequently, as Ye believes, it is likely to witness the development of a clear and comprehensive Chinese strategy to protect its maritime interests and territorial integrity in disputed waters in the future.168

Nevertheless, whether the Chinese government under Xi Jinping can made clear and coordinated policies to protect China’s maritime interests is still questionable. Even though the Chinese government authorised the establishment of SOC and CGG in 2013, it is still facing some difficulties. As one observer claims, “questions remain, however, over the precise authority of the revamped SOA versus the SOC in coordinating Chinese maritime policy and strategy.” 169 For instance, the detailed structure of this new commission has yet been revealed by the State Council. Who will chair this newly established commission? Who are the primary members participating in the inter-agency consultation? How will the SOC interact with SOA if the latter is supposed to carry out decisions made by the former? The answers to these questions are not clear. No more follow-up reports related to the development of SOC have been made. Based on the experience of China’s previous institutional reforms, it may take a long time for SOC to become fully operational.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

The development of China’s maritime security policy and changes in the relevant legal regulations and institutional arrangements in the past sixty years have revealed the evolving strategic thinking of different generations of the CCP

168 Ye Hailing, “Dazao Weihu Haiquan De Jianqiang Zhongshu [Create a Strong Mechanism to Bolster China’s Maritime Power],” People’s Daily, March 14, 2013, http://opinion.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0314/c1003-20785826.html (accessed March 20, 2013). 169 Lyle J. Morris, “Taming the Five Dragons? China Consolidates Its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,” China Brief 13, no. 7 (2013): 10.

121 leadership. China is no longer an old and conservative continental power. Instead, the importance of the ocean to its national security has gradually increased as the development of the country has become more and more dependent on its maritime economy.

In the early years of the PRC, its prioritised tasks of defending the ROC Navy’s counter-attacks, securing China’s land borders and dealing with internal power struggles substantially preoccupied CCP leaders’ minds. Albeit Mao Zedong articulated that China should expand its power seaward and developed a strong navy, limited efforts were made in support of his claims. Following the introduction of economic reform, the Chinese government paid more attention to the implications of a secure maritime environment for the country’s economic development. Nevertheless, in general, China’s maritime security policy during Deng’s era still served the ultimate goal of economic reform. Relevant legal regulations and institutional arrangements were made or restructured, yet still far from mature. Jiang Zemin revised his predecessors’ strategic thinking and endeavoured to expand China’s power seaward, albeit some security challenges, such as the independence of Taiwan to a large degree compromised Beijing’s agenda. As China has become much wealthier in the 21st century, the CCP leadership under Hu Jintao and his successor Xi Jinping has been able to look beyond the Taiwan Strait and make ambitious policies for securing China’s interests in both coastal and distant waters.

Given China’s increased dependence on imported energy and seaborne trade as well as its uncompromising commitment to protecting its maritime sovereignty, it is logical that Beijing will put more resources into developing the PLAN and its civilian maritime law enforcement forces in the future. However, as China has gradually increased its reliance on the ocean, more government organs have become involved in the maritime affairs. The multiplicity of actors who have individual influences on policy-making and the lack of sufficient inter-agency coordination have negatively affected Beijing’s responses to relevant issues, such

122 as law enforcement at sea and the more complicated maritime disputes. 170 Although efforts have been made to cope with these problems, the results are still unclear.

170 Patalano, “Sea Power, Maritime Disputes, and the Evolving Security of the East and South China Seas,” 51.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Decision-making Process of Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute

The East China Sea has long been a thorny issue in the Sino-Japanese relationship since it initially surfaced in the late 1960s. Rounds of diplomatic confrontations and negotiations have been conducted over the past forty years but no substantial settlement was achieved. In the past decade, tense situation in the East China Sea has significantly worsened due to Beijing’s increasing belligerent operations in this disputed area and Japan’s tough stance on the Diaoyu Islands issue. China’s actions have largely deepened Japan and other regional countries’ concern about the stability in East Asia. However, despite China’s increasing assertiveness, to a certain extent, its behaviours in this dispute are inconsistent as conflicting interests and stances of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), maritime patrol forces and other government agencies can been observed from time to time.

This chapter seeks to address the question of why China has more assertively bolstered its presence in the East China Sea in the past few years while having inconstant behaviours at the same time. It argues that China does not have a clear and coherent plan to resolve the East China Sea dispute. Moderates in the Chinese government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and hard-line agencies, the PLA for example, have different interpretations regarding how to translate top leaders’ in-general directives into specific policies to resolve this dispute. In particular, the PLA has a prominent role in the country’s maritime conflicts with Japan. Nevertheless, as the fragmentation is a core feature of China’s political system, Beijing faces some difficulties in adequately coordinating policy actors with conflicting interests, causing incoherent policies and behaviours regarding the East China Sea dispute.

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This chapter is organised into five major parts. Section 4.1 provides some background information of the East China Sea dispute between China and Japan since the late 1960s. Section 4.2 reviews Beijing’s policy on the East China Sea dispute. Section 4.3 considers the roles of major players in the process for policy formulation and Section 4.4 discusses some key features of that process. Section 4.5 offers some conclusions.

4.1 The East China Sea Dispute: Competing Claims and Strategic Significance

The maritime territorial dispute in the East China Sea between Beijing and Tokyo emerged as early as 1969 when a scientific survey conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East discovered potential hydrocarbon deposits on the seabed in this region.1 The East China Sea dispute can be generally categorised into two major issues: (1) the delimitation of the East China Sea EEZ border between Japan and China; and (2) contending sovereignty claims to the Diaoyu Islands. These two issues are inextricably inter-related as the delimitation of the East China Sea exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary concerns which state has the right to use the Diaoyu Islands as the base point to draw its baseline and territorial sea in the East China Sea.2 Also, this disputed area has significant strategic values in terms of economy and security. As some point out, the East China Sea dispute is an issue with multi-dimensions given that it is “both territorial and maritime, involving not only the discovery, occupancy and use of the islands themselves, but also the sea lanes to and, in contemporary times, the

1 Yu Zhirong, Donghai Weiquan [Defending China’s Rights in the East China Sea] (Shanghai: Wenhui Publishing House, 2012), 61-62; Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer Verlag, 2009), 109; Steven Wei Su, “The Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update,” Ocean Development and International Law 36, no. 1 (2005): 47. Also see Chine-Peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes (New York: Routledge, 2004), 26-34. 2 Junwu Pan, Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China’s Territorial and Boundary Disputes (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 140.

125 water column and seabed near the islands.” 3 As a result, this dispute involves scholars and officials specialised in a great deal of expertise, such as history, international law, international politics, geography and economy.4

The Dispute over the Delimitation of East China Sea EEZ

The dispute over the EEZ in the East China Sea between China and Japan lies with conflicting positions on how to delimit the EEZ border. Japan defines its EEZ border in this region with a hypothetical median line between the Chinese and Japanese coasts. On the other hand, China, believing that the continental shelf principle ought to be applied, claims that the border of the EEZ should be the margin of its continental shelf.5 Due to diverse understandings regarding how to draw its maritime boundaries, the maritime zone claimed by China is much larger than that claimed by Japan, and Beijing contends that the area between the Chinese-claimed and Japanese-claimed lines should be regarded as a disputed zone6 which is estimated to comprise about 160,000 square kilometres of water (see Figure 4.1). 7 In addition, China and Japan also differ in their attitudes towards the settlement of this dispute by means of international adjudication. In general, Japan is inclined to submit this dispute to international institute for judicial settlement due to its previous experience in managing its maritime disputes with

3 Unryu Suganuma, Sovereignty Rights and territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 2. 4 Ibid. 5 Reinhard Drifte, Japanese-Chinese Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea: Between Military Confrontation and Economic Cooperation (London: Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, 2008), 6; James C. Hsiung, Sea Power, Law of the Sea and China-Japan East China Sea Resource War (Macao: Institute of Sustainable Development, Macao University of Science &Technology, 2005), 7. 6 Susumu Yarita, “Toward Cooperation in the East China Sea,” in Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation, ed. Selig S. Harrison (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2005), 23. 7 Peter Kien-Hong Yu, “Solving and Resolving the East China Sea Dispute: Beijing’s Options,” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 17, no. 3 (2005): 123.

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South Korea.8 On the other hand, due to the lack of trust in western judicial system, China is reluctant to accept international adjudication when managing its maritime disputes with regional countries.9

Figure 4.1 The East China Sea Dispute

(This figure has been removed due to copyright restirctions)

Source: China Briefing

8 Wei-Chin Lee, “Troubles under the Water: Sino-Japanese Conflict of Sovereignty on the continental Shelf in East China Sea,” Ocean Development and International Law 18, no. 5 (1987): 596-597. 9 Song Yuxiang, “Zhongri Diaoyudao Zhengduan De Jiejue Fangshi Wenti [Questions of the Resolution for Chin-Japan Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands],” China Oceans Law Review, no. 1 (2006): 57-58.

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In addition, it is worth mentioning that while denying a median line principle proposed by the Japanese government, Beijing has yet developed a clear and well- researched argument to refute Japanese assertions as, to a large degree, the details of its claim are still underdeveloped.10 Even though China has published a set of statements regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries of its neighbouring seas, they still lacked detailed information to clarify China’s position regarding the border of the East China Sea EEZ.11 As one Chinese scholar has pointed out, the major problem China faces is that it does not have an in-depth understanding regarding how to delimit its maritime boundaries in this region.12

Contending Claims to the Diaoyu Islands

Both Beijing and Tokyo assert that it has undisputable sovereignty over this uninhabited group of islands. The Chinese government argues that they are China’s traditional territory as nearby region has long been a fishing ground of Chinese anglers and China’s rein over them can be traced back to the Ming Dynasty (1368- 1644).13 In addition, from Beijing’s point of view, this group of islands were also part of the Taiwan province administrated by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).14 As China’s 2012 white paper on the Diaoyu Islands stated, “the earliest historical record of the names of the Diaoyu Islands, Chiwei Yu and other places can be found in the book Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng Xiang Song) published in

10 Yu, Donghai Weiquan, 32-33. 11 Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and International Development (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in Association with the Dept. of Intl. Relations and the Northeast Asia Program, ANU, 1998), 56-57. 12 Yu, Donghai Weiquan, 34-35. 13 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper: Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China (Beijing, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012- 09/25/c_131872152.htm (accessed April 17, 2013). 14 Xinhua News, “Backgrounder: History Proves Diaoyu Islands are China’s Territory,” September 8, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/08/c_13484565_2.htm (accessed July 20, 2011); Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes, 28.

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1403 (the first year of the reign of Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty). It shows that China had already discovered and named the Diaoyu Islands by the 14th and

15th centuries… The Qing court not only incorporated the Diaoyu Islands into the scope of China’s coastal defence as the Ming court did, but also clearly placed the islands under the jurisdiction of the local government of Taiwan.”15 In addition, according to Beijing, despite the fact that the Diaoyu Islands were taken by Japan after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, they, together with Taiwan, were returned to China after World War II.16

On the other hand, the Japanese government refuses to recognise China’s claim which heavily relies on historical references. Instead, Tokyo justifies its claim to the Diaoyu Islands by spotlighting a concept of the international law − terra nullius which refers to a territory belonging to no one.17 Japan argues that this group of islands had always been terra nullius until the Japanese government formally laid claim to them in 1895. 18 From then on, as Tokyo contends, the Diaoyu Islands, except for the American occupation from 1945 to 1972, have always been treated as part of Okinawa, not Taiwan. 19 In addition, the administrative right over the Diaoyu Islands was given back to Japan in accordance with U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement signed on 17 June 1971.20 The Japanese government regards this agreement as evidence supporting its sovereignty claim to these disputed islands.

15 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper: Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China. 16 M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2010), 146-147; Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html (accessed August 2, 2011). 17 Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (New York; London: Oceania Publications, 1963), 21-23. 18 Pan Zhongqi, “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 1 (2007): 77. 19 Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes, 28; Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. 20 Kimie Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001): 375-380.

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Strategic Significance of the East China Sea

The East China Sea has considerable economic and security values as is endowed with rich marine resources and facilitates maritime transportation between East Asia and Europe.21 Firstly, it is one of major fishing grounds in East Asia.22 In particular, the Diaoyu Islands are a traditional fishing base for both Chinese and Japanese fishers, especially those from Taiwan and Okinawa. 23 In addition to rich fishery resources, carefree transportation through sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in this area is also an important factor in sustaining foreign trades − the maritime lifeline for both countries’ economic development. In particular, these sea lines are important for the economic development of the nearby Yangtze River Delta, China’s most prosperous region with an annual local gross domestic product (GDP) output up to 9 trillion Chinese yuan.24

More importantly, the oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf in the East China Sea are believed to be lucrative even if the estimated volume varies in different surveys. For instance, foreign researches estimate that the potential petroleum deposits in this area are as high as 100 billion barrels. 25 China also believes that the volume of natural petroleum gas (NPG) reserves there is between 175 trillion and 210 trillion cubic feet while the most promising deposits lie on the eastern side of the continental shelf claimed by Japan.26 At present, there are four major gas fields operated by Chinese oil companies approaching or overlapping the proposed median line in the East China Sea: Longjing, Duanqiao, Chunxiao and

21 Jian-Liang Lu, “Donghai Shiyou Nengyuan Yu Zhongri Chongtu [Energy Resources in the East China Sea and China-Japan Conflicts],” Journal of Fu Hsing Kang College no. 88 (2006): 261. 22 Ralf Emmers, Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 39. 23 Harold C. Hinton, The China Sea: The American Stake in Its Future (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980), 13. 24 Xinhua News, “Chang Sanjiao Shiliu Cehngshi Guonei Shengchan Zongliang Bijin Jiu Wanyi Yuan [The Yangtze Delta’s GDP Output Approximates to 9 Trillion],” December 27, 2013, http://www.cusdn.org.cn/news_detail.php?id=247558 (accessed May, 8, 2013). 25 Selig S. Harrison, “Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation?” in Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation, ed. Selig S. Harrison (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2005), 5. 26 Ibid.

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Tianwaitian. Among these gas fields, the Chunxiao gas field is believed to have the largest hydrocarbon deposits that are equivalent to 63.8 million barrels of petroleum and 168.6 billion cubic feet of NPG.27

Both China and Japan are net importers of primary energy and the rich hydrocarbon resources on the seabed of East China Sea can alleviate both countries’ thirst for energy. Therefore, this area is “a hot seat of competition” between Beijing and Tokyo given that these oil deposits are “like a dragnet of conflict further exacerbated by the latent competition for sea power dominance in the region.”28 In addition, given that the East China Sea gas fields are located close to China’s most populated areas, they are more economically valuable to China.29 As one Chinese scholar has claimed,

Southeast China’s coastal areas, particularly Shanghai municipality and Zhejiang province, are China’s most industrial (and thus energy-consuming) bases… Consequently, their domestic oil/gas supply must rely on imports from the far northern and western provinces and is therefore both costly and insufficient. In contrast, the transportation of oil and gas from the East China Sea’s continental shelf is much easier and cheaper (locate within five hundred kilometres or so).30

The second strategic significance of the East China Sea is about security considerations. For instance, the Diaoyu Islands are part of a hypothetical “the first islands chain” in East Asia which stretches from the southern part of Japan’s

27 U.S. Energy Information Administration, East China Sea Energy Data, http://205.254.135.24/emeu/cabs/East_China_Sea/OilNaturalGas.html (accessed July 15, 2011); Singtao Daily, “Donghai Youchu Nanjie Zhongri Zhike Gongtong Kaifa Xuananduo [East China Sea Oil Reserve Cannot Satisfy China and Japan’s Thirst and The Joint Development is Questionable],” June 19, 2008, http://www.stnn.cc:82/china/200806/t20080619_797972.html (accessed July 5, 2011). 28 Hsiung, Sea Power, Law of the Sea and China-Japan East China Sea Resource War, 5. 29 Chris Acheson, Disputed Claims in the East China Sea: An Interview with James Manicom, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=159 (accessed July 25, 2011) 30 Guo Rongxing, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation: Some Options for the East China Sea (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2010), 9.

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Kyushu Island, south-westward to the Okinawa Islands and Taiwan. On the one hand, this islands chain has long been a strategic barrier of China’s naval development while, on the other, it builds a defence perimeter for Japan.31 Form Japan’s point of view, due to the maturing operational capability of the People’s Liberation of Army Navy (PLAN), it has to maintain the balance of power in this region, possibly leading it to seek a military dominance which is capable of securing its interests.32 In contrast, Beijing has endeavoured to exert its military power beyond the first islands chain as doing so can provide China with a larger scale of strategic depth. It has also expressed its concerns about Japan and U.S. military operations in the East China Sea.33 This is because, while holding a neutral position on the Diaoyu Islands dispute, Washington clearly states that the Japan- U.S. Security Treaty would come into force should there be military conflicts between China and Japan in the waters off the Diaoyu Islands.34

4.2 Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute

China did not have a clear position on the Diaoyu Islands issue before the rich hydrocarbon deposits on the seabed in the East China Sea were discovered in the late 1960s.35 In December 1970, Beijing for the first time made a clear claim to the Diaoyu Islands and argued that they had always been China’s sacred territory, not

31 Christian Wirth, “Ocean Governance Maritime Security and the Consequences of Modernity in Northeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 25, no. 2 (2012):228-229. 32 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 159. 33 David Scott, The China Century? The Challenge to Global Order (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 42-43; Michael R. Chambers, “Rising China: A Threat to its Neighbours?” in The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications, ed. Carolyn W. Pumphrey (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 74. 34 Chandra Muzaffar, “The China Japan Dispute over Diaoyu Islands: Historical Analysis,” Global Research, September 27, 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-china-japan-dispute-over-diaoyu- islands-historical-analysis/5306206 (accessed May 6, 2013). 35 Liu Jiangyong, “Cong Lishi Shishi Kan Diaoyudao Zhuquan Guishu [The Sovereignty Issue of the Diaoyu Islands: A Historical View],” People’s Daily, January 13, 2011, http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/52655/13723807.html (accessed March 2, 2014); Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, 106.

132 part of the Okinawa Islands (see Table 4.1 for a chronology of the East China Sea dispute). 36 Nevertheless, to facilitate the progress of the normalisation of the bilateral relationship in 1972, Beijing agreed to shelve the Diaoyu Islands dispute for later negotiations. 37 As one retired Chinese diplomat has recalled, when meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in September 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made such proposition. He argued that while the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the East China Sea was important to China, it was more urgent to normalise the Sino-Japanese relationship and relevant disputes (e.g. the Diaoyu Islands dispute) could be settled in the future.38

Table 4.1 Chronology of the East China Sea Dispute, 1969-2013

The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 1969 identified potential oil and gas reserves in the East China Sea. In December, Beijing made it first official claim to the Diaoyu 1970 Islands. Washington and Tokyo signed the U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement which included the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa to 1971 be returned to Japan. Beijing again made its claim to this group of islands. In September, when meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei 1972 Tanaka, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai agreed to shelve the Diaoyu Islands dispute. Japan and South Korea signed a joint agreement which made the 1974 northern part of the East China Sea a “joint maritime zone.” China protested this agreement.

36 Chi-Shiong Chang, “Diaoyutai Lieyu De Zhuquan Guishu Wenti [The Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty Dispute],” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academic Sinica no. 22 (1993): 113. 37 Gao Hong, Huimou Zhongri Waijiaoshi Shang Guanyu Daioyudao Zhuquan Zhengduan De Moqi Yu Gongshi [A Review of the History of the Sino-Japanese Ties regarding the Diaoyu Islands Dispute], http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2012-09/13/content_26514177.htm (accessed June 3, 2013). 38 Xinhua News, Zhou Enlai Yu Tianzhong Jiaorong: Diaoyudao Wenti Yihou Zaishuo [Zhou Enlai and Kakuei Tanaka: The Diaoyu Islands Disputed Can Be Discussed Later], August 14, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-08/14/c_125164324.htm (accessed August 20, 2013).

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Deng Xiaoping adopted the principle of “shelving disputes and 1979 carrying out joint development for areas over which China owns sovereign rights” to resolve the East China Sea dispute. China, for the first time, successfully drilled a well in the Longjing 1980 gas field. The China National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC) was 1985 nominated by Beijing to negotiate with its Japanese counterpart on a possible joint development project in the East China Sea gas fields. China passed the Law of Territorial Sea and Adjacent Area. It 1992 included the Diaoyu Islands as part of its territory. China discovered an undersea natural gas field in the East China Sea, 1995 namely the Chunxiao gas field. A Hong Kong activist Yuk-Cheung Chan drowned while attempting 1996 to swim to one of the Diaoyu Islands. CNOOC, Sinopec and Pecten Orient signed an agreement on the 2003 joint development in the Chunxiao gas field. In July, Japan sent a surveillance ship to the Japanese side of the 2004 median line of the East China Sea EEZ. In October, China and Japan initiated the first round of negotiation 2004 regarding how to delimit the East China Sea EEZ boundary and joint development in gas fields there. In February, the Japanese government took over a lighthouse erected 2005 by Japanese activists on one small islet in the Diaoyu Islands.

2005 The 2nd and 3rd rounds of the Sino-Japanese negotiation commenced.

In July, Japanese government authorised the Teikoku Oil Company 2005 to conduct test drilling in three gas fields in the East China Sea. The 4th, 5th and 6th rounds of the Sino-Japanese negotiation 2006 commenced. Since this year, vessels from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have numerously entered the waters near the Diaoyu Islands. The 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th rounds of the Sino-Japanese negotiation 2007 commenced. In June, after 11 rounds of talks, China and Japan reached a general consensus on the joint development of the East China Sea gas fields. 2008 In same month, a Taiwanese fishing boat hired by Taiwanese activists was sunk by Japanese patrol vessels off the Diaoyu Islands. In December, China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels entered 2008 the territory sea of the Diaoyu Islands.

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On September 7, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese 2010 Coast Guard vessels off the Diaoyu Islands which sparked a strident diplomatic row between China and Japan.

In October, the PLAN deployed a task force to undertake regular 2010 patrols in the area nearby the East China Sea gas fields.

In August, Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command’s (FLEC) 2011 vessels entered the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands. In February, the Japanese government named some of the Diaoyu 2012 Islands. On April 17, Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara announced a plan to 2012 purchase three of the Diaoyu Islands. On August 15, Hong Kong and Taiwanese activists landed on the 2012 Diaoyu Islands. In September, Tokyo decided to nationalise the Diaoyu Islands. In 2012 same month, the Chinese government officially announced the baseline for the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands. On December 13, 2012, a CMS aircraft entered Japanese-controlled 2012 airspace for the first time. Japanese government accused a Chinese frigate of pointing its fire- 2013 control radar at a Japanese destroyer near the waters off the Diaoyu Islands in late January. In April, China’s Defence White Paper openly accused Japan of 2013 “making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.” In September, a PLA Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entered the 2013 airspace of the Diaoyu Islands. In December, Beijing established an air defence identification zone 2013 (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.

Source: Guo, 2010; Chen and Wang, 2011; Xinhua News.

Beijing’s policy to shelve its territorial disputes with Japan was again confirmed by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 when he officially introduced the principle of “shelving disputes and carrying out joint development for areas over which China

135 owns sovereign rights” to his Japanese counterparts.39 Also, since the mid-1980s, Beijing had commenced a few rounds of negotiations with Tokyo for possible joint development in the East China Sea gas fields although no solid conclusion was reached.40 In general, throughout the period between the early 1970s and mid- 1990s, shelving maritime disputes and maintaining a good “China-Japan friendship” had served as the principle of Beijing’s policy on the East China Sea dispute.41 In the meantime, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship had also enhanced significantly 42 despite the fact that there were still sporadic frictions between two sides, such as Beijing’s protest against gas/oil exploitation projects in the northern part of the East China Sea which were jointly conducted by Japan and South Korea in the early 1970s as well as confrontations over Chinese “Diaoyu Islands Defenders” and Japanese right-wing actives’ attempts to land the disputed islands.43

China initiated a new campaign regarding the exploitation of marine resources in the East China Sea in the late 1990s as it shifted from mainly verbal claims to a surge of its physical presence in this region. For instance, China commenced scientific research activities in some disputed areas in the East China Sea in 1999.44 Moreover, in 2003, it initiated drilling projects in the Chunxiao gas field. Given that the drilling platform was located less than one mile from the Japanese-claimed median line, this project subsequently led to a strong protest lodged by the

39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping: Zhuquan Zaiwo, Gezhi Zhengyi, Gongtong Kaifa [Deng Xiaoping: Shelve Disputes and Carrying out Joint Development for Areas over Which China Owns Sovereign Rights], http://guoqing.china.com.cn/2012-04/11/content_25115509.htm (accessed June 5, 2013). 40 Yarita, “Toward Cooperation in the East China Sea,” 23-26. 41 Ryosei Kokubun, “The China-Japan Relationship, East Asia Community, and the Dynamics of Trilateral Relations,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2010), 50. 42 Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” 145; Liao Xuanli, “Sino- Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of East China Sea Gas Exploration,” East Asia no. 25 (2008): 57; International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), 3. 43 Yang Jinsen and Gao Zhiguo, Maritime Policies in Asia and the Pacific (Beijing: Ocean Press, 1990), 305-311; Su, “The Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,” 47. 44 Lu, “Donghai Shiyou Nengyuan Yu Zhongri Chongtu,” 261.

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Japanese government.45 In response to China’s exploitation projects in this disputed area, Tokyo also started its own oil drilling projects in its claimed waters. In 2005, the Japanese government authorised the Teikoku Oil Company to conduct test- drilling projects in three gas fields in this region – Shirakaba, Kusunoki, and Kikyou.46

Some efforts to settle the EEZ border issue had also been made. From 2004 to 2007, MFA conducted 11 rounds of negotiations with its Japanese counterpart. The first round was conducted in late 2004. Cui Tiankai, Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of MFA, and Mitoji Yabunaka, Director of Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, headed the talk. The main topic of this round of talk was about how to delimit the East China Sea EEZ boundary and whether to joint development gas fields in this region and how.47 Nevertheless, no agreement was reached as both sides insisted on their own positions, which was also the primary factor spoiling the subsequent rounds of negotiations.48 On June 18, 2008, two countries eventually reached a general consensus (also known as the 6/18 principle) which included the creation of a joint development zone, the participation of Japanese oilers in disputed gas fields developed by China under Chinese law, and further negotiations towards a treaty.49 However, even though the 6/18 principle was a milestone for settling the East China Sea EEZ dispute, debates over the location of the joint development remain and no substantial progress has been achieved thereafter.50

45 Harrison, “Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia,” 4. 46 Lu, “Donghai Shiyou Nengyuan Yu Zhongri Chongtu,” 265. 47 Liao, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability,” 64-65. 48 Yi-Chun Chen and Ching-Yu Wang, “Conflict or Cooperation: The Past, Present, and future of the Dispute over the Oil-gas Fields in East China Sea,” Prospect and Exploration 9, no. 8 (2011): 62- 67. 49 Xinhua News, “China, Japan Reach Principled Consensus on East China Sea Issue,” June 18, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/18/content_8394206.htm (accessed April 29, 2013). 50 Guo, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation, 31. Also see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, ed. Peace in Northeast Asia: Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes with China, Korea and the Russian Federation (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008), 13-21.

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Strident disputes over the Diaoyu Islands were again brought to the forefront in 2008 when a maritime clash between a Taiwanese fishing boat (hired by Taiwanese activists) and Japanese patrol vessels sparked off the Diaoyu Islands given that Beijing regarded this incident as a Japanese act that violated Chinese sovereignty rights.51 A series of maritime clashes between Chinese and Japanese vessels took place thereafter as the number of Chinese patrol operations nearby these disputed islands significantly increased.52 Moreover, Beijing adopted a more hardline attitude to claim the Diaoyu Islands in response to the Japanese government’s decision to nationalise them in September 2012 albeit Tokyo regarded its plan as a matter of domestic affairs.53 For instance, according to the Japanese government’s statistics, the number of Chinese military and non-military patrols in the waters off the Diaoyu Islands has significantly increased since the second half of 2012.54 From 2008 to 2011, there were only four records of Chinese patrol vessels entering the territorial sea of them. Nevertheless, during the period between September 2012 and February 2013, on average, the frequency of Chinese vessels’ operations in the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands reached 15 times per month (see Figure 4.2). A Chinese attempt to normalise its patrol operations in these disputed islands is evident. Additionally, some observers further warn that given the increasing presence of Chinese fleets in the waters adjacent to the Diaoyu Islands, China has been undermining Japan’s de facto control of this contested area where has been under Japanese jurisdiction for more than forty years.55

51 Global Times, “Zhongguo Duiri Zai Diaoyudao Jinhai Zhuangchen Taiwan Yuchuan Biaoshi Qianlie Buman [Chinese Foreign Ministry Is Strongly Discontent with Japanese Patrol Vessels’ Operations in the Diaoyu Islands],” June 10, 2008, http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2008- 06/136258.html (accessed June 20, 2012). 52 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” China Leadership Monitor no. 41 (2013): 1; South China Morning Post, “Timeline: The Diaoyu-Senkaku Island Dispute,” September 18, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039204/timeline- diaoyu-senkaku-islands-dispute (accessed May 12, 2013). 53 Xinhua News, “China: Japan Must Abandon Illegal Purchase of Diaoyu Islands,” September 13, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2012-09/13/c_131848129.htm (accessed May 1, 2013). 54 See Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/senkaku/index.html. 55 The Economist, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands: Dangerous Shoals,” January 19, 2013, http://www. economist.com/news/leaders/21569740-risks-clash-between-china-and-japan-are-risingand-consequ ences-could-be (accessed May 1, 2013).

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Figure 4.2 Chinese Patrols in the Diaoyu Islands Waters

(This figure has been removed due to copyright restirctions)

Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The tense Sino-Japanese relationship reached another peak in late 2013 when Beijing announced the establishment of its East China Sea ADIZ which overlaps those of Japan and South Korea (see Figure 4.3). According to Beijing, an ADIZ is established by a country in the public airspace beyond its territorial airspace for identification and early warning, and establishing the East China Sea ADIZ is not against any particular country or target. 56 The Chinese Defence Ministry also claimed that establishing an ADIZ “has nothing to do with the expansion of China’s claimed airspace.” 57 However, regardless Beijing’s explanations, this action subsequently brought protest and concerns from Japan, South Korea and the United States. As the legitimacy and role of an ADIZ in air safety and security are

56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on December 2, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2 510/2511/t1104719.shtml (accessed January 3, 2014). 57 Ministry of Defence of the People’s Republic of China, Guofangbu Fayanren Da Jizhe Wen [Defence Ministry Spokesperson’s Response to Journalists’ Questions], http://www.mod.gov.cn/aff Air/2013-11/28/content_4476914.htm (accessed January 3, 2014).

139 unclear,58 more mid-air frictions between China and Japan my possibly take place in the future.

Figure 4.3 ADIZs over the East China Sea Region

(This figure has been removed due to copyright restirctions)

Source: Voice of America, 2013

58 Daniel Pinkston, “China’s ADIZ and the Implications for North East Asia,” International Crisis Group, December 4, 2013,http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/strongandprosperous/2013/12/04/chinas- adiz-and-the-implications-for-north-east-asia/ (accessed January 4, 2014).

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On the other hand, despite its assertiveness in the East China Sea, China’s relevant behaviours in this disputed region are inconsistent to a certain degree as belligerent operations conducted by Chinese patrol vessels at times contrasted sharply with Chinese leaders’ reassuring rhetoric. For instance, in December 2008, patrol vessels belonging to CMS for the first time entered the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands and again ignited the anger of the Japanese government which regarded CMS’s operations as good examples of China’s increasing assertiveness. 59 Since then, CMS has continued to undertake similar patrol operations in the areas adjacent to these disputed islands. Nevertheless, these provocative operations were undertaken a few months right before the introduction of the “harmonious ocean” concept proposed by Hu Jintao in April 2009. 60 Based on this concept, China should have aimed to “be more open and practical in international maritime security cooperation in the future and unremittingly work towards the goal of building a harmonious ocean.”61 Clearly, CMS’s operations contradicted Chinese leaders’ effort to create a more harmonious international environment.

Similarly, Xi Jinping’s remarks about this dispute and China’s belligerent patrol operations are conflicting as well. For instance, in November 2012, Xi made moderate comments on the Diaoyu Islands issue when meeting with a special envoy of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He stated that China’s policy to develop a friendly relationship with Japan had never changed and encouraged Japan to “make joint efforts with China through real action to seek effective methods for appropriately controlling and resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation.” 62 Xi’s statement suggested that the new Chinese leader had no

59 China Review News, “Zhongguo Xunhang Diaodao Xijie Puguang [Details of China’s Patrol Operations to the Diaoyu Islands Unveiled],” December 12, 2008, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1008/2/6/ 100826683.html (accessed May 2, 2012). 60 Zhu Zhiqun, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Farnham, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 12-13. 61 Xinhua News, “President Hu Meets Foreign Navy Delegations, Says China No Threat to Other Nations,” April 24, 2009, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2009- 04/24/content_1742324.htm (accessed May 13, 2013). 62 Yang Jingjie, “Xi Takes Soft Tone after Abe Personal Letter,” Global Times, January 26, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/758270.shtml (accessed March 3, 2013).

141 intention to raise tension in the East China Sea.63 However, Xi’s conciliatory tone was again contradicted by the PLAN and Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies’ belligerent operations in response to Tokyo’s policy to nationalise the Diaoyu Islands.

Furthermore, the inconsistency can be observed from the PLA, Chinese official media and MFA’s conflicting attitudes towards the issue of labelling the Diaoyu Islands as one of China’s core interests. The concept of “core interests” is generally understood as the country’s non-negotiable sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.64 For instance, in January 2012, when commenting on Tokyo’s plan to name some of the Diaoyu Islands, an editorial in the People’s Daily first labelled the Diaoyu Islands dispute as one of China’s core interests and stated “China solemnly pointed out that Japan’s patrol boats cannot engage in law enforcement activities near the Diaoyu Islands. Attempt to name some islets near the Diaoyu Islands is a blatant move to damage China’s core interests.”65 This claim was again echoed by a PLA delegation to Japan in August 2013 which was headed by the PLA’s Deputy Chief of Staff Qi Jianguo.66 In contrast, MFA did not endorse the PLA and official media’s claims. In October that year, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun refused to confirm whether Beijing had regarded the Diaoyu Islands issue as one of its core interests.67 In addition, it’s intriguing that while the MFA webpage once published a statement which mentioned that the Diaoyu Islands dispute involved China’s core interests, it

63 Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” 11; Michael D. Swaine and Rachel Odell, “How to Contain Japan-China Tensions?” The Diplomat, June 21, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/24/how-to-contain-japan-china-tensions/ (accessed June 22, 2013). 64 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behaviour Part One: On Core Interests,” China Leadership Monitor no. 34 (2011): 7-8. 65 People’s Daily, “China Will not Tolerate Test of Its Will to Safeguard Sovereignty,” January 18, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90780/7708939.html (accessed May 20, 2013). 66 Xinhua News, “Zhongfang Duiri Xuanshi Diaoyudao Shu Hexin Liyi [Chinese Military Labelled the Diaoyu Islands as One of China’s Core Interests during Visit to Japan],” August 21, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-08/21/c_125211814.htm (accessed August 30, 2013). 67 Xinhua News, “Waijiaobu Fubuzhang Zhang Zhijin Jiu Diaoyudao Wenti Juxing Zhongwai Meiti Chuifenghui Wenda Shilu [Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun’s Comments on the Diaoyu Islands Issue],” October 27, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-10/27/c_113518756.htm (accessed November 2, 2013).

142 was subsequently removed. 68 In short, the inconsistency of China’s relevant behaviours therefore leads to some questions: is Beijing’s assertiveness in the East China Sea a well-designed plan? Would such assertiveness be the product of various actors’ uncoordinated actions? 69 To answer these questions, more studies of the policy process for Beijing’s policy on this dispute should be made.

4.3 Policy Actors’ Roles in Beijing’s Policy on the East China Sea Dispute

To examine the decision-making process of China’s policy to deal with its maritime disputes with Japan, one key issue is about the roles of various policy actors in that process. As traditional bureaucracies in charge of a country’s foreign and security policy, the PLA and MFA are key players regarding China’s policy on this dispute. In addition, some other government and non-government actors, such as civilian maritime law enforcement forces, Chinese state-owned oil companies, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Publicity Department and Chinese scholars have also played some roles in the policy process.

The Chinese Military

The Chinese military has a particularly salient role in China’s territorial disputes with Japan. In comparison with other Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, the PLAN has possessed the most advanced vessels, aircrafts and reconnaissance capabilities in recent years and has made significant progress

68 Radio France International Chinese, “Zhongguo Hexin Liyi De Hexin Shishenme [What Is the Core of China’s Core Interest],” May 21, 2013, http://www.chinese.rfi.fr/print/129789?print=now (accessed November 2, 2013). 69 Also see Linda Jakobson, “How Involved Is Xi Jinping in the Diaoyu Crisis?” The Diplomat, February 8, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/08/how-involved-is-xi-jinping-in-the-diaoyu- crisis-3/?all=tru e (accessed March 5, 2013).

143 regarding the development of its combat capacity. 70 It is also evident that the PLAN has acquired the capability to break through the strategic barrier of first island chain.71 Among the PLAN’s three major fleets, the East and North Sea Fleets are responsible for China’s security interests in the East China Sea.72

The PLA constantly adopts a hawkish attitude towards China’s dispute with foreign countries, which is partly driven by the needs to shore up its demand for more defence budgets. Its hawkish role in China’s maritime disputes with Japan is evident as Chinese warships have conducted frequent assertive and high-profile operations in the East China Sea which have contributed to Beijing’s assertiveness. In recent years, the PLAN has not only increased the amount of its training exercises in disputed waters in close proximity to the Diaoyu Islands and East China Sea gas fields but also normalised its patrol operations in these areas since 2010.73 For instance, it was reported that on October 9, 2010, the PLAN deployed a task force to undertake regular patrols in the area nearby the East China Sea gas fields. Albeit this task force did not enter the waters claimed by Japan, Tokyo still believed that this patrol was a deliberate plan of China to damage regional stability and challenge Japan’s bottom line.74

Moreover, according to the U.S. Naval Intelligent Office, in 2012, the PLAN had conducted seven naval exercises in the western Pacific with a focus on war at sea and sinking “enemy’s fleets” which were believed to be the Japanese fleets.75 In particular, two of them were held about thirty nautical miles off the Diaoyu

70 Yin Tianshin, “PLAN Blue Water Navy,” Defence International no. 344 (2013): 69. 71 Russell Hsiao, “PLAN East Sea Fleet Moves beyond First Island Chain,” China Brief 10, no. 9 (2010): 1-2. 72 However, the PLAN South Sea Fleet also undertakes training exercises in the East China Sea. 73 Du Songtao, “Haijun Liangjian Zhanshi Juexin [PLAN Advertises Will by Sending Battle Ships],” Defence Review no. 77 (2013), http://news.qq.com/zt2013/navysres/ (accessed May 6, 2013). 74 Xinhua News, “Rimei Cheng Zhongguo Haijun Wunianlai Shouci Zai Donghai Youqitian Jijie [Japanese Media Claims the PLAN Conducted the very first Patrol in East China Sea Gas Fields in Recent Five Years],” October 11, 2010, http://war.news.163.com/10/1011/09/6IN2EVNG00011MT O.html (accessed May 1, 2013). 75 David Lague, “China Navy Seeks to Wear out Japanese Ships in Disputed Waters,” Reuters, March 6, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-china-japan-navy-idUSBRE9251GU2 0130306 (accessed May 2, 2013).

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Islands. 76 Apart from sending warships to disputed waters, the PLAN also challenged the airspace claimed by Japan. In March 2011, the Japanese Air Self Defence Force radar probed that two PLAN aircrafts flew over the East China Sea and came within 55 kilometres off the Diaoyu Islands. Even though these two Chinese aircrafts did not enter the airspace claimed by Japan, it was the first time that a Chinese patrol aircrafts approached so close to these contested islands.77 Furthermore, as Michael Swaine argues, the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ was also promoted primarily by the Chinese military.78

Senior Chinese military officers are also prominent advocates of more active actions against Japan and, to a certain extent, have pushed the government to adopt a more assertive stance on the East China Sea dispute. For instance, in 2011, Major General Luo Yuan argued that Japan’s 2011 Defence White Paper evidently revealed Tokyo’s ambition to awaken Japanese people’s nationalistic sentiment, legitimise Japan’s military modernisation programs and facilitate American’s plan to enclose China.79 According to General Luo’s point of view, China had no choice but to take more hawkish actions in response to Japan’s ambitious agenda which may severely undermine its maritime interests. Additionally, when attending the meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held in Mach 2012, he also urged Beijing to accomplish China’s “five presences (wuge cunzai)” − the administrative presence, the legal presence, the military presence, the economic presence and the public opinion presence − in its claimed waters in the East and South China Seas.80

76 Du, “Haijun Liangjian Zhanshi Juexin.” 77 BBC News, “Japan Sends Jets as China Planes near Disputed Islands,” March 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12632042 (accessed July 5, 2011). 78 See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentaty on the East China Sea Air Defence Indeification Zone (ECS ADIZ),” China Leadership Monitor no. 43 (2014): 1-54. 79 Luo Yuan, “Zhongguo Renmin Youquanli Yaoqiu Riben Junshi Touming [Chinese People Have the Right to Request Japan to Make Its Military Affairs More Transparent],” Xinhua News, August 5, 2011, http://war.news.163.com/11/0805/10/7AMIDDJ900011MTO.html (accessed August 10, 2011). 80 Song Shijia, “Nanhai Wenti Zhongguo Wenti Yinggai QiangdiaoWuge Cunzai [China Should Accomplish Five Presences in South China Sea],” China Today, March 6, 2012, http://www.chinato day.com.cn/ctchinese/second/2012-03/06/content_432396.htm (accessed May 6, 2013).

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To some extent, General Luo’s proposal had an effect on Beijing’s policy on the East China Sea dispute as some key points he made can be seen in China’s recent approaches to deal with its ties with Japan or in both the East and South China Sea disputes. For instance, in September 2012, the Chinese government officially announced the baseline for the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands. This unprecedented Chinese action clearly delimited a baseline in this contested region. This new baseline was in contrast to Beijing’s 1996 declaration on the Chinese baseline that did not include the base point regarding the territorial sea of the Diaoyu Islands. 81 Beijing’s aggressive action was believed to coincide with General Luo’s outspoken proposition of enhancing Beijing’s “legal presence” in the East China Sea.82

Civilian Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies

China’s civilian maritime law enforcement agencies are also involved in the East China Sea dispute. In particular, there are two main roles of Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement agencies: demonstrating the significance of their administrative functions and promoting a more capable and larger Chinese maritime patrol force. Firstly, regardless of making the East China Sea disputed more troubled, sending more patrol vessels to contested areas there is one main approach for a Chinese maritime law enforcement force to demonstrate the significance of itself among numerous government organs which can help it bid

81 J. Ashley Roach, “China’s Straight Baseline Claim: Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” ASIL Insights 17, no. 7 (2013):1-11; Also see M. Taylor Fravel, “Drawing Lines in the Water,” The Diplomat, September 14, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/drawing-lines-in-the-water/ (accessed May 6, 2013); Xinhua News, Chinese Envoy Files Diaoyu Islands Baseline Announcement with UN, September 14, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/14/c_131850150.htm (accessed May 7, 2013); Mure Dickie and Kathrin Hille, “Japan Risks China’s Wrath over Senkaku,” The Financial Times, September 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/babbfa2a- fb2b-11e1-87ae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wTsQdD3X (accessed May 7, 2013). 82 National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2012 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2012), 30-32.

146 more domestic support and budgetary funds.83 For instance, CMS has started to conduct regular patrols in the Chinese-claimed East China Sea EEZ since 2007.84 According to an unofficial survey, from 2007 to 2009, CMS’s maritime law enforcement operations in East China Sea had repelled 171 targets which may cause potential threat to China’s maritime interests.85 Also, CMS aircrafts have constantly approached the air space of the proposed median line of the East China Sea EEZ.

In addition to CMS’s presence in the East China Sea, as China’s primary agency in charge of fisheries management, FLEC’s endeavours to conduct patrol operations in this region have also intensified since the late 2000.86 To a certain extent, tense situation in the East China Sea in recent years have provided FLEC with a justified reason to normalise its patrols in this region. This is because theses maritime standoffs normally involved Chinese fishing ships which should be under FLEC’s protection. For instance, on September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the waters nearby the Diaoyu Islands, which led to a strident diplomatic row between China and Japan.87 In the aftermath of this incident, Chinese Agriculture Ministry declared that its FLEC fleets would undertake regular patrols in the East China Sea in order to “protect Chinese fishers’ interests and safety.”88 Within a year, FLEC totally launched 13 law enforcement operations in the East China Sea EEZ and the waters nearby the

83 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1 ) (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 201), 19-21. 84 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 480. 85 Xinhua News, “Zhongguo Haijian Donghai Weiquan Fengyun [The Whirlwind of China Maritime Surveillance’s Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in East China Sea],” February 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-02/18/content_10839414.htm (accessed August 25, 2011). 86 Sate Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011, 490-491. 87 James L. Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Troubled Waters,” Comparative Connections 12, no. 3 (2010): 104-110. 88 BBC Chinese, “Zhongguo Yuzhengchuan Zai Donghai Yu Riben Xunluojian Duizhi [China’s FLEC Vessel Confronted Japanese Patrol Boat in East China Sea],” January 27, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/world/2011/01/110127_china_japan_sea.shtml (accessed May 2, 2011).

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Diaoyu Islands. Among these FLEC operations, two of them were regarded by the Japanese government as infringing on its sovereignty rights.89

Secondly, officers of the civilian maritime law enforcement forces know how to promote their agenda for building a more capable and mighty maritime patrol force as well. To this end, they have been constantly interviewed by Chinese news media and even welcomed journalists on board their patrol vessels to report the daily life of the crewmembers, which are the fastest and easiest approaches to solicit more support from the public. For instance, when giving a newspaper interview in February 2009, He Xuming, Captain of the “CMS No. 51” surveillance vessel, argued that “China has a blue territory which covers about 3,000,000 square kilometre of water and we must obtain larger patrol vessels to protect our interests. This is because our Japanese competitors have more advanced and larger vessels than what we have had. If CMS acquires larger ships and more advanced aircrafts, we can have more strength to accomplish our goals.” 90 In addition, the Chinese Fishery News, a news agency subordinate to the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, constantly publishes articles in support of FLEC’s operations in the East China Sea. For instance, one commentary published on February 22, 2011 not only highlighted the implications of China’s fishery industry for China’s coastal economy and food security but also urged the CCP government to dispatch more fisheries patrol vessels to the East China Sea in order to demonstrate China’s determination of protecting its sovereignty rights there.91

In short, CMS and FLEC’s increasing presence in the East China Sea and their outspoken requests for stronger patrol fleets have contributed to China’s

89 “Diaoyudao Shili Haiyu Zhongguo Yuzhengchuan Shouci Jinru [China’s FLEC Vessel Firstly Entered the Waters 10 Nautical Miles away from the Diaoyu Islands],”Yazhou Zhoukan 25, no. 35 (2011): 9. 90 Xinhua News, “Zhongguo Haijianchuan Dunwei Pianxiao Zai Haishang Duizhi Zhong Rongyi Chikui [Small Displacement of CMS Vessels Makes Lie in an Unfavourable Situation when Confronting Adversaries],” February 18, 2009, http://big5.eastday.com:82/gate/big5/mil.eastday.co m/eastday/mill/m/20090218/u1a4181957.html (accessed July 16, 2011). 91 Yu Xiangdong, “Zhongguo Yuzheng: Lanse Guotu De Shouhuzhe [FLEC: Guardian of China’s Blue Territory],” The Chinese Fishery News, February 22, 2011, http://www.farmer.com.cn/news/bz jc/201102/ t20110222_614201.htm (accessed, July 2, 2011).

148 assertiveness over the past few years. Even though their assertive operations are mainly driven by the demand for more bureaucratic interests, to some extent, they have further deepened Japan’s fears and suspensions about the strategic intensions behind Chinese operations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFA has an institutional interest in maintaining good ties between China and foreign countries and obtains few benefits if it keeps China’s foreign issues disputed.92 As a result, compared with a hawkish position held by the Chinese military and civilian maritime law enforcement forces, the tone of MFA regarding China’s disputes with Japan is relatively moderate.93 Evidence shows that MFA normally undertakes a dovish stance on the East China Sea dispute, even in the aftermath of some China-Japan clashes at sea. For instance, the Sino-Japanese maritime collision incident in September 2010 led to a heated wave of anti-Japan nationalist campaign in China. However, on MFA’s regular press conference on September 9, 2010, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu, while requesting the Japanese government to release the Chinese fishers, reiterated that the Chinese government was still willing to resume the dialogue with the Japanese government and hoped to settle this dispute in proper ways.94 Additionally, when meeting with the Japanese ambassador to China, Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo, the highest-ranking Chinese diplomat, still urged Tokyo to find a “wise political solution” for this unpleasant incident. 95 MFA’s position on this clash was relatively moderate

92 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 164. 93 John Pomfret, “Dispute with Japan Highlights China’s Foreign-policy Power Struggle,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201 0/09/23/AR2010092306861_ pf.html (accessed, July 7, 2011). 94 For relevant comments made by Jiang Yu, see MFA Spokesperson Yu Jiang’s Remarks on September 9, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/jzhsl/. 95 Austin Ramzy, “China-Japan Tensions Grow after Shipping Collision,” Time, September 13, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2017768,00.html (accessed May 8, 2013).

149 compared with the overwhelming anti-Japanese sentiment in China at that time. For instance, in mid-September, Chinese citizens in Beijing Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xian, Jinan and Qingdao launched a massive wave of anti-Japan protest which strongly requested the Chinese government to undertake a tougher position against Japan.96

In terms of the role of MFA in China’s policy on the East China Sea dispute, as the country’s main agency in charge of international negotiations, 97 it has devoted lots of labour and material resources into the talks of a Sino-Japanese joint development of oil/gas drilling in the East China Sea gas fields and the settlement of EEZ boundary issue. From MFA’s point of view, completing a settlement of the East China Sea EEZ dispute is presumably a great achievement of the ministry and helps to bolster its bureaucratic prestige. Nevertheless, the pursuit of institutional interest has also caused a problem regarding the making of China’s relevant maritime security policies – MFA is inclined to make its decisions at the expense of the country’s national interests as a whole. A good example is addressed in the following.98

When conducting China-Japan negotiations regarding delimiting the East China Sea EEZ border during 2004-2008, the Chinese negotiators, MFA diplomats for the most part, held a stance that intentionally ignored the State Oceanic Administration’s (SOA) professional opinions regarding how to best draw the maritime borders and maximise Chinese interests there. This is because Chinese negotiators believed that SOA’s opinions might hold up the progress for reaching a final settlement, a task MFA was keen to accomplish. Consequently, while a general agreement about the joint development of the East China Sea gas fields was

96 Duowei News, “Beijing Xiangang Shanghai Fanri Kangyi [Anti-Japan Protests in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong],” September 17, 2010, http://politics.dwnews.com/news/2010-09- 17/56466720.html (accessed May 3, 2012). 97 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz/ (accessed May 8, 2013). 98 The information about this example was retrieved from the author’s interview in Beijing on November 7, 2011. Chinese scholar Yu Zhirong who has served more than 20 years in SOA also has similar observations. See Yu, Donghai Weiquan, 1-104.

150 reached in 2008, China’s interests were violated on the contrary. The Japanese officials also believed that Chinese negotiators made some mistakes. This example can partly explain why the top CCP leaders have been reluctant to proceed with the Sino-Japanese negotiation from then on.

In addition to the above problem it has caused, MFA also faces a great deal of pressure from Chinese people’s anti-Japan nationalistic sentiment. For instance, as one senior MFA official has acknowledged, he and his colleagues had to consider the opinions of the Chinese citizens when making decisions to manage the Sino- Japan maritime collision incident in September 2010. While MFA did not want to see an escalation of the dispute and wished to solve it as soon as possible, it had to respond to the furious Chinese citizens.99 Meanwhile, the PLA has also frequently made nationalistic comments on China policy towards Japan and urged the government to re-define its interests in disputed waters in the East China Sea, imposing another sort of pressure on MFA.100

At times, MFA has no choice but to passively make some hardline statements to pacify the Chinese citizens’ nationalistic sentiment. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 collision incident, MFA was forced to replace its initial stance with a tougher attitude towards Japan. It initiated a series of countermeasures in response to Chinese people’s mounting animosity against Japan: (1) suspending high-level exchanges between the two governments; (2) cancelling a scheduled bilateral talk on the negotiation of the joint exploitation of the Chunxiao gas field; (3) requesting the Japanese government to make an official apology to China; and (4) indemnifying the Chinese fishing ship for the loss incurred.101

99 Xinhua News, “Wouguo Waijiao Kaishi Zhongshi Minyi Waijiao Juece Cankao Wangmin Yijian [Foreign Ministry Values Public Opinion and Refers to Netizens’ Opinions When Making Policies],” November 9, 2010, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010 -11/09/c_12754167.htm (accessed August 14, 2011). 100 Author’s survey of Chinese online news reports. 101 Sina News, “Waijiaobu Cheng Zhongri Zhuanhchuan Shitai Zouxiang Qujueyu Rifang Xuanze [MFA: Future Development of the Collision Incident Depends on Japan’s Attitude],” September 20, 2010, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-09-20/140421140626.shtml (accessed May 2, 2013).

151

However, nationalistic voices for a more hardline policy to solve China’s maritime disputes have had some negative impacts on Chinese diplomats when making their decisions.102 As one China expert asserts, “when popular nationalists demand tougher foreign policies, the MFA is stuck between a rock and a hard place: they need to maintain stable relations with Japan to ensure China’s continued economic growth, but also fear appearing weak before nationalists at home.”103

State-owned Oil Companies

Some Chinese state-owned oil companies have also been involved in the East China Sea dispute. Although they are not directly in charge of the delimitation of maritime border and international negotiations, they have still played some roles in relevant issues. One particular role of Chinese oil companies is their participation in the China-Japan negotiations regarding the East China Sea EEZ border. For instance, since the beginning of its first drilling project in the Longjing gas field in 1980, CNOOC had subsequently exploited the hydrocarbon deposits in the Xihu Trough, a basin consisting of numerous gas fields, in the following years.104 Given its experience in the research and exploitation of these gas fields, CNOOC participated in the Sino-Japanese bilateral talks regarding a possible joint development in gas fields there in the mid-1980s as it was authorised by the Chinese government to negotiate with its Japanese counterparts.105

102 Yoshikazu Kato, “Zhongri Diaodao Zhengduan Qingxuhua Minzu Zhuyi Yuanhe Baofa [Dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands and China’s Temperamental Nationalism],” Nanfang Daily, October 29, 2010, http://opinion.nfdaily.cn/content/2010-10/29/content_17148546.h tm (accessed August 14, 2010); Zhao Suisheng, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 550- 551. 103 Peter H. Gries, “China’s New Thinking on Japan,” The China Quarterly, no. 184 (2005): 848. 104 Cun-Ni Long, “Diaoyu Tai Ji Chunxiao Youtian [The Diaoyu Islands and Chunxiao Gas Field],” Defence International no. 261 (2006), http://www.diic.com.tw/mag/mag261/261-68.htm (accessed May 4, 2013). 105 Yarita, “Toward Cooperation in the East China Sea,” 23-24.

152

The effects of CNOOC on the Sino-Japanese negotiations were evident. From 1985 to 2001, CNOOC conducted a series of negotiations with Japanese oil companies such as Uruma, Japex and Japan National Oil Cooperation. A set of issues were discussed: (1) the delimitation of the border of the East China Sea EEZ; (2) the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands; (3) the scope of the joint development area in the Japanese-claimed EEZ; and (4) where and when to initiate the joint development project.106

Despite the fact that only limited progress was achieved and negotiations between CNOOC and Japanese oilers eventually terminated in 2001, CNOOC still played two roles in relation to China’s later interactions with Japan. Firstly, CNOOC collected some useful information about Japan’s basic positions and negotiation strategies. From numerous rounds of negotiations, CNOOC representatives could understand what their Japanese counterparts wanted and how they bargained for more interests. 107 Secondly, CNOOC’s research projects and proposals during this period were also important sources of information for the Chinese government when it launched a new round of negotiation regarding the Sino-Japanese joint development in the East China Sea EEZ in 2004. For instance, based on its studies, CNOOC in 2005 openly refuted Japan’s accusation of China’s “siphoning off” the oil and gas deposits in its claimed EEZ. According to Wang Yan, general manager of the exploration department CNOOC’s, oil and gas deposits were not like a glass of juice and, based on the principles of oceanic geology, it would be impossible that Chinese drilling platform could siphon off the deposits in Japanese-claimed EEZ.108

106 Ibid., 24-26. 107 Ibid. 108 Long Zhixing, Quanmian Jiexi Zhongri Donghai Jiufen De Shiyufei [A Comprehensive Analysis of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute], http://bbs.creaders.net/military/bbsviewer.php?trd_id =125318&language=big5 (accessed June 8, 2013); Liao, “Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability,” 64-66.

153

CCP Publicity Department and the Government’s Interaction with Public Opinion

China has had a long history of anti-Japan nationalistic campaigns which can be traced back to the first Sino-Japanese textbook controversy in 1982.109 There are various factors which might contribute to the phenomenon and, in particular, some believe that the Chinese government has been deliberately manipulating its citizens’ anti-Japan nationalistic sentiment as it is a good way for CCP to consolidate its legitimacy.110 For example, in the mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin launched a new wave of nationalistic campaign which focused on China’s miserable experience in the Japanese invasion during World War II. While some argue that this campaign was motivated by Jiang’s personal memory and the history of his family who sacrificed during the war,111 others believe that consolidating the legitimacy of CCP was the main driver. To serve the aim to bolster the CCP government’s authority, as the CCP’s primary organ in charge of controlling public opinion, the CCP Publicity Department has an important role in anti-Japanese campaigns launched by the government.

In terms of the East China Sea dispute, Chinese leading news agencies associated with the CCP Publicity Department constantly publish hawkish commentaries on China’s disputes with Japan. They further inflame Chinese

109 He Yinan, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino- Japanese Relations, 1950-2006,” History & Memory 19, no. 2 (2007): 51-56. For more analysis of Chinese nationalism and Sino-Japanese relationship, see Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernisation, Identity and International Relations (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Zhang Jian, “The Influence of Chinese Nationalism on Sino- Japanese Relations,” in China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past, ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007), 15-34; Xia Liping, “East Asian Multilateral Cooperation and the Prospects for China-Japan Relations,” in China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past, ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007), 35- 53. 110 Erik Beukel, Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011), 11; He Yinan, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (2007): 1-24. 111 Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 144-145.

154 citizens’ clamorous voices for a tougher Chinese policy to counter Japan.112 The 2012 anti-Japan nationalistic protest against the Japanese government’s decision to nationalise the disputed Diaoyu Islands was a good example as the Chinese state- owned media played a significant role in instigating the irredentist nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese citizens. 113 A series of hawkish commentaries were published in newspapers supervised by the CCP Publicity Department. For instance, on September 16, 2012, the Xinhua News Agency published a special report denouncing Japan’s nationalising the contested islands and argued that the Japanese government’s decision was “an act of Fascism” which violated the norms of human justice.114 A few days later, adopting a more belligerent stance, one editorial of the Global Times strongly condemned Japan’s unilateral act and urged the Chinese people to stop giving respect to the Japanese people and treat them as “rascals in Asia.”115

In fact, some Chinese scholars argue that the CCP government may even be willing to consider using Chinese citizens’ nationalistic sentiment as a good bargaining chip when conducting negotiations with Japan.116 As has been stated, “the nature of public opinion and government’s policy is totally different… the difference can provide the decision makers with more bargaining chips when negotiating with foreign countries… Diplomacy is an art of negotiation, and the more bargaining chips we have, the more interests we can obtain.”117

112 Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited,” 552. 113 See James Reilly, “A Wave to Worry About? Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and China’s Anti- Japan Protests,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014), 197-215. 114For more on this, see Xinhua News, “Pinglun: Riben Gou Diaoyudao Shiyu Renlei Zhengyi Weidi [Commentary: Japan’s Decision to Purchase the Diaoyu Islands Violates the Norms of Human Justice],” September 16, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-09/16/c_113092525.htm (accessed May 4, 2013). 115 For more on this, see Global Times, “Sheping: Biezai Yangshi Riben Bata Kancheng Yazhou Diaomin [Editorial: Stop Giving Respect to the Japanese People and Treat Them as Rascals in Asia],” September 28, 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-09/3154327.html (accessed May 4, 2013). 116 Author’s interview in Beijing, November 3, 2011. 117 Qi Jianhua, Yingxiang Zhongguo Waijiao Juece De Wuda Yingsu [Five Drivers of Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-making] (Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2010), 251- 252.

155

Nevertheless, it is not to say that Chinese people’s anti-Japanese sentiment was completely manipulated by the Chinese government.118 In China today, greater civilian access to information through media and internet have made Chinese citizens be able to acquire the latest news everyday more easily as well as to exchange their opinions with other people. The Publicity Department finds that, to a certain extent, it is difficult to manage the anti-Japanese nationalism. It is also uneasy to make nationalism facilitate Beijing’s political ends. As some argue, “Beijing certainly has the coercive power to silence dissenting voices, as recently demonstrated in its crackdown of the Falun Gong and many scattered labour and rural riots. But to use that power against popular can be politically risky because it would be contradict to the government’s own claims to be the foremost defender of national interest and pride.”119 The net result is that the creation of a freer Chinese media environment flooded with nationalistic sentiment, which will force the government to undertake more muscular attitude towards foreign countries.120 In particular, the Publicity Department sometimes needs to cool down the overheated nationalism and discourages the Chinese people from organising large-scale anti- Japanese protests because they would spoil social stability should became incontrollable.121

Academic Institutes and Chinese Scholars

Over that last twenty years, Chinese scholars and civilian think tanks have obtained more opportunities to participate in the decision-making process for China’s foreign policy when the country has increased its interactions with the

118 For more information, see Yang Jian, China’s Security Strategy towards Japan: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2001), 4. 119 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,”18-19. Also see Beukel, Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship, 16-17. 120 Thomas Christensen, “The Advantages of An Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 60-61. 121 Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited,” 233.

156 outside world. 122 Through multiple channels, the opinions from the Chinese intellectuals can be passed either directly or indirectly on to decision makers at the centre. 123 As some argue, “scholars now regularly interact with and advise government official, and many commonly appear in China’s print and broadcast media to comment on current international topics… They are both opinion-makers and conveyors of public opinion.”124

In terms of direct channels, Chinese scholars working in think tanks affiliated with the government can convey their opinions to the decision makers via several ways, such as publishing research studies, submitting internal reports and attending meetings organised by the government. Publications form these think thanks are numerous. For instance, papers in the journal of Xiandai Guoji Guanxi published by China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) are believed to be important reference materials for Chinese decision makers.125 In addition, the journal of Guoji Wenti Yanjiu and internal and reports published by China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), MFA’s primary subordinate think tank, are also influential documents.126

CICIR scholars frequently publish papers regarding China’s policy for managing the East China Sea dispute on Xiandai Guoji Guanxi and other Chinese journals and newspapers. These papers provide good pathways for us to learn the logic and perspectives of these academics. Assessments made by CICIR scholars are diverse. Some argue that China should be more cautious about managing its relationships with neighbouring countries and believe that people who urge for a

122 Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002): 597. 123 For more discussion on this, see Yang Jian, “Two Tigers on the same Mountain: China’s Security Policy towards Japan,” in China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past? ed. Michael Heazle and Nick Knight (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 127-148. 124 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of Peaceful Rise,” The China Quarterly, no. 190 (2007): 307. 125 David Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” The China Quarterly, no. 171 (2002): 583; Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes,” 608-615. 126 Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks,” 583-585.

157 more offensive naval power capable of breaking through the strategic barrier of the first and second island chains mistakenly calculated China’s strategic interests.127 On the other hand, some highlight the implications of a rising Japanese military presence in the Diaoyu Islands region and urge Beijing to develop a strong naval force to protect its maritime interests, especially when the strategic environment has been less favourable to China.128 Albeit these papers may not be identical to the inner reports submitted to the government, they suggest that Chinese decision makers receive papers conducted by their subordinate think tanks with diverse analyses and recommendations. In general, however, CICIR holds a more sceptical stance on China’s cooperation with Japan.129

Different from the sceptical tone of Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, many articles in Guoji Wenti Yanjiu regarding the Sino-Japanese relations hold a relatively conciliatory stance and support more cooperation with Japan130 even though some of them were published in the aftermath of maritime clashes in the East China Sea. Unsurprisingly, this stance is quite consistent with MFA’s moderate position. For example, in early January 2011, 3 months after the 2010 fishing boat collision incident, one paper on Guoji Wenti Yanjiu argued that while the strategic environment China faced had become grimmer in recent years, China should still sustain a principle of “uphold keeping a low profile, actively do something (taoguang yanghui, TGYH).”131 The article also refuted arguments in support of a tougher stance on China’s maritime disputes with regional countries. Instead, it

127 Lin Limin, Xianjieduan Zhongguo Zhanlue Shang De Fancuo Kongjian Youduoda [How Many Mistakes Can China Make on China’s Strategy at Current Stage], http://www.cicir.ac.cn/chinese/newsView.aspx?nid=2622 (accessed August 18, 2011). Lin Limin is a research fellow at CICIR and the editor of Xiandai Guoji Guanxi. 128 Chen Xiangyang, Youxiao Yinying Zhoubian Haiquan Xinjiaozhu [Effectively Manage the Regional Competition for Maritime Power], http://cicir.ac.cn/chinese/newsView.aspx?nid=1678 (accessed August 18, 2011). Chen Xiangyang is an associate research fellow at CICIR. 129 Liao Xuanli, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006), 132. 130 For instance, see Jiang Yaochun, “Lun Zhongri Guanxi [On China-Japan Relations],” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu no. 5 (2006): 1-5. 131 A more detailed discussion of TGYH is made in section 4.4.

158 contended that a “modest and prudent” policy would be China’s best strategic choice.132

Additionally, the indirect pathway for Chinese scholars to pass their opinions on to the decision makers is through public debates, and one important platform for conducting these debates is TV talk shows.133 Their participation in TV talk shows has been a common phenomenon in China at present and, to some extent, these comments have the function of guiding public opinion.134 For instance, the most popular and influential news talk shows − “Focus Today (jinri guanzhu)” and “Global Watch (huanqiu shixian)” − regularly invite Chinese scholars to comment on the PLAN’s modernisation and maritime territorial dispute between China and Japan. For instance, on July 4, July 26, July 31, August 2 and August 4, 2011, “Focus Today” made a series of programs discussing the rising Japanese naval power, confrontation between Chinese and Japanese vessels in East China Sea and Japan’s security threat to China.135 These programs were subsequently uploaded on Chinese online forums. They brought extensive discussions among Chinese netizens.136

Finally, it is noteworthy that among Chinese online blogs or forums, many Chinese bloggers are inclined to quote commentaries made by Chinese university lectures or TV talk show commentators. Bloggers usually quote some comments made by a famous scholar to justify his/her own arguments as well as attract more attentions and feedbacks.137 For example, in early July 2010, a topic on “Tianya Online Forum,” one leading online forum in China, discussing the PLAN East Sea

132 Wang Jisi, “The International Positioning of China and the Strategy of Keeping a Low Profile while Getting Something Accomplished,” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, no.2 (2011): 4-9. 133 Zhao Quansheng, “Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy, ed. Hao Yufan and Su Lin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 128. Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes,” 607. 134 Wang Jianwei and Wang Xiaojie, “Media and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 221. 135These programs can be accessed on CCTV webpage, http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/jinriguanzhu/video.ind ex.shtml. 136 Based on author’s survey of Chinese online forums. 137 Based on author’s survey of Chinese online forums.

159

Fleet’s military exercise in the East China Sea quoted the comments of Chen Hu, the editor of one famous Chinese military magazine “World Military (shijie junshi).” Another topic on “Sina Military Online Forum” discussing the PLAN’s naval operations in surrounding waters of the Diaoyu Island quoted remarks of both China Foreign Affairs College professor Zhou Yongsheng and China Research Institute of Oceanographic Development researcher Jin Yongming.138 It appears that Chinese scholars are happy to see their comments being quoted online. Moreover, they also establish individual online blogs and welcome Chinese neitzens’ comments give that internet has become the most convenient channel to pass their opinion on to the public as well as government officials. 139 While these scholars do not directly participate in the policy-making, their opinion may still indirectly affect the policy outcomes.

4.4 Key Features of the Policy Process

Policy actors within or outside the Chinese official decision-making apparatus has their individual influences on China’s policy on East China Sea dispute. Some urge for a more assertive action against Japan while others favour a more moderate approach to resolve the long-lasting territory dispute. Particularly, this chapter finds that due to the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority, the policy process of its decisions to resolve the East China Sea dispute has three key features: (1) the bids for individual bureaucratic interests among policy actors; (2) the lack of functional policy coordination; and (3) diverse interpretations of policy guidelines.

138 On more discussion on this topic, see Sina Military Forum Online, “Riben Shangyue Qitu Qiangzhan Diaoyudao Zhongguo Paichu Junjian Qiangying Jinggao [Japan Attempted to Seize the Diaoyu Islands Last Month; China Singled a Warning by Dispatching Battleships],” http://club.mil.news.sina.com.cn/thread-399717-1-1.html. 139 Qi, Yingxiang Zhongguo Waijiao Juece De Wuda Yingsu, 244-247.

160

Bids for Bureaucratic Interests

China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea is clearly reflected by the belligerent patrol operations undertook by China’s naval fleets which have increasingly enhanced their presence in this region. In China, hardliners, such as the PLA, find that it is easier for them to promote their views and obtain the interests they bid because voice of the hard-liners is generally louder than that of the moderates.140 For instance, the PLA is good at promoting the view that the external security environment has become more unfavourable to China over the past few years. The best platform the PLA has utilised is its subordinate media, such as the PLA Daily and its associated Chinese Military Net. Stories reported by the PLA-controlled media constantly address the PLAN’s outstanding performance in detail as well as urge the government and the Chinese people to support the pursuit of a greater military power. 141 To justify their claims, these reports frequently highlight the threatening military presence of American and Japanese forces in East Asia. They have been extensively cited by leading news agencies in China.142

The PLAN’s operations in East China Sea have also stimulated Chinese netizens’ anti-Japan nationalistic sentiment. For instance, one topic on Tianya Forum Online reported the PLAN East Sea Fleet’s military exercise in East China Sea in early July 2010. The topic was published on June 28, 2010. It gained fervent feedbacks up to 53,000 reviews/comments within a short period. Unsurprisingly, a great deal of these feedbacks supported the PLAN’s operations. For instance, one netizen argued that “‘keep a thing seven years and you will always find a use for it (yangbing qianri yongzai yishi),’ and now it’s the best timing for the PLA to

140 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 15. 141 For instance, see a special report by the PLA Daily: Xiaohu Qian, “Bihai Jinglei: Muji Donghai Jiandui Haikong Shibing Shidan Yanlian [Thunder on the Blue Sea: Witness PLAN East Sea Fleet Live-fire Military Exercises],” PLA Daily, July 16, 2010, http://tc.wangchao.net.cn/junshi/detail_ 14 8110.html (accessed July 28, 2011). Also see China News, “Jiefanfjun Donghai Yanlian Gaodiao Puguang Zhongguo Guoduan Liangjian [PLA Reports Its Military Drill in East China Sea with High-sounding Words to Show China’s Sword],” July 7, 2010, http://big5.chinanews.com.cn:89/gat e/big5/www.chinanews.com/hb/2010/07-07/2386578.shtml (accessed July 28, 2011). 142 Based on author’s survey of online news reports.

161 demonstrate its strengths.” Another even claimed that “since this is a live-fire exercise, why not just sink Japanese and American ships at once?”143 A more sensational topic named “Could the PLAN’s No. 022 Missile Boat Destroy U.S. Carriers?” was posted two days later and received over 65,000 reviews/comments. Like the previous case, there was also a landslide support of a stronger PLAN.144 Clearly, Chinese netizens’ online discussions and comments bolstered the heroic image of the PLA domestically as they regarded these warships as protectors of China’s maritime interests and national pride.

In addition, the bid for institutional interests can be also observed from the reports published by Chinese academic institutes because they, either directly or indirectly, receive budgetary funds from different government agencies. The diverse positions indicate that each think tank has its own preferred policy when analysing certain issues given their institutional backgrounds. 145 As previously mentioned, the CICIR scholars are generally inclined to have an assertive stance on China’s maritime disputes with Japan. This is because CICIR has a closer relationship with the military.146 As Liao Xuanli argues, viewpoints of military think thanks or institutes close to the military normally have positions that are more assertive. This is because tougher voices “on the one hand, allow them to justify the necessity for military modernisation to cope with possible threats to China’s national security and, on the other hand, enhance military significance in Chinese politics which had been undermined in post-Mao era.”147

143 For more on these Chinese netizens’ discussions and comments, see Tianya Forum Online, “Zhongguo Zhongyu Chushoule−Donghai Junyan DuiKang Meihan Huanghai Junyan [China Finally Makes Actions − PLAN East China Sea Military Exercise in Response to America-South Korea Joint Military Exercise in Yellow Sea],” http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/worldlook /1/275749.shtml. 144 For more on these online discussions and comments, see Tianya Forum Online, “Canjia Donghai Junyan De Ling Er Er Daodan Kuaiting Nengfou Cuihui Meihangmu [Could the PLAN’s No. 022 Missile Boat Destroy U.S. Carriers?]” http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/worldlook/1/27603 9.shtml. 145 Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan, 137, 254-255. 146 Ibid. 137. 147Ibid.

162

The Lack of Functional Inter-agency Coordination

The lack of functional inter-agency coordination concerning China’s East China Sea policy can be observed from Chinese agencies’ inconsistent stances on a few issues. First of all, the PLA and MFA have had conflicting stances on the PLAN’s operations in the East China Sea from time to time. For instance, in July 2010, the PLAN held a life fire exercise in the East China Sea which was perceived by Japan, South Korea and the U.S. as an assertive operation in response to a planned joint exercise between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) navies in the Yellow Sea. 148 Nevertheless, this naval drill was conducted one month after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s trip to Japan during which Premier Wen promoted closer bilateral ties and the development of a Sino-Japanese “hot line” mechanism. 149 When commenting on this naval drill, MFA tried to pacified China’s unsettled neighbours and claimed that it was merely a regular military operation without targeting a particular country.150 However, according to some Chinese observers, the PLA was quite discontent upon hearing MFA’s statement.151 Instead, it broadly advertised this naval exercise with high-profile remarks which considerably contradicted MFA’s low-key stance.

Also, the 2013 China-Japan “radar incident” again revealed inconsistent positions of MFA and the PLA. On February 5, 2013, the Japanese government accused a Chinese frigate of pointing its fire-control radar at a Japanese destroyer near the waters off the Diaoyu Islands on January 30. 152 Nevertheless, the

148 Russell Hsiao, “Aims and Motives of China’s East China Sea Life Fire Drills,” China Brief 10, no. 14 (2010): 1-3. 149 Tsui-Yi Lin, “Wen Jiabao Fangri: Rizhong Chongjian Zongli Rexian [Wen Jiabao Visits Japan: Sino-Japanese Hot Line Resumed],” The Liberty Times, June 1, 2010, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/jun/1/today-int2.htm (accessed September 20, 2011). 150 The Beijing News “Waijiaobu: Jiefangjun Donghai Sheji Wuguan Beihan Bandao Jushi [MFA: PLAN East China Sea Drill Does not Concern the North Korea Situation],” June 30, 2010, http://big 5.citygf.com/news/news_001036/201006/t20100630_498593.html (accessed September 20, 2011) 151 See Zhongguo Junfang Raokai Waijiaobu Liangjian Meihan Junyan [Chinese Military Showed Its Sword in Response to the U.S.-South Korea Joint Military Exercise, Disregard MFA’s Position], http://ido.3mt.com.cn/Article/201006/show1931919c30p1.html (accessed September 20, 2011). 152 Martin Fackler, “Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Ship,” The New York Times, February 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/asia/japan-china-islands-dispute.html ?_r=0 (accessed May 12, 2013).

163 responses of MFA and the PLA were somewhat conflicting. Upon facing Tokyo’s accusation, MFA claimed that Japan completely created something out of nothing. On the other hand, while claiming that the Chinese frigate did not open the fire- control radar, the PLA confirmed that two warships did encounter in the Diaoyu Islands area.153 It appeared that the inter-agency coordination between the PLA and MFA was somewhat problematic given their conflicting positions on this issue.

Furthermore, oil-drilling projects undertaken by Chinese oil companies in some disputed areas in the East China Sea also disclose another aspect of problematic inter-agency coordination, that is, government agencies may promote its preferred policies/projects without advance consultations with other policy actors.

CNOOC, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) have long history of conducting drilling projects in the East China Sea EEZ. From Tokyo’s point of view, these projects symbolise China’s unilateral and assertive attempts to exploit the hydrocarbon deposits as they violate Japan’s economic interests in this region. Numbers of Sino- Japanese disputed have emerged. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that while damaging bilateral ties, these controversial projects are not products of a deliberate plan made by the Chinese government. For instance, when publishing its annual business report on April 12, 2007, CNOOC claimed that it had launched an exploitation project in the Tianwaitian gas field and another project in the Chunxiao gas field would be initiated soon. This report was released only one day after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which reached an oral consent on the Sino-Japanese joint development in the East China Sea gas fields. 154 While this report had brought Japan’s strong

153 Andrew Chubb, “Radar Incident Obstructs Beijing’s Conciliatory Turn toward Japan,” China Brief 13, no. 4 (2013): 6-7. 154 Chien-Peng Chung, “China-Japan Relations in the Post-Koizumi Era: A Brightening Half- decade?,” Asia-Pacific Review 19, no. 1 (2012): 93; Asia News, “Wen Jiabao in Tokyo: Friendship, Economics and Some Silence,” April 12, 2007, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Wen-Jiabao-in- Tokyo:-friendship,-economics-and-some-silence-8983.html (accessed May 14, 2013).

164 protest,155 it was not endorsed by the Chinese government as, on the same day, MFA spokesperson Qin Gang did not given any confirmation of CNOOC’s project in the Tianwaitian gas field by using an excuse that gas exploitation was not one of MFA’s duties.156 Instead, Qing Gang reiterated China’s positive attitude towards the Sino-Japanese joint development in the East China Sea gas fields.157

CNOOC’s controversial report did not appear to be a two-faced strategy of the Chinese government but more likely a product of problematic inter-agency coordination between CNOOC and other policy actors. This is because there were several CNOOC’s previous announcements about the commencement of drilling projects in the East China Sea gas fields which had never been endorsed by the Chinese government.158 Consequently, this case revealed a fact that CNOOC was inclined to put pressure to the Chinese central government to approve it drilling projects by making public announcements without advance consultations with relevant government agencies and the CCP authority.159 In short, on the one hand, unilateral announcement may be a strategy for CNOOC to do its business. On the other hand, it also indicates the problematic inter-agency coordination among Chinese government organs.

The third case indicating the problematic inter-agency coordination in China is the controversy over a proposal of revisiting Japan’s ownership of the Okinawa Islands. On May 8, 2013, a People’s Daily special report, quoting two Chinese scholars from a state-run research institute, proposed that it was the time to reconsider Japan’s sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands because they were not

155 China Review News, “Zhongri Da Youqi Gongshi Liangyoutian Youqi Zhengyi [Dispute Agitated after China and Japan Agreement on Joint Development],” April 13, 2007, http://www.chinareviewn ews.com/doc/ 1003 /4/7/7/100347700.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100347700 (accessed May 10, 2011). 156 Singtao Daily, “Zhonghaiyou Bao Donghai Youqitian Chanyou Waijiaobu Weizhengshi [Chinese Foreign Ministry Did Not Confirm CNOOC’s Drilling Project in the East China Sea]” April 13, 2007, http://www.stnn.cc:82/china/200704/t20070413_512827.html (accessed May 16, 2013). 157 Ibid. 158 Drifte, Japanese-Chinese Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea, 15. 159 Ibid.

165 part of Japan’s traditional territory.160 Due to the nature of the People’s Daily, the Japanese government regarded this proposal as a signal of a possible change in Beijing’s position on the Okinawa Islands and warned that it may further exacerbate stressful situation in the East China Sea. 161 Nevertheless, MFA subsequently refused to endorse it. According to MFA, the re-examination of the ownership of the Okinawa Islands was only a long-standing topic in the Chinese academic community and this did not suggest that the government’s position on this issue had changed.162

This controversy also appeared to be a product of the lack of policy coordination in China. As some observe, MFA has never changed its position which acknowledges Japan’s ownership of the Okinawa Islands and little interests China can obtain should it change its current position. Accordingly, revisiting the ownership of them was unlikely Chinese government’s well-thought plan to provoke Japan. 163 In addition, MFA’s position was echoed by the PLA’s Deputy Chief of Staff Qi Jianguo’s comment which was made at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a few days after the disputed surfaced. As General Qi stated, scholars could advertise any idea they wanted while they did not represent the position of the government.164 More importantly, if the proposal of revisiting the ownership of Okinawa was a well-designed plan, more articles in relation to this issue should have been published by the government’s mouthpiece media. However, the “Okinawa campaign” launched by the People’s Daily only lasted for a few days. The termination of this media campaign was regarded as CCP leaders’ decision to

160 Guo Zhongxiao, “Liuqiu Zhuquan Yinfa Waijiao Fengbao [Okinawa Sovereignty Issues Leads to Diplomatic Dispute],” Yazhou Zhoukan 27, no. 20 (2013): 46; The Japan Times, “China Questions Okinawa Ownership,” May 8, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.Jp/news/2013/05/08/national/china- questions-okinawa-ownership/ (accessed, May 10, 2013). 161 Voice of America, “Japan Protests Chinese Report Questioning Sovereignty of Okinawa,” May 9, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1657499.html (accessed May 10, 2013). 162 Japan Update, “Communist Media Suggests Okinawa Belongs to China,” May 16, 2013, http://www.japanupdate.com/2013/05/communist-media-suggests-okinawa-belongs-to-china/ (accessed May 20, 2013). 163 Guo, “Liuqiu Zhuquan Yinfa Waijiao Fengbao,” 47. 164 Reuters, “China Not Disputing Japan Sovereignty over Okinawa,” June 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/us-security-asia-okinawa-idUSBRE95101P20130602 (accessed June 2, 2013).

166 call off this disputed issue.165 The controversy again unveiled the problematic inter- agency coordination in China.

Diverse Interpretations of Policy Guidelines

As mentioned in Chapter 2, even though major policy decisions are made by the top CCP decision-makers, they do not always make clear and detailed policy directives. Instead, only broad policy guidelines are made with lots of efforts left for later bureaucratic negotiations among government organs. This phenomenon therefore provides China’s policy actors with a wider room to interpret these policy guidelines and formulate relevant policies more favourable to their bureaucratic interests. In the case of Beijing’s policy on the East China Sea dispute, policy actors have different interpretations regarding how to translate the TGYH principle – a longstanding guideline for its foreign policy − into specific policies for resolving this dispute.

The TGYH principle was firstly introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and become a philosophy for Chinese diplomats when dealing with China’s relationships with foreign countries. As Deng stated, “firstly, we should observe the situation coolly. Secondly, we should hold our ground. Thirdly, we should act calmly… We should be calm, calm and again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish something − something for China.”166 Even if this principle has been under some debates over its nature and values among Chinese scholars,167 there is a consensus in China

165 Guo, “Liuqiu Zhuquan Yinfa Waijiao Fengbao,” 46. 166 Quoted in Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng and Franklin Wakung Zhan, “Chinese Foreign Relations Strategies under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis,” Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 14, no. 3 (1999): 100. 167 For instance, see Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 68-79; Ye Zicheng, “On Keeping a Low Profile and Get Something Things Done,” Pacific Journal no. 1 (2002): 62-66.

167 which believes that the country should continue to follow Deng’s instruction while having a more active Chinese role in the global affairs.168

Nevertheless, MFA and the PLA have diverse observations regarding how to translate the TGYH principle into specific policies to resolve the East China Sea dispute albeit both agencies agree to continue this long-standing principle. In terms of MFA’s attitude, it has reiterated the importance of upholding this principle when managing its maritime dispute with Japan. For instance, senior MFA diplomat Ma Zhengang called for a calm Chinese stance on the Diaoyu Islands issue in the wake of a dispute over Japan’s purchase of the contested islands in 2012. He argued that “TGYH is a profound philosophical and strategic thinking and we should keep our current low-key stance and continue our works with a cautious mind.”169 Adopting a similar stance, Wu Jianmin, former Chinese ambassador to France, claimed that Japan’s decision to nationalise the Diaoyu Islands had nothing to do with this principle. Instead, he contended that China should confidently continue current policy and believed that promoting the revision of the TGYH principle was “an act of weakness.”170 According to Chinese diplomats’ explanation, when managing the East China Sea dispute, the Chinese government should emphasise its promise to uphold keeping a low profile” with the second part − “actively do something” − being less addressed.

On the other hand, the PLA has a different interpretation of the nature of this principle. For instance, General Ma Xiaotian, Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), has pointed out that even though China is still following this principle, much of China’s attention should be given to the part

168 Chen Dingding and Wang Jianwei, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9. No. 2 (2011): 214. 169 People’s Daily, “Taohuang Yanghui Juefei Wusuo Zuowei [Taohuang Yanghui Doesn’t Mean Doing Nothing],” September 29, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0929/c1002- 19154687.html (accessed May 2, 2013). 170 Sina News, “Wu Jianmin: Fandui Jianchi Waijiao Shang Taoguang Yanghui Shi Ruoguo Xintai Zuoguai [Wu Jianmin: Revising the TGYH Principle Is an Act of Weakness],” January 2, 2014, http://news.sina.com.hk/news/20140102/-9-3155399/1.html (accessed January 3, 2014).

168 of “actively do something.” 171 Also, when commenting on the East China Sea ADIZ issue in late 2013, General Luo Yuan contended that under the guidance of it, the PLA should make more active conducts to secure China’s sovereignty rights in disputed waters and the establishment of the ADIZ was a good example.172 Clearly, both generals’ arguments indicate that the PLA is inclined to highlight the second part this principle. As some have argued, the Chinese military has been undertaking a reformulated version of it − uphold keeping a low profile, actively “achieve” something.173

In short, although both the PLA and MFA agree that the TGYH principle should still serve as the guideline for China’s foreign policy, these two agencies have their individual explanations regarding how to translate it into specific policies to resolve the East China Sea dispute. From MFA’s point of view, even though the situation in the East China Sea has been deteriorating in recent years, the government should stick to a conciliatory and cooperative stance. Any hasty decision to change the policy would be an unwise call. On the contrary, the PLA urges the Chinese government to undertake more “active” policies which can adequately respond to an unfavourable security environment in East China Sea. In other words, MFA tries to prevent the Sino-Japanese dispute from going out of control while the PLA simply “pours more oil on the fire” by assertively sending more warships, making inconsistent outcomes of Beijing’s policy regarding the East China Sea dispute.

171 Tao Shelan, “Zhongguo Yinggai Jianchi Taoguang Yanghui Yousuo Zuowei Zhanlue [China Should Insists on Its Following the Taoguang Yanghui Strategy],” China News, December 27, 2011, http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2011-12/26/content_24254313.htm (accessed May 3, 2013); M. Taylor Fravel, “Revisiting Deng’s Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/revising-deng%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/ (accessed May 3, 2013). 172 Sina News, “Luo Yuan: Zhongguo Jinfang Pinpin Chuzhao Feiqi Taoguang Yanghui Zhengce [Luo Yuan: The PLA’s Active Manners Do Not Refer to the End of TGYH Principle],” November 27, 2013, http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnpolitics/phoenixtv/20131127/19505214695.html (accessed January 3, 2014). 173 National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2012, 14; Fravel, “Revisiting Deng’s Foreign Policy.”

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4.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examines the roles of different players in the decision-making process regarding China’s policy on maritime dispute in East China Sea. It argues that there is no deliberated policy as some sceptics assume. Due to diverse institutional backgrounds, China’s governmental organs have conflicting positions on the issue about whether the country should undertake a tougher or a conciliatory policy to resolve this dispute. As Andrew Scobell and Scott Harold assert, “bureaucratic actors play more active and prominent roles in the process. In addition, representatives of different bureaucracies are more and more outspoken in articulating different and sometimes competing views about national priorities.”174 Some policy actors, the PLA in particular, believe that, adopting a hawkish stance on the dispute can help them attract more attentions from the public and the top leaders. However, even though doing so can facilitate their bids for more budgetary funds, it has considerably contributed to the assertiveness of China’s relevant behaviours in the East China Sea at the same time. Moreover, due to the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority, diverse bureaucratic preferences have prevented the government from conducting consistent policies and operations from time to time.

In the past thirty years, the bilateral relations between Beijing and Tokyo have become much closer. More importantly, the two countries are expected to become more economically interdependent in the coming decades. 175 As one observer argues, it is clear that, despite never foregoing its sovereignty rights in disputed areas, the CCP government does not wish to see an escalation of China-Japan confrontation in the East China Sea. This is because a deepening rift with Tokyo does not accommodate China’s strategic needs which demand “the common, long- term interests of both countries in peaceful, stable and mutually productive

174 Andrew Scobell and Scott Harold, “An Assertive China? Insights from Interviewers,” Asian Security 9, no. 2 (2013):113. 175 Paul J. Smith, “China-Japan Relations: Competition amidst Independence,” in East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives, ed. Andrew T. H. Tan (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 67-68.

170 relations.” 176 However, to a certain extent, a fragmented structure of Chinese authority has considerably prevented Beijing from adopting consistent approaches and behaviours. Some of them are conciliatory while others are assertive. This phenomenon has not only blemished the Sino-Japanese relationship but also caused other regional countries’ deepening concern about China’s real intentions and its rapid rise. As a result, even if China wishes to settle its territorial disputes with Japan through peaceful means, it has not developed a consistent approach in support of this aim. Instead, some of its actions have seemed to contradict other efforts and therefore such inconsistency makes the settlement of this dispute difficult.177

176 Michael D. Swaine and others, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 46. 177 Byron N. Tzou, China and International Law: The Boundary Disputes (New York: Prager, 1990), 125-134.

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Making of Beijing’s Policy on the South China Sea Dispute

In recent years, the South China Sea has become one of the flashpoints in the Asia- Pacific region as clamorous disputes over maritime sovereignty among claiming states have considerably damaged regional stability. Even though Beijing has reiterated that it has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, its policy on the South China Sea dispute is quite conflicting in nature. On the one hand, China at times holds a moderate position to seek more regional cooperation while, on the other, it sometimes undertakes aggressive operations to enhance its presence in the South China Sea region. As a conciliatory Chinese stance at one time can be easily followed by a more antagonistic one later, regional claiming states have not only become wary of the implications of China’s rapid rise for regional stability but also shown more concern about the prospect of the resolution of the South China Sea dispute.

This chapter examines the decision-making process behind Beijing’s policy to manage its maritime disputes in the South China Sea. In particular, it seeks to explain the factors that led to the inconsistent nature of this policy. This chapter argues that intense inter-agency competition among policy actors in a fragmented Chinese political system has contributed to such contradictory nature. In addition, unlike Beijing’s policy on the East China Sea disputed as examined in the previous chapter, the impacts of local authorities, especially the Hainan provincial government, on its South China Sea policy are particularly noteworthy. Finally, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been losing its bureaucratic authority over the formulation of China’s foreign and maritime security policies, as the arena for decision-making in China has become more crowded.

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This chapter consists of four main sections. Section 5.1 reviews the South China Sea dispute. In Section 5.2, this chapter examines the nature of Beijing’s policy on this dispute. Section 5.3 looks at the decision-making process of this policy and considers three relevant issues: aggressive civilian maritime law enforcement patrol operations, the controversy over Chinese passports having maps which include the South China Sea islands as Chinese territory and Hainan Province’s tourism project in disputed waters. Section 5.4 concludes with some major findings.

5.1 The South China Sea Dispute: An Overview

The South China Sea, a vast body of water stretching from the Taiwan Strait in the north to the Strait of Karimata between the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Borneo in the south, encloses hundreds of reefs, rocks, atolls and small islands.1 The entire area of the South China Sea is estimated to be approximately 3.5 million square kilometres.2 The land formation in this area is composed of four major groups of islands: the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands) and Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands) with the majority of it located in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.3 The Natuna Islands occupied by Indonesia are in the southern extremity of the South China Sea.4 Lying alongside the Indochina subcontinent and Chinese mainland, and with about 90% of it surrounded by land, the South China Sea is

1 John R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London: Methuen, 1985), 209-210. 2 Sam Bateman, “Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea,” in Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation, ed. Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 15; Wu Shicun, The South China Sea Dispute: Origin and Development (Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 2013); 4-6. 3 Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer Verlag, 2009), 137. 4 Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Aldershot; Brookfield, USA: Ashgate, 1997), 3.

173 regarded as a “geopolitical lake” where littoral states compete for marine resources and sovereignty rights.5

In terms of the economic significance of the South China Sea, its natural resources in this region are abundant. For example, a 1989 Chinese survey estimated that the potential hydrocarbon reserve on the seabed in this region is equivalent to 25 billion cubic metres of natural gas, 370,000 tons of phosphorous and 105 billion barrels of oil.6 Given these massive oil and gas reserves, some Chinese analysts regard the South China Sea as “The Second Persian Gulf.”7 On the other hand, a 1993/1994 research study conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) provided relatively conservative estimates, claiming that the petroleum reserve in the South China Sea is roughly 28 billion barrels, still a large number. 8 Consequently, there is no doubt that the hydrocarbon reserve in this region is an important source of primary energy for littoral countries. As there is growing reliance on imported oil in this region,9 it is foreseeable that the need to exploit oil and gas in the South China Sea will become more intense.10 The rich hydrocarbon reserve therefore serves as a major factor contributing to disputed sovereignty claims to the South China Sea islands.

5 Joo-Jock Lim, “The South China Sea: Changing Strategic Perspectives,” in Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development, ed. Chia Lin Sien and Colin MacAndrews (Singapore: McGraw-Hill International Book Company, 1981), 230-231. 6 John W. Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,” The China Quarterly no. 132 (1992): 1015. Also see Catley and Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea, 46. 7 China Review News, “Nanhai You Dier Bosiwan Zhicheng [South China Sea is also Called the Second Persian Gulf],” June 20, 2011, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1017/3/7/9/101737965.html?coluid=7 &kindid=0&docid=101737965 (accessed July 3, 2013); Hainan Daily, “Nanhai Youqi Ziyuan Fengfu Kancheng Dier Ge Bosiwan [The South China Sea is the Second Persian Gulf due to Its Rich Oil and Gas Reserve],” December 7, 2012, http://ocean.china.com.cn/2012- 12/07/content_27344617.htm (accessed July 3, 2013); Peter Hartcher, “Full Steam ahead for China’s Territorial Ambitions,” The Sydney Morning Herald,” July 13, 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/full-steam-ahead-for-chinas-territorial- am bitions-20100712-107sp.html (accessed July 3, 2013). 8 For more on estimates of the hydrocarbon reserve in the South China Sea, see South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-oil.htm. 9 Nick Owen, “Oil Disputes in the South China Sea in Context,” in Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Energy and Geopolitics, ed. Clive Schofield (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 15-16. 10 Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia (Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 291.

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In addition to its rich hydrocarbon reserve, the South China Sea is one of the world’s largest fishing grounds. One Chinese study estimates the average annual catch from this region at about 30 million tons.11 Additionally, a U.S. survey ranks the South China Sea the fourth-largest fishing ground in the world in terms of total maritime production.12 The enormous amounts of marine resources in these waters are particularly important to China as some Chinese coastal provinces have long had problems of over-fishing and pollution in their waters.13 For instance, due to over-fishing, fish species in the Beibu Gulf area declined from 487 in the early 1960s to 238 in the mid-2000s. In the meantime, stock density obtained from trawlers also declined significantly, reaching its lowest point on record in 1998 of just 16.7% of that in 1962. Even though the Chinese government has implemented a closed-season policy in coastal areas since 1999, the problem of over-fishing remains.14

In terms of the strategic significance, the South China Sea is the world’s second busiest international waterway, with more than 50 percent of global oil- bearing traffic and merchant shipping passing through this region. 15 As some argues, this region is a “maritime bridge connecting Asia to markets and raw materials suppliers in Europe, South Asia, the Middle East, North America and Australia as well as facilitating intra-Asia trade.”16 In particular, the gross tonnage of commercial shipping in the South China Sea is double that in the Suez Canal and triple that in the Panama Canal.17 Some channels in the South China Sea region, for example, the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda and Lombok Straits, are the most

11 Guo Lan, Nanhai Diyuan Zhengzhi Yanjiu [Geopolitical Studies of the South China Sea] (Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2007), 42. 12 Daniel Y. Coulter, “South China Sea Fisheries: Countdown to Calamity,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 4 (1996): 375. 13 Shandong Business News, “Zhongguo Jinhai Ji Wuyu Kebu [No Fishes in China’s Near Seas],” January 6, 2012, http://www.readmeok.com/2012-1/6_3434.html (accessed July 10, 2013). 14 Yu Yunjun and Mu Yongtong, “The New Institutional Arrangements for Fisheries Management in Beibu Gulf,” Marine Policy 30, no. 3 (2006): 251-252. 15 Rajaram Panda and Shamshad A. Khan, “China and the South China Sea: Future Power Projections,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 5, no. 3 (2010): 306. 16 Christopher Chung, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Decision Units and Domestic Politics” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2004), 91. 17 Jin Yongming, Study on the Ocean Issues vol. 1 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 398.

175 important strategic checkpoints in the world.18 From the Chinese point of view, the strategic significance of the South China Sea is unquestionable as about 75% of China’s international trade and 80% of its imported energy are transported through this region.19 Clearly, China’s economic development is dependent on the safety of maritime transportation in the South China Sea.

In addition, some contested islands in the South China Sea serve as military outposts as well.20 For instance, in World War II, Japan deployed a few forward naval bases in this region. These forward bases supported Japan’s seaborne operations against Southeast Asian countries.21 During the Cold War period, both Washington and Moscow valued the South China Sea’s convenient egresses for troops and regarded it as an ideal waterway to “succour allies and bring naval influence to bear on enemies and to discourage any hostile acts by potential foes.”22 Currently, the military value of this area is still significant as it encompasses several oceanic basins which are good arenas for modern submarine operations.23 Also, Washington regards sea lines in this region as important passages connecting its naval bases in Guam in the western Pacific and Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean.24 Similarly, the Japanese government claims that it will extend the scope of its nation’s defence up to 1,000 miles away from the Japanese coastline, which covers almost the entire South China Sea.25

18 Dong Liangqing, Zhanlue Dili Xue [Strategic Geography] (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1999), 207-208. 19 Gao Zichuan, ed., Lanse Jingshi: Ershiyi Shijichu De Haiyang Zhengduo Yu Zhanwang [The Blue Warning: The Maritime Competition and Prospect in Early 21st Century] (Beijing: Haichao Press, 2004), 97. 20 Ralf Emmers, The Changing Power Distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for Conflict Management and Avoidance (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009), 5-7. 21 Lim, “The South China Sea: Changing Strategic Perspectives,” 227. 22 Ibid., 228-229. 23 Chao-Ying Hsu and Chi-Peng Wang, “Chinese Perspectives: Re-evaluation of the South China Sea Interests,” Defence International no. 347 (2013): 33. 24 Ke-Chin Shen, Nanhai Zhudao Zhuquan Zhengyi Pingshu [Comments on Sovereignty Disputes over South China Sea Islands] (Taipei: Student Books, 2009), 36. 25 Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, ed., Network Power: Japan and Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 277.

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The origin of the South China Sea dispute dates back to the early 1930s. In 1932, the French colonial authorities in Vietnam instituted an administrative office in the Paracel Islands 26 and, one year later, the French government declared that it had occupied nine features in the Spratly Islands. These actions subsequently led to a protest being lodged by the Chinese Nationalist government which accused the French government of violating Chinese sovereignty.27 The dispute between China and France was later shelved given the eruption of World War II, during which the Japanese navy controlled most parts of the South China Sea region. In the 1950s and 1960s, regional order in the South China Sea was relatively stable, albeit China, Vietnam and the Philippines had begun to occupy some land features in this region.28 Nevertheless, since the hydrocarbon reserve had been discovered in the late 1960s,29 new rounds of sovereignty disputes over the South China Sea have re- emerged. Apart from China, Vietnam and the Philippines, other littoral states, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei have also expressed their interests.30

In terms of the competing claims, disputes concern mainly the ownership of the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal (Figure 5.1 illustrates competing claims in the South China Sea). 31 In China, a U-shaped maritime boundary line was included in an official map drawn by the Nationalist government in 1947.32 Then, after the Chinese civil war (1947-1949), Zhou Enlai made the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government’s first official claim to the South China Sea in 1951, arguing that the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank are China’s traditional maritime territory.33 Since the early 1950s, Beijing has initiated a set of administrative approaches through a prolonged

26 Wu, The South China Sea Dispute, 91. 27 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982), 61-63. 28 Wu, The South China Sea Dispute, 3. 29 Brantly Womack, “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 373. 30 Wu, The South China Sea Dispute, 4. 31 The Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) is geographically part of the Macclesfield Bank. 32 Chien-Peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 128. 33 Chi-Kin Lo, China’s Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 27-28. The 1947 U-shaped maritime boundary line was originally an eleven-dashed line. In 1953, the PRC government changed it to a nine-dashed line.

177 process to consolidate its claim to the South China Sea islands (see Table 5.1). In addition, even if Beijing has reiterated that the area within the nine-dashed line is China’s “historical waters,” it has not clarified the legal claim it wishes to make within this line to date.34

Figure 5.1 Competing Claims in the South China Sea

(This figure has been removed due to copyright restirctions)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

34 Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behaviour Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor no. 35 (2011): 2-4.

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Table 5.1 Beijing’s Administrative Approaches in the South China Sea, 1950-2013

The Hainan Administrative Region Office under the Guangdong 1950-56 provincial government conducted scientific activities in the waters off the Paracel Islands.

The Chinese government made the Statement on China’s Territorial 1958 Sea, which claimed that the rule of delineating a country’s territorial sea should be applied to the South China Sea islands.

The Hainan Administrative Region Office established the Office of 1959 the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank.

The Guangdong Revolutionary Council of the Paracel Islands, 1969 Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank was established.

The China Committee on Geographical Names published the 1983 “Standard Names of Chinese Islands.” 287 islands were given official names, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

The government of the Hainan Administrative Region was established in Haikou City. This new organ was responsible for 1984 governing Hainan Island as well as the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 1987 Organisation (UNESCO) commissioned China to build an observation post on the Spratly Islands.

Beijing passed the Law of Territorial Sea and Adjacent Area. This 1992 law reiterated Chinese claim to the South China Sea islands.

Beijing rectified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 1996 Sea (UNCLOS) as well as established baselines for the Paracel Islands. A maritime rescue centre was established on Woody Island, the 2006 largest of the Paracel Islands. The Hainan provincial government established a county-level organ 2012 “Sansha City.” The Hainan provincial government officially opened the Paracel 2013 Islands to tourism in May.

Source: China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011; Shen, 2009; Xinhua News

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On the other hand, the Vietnamese government claims its ownership of the entire Paracel and Spratly Islands, even if the Vietnamese navy was defeated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the 1974 Sino-Vietnamese naval clash and lost de facto control of the Paracel islands thereafter. 35 Unlike China and Vietnam, the Philippines claim about 60 features in the Spratly Islands plus the Scarborough Shoal whilst Malaysia claims the southern part of the Spratlys. 36 Indonesia and Brunei also claim some maritime areas in the South China Sea as their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).37

Given the understanding that legal resolution of a territorial dispute may take a very long time, since the 1970s, regional claimants have endeavoured to occupy as many land features in the South China Sea region as possible, a strategy in support of their sovereignty claims in the international tribunal.38 In particular, the region of the Spratly Islands is the main battleground. By the end of the 20th century, Vietnam had occupied 29 features in the Spratly Islands; the Philippines and Malaysia both seized 8 features; China 7 and Taiwan 1. 39 However, these numbers may vary in different periods. For example, according to Xiamen University Professor Li Jinming’s 2003 research, Vietnam occupies 29 features, China 7, Taiwan 1, the Philippines 9, Brunei 1 and Malaysia 5. In Shanghai Jiaotong University Professor Ji Guoxing’s 2009 research, Vietnam occupies 31 features, China 6, Taiwan 1, the Philippines 9 and Malaysia 5. 40 However,

35 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (The Hague; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), 30; Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 119. 36 Ibid., 31; Omar Saleem, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium,” American University International Law Review 15, no. 3 (2000): 542; Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 81-82. 37 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, 137. 38 Hsu and Wang, “Chinese Perspectives,” 28. 39 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean,” Maritime Briefing 3, no. 1 (2001): 58. Also see Chung, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Decision Units and Domestic Politics,” 78. 40 For more on Professor Li and Professor Ji’s works, see Li Jinming, Nanhai Zhengduan Yu Guoji Haiyangfa [The South China Sea dispute and The Law of the Sea] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2003); Ji Guoxing, Zhongguo De Haiyang Anquan He Haiyu Guanxia [China’s Maritime Security and Maritime Jurisdiction] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press, 2009).

180 generally speaking, Vietnam controls most features followed by China (Figure 5.2 illustrates the map of occupied features in the Spratly Islands).

Figure 5.2 Occupied Features in the Spratly Islands (2008)

(This figure has been removed due to copyright restirctions)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

Regional efforts to solve the South China Sea dispute have been undertaken. After rounds of negotiations, China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The DOC stated that the parties should “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,

181 without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned,” as well as “exercise self- restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”41 It was the first step towards the development of a substantial code of conduct (COC) for any activity in the South China Sea. However, the DOC was not a treaty in the legal sense as it focused more on how to manage tension than on how regional countries should solve their disputes. 42 Following talks on the implementation of the DOC and the future China-ASEAN COC have been intermittently conducted between China and ASEAN countries, but no substantial progress has been achieved to date.

Finally, even though the United State is not a direct claimant in the South China Sea dispute, it still plays a significant role in this regard. 43 Form Washington’s point of view, albeit the United States does not take any position regarding the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea region, it still “has a national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea.”44 Since 2009, Washington has consolidated its ties with Southeast Asian countries through summits of U.S. and ASEAN leaders

41 The full text of the 2002 DOC can be found at ASEAN website, http://www.asean.org/asean/exter nal-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea. 42 M. Taylor Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights,” in Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: Centre for a New American Security, 2012), 44. Also see Li Mingjiang, “China Participates in East Asian Maritime Cooperation: Growing Activism and Strategic Concerns,” in Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power: Between Rising Naval Powers, ed. Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 217. 43 For some plausible discussions on America’s interests and its role in the South China Sea dispute, see Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea,” in Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: Centre for a New American Security, 2012), 3-30; Alan Dupont, “The Pacific Power: American’s Renewed Engagement with Asia Comes at an Opportune Time,” American Review no. 6 (2011), http://americanreviewmag.com/ stories/The- Pacific-power (accessed December 15, 2011); Bronson Percival, “Growing Chinese and Indian Naval Power: U.S. Recalibration and Coalition Building,” in Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power: Between Rising Naval Powers, ed. Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 36-47; Carlyle A. Thayer, “The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Security Challenges 6, no. 2 (2010): 69-84. 44 Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, State Department on South China Sea, http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/08/20120803134096.html#axzz2teSAIqNU (accessed December 25, 2013).

182 as these summits are platforms for consolidating America’s economic and military cooperation with its ASEAN allies.45 From time to time, the U.S. conducts joint military exercises with the armed forces of the Philippines, Japan and Australia in the South China Sea region.46 In short, as the South China Sea dispute appears nearly unable to be resolved in the near future, Washington will maintain its current policy of collaborating with regional countries while seeking to hold China within international norms and prevent it from changing the balance of power in the region.47

5.2 Beijing’s Policy on the South China Sea Dispute

Since China’s general policy guideline for managing its maritime disputes with foreign countries − shelving disputes and carrying out joint development for areas over which China owns sovereign rights − was introduced in the late 1970s, it has long been practiced by Chinese decision makers. For instance, when commenting on the South China Sea dispute in 1986, Deng Xiaoping reiterated that “we should leave aside the issue of the Spratly Islands for a while, and we can set aside this issue for the time being and take the approach of pursuing joint development.” 48 Nonetheless, even though Beijing was willing to shelve the territorial dispute for later negotiations, a precondition was that China owned these

45 Zhao Jie, “Yi Waijiao Xinsiwei Yingdui Nanhai Xinjumian [Managing the New Situation in South China Sea with New Diplomatic Thoughts],” China Newsweek no. 38 (2011): 21; Author’s interview in Beijing, November 17, 2011. 46 Samantha Hoffman, “Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Rising amid Scarborough Standoff,” China Brief 12, no. 9 (2012): 15; BBC News, “U.S.-China Spat over South China Sea Military Exercise,” July 11, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14097503 (accessed December 2, 2011); Defence News, “U.S., Japan, Australia Plan South China Sea Drill,” July 8, 2011, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7046282 (accessed December 2, 2011); Xinhua News, Philippines, U.S. Eye Expansion of Joint Military Exercise, April 17, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/17/c_132317138.htm (accessed November 20, 2013). 47 Cronin and Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea,” 10-11. 48 Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Set aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18023.htm (accessed July 29, 2013).

183 contested islands. For example, to demonstrate that the Chinese government thought highly of the South China Sea sovereignty issue, on January 1st 1987, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary-general Hu Yaobang personally visited the Paracel Islands and celebrated New Year’s Day with the PLAN soldiers deployed on Woody Island.49 The PLAN also battled against the Vietnamese Navy over the South Johnson Reef in March 1998.50

The Chinese government inherited this guideline during the post-Cold War era and further introduced it to the international community. In 1992, Chinese foreign ministry Qian Qichen firstly introduced the policy guideline to his Southeast Asian counterparts during the meeting among ASEAN foreign ministers, stating that the South China Sea would not become a flashpoint in Asia but a region of cooperation should every claiming state endeavour to work together. Mr. Qian’s remark was welcomed by the ASEAN countries.51 In addition, when attending the 1994 Jakarta Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit, President Jiang Zemin again highlighted China’s willingness to shelve the South China Sea dispute and to enhance its cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.52 In general, during the 1990s, Beijing undertook a considerably restrained policy to deal with the South China Sea dispute. 53 Nevertheless, its goodwill was to a certain degree spoiled by the 1995 Mischief Reef Incident, a maritime skirmish between China and the Philippines over Chinese construction on this disputed feature.54

A salient milestone of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute was the signing of the DOC in 2002 as Chinese willingness to do this indicated that it had become more willing to make its claims based on international law as well as

49 Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiaoshi [Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing Group, 2011), 340. 50 Shen, Nanhai Zhudao Zhuquan Zhengyi Pingshu, 146-148. 51 Zhao Weitao, “Policies for the South China Sea during Post Cold War and Some Explanation,” Journal of Xiangfan University 32, no. 7 (2011): 31. 52 Ibid., 32. 53 Alistair Cook, “Unpacking the Scarborough Shoal Dispute,” East Asia Policy, 4, no. 3 (2012): 53. 54 For more discussion on the1995 Mischief Reef Incident, see Zha Daojiong and Mark J. Valencia, “Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and Implications,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 31, no. 1 (2001): 86- 103.

184 embrace international norms. 55 Nevertheless, the Chinese government was still reluctant to solve the South China Sea dispute through multilateral negotiations. China’s stance was based on two reasons. Firstly, Beijing believed that it was very difficult to solve a multi-party territorial dispute by means of collective negotiations. Instead, undertaking bilateral talks with each regional claimant was regarded by Chinese policy makers as a more feasible and effective approach.56 Secondly, Beijing thought that crisis management and prevention in the South China Sea was more urgent than solving sovereignty dispute. Therefore, while opposing collective negotiations on sovereignty issues, China did not object multilateral mechanism for crisis management and prevention in the South China Sea region. Why Beijing approached ASEAN countries was also because it understood that multilateral cooperation would be a key element of crisis management and prevention.57

Nevertheless, since the late 2000s, Beijing has failed to either come up with resolutions to its disputes with other South China Sea claiming states or contribute to a more stable security environment in this region as frictions have increased significantly. In particular, regional countries perceive that Beijing has changed its previous policy of shelving disputes with neighbouring countries and undertaken a more hardline position on its territorial claims since 2009.58 The assertiveness of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is twofold. Firstly, Beijing has significantly enhanced its physical presence in the South China Sea region in the past few years. For example, frequent belligerent patrol operations in disputed waters undertaken by the PLAN and other maritime law enforcement forces have sparked maritime skirmishes between China and other South China Sea claiming

55 Chen Zhiming and Dominique Caouette, “China’s South China Sea Policy and Its Implications for Canada: Claims, Strategies and Consequences,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 3 (2012): 304. 56 You Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China Seas (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2013), 8. 57 Ibid. 58 Hoffman, “Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Rising amid Scarborough Standoff,” 13; Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” International Journal of China Studies 2, no. 3 (2011): 574; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 19.

185 states, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. This situation has made the historical characterisation of the South China Sea region as a “dangerous ground” more plausible now than in the past.59

Secondly, regional countries also see legal documents published by Beijing as evidence of its assertiveness, even though such a practice reveals the Chinese government’s willingness to solve the South China Sea dispute based, at least partially, on international legal regulations.60 These documents are the 2009 note verbale to the United Nations Secretary General in the Response to Malaysia- Vietnam Joint Submission concerning the Outer Limits to the Continental Shelf; China’s 2009 Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf; and the 2011 note verbale to the United Nations Secretary General in Response to a Philippine note verbale. They are considered assertive as they include the nine-dashed line as well as claims of entitlement to the South China Sea islands’ territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf.61

The perceived assertiveness of China may, to a certain extent, be in response to other regional countries’ active approaches for consolidating their own claims.62 However, Beijing’s hardline stance, a controversy over whether the Chinese government considered the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea as one of its core interests for example, has also been regarded by foreign countries as a possible change of its policy.63 This controversy first surfaced in April 2010 when Western media reported this story. According to the New York Times, in a meeting between Chinese diplomats and U.S. Deputy Secretary James Steinberg and Asia Director of National Security Council Jeffery Bader in March, 2010, Chinese

59 Alice D. Ba, “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33. No. 3 (2011): 270. Also see Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 2 (2011): 77-104. 60 Chen and Caouette, “China’s South China Sea Policy and Its Implications for Canada, “304-305. 61 Ibid. 62 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 314-315. 63 For one plausible report the core interests issue and its implications, see The Economics, “A Sea of Disputes,” February 21, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/south_china_sea (accessed March 2, 2011).

186 delegates claimed that Beijing would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea which is now part of China’s core interests regarding sovereignty. This was alleged to be the first time that the Chinese government regarded the South China Sea as its core interest.64 In addition, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also acknowledged that during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2010, Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo again labelled the South China Sea as one of China’s core interests.65 These Chinese officials’ remarks were interpreted in Washington as possible efforts of Beijing to elevate the South China Sea dispute to be on a par with the Taiwan issue which the Chinese government would seek to resolve with any possible means, including the use of force.66

China’s response to this controversy is ambiguous. On the one hand, labelling the South China Sea as one of its core interests has never been officially acknowledged by the Chinese government.67 For instance, since the outbreak of the controversy, Chinese officials have refrained from clearly describing the South China Sea this way on either formal or public occasions.68 On the other hand, Chinese news reports and non-official sources have at times “inadvertently” claimed this. For example, in August 2011, an article published by the government’s mouthpiece media, the Xinhua News Agency, stated that “China has always made itself loud and clear that it has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea’s islands and surrounding waters, which is part of China’s core interests.”69 Furthermore, while avoiding clearly describing the South China Sea this way, Chinese officials still use a vague tone when valuing its strategic importance. For example, when chairing a working conference on maritime affairs

64 Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” The New York Times, April 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all (accessed December 14, 2011). Also see Peter Lee, “U.S. Goes Fishing for Trouble,” Asia Times, July 29, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ China/LG29Ad02.html (accessed December 14, 2011). 65Hillary Clinton, Interview with Greg Sheridan of the Australian, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm /2010/11/150671.htm (accessed July 2, 2013). 66 Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia,” China Brief 10, no. 25 (2010): 5. 67 Author’s interview in Beijing, November 24, 2011. 68 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 45. 69 Xinhua News, “China-Philippines Cooperation Depends on Proper Settlement of Maritime Disputes,” August 31, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-08/31/c_1310869 32.htm (accessed July 4, 2013).

187 in Haikou on October 26, 2012, Director of State Oceanic Administration (SOA) Liu Cigui stated that the South China Sea has great strategic values and defending Chinese interests in this region concerns China’s core national interest.70 In short, whether the Chinese government has determined to see the South China Sea sovereignty issue as one of its core national interests, this controversy has made both neighbouring claiming states and the United States more wary of stability in the South China Sea region.71

More importantly, in addition to China’s perceived assertiveness, Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute has, to a certain extent, also been characterised by inconsistency as a conciliatory Chinese stance on the dispute has often been quickly replaced by a more antagonistic one. From 2009 to 2013, Beijing’s stance changed at least three times. As previously mentioned, the tensions in the South China Sea increased significantly in 2009 as a growing Chinese assertiveness was perceived by regional countries. However, signs of its moderateness re-emerged in mid-2011.72 On September 6, 2011, the Information Office of the State Council published a white paper on China’s Peaceful Development. In particular, this document highlighted China’s successful experience in solving its disputes with neighbouring countries over land borders during the past few decades, which showed that it had the ability to cope with any territorial dispute. 73 Additionally, the white paper reiterated that the Chinese government was still following Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “shelving disputes

70 China News, “Liu Cigui: Weihu Zhongguo Zai Nanhai De Quanyi Shiguan Guojia Hexin Liyi [Liu Cigui: Defending Chinese Interests in the South China Sea Concerns China’s Core National Interests],” October 26, 2012, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/10-26/4279424.shtml (accessed May 4, 2013). 71 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behaviour Part One: On Core Interests,” China Leadership Monitor no. 34 (2011): 11; Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia,” 5. 72 Ian Storey, “ASEAN and the South China Sea: Movement in Lieu of Progress,” China Brief 12, no. 9 (2012): 10; Tran Truong Thuy, The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of Recent Developments and Prospects for Coming Future (Hanoi: Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 2011): 12; M. Taylor Fravel, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2012,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea (accessed May 20, 2013). 73 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Peaceful Development White Paper (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011), http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_3.htm (accessed May 4, 2013).

188 and seeking joint development” to manage maritime disputes. It reassured the world that China neither seeks world hegemony nor attempts to break down the balance of power in Asia. As it claimed, “we will continue the policy of developing good-neighbourly relations and treating China’s neighbours as partners and enhance friendship and cooperation with both the neighbouring countries and other Asian countries. We will expand bilateral and regional cooperation and jointly create a regional environment of peace, stability, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and mutual benefit.”74 From Chinese scholars’ point of view, the publication of this white paper represented Beijing’s efforts to play down the stressful relationships between China and other South China Sea claiming states as well as demonstrated its willingness to promote more China-ASEAN cooperation.75

In addition, exchanges of high-level political leaders between China and ASEAN countries, which agreed on more cooperation between the two sides, were conducted.76 For instance, when meeting Philippine President Benigno Aquino III on September 1, 2011, Wu Bangguo, China’s top legislator, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao held a dovish attitude towards the South China Sea dispute. Both Chinese leaders expressed China’s goodwill regarding how it would work with its Southeast Asian neighbours.77 Moreover, in January 2012, senior officials of China and the ASEAN countries agreed to establish a working group to promote cooperation as well as further talks on the China-ASEAN COC in the South China Sea. Beijing also announced that it had set up China-ASEAN maritime cooperation funds of three-billion Chinese yuan, which showed China’s positive efforts towards promoting a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute.78

74 Ibid. 75 Sina News, “Zhuanjia Jiedu Zhongguo De HepingFazhan Baipishu Chen Fabiao Shiji Qiadang [Experts Acclaim the Good Timing of Publishing the Peaceful Development White Paper],” September 8, 2011, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-09-08/101023125661.shtml (accessed May 4, 2013). 76 Fravel, “All Quiet in the South China Sea.” 77 Xinhua News, “Consultation to Settle China-Philippines Disputes,” September 2, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-09/02/content_23337358.htm (accessed May 23, 2012). 78 People’s Daily, “Resolving South China Sea Issue Needs Concrete Measures,” January 18, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-01/18/content_24434176.htm (accessed May 18, 2013).

189

Even though a moderate Chinese policy to deal with maritime disputes with other South China Sea claimants had re-emerged since mid-2011, the window of opportunity for a peaceful resolution did not last long given Beijing’s altered stance afterwards. In mid-2012, China again adopted a hawkish policy, arguing that the time was not ripe for further talks on the COC. This was because Beijing believed that there was little point in discussing how to settle this dispute peacefully after the strident China-Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal, a coral reef claimed by both Beijing and Manila, a few months earlier.79 This maritime standoff broke out on April 10, 2012 when a Philippine patrol boat confronted Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels in the waters off the disputed feature. This maritime clash led to fervent nationalistic campaigns in both China and the Philippines. In China, the voices urging the sending of more warships to protect Chinese territory in the South China Sea were clamorous and numerous Chinese tours to the Philippines were cancelled, while Philippine citizens launched waves of anti-China protests. 80

However, the cause of this maritime standoff was not clear. This is because on the one hand, the Philippine government accused Chinese fishing boats of illegally collecting corals and clams in this disputed region while, on the other, the Chinese government accused the Philippine patrol vessels of aggressively infringing on China’s sovereignty and rights.81 In general, the situation in the South China Sea experienced another peak of tension in mid-2012.82

79 Ian Storey, “Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts,” East and South China Seas Bulletin no.11 (2013): 4-5. 80 BBC News, “China Travel Agencies Suspend Philippine Tours,” May 10, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18015538 (accessed, May 18, 2012); BBC News, “Protest in Philippines over South China Sea Standoff,” May 11, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia- 18030805 (accessed May 18, 2012). 81 Philippine Daily Inquirer, “PH, China Naval Vessels in Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” April 11, 2012, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/ (accessed August 4, 2012). 82 Christopher B. Roberts, “The Future of Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia,” in East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives, ed. Andrew T. H. Tan (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 285; Ian Storey, “The South China Sea Dispute (Part 1): Negative Trends Continue in 2013,” China Brief, 13, no. 12 (2013): 4.

190

Beijing’s hawkish position generally softened again after the new Chinese leadership was formed in late 2012, although sporadic disputes persisted.83 China’s newly elected leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, as well as other senior officials actively reassured the world that China would maintain close cooperation with ASEAN countries to solve the South China Sea issue and maintain overall peace and stability in the region.84 A notable reassuring stance made by China was Xi Jinping’s meeting with the U.S. President Obama in Sunnylands, California in June 2013. This trip was also Xi’s first unofficial visit to the U.S. after serving as the Chinese President. During the meeting, Xi argued that the Pacific Ocean was wide enough for collaboration between Beijing and Washington and he was most interested in the cooperation with the Americans regrading relevant issues.85 In addition to articulating reassuring rhetoric, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi also made extensive contacts with ASEAN countries after assuming office in March 2013. Within four months, Mr. Wang visited seven ASEAN member countries.86 During these visits, he agreed to resume talks on the COC and hold a senior officials’ meeting on further work towards obtaining peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute.87 Even though whether significant progress will be made is unknown, this is still a signal that Beijing is willing to engage in more regional dialogues and cooperation regarding the South China Sea dispute.

In short, the inconsistency of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is evident. Why does it fail to have consistent policies to deal with maritime disputes in the South China Sea? The regional order in the South China Sea dispute has become more unstable as China has enhanced its physical presence in this area

83 For instance, a maritime standoff between Chinese and Philippine patrol vessels took place off the Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013. It has now been under China’s de facto control. 84 Ian Storey, “The South China Sea Dispute (Part 2): Friction to Remain the Status Quo,” China Brief 13, no. 13 (2013): 2; Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Assertive New Foreign Policy and Implications for the South China Sea,” China Brief 13, no. 13 (2013): 14. 85 Xinhua News, “Xi, Obama Meet for First Summit,” June 8, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/08/c_132440860.htm (accessed July 20, 2013). 86 These countries are Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 87 Xinhua News, “China, ASEAN to Hold Meetings on South China Sea in September,” July 1, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/01/c_124933373.htm (accessed July 3, 2013); China Review News, “Wang Yi Zaifang Dongmeng [Wang Yi Visits ASEAN Again],” August 5, 2013, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1026/6/3/5/102663538.html (accessed August 5, 2013).

191 in the past few years. Why? To answer these questions as well as determine the intentions of the policy actors in the decision-making process, how they bargain with each other and what the implications are for China’s policy regarding the South China Sea dispute as well as region stability are discussed in the following.

5.3 Three Selected Issues: Factors behind the Decisions

Due to the fragmentation of authority, the decision-making process in China features intense bureaucratic bargaining among various government organs and policy outcomes are normally products of bureaucratic competition for individual interests without functional inter-agency coordination. In the following parts of this section, three issues relevant to the South China Sea dispute are selected as case studies: the aggressive patrol operations of China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces; the Chinese passport controversy; and Hainan Province’s tourism project in disputed waters. These situations show that China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is largely caused by intense competition for more budgets and power among loosely coordinated policy actors rather than a well-thought decision made by top decision makers.

Aggressive Civilian Maritime Law Enforcement Patrol Operations

While non-military in nature, China’s civilian maritime law enforcement forces are still responsible for defending China’s maritime frontier and interests in its claimed waters. Moreover, with their capability to undertake long-range patrol operations, these forces have played many roles in the making of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute in recent years. Several maritime standoffs between these paramilitary forces and foreign vessels have broken out due to the aggressive

192 operations of Chinese patrol vessels. One notable case is the 2009 Impeccable incident, a maritime standoff between Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels and a U.S. Navy surveillance ship. This section focuses on one question: was this aggressive operation a well-designed plan by top CCP decision makers or a product of inter-agency competition among competing government organs? This section firstly makes a brief review of Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement forces’ presence in the South China Sea and then provides a detailed discussion of the 2009 Impeccable Incident and its implications.

Of the various civilian maritime law enforcement forces in China, the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) under SOA and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) under the Fishery Bureau of Chinese Agriculture Ministry are the most prominent actors in relations to China’s disputes with other South China Sea claiming states. While subordinate to different ministries at the centre, both CMS and FLEC undertake constant patrol operations in the South China Sea with overlapping duties. In addition, even though the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) also dispatches patrol vessels to the South China Sea, its role in the dispute has never been as significant as that of CMS and FLEC in terms of scale and frequency.

As CMS’s superior organ, SOA and other Chinese academic institutes initiated batches of scientific research projects for the South China Sea’s marine geology and resources in the early1970s. This is SOA’s first act in relation to the management of Chinese interests in the South China Sea. 88 Since then, waves of Chinese research teams were sent to the South China Sea to conduct survey and research projects.89 CMS began to undertake patrol operations in the South China Sea in the late 1990s. In 2007, CMS commenced to conduct regular maritime patrols in the waters of South China Sea, thereby bolstering China’s sovereignty

88 Ge Jiangtao and Qian Hejin, “Xuezhe Jiangshu Nanhai Yanjiushi [Scholars Narrates the History of the Research of the South China Sea],” Oriental Outlook no. 20 (2012), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2012-05-28/115324491664.shtml (accessed May 2, 2013). 89 Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea,” 1009.

193 claims while keeping the South China Sea dispute “civilianised.”90 In 2009, the scope of CMS’s operations covered the entire waters of South China Sea, accomplishing SOA’s goal of gaining substantial control of these waters under Chinese jurisdiction.91

In terms of the capacity of CMS in the South China Sea region, SOA South China Sea Bureau and CMS South China Sea Fleet, which are responsible for patrol missions in this region, possessed 13 large vessels, two aircrafts and one helicopter in 2011 to which SOA aims to add 16 aircrafts and 350 vessels by 2015,92 a large proportion of which will be deployed in the South China Sea.93 As Nanyang Technological University Professor Li Mingjiang argues, with such a strong capacity, CMS “is able to increase surveillance from, say, one or two trips every few months to surveillance on a daily basis.”94

On the other hand, FLEC is responsible for regulating China’s domestic fishing industry, as well as safeguarding Chinese fishing boats and land features claimed by China. For instance, in 2009, FLEC began to undertake regular patrols in the South China Sea.95 In particular, much attention was paid to the protection of the Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef.96 In terms of the numbers of vessels and work force, the South China Sea branch of the Fishery Bureau owned 21 large and

90 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2011), 480; Dean Cheng, “Sea Power and the Chinese State,” Backgrounder no. 2576 (2011): 4. 91 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011, 490. 92 China Review News, “Zhongguo Haijian Nanhai Zongdui Chuanting Zongshu Dado Shisan Sou [CMS South China Sea Fleet Vessels Reach to 13],” May 8, 2011, http://chinareviewagency.com/do c/1016/8/6/9/101686980.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101686980 (accessed May 29, 2011). 93 Voice of America, “China to Boost Maritime Patrol Forces,” June 17, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/China-to-Boost-Maritime-Patrol-Forces--124062564.ht ml (accessed December 28, 2011). 94 Quoted in Russell Hsiao, “In a Fortnight,” China Brief 11, no. 10 (2011):1. 95 State Oceanic Administration, China’s Ocean Development Report, 2011, 482-485. 96 Xinhua News, “Woguo Jiangzai Nansha Qundao Haiyu Zhankai Changtaihua Huyu [China will Undertake Constant Fishery Patrol Missions in the Waters off the Spratly Islands,]” February 24, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-02/24/c_114780350.htm (accessed July 8, 2013).

194 mid-sized patrol vessels in 2012, with more than 3,000 officers and onboard crew.97

Since 2009, Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement forces’ patrol operations in the South China Sea have constantly made international news headlines and are regarded by regional countries as good examples of China’s assertiveness in the region, especially the 2009 Impeccable Incident. On March 8, 2009, one FLEC patrol vessel, one CMS surveillance vessel and three other Chinese ships surrounded a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance vessel, the U.S.N.S. Impeccable, 120 kilometres off the Hainan Island. According to the Pentagon, these five Chinese vessels “shadowed and aggressively manoeuvred in dangerously close proximity to the Impeccable, in an apparent coordinated effort to harass the U.S. ocean surveillance ship while it was conducting routine operations in international waters.”98 On the other hand, China argued that Chinese vessels did not harass the U.S. ship but simply tried to prevent it violating international and Chinese law within China’s claimed EEZ. 99 For instance, according to Wang Dengping, political commissar of the Armament Department of the PLAN, “it is Chinese sovereignty for Chinese vessels to conduct activities in the country’s special economic zone, and such activities are justified. Innocent passage by naval vessels from other countries in the territorial waters in the special economic zone is acceptable, but not allowed otherwise.”100 Nevertheless, the American government

97 Xinhua News, “Woguo Nansha Qundao Haiyu Changtaihua Huyu Xingdong Zhengshi Qidong [Constant Fishery Patrol Missions in the Waters off the Spratly Islands Initiate],” March 10, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-03/10/c_114967694.htm?prolongation=1 (accessed July 8, 2013). 98 Yang Yuli, “Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship,” CNN News, March 9, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/us.navy.china/ (accessed January 2, 2012). Also see Jonathan Holslag, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), 68-70. 99 The Economist, “Naked Aggression: China and America Spar at Sea with An Impeccable Sense of Timing,” March 12, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13279348 (accessed December 9, 2011); Paul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The U.S.N.S. Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 3 (2009): 102. 100 Xinhua News, “Navy Lawmaker: Violation of China’s Sovereignty Not Allowed,” March 10, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/10/content_10985038.htm (December 9, 2011).

195 did not accept China’s explanation and believed that Chinese civilian maritime law enforcement vessels’ assertive actions violated international law and norms.101

Why did Chinese paramilitary forces undertake such an aggressive operation? Did the Chinese government deliberately send these patrol ships to confront the U.S. vessel? One plausible answer is that this operation was not the outcome of a properly coordinated policy made by the Chinese government but the product of inter-agency competition among competing government organs. As Peking University Professor Wang Yizhou argues, to earn more budget or bureaucratic power, Chinese officials are inclined to overstate the significance of their issues of interest and demand more resources to deal with these so-called vital issues, albeit not all of these issues are as important as they presume.102 Officials in civilian maritime law enforcement organs are also inclined to seek to obtain a larger share of the State Council’s fixed budget.103 While CMS and FLEC are China’s two main maritime law enforcement forces responsible for protecting the country’s maritime frontier while, on the other hand, they are competitors for larger budgets and greater administrative power. For instance, even though the role of SOA has been more significant in the Chinese politics in recent years, its bureaucratic level is still one of the Chinese administrations and bureaus under the ministries and commissions.104 SOA has constantly lobbied for a higher bureaucratic level and the authority to command all China’s maritime law enforcement forces. On the other hand, the Agriculture Ministry is also unwilling to surrender its administrative power, fleets and personnel to SOA.105 In addition, CMS and FLEC officials have been following a tradition a regarding how to finish their jobs: “grab what you can on the sea, and then divide the responsibilities between agencies afterwards

101 BBC News, “Chinese Ships Harass U.S. Vessel,” March 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- pacific/7933171.stm (accessed January 2, 2012). While China refused to admit its fault, it is a common view among international legal experts that there is no legal foundation for China’s claim because it cannot prevent foreign naval vessels from operating within its EEZ. 102 Wang Yizhou, Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2011), 132-134. 103 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1) (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 201), 19-21. 104 For more on the bureaucratic rank of SOA, see Administrations and Bureaus under the Ministries & Commissions, http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/07/content_21047.htm. 105 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 20.

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(haishang zhuayibah uijia zai fenjia).”106 Consequently, to promote one’s interests, undertaking high-profile operations that normally attract attention from both China’s citizens and top political leaders appears to be a good approach, even though not all these operations are properly coordinated or authorised by the top leaders.107 Such an inter-agency competition would not only increase the possibility of maritime clashes but also complicate Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute. More discussions are made in the following.

Firstly, the Impeccable incident was not the outcome of a coordinated policy process as can be observed from government organs’ diverse positions. For instance, in the aftermath of this maritime standoff, while Beijing still accused the American ocean surveillance of violating China’s sovereignty rights, it began to soften its stance on the U.S. government. For example, when meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington on March 12, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi concurred with the President’s proposal to de-escalate the confrontation in the South China Sea and establish more channels for dialogue.108 Meanwhile, the China Daily, a government mouthpiece media, stated that both the government and military had no further plans to escalate recent diplomatic frictions with the United States. 109 Mr. Yang and China Daily’s conciliatory stances revealed that Beijing wanted to tamp down the tense situation in the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, China’s maritime law enforcement forces were still belligerent. In particular, FLEC continued to escalate the tension in the South China Sea by sending its 4,600-ton patrol vessel “FLEC No. 311” to the waters off the Paracel

106 Ibid., 19 107 Ibid. 108 Sina News, “Aou Bama Huijian Yang Jiechi Tan Hanhai Moca Deng Wenti [Obama Meets with Yang Jiechi on South China Sea Confrontation],” March 13, 2013, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009- 03-13/134317402202.shtml (accessed July 9, 2013). 109 The Associate Press, “China Not Boosting South China Sea Naval Presence,” March 20, 2009, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x3792295 (accessed July 9, 2013); Asia News, “Confrontation Heating Up in South China Sea,” March 23, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Confrontation-heating-up-in-South-China-Sea-14804.html (accessed July 9, 2013).

197 and Spratly Islands.110 This patrol vessel set sail just one day before Yang Jiechi’s meeting with President Obama. According to FLEC officials, “FLEC No. 311” was their largest law enforcement vessel and had the mission of protecting Chinese fishing boats sailing near disputed islands where “fishing illegalities by neighbouring countries are on the rise.”111 This patrol immediately led to a protest lodged by the Philippine government which, this time, regarded this voyage to the South China Sea as a provocative action.112 FLEC’s hawkish stance suggested that there was an internal disagreement within the Chinese government regarding how to manage the tense situation in the South China Sea. Some officials wanted to cool down the confrontation while others demanded more high-profile Chinese actions in the disputed region. Therefore, as one naval strategist points out, the Impeccable incident was more likely a rash reaction of Chinese bureaucrats who decided to confront the U.S. spy vessel than a well-thought plot hatched by top decision makers.113

Secondly, the Impeccable incident was also more likely the product of bureaucratic competition. As a matter of fact, this incident was not a single event. Prior to that March 8 incident, Chinese civilian patrol vessels and maritime surveillance aircraft had challenged American vessels in China’s coastal waters several times. For instance, on March 4, a FLEC patrol vessel harassed another U.S. Navy surveillance vessel, the U.S.N.S. Victorious, about 125 nautical miles off China’s northern coast. The FLEC vessel used a high-intensity spotlight to illuminate the American ship several times. 114 Also, on March 5, a CMS surveillance aircraft Y-12 conducted 12 fly-bys over the Victorious at an altitude of

110 People’s Daily, “China’s Largest Fishing Administration Ship Makes Maiden Voyage,” March 11, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6611845.html (accessed May 15, 2011). 111 Xinhua News, “Chinese Fishery Administration Vessel Begins Patrol in South China Sea,” March 17, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/17/content_11027444.htm (accessed December 15, 2011). 112 Ian Storey, “Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea,” China Brief 9, no. 9 (2009): 8. 113 Eric A. McVadon, “The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea,” China Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 6-7. 114 Jonathan G. Odom, “The True Lies of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of International Law 18, no. 3 (2010): 415.

198 about 400 feet and a range of 500 yards. On the same day, another CMS aircraft conducted 11 fly-bys over the U.S.N.S. Impeccable at an altitude of 600 feet and a range from 100 to 300 feet. 115 And eventually, both CMS and FLEC ships took part in intercepting the Impeccable on March 8. These provocations reveal some notable information: CMS and FLEC undertook aggressive operations one after another within a few days. Therefore, these operations were more likely a contested game between CMS and FLEC as they wanted to demonstrate superior performances which could serve their aims of achieving their individual interest when bargaining with other organs in the government.

As CMS and FLEC are not military forces, sending them to patrol contested waters in the South China Sea would be a signal of Beijing’s attempt to limit potential escalations of its disputes with other regional claiming states. 116 Nevertheless, although sending civilian patrol vessels in disputed waters is theoretically less sensitive and less provocative than dispatching navy warships, it may also lead to some problems. For instance, commanders of military operations are cautious about political implications of the use of force. Therefore, they normally act with more restraint and more restrictive rules of engagement than other non-military forces. On the other hand, given the lower political sensitivity of their operations, civilian patrol forces may be more willing to conduct aggressive operations as the diplomatic ramifications will not be as great with a civilian vessel as a navy warship. 117 Consequently, as CMS and FLEC are more capable of undertaking long-range operations to patrol China’s claimed waters, the risks of maritime confrontation will possibly increase. As one observer claims,

But although use of maritime paramilitaries thus allows for a restrained assertion of sovereignty in disputed waters, it also brings risks. The growth in the size of paramilitary fleets, and the vessels within them, means that they

115 Ibid., 416. 116 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Strategic Implications of Chinese Fisheries Development,” China Brief 9, no. 16 (2009): 11. 117 Christine Le Miere, “Policing the Waters: Maritime Paramilitaries in the Asia-Pacific,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53, no. 1 (2011): 142-143.

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can patrol further from the coast and for longer periods. Another concern is that the use of paramilitaries may lower the barriers for entry into confrontation.118

Indeed, the Impeccable incident reveals the fact that Chinese civilian law enforcement forces have been increasingly willing to conduct aggressive operations. Even though these provocations were more likely due to intense inter-agency competition than well-planned decisions of the top decision makers, in fact, they made the U.S. and regional countries more suspicious of China’s willingness to solve the South China Sea peacefully. For instance, U.S. senior military officers and conservatives claimed that China had behaved in an aggressive and troublesome manner as well as tried to shift the balance of power in the region.119 Meanwhile, the Philippine government also denounced China’s patrol operations as escalating disputes and argued that it would seek more support from the U.S. and its ASEAN allies to counter China.120 A campaign to balance China’s rise was launched by the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries. This was quite unfavourable to China’s efforts to protect its maritime interests and territorial integrity in the disputed South China Sea region.

It is worth noting that, while the 2013 institutional reform replaced the CMS and FLEC with a centralised Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) under the supervision of the Maritime Police Bureau (MPB) of SOA, it appears that the problem of insufficient inter-agency coordination remains. On the one hand, some progress regarding incorporating FLEC with CCG has been achieved. For instance, the first batch of CCG patrol vessels has been deployed in South China Sea in June 2013. These patrol vessels are CCG No. 3210, CCG No.3102, CCG 3367 and CCG 3369. The first two are former FLEC patrol vessels and the last two are former CMS ships. They are equipped with some light weapons and shall all be placed under the

118 Ibid., 142. 119 Mark J. Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,” China Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 25 120 Storey, “Impeccable Affair and Renewed Rivalry in the South China Sea,” 8.

200 command of MPB’s South China Sea Bureau.121 Since July 2013, CCG patrol vessels have undertaken patrol operations in the South China Sea, including in some disputed regions, such as the Mischief Reef.122 In January 2014, the most advanced CCG No. 3401 was commissioned to the MPB South China Sea Bureau. The 4,000-ton vessel is capable of undertake more long-range and enduring patrol operations in the South China Sea region.123

On the other hand, even though a few batches of FLEC’s forces have been placed under MPB’s command, it is still undertaking patrol operations in some regions in the South China Sea. For instance, the Chinese government, in mid-May 2013, initiated a two-and-half month closed season for fishing in the northern South China Sea. The main agency to enforce this policy is still FLEC, nevertheless. According to officials of the South China Sea Division of the Fishery Bureau, patrols operations are under the command of South China Sea Division of the Fishery Bureau.124 Also, FLEC vessels drove some Vietnamese fishing boats from the Paracel Islands as well as appearing in waters off the Scarborough Shoal.125 Additionally, in October 2013, the Fishery Bureau of the Guangdong provincial government announced a new policy to launch a special patrol in the waters off the Paracel Islands. The patrol aimed to provide Chinese fishers with immediate assistance should they demand it. Nevertheless, according to a

121 Guangzhou Daily, “Zhongguo Haijing Shoudu Kaifu Nanhai Xiedaiyou Ziwei Wuqi [China Maritime Police Bureau Vessels Firstly Sail off South China Sea with Defensive Weapons],” June 15, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/06-15/4930791.shtml (accessed July 25, 2013). 122 The Associated Press, “New China Coastguard Ships Seen in Disputed Area,” July 25, 2013, http://asiancorrespondent.com/111064/new-china-coast-guard-ships-seen-in-disputed-area/ (accessed August 5, 2013). 123 People’s Daily, “Zhongguo Siqian Dunji Haijingchuan Rulie Haijian Nanhai Zongdui [CCG 4,000-ton Patrol Vessel Commissioned to MPB South China Sea Bureau],” January 10, 2014, http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2014/0110/c1011-24084901.html (accessed January 30, 2014). 124 Guangxi News, “Nanhai Jinru Xiuyuqi [Closed Season in South China Sea Begins],” May 18, 2013, http://www.nhjd.net/article-135-1.html (accessed August 2, 2013). 125 Singtao Daily, “Yuenan Kangyi Yuchuan Zao Zhongguo Yuzhengchuan Dengjian [Vietnam Protests against Chinese Fishery Patrol Vessels’ Onboard Inspection],” July 20, 2013, http://ny.stgloballink.com/global/201307/t20130720_1916239.html (accessed July 29, 2013).

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Guangdong government official, this patrol was still undertaken by local FLEC force not CCG ships.126

The above cases suggest that both SOA and the Fishery Bureau still have their own individual agendas regarding the maritime law enforcement operations in the South China Sea. The Chinese government’s aim of centralising all its maritime law enforcement forces has yet to be accomplished. Also, it may take more time and efforts to integrate the former crew members and functions of CMS and FLEC. As some have put it, “the extent of this unification is yet to be fully fleshed out, and questions of personnel training, fleet build up, jurisdiction and other such details are yet to be resolved.”127As a result, maritime patrols operated by competing agencies without sufficient coordination are still likely to be seen in the South China Sea in the near future.

Chinese Passport Controversy

In late November 2012, a strident dispute between China and other South China Sea claimants occurred over the latest version of Chinese passport issued by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). On November 22, MPS disclosed a newly designed passport featuring a watermarked map showing disputed areas in the South China Sea as belonging solely to China.128 This section seeks to examine the drivers behind the decision to issue this new Chinese passport, how the decision

126 Phoenix News, “Guangdong Yuzheng Jiang Zhankai Zhenduixing Xunhang [Guangdong Fishery Bureau to Begin Special Fishery Patrol],” October 6, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_10/06/30088562_0.shtml (accessed January 6, 2014). 127 Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “The Promise and Peril of China’s New Coastguard,” The Diplomat, August 7, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/07/the-promise-and-peril-of-chinas- new-coast-guard/ (accessed August 8, 2013). 128 The Guardian, “China Passports Claim Ownership of South China Sea and Taiwan,” November 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan (accessed January 2, 2014).

202 was formulated, and implications of the passport controversy for China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute.

The issuing of a new version of Chinese passport subsequently stirred anger across the region, even though it was to a large degree symbolic in nature. From regional countries’ point of view, this was unquestionably another example of China’s assertiveness in managing the South China Sea dispute. Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, India and the United States all expressed their discontent with the Chinese government’s assertive approach, arguing that it would do nothing but damage regional order and hold up further talks on finding a resolution to the South China Sea dispute.129 For instance, Vietnam claimed that “it’s one very poisonous step by Beijing among their thousands of malevolent actions” while the Philippines argued that it “strongly protests the inclusion of the nine-dashed line in the passport as such an image covers an area clearly part of the Philippines’ territory and maritime domain.”130 The U.S. Department of State also questioned Beijing’s motives, stating that “we do have concerns about this map which is causing tension and anxiety between and among the states in the South China Sea.” 131 Finally, the Taiwanese government also denounced the new passport, albeit Taipei had significantly enhanced its ties with Beijing since 2008.132

In fact, MPS’s decision was to a certain extent contradictory to the Chinese government’s overall stance on the South China Sea dispute during the same period of time which sought to ease the tense situation in the contested region. For instance, while the policy guideline of building China into a maritime power was confirmed in Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th CCP Party Congress in early November 2012, Hu deliberately underlined the necessity of preserving regional stability in

129 Reuters, “U.S. to Raise Passport Issue with China,” November 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/11/27/us-china-usa-passport-idUSBRE8AQ18P20121127 (accessed January 2, 2014). 130 The New York Times, “A New Map in Chinese Passports Stirs Anger across the Region,” November 25, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/a-map-in-chinas-new- passports-stirs-anger/ (accessed January 2, 2014). 131 Reuters, “U.S. to Raise Passport Issue with China.” 132 The Associated Press, “Beijing S. China Sea Rivals Protest Passport Map,” November 23, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/beijings-china-sea-rivals-protest-passport-map-071228770.html (accessed January 2, 2014).

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Asia.133 More importantly, in the aftermath of this passport controversy, it appeared that both MFA and newly elected CCP Secretary-general Xi Jinping tried to pacify China’s angry neighbours. For instance, on November 23, 2012, MFA spokesperson Hua Chunying particularly sought to play down the controversy, arguing that “the map on the Chinese passport is not directed at any specific country… China is willing to keep constant contacts with its neighbouring countries to facilitate exchanges between Chinese citizens and foreigners.”134 Five days later, MFA again minimised the significance of this disputed map and reiterated China’s willingness to maintain communication with regional countries and promote more exchanges.135 Adopting a similar stance, Xi Jinping reiterated China’s good faith in seeking a harmonious international environment when meeting with foreign visitors on December 5, 2012. In particular, he claimed that China’s development was not a zero-sum game and would never be a threat to other foreign nations. Xi’s remark was suggestive of another Chinese attempt to cool down the stressful relationship between China and regional claiming states.136

Some believe that the passport controversy could possibly have been a shrewd Chinese plan to consolidate its claim to the South China Sea, arguing that, “by printing the passports and inviting other states to stamp their visas in them, Beijing was attempting to gain recognition for its claim to sovereignty.”137 Nevertheless, the inconsistent positions of MPS, Chinese leaders and MFA suggest that the passport controversy was more likely the product of insufficient policy

133 Duowei News, “Xinhuzhao Zaoqiang: Zhongguo Waijiao Qudenghua Bukequ [Chinese Foreign Policy Causes More Controversy: It Is Unwise to Forego Deng Xiaoping’s Policy],” November 29, 2012, http://china.dwnews.com/news/2012-11-29/58990834.html (accessed January 2, 2014). 134 Phoenix News, “Waijiaobu Wuiying YueFei Kangyi [Foreign Ministry’s Response to Vietnam and the Philippines’ Protests],” November 23, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/zhongg uohuzhao/content-3/detail_2012_11/23/19487596_0.shtml (accessed January 2, 2014). 135 The Wall Street Journal, “China Seeks to Calm Anger over Passports,” November 28, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323751104578146700465245848 (accessed January 2, 2014). 136 China News, “Nanhai Donghai Fenzheng Jiaju Xi Jinping Fayan Jiangwen [Xi Jinping’s Remark to Cool down the South and East China Sea Disputes],” December 9, 2012, http://chinanews.epochtimes.com/n/popular/201212/0916167.html/print/ (accessed January 2, 2014). 137 “China’s Passport Move Strokes South China Sea Dispute,” Strategic Comments no. 47 (2012), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections (accessed January 2, 2014).

204 coordination among government agencies. 138 As Shi Yinhong, a professor of International Affairs at Renmin University, argues, the decision to issue this new passport appeared to be a decision made solely at the ministerial level rather than the CCP leadership level as it could lead to more troubles in the South China Sea, a situation the CCP leaders do not want to see.139

Issuing passports concerns both MPS’s and MFA’s bureaucratic interests. In China, the Bureau of Exit and Entry Administration of the MPS is the government organ in charge of issuing passports and relevant immigrant affairs.140 On the other hand, even though issuing passports is not MFA’s responsibility, these Chinese diplomats’ duties include supervising consular works, coordinating efforts to handle urgent incidents abroad involving Chinese interests and safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and institutions abroad.141 Therefore, as these overseas Chinese citizens hold Chinese passports, issuing a new passport concerns MFA’s bureaucratic interests. Moreover, given the political sensitivity of issuing a passport with a map showing disputed region in the South China Sea, MFA, China’s primary foreign policy maker, should be involved in the decision- making process.

There are several Chinese government agencies which favour more assertive policies on foreign affairs and believe that undertaking outspoken acts can help them compete for more budgetary funds and administrative power. MPS’s decision to issue a new Chinese passport with a watermark mapping China’s “historical territory” in the South China Sea appears to follow this logic. 142 As the International Crisis Group contends, China today is encountering a problem of

138 International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), 34; Linda Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), 14. 139 The Financial Times, “China Stamps Passports with Sea Claims,” November 21, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7dc376c6-3306-11e2-aabc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2toqu9IZq (accessed May 23, 2013). 140 For the main duties of the Bureau of Exit and Entry Administration of the MPS, see the official webpage, http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n84147/index.html. 141 For MFA’s main duties, see MFA’s official webpage, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz/. 142 Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma, 14.

205 more domestic policy actors playing foreign policy roles. 143 Similarly, MPS, a traditional Chinese organ in charge of domestic affairs, has been exerting some influence on China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute which, in theory, is not one of its duties. However, given that the fragmentation of authority is a key feature of the Chinese political system, although it is common practice for MPS to consult with other relevant government agencies on certain issues, to a certain degree, MPS still enjoys the autonomy to conduct its preferred policies.

MPS’s superior role in the decision-making process of issuing the new Chinese passport was observed. For instance, when the decision was under consider, MFA contradicted MPS’s proposal to include the map showing Chinese- claimed U-shaped line in the passport. 144 Nevertheless, this objection was overlooked by MPS as it believed that issuing passports was a matter of domestic affairs not foreign policy.145 In addition, according to one report, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was furious upon hearing the news that the new passport was issued because he was not informed before MPS made the decision.146 Mr. Yang’s anger has two implications. Firstly, MFA realised the negative impact of issuing this new Chinese passport on China’s relationship with other regional claimants. It did not wish to see further diplomatic frictions caused by MPS. Secondly, the inter- agency coordination between MFA and MPS was problematic because the latter, either deliberately or inadvertently, did not provide the former with any advance information about its final decision.

This passport controversy also reveals the fact that, while being able to bargain with MPS, MFA’s authority in the making of China’s foreign policy has been under challenge by other government organs. 147 Even though MFA still acts as the primary foreign policy maker in China, its failed attempt to stop MPS from issuing the new passport and the anger of Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi indicate

143 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 14. 144 International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters, 34. 145 Idid. 146 Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma, 14. 147 International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters, 34.

206 that its influence has been gradually diluted and it is now struggling to wield influence over other policy actors.

Nevertheless, as more policy actors, many of whom are inexperienced in foreign affairs but strive to increase their bureaucratic power and budgets, are able to exert their influence on final decisions, it will be more difficult for China to develop policies that best serve the country’s interests when managing its ties with foreign countries. For instance, issuing the new Chinese passport was regarded by MPS as a smart way of forcing other South China Sea claimants to recognise China’s claim. However, it did not serve this original aim but caused diplomatic frictions as various South China Sea claiming states launched a “visa war” against China. These countries refused to stamp the new passport, which inconvenienced Chinese travellers. 148 On the other hand, MFA had to calm these enraged neighbours who were infuriated by MPS’s assertive decision. To some extent, the passport controversy caused China more trouble regarding the South China Sea issue.

Hainan Province’s Tourism Project

As performing well in terms of local gross domestic product (GDP) growth is an important criterion for provincial leaders’ career advancement in the political hierarchy, coastal provinces are eager to develop economic projects in some resource-rich waters off the Chinese coast to bolster local development. Albeit these economic projects are profit-driven, local governments’ activities in disputed waters claimed by both China and regional countries may blemish China’s relationship with these claiming states. Nevertheless, since the economic reform, local governments have been enjoying greater freedom to implement their preferred

148 J. Michael Cole, “China’s New Passport Sparks Controversy,” The Diplomat, November 27, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-new-passport-sparks-controversy/ (accessed May 2, 2013).

207 policies without the central government’s strict restriction. Therefore, to pursue more local interests, coastal governments still promote their favoured projects regardless of the fact that they may cause deterioration in the tense situation in the troubled water. 149 As one China watcher argues,

Local administrations have developed their own interests in protecting their fishers and fishing rights in these areas (the South China Sea), undertaking their own initiatives, not all of which can be assumed to have prior approval from the central government. Therefore, some tension between the aims of central and regional government and initiatives should not be surprising.150

In particular, Chinese local governments’ roles are more salient in the South China Sea dispute than in the East China Sea dispute, which is due to two reasons. Firstly, in the case of East China Sea dispute, the land features in the disputed waters, the Diaoyu Islands, have long been under Japan’s de facto control. Therefore, it is unlikely that Chinese local governments are able to undertake economic activities there. Instead, China has de facto control over the largest island group in the South China Sea－ the Paracel Islands－ and has long been using them as the main base to enhance Chinese physical presence in this disputed region. It would not be a problem if China’s local authorities, such as the Guangdong and Hainan provincial governments plan to undertake economic activities on the Paracels. Consequently, these local governments can be easily involved in China’s maritime disputes with other South China Sea claimants. Secondly, even if Beijing argues that the Diaoyu Islands have long been China’s traditional territory, at the same time, it concedes that they are part of the Taiwan Province of China. However, because the Republic of China (ROC) government controls Taiwan, local governments on the Chinese mainland, such as the Fujian and Zhejiang provincial governments do not have the authority to undertake any activities on

149 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 10. 150 Sarah Raine, “Beijing’s South China Sea Debate,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011):81.

208 these Islands. As a result, there is little chance that China’s local governments will play salient roles in China’s maritime disputes with Japan.

The Hainan provincial government has incentives to develop tourism in the South China Sea region as profit generated from it is an important source of its annual income. For instance, its annual revenue from the tourism industry reached 19.2 billion Chinese yuan in 2008 from 11.1 billion Chinese yuan in 2004, with an average annual growth of 15.5%. The number peaked at 39.7 billion Chinese yuan in 2012, 17% higher than in 2011.151 As the General Secretary of the CCP Hainan Province Wei Liucheng argues, developing tourism industry can best serve the target of local economic development, lift the standard of living in Hainan and provide its 8.5 million citizens with more money in their pockets.152 Believing that the economic value of the tourism industry in the tropical South China Sea region is considerable, the Hainan provincial government has long been interested in welcoming tourists to both Hainan Island and some beautiful tropical islets in the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, welcoming tourists to South China Sea islands is not a purely economic project but also highly related to the sovereignty disputes between China and regional claimants. According to the Hainan provincial government, its tourism project aims to bolster tourist activities not only in the main Hainan Island but also in the disputed Paracel Islands.153 As the Paracel Islands is included in the project, the Hainan provincial government’s plan is regarded by other regional claimants as an assertive Chinese attempt to enhance its presence in the disputed South China Sea as well as a unilateral effort to alter the regional status quo. For instance, in June 2010, responding to the proposed tourism project, the Vietnamese government

151 Takung Pao, “Nanhai Guoji Lvyoudao Jianshe Sanniankao [Three Years of the Hainan International Tourism Island],” July 22, 2013, http://finance.takungpao.com.hk/gscy/q/2013/ 0722/1777029.html (accessed July 25, 2013). 152 Xinhua News, “Hainan Guoji Lvyou Heyi Tishengwei Guojia Zhanlue [Why Does the Hainan International Tourism Island Project Become a National Strategy],” January 6, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-01/06/content_12767288.htm (accessed July 9, 2013). 153 New Beijing News, “Woguo Xisha Qundao Luyu Jijiang Dui Putong Youke Kaifang [The Paracel Islands Will be Open for Tourists Soon],” April 5, 2012, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-04- 05/022924221303.shtml (accessed July 20, 2013).

209 argued that it would do nothing but hold up regional countries’ efforts to resolve the South China Sea dispute. As a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated, “such action seriously violates Vietnam’s sovereignty, runs counter to the common views of Vietnamese and Chinese leaders, goes against the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which China and ASEAN member states signed in 2002.”154 In addition, this tourism project has also deepened the Philippine government’s wariness of the increasing Chinese presence in the region. While not claiming the Paracel Islands, Manila still believes that Chinese tourist activities in the disputed South China Sea region would considerably undermine the Philippine people’s sovereignty rights.155 This project, to a certain degree, has exacerbated the stressful situation in the South China Sea, even though spoiling China’s relationship with other regional claimants was not the original intention of the Hainan provincial government.

The decision-making process of the tourism project can be divided into two stages. The first stage was the formulation of an initial plan and policy guidelines. The origin of the tourism project can be traced back to the early 1990s when the Hainan provincial government began to calculate the economic value of developing tourism in both the Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands. Since then, a series of initial research studies and discussions had been conducted by the Hainan provincial government.156 In the mid-1990s, it deliberated a preliminary proposal for bolstering the local tourism industry as “one province, two places (yisheng liangdi),” which aimed to make Hainan a top industrial province in China as well as a place for tropical agriculture and tourism. 157 In 1996, this proposal was

154 Foreign Ministry of Vietnam, Regular Press Briefing by MOFA’s Spokesperson on 24th June, 2010, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns100624185700#JVew0HAfgRkg (accessed July 20, 2013). 155 Manila Standard Today, “Sino Sea Tour: Palace Clueless on the Issue,” April 30, 2013, http://manilastandardtoday.com/2013/04/30/sino-sea-tour-palace-clueless-on-the-issue/ (accessed July 3, 2013). 156 Li Jing, “Nanhai Xisha Luyou Kaifang [The Paracel Islands Is Open for Tourists],” Oriental Outlook no. 20 (2012), http://news.21cn.com/today/pandian/2012/05/16/11857290.shtml (accessed July 20, 2013) 157 Xinhua News, “Nanhai: Cengjing Canghai De Rizi [South China Sea: The Old Days],” January 6, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-01/06/content_12767104_7.htm (accessed July 20, 2013).

210 approved in principle by top CCP leaders who made a policy guideline for developing tourism in Hainan. When meeting with Hainan delegates at the National People’s Congress in March 1996, President Jiang Zemin stated that the Hainan provincial government’s proposal for developing its tourism industry served the province’s interests needs and could be achieved by hard work.158

The second stage was bureaucratic bargaining among the Hainan provincial government and other Chinese agencies. The 1996 policy guideline provided the direction for subsequent bureaucratic activities in relation to the making of the tourism project. After the policy guideline was determined, the Hainan provincial government began to lobby relevant government agencies, such as the PLAN, SOA National Tourism Administration (NTA).159 This inter-agency bargaining between it and other Chinese branches lasted for more than 15 years as each government agency adopted a different position while having approximately equal ranks in the bureaucratic system.

In terms of the diverse positions on the tourism project, each government agency had its own interest to consider. NTA cared mainly about whether the Hainan provincial government could effectively manage the tourism industry on these islands which are small and lack infrastructure. It also evaluated the pros and cons of the tourism project from a macroscopic viewpoint: whether it could benefit China’s tourism industry as a whole or just boost the local economy at the expense of national interests.160 SOA worried about the influence of developing a tourism industry on the ecological system and marine resources in its surrounding waters.161 The PLAN was also sceptical of the tourism project even though Chinese military officers constantly advocated approaches for enhancing China’s presence

158 Ibid. 159 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 23. 160 New Beijing News, “Luyouju Fouren Jiang Tuidong Xisha Luyou [National Tourism Administration Denies the Paracel Islands Is Open for Tourists],” April 6, 2012, http://news.sohu.com/20120406/n339849525.shtml (accessed July 20, 2013). 161 Haikou Evening News, “Guojia Haiyangju Tongyi Tuijin Nanhai Zhongsha Xisha Lvyou Kaifa [State Oceanic Administration Agrees to Boost Tourism in South China Sea Islands],” April 27, 2012, http://house.hkwb.net/content/2012-04/27/content_723121.htm (accessed July 12, 2013).

211 in the South China Sea. This position was understandable. Since the end of the naval clash between the PLAN and Vietnamese Navy in 1974, the PLAN had gained de facto control of this group of islands. It also designated Woody Island as an important headquarters for its South China Sea Fleet and equipped it with extensive radar and electronic monitoring facilities.162 Given that civilian visitors who approached these military facilities may possibly reveal military intelligence, the PLAN was reluctant to support this project.

As the main driver of the tourism project, the role of the Hainan provincial government was prominent and, delving deeper, some key features of the decision- making process can be identified. Firstly, the policy process was protracted. It was initially introduced in the early 1990s, but not until May 2013 did the Hainan provincial government officially opened the Paracel Islands to tourism in May 2013.163 During this long period, bureaucratic bargaining and negotiations among various government organs were conducted to achieve an outcome acceptable to everyone. For instance, the Hainan provincial government had begun contacting the PLAN and exchanging views on the feasibility of this tourism project since the mid-1990s.164 In addition, from 1997 to 2000, it initiated a series of talks with the PLAN to try to persuade its military counterparts to support the proposal of opening the Paracel Islands to tourism.165 It also invited senior officials of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) and State Council to conduct field research trips to the Paracel Islands in 2000 and 2001.166 Then, a more than ten years of negotiation, it finally received the PLAN’s consent.167

The second feature of this policy process is that the decision to open the Paracel Islands for tourists was made incrementally. Although an in-principle

162 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 36. 163 Xinhua News, “China to Open Xisha Islands to Tourism before May,” April 6, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/06/c_132288317.htm (accessed July 20, 2013). 164 Li, “Nanhai Xisha Luyou Kaifang.” 165 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 23. 166 Li, “Nanhai Xisha Luyou Kaifang.” 167 International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea (1), 23.

212 policy to develop the tourism industry in Hainan was made by top decision makers in the mid-1990s, it did not clearly explain whether this project would cover only the Hainan Island or both it and the Paracel Islands. To make the broad policy guideline specific, relevant decision-making process was incremental and changed gradually. For instance, there were three important government documents relevant to the tourism project: “the State Council’s Opinion on Boosting Tourism Industry;” “State Council’s Opinion on Further Building and Developing Hainan International Tourism Island;” and “Guideline for the Development of Hainan International Tourism Island.” The first two documents were published in 2009 and the third one was published in 2010.168 The details of the tourism project required some changes to each of these documents. An analysis of the feasibility of boosting the tourism industry in Chinese islands and territorial waters was made first, followed by a specific study of welcoming more tourists to the Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands.

Thirdly, the lack of inter-agency coordination during the policy process could still be observed. For example, on April 5, 2012, the Hainan provincial government announced that it had decided to open the Paracel Islands for tourists at the end of 2012. According to Deng Xiaogang, Vice-chairman of the Hainan Tourism Development Commission, the tourism project was ready, and the government would open the Paracel Islands to tourism within a few months.169 However, NTA subsequently denied the Hainan provincial government’s announcement on April 6, claiming that there was no plan to open theses disputed islands for tourists so far. According to NTA, opening the Paracel Islands for tourists was still under discussion and it demanded more time to consult various interest groups in the country given that some people still had reservations about the feasibility of this project. 170 Nevertheless, regardless of NTA’s statement, the Hainan provincial government still encouraged local travel agencies to develop travel plans for future tours to the Paracel Islands and authorised small groups of tourists to visit Woody

168 Takung Pao, “Nanhai Guoji Lvyoudao Jianshe Sanniankao.” 169 New Beijing News, “Woguo Xisha Qundao Luyu Jijiang Dui Putong Youke Kaifang.” 170 New Beijing News, “Luyouju Fouren Jiang Tuidong Xisha Luyou.”

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Island and surrounding islets. 171 Clearly, the Hainan provincial government’s unilateral approaches suggested that while it had some liberty to undertake preferred projects, to some extent, inter-agency coordination between it and NTA was problematic.

In short, albeit the project to open the Paracel Islands to tourism was identified by the Hainan provincial government as an economic policy to lift the local people’s standard of living, it unquestionably contains various political and diplomatic connotations.172 On the one hand, the Hainan provincial government has appeared to be the main pusher throughout the entire policy process. As opening the Paracel Islands for tourists is highly related to China’s relationships with other South China Sea claimants, this project therefore demonstrates a local government’s influence on Beijing’s policy regarding the South China Sea dispute even though interfering in the foreign policy-making may not be its primary concern. On the other hand, like MPS and other domestic policy actors, local governments are not traditional foreign policy actors in China and lack sufficient experience or knowledge of international affairs. As a result, the profit-driven efforts of local governments may sometimes damage China’s diplomatic relationships with foreign countries, which the central government does not wish to see.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examines various policy actors in the decision-making process of China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute. It finds that, while having an overarching policy guideline to solve its maritime disputes with other regional claiming states, Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute is still

171 Li, “Nanhai Xisha Luyou Kaifang.” 172 Ju Hailong, “Speculation around Xisha Tourism Should Be Cleaned Up,” Global Times, April 27, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/778034.shtml (accessed July 15, 2013).

214 characterised by inconsistency to some extent. This is due to inter-agency competition between loosely coordinated policy actors who, in the decision-making process, enjoy approximately equal ranks in the bureaucratic system and do not report to one another. They advertise policies and approaches favourable to their own bureaucratic interests even at the expense of a well-planned policy or stable order in the South China Sea region. Some of the findings can be summarised as follows.

First of all, the perceived Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea is due to intense competition among government agencies, not a well-designed plan. The 2009 Impeccable incident indicates that, while this maritime standoff considerably raised tensions in the South China Sea, Chinese patrol vessels’ assertive operations were mainly driven by the intention to compete for more bureaucratic power and budgetary funds. Similarity, the 2012 passport issue was also a product of inter- agency competition between MPS and MFA. It was not a well-designed plan to bolster China’s sovereignty claim to the South China Sea but an interest-driven act of MPS which caused more diplomatic frictions between China and regional claiming states.

Additionally, inter-agency coordination is to a certain extent problematic in China, as can be observed from the conflicting positions of FLEC and other government agencies in the aftermath of the Impeccable incident, the anger of Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi when hearing MPS’s decision to issue the new passport, and NTA’s denial of the Hainan provincial government’s 2012 announcement regarding opening the Paracel Islands to tourism. As these policy actors have approximately similar bureaucratic ranks, it would be difficult for them to give direct orders to one another when a functional policy coordination mechanism is absent.

At last, it is worth mentioning that the weight of some policy actors’ influence on final decision outcomes has been changing in recent years. On the one hand,

215 more non-traditional foreign policy makers at the centre, such as maritime law enforcement forces and MPS, have increased their bureaucratic influence on the outcomes of Beijing’s policy on the South China Sea dispute. Also, the Hainan provincial government has been involved in China’s conflicts with regional countries in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, on the other hand, MFA’s bureaucratic influence has been gradually diluted as the playing field of decision- making has become more crowded.

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CHAPTER SIX

China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Factors behind the Prolonged Process

Since the former Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Liu Huaqing championed China’s aircraft carrier program in the early 1980s,1 there has been a great deal of speculation about it and its implications for regional stability in Asia among China watchers around the world. The existing literature, in either English or Chinese, has conducted extensive studies of the utility of a Chinese aircraft carrier and the number of them that may be constructed in the future.2 As China’s national wealth has been rapidly increasing since the economic reform, it is not surprising to witness its rise in military power and the development of its aircraft carriers. Nonetheless, even though China launched the aircraft carrier program in the 1980s, not until 2012 did the PLAN finally commission its maiden aircraft carrier Liaoning. 3 Consequently, what deserves

1 It is widely believed that China’s aircraft carrier program was initiated by Liu Huaqing in the early 1980s. See Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth form Rumours,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 (2004): 78; Andrei Pinkov, Zhongguo Zhizao Hangkong Mujian [China Constructs Aircraft Carrier] (Mississauga, ON: Kanwa Information Centre, 2010), 2; Ming-Shih Shen, “The International and Strategic Implications of the PRC’s First Aircraft Carrier Trial Voyage,” Prospect and Exploration 9, no. 9 (2011): 24-25; Sing-Lie Wang, “Discussion on the Development of the PRC Navy Aircraft Carrier,” Prospect and Exploration 8, no. 6 (2010):58. 2 For example, see Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (2006): 12-45; Li Nan and Christopher Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 1 (2010): 13-32; Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark and Gabriel B. Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (2012): 15-54; Andrew F. Diamond, “Dying with Eyes Open or Closed: The Debate on a Chinese Aircraft Carrier,” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 18, no. 1 (2006): 35-58; Chen Wenzhong and Chen Runzhi, Zhongguo Hangmu [China’s Aircraft Carrier] (Beijing: China Development Press, 2012); Zhang Zhaozhong, Bainian Hangmu [The Centennial Aircraft Carrier] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Publishing House, 2011); Tsung-Ta Lin, “An Estimation and Analysis on the PRC’s Capability in Constructing Aircraft Carriers and on the Training and Cultivation of Carrier Pilots,” Prospect and Exploration 8, no 3 (2010): 46-65. 3 Xinhua News, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Commissioned,” September 25, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131871538.htm (accessed September 26, 2012).

217 more analysis is not why China wants to construct aircraft carriers but why it took China more than three decades to obtain one, which has been little researched to date.

This chapter seeks to determine what factors have led to the slow progress of China’s aircraft carrier program. In particular, it aims to examine one key implication of the fragmentation of Chinese authority for the decision-making process and the outcomes of that process – decisions are slow in coming through a protracted policy process. This chapter argues that intense factional competition within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and bargaining among government agencies, to a large degree, held back the development of China’s aircraft carrier program. Additionally, no clear plan regarding how many aircraft carriers China should build and the missions these ships should undertake has been made to date. This is because details of the program’s future course are dependent on further debate and consensus building among the Chinese agencies involved. This phenomenon has two strategic implications for regional security in Asia. Optimistically, a fragmented policy-making structure implies that China needs to spend more time to determine its next step in the development of its aircraft carrier forces. A Chinese plan to resolve its maritime disputes with its newly developed aircraft carrier is unlikely in the near future. On the other hand, the lack of a clear plan for the future course of its aircraft carrier program implies uncertainty for balance of military power in Asia in the long run, possibly leading to greater naval competition between China and regional countries.

This chapter is organised in four sections. Section 6.1 provides a review of the slow progress of China’s aircraft carrier program. Section 6.2 examines various policy actors’ roles in the decision-making process and looks at how they persuaded top decision-makers to propel or postpone the aircraft carrier program. Section 6.3 offers a synthetic analysis of the Chinese decision-makers’ decision to build China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning and the future trend of China’s aircraft carrier program. Finally, section 6.4 makes some conclusions.

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6.1 China’s Long March to Its First Aircraft Carrier

The terminology “aircraft carrier dream (hangmu meng)” has been widely used in Chinese books, journals, newspapers and television programs. In fact, Chinese people have been thinking for more than 80 years of obtaining aircraft carriers (see Table 6.1). Nevertheless, at the early stage of China’s endeavour to develop aircraft carriers, having these warships was nothing but a dream. During the period between the 1920s and the 1970s, no substantial progress was made, while Chinese carrier advocates introduced some preliminary proposals.4

The ostensible beginning of China’s interest in developing aircraft carriers dates back to 1928, when Chen Shaokuan, Navy Minister of the Nationalist government, proposed a draft plan for constructing aircraft carriers.5 According to Chen Shaokuan’s plan, the navy planned to spend 20 million Silver Dollars (yinyuan) on the construction of an aircraft carrier.6 In late1943, Chen Shaokuan proposed another draft. Compared with the 1928 proposal, the second draft was much more ambitious as it intended to acquire 20 aircraft carriers for the Republic of China (ROC) Navy. In August 1945, Chen Shaokuan made his third draft plan which reduced the number of aircraft carriers to 12.7 Chen Shaokuan’s proposals were the first Chinese attempt to develop aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, all of them were shelved by the government due to insufficient budgetary funds and the lack of personal support from Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s then supreme leader. In particular, Chen and Chiang had different positions on whether China should import foreign aircraft carriers or build Chinese-made aircraft carriers. Chiang preferred foreign aircraft carriers but Chen insisted that China should have indigenous carriers.8 In

4 Erickson, Denmark and Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps,” 16-17. 5 Aaron Shraberg, “Near-term Missions for China’s Maiden Aircraft Carrier,” China Brief 11, no. 11 (2011): 4-6. 6 Erickson, Denmark and Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps,” 17; Shraberg, “Near- term Missions for China’s Maiden Aircraft Carrier,” 4. 7 Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 84. 8 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 300-303.

219 late 1949, Chen Shaokuan was deposed given that he refused to subdue communists’ activities in Shandong as Chiang requested.9

Table 6.1 Timetable of China’s Aircraft Carrier Development, 1928-2013

The Nationalist Government Navy Minister Chen Shaokuan made the 1928 first proposal to construct an aircraft carrier.

Chen Shaokuan proposed a more ambitious plan to construct 20 aircraft 1943 carriers. The number was cut down to 12 in a revised draft in 1945.

Liu Huaqing led a special team to conduct feasibility study of building 1970 an aircraft carrier. The study was called off in 1971.

In May, Liu Huaqing and his colleagues boarded the American aircraft 1980 carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk during their visit to the United States. This was the first time that the PLAN officers on board an aircraft carrier.

1982- Serving as Commander-in-chief of the PLAN, Liu Huaqing strongly 88 advocated for building Chinese aircraft carriers.

Under Liu Huaqing’s supervision, the PLAN’s Shanghai Research 1982 Institute initiated a feasibility study on the construction of aircraft carriers.

China purchased former Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne. The ship 1985 arrived in China in June but was dismantled in four months.

Guangzhou Naval Academy opened training class for future aircraft 1987 carrier commanders and pilots. China purchased former Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk from a South 1998 Korean company. Minsk later became part of a military theme park in Shenzhen.

China purchased incomplete ex-Varyag aircraft carrier hull from 1998 Ukraine. The deal cost 20 million USD.

9 For more on Chen Shaokuan and Chinese navy, see Li Jiawei, “Chen Shaokuan: Weijing Hangmumeng [Chen Shaokuan: Unrealised Aircraft Carrier Dream],” China Weekly no. 11 (2012), http://www.chinaweekly.cn/bencandy.php?fid=48&id=6308 (accessed May 2, 2013).

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1999 In July, ex-Varyag made its way back to China.

China purchased another former soviet aircraft carrier Kiev from 2000 Ukraine. Kiev later became part of a military theme park in Tianjin.

After a prolonged, complex and costly voyage, ex-Varyag was towed to 2002 the Dalian Shipyard on March 3.

2005 In April, ex-Varyag was moved to a dry dock in the Dalian Shipyard.

In early March, Major General Wang Zhiyuan at the PLA’s General 2006 Armaments Department (GAD) revealed that China had been constructing its first aircraft carrier. On October 26, Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) deputy Chairman Sun Laiyan stated that 2006 China would be able to acquire the technology for constructing an aircraft carrier soon. COSTIND spokesperson Huang Qiang stated that China had the ability 2007 to build an aircraft carrier, but had not determined a specific time to do so. Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie said that China could not be 2009 without aircraft carriers forever, a hint that China was about to officially confirm the construction of an aircraft carrier. At the end of 2010, the power and radar system had been installed on 2010 board ex-Varyag.

On June 8, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Chen Bingde 2011 officially confirmed that Beijing was building an aircraft carrier.

2011 On August 10, ex-Varyag began its first sea trial.

The maiden Chinese aircraft carrier was commissioned into the PLAN 2012 as Liaoning on September 25.

The PLAN’s J-15 fighters performed carrier touch-and-go training on 2012 board Liaoning on November 4.

2013 In June, a second round of flight tests began on board Liaoning.

Liaoning commenced its first sea trial in the South China Sea on 2013 November 26.

Source: Zhang, 2011; Chen and Chen, 2012; Erickson, Denmark and Collins, 2012; Xinhua News

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During the 1950s-1970s, the development of China’s aircraft carrier program was still stagnated, even if senior leaders in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government, compared with those in the Nationalist government, expressed a greater interest in developing aircraft carriers. Senior CCP leaders, such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Xiao Jinguang (the first PLAN Commander-in- chief who was in office from 1950-1980) verbally supported the development of aircraft carriers (see Table 6.2).10 However, senior CCP leaders’ remarks were merely rhetoric as they did not endeavour to advance the project. For instance, Mao Zedong introduced a plan called “maritime railway (haishang tielu)” to members of Central Military Commission (CMC) in June 1958. According to the “maritime railway” plan, in addition to continuing the modernisation of the PLA ground force and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), China aimed to construct large surface warships and aircraft carriers should the Great Leap Forward campaign succeed.11 However, looking more closely at Mao’s remarks, one can see that while the ambitious “maritime railway” project was introduced, it was only a preliminary thought conditional upon China’s success in the Great Leap Forward Campaign which had never succeeded. Mao was more likely painting a rosy picture rather than making a determined decision as he did not provide a specific agenda or detailed plan.

10 Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Ministry of National Defence: 1st Aircraft Carrier Liaoning Handed over to PLA Navy, http://www.andrewerickson.com/2012/09/chinas-ministry-of-national-defense- 1st-aircraft-carrier-liaoning-handed-over-to-pla-navy/(accessed May 18, 2013); Shu Yun, Guofang Buzhang Lin Biao Tichu Jianzao Hangkong Mujian [Defence Minister Lin Biao Proposed the Development of Aircraft Carriers], http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4447da480102drxr.html (accessed May 18, 2013); Shi Xuechang, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing [Admiral Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Changzheng Publishing House, 2013), 363-364; China Daily, “China Set for Maiden Voyage,” July 28, 2011, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-07/28/content_13002398.htm (accessed October 18, 2013); Tengxun News, “Hangmu Zhuanjia Li Jie Fangtan Shilu [Interview with Aircraft Carrier Expert Li Jie],” April 21, 2011, http://news.qq.com/a/20110421/000906.htm (accessed April 3, 2012). 11 Dai Xu, Hai Tuteng: Haiyang Haiquan Haijun Yu Zhong Hangkong Mujian [China and 21st Century Sea Power] (Hong Kong: New Point, 2011), 193; Gao Xinsheng, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Communist Party’s Leading Group, 1949-2009 (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2010), 102; Global Times, “Zhongguo Hangmu Zhilu: Yijiu Wuba Nian Mao Zedong Ji Tichu Jianzao Hangmu [China’s Path towards Aircraft Carriers: Mao Zedong Proposed to Construct Aircraft Carriers in 1958],” August 29, 2012, http://history.huanqiu.com/china/2012- 08/3079379.html (accessed May 18, 2013); China News, “Yijiu Wuba Nian Zhongguo Tichu Zao Hangmu [China Proposed to Construct Aircraft Carriers in 1985],” December 25, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2013/12-25/5660736.shtml (accessed January 3, 2014).

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Table 6.2 Senior CCP Leaders’ Remarks on Aircraft Carrier, 1950-1970s

When commenting on the PLAN’s acquisition agenda, Xiao Jinguang said that “we have to use our limited resource to enhance coastal islands’ 1952 defence capability and make them unsinkable aircraft carriers. If China has enough money in the future, we must construct aircraft carriers.”

Mao Zedong proposed a “maritime railway” plan aimed to construct large surface warships and aircraft carriers if the country could afford the expense. At CMC meeting on June 21, Mao stated that “in addition to 1958 modernising PLA land and naval force, we must develop China’s shipbuilding industry, construct more large warships and build a maritime railway. Doing so can help China acquire a strong naval force in the future.”

Chinese Defence Minister Lin Biao suggested that China should develop 1971 aircraft carriers, large amphibious ships and the PLAN marine division.

When meeting foreign delegates on October 25, Zhou Enlai said that “our Nansha (Spratly) Islands and Xisha (Paracel) Islands are taken by enemies now. Without an aircraft carrier, Chinese soldiers cannot fight 1973 against the enemies. I spent my whole life in politics and the military but could not see any single aircraft carrier serving in China. I am still holding a grudge.”

Source: Gao, 2009; Xinhua News; Global Times; Tengxun News

Two reasons explain why little progress of China’s aircraft carrier program was made in the 1950s-1970s. Firstly, during this period, China’s overarching naval strategy reflected the concept of “near coast defence.” 12 As discussed in Chapter 3, protecting the mainland’s coastline from invasion forces was the PLAN’s primary concern during this period. China’s concern over Soviet naval operations near its coast remained great. As the Sino-Soviet relationship increasingly deteriorated during the 1960-70s, Soviet naval warships constantly undertook provocative operations in China’s coastal areas. For instance, Soviet

12 Li Nan, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From Near Coast and Near Seas to Far Seas,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 146-150.

223 destroyers, submarines, intelligence collection ships and the carrier Minsk had appeared in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, imposing a direct threat on China.13 Projects for constructing ocean-going warships were marginalised. For instance, the PLAN officers once proposed the construction of large destroyers in the 1960s. However, CMC regarded the plan as “reaching for what is beyond one’s grasps (haogao wuyuan).” This is because CMC believed that small patrol boats and submarines for coastal defensive operations should satisfy China’s security needs.14

Secondly, the lack of budgetary funds was a bigger problem. In the 1970s, even though China’s annual defence budget reached approximately 17 billion Chinese yuan, the PLAN only receive several hundred million Chinese yuan annually for armament procurement. Such a small budget could at most afford a few 3,700-ton destroyers which cost 100 million Chinese yuan each. 15 The PLAN could never afford the construction of an aircraft carrier which may have cost billions of Chinese yuan. As Xiao Jinguang commented in 1987, why China had failed to obtain any single aircraft carrier during the past few decades was not because the government did not want one but that it could not afford one.16 On the other hand, during much of the 1970s, the PLAN spent much of its budget on the research and construction of conventional-powered and nuclear-powered submarines, which were much cheaper than budget-consuming aircraft carriers.17

13 Bruce Swanson, “Naval Forces,” in Chinese Defence Policy, ed. Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (London: The MacMillan Press, 1984), 88. 14 Han Yong, “Zhongguo Haiyang Xinsiwei [China’s New Thought on the Ocean],” China Newsweek no. 30 (2011): 32. 15 Li and Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” 16. 16 Wu Dianqing, “Liang Dai Haijun Silingyuan Guanyu Zhongguo Jianzao Hangkong Mujian De Duihua [Dialogue between Naval Commanders-in-chief of Two Generations on the Construction of Chinese Aircraft Carrier],” Military History no. 6 (2008): 54. 17 For more on the development of the PLAN’s submarines in the 1960-1970s, see William S. Murray, “An Overview of the PLAN Submarine Force,” in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew R. Wilson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 59-76; Wu Dianqing, Zai Mao Zedong Guanhuaixia Chengzhang Qilai De Xiao Jinguang Dajiang [Admiral Xiao Jinguang − A Man under the Patronage of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007), 180-199.

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However, the interest in developing aircraft carriers remained strong. In 1970, a preliminary feasibility research study of the aircraft carrier program was conducted by a team led by Liu Huaqing, then Director of the Office of the PLAN Shipbuilding Leading Small Group (haijun zaochuan gongyei lingdao xiaozu bangongshi).18 As Liu recalled, “when I worked in the Office of Shipbuilding Industry Small Group in 1970, I was instructed to organise a special team to conduct a feasibility study for building an aircraft carrier. This research was later submitted to the higher authorities for their consideration.”19 With regard to details of the feasibility study, four issues were focused on: (1) the history of aircraft carriers around the world; (2) their strengths and weaknesses; (3) the key technology required to construct them; and (4) how foreign navies deployed them. 20 In 1971, Admiral Liu and his team made a proposal for the future development of the PLAN (also called the 707 project). According to this proposal, developing aircraft carriers was listed as its third priority behind the development of missiles and submarines. However, the 707 project was subsequently abandoned due to the outbreak of the “Lin Biao Incident.”21

China’s aircraft carrier program entered into a new stage in the 1980s as the PLAN once again reconsidered the feasibility of constructing aircraft carriers. For instance, in May 1980, Liu Huaqing and other PLAN delegates boarded the American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk during their visit to the United States, the first time that the PLA personnel were permitted to visit an American aircraft carrier. This trip also greatly impressed on Liu Huaqing and his associates the utility of aircraft carriers in a naval war, further consolidating Liu Huaqing’s later

18 Shi, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing, 357. 19 Liu Huaqing, “Zhongguo Hangmu De Kexingxing Yanjiu [Study on the Feasibility of China’s Aircraft Carrier Program],” Contemporary Military Digest no. 3 (2005): 12. 20 Han Yong, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu Danshengji [The Birth of China’s First Aircraft Carrier],” China Newsweek no. 30 (2011): 23; Zheng Ming, “Huiyi Laoshouzhang− Liu Huaqing Silingyuan [Recollecting the Old Admiral− Commander-in-chief Liu Huaqing],” Modern Ships no. 3 (2011): 10. 21 Ye Biao, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu [China’s First Aircraft Carrier],” Military Industry and Culture no. 4 (2013): 61. For more on the 1971 “Lin Biao Incident,” see Stephen Uhalley Jr. and Jin Qiu, “The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later,” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (1993): 386- 398.

225 determination to reinstate the development of Chinese aircraft carriers. 22 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Liu Huaqing’s devotion to the aircraft carrier program did not simply mean that he overlooked the development of Chinese submarines. Instead, Liu still regarded submarines, especially nuclear submarines, as a strategic platform in naval warfare. He had also participated in the research and construction of China’s nuclear submarines during the 1970-90s. As Liu recalled in his memoir,

Marshal Nie Rongzhen launched the development of Chinese nuclear submarines. The centre approved Nie’s proposal in 1958. Since 1961, I had begun to supervise the research and design of nuclear submarines. In the following thirty years, I had always participated in the development of Chinese nuclear submarines, even if I had served several different positions in the military. I had personally witnessed the success and failure of the nuclear submarine program in China.23

The role of Liu Huaqing in China’s aircraft carrier program in the 1980s was particularly salient. After taking over command of the PLAN in 1982, Liu Huaqing initiated a series of actions in relation to the development of aircraft carrier. Admiral Liu’s efforts were twofold: research and training. In terms of the research of developing aircraft carriers, Liu firstly directed the Naval Research College to elaborate a new defence strategy for the PLAN, the “near sea active defence” strategy. He argued that the strategic position of the Pacific was becoming more important and China must move its maritime defence seaward.24 Using the same logic, he believed that it was time for China to consider the aircraft carrier issue again, as an aircraft carrier would be an ideal platform for expanding the PLAN’s

22 Liu, “Zhongguo Hangmu De Kexingxing Yanjiu,” 12; Ke-Chiang Chang, Yi-Kai Huang and Chian-Shun Shiao, “Zhonggong Jiangou Hangmu Zhanli De Kexingxing Fenxi [Assessment of the Capability of China’s Aircraft Carrier Force],” Defence Journal 23, no. 1 (2008): 40. Also see Shu- Cheng Chang, “Zhonggong Haijun Juecei Jieceng Zhi Paixi Fenxi [Analysis of PLAN Factions and Its Decision-making],” Defence Journal 23, no. 1 (2008): 72-82. 23 Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), 474. 24 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 174-176.

226 maritime defence scope.25 Given that the PLAN’s previous feasibility study of the development of aircraft carriers was made more than ten years ago, Liu Huaqing, in 1982, requested the PLAN’s Shanghai Research Institute to conduct a new round of feasibility studies.26 In addition, he convened three special task forces on naval equipment and technology between 1984 and 1987, which helped the PLAN officers gain greater understanding of the pros and cons of constructing an aircraft carrier. They were also a good platform for Chinese military officers from different backgrounds to exchange their views on the aircraft carrier program.27

In terms of training future naval officers serving on aircraft carriers, as instructed by Liu, the Guangzhou Naval Academy opened a “pilot and commander training class (feixingyuan jianzhangban)” to educate China’s first batch of aircraft carrier commanders and pilots in 1987.28 According to Liu’s plan, the PLAN would follow the American model for selecting its future aircraft carrier commanding officers, that is, they will be selected from the PLAN jet fighter pilots rather than surface warship skippers. 29 This training class was a great contribution to the development of the PLAN. Firstly, it not only provided the PLAN officers with the skills and knowledge required to be a pilot of carrier-based jets but also helped the PLAN develop strategies for naval combat involving an aircraft carriers. 30 Secondly, this training class had significant implications for the cultivation of Chinese warship commanders. Some cadets in the training class later became captions of the PLAN’s advanced destroyers and fidgets, despite the fact that they did not have the opportunity to serve on China’s maiden aircraft carrier.31

25 Shi, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing, 374-375. 26 Storey and You, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” 78. 27 Ye, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu,” 62. 28 Han, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu Danshengji,” 25. 29 Storey and You, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” 78. 30 Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 91. 31 Han, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu Danshengji,” 25; Xinhua News, “Shenmide Feixingyuan Jianzhangban [Occult Pilot and Commander Training Class],” July 19, 2011, http://big5.xinhuanet.c om/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-07/19/c_121686173.htm (accessed October 3, 2013); China Review News, “Zhongguo Hangmu Chuhai [China’s Aircraft Carrier Sets Sail],” August 15, 2011, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crnwebapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0& docid=101800132 (accessed October 3, 2013);

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During much of the 1990s, nevertheless, the process of China’s aircraft carrier program did not accelerate. A distinctive feature was the release of unofficial reports about the potential procurement of foreign aircraft carriers as a stopgap measure to overcome technological problems involved in carrier construction. However, none of these procurement deals was reached. For instance, the PLAN was reportedly interested in acquiring former Soviet aircraft carriers in 1992 and Chinese delegates were sent to Russia to negotiate deals for purchasing Kuznetsov- class and Kiev-class carriers. What discouraged China’s aircraft carrier advocates was that nothing came of these trips given the high selling price quoted by the Russian government.32 In 1995, the PLAN again reportedly approached France and Spain and discussed the possibility of purchasing small-to-mid-sized aircraft carriers, such as the French aircraft carrier Clemenceau and Spanish vertical and/or short take-off and landing (VSTOL) carriers.33 These alleged deals had never been confirmed by Beijing.34

The purchases of three former Soviet aircraft carriers − ex-Varyag (70% complete), Minsk and Kiev − between 1998 and 2000 was a milestone in the prolonged process of China’s aircraft carrier program as the PLAN eventually obtained an aircraft carrier, while decommissioned, which it had long been desiring.35 Nevertheless, among these three aircraft carriers, only ex-Varyag made notable contribution to the development of China’s aircraft carriers. According to Rear Admiral Zheng Ming, the PLAN was not involved in the purchase of Minsk and Kiev as buying these two ships was decided by Chinese companies for purely business reason.36 Albeit the PLAN made some paramilitary studies of Minsk and Kiev, in the end, they became popular tourist attractions in theme parks in

32 Thomas J. Hirshfeld, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: A Virtual Dragonfly?” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 10, no. 1 (1998): 147. 33 Erickson and Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” 19-20; Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 92-93. 34 Richard D. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernisation,” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David L. Shambaugh (Armonk, NY; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 105. 35 Albeit a Chinese company purchased the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1985, the PLAN did not have the chance to make a thorough study of this ship. As Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong recalls, he and his PLAN colleagues were invited to have a “tour” on board the ship. 36 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 334-335.

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Shenzhen and Tianjin.37 The contribution of these two former Soviet carriers to China’s aircraft carrier program was limited.38 On the other hand, the purchase of ex-Varyag was planned and supervised by the PLAN.39 This ship, a 67,500-ton, conventionally powered former Soviet Naval warship, was handed over to the PLAN for further research after it was towed back to the Dalian Shipyard in 2002.

The protracted process of China’s aircraft carrier program can still be observed during much of the 2000s, even if China purchased the ex-Varyag in 1998. During this period, the development of China’s aircraft carrier program was highlighted by “signs of the slow progress of the rebuilding of ex-Varyag, numerous unofficial remarks, but no official confirmation.” First of all, vivid pictures released by journalists, military enthusiasts and American military satellites suggested that after leaving ex-Varyag in the Dalian Shipyard for more than three years, the PLAN eventually began to rebuild the ship in 2005. In August 2005, the hull of ex-Varyag was repainted in standard navy grey.40 This would only be a small step. Nonetheless, as a U.S. military strategist argues, “the adoption of this colour clearly indicates that Varyag is to be adopted by the PLAN for some yet-to-be-determined missions.” 41 Relevant reconstruction works were subsequently made at a slow pace. These signs implied that the PLAN was planning to turn ex-Varyag into China’s first aircraft carrier.42

In the meantime, Beijing’s attitude towards its aircraft carrier program was quite ambiguous. While giving no specific details about the aircraft carrier program, unofficial remarks made by Chinese officials also suggested that China had been undertaking relevant works in relation to the reconstruction of ex-Varyag since the mid-2000s. For instance, in 2006, two senior Chinese officials, Major General

37 Vijay Sakhuja, “Dragon’s Dragonfly: The Chinese Aircraft Carrier,” Strategic Analysis 24, no. 7 (2000): 1374; Diamond, “Dying with Eyes Open or Closed,” 41. 38 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 336. 39 More detailed discussion on the purchase of ex-Varyag will be made in Section 6.2. 40 Tang Lie, “Zhuangbei Waliangge [Equips x-Varyag],” China Newsweek no. 30 (2011): 27. 41 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernisation: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 188. 42 Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 116-117.

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Wang Zhiyuan at the PLA’s GAD and deputy Chairman of COSTIND Sun Laiyan, revealed that China would construct an aircraft carrier by itself and develop the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier combat group.43 In 2009, the PLAN Commander-in- chief Wu Shengli claimed that “Chinese navy will endeavour to enhance its power- projection capacity in far seas and develop more large surface combatants, sophisticated and quieter submarines, as well as super-sonic and long-ranged jet fighters.” 44 While mentioning nothing about aircraft carriers, Admiral Wu’s remarks still revealed the PLAN’s ambition to develop aircraft carriers as he highlighted the task to build more large warships with power-projection capabilities. In particular, then Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie made the most noteworthy remark when he answered a question put by his Japanese counterpart, Yasukazu Hamada, in Beijing in 2009. General Liang reportedly said that China could not be without aircraft carriers forever, a remark widely regarded by both Chinese and Western media as a hint that China was about to officially confirm the construction of its maiden aircraft carrier.45

Even if signs of the rebuilding of ex-Varyag and unofficial remarks suggested that the development of China’s maiden aircraft carrier was possibly underway, official document published by the Chinese government still addressed nothing about the aircraft carrier program. The Chinese defence white papers were good examples. To increase the transparency of its military affairs, the Chinese government has begun to publish defence white papers every two years since 1998.

43 Singtao Daily, “Chuan Zhongguo Sanniannei Zaochu Hangmu [China Alleged to Launch an Aircraft Carrier in Three Years],” April 3, 2006, http://www.stnn.cc/global/china/headline/t2006040 3_180629.html (accessed April 5, 2012); People’s Daily, “Sun Laiyan: Zhongguo Jiang Renzhen Yanjiu Han Kaolv Jianzao Hangmu De Wenti [Laiyan Sun: China is to Seriously Considerate the Question of Constructing an Aircraft Carrier],” October 26, 2006, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/ 1076/52984/4961034.html (accessed April 5, 2012). 44 Lianhe Zaobao, “Zhongguo Jiang Dazao Ju Yuanyang Zuozhan Nengli Haijun [China Is Going to Develop a Blue-water Navy],” April 27, 2009, http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/cnpol/pages2 /cnpol090417a.shtml (accessed January 19, 2011). 45 The Hindu, “China for the First time Reveals Aircraft Carrier Plan,” December 17, 2010, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-for-the-first-time-reveals-aircraft-carrier-plan/art icle959162.ece (accessed July 21, 2013); Jimmy Chuang, “U.S. Stirring Unnecessary Tension over Aircraft Carrier,” Want Daily, April 14, 2011, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass- cnt.aspx?id=20110414000138&cid=1101 (accessed October 21, 2013); The Financial Times, China Reveals Aircraft Carrier Plans,”, December 17, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fa7f5e6a-09cc- 11e0-8b29-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2iJrP3xKF (accessed July 21, 2013).

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Nevertheless, throughout the 2000s, all China’s defence white papers kept silent about China’s aircraft carrier program.46 For instance, even if the alleged Chinese aircraft carrier had been widely discussed domestically and internationally, at the press conference introducing the 2010 white paper, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng, in response to a CNN journalist’s question about the ex-Varyag carrier, stated that “the aircraft carrier issue is important…… what I would like to say is I have no comment on this matter.”47 Clearly, the Chinese government was still cautious about the aircraft carrier issue. The Chinese government’s ambiguous stance on the aircraft carrier program remained.

After years of speculation and debate over the possible rebuilding of ex- Varyag among Chinese and foreign military strategists, on June 8, 2011, Chief of Staff of the PLA Chen Bingde confirmed that China’s first aircraft carrier is under construction. Despite his refusal to provide a clearer answer of when the construction will be completed, his remark was the very first official confirmation of the Chinese government.48 Speculations about when the construction would be finished did not last for too long as two months later, on August 10 2011, the newly-rebuilt ex-Varyag quietly left the Dalian Shipyard and began its first sea trial in the Bohai Sea and northern Yellow Sea.49 This mission aimed to testify its propeller and communication system.50 After ten rounds of sea trials, the ship was commissioned into PLAN as Liaoning on September 25, 2012. Liaoning is

46 Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “China Defence White Paper 2010: Better Transparency, but What Key Developments Were Left out of the Discussion?” China SignPost no. 32 (2011): 3; Michael S. Chase, “China’s 2010 National Defence White Paper: An Assessment,” China Brief 11, no. 7 (2011): 10-12; D. S. Rajan, “China: Latest Defence White Paper: What Is New?” SAAG Papers no. 4416 (2011), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers45%5Cpaper44 16.html (accessed April 9, 2012). 47 For full text of the Chinese Defence Ministry’s press conference on March 31, 2011, see http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2011-03/31/content_22252608.htm?show=t. 48 BBC News, “China Aircraft Carrier Confirmed by General,” June 8, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13692558 (accessed February 2, 2012). Also see, ABC News, “First Chinese Aircraft Carrier Revealed,” June 9, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ chinese-aircraft-carrier-revealed/story?id=13800990 (accessed May 2, 2012). 49 BBC News, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Starts Sea Trials,” August 10, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-pacific-14470882 (accessed February 3, 2012). 50 William Ide, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Begins Sea Trial,” Voice of America, August 10, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/chinas-first-aircraft-carrier-begins-sea-trial-127446783/143603.ht ml (accessed August 20, 2012).

231 currently based in Qingdao, the main base of the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet. The maiden Chinese aircraft carrier’s primary tasks are reported to conduct scientific research, experiments and crew training.51 As the duration of Liaoning’s longest sea trial is just more than one month (see Table 6.3 for Liaoning’s sea trials), this ship is expected to undertake more additional and longer sea trials and will not be fully operational until 2015.52

Table 6.3 Liaoning’s Sea Trials, 2011-2013 Trial Depart Date Return Date Duration (Days) 1 Aug. 10 2011 Aug. 14 2011 5 2 Nov. 29 2011 Dec. 12 2011 13 3 Dec. 20 2011 Dec. 29 2011 10 4 Jan. 08 2012 Jan. 15 2012 8 5 Apr. 20 2012 Apr. 30 2012 11 6 May 06 2012 May 15 2012 10 7 May 23 2012 Jun. 01 2012 10 8 Jun. 06 2012 Jun. 22 2012 16 9 Jul. 06 2012 Jul. 30 2012 25 10 Aug. 27 2012 Aug. 30 2012 4 11 Oct. 12 2012 Oct. 30 2012 19 12 Nov. 10 2012 Nov. 25 2012 16 13 Feb. 26 2013 Feb. 27 2013 2 14 Jun. 09 2013 Jul. 03 2013 25 15 Aug. 15 2013 Sep. 21 2013 38 16 Oct. 23 2013 Nov. 11 2013 20 17 Nov. 26 2013 Nov. 29 2013 4

Source: Defence International, 2014

51 Mike Yeo, “Aircraft Carriers or Not? Flattops in the Pacific,” The Diplomat, September 8, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/08/aircraft-carriers-or-not-flattops-in-the-pacific/ (accessed March 2, 2014). 52 Erickson, Denmark and Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps,” 21.

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In short, it took China more than thirty years to commission its maiden aircraft carrier. From a review of its aircraft carrier program, one can see that its progress has been considerably protracted. As the PLAN has been building more and more large-sized surface warships and advanced submarines during the past three decades, the development of China’s aircraft carrier program, on the other hand, is relatively much slower. Particularly, Liu Huaqing reportedly vowed that “I will not die with my eyes closed if I cannot see a Chinese aircraft carrier in front of me.”53 What we want to ask is why Liu Huaqing could not be able to witness the birth of Liaoning, even if he had been working hard to advocate and propel the aircraft carrier program for decades. Why did China take such a long time to construct its first aircraft carrier? Who were the actors in the decision-making process of China’s aircraft carrier program? Answering these questions can help us better understand the nature of the policy process, and the future course of the aircraft carrier program as well as its implications for regional security in Asia.

6.2 The Decision-making Process of China’s Aircraft Carrier Program

This section looks at the decision-making process involved in China’s prolonged aircraft carrier program by applying the model of fragmented authoritarianism discussed in previous chapters. It examines the roles of various actors in the decision-making process in a fragmented political system and discusses how they could influence the Chinese government to either propel or postpone the program. This section consists of two parts. The first part looks at the factional competition within the Chinese military and discusses how the PLA’s advocate for an aircraft carrier bargained with other PLA officers who had conflicting armament procurement agendas in mind. The second part examines the

53 Abraham M. Denmark, Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “Should We Be Afraid of China’s New Aircraft Carrier?” Foreign Policy, June 27, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article s/2011/06/27/should_we_be_afraid_of_chinas_new_aircraft_carrier?page=0,0 (accessed April 19, 2012).

233 policy arena at a broader level, analysing the roles of other government agencies, notably Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state-owned shipbuilding companies, in the decision-making process of developing Chinese aircraft carriers. These entities had conflicting perspectives, with the former sceptical about the implications of acquiring an aircraft carrier for China’s relationships with regional countries and the latter keen to bid a potential contract to build more aircraft carriers.

Competing Factions within the Chinese Military

The PLA has experienced a long-lasting factional competition regarding whether aircraft carriers should be listed as the priority of its armament procurement. The PLA carrier faction, which consisted of Liu Huaqing and his colleagues, constantly competed with other factions unfavourable to the development of aircraft carriers. In general, the longstanding factional competition over the aircraft carrier program can be divided into two rounds. The first round of factional competition took place in the 1980s. Despite Liu Huaqing’s effort to develop China’s aircraft carriers, Liu and his carrier faction colleagues still needed to bargain with other services in the PLA which worried about that the aircraft carrier program may deplete their limited budgetary funds. The second round of factional competition kicked off after the concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA) was introduced to China in the early 1990s. Since then, the Admiral Liu and his carrier faction had begun to bargain with the RMA School in the PLA over whether China should construct aircraft carriers or other asymmetric weapons. Intense debates lasted for another fifteen years.

The first round of factional competition between the carrier faction and other services in the PLA commenced after Liu Huaqing took charge of the PLAN. To push the aircraft carrier program, Admiral Liu and his carrier faction comrades

234 initiated a series of approaches to bargain with other military and civilian officers in the defence circle. To push the aircraft carrier program, submitting special reports to the PLA’s high command was the primary approach. Liu Huaqing’s 1987 report to the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD) and COSTIND was a good example. Liu provided his PLA counterparts with a nuanced analysis of the pros and cons of constructing an aircraft carrier. Based on Liu’s analysis, despite the high expense of developing an aircraft carrier battle group, the profit it generates would be much higher than the money spent.54 More importantly, according to Liu, China would not have to spend as much as critics to the aircraft carrier program assumed if the PLAN could best make use of its budget as well as existing armament.55 In addition, Liu Huaqing also recommended the PLA to undertake three tasks: (1) conducting feasibility studies in the Seventh Five-Year Plan period; (2) commencing preliminary works to study the platform deck and answer some key questions about the ship during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period; and (3) determining the type and model of the aircraft carrier in 2000.56

This report was a milestone in China’s aircraft carrier program in the 1980s as it was valued by the high command of the PLA. It made the PLA consider the key questions about constructing aircraft carrier. 57 As Liu recalled in his memoir, “the report had a certain influence on the GSD and COSTIND. Subsequently, a research unit organised by COSTIND and the PLAN’s armament department conducted some in-depth studies for constructing an aircraft carrier.” 58 For instance, after reading the report, Defence Minister Qin Jiwei and Head of COSTIND Ding Henggao gave direct orders to review the feasibility of constructing an aircraft carrier. In particular, Ding Henggao claimed that developing aircraft carriers is an urgent issue in China and CMC must decide whether the PLA should prioritise the

54 Shi, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing, 381. 55 Ibid. 56 Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, 480. 57 Erickson and Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” 17-18; Wu Donglin, Zhongguo Haiquan Yu Hangkong Mujian [China’s Sea Power and Aircraft Carrier] (Taipei: Shiying Publishing House, 2010), 17-18. 58 Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, 480.

235 aircraft carrier program as soon as possible.59 More importantly, CMC’s decision to endorse the 1987 “pilot and commander training class” was also influenced by Liu Huaqing’s report.60

On the other hand, Liu Huaqing and his carrier faction colleagues were confronted by other services in the PLA in the meantime. As Zhang Zhaozhong argues, “the PLAN unanimously backed the aircraft carrier program without a question. But the army and the PLAAF were reluctant to support.”61 The opening of the PLAN’s “pilot and commander training class” does not simply suggest that the aircraft carrier program was unconditionally supported by CMC which had long been dominated by army generals.62 In contrast, a number of the PLA top leaders still had some reservations about developing aircraft carriers. For example, the Chief of Staff of the PLA Chi Haotian clearly rejected the aircraft carrier proposal in 1988, arguing that “we have to reconsider the feasibility of building aircraft carriers and it’s not the right time for us to do so.”63 The Vice Chairman of CMC Yang Shangkun also agreed with the view that the task should be left to the next generation given China’s limited military budget. 64 More importantly, Deng Xiaoping did not fully back Liu Huaqing’s campaign either, despite the fact that Deng had endorsed Liu’s “near sea active defence” strategy and later appointed him as the Vice Chairman of CMC (1989-1997).65

As a matter of fact, any major decision regarding the PLA’s armament procurement was the product of intense bargaining and compromises among factions at the level of each armed service as well as CMC.66 As the fragmentation of decision-making authority has been a long-standing phenomenon in Chinese

59 Han, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu Danshengji,” 25. 60 Ibid. 61 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 319. 62 For instance, from 1988 to 1993, the PLAN only held one seat (Liu Huaqing) on CMC. However, the PLA ground force secured seven seats. 63 Han, “Zhongguo Hangnu Jihua Chutai Shimo,” 45. 64 Ibid. 65 Shi, Haijun Siling Liu Huaqing, 381-383. 66 Shu-Cheng Chang, “Analysis of the Problems in Studies of the People’s Liberation Army Navy,” Prospect and Exploration 8, no. 2 (2010): 70.

236 politics, to reach a win-win situation through bureaucratic bargaining has always been significant in China’s bureaucratic and military systems. One example of consensus building and bureaucratic bargaining over issues relevant to the development of aircraft carriers was the debate over the in-air-refuelling capability in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. As the carrier faction argued, acquiring an aircraft carrier would be the best option for the PLAN to enhance its power projection capability, especially that of providing air support for naval operations in distant waters. However, constructing an aircraft carrier would unavoidably lead to a major adjustment of China’s defence budget allocation as it was unlikely that the competing PLAAF’s demand for in-air-refuelling would allow CMC to satisfy both demands at the same time. Due to the constraint of budget, priority was given to fulfilling the PLAAF’s request. 67 However, in return, compensation was provided to the PLAN at the same time in the form of CMC’s consent to develop an in-air-refuelling capability for the PLAN Aviation Force (PLANAF). 68 For instance, in the early 1990s, the PLA converted a number of H-6 bombers into in- air-refuelling tankers which were introduced to both the PLAAF and the PLANAF.69 Consequently, a win-win situation was reached.

In short, given the PLA’s relatively limited defence budget in the 1980s and early 1990s, unavoidably, an expensive aircraft carrier project would be undertaken at the expense of its other armed services. Also, an expansion of China’s naval force could even make the PLAN independent or, if possible, superior to other armed services. 70 Moreover, as the PLA’s research and development (R&D) process constantly encountered problems of fragmentation, intra-bureaucratic

67 Paul H. Godwin, “Force Projection and China’s National Military Strategy,” in Chinese Military Modernisation, ed. C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), 96. 68 Tai-Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional Implications (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), 28. 69 For more information, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Martine Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernisation: Force Development and Strategic Capabilities (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2007), 134. 70 For more on this, see Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Strategy,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 12 (2000): 2040.

237 competition and the lack of efficient coordination,71 any single commander of the PLAN could not dominate the decision-making process without consulting other services in the PLA.72 Since no consensus on constructing an aircraft carrier was reached among CMC members at that time, it was unlikely that significant progress would be made despite Liu Huaqing trying so hard to advance the carrier program.73

In the early 1990s, a new element was added to the enduring factional competition within the PLA as a new PLA faction − the RMA School − was formed. The Chinese military learned the concept of RMA from America’s Gulf War Campaign against Iraq in 1991.74 Since then, the PLA strategists had been interested in the research of RMA and applied the concept of RMA to China’s military affairs.75 The introduction of RMA subsequently led to a new wave of competition between the carrier faction and the RMA School from the early 1990s to mid-2000s.76 Generally speaking, the latter achieved some success in persuading CMC to put more resources into the modernisation of nuclear and conventional- powered submarines and ballistic missiles. On the other hand, the development of China’s aircraft carrier program was held back to a considerable degree during a great deal of the 1990s.

The notion of RMA, which was mainly driven by the development of information technology (IT), advocates a revolutionary change in a military’s organisation/structure and operational doctrine. A general definition of it is “a discontinuous increase in military capability and effectiveness arising from

71 Jonathan D. Pollack, “Structure and Process in the Military System,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 173. 72 Fisher, China’s Military Modernisation, 20. 73 Zhan Jun, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Sea Power Mentality and the South China Sea,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (1994): 199-200. 74 You Ji, “The Debate on China’s Aircraft Carrier Program,” China Brief 5, no. 4 (2005), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3719 (accessed March 9, 2012) 75 Jagannath P. Panda, “Debating China’s RMA-driven Military Modernisation: Implications for India,” Strategic Analysis 33, no. 2 (2009): 287. 76 Wang, “Discussion on the Development of the PRC Navy Aircraft Carrier,” 59-60.

238 simultaneous and mutually supportive changes in technology, systems, operational methods and military organisations.”77 Bates Gill, an expert on military affairs, conceptualises some general points of RMA as follows:

 RMA is not simply technological in nature, but concerns significant progress and change in at least 4-5 important military-related areas: technology, systems, operations, organisation and strategy.  Changes or progress in these areas in and of themselves do not represent a true RMA, but rather it is the synergistic combination of these developments which forms the true RMA and alters the nature of warfare.  RMA emerges from revolutionary changes of historic magnitude within the broader social, economic and political environments of national and global societies, which in turn offer the conditions for RMA to be recognised, appreciated, internalised and exploited.  The smooth and successful process of recognition, appreciation, internalisation and exploitation requires flexibility, adaptability, innovation and openness to change.78

In China, the PLA regards RMA as a technology-driven phenomenon in the military field as well as human society. 79 In addition to adopting it, the RMA School introduced a new concept called “RMA with Chinese characteristics (you zhongguo tece de junshi shiwu gexin)” which argued that the PLA should aim to build a smaller and more advanced force through mechanisation (jixiehua) and informationalisation (xinxihua). The highlight on the “Chinese characteristic” would preclude the PLA from mechanically copying the U.S. model of RMA.80

77 Kriti Singh, “Revolution in Military Affairs and China,” South Asia Defence and Strategic Review no. 2 (2010), http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=231 (accessed April 18, 2012). 78 Bates Gill, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Centre, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 2. 79 Arthur S. Ding, “China’s Revolution in Military Affairs: An Uphill Endeavour,” Security Challenge 4, no. 4 (2008): 82. 80 You Ji, “Learning and Catching up: China’s Revolution in Military Affairs Initiatives,” in The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, ed. Emily Goldman and Thomas Mahnken (New York: Palgrave McMillian, 2004), 104.

239

Moreover, given that the increasing tension in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s, China might need to prepare for a military conflict against the U.S. armed force over the Taiwan issue, which attracted much top Chinese decision-makers’ attention and justified the PLA’s RMA development.81 As the military power of China would not exceed that of the U.S. in a short time, “RMA with Chinese characteristics” also emphasised “asymmetry” by which an inferior PLA could defeat a superior U.S. force.82

On the topic of PLAN’s armament procurement, the RMA School argued that there should be no need for China to have aircraft carriers. It regarded an aircraft carrier as an obsolete military platform as its high onboard radar rack and electromagnetic visibility could make it vulnerable to hostile anti-ship missiles. As one RMA School strategist once contended, “the defence system of aircraft carriers is not faultless and invincible. Its weakness is prominent…The massive formation of an aircraft carrier battle group is also an easy target of enemy attacks.”83 In addition, according to the RMA School, aircraft carriers could be vulnerable to submarines and mines as well.84 Instead, it believed that the PLAN’s war plan of either sea control or sea denial should be achieved in a few vertically distributed lanes but not across a large horizontal area. The victory of China’s future war would be based on partial superiority over its rivals within a limited time rather

81 Ding, “China’s Revolution in Military Affairs,” 83. 82 R. K. Shirohi and M. K. Singh, Military Strength of China (New Delhi: Prashant Publishing House, 2011), 289; Ding, “China’s Revolution in Military Affairs,” 83. For more on China’s RMA, see David M. Finkelstein, “Thinking about the PLA’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operation Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, ed. James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (Washington, DC: Centre for Naval Analysis, 2005), 1-28; David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 74-83; Paul C. Christian, An Assessment of China’s View on the Revolution in Military Affairs and Future Warfare (New Port, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1998), 1-4; You Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 3 (1999): 344- 364. 83 Ying Nan, “Hangmu De Biduan Ji Fan Hangmu Zuozhan [The Defects of Aircraft Carriers and Anti-carrier Operations],” Contemporary Military Affairs no. 1 (1998): 13. 84 Storey and You, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” 88. Also see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2000), 83-84.

240 than undertaking comprehensive and long-term combats.85 In line with this logic, the RMA School claimed that more resources should be devoted to the development of asymmetrical weapons, such as advanced submarines, sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missiles and cyber-warfare technologies. It believed that the best choice for PLAN to defeat a hostile aircraft carrier invasion should be to utilise its sophisticated land or ship-based anti-ship missiles rather than sending a mediocre Chinese aircraft carrier to sea.86

With an opposite position, the carrier faction contended that an aircraft carrier battle group would be a great platform for operations involving IT warfare.87 The carrier faction made three points to support its claim. Firstly, an aircraft carrier battle group composed of the carrier, destroyers, submarines and ship-based helicopters and aircrafts would act as a good platform for developing and testing the PLAN’s communication and command systems which require sophisticated IT networks. For that reason, the PLAN’s relevant R&D programs, such as early- warning systems, anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, and advanced command and control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems would benefit.88 Secondly, the carrier faction contended that an aircraft carrier is not an obsolete military weapon with conventional combat capabilities but an informationalised platform for coordinating underwater, surface, mid-air and even space warfare. 89 Without sufficient air cover, Chinese battleships would be dangerously exposed to an enemy’s fighter aircrafts.90 Thirdly, the carrier faction asserted that the utility of the aircraft carrier program is not limited to enhancing China’s maritime power-projection capability. Instead, conducting the research of

85 Michael Pillsbury, “Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David L. Shambaugh (Armonk, NY; London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 67, 69-71. 86 Some American naval strategists also regard Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile as U.S. Navy surface combatants’ number one threat. For instance, see James Kraska, “How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015,” Orbis 54, no. 1 (2010): 35-45. 87 Diamond, “Dying with Eyes Open or Closed,” 47-48. 88 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (St. Leonard, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 196. 89 Li Jie, “Dangdai Hangmu Fazhanzhong De Zhenglun Jiaodian Ji Sikao [Some Thoughts and Debate on the Development of Aircraft Carrier in Modern Times], Modern Ships no. 4 (2008): 21- 22. 90 Andrei Pinkov, The Chinese Navy and Russian Aircraft Carrier, http://www.kanwa.com/english/ /981107c.html (accessed April 8, 2012).

241 aircraft carriers is beneficial as doing so would not only help research of the strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft carrier battle group but also provide the PLAN with more valuable information to compete with American aircraft carriers, the PLAN’s primary maritime adversary.91

Regarding structural influence on the decision-making process of each of the factions, the RMA School undertook several approaches. Firstly, after the outbreak of the Gulf War, CMC convened a series of special meetings to study America’s military campaign against Iraqi troops.92 At these CMC meetings, PLA strategists subscribing to the RMA School introduced CMC members to the concept of RMA and its implications for modern warfare. In particular, Jiang Zemin attend these meetings personally. 93 According to Jiang, these CMC meetings reached a conclusion that modern warfare will become warfare with high technology as the world’s military affair is now undergoing a revolutionary change.94 Secondly, the RMA School held conferences and published research articles which led to Chinese people’s extensive discussion and study on how the PLA should conduct its own RMA.95 For instance, the RMA School held two seminars on RMA and China’s future military affairs in December 1994 and October 1995. 96 In addition, according to unofficial statistics, about 200 books or journal papers on RMA were published by more than 50 Chinese strategists in the second half of the 1990s. Authors of these articles were RMA advocates in COSTIND and the PLA’s research institutes, such as Academy of Military Science, National Defence University and Air Force Command Institute.97

The RMA School has long been exerting its influence on the development of the PLA’s modernisation and weapons acquisition. As early as 1993, top CCP

91 You, “The Debate on China’s Aircraft Carrier Program.” 92 These meeting were held on June 8, June 15, and June 25, 1991. 93 Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Vol. 1 [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Vol. 1], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/index.html (accessed October 25, 2013). 94 Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Vol. 3 [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Vol. 3], http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/index.html (accessed October 25, 2013). 95 Pillsbury, “Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” 66. 96 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, 291. 97 Pillsbury, “Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” 66.

242 leaders had learned the value of RMA, and in that year, Jiang Zemin, influenced by the RMA School, gave the PLA an order to study its theory and expected effect on modern warfare.98 Then in 1996, Jiang Zemin requested the PLA to prepare to adopt RMA as part of China’s military strategy, 99 claiming that informationalisation is the booster (beizengqi) of a country’s military development, and the essence of high-technology warfare on the sea should be characterised by informationalisation of the navy.100 Moreover, under Jiang’s supervision, the PLA initiated a program to develop so-called “magic weapons (shashoujian wuqi)” in 1995. These weapons, notably advanced submarines and ballistic missiles, aimed to deter foreign invasions given China’s limited defence capacity. 101 Jiang’s decision reflected the notion of asymmetrical warfare advocated by the RMA School.102

Additionally, terminologies and concepts used in China’s previous defence white papers suggested that China had adopted RMA and placed the preparation for asymmetrical warfare as a prioritised task. For instance, the terminology of the informationalisation firstly appeared in China’s 2002 defence white paper which stated that the PLA aimed to “accomplish the historical tasks of mechanisation and IT application (informationalisation), thereby bringing about a leapfrog development in the modernisation of the military.”103 In addition, China’s 2004 defence white paper also noted the significance of “asymmetrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations” when reiterating its aims to push forward informationalisation in the field of military operations.104 The white paper further

98 The Economist, “Briefing China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth,” April 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552193?page=1 (accessed April 10, 2012) 99 Jiang, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Vol. 3. 100 Ibid.; Gao, Study on the Coast Defence Thought for the Chinese Communist Party’s Leading Group, 1949-2009 , 308. 101 Xu Zuzhi, “Jiang Zemin Bushu Gaozhi Fangyu Wuqi [Jiang Zemin to Deploy High Technology Defensive Weaponry Systems],” Wide Angle no. 3 (1995), http://chinaqw.com/node2/node116/node 425/node427/node435.node435/userobject6ai23757.html (accessed October 25, 2013) 102 Pillsbury, “Chinese Views of Future Warfare,” 64. 103 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/ (accessed October 20, 2013). 104 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm (accessed March 5, 2012).

243 stated that “in accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLAN compresses the chain of command and reorganises the combat forces in a more scientific way while giving prominence to the building of maritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces.”105 The 2004 defence white paper clearly disclosed the principle of PLAN’s modernisation − developing a small but more efficient naval force with asymmetrical combat capabilities, which again followed the logic of the concept advocated by the RMA School.106

The carrier faction’s effort to push the aircraft carrier program remained. One notable effort was the PLAN’s proposal for “the development of an ocean-going navy with a localised nature (quyuxing yuanyang haijun),” a carrier-based design to modernise China’s naval fleets. This plan was proposed by Admiral Shi Yunsheng and other carrier faction officers during an internal meeting among PLA delegates at the 15th CCP Party Congress in 1997. After extensive discussion and debates, Shi Yunsheng and his colleagues eventually persuaded CMC to endorse their proposal.107 In this plan, the PLAN aimed to expand its land-based aviation forces to enhance its power-projection capacity before the country acquired its first aircraft carrier. Although this plan did not contain a specific timetable for China to construct aircraft carriers, it was still one key stepping-stone in China’s aircraft carrier program.108

The carrier faction also facilitated the process of purchasing ex-Varyag in 1997-1998. Since the Ukraine decided to sell this incomplete former Soviet carrier in 1995, the PLAN had been interested in purchasing it. The PLAN also sent a delegation there to conduct some tentative negotiations with the Ukraine’s military and government. Nevertheless, CMC and CCP leaders were hesitant to endorse this procurement plan due to the lack of budgetary funds and the political sensitivity of

105 Ibid. 106 Diamond, “Dying with Eyes Open or Closed,” 43. 107 Wen-Chong Liao, “Zhonggong Haiqianpai Fuchu Qiandong Meizhongtai Haijun Zhanlue Zhibian [The Return of PLAN Submarine Faction Makes a Substantial Chang of China, America, and Taiwan’s Naval Strategy],” Defence Technology Monthly no. 241 (2004): 18-19. 108 Wang, “Discussion on the Development of the PRC Navy Aircraft Carrier,” 59.

244 any deal.109 To make the procurement of ex-Varyag possible, officers belonging to the carrier faction (most of whom were members of Liu Huaqing’s office) laid eyes on the Chong Lot Travel Agency Chairman Xu Zengpin, a former PLA officer in the Guangzhou Military Region and a closer friend of Liu Huaqing.110 The carrier faction persuaded him to buy the former Soviet aircraft carrier for the Chinese government in 1997. Both parties reached a consensus that the government would partially finance the purchase and the Chong Lot Travel Agency would publicly unveil its plan to turn the ship into a floating casino in Macau. This alternative approach helped to reduce the political sensitivity of this deal and the amount of government budget spent on the Soviet warship. Eventually, the carrier faction was successfully in convincing CMC and CCP authorities to approve the deal in 1998.111

Civilian Agencies’ Roles in the Policy Process

The policy process of procuring military weapons and equipment in China is quite fragmented as it involves not only interest groups within the PLA but also other civilian government agencies. 112 In theory, armament procurement involves short and long-term objectives, a budget plan, and a coordinated process of design, trial and serial production and deployment. Nevertheless, in China, the Chinese government has always had a problem involving effectively processing its armament procurement given that research, development and production are retarded by the lack of centralised coordination.113 For instance, the acquisition of

109 Yi Yang, Zhujian: Zhongguo Diyisou Hangkong Mujian Danshengji [Casting Sword: The Birth of China’s First Aircraft Carrier] (Hong Kong: Tinhangkin Publications, 2011), 60-65 110 Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 98-105. 111 Ibid. 112 Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. Godwin, “Advance Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century,” in The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 166; J. S. Bajwa, Modernisation of the PLA: Gauging Its Latent Future Potential (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2002), 186. 113 Cole and Godwin, “Advance Military Technology and the PLA,” 166.

245 aircraft carriers has caused debate and bargaining among Chinese agencies as the aircraft carrier program involves a wide range of issues regarding the country’s affordability of constructing aircraft carriers, the implications of constructing aircraft carrier for China’s foreign policy, and China’s technological capability. As various interest groups have their own agendas and stances on the aircraft carrier program, it would be time-consuming for China’s decision-makers to arrive at a decision.

China’s aircraft carrier program has a profound impact on China’s foreign relations, especially its ties with the U.S., Japan and Southeast Asian countries. For both Washington and Tokyo, the birth of a Chinese aircraft carrier implies a potential change in the balance of maritime power in the western Pacific. For Southeast Asian countries, a Chinese navy with a greater power-projection capability could possibly make the South China Sea a “Chinese Caribbean Sea” as well as back up Beijing’s claim to the Spratly Islands.114 For India, another regional power in Asia, China’s aircraft carrier is also a threat to its security interests in the Indian Ocean region. In response to China’s aircraft carrier program, India launched the 37,500-ton Vikrant as its first “indigenous” aircraft carrier in August 2013, although the ship is still far from functional. 115 These regional concerns therefore boosted dissemination of the China threat theory around the world.

Given that MFA is responsible for building friendships and managing tensions between China and foreign countries, MFA is reluctant to see any armament procurement plan proposed by the PLA which could cause international disputes or tarnish China’s international image. As some put it, MFA has a more conservative position on the PLA’s armament procurement, which likely results from MFA’s

114 Xu You and You Ji, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s,” The Pacific Review 4, no. 2 (1991): 145-146. 115 Donald Kirk, “Asian Aircraft Carrier Race: China vs. India vs. Japan,” Forbes, August 13, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2013/08/13/aircraft-carriers-first-chinathen-india-and- japan-all-want-one/ (accessed October 20, 2013).

246 role in assessing the impact of this issue for China’s foreign relations and its international image.116

In theory, GSD, GAD and COSTIND supervise the PLA’s armament procurement projects in consultation with MFA.117 However, in normal practice, largely, the PLA dominates the decision-making, with MFA occasionally intervening in “military affairs.” Nevertheless, this is not to say that MFA completely loses its power to veto or support the PLA’s armament procurement projects. 118 Instead, MFA has established several departments which are responsible for the analysis of and policy recommendations about foreign armament procurement.119 Furthermore, a MFA delegate can still bargain with its PLA counterpart at the State Council or even top CCP leaders.

MFA also exerted some influence on the CCP authority’s decision to postpone the purchase and rebuilding of ex-Varyag. When the PLA expressed its interest in purchasing ex-Varyag in 1995-1997, MFA had expressed its concerns. This is because MFA regarded the purchase of ex-Varyag as a potential roadblock to MFA’s endeavour to ameliorate the tense Sino-American relations in the aftermath of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crises. 120 Moreover, MFA also believed that purchasing an aircraft carrier, an offensive weapon in nature, would significantly discredit China’s “New Security Concept,” a diplomatic rhetoric introduced in 1997 advertising Beijing determination to implement a moderate and

116 Evan S. Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players and Process (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 39. 117 COSTIND was established in 1982 to supervise the PLA’s procurement and R&D of defence technology. In 1998, a new COSTIND was formed under the State Council. The military and civilian functions of old COSTIND were separated. The military component was incorporated into PLA’s GAD. In March 2008 the new COSTIND was again merged into a new civilian bureaucracy called the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. 118 John W. Garver, “The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Chinese Military Modernisation, ed. C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), 257. 119 Medeiros and Gill, Chinese Arms Exports, 38. 120 Chong-Lun Guo, “Jingzhu Hangmu Meng Zhonggong Feisiliang [The Pursuit of Aircraft Carrier Dream: A CCP Endeavour],” China Times, April 2, 1999, http://forums.chinatimes.tw/special/war/2 000/mother-ship.htm (accessed October 2, 2013).

247 accommodating foreign policy.121 To boycott the PLAN’s proposal, then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen lobbied the CCP decision-makers via various high- level meetings.122

The plan to purchase ex-Varyag was shelved by the CCP leadership in 1997. As one member of the Chinese delegation to the Ukraine recalled, “in 1995, we inspected ex-Varyag and believed that our aircraft carrier dream will be realised soon… However, we later received the order from the superior, which requested us to stop submitting reports on aircraft carriers.” 123 Qian Qichen’s effort was reportedly the main driving force behind CCP’s decision to put the procurement on hold.124 Although ex-Varyag was purchased by the Chong Lot Travel Agency in 1998 and later towed to the Dalian Shipyard in 2002, MFA once more opposed the further step of starting to rebuild the incomplete warship. MFA initiated a new round of bargaining with the PLA’s carrier advocates which lasted for more than three years.125 Accordingly, the development China’s first aircraft carrier was again postponed.

In addition to China’s ties with foreign countries, constructing aircraft carriers relates to the country’s shipbuilding industry as well. Even though the commercial shipbuilding industry is not directly applicable to warships, carrier-relevant R&D can help Chinese shipbuilding companies advance their technological capacities and expand their scales of business operations. In fact, Chinese state-owned shipbuilding companies have a long record of building both military and commercial vessels. Prior to the economic reform, most of China’s shipbuilding was that of warships. In 1963, Beijing established the Sixth Department for Shipbuilding (diliu jixie gongyebu) to coordinate the country’s shipbuilding industry. The first generation of PLAN warships was subsequently developed,

121 Chen and Chen, Zhongguo Hangmu, 94. 122 Guo, “Jingzhu Hangmu Meng Zhonggong Feisiliang.” 123 Ye, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu,” 63. 124 Guo, “Jingzhu Hangmu Meng Zhonggong Feisiliang;” Ye, “Zhongguo Diyisou Hangmu,” 63. 125 Yu Wei, “Zhongguo Hangmu Zhanlue Jihua Dansheng Shimo [Story about the Development of China’s Aircraft Carrier Strategy],” Review of Party History no. 2 (2012): 8.

248 including guided-missile destroyers, surveillance ships and submarines.126 In the 1980s, Chinese shipbuilding companies focused on building commercial vessels and began to expand their share of the global commercial shipbuilding market.127 The performance of China’s shipbuilding industry was remarkable. In 2005, the total tonnage of China’s shipbuilding was up to 100 million tons, approximately 16 percent of the world’s market. China’s shipbuilding capacity in 2010 symbolised a high tide of the country’s shipbuilding history, as China surpassed Japan and South Korea to become the world’s largest shipbuilder.128

It is worth mentioning that despite Chinese shipbuilders’ expanding commercial business networks, China’s naval construction did not appear to suffer from this rapid rise. Chinese shipbuilders were still keen to bid warship-building contracts, with increasingly more modern PLAN warships commissioned by China’s state-owned shipyards.129 This is because constructing military warships can benefit Chinese shipyards in two ways. Firstly, constructing naval ships, especially large combatants, suggests more economic profits Chinese shipyards can be entitled to. Secondly, constructing advanced warship can also help Chinese shipyards enhance their shipbuilding capabilities.130

Despite the fact that there are numbers of shipyards capable of building large ships throughout the country, two shipyards are ideal candidates for aircraft carrier construction: the Dalian Shipyard and the Jiangnan Shipyard. Both shipyards were established in the 19th century and have more than one hundred years’ experience in shipbuilding (the Dalian Shipyard was founded in 1898 and the Jiangnan

126 Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Equipment Acquisition,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9 (1999): 1512. 127 Keith Crane and others, Modernising China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 180. 128 CCTV News, “China Shipbuilding Industry Face Headwinds,” January 25, 2013, http://english.cntv.cn/program/bizasia/20130125/102614.shtml (accessed October 4, 2013). 129 Evan S. Medeiros and others, A New Direction for China’s Defence Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 138. 130 Gabriel B. Collins and Michael Crubb, “Strong Foundation: Contemporary Chinese Shipbuilding Prowess,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 361.

249

Shipyard in 1865). With advanced dry docks and engine shops, they have a great deal of experience in constructing large containerships, large and ultra large crude tankers, as well as advanced PLAN warships, such as the Luhu and Luhai class destroyers. Moreover, the Dalian Shipyard is located adjacent to Shenyang and Harbin where numerous factories produce steel and mechanical equipment. The PLAN’s North Sea Fleet bases are also nearby. On the other hand, the Jiangnan Shipyard rests in China’s most prosperous region which has a variety of sources of the hardware and software materials required by an aircraft carrier. 131 Their advantageous locations make them competitive in the bid for carrier-building contracts.

The Dalian Shipyard and the Jiangnan Shipyard are subsidiaries of China’s two state-owned shipbuilding conglomerates − the Beijing-based China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and the Shanghai-based China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) − respectively.132 They are both sub-ministerial level agencies that report to the State Council through the state-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission. However, at times, the pressure to maintain profitability provides these shipbuilders with incentives to pursue their own business and operational agendas, even though they must seek in-principle government approval for large projects.133 More importantly, prior to the late 1990s, CSSC existed as a single entity in charge of governing the vast majority of China’s shipbuilding industry. In 1999, some of its subsidiaries were incorporated into CSIC as an anti-monopoly initiative implemented by the Chinese State Council. Since then, free-market competition has been introduced to boost business innovation within the Chinese defence industrial sector as well as facilitate Beijing’s long-term plan for developing the country’s shipbuilding industry. As a

131 Bussert and Elleman, People’s Liberation Army Navy, 114-115. 132 CSIC is also known as “Zhongchuan Zhonggong” or “Bei Chuan (Northern Shipbuilding).” CSSC is also known as “Zhongchuan Jituan” or “Nan Chuan (Southern Shipbuilding).” 133 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26 (2010): 24-25.

250 result, CSIC and CSSC are encouraged to compete for more contracts, both domestically and internationally.134

Given the commercial and technological interests a carrier-building contract can generate, both CSIC and CSSC have long been interested in building aircraft carrier. For instance, after China purchased the ex-Varyag, in 1999, CSIC general manger Chen Xiaojin openly stated that the company had two long-term dreams: to sign more commercial shipbuilding contracts and build an aircraft carrier.135 On the other hand, while ex-Varyag was towed to the Dalian Shipyard in 2002, the Jiangnan Shipyard was still competing for the contract to build a second aircraft carrier (or the first indigenous aircraft carrier). 136 To facilitate its R&D into building an aircraft carrier, CSSC officials also utilised their personal network in the government to access the blueprint and vital information of ex-Varyag.137 In 2009, the general manager of the Jiangnan Shipyard Nan Daqing openly stated that the shipyard was ready to construct China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier as it already had the essential technology and capacity, as well as determined will of the shipyard’s workers.138 Additionally, to promote its employees’ morale in its bid for the aircraft carrier contract, the Jiangnan Shipyard also erected a poster which noted that “the Jiangnan Shipyard has the will and the capacity to build China’s first large surface warship.” The erection of the poster was just days after Nan Daqing’s above remarks.139 In 2011, the Jiangnan Shipyard made a more ambitious announcement − recruiting 10,000 workers to run its newly constructed dry dock No. 3. The new dry dock again suggested that the Jiangnan Shipyard was ready for constructing a second Chinese aircraft carrier if it wins the bid.140

134 Collins and Crubb, “Strong Foundation,” 354-355. 135 Ibid., 361. 136 Andrei Pinkov, Zhongguo Hangmu Yu Nanzhongguohai Zhengduan [Chinese Aircraft Carrier and the South China Sea Dispute] (Richmond Hill, ON: Kanwa Information Centre, 2012), 162. 137 Ibid. 138 Dai, Hai Tuteng, 207. 139 Pinkov, Zhongguo Zhizao Hangkong Mujian, 400-401. 140 Cankao Xiaoxi, “Zhongguo Guochan Hangmu Jianzao Zhunbei Jiasu [China Speeds up the Preparation for Building Aircraft Carrier],” September 25, 2011, http://column.cankaoxiaoxi.com/g/ 2011/0926/2747.shtml (accessed October 5, 2013).

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To a certain degree, Chinese shipbuilding conglomerates play a role in the decision-making regarding building Chinese warships. CSIC and CSSC have profound relationships with the PLA. In fact, given that they control a large amount of Chinese organisations involved in commercial and military shipbuilding R&D, the PLA is in fact dependent on their knowledge and human resources. For instance, CSIC’s 702 Research Centre and China Ship Research and Development Academy are prestigious shipbuilding R&D institutes in China. They cooperate with the PLA, with constant exchanges of personnel. The 702 Research Centre has more than 20 mid-sized to large laboratories and is the largest shipbuilding R&D institute in Asia.141 In addition, CSIC’s 701 Research Centre is another primary designer of Chinese warships.142 Founded in 1961, the 701 Research Centre participated in the design of Chinese advanced destroyers. In particular, its former deputy chief engineer Pan Jingfu is regarded as “the father of Chinese destroyers,” and Zhu Fuying, senior engineer of the 701 Research Centre, is called “the chief designer of Chinese Aegis destroyer.”143 On the other hand, CSSC’s 708 Research Centre and the China Shipbuilding Mansion Industry Comprehensive Technology Economy Academe also conduct intense R&D for the PLAN’s warships. The latter also publishes “Naval and Merchant Ships (jianchuan zhishi),” a leading Chinese journal regarding naval technology and shipbuilding. 144 Therefore, this special relationship leads to the promotion of CSIC and CSSC’s institutional influence on the decision-making process. 145

In sum, given that CSIC and CSSC rank equally in the bureaucratic hierarchy and have individual power to influence CCP leaders and the PLA, the bid for the franchise to construct future Chinese aircraft carriers inevitably requires more of

141 Xinhua News, “Sheizai Zhudao Hangmu Gongcheng [Who is Dominating the Aircraft Carrier Project],” October 23, 2013, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-10-23/0842745781.html (accessed October 31, 2013) 142 Pinkov, Zhongguo Zhizao Hangkong Mujian, 405. 143 Shan Xu, “Qilingyi Suo: Yinshen De Jianchuan Dashi [The 701 Research Centre: Invisible Shipbuilding Master],” Oriental Outlook no. 39 (2012), http://www.lwdf.cn/wwwroot/dfzk/current/ 256814.shtml (accessed October 30, 2013). 144 For more on the 708 Research Centre and the China Shipbuilding Mansion Industry Comprehensive Technology Economy Academe, see their official web pages, http://www.shipbuilding.com.cn/yp/web/?39369; http://cimtec.cssc.net.cn/. 145 Ibid.; Medeiros and others, A New Direction for China’s Defence Industry, 122.

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Beijing’s effort and time to coordinate their competing interests. Intense bargaining has been in progress for more than a decade but no decision to sign a contract with either shipbuilding conglomerate has been confirmed. 146

6.3 CCP’s Decision to Begin Carrier Construction and Undetermined Future Trend

While being widely regarded as an authoritarian regime by Western countries, the CCP government is not as capable of centralising its decision-making authority as many in the West assume. Instead, given the fragmentation of China’s decision- making authority, issues and policies must be discussed through a complicated process of consensus building and bureaucratic bargaining involving many government agencies, which takes time, even decades before decisions are made. China’s aircraft carrier program is clearly facing prolonged policy process. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority does not simply imply that the CCP leadership is weak or decisions will never be made as its main decision-makers still have the power to make a final call.147

After three decades of debate, the CCP leadership eventually made the decision to begin aircraft carrier construction during a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) meeting in April 2009,148 a decision that echoed the acceleration of ex-Varyag’s rebuilding process. As mentioned previously, ex-Varyag was moved to a dry dock in the Dalian Shipyard and repainted in standard navy grey in 2005, but no further significant progress was made. However, in late 2009, the

146 Central News Agency, “Dalu Keneng Fenduan Jianzao Hangjian [China May Build Carriers in Parts],” September 27, 2013, http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aCN/201309270283-1.aspx (accessed October 12, 2013). 147 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 5. 148 Dai, Hai Tuteng, 168; Sina News, “Zhongguo Shouzao Hangmu Ding 2014 Nian Fuyi [China’s First Indigenous Aircraft Carrier Commissioned in 2014],” December 16, 2010, http://dailynews.sin a.com/gb/chn/chnnews/ausdaily/20101216/13342086731.html (accessed May 2, 2013).

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PLAN accelerated the rebuilding, initiating a series of refurbishment and renovation works on the ship.149 Within two years, the engine, radar, and command and communication systems were all installed on board. Moreover, according to one research, the duration of the rebuilding of ex-Varyag is much shorter than that of the construction of her sister carriers.150 This “high efficiency” suggests that the PLAN had already been preparing ex-Varyag for sailing at sea. The PLAN could have finished the construction of ex-Varyag earlier but, instead, spent a great deal of time bargaining with other competing government sectors as well as waiting for CCP leaders’ final decision.

Some reasons explain why CCP leaders made a decision to commence aircraft carrier construction in 2009. The first is that its high coast was affordable due to the continual expansion of China’s national wealth during the 21st century. The following case indicates that China’s position on the budgetary issue has changed considerably during the past ten years. In the 1990s, Chinese military strategists constantly complained about the costly aircraft carrier, describing it as a weapon with an unbearably high price that the Chinee government could never afford. 151 For instance, in 1999, National Defence University Professor Zhang Zhaozhong argued that the government should reconsider budget constraints before making any decision regarding building aircraft carriers. He stated that “even if our army did not eat, buy new clothing or equipment for six to seven years we would still not be able to afford one Nimitz.”152 However, his attitude was much more different ten years later. When commenting on the aircraft carrier program on a TV program in 2009, he said that as “China is a great power in the world and must have aircraft carriers. We have the capability to build one now and money is not the problem…”153 As China becomes wealthier, budget constrains will be a less

149 Pinkov, Zhongguo Hangmu Yu Nanzhongguohai Zhengduan, 161; Dong Qing, Zhao Lin and Jia Ruijun, “Waliangge Chuanqi [The Legend of Varyag],” East West South North no. 16 (2011): 19. 150 Pinkov, Zhongguo Hangmu Yu Nanzhongguohai Zhengduan, 161-162. 151 Carl O. Shuster, “China: Its Maritime Traditions and Navy Today,” in Sea Power and the Asia- Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune? ed. Geoffrey Till and Patrick C. Bratton (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 62. 152 Quoted in Sakhuja, “Dragon’s Dragonfly,” 1380. 153 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 393.

254 worrying issue for Chinese decision-makers when deciding the construction of China’s maiden aircraft carrier.

CCP’s decision to build aircraft carriers is also undeniably influenced by public opinion to a certain degree, given that the political utility of a Chinese aircraft carrier is associated with growing Chinese nationalism. For instance, avoiding another “century of humiliation” has been widely used as the major justification for the aircraft carrier program.154 As one Xinhua News commentary argues, “[f]rom the Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China suffered more than 470 offenses and invasions that came from the seas.”155 Moreover, some believe that constructing aircraft carriers is just “paying the overdue bills of history (mibu lishi qianzhang).”156 According to these views, all the miserable experiences China encountered over the last two centuries were due to China neglecting to develop a strong maritime power. An aircraft carrier would play a leading role in this nationalistic campaign because it could provide China with a platform for “showing the flag,” the best way to demonstrate its pride. 157 After CCP had begun to loosen its control of public opinion and become more sensitive to popular nationalism since the 1990s, CCP leaders had to be more responsive to the Chinese people’s nationalistic thirst for aircraft carriers.

However, albeit the decision to begin the aircraft carrier construction has been made, it is more likely a general policy guideline with details of the construction plan left unclear. The following step of China’s aircraft carrier program remains unclear. For instance, the 2013 edition of China’s defence white paper for the first time mentioned China’s maiden aircraft carrier but only addressed two lines regarding the aircraft carrier program, stating that “in September 2012, China’s

154 For more on the issue of “century of humiliation,” see Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 43-53. 155 Jeremy Page, “China Flexes Naval Muscle,” The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576499423267407488.html (accessed April 6, 2012). 156 Author’s interview in Qingdao, November 19, 2011. 157 Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” 64.

255 first aircraft carrier Liaoning was commissioned into the PLAN. China’s development of an aircraft carrier has a profound impact on building a strong PLAN and safeguarding maritime security.” 158 As a result, while Liaoning is continuing its sea trials, more questions about the next step of China’s aircraft carrier program have been raised simultaneously by both Chinese strategists and China watchers elsewhere in the world. These questions focus on one key issue: Will there be more Chinese carriers operating at sea in the future?

The number of future Chinese aircraft carriers is being estimated. For example, the U.S. Department of Defence’s 2013 report indicates that the PLAN “will probably build several aircraft carriers over the next 15 years” but does not provide a specific number.159 In China, Senior Captain Li Jie asserts that “China should obtain at least three aircraft carriers to undertake maritime operations.”160 Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong has a more outspoken claim, suggesting that the PLAN should construct four to six 60,000-ton, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to serve China’s security needs in the future.161 In addition, Chinese and Western reports about the possible construction of China’s second aircraft carrier at a shipyard on Shanghai’s Changxing Island surfaced in mid-2013 as some photos revealed that the PLAN was building a large surface warship “resembling an aircraft carrier.” Nevertheless, these reports were based more on speculation than concrete evidence.162

158 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013- 04/16/c_132312681.htm (accessed April 17, 2013). 159 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2013), 39. 160 People’s Daily, “Wuo Hangmu Weilai Fazhan Xu Manzu Haishang Zuozhan Xuqiu [Aircraft Carrier’s Future Development Must Satisfy the Need for Naval Operations],” November 27, 2012, http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/1127/c1011-19716213.html (accessed October 20, 2013). 161 Zhang, Bainian Hangmu, 323. 162 Zachary Keck, “Is China Building An Aircraft Carrier in Disguise?” The Diplomat, August 26, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/26/is-china-building-an-aircraft-carrier-in- disguise/ (accessed October 20, 2013).

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Deciding how many aircraft carriers China should build concerns how much money it intends to spend on them. Despite China’s mounting national wealth, this does not simply mean that PLAN can feel free to build as many aircraft carriers as it wants. Instead, consensus among various government agencies regarding how much money should be spent on the construction of aircraft carriers still needs to be reached before the top CCP leaders make a final decision. It is true that China is much richer than it was but as, in the meantime, it has been confronting more security challenges, CCP leaders still have many issues they have to deal with both now and in the future.

As a matter of fact, when China continues to expand its power seaward, domestic unrest has been an emerging concern since the late 2000s.163 Such an emerging concern is addressed clearly in China’s 2010 defence white paper which states that “separatist forces working for East Turkistan independence and Tibet independence have inflicted serious damage on national security and social stability.”164 As pressure builds to preserve China’s territorial integrity, securing internal stability (weiwen) is now a prioritised policy objective of the Chinese government. 165 The mysterious “car crash” in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in October 2013, an alleged suicide attack plotted by Xinjiang separatists in China’s most symbolic space for protesting government injustice, once again deepened the Chinese government’s concerns over the country’s internal security.166

163 The most notable cases are the “2008 Tibetan Unrest” and the “July 5 Urumqi Riot” in 2009. 164 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm (accessed May 3, 2012). 165 For more on the PLA’s internal security missions, see Murray S. Tanner, “How China Manages Internal Security Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 39-98. 166 Reuters, “China Suspects Tiananmen Crash a Suicide Attack, Sources,” October 29, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-china-tiananmen-idUSBRE99S02R20131029 (accessed October 31, 2013); CNN News, “China Links Islamic Terrorist Group to Tiananmen Square Crash,” November 1, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/01/world/asia/china-beijing- tiananmen/ (accessed November 1, 2013).

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Local governments in China have been advocating for more funds to finance their efforts to secure local stability in meetings of the CCP National Party Congress and the National People’s Congress (NPC). Although representatives of local governments are not as influential as those of the PLA, they can still cooperate with representatives from other government agencies, Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in particular, to bargain for more spending on internal security.167 MPS and local governments have achieved some success as China’s spending on public security has been larger and increasing faster than that on defence since 2011.168 A report by Reuters also notes that, “for 2012, China set combined central and local governments spending on public security to 701.8 billion yuan ($111.4 billion), compared with 629.3 billion yuan in 2011, when it grew by nearly 13.8 percent.”169 Given that maintaining internal stability is expected to be a priority of CCP’s political agenda in the near future, more bureaucratic competition between the PLA and other competing government organs in charge of internal security for budgetary funds should occur, which could be unfavourable to the development of more Chinese aircraft carriers. There are still uncertainties about China’s aircraft carrier program in the future.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

As a regional power in Asia, China has achieved exceptional success in its development of economic, political and military power. It is not surprising to see the rapid development of China’s armed forces, including aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, despite the continuing voice in support of the development of Chinese aircraft carriers, the process of China’s aircraft carrier program had been

167 Dongfang Hong, “China’s Defence Budget Goes up or down?” Defence International no. 332 (2012): 11 168 Dennis J. Blasko, “Politics and the PLA: Securing Social Stability,” China Brief 12, no. 7 (2012): 6; The Economist, “Briefing China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth.” 169 Chris Buckley, “China Boosts Domestic Security Spending by 11.5 Percent,” Reuters, March 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/china-parliament-security-idUSL4E8E408F20120 305 (accessed April 3, 2012).

258 considerably protracted during the past three decades. This prolonged process deserves more attention as the strategic implications of Chinese aircraft carrier for regional security in Asia are significant and profound.

This chapter looks at the factors behind the slow progress of China’s aircraft carrier program, a phenomenon that has not been fully examined by the existing literature. It argues that due to the fragmentation of authority, policy actors in relation to the development of Chinese aircraft carrier program have long been bargaining over whether China’s should build aircraft carriers. Intense factional competition within the PLA and bargaining among government agencies considerably prolonged the process of China’s aircraft carrier program. Moreover, although China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning has been commissioned, the next stage of China’s aircraft carrier program is still under debate. CCP leaders now have the intention to construct aircraft carriers but do not have a clear blueprint in mind. The increasing concern over China’s internal security caused by series domestic riots may possibly hinder the development of its future aircraft carriers.

Consequently, in the near future, China is likely to take one-step forward, stop for a new round of consensus building, and then take the next step when new consensus is reached. Therefore, the process of China’s aircraft carrier program will most likely follow the logic of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform in the late 1970s, that is “crossing the river by feeling the stones (mozhe shitou guohe),” meaning that China will maintain a general course forward but keep it sufficiently flexible to incorporate any possible changes in future.170 Since the competition among various policy actors with different self-interests is expected to endure, a consensus on how many extra aircraft carriers China should build will not be reached within a short period.171

170 Erickson, Denmark and Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps,” 49. 171 Author’s interview in Beijing, November 3, 2011; Dongfang Daily, “Mohu De Hangmu Juese Yu Zhongguo Haiyang Zhanlue [Blurred Role of Aircraft Carrier and Maritime Strategy],” August 1, 2011, http://www.news365.com.cn/jj/201108/t20110801_3100127.htm (accessed April 11, 2012).

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Finally, a maturing Chinese carrier force without a clear blueprint for its aircraft carrier project will have two strategic implications for regional security in Asia. On the one hand, as a new decision regarding the next stage of China’s aircraft carrier program is unlikely to be made soon, what the PLAN is more likely to do in the following years is continuing its current task of testing the capabilities of Liaoning and using this ship as a platform for the development of future aircraft carrier battle groups, patiently taking one step after another. A Chinese plan to resolve maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas with its maiden aircraft carrier is unlikely in the near future. However, in the long run, an unclear blueprint for China’s aircraft carrier project also implies uncertainty for balance of military power in Asia. Consequently, regional countries may possibly put more resources to development their naval force to balance the PLAN, which suggests greater naval competition between China and regional countries.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Policy Process of China’s Escort Operations in the Gulf of Aden

China’s counter-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden is not only an unprecedented operation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) but also the very first Chinese maritime expedition in the Indian Ocean region since Admiral Zheng He’s illustrious voyages in the early 15th century.1 A mainstream view on this naval campaign is that it has demonstrated China’s will and capability to project its military power far away from home. The existing literature has also made good analysis of the drivers behind Beijing’s decision to dispatch naval fleets to the Gulf of Aden. Some argue that the PLAN’s escort operations are driven by realist considerations that aim to secure China’s external strategic environment while others contends that Beijing tries to use this naval campaign to fulfil its responsibility globally. Nevertheless, one issue deserves more attention is that despite the PLAN’s success in escorting Chinese and foreign vessels in the waters off the Horn of Africa, Chinese behaviours relevant to the counter-piracy campaign are, to a certain degree, inconsistent. One the one hand, some of them have contributed to Beijing’s efforts to uphold its responsibility stakeholder image in the world. On the other hand, other controversial Chinese behaviours have suggested China’s ambition to enhance its military presence in the Indian Ocean region.

This chapter seeks to address the above issue by examining the policy process of China’s decision to dispatch escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden. It introduces key policy actors, their roles in the policy process and impacts of the fragmentation of authority on this naval campaign. It argues that the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority makes its counter-piracy operations more a collection of ad hoc initiatives with some coordinated and some not, and some politics-driven

1 Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight against Pirates,” Proceedings Magazine135, no. 3 (2009), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009- 03/welcome-china-fight-against-pirates (accessed May 14, 2012).

261 while others interest-driven. Despite having a limited inter-agency coordination mechanism, Beijing has not developed a well-planned policy for guiding its counter-piracy operations and relevant matters conducted in the Indian Ocean region. As relevant decisions have been made on a short-term basis with room for further negotiations which may be time-consuming, the future course regarding the PLAN’s escort missions is still unclear and a well-designed policy for expanding China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean region is unlikely in the near future.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 7.1 provides an introduction of China’s counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Section 7.2 reviews existing studies of China’s Somali Campaign. Section 7.3 examines the roles of the main policy actors, focusing on examining how they value this naval campaign as well as how they have exerted their influences in the policy-making process. Section 7.4 conducts a synthetic analysis of the impacts of the fragmentation of Chinese authority on its Somali operations. Finally, Section 7.5 makes some conclusions.

7.1 China’s Counter-piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden: An Introduction

The problem of piracy in Somalia has significant impacts on both global and Chinese interests. According to a statistic report published by the U.S. Department of Energy, as of 2006, approximately 3.3 million barrels of oil per day were transported through the sea lines between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.2 Moreover, about 33,000 merchant cruisers pass through the waterway close to Somalia’s northern shore every year, making this region home to busy maritime trade between Asia and East Africa.3 Nevertheless, the piracy problem has caused

2 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Globalisation, Sea Piracy and Maritime Security of the Horn of Africa,” African Political Science Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 138. 3 Lauren Ploch and others, Piracy off the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 9-10. Also see Martin N. Murphy, “Somali Piracy,” The RUSI Journal 156, no. 6 (2011): 4-11; Martin N. Murphy, Somalia, the New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

262 considerable economic loss, including ransom payments, naval operational costs, increasing in insurance premiums and additional procurements of security equipment. The estimated economic loss caused by Somali pirates’ attacks is as high as 18 billion U.S. dollars annually.4

Like many other foreign countries, China also worries about the negative impacts of the pirates’ attacks in Somalia on its economic interests because around 16 percent of China’s overall imported energy (including one-third of its imported oil) and numerous strategic resources from global markets are transported through the waters off the Horn of Africa.5 In addition, much of the trade between China and African countries and the European Union, China’s largest trading partner, also transits via the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 6 According to the Chinese government’s statistics, piracy in Somalia has been a significant threat to Chinese vessels in the region since the second half of the 2000s. In particular, from January to November 2008, of 1,265 Chinese commercial vessels which passed through the Gulf of Aden, approximately 20 percent of them were either directly or indirectly threatened by Somali pirates, with seven hijacked and some crew members detained.7

To protect Chinese vessels and overseas trade, the Chinese government in late 2008 announced its plan for deploying counter-piracy naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden. On December 26, 2008, the PLAN dispatched two missile-armed

4 The Economist, “What Happened to Somalia’s Pirates,” May 19, 2013, http://www.economist.com /blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-11 (accessed November 19, 2013). Also see Kennedy K. Mbekeani and Mthuli Ncube, “Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy,” Africa Economic Brief 2, no. 10 (2011): 1-8. 5 Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Dependence on the Global Maritime Commons,” in China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Nan Li (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 20. 6 Chen Jun, “Yadingwan Heihou De Liyi Bantu [Interests Calculations behind China’s Somali Campaign],” China Newsweek no. 1 (2009): 28; Stephan Theil, “China’s New Best Partner,” Newsweek, September 18, 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/09/18/europe- becomes-china-s-biggest-trade-partner.html (accessed August 12, 2012). 7 Mark McDonald, “China Sends Naval Task Force on Counter-piracy Mission,” The New York Times, December 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/26/world/asia/26iht-beijing.1.119836 740.html (accessed August 7, 2012); Xinhua News, “China Decides to Send Navy Vessels to Fight Pirates off Somali Coast,” December 20, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008- 12/20/content_10531229.htm (accessed August 7, 2012).

263 destroyers, DDG-171 Haikou and DDG-169 Wuhan, and one supply vessel Weishanhu to protect Chinese merchant ships from being harassed and threatened by Somali pirates in the waters off the Horn of Africa.8 On January 6, 2009, the PLAN flotilla arrived in the designated location and began counter-piracy operations with the aims of inspecting suspected pirate ships and protecting Chinese merchant vessels, including those belonging to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, if threatened.9

In addition, although the main goal of this task force was to protect Chinese merchant vessels, foreign vessels would also be assisted on request. In terms of the escort procedure and the rules of engagement, according to Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN Xiao Xinnian, the PLAN warships would first send shipboard helicopters to conduct reconnaissance operations when finding suspicious pirate ships at sea. Then, if pirates were engaged in robbery, the PLAN task force would adopt appropriate counter-measures in light of the current circumstances. At last, Chinese warships would resolutely defend themselves if the pirates attacked them.10

Beijing’s decision to dispatch naval escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden was welcomed by the United States and the United Nations (UN). For instance, upon hearing that Beijing was about to announce its decision to commence its Somali Campaign, Timothy Keating, then Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, praised the Chinese government’s decision, stating that “I hope the Chinese send People’s Liberation Army navy ships to the region, and we will work closely with them…..we want everyone in our area of responsibility to know we are committed to security, stability and prosperity all over throughout our region, which covers

8 Agence France-Presse, “Chinese Navy off on Historic Counter-piracy Mission,” December 26, 2008, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5juvBNMjqDxKCxtbyk7NEbIbEc3h (accessed July 2, 2012) 9 China Daily, “Chinese Naval Fleet Sails into Gulf of Aden,” January 6, 2009, http://english.sina.com/china/p/2009/0105/209579.html (accessed July 3, 2012). 10 China Daily, “Sanzhong Qingkuang Xiji Haidao [Three Scenarios regarding Attacking the Pirates],” December 23, 2008, sec. 2.

264 over half the surface of the Earth.” 11 With similar attitude towards this naval campaign, when meeting with China’s permanent representative to the UN, both the UN Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon and President of the UN Security Council Neven Jurica unanimously supported the PLAN’s endeavours and commended Beijing for its commitment to ensure maritime safety in the reign of Gulf of Aden.12

The performance of China’s unprecedented counter-piracy campaign was quite notable. By the end of 2013, according to Chinese statistics, the PLAN had dispatched 15 task forces to the Gulf of Aden. Each PLAN flotilla normally consisted of 2-3 warships and one supply vessel. These escort task forces, in total, had protected more than 5,400 Chinese and foreign ships passing through the waters off the Somali coast and succeeded in rescuing more than 50 ships threatened by Somali pirates.13 On the topic of labour put in this naval campaign, each task force consisted of approximately 800 Chinese sailors, which equalled to the force of two army battalions (see Table 7.1 for the details of the 15 task forces). Regarding the duration of these operations, the most lasting voyage lasted for more than seven months. Evidently, in terms of labour and duration, it is the greatest overseas naval campaign that the PLAN has ever conducted over the past fifty years.14

11 Donna Miles, “U.S. Welcomes Chinese Plans to Fight Piracy, Admiral Says,” American Forces Press Service, December 18, 2008, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=52386 (accessed August 7, 2012). 12 Xinhua News, “UN Hails Naval Escorting Operations by China in Gulf of Aden, Somali Waters,” December 23, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/23/content_10544944.htm (accessed August 7, 2012); Xinhua News, “China to Send Navy to Fight Somali Pirates,” December 18, 2008,http://www.china.org.cn/international/foreign_ministry/2008-12/18/content_16974487.htm (accessed August 7, 2012). 13 People’s Daily, “15th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Holds Rally before Sailing to Gulf of Aden,” August 6, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8353801.html (accessed November 18, 2013). Also see People’s Daily, “15th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Berths at Port of Jiddah, November 7, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90786/8449047.html (accessed November 18, 2013). 14 CRI Online, “Zhongguo Haijun Zhixing Yadingwan Suomali Haiyu Huhang Renwu Biaozhang Dahui Juxing [Accolade for the PLAN’s Counter-piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden],” January 3, 2014, http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2014/01/03/7211s4378953.htm (accessed January 4, 2014).

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Table 7.1 The PLAN’s Escort Missions in the Gulf of Aden, 2008- 2013

No. of Task PLAN Fleet Departure Date Commander No. of Crew Vessels Force Escorted

South Sea Rear Admiral 1 2008 Dec. 16 Approx. 800 212 Fleet Du Jingchen

South Sea Rear Admiral 2 2009 Apr. 02 Approx. 800 478 Fleet Yao Zhilou

East Sea Rear Admiral 3 2009 Jul. 16 806 582 Fleet Wang Zhiguo

East Sea Rear Admiral 4 2009 Oct. 30 Approx. 700 660 Fleet Qiu Yangpeng

South Sea Sr. Captain 5 2010 Mar. 04 Approx. 800 855 Fleet Zhang Wendan

South Sea Rear Admiral 6 2010 Jun. 30 965 615 Fleet Wei Xueyi

East Sea Rear Admiral 7 2010 Nov. 02 780 578 Fleet Zhang Huachen

East Sea Sr. Captain 8 2011 Feb. 21 Approx. 800 507 Fleet Han Xiaohu

South Sea Rear Admiral 9 2011 Jul. 02 Approx. 800 280 Fleet Quan Jianguo

South Sea Rear Admiral 10 2011 Nov. 02 Approx. 800 240 Fleet Li Shijiang

North Sea Rear Admiral 11 2012 Feb. 27 Approx. 800 184 Fleet Yang Junfei

East Sea Rear Admiral 12 2012 Jul. 03 790 204 Fleet Zhou Xuming

South Sea Rear Admiral 13 2012 Nov. 09 Approx. 800 166 Fleet Li Xiaoyan

North Sea Rear Admiral 14 2013 Feb. 16 730 181 Fleet Yuan Yubo

South Sea Rear Admiral 15 2013 Aug. 08 Approx. 800 113 Fleet Jiang Zhonghua

Source: Xinhua News; Kamerling and van der Putten, 2011.

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However, looking more closely at the number of merchant vessels escorted by the PLAN task forces, one can find that it has begun to decline since mid-2011. From 2009 to 2011, each task force escorted approximately 400 merchant vessels passing though the Gulf of Aden, with the highest number of ships protected 855 whereas after the second half of 2011, each protected only about 200 ships. The number continued to decrease in 2012 and 2013 when none of the PLAN task forces (the 13th, 14th and 15th) escorted more than 200 merchant vessels in the waters off the Horn of Africa. The declining number of merchant vessels escorted by PLAN warships is consistent with the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) statistics regarding the number of Somali pirates’ attacks.15 According to IMB, the number peaked in 2000-2011 while started dropping from 237 in 2011 to 75 in 2012. The number continued to plummet in 2013, with just 10 incidents attributed to Somali pirates in the first nine months of this year, down from 70 during the same period in 2012.16 The declining number of both Somali pirates’ attacks and merchant vessels escorted by the PLAN suggests that China is likely to make some adjustments regarding its current escort missions.17

In addition, despite its notable performance, the PLAN has also encountered some difficulties in relation to its long-range operational capabilities. Firstly, the performances of the PLAN’s software systems and hardware are still limited.18 Regarding the performance of the PLAN’s software systems, the Chinese Navy’s C4ISR (command, control, communication and computer intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems are relatively outdated. The informational technology (IT) system in the Chinese military is still categorised as a third-generation of

15 IMB is a specialised department of the International Chamber of Commerce. It responsibilities include fighting crimes related to maritime trade and transportation, particularly piracy and commercial fraud, and protecting the crews of merchant vessels. 16 Xinhua News, “Roundup: Global Navies Thwart Piracy off Coast of Somalia,” July 15, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2013-07/15/content_29428341.htm (accessed July 20, 2013). For more on this, see All Africa, “Somalia: International Piracy Attacks Reach Five-year Low in 2012,” January 17, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201301180240.html (accessed November 21, 2013). 17 Phoenix News, “Suomali Haidao Jinpen Xishou? [Somali Pirates Quitting Their Gobs?]” February 21, 2013, http://blog.ifeng.com/article/23432298.html (accessed May 2, 2013). 18 Benjamin S. Purser and Michael S. Chase, “Waypoint or Destination? The Jin-class Submarine and China’s Quest for Sea-base Nuclear Deterrence,” China Brief 12, no. 15 (2012): 11-15.

267 weapons system while that of the U.S. has reached a more advanced stage. 19 Secondly, in addition to its mediocre C4ISR systems, inherent weakness in the PLAN’s military hardware makes it a regional rather than a global naval force.20 Protecting China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in distant waters is entirely different from engaging in naval combat in home waters. Developing an ocean-going naval capability to achieve the former relies on constructing larger vessels, including surface warships, replenishment vessels and submarines. One major problem the PLAN encounters is the lack of large vessels which are able to re-fuel and re-supply Chinese warships’ stores of foods, water, ammunition and other commodities far away from home.21 China had used civilian cargo vessels to replenish its warships.22 However, doing so in distant waters served mainly as a temporary expedient rather than a long-term solution.

To facilitate its effort to replenish warships in distant waters, the PLAN task forces have been learning to rely on making port visits for fuel and daily supplies. For instance, during the first escort task force, only the supply ship Weishanhu made two short port calls. However, the crews had never had a chance to rest on land which had considerably challenged their physical and mental endurance.23 Although the crews of the second task force were allowed to rest on land for three days, this was the only chance they had to disembark from their vessels during the four-month-long mission.24 As China dispatched more and more escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden, normalisation of port calls conducted by the PLAN occurred progressively from 2010. 25 To date, the PLAN task forces have stopped in

19 You Ji, “The Chinese Navy, Its Regional Power and Global Reach,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3 (2012): 484. 20 Ibid., 477. 21 Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Dragon Boats: Assessing China’s Anti-piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” Defence and Security Analysis 26, no. 2 (2010): 224. 22 Ibid., 225. 23 Xinhua News, “Jiefangjun Zouru Lanhai Buzaishi Mengxiang [A Blue-water PLAN Is Not a Dream],” July 3, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-07/03/content_13798051.htm (accessed November 20, 2013). 24 You Ji, “The PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Mission as Capability Building against NTS Threats,” in Not Congruent but Complementary: U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Non-traditional Security, ed. Lyle Goldstein (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2012), 38. 25 Daniel J. Kostecka, “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” China Brief 10, no. 15 (2010): 3.

268 numerous littoral ports in the Indian Ocean region, including those of Aden, Salalah, Jeddah, and Djibouti, at a frequency of approximately once per month and a duration of normally 3-5 days (see Table 7.2 for selected port calls conducted by the PLAN).26 While the PLAN has been able to use littoral ports in the Indian Ocean region to replenish its escort task forces, its weakness in conducting long- range operations remains and issues about the best solution for filling this capability gap have still been under debate.27

Table 7.2 Selected Port Calls Conducted by the PLAN Task Forces

Arrival Date Duration (Days) Task Force Port Visited 2009 Feb. 21 3 First Port of Aden 2009 Jun. 21 11 Second Port of Salalah 2010 Jan. 04 N/A Fourth Port of Salalah 2010 May 03 5 Fifth Port of Djibouti 2010 Sep. 23 7 Sixth Port of Djibouti 2010 Dec. 13 5 Seventh Port of Djibouti 2011 Sep. 04 5 Ninth Port of Jeddah 2012 Feb. 21 4 Tenth Port of Salalah 2012 Apr. 02 3 Eleventh Port of Salalah 2013 Mar. 01 3 Thirteenth Port of Salalah 2013 Jun. 06 3 Fourteenth Port of Djibouti 2013 Sep. 05 5 Fifteenth Port of Jeddah 2013 Nov. 30 3 Fifteenth Port of Salalah

Source: Xinhua News; China National Radio; Sina News

26 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “Learning by Doing: PLAN Operational Innovations in the Gulf of Aden,” China Brief 13, no. 21 (2013): 12-13. 27 Xinhua News, “Zhongguo Kejian Sanxian Jidiqun [China Can Develop Three Groups of Overseas Military Bases],” November 23, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2011-12/23/c_131321310 .htm (accessed September 4, 2012). More on this debate will be made in Section 7.4.

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In addition to the weakness of the PLAN’s operational capabilities, the PLAN’s escort fleets have also faced some other challenges regarding its counter- piracy operations. One challenge is about whether the costs for maintaining these ocean-going task forces would outweigh the benefits which future escort operations can generate.28 Even though Beijing was initially willing to pay a premium to protect Chinese merchant vessels and gain long-range naval combat experiences, the direct cost of an escort mission (e.g. fuel, food, health supplies, port visit expense, ammunition and equipment used in training exercises and exchange of fire, and the depreciation of the PLAN’s warships) is still immense.29 For example, according to one research, the average expense for daily operation of a mid-size and 200-man destroyer is about 300,000 Chinese yuan. Therefore, the total expense of a PLAN escort task force which consists of three warships and at least endures for three months would be no less than 81 million Chinese yuan.30 On the other hand, China still has to protect his maritime interests and merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden. For instance, during his visit to Washington in May 2010, the PLA’s Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde admitted that China was facing a dilemma regarding dispatching more warships to the Gulf of Aden. As he argued, “we must spend more money if we continue to build more warships and send them to Somalia. This will be a great financial burden… However, if we stop building these warships, we will find it even difficult to protect our maritime interests overseas.”31

The second challenge China encounters is about how to find the best approach to undertake its counter-piracy operations while reducing foreign countries’ concern about China’s growing military capabilities. In terms of its ties with littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, China has to quest for more reliable

28 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2013), 187-189; Erickson and Strange, “Learning by Doing,” 15-16. 29 Erickson and Strange, “Learning by Doing,”15. 30 Peng Zhiwen, Yadingwan Huhang Xingdong Yijing Zhujian Biancheng Jile [The PLAN’s Escort Operation Has Little Value], http://www.26953.com/act/147457/10542145.html (accessed October 20, 2012). 31 People’s Daily, “Chen Bingde Tanyan Meiguo Junli Xianjin [Chen Bingde Acknowledges America’s Superior Military Power], May 20, 2011, http://military.china.com/important/64/20110520/16551582.html (accessed November 20, 2013).

270 replenishment and supply networks while preventing littoral states from doubting that the PLAN’s cooperation with littoral ports is a step for Beijing’s plan to enhance its military presence in this region.32 As Renmin University Professor Shi Yinhong has argued, from a strategic point of view, China must have better replenishment and supply networks for its naval warships in the Indian Ocean region. Nevertheless, while the PLAN’s has been gradually “going out” in recent years, it could, in the meantime, make littoral states concern about the implications of a more powerful PLAN for stability in the Indian Ocean region.33 General Chen Bingde also acknowledged this thorny issue during his 2010 visit to the US.34

More importantly, policy outcomes relevant to China’s counter-piracy operations are to a certain degree inconsistent. Evidence indicates that even if this naval campaign helped the Chinese government obtain some respect for assisting Western countries to secure maritime safety, at the same time, it sparked some maritime standoffs with Indian Ocean littoral navies. For instance, the PLAN’s very first counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden led to increased tension between Beijing and New Delhi. It was reported that an Indian Kilo-class attack submarine and Chinese warships, which were on their way to the Somali coast, engaged in a one-hour “hide and seek” game in international waters in January 2009. 35 According to the Indian media, the PLAN warships forced the Indian submarine to surface after more than one hour of searching through onboard sonar.36 This maritime standoff was clearly contradictory to the main task of the PLAN flotilla to fight against Somali pirates.

32 You, “The PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Mission as Capability Building against NTS Threats,” 38; John W. Garver, “The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia,” Orbis 56, no. 3 (2012):391-411. 33 Yao Yijiang, “Zhongguo Haiwai Jidi De Xianshi Yu Mengxiang [The Dream and Reality of China’s Overseas Military Bases],” Southern Weekend, August 1, 2011, http://www.infzm.com/content/61702 (accessed November 29, 2013) 34 People’s Daily, “Chen Bingde Tanyan Meiguo Junli Xianjin.” 35 Hindustan Times, “Indian Submarine, Chinese Ships in Standoff near Somalia,” February 4, 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/TopStories/Indian-submarine-Chinese-ship-in-standoff -near-Somalia /Article1-374662.aspx (accessed August 27, 2012). 36 Manu Pubby, “Indian Submarine, Chinese Warships Test Each Other in Pirate Waters,” The Indian Express, February 5, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-submarine-chinese- warships-test-each-other-in-piratewaters/419485 (accessed August 27, 2012).

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Additionally, China also has demonstrated inconsistent positions regarding how to conduct its escort missions. On the one hand, the PLAN’s active role in the international community’s endeavour to fight against the Somali pirates, from time to time, has been utilised by Beijing as a good example to advocate its commitment to the global security and military cooperation.37 For instance, when introducing the PLAN’s first escort task force on December 23, 2008, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesperson Huang Xueping highlighted the PLAN’s willingness to extensively collaborate with foreign escort task forces, claiming that “China is ready to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in performing humanitarian rescue tasks.”38 On the other hand, while the PLAN has conducted exchanges and joint exercises with other foreign naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden, it is reluctant to integrate itself with existing multilateral mechanisms, such as the European Union-led “Operation Atalanta” which is also known as the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU-NAVFOR-ATALANTA), the Operation Ocean Shield directed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as well as the U.S. Navy-commanded combined counter-piracy task force, the CTF-151.39 China’s reluctance makes Western countries wary of the real intentions behind its Somali Campaign, which, to some extent, has tarnished a cooperative and accommodating international image the Chinese government has endeavoured to establish.40

37 Chen, “Yadingwan Heihou De Liyi Bantu,” 29. 38 CRI Online, “Warships to Set off on Friday for Somalia Pirates,” http://english.cri.cn/2946/2008/ 12/23/189s435740.htm (accesses May 3, 2012). 39 Marc Lanteigne, “Fire over Water: China’s Strategic Engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden Crisis,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 305; Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “The Relevant Organs: Institutional Factors behind China’s Gulf of Aden Deployment,” China Brief 13, no. 20 (2013): 5; Gaye Christoffersen, China and Maritime Cooperation: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Berlin: Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, 2009), 14. Also see Roger Middleton, “Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars,” Catham House Briefing Paper no. 2 (2008): 7-8; Lee Willett, “Pirates and Power Politics,” The RUSI Journal 156, no. 6 (2011):20-21; Vijay Sakhuja, “Security Threats and Challenges to Maritime Supply Chains,” Disarmament Forum Maritime Security no. 2 (2010): 3-12. 40 Thomas J. Bickford, Uncertain Waters: Thinking about China’s Emergence as a Maritime Power (Alexandria, VA: Centre for Naval Analysis, 2011), 79-81.

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7.2 Existing Studies of China’s Somali Campaign

The PLAN’s counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have attracted much attention both domestically and internationally. In China, they are widely regarded by Chinese scholars and military strategists as an iconic military campaign which extends the country’s interest. For instance, Xu Weizhong, senior analyst the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argues that participating in the world’s counter-piracy efforts in Somali waters not only serves as a testing opportunity for PLAN and its capability to project long- range combat operations, but also illustrates the nation’s commitment to preserving international maritime security.41 In addition, Senior Captain Li Jie also regards China’s Somali Campaign is a “large Chinese naval parade,” arguing that it has demonstrated the PLAN’s blue-water abilities.42

China’s counter-piracy operations have also been studied abroad with various foreign reports on China’s military development addressing this issue. These documents highlight two points. Firstly, the growth in the PLAN’s ocean-going capability is evident and, secondly, an overriding concern of many in the West is that China is enhancing its military presence in the Indian Ocean region.43 For instance, the U.S. Defence Department’s 2011 report on China’s military development states that “the PLA Navy has demonstrated the capability to conduct limited deployments of modern surface platforms outside the second island chain, including nine separate deployments to the Gulf of Aden to support sustained counter-piracy operations from 2009 through 2011.” 44 Moreover, one report published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service claims that “Chinese navy

41 Liu Dong, “China Extends Anti-piracy Effort near Somalia,” Global Times, January 4, 2010, http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/diplomacy/2010-01/495999.html (accessed November 10, 2013). 42 Shanghai Morning Post, “Wo Hiajun Suomali Huhang Yeshi Dayuebing [The PLAN’s Escort Operation Is also A Naval Parade],” August 11, 2009, http://club.mil.news.sina.com.cn/thread- 45121-1-5.html (accessed January 2, 2013). 43 Adam P. MacDonald, “China’s Maritime Strategy: A Prolonged Period of Formulation,” Canadian Naval Review 8, no. 4 (2013): 12. 44 U.S. Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2011), 32-33.

273 ships in recent years have begun to conduct operations away from China’s home waters. Although many of these operations have been for making diplomatic port calls, some of them have been for other purposes, including in particular counter- piracy operations in waters off Somalia.”45 Correspondingly, Japan’s 2012 Defence White Paper contends that “China has also been taking part in international initiatives to deal with piracy off the coast of Somalia……This demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is improving its capacity to execute naval operations in more distant waters.”46

The drivers behind China’s policy of the counter-piracy operations have been studied in the existing literature. They can be identified as either realist or idealist. In general, the realist drivers are about coping with China’s insecure strategic environment while the idealist drivers underline the opportunities and prospects for China to fulfil its international responsibilities. Nevertheless, these two types of drivers are not entirely mutually exclusive as China’s Somali Campaign allows it to guarantee maritime stability in the region, which in return enhances security for China’s maritime interests and provides the PLAN with more opportunities for combat training.47

The realist drivers include the protection of China’s economic interests, the expansion of China’s diplomatic influence in Africa and South Asian, and the opportunity to enhance the PLAN’s ocean-going naval combat capabilities.48 Some foreign analysts specialised in China’s military affairs further claim that this

45 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities − Background and Issues for Congress (Washington DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2012), 34. 46 Japan Ministry of Defence, Defence of Japan 2012 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defence, 2012), 40. 47 Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Dragon Boats,” 216. 48 For more discussion on the realist drivers, see You Ji and Chee Kia Lim, “Implications of China’s Naval Deployments to Somalia,” East Asia Policy 1, no. 3 (2009): 61-68; Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (2011): 59-78; Harsh V. Pant, “China Shakes up the Maritime Balance in the Indian Ocean,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3 (2012): 364-368; Bronson Percival, “Growing Chinese and Indian Naval Power,” in Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power, ed. Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 41-42; Ryan Clarke, Chinese Energy Security: The Myth of the PLAN’s Frontline Status (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 49-50.

274 campaign serves one major step of the plan to fulfil the “new historic missions” of the Chinese military outlined by Hu Jintao in 2004, which included securing China’s strategic interests overseas. 49 Benefiting from its Somali Campaign, as some believe, Beijing can leverage its strategic cooperation with littoral countries to counter-balance U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean region, check India’s military rise and monitor U.S. and Indian’s naval operations.50 Even though there is no sustentative evidence to verify that China has been building overseas military bases in littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, some sceptics still believe that PLAN’s escort missions and relevant initiatives in expanding its naval support networks in this region have provided more evidences in support of the speculation that China has been increasingly enhancing its political and military presence in this region. 51 As one observer notes,

[I]t’s ships are regularly spotted in Indian Ocean waters and over the years it has been able to secure for itself a presence in these waters by building strong political, economic and defence relationships with several littoral states……Given its substantial influence in countries of the Indian Ocean littoral, China’s future demands for access (even influence) are likely to be concede, at least for the right amount of incentives and compensation to local regimes.52

On the other hand, the idealist drivers are the needs to consolidate China’s cooperation with existing international counter-piracy mechanisms and Beijing’s wish to assume the role of a responsible stakeholder in the world as the counter-

49 Dean Cheng, “The Chinese Navy’s Budding Overseas Presence,” Web Memo no. 2752 (2010): 1; Jesse Karotkin, “PLAN Shapes International Perception of Evolving Capabilities,” China Brief 10, no. 3 (2010): 5; Alison A. Kaufman, China’s Participation in Anti-piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications (Alexandria, VA: Centre for Naval Analysis, 2009), 50 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008): 378. 51 Richard Weitz, “Operation Somalia: China’s First Expeditionary Force?” China Security 5, no. 1 (2009): 31-32. Also see James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Is China Planning String of Pearls,” The Diplomat, February 21, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/is-china-planning-string-of- pearls/ (accessed November 30, 2013). 52 Swaran Singh, “China’s Forays into the Indian Ocean: Strategic Implications for India,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 7, no. 2 (2011): 239.

275 piracy operation has been justified by UN Resolutions.53 From an optimistic point of view, some claim that China’s Somali Campaign may lead to closer cooperation among China, the United States and other nations participating in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean region. For instance, some U.S. Naval War College scholars claim that China’s Somalia campaign “may ultimately allow the two countries to move beyond their tendency to compete and may promote a brighter future of cooperative coexistence. The United States and 16 other nations that participate in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean region − including Indian, Russian, as well as NATO forces − should seek from this unprecedented deployment ways to generate lasting military cooperation with China.” 54 Even though they acknowledge that it is still too early to judge how eager China would be to accept America’s leading role in the anti-piracy campaign, they are still optimistic about the prospect of multilateral cooperation among China, the United States and other Western countries.55

Above researches contribute to an understanding of the motives behind’s the PLAN’s escort missions. Despite their virtues, there are still some noticeable limits. Firstly, these studies suggest that there is a clear driver, either realist or idealist, dominating the making of China’s decision to deploy naval escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, Chinese behaviours relevant to the PLAN’s counter-piracy operations are contradictory. This indicates that the decision-making process behind this naval campaign should be more complicated. In addition, even if the existing scholarship helps clarify the motives behind Beijing’s intervention in the global counter-piracy endeavours in the Gulf of Aden, additional institutional factors have also influenced its decision to participate in the

53 For more discussion on the idealist drivers, see Guo Shu, “Zhongguo Haijun Suomali Huhang Xingdong De Falu Yiju Yu Yiyi [Chinese Navy’s Somali Campaign: Legal Basis and Implications],” China Today Forum no. 1 (2009): 32-34; Hou Yongbo, “Daji Haidao Zhongguo Haijun Zhunbeizhe [Chinese Navy Ready to Subdue Pirates],” Global Military no. 178 (2008): 12-13; Wang Lirong, “International Piracy and the Security of China’s Sea Lines,” Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies no. 6 (2009): 120-131. 54 Erickson and Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight against Pirates.” 55 Ibid.

276 counter-piracy mission.56 As Linda Jakobson argues, China’s decision-makers are now facing a problem in regulating the increasingly dynamic roles of a diverse group of Chinese policy actors in relation to its foreign affairs.57 As the decision- making authority have become more fragmented, Chinese leaders are struggling to deal with pressure from a more diverse society in which policy actors strive to shape policy outcomes in the midst of fierce bureaucratic competition for more budgetary funds and power.58 Consequently, to understand the nature of China’s decision to deploy naval escort task forces in the Gulf of Aden, the incentives for policy actors in the decision-making process, the roles of these actors in the policy process, and the implications of a fragment decision-making authority for regional security in the Indian Ocean should be further examined.

7.3 Policy Actors’ Roles in the Decision-making Process

Although the counter-piracy operations are military affairs by nature, they also involve the roles of diverse civilian Chinese agencies. In addition to the PLAN, three other policy actors have participated in Beijing’s decision to dispatch escort task forces: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Transportation (MOT) and national oil companies (NOCs). MFA and MOT are China’s primary agencies in charge of international exchanges and maritime transportation respectively, which makes both important stakeholders in the formulation of escort missions. Additionally, Chinese NOC, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in particular, has also exerted some marginal influence on the deployment of the PLAN task forces in the Gulf of Aden due to its extensive business networks in the Indian Ocean littoral.

56 Erickson and Strange, No Substitute for Experience, 45. 57 Linda Jakobson, “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa: Drivers and Constrains,” International Relations of Asia-Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009): 413. 58 Linda Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), 14.

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The formulation of Beijing’s policy regarding the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is twofold. On the one hand, the issue is, in general, welcomed by the PLAN, MFA, MOT and NOCs which see that the escort missions could serve their individual interests. On the other hand, even though all are in favour of the Somali Campaign, the decision-making process of this policy is to a certain extent similar to that of other policies regarding the protection of China’s maritime interests whereby relevant policy actors use their bureaucratic influences to shape policy outcomes by means of intensive inter-agency bargaining as well as consensus building.

The People’s Liberation Army

The PLAN has long desired a proper opportunity to enhance its ocean-going operational capability. Although it has regularly conducted long-range overseas visits, none of them is combat-oriented deployment that can substantially test the PLA’s war-fighting readiness. Therefore, clearly, high-seas counter-piracy operations can provide the PLAN with opportunities to accumulate more ocean- going combat experiences.59 Despite the fact that fighting against pirates is not completely identical to engaging enemy warships in a real naval battle, the PLAN can still benefit from the escort operations in two ways: (1) accumulating more experience in fighting wars in distant waters; and (2) closing the gap in capabilities of its three main fleets.

Firstly, counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden can provide the PLAN with good opportunities to practice ocean-going war-fighting tactics, long-range replenishment operations and maritime reconnaissance far from the Chinese

59 Li Hongda, “Guojifa Shiyexia De Zhongguo Haijun Yuanuang Huhang [PLAN’s Blue-water Escort Task Force in An International Law Perspective],” Journal of Yunnan University Law Edition 22, no. 2 (2009): 137.

278 periphery.60 In particular, they provide the PLAN fleets with more opportunity to understand what a real naval combat is. For instance, the PLAN’s task forces are authorised to use onboard weapon to fight against any pirates they encounter during the escort operations.61 This therefore helps Chinese soldiers accumulate real combat experience which they cannot learn from ordinal military drills. As some argue, the PLAN’s task forces have benefited much from the counter-piracy mission as the Chinese soldiers’ engagement with the Somali pirates are close to real combat situations.62

Secondly, sending warships to areas off the Somali coast can help the PLAN reduce the capability gap among its three main fleets. For instance, of its 15 counter-piracy operations, its South Sea, East Sea and North Sea Fleets operated 8, 5 and 2 voyages respectively.63 About half of the escort missions were undertaken by the PLAN South Sea Fleet which was traditionally regarded as the weakest in comparison with the other two Fleets. Therefore, the PLAN used the counter-piracy operations as a platform to assist the South Sea Fleet to enhance its combat capability.64 Moreover, as most escort operations were undertaken by its South Sea and East Sea Fleets, enhancing the combat capability of these two fleets could have been viewed by the PLAN as an important priority.65 This deployment was quite logical as both fleets are responsible for safeguarding China’s maritime interests and territorial integrity in the South and East China Seas which have witnessed numerous maritime disputes in recent years.

60 Yu Mengyan, “Dui Suomali Haidao Wenti Ji Zhongguo Paichu Haijun Jiandui Huhang De Qianxi [Analysis of Somali Piracy and China’s Escort Missions in the Gulf of Aden],” Legal System and Society no. 19 (2009): 226; Cheng Chuanqiang and Xiao Xiangwen, “Suomali Haidao Xingqi Ji Gefang Duiying Zhice [The Rise of Somali Piracy and Foreign Countries’ Responses],” International Data Information no. 1 (2009): 43. 61 CXinhua News, “Zhongguo Haijun Jiandui Jinri Qihang Fu Suomali [Chinese Naval Fleet Headed to Somali Today],” December 28, 2008, http://mychinasea.home.news.cn/blog/a/010100025C3F050 30720AE 5A.html (accessed May 20, 2012). 62 You and Lim, “Implications of China’s Naval Deployments to Somalia,” 65-66. 63 See Table 7.1. 64 You and Lim, “Implications of China’s Naval Deployments to Somalia,” 65. 65 Xinhua News, “Zhongguo Haijin Huhang Jinru Lunzhi Zhuangtai [ The PLAN’s Three Fleets Are on Duty in Turns],” March 6, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-03/26/c_122880461_2.htm (accessed May 20, 2013).

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While the PLAN is eager to provide more opportunities to train its fleets in distant waters, such blue-water operations must be permitted by the Central Military Committee (CMC). Nevertheless, unlike the PLAN, CMC at the beginning had some reservations about deploying a naval task force in the Gulf of Aden given both the lack of legal clarity surrounding it and the uncertain feasibility of undertaking such an unprecedented naval campaign.66 To promote this naval campaign, the PLAN undertook two measures. Firstly, it conducted a research paper regarding international military legal issues which helped justify the legality of it. Written by Captain Xing Guangmei at the Navy Military Studies Research Institute (haijun xueshu yanjiusuo) in October 10, 2008, this research paper summarised three main conclusions: (1) the PLAN’s escort mission is legally justified; (2) maritime piracy must be economically motivated; and (3) if maritime piracy is politically motivated and pirates and terrorists collude on the sea, no country can send its naval fleets to subdue them unless new UN Resolutions are passed.67 Captain Xing’s paper was subsequently presented at internal meetings in the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) as the theoretical foundation for the PLAN’s escort operation in the Gulf of Aden.68

Secondly, the PLAN’s previous feasibility researches of counter-piracy operations, while not focusing on fighting against Somali pirates, also contributed to CMC’s decision to deploy escort task forces in the waters off the Somali coast. For instance, prior to the discussion of this issue among Chinese civilian agencies and the public, the PLAN had long been assessing the feasibility of undertaking counter-piracy operations in China’s neighbouring waters. 69 In addition to conducting feasibility research, the PLAN also initiated the training of future long- range counter-piracy operations which were held either solely by the PLAN or

66 Erickson and Strange, No Substitute for Experience, 46-47; International Crisis Group, China’s Growing Role in UN Peacemaking (Beijing; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009), 27. 67 Shen Liang, “Zhongguo Jundui Yexu Falu Yanhu [Chinese Military Also Needs the Cover of Law],” Southern Weekend, April 3, 2009, http://magazine.sina.com/bg/nfweekend/20090403/20090 0402/203181868.html (accessed November 11, 2013). 68 Ibid. 69 Huang Li, Jianzhi Yadingwan: Zhongguo Haijun Yuanyang Liangjian [Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden: Chinese Navy Draws the Sword in Distant Waters] (Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press, 2009), 174.

280 jointly by both Chinese and foreign navies. In May 2002, it undertook a counter- piracy exercise in the Indian Ocean, its first pirate-fighting drill in distant waters 70 and, since then, it has held a series of them in the South China Sea.71 Owing to these previous efforts, the PLAN was able to respond quickly to the issue of deploying escort task forces in the Gulf of Aden when this issue was suggested to Chinese decision-makers in the second half of 2008.72

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In terms of MFA’s position on the PLAN’s counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it cares more about how they can secure China’s diplomatic interests overseas and bolster China’s positive international image at the same time. China’s Somali Campaign has paid dividends for MFA. This is because: (1) participating in the world’s counter-piracy endeavours can help it propagate the peaceful development rhetoric articulated by Chinese leaders globally as well as enhance China’s ties with African countries from which it imports energy resources and raw materials; and (2) the counter-piracy operations serve the diplomatic objective of exerting greater influence over Taiwan which is claimed by the Chinese government.

Firstly, a principle of China’s foreign policy is to enhance its image of peaceful development and fight against advocates of the China Threat Theory because Beijing fears a backlash against its rising role in the world and possible

70 For more on this, see Xinhua News, “Haijun Biandui Shiru Yinduyang Jinxing Fan Haidao Yanlian [The PLAN Fleets Conduct Counter-piracy Exercises in the Indian Ocean],” May 28, 2002, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/ gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-05/28/content_412581.htm (accessed May 2, 2012) 71 Shi Chunlin, “Jinnianlai Zhongguo Fangfan Han Daji Haidao Wenti Ji Duice [The Problem and Strategy of China’s Counter-piracy Operations in Recent Years], Journal of Dalian Maritime University Social Science Edition 9, no. 2 (2010): 74. 72 You, “The PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Mission as Capability Building against NTS Threats,” 33.

281 damage to its ties with foreign countries. 73 As the primary organ in charge of China’s foreign policy, MFA has long been the most active body in promoting a greater Chinese involvement in the international community’s peacekeeping endeavours.74 As the PLAN’s counter-piracy operations can be seen in the same light as China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, they will help MFA uphold China’s positive international image.75Additionally, the dividend from the Somali Campaign is greater than helping MFA to play its propaganda game as the strategic value of Africa has been more significant since Beijing began to enhance its diplomatic ties with African countries in the late 1980s.76 Since the early 2000s, MFA has organised regular high-level visits between the Chinese and African governments which have enhanced their cooperation on numerous issues, such as investment, economic assistance and cultural exchanges.77 More importantly, as the UN invites foreign intervention to cope with the problem of piracy in Somalia, unsurprisingly, the escort operations can provide MFA with another platform for exerting China’s diplomatic influence on countries in the African continent without violating its doctrine of non-interference in African countries’ domestic affairs.78

Secondly, China’s Somali Campaign also serves as a good opportunity for MFA to facilitate diplomatic recognition of China’s claim to Taiwan,79 an issue that remains a top priority on China’s diplomatic agenda despite cross-strait

73 International Crisis Group, China’s Growing Role in UN Peacemaking, 13 74 Ibid., 26. 75 Southern Weekend, “Buluo Renhou Waijiaobu Gaoguan Biaoshi Zhongguo Kaolu Jinqi Huibing Suomali [Not to Leg behind: Senior MFA Officials Claims China Will Dispatch Naval Force to Somalia Soon],” December 17, 2008, http://www.infzm.com/content/21309 (accessed May 2, 2012). Also see Simon Rabinovitch, “The Rise of an Image-conscious China,” China Security 4, no. 3 (2008): 33-47. 76 Jakobson, “China’s Diplomacy toward Africa,” 408. 77 Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiaoshi [Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing Group, 2011), 516-522. 78 Lin Lin, “Zhongguo Dui Suomali De Feichuantong Taidu [China’s Non-traditional Attitude toward Somalia],” Phoenix Weekly no. 8 (2012), http://www.ifengweekly.com/display.php?newsId= 5211 (accessed May 2, 2013); Niu Song, “Yuejing Daji Suomali Haidao Yu Zhongguo Waijiao Zhuanxing [Across-border Attacks on Somalia Pirates and the Transformation of China’s Diplomacy],” Pacific Journal 20, no. 9 (2012): 67-76. For more on China’s non-interference doctrine and its relationship with Africa, see Madison Condon, “China in Africa, What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma,” The Fletcher Journal of Human Security no. 27 (2012): 5-25; Festus Aubyn, “China’s Foray into African Security and the Question of Non-interference,” African East-Asia Affairs: The China Monitor no. 3 (2013): 9-30. 79 Weitz, “Operation Somalia,” 33-34.

282 relations having been improved since 2008.80 As Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic ties with any nations near the region of the Gulf of Aden, it would be highly unlikely for the Taiwanese government to deploy its naval escort task forces off the Somali coast. In the meantime, Beijing claims that it regards Taiwanese- flagged vessels as Chinese and is willing to escort Taiwanese ships passing through the Gulf of Aden.81 For instance, on January 13, 2009, in response to the issue regarding protecting Taiwanese vessels in the Gulf of Aden, MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu stated that the Taiwanese government was not qualified to dispatch its naval force to conduct escort operations, but the PLAN task forces would be willing to protect Taiwanese ships as Taiwanese sailors were also Chinese.82 While Taipei has refused to establish an official channel for Taiwanese ships to request escort from the PLAN, numerous Taiwanese ships have still benefited from the PLAN’s protection.83 For instance, on April 6, 2009, the Somali pirates hijacked a Taiwanese trawler “Wenfa No. 161” with thirty crewmembers on board (2 Taiwanese, 5 Chinese, 6 Indonesians and 17 Filipinos). After being released by the pirates, this Taiwanese trawler was escorted by the PLAN task force and returned to Taiwan on March 5, 2010.84 In response to this hijack incident, the Taiwanese government held a low-key stance and refused to comment on the PLAN’s escort

80 Yue Yucheng, “Huihuang De Chengjiu Baohui De Jingyan [Exceptional Achievement and Precious Experience],” in Xin Zhingguo Waijiao Liushinian [China’s New Diplomacy, 1949-2009], ed. Zhao Jinjun (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), 8. The China-Taiwan relations have been significantly improved since Ma Ying-Jeou took office in May, 2008. For more on cross-strait relations in post-2008, see Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-strait Relations: In Search of Peace,” China Leadership Monitor no. 23 (2008): 1-19; Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China- Taiwan Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); Russell Hsiao and Michael Hsiao, “Su Tseng-Chang and the Future of the DPP,” China Brief 12, no. 12 (2012): 6-9. 81 People’s Daily, “Zhongguo Haijun Suomali Huhang Buhui Xiang Chuanzhi Shouqu Renhe Feiyong [The PLAN’s Escort Task Forces Will Not Charge Chinese Vessels],” December 24, 2008, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/72028/141596/141602/8572873.html (September 9, 2012). 82 China Review News, “Jiang Yu: Taiwan Tongbao De Chuanzhi Dangran Shi Women Baohu De Duixiang [Jiang Yu: We also Protect Taiwanese Ships],” January 13, 2009, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1 008/5/6/3/100856376.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100856376 (accessed September 10, 2009). 83 The Taiwanese government expressed its gratitude for Chinese government’s effort to escort Taiwanese vessels but refused to establish official platforms for Taiwanese vessels to request escort from the PLAN task forces. See China Youth Daily, “Taiwan Yadingwan Huhang Nan Chengxing [Taiwan Unlikely to Send Escort Task Forces to the Gulf of Aden],” January 13, 2009, http://news.163.com/09/0113/16/4VI5I6M3000120GU.html (accessed September 9, 2012). 84 China News, “Yisou Bai Suomali Haidao Jiechi De Zhongguo Taiwan Yuchuan Huoshi [A Taiwanese Trawler Was Released by Somali Pirates],” February 11, 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/tw/tw-mswx/news/2010/02-11/2122382.shtml (accessed September 5, 2012).

283 operations.85 This phenomenon validates the diplomatic isolation of the Taiwanese government and Beijing’s ability to act on behalf of Taipei internationally, which provides MFA with more advantage in support of China’s sovereignty claim to Taiwan.86

In terms of MFA’s role in the formulation of Beijing’s decision to launch its Somali Campaign, it had conducted some previous research of foreign countries’ response to Chinese naval task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden, as Chinese diplomats understood that it was necessarily to “test the water” before Beijing made any important decisions regarding military actions. For instance, MFA diplomats to the UN first stated that China was considering the possibility of taking part in the world’s counter-piracy endeavours. 87 This issue was discussed extensively within the international community, with Chinese diplomats receiving a globally positive response which was subsequently reported to Beijing as evidence in support of this naval campaign.88 In addition, senior MFA leaders also participated in the high-level meeting among civilian and military leaders and bargain with other government agencies. In particular, it is reported that, to promote the counter-piracy operation, MFA delegates successfully convinced some PLA generals who initially had some reservations about sending naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden through a two-month-long debate.89

85 Now News, “Wenfa Yiliuyi Hao Renchuan Pingan [Wenfa No. 161 Return Home Safely],” February 25, 2010, http://www.nownews.com/n/2010/02/25/751028 (accessed September 5, 2012). 86 Li Zhide, “Yiwo Haidao Sanfang Boyi [Counter-piracy Operation: A Game among Three Parties],” United Daily, January 14, 2009, http://boxun.com/forum/200901/boxu n2009a/29443.shtml (accessed September 5, 2012); Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “An Overseas Naval Presence without Overseas Bases: China’s Counter-piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40, no. 4 (2011): 126. 87 Li Mingjiang, “China’s Gulf of Aden Expedition and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia,” China Brief 9, no. 1 (2009): 5. 88 Ibid. 89 Internatio International Crisis Group, China’s Growing Role in UN Peacemaking, 26.

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Ministry of Transportation

MOT is one primary government organ in charge of maritime traffic and the protection of SLOC security and therefore makes itself another key factor pushing for the PLAN’s counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. 90 As the top government entity supervising China’s transportation and communication affairs, according to the “PRC Government Structure Report” published by the U.S.-China Business Council, MOT “handles bilateral shipping issues, such as port access and negotiating cross-strait shipping with Taiwan. It ensures the health and safety of water transport as well as regulates the use of existing marine transport facilities and navigation channels. In addition, MOT regulates shipping agents and providers of navigation insurance, tallies foreign vessels, and coordinates salvage efforts.”91 Therefore, MOT’s bid to initiate China’s Somali Campaign was because it believed that a more secure Chinese SLOCs in distant waters could contribute to more maritime transits. As the impact of maritime transportation on China’s economic development increases, the bureaucratic influence of MOT and its subordinate agency, Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) will increase, which will contribute to MOT’s effort to solicit more budgetary funds from the government.92

MOT has played various roles in the planning of the PLAN’s counter-piracy operations. Firstly, prior to the decision being made in late 2008, it had started lobbying for the deployment of an escort mission. According to Ju Chengzhi, Director of its International Cooperation Department, the owners of Chinese merchant vessels had been complaining about the Somali piracy issue for years and requesting the Chinese government’s protection. The number of requests significantly increased in the second half of 2008 as more Chinese vessels had been harassed by Somali pirates in the waters off the Horn of Africa. Acknowledging the significance of the Somali piracy issue and pirates’ threats against Chinese interest,

90 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenge and Opportunity,” China Brief 9, no. 23 (2009): 5. 91The U.S.-China Business Council, PRC Government Structure Report: Ministry of Transport, https://www.uschina.org/public/china/govstructure/mot.html (accessed September 5, 2012). 92 Bickford, Uncertain Waters, 66-67.

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MOT officials passed these requests on to the State Council and suggested that the government should provide an appropriate response. This immediately attracted a great deal of attention from the Chinese decision-makers, which subsequently contributed to the commencement of planning for the first counter-piracy mission in late 2008.93

Secondly, MOT also facilitated the revision of China’s policy on the counter- piracy operations. After the PLAN’s first task force set sail for the Gulf of Aden, MOT officials constantly published research papers assessing the pros and cons of the unprecedented naval campaign. In particular, MSA Deputy Director Zhai Jiugang published a series of articles in one of China’s leading journals, China Maritime Safety, a couple of months later. 94 According to his analysis, as Chinese vessels had been facing considerable threats from Somali pirates, the Chinese government should implement more staunch and effective countermeasures, such as better communication between a PLAN task force and escorted vessels, more cooperation with foreign naval task forces and the improvement of Chinese merchant vessels’ self-defence capabilities.95 In addition, according to Zhai, the Chinese government still encountered some problems of coordination among the various government agencies participating in the mission. He concluded that China should continue to send escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden while greater efforts were needed to cope with these problems. There were still lots works needed to be done, particularly a more functional inter-agency coordination mechanism, Zhai suggested. 96 Research studies conducted by MSA provided good reference

93 Xu Jingjing, “Women Weishenme Yao Hufang: Zhuafang Jiaotong Yunshu Bu Guoji Hezuo Si Sizhang Ju Chengzhi [Why Should We Deploy Escort Task Force: Interview with Head of International Cooperation Department of MOT Ju Chengzhi],” Sanlian Life Weekly, January 16, 2009, http://mil.qianlong.com/37076/2009/01/16/[email protected] (accessed July 26, 2013). 94 For more on Zhai’s argument, see Zhai Jiugang, “Analysis on the Present Situation of Piracy off Somalia Coasts and Enhancement of Preventive Measures for Ships (1),” China Maritime Safety no. 6 (2009): 38-42; Zhai Jiugang, “Analysis on the Present Situation of Piracy off Somalia Coasts and Enhancement of Preventive Measures for Ships (2),” China Maritime Safety no. 7 (2009): 28-31; Zhai Jiugang, “Analysis on the Present Situation of Piracy off Somalia Coasts and Enhancement of Preventive Measures for Ships (3),” China Maritime Safety no. 8 (2009): 36-38. 95 Zhai, “Analysis on the Present Situation of Piracy off Somalia Coasts and Enhancement of Preventive Measures for Ships (3),” 37-38. 96 Zhai, “Analysis on the Present Situation of Piracy off Somalia Coasts and Enhancement of Preventive Measures for Ships (2),” 29-30.

286 materials for later policy revisions, such as the new protocol regarding how the PLAN task forces should escort Chinese merchant vessels passing through dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden, as MOT played a consulting role in the decision-making process.97

National Oil Companies

NOCs’ support of the PLAN task forces in the Gulf of Aden is mainly to enhance the safety of their petroleum products shipped through this region, a prerequisite for expanding the business scale of their companies. Due to China’s low level of domestic oil reserves and its desire to have excellent energy companies, Chinese NOCs began to establish an international presence in 1992, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.98 For these oil companies, as the sea lines in the waters off the Horn of Africa are one of their primary maritime pathways for transporting their products, their businesses could be significantly jeopardised should Somali pirates attack their oil tankers passing through this region. A good example is the Moscow University hijack incident. On May 5, 2010, a Russian oil tanker Moscow University was hijacked by Somali pirates about 350 miles off the coast of Socotra, Yemen.99 The cargo of crude oil on board belonged to one large Chinese NOC − China National Petrochemical Group (Sinopec) − and its total value was approximately 52 million U.S. Dollar.100 Clearly, the need to secure their

97 Bickford, Uncertain Waters, 75. 98 Erica S. Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” The China Quarterly no. 177 (2004): 34; Trevor Houser, “The Roots of Chinese Oil Investment Abroad,” Asia Policy no. 5 (2008): 153. 99 Maria Antonova, “Somali Pirates Seize State-owned Tanker,” The Moscow Times, May 6, 2010, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/somali-pirates-seize-state-owned-tanker/405494.h tml (accessed August 30, 2012). 100 Neftegaz News Release, “Russian Super Tanker Hijacked by Somali Pirates,” May 6, 2010, http://neftegaz.ru/en/news/view/94644 (accessed August 30, 2012).

287 petroleum products being transported through this region was considered significant by Chinese NOCs.101

In terms of Chinese NOCs’ roles in the formulation of China’s Somali Campaign, they assisted China’s search for a supply and logistic network in the Indian Ocean region which was this naval campaign’s greatest challenge. Despite business-driven considerations, their widespread business networks in East Africa, the Middle East and some South Asian countries still provided the Chinese government with advantage when negotiating with Indian Ocean littoral countries over replenishment services for the PLAN warships. For instance, as the PLAN’s first task force encountered the problem of a lack of sufficient replenishment, how to arrange port calls for its warships became an imperative for the Chinese government, with the Omani Port of Salalah an ideal candidate given its developed port facility and proximity to the Gulf of Aden.102 In particular, CNOOC made a great contribution to this issue. Since 2007, CNOOC has expanded its investment in Oman and made a master purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2008.103 This deal not only increased its share of Oman’s LNG export but also consolidated the Sino-Omani economic relationship which made the Omani government willing to further enhance its cooperation with China. Consequently, through its growing business networks in Oman, CNOOC, as a key liaison point between the Omani government and the PLAN, facilitated the negotiation regarding replenishing China’s second escort task force in the Port of Salalah.104

Finally, it is worth noting that expanding the business scale is a strategy for Chinese NOCs to obtain political influence, especially when they compete with

101 For more on China’s oil security, see Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Gunboats for China’s New Grand Canals? Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 2 (2009): 43-76. 102 Ke-Yong Hu, “Zhonggong Yuanyang Haijun Yu HaiwaiXiubu [China’s Ocean-going Navy and Overseas Replenishment],” Taipei Forum, July 7, 2013, http://140.119.184.164/taipeiforum/print/P_ 76.php (accessed November 26, 2013). 103 Kostecka, “Places and Bases,” 66. 104 Ibid.

288 other Chinese oilers in the contested domestic market. 105 This is because the influence of them is “a result of both their oil expertise and their political clout, derived from the Chinese fiscal dependence on them and from the fact that their top positions are appointed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).” 106 The heads of NOCs also see the success of their business as an admission ticket for their post-oil-career positions in CCP or central government.107 This can particularly explain CNOOC’s active role in the search for the PLAN’s port calls because it does not have the same power as its primary competitors, China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and is most keen to compete for political influence.108

7.4 Impacts of a Fragmented Structure of Authority on the Escort Operations

The formulation of Beijing’s policy on the counter-piracy operations is emblematic of the features of the fragmented structure of its decision-making authority. In general, China’s counter-piracy operations, although making some outstanding achievements, still reveal an unsolved problem that the Chinese government encounters today − the lack of a fully functional or centralised mechanism with an overarching level of authority capable of supervising all of China’s endeavours against pirates.109 The deployment of the PLAN’s counter- piracy missions necessitates the interaction of policy actors who exert their influence on the policy process in the pursuit of bureaucratic interests. As there is

105 Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” 25. 106 Ibid. 107 Erica S. Downs, Energy Security Series: China (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006), 36. 108 For more competition between Chinese NOCs, see Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream: The Reality and Strategic Consequences of Seaborne Imports,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (2010): 89-112. 109 Xu Ke, “Zhongguo Daji Haidao De Huigu Yu Cunzai De Wenti [China’s Counter-piracy Endeavour: Retrospect and Existing Problems],” Peace and Development no. 3 (2011): 53-55. Also see Guo Riyi, “Research on Anti-piracy Multi-mechanism of Ship,” Journal of Qingdao Ocean Shipping Mariners College 32, no. 2 (2011): 26-27.

289 no fully functional policy coordination mechanism, the formulation and implementation of policy involves a series of inter-agency competitions and consensus building. Even though this could result in more informed policy decisions which make Chinese decision-makers aware of the various economic, political and military issues related to an escort mission,110 it could also lead to some negative impacts on policy outcomes, especially when a fully functional inter-agency coordination mechanism is somewhat absent.

The effect of the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority on the outcomes of its policy regarding the counter-piracy operations is evident. It makes the policy more a collection of ad hoc initiatives − some coordinated and some not − rather than a coherent design. On the one hand, the limited coordination mechanism for regulating interactions among government agencies involved in the PLAN’s deployment has been observed since 2009. On the other hand, there are also extensive internal debate and inter-agency bargaining among a set of policy actors having approximately the same ranks in the political hierarchy. This phenomenon makes the absence of a well-developed design regarding the future course for the counter-piracy operations which is accepted by all stakeholders involved.

Operations with Limited Inter-agency Coordination

As examined in previous chapters, without a fully functional policy coordination mechanism, Chinese law enforcement agencies encounter a longstanding problem of having overlapping duties. On particular phenomenon is “building one house on top of another (diechuang jiawu)” which means that government organs tend to interfere tasks rather than efficiently formulating and

110 David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-making Process: Is It Changing and does It Matter?” in The Making of Chinee Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 12-13.

290 implementing a policy. For instance, at the beginning of China’s counter-piracy operations, this problem was particularly evident in the inadequate inter-agency coordination between MOT and PLAN. Even though both of them were presumed to be partners in counter-piracy operations, MOT and the PLAN still wished to ensure that their roles were indispensable. Both MOT and the PLAN were bidding to liaise between owners of Chinese merchant vessels and the government. According to the initial design, when a Chinese ship owner demanded a PLAN escort, it could directly contact the relevant PLAN departments which then assigned warships to accompany his/her ships.111 Nonetheless, at the same time, MOT also suggested that Chinese ships submitted their requests to the National Centre of Maritime Rescue, a subordinate agency of MOT, rather than directly reporting to the PLAN.112 Evidently, both agencies − one military and the other civilian − wished to have direct contact with Chinese ship owners whilst no fully functional inter-agency coordination mechanism was established.

Moreover, as some Chinese scholars contend, Chinese officials generally have a mindset of “I can interfere in the missions of others, while others cannot meddle in mine (bieren de shi wo keyi guan, dan wo de shi jue buxu bieren guan).” 113 They are reluctant to see other government agencies middle in their own business. However, MOT and the Chinese military do not have direct “leadership relations (lingdao quanxi)” as the former is under the supervision of the State Council while the later directly report to CMC. Consequently, while the PLAN is the main agency in charge of protecting Chinese vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden, it cannot directly request MOT to comply with its plans.

The problematic inter-agency coordination caused a series of troubles immediately after the PLAN deployed its first escort task force to the Gulf of Aden.

111 Yuan Tian and Xiaohu Qian, “Chinese Naval Escorting Formation Reminds Ships to Pay Attention to Sailing Safety,” PLA Daily, March 3, 2009, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special -reports/2009-03/03/content_1673945.htm (accessed September 5, 2012). 112 Guo Zhengyun, “Discussion on Marine Anti-piracy Measures,” Navigation of China 32, no. 4 (2009): 111-112. 113 Zhonglong He and others, Zhongguo Haian Jingweidui Zujian Yanjiu [Study on the Development of Chinese Coast Guard Force] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), 41-42.

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For instance, Chinese ships did not know with whom they should communicate and where they should meet a PLAN task force, thereby making the escort mission’s conduct chaotic. As Zhang Yuexing, Deputy Head of Department of Military Operation of the PLAN, once said, “we encountered a lot of difficulties in communicating with Chinese vessels as well as MOT.”114 From then on, a series of negotiations between the PLAN and MOT, which focused on how to enhance inter- agency coordination were undertaken. A revised policy was later implemented, which made MOT the sole liaison point between the Chinese ship owners and the government as well as more detailed regulations regarding how a PLAN task force and protected vessels should contact one another. According to the revised policy, the PLAN confirms its escort plan and makes it public more than 15 days prior to a voyage so that Chinese ship owners can more directly obtain the latest information about an escort mission.115 Moreover, MOT is in charge of soliciting applications submitted by Chinese vessels which wish to join a PLAN flotilla and passing them on to PLAN five days before an operation. Furthermore, MOT is also responsible for guiding Chinese ships to the location where they are supposed to meet a PLAN task force. 116 To a certain extent, this new policy contributed to coordinated operations conducted by the PLAN and MOT.117

Even though the communications between Chinese ship owners and the government are only a small part of a counter-piracy operation, China has made one step towards the development of a fully functional inter-agency coordination mechanism as a limited one has been observed. Nevertheless, as each step moving forward is the product of rounds of negotiations among Chinese government

114 Xinhua News, “Wo Haijun Huhang Liangyue Neiqing Jiemi [Unveiling the Story of the Navy in the First Two Months of Escort Mission],” February 25, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009- 02/25/content_10890359.htm (accessed December 1, 2013). 115 Ibid. 116 Xu, “Women Weishenme Yao Hufang,” 117 Ibid.

292 agencies with diverse bureaucratic interests, it may spend China more time to further consolidate and centralise this mechanism.118

Undetermined Future Course regarding Replenishing the PLAN Task Forces

While China’s policy actors, in general, support the PLAN’s counter-piracy missions and its endeavour to escort merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden will continue, how China should supply its naval sailors far away from home has still been under extensive internal debate. In particular, the Chinese military and the Chinese Foreign Ministry have conflicting positions on the merit of developing overseas military bases as the solution for the replenishment issue. The former speaks in favour of overseas naval bases in the Indian Ocean littoral but the latter urges the government to sustain its pledge to keep away from establishing longstanding military bases overseas. Nevertheless, due to the fragmentation of Chinese authority, any decision must be made through an incremental bureaucratic bargaining process. Therefore, relevant policies regarding the escort missions have be made on a short-term base and a determined decision about replenishing the PLAN’s subsequent task forces is unlikely to be reached within a short period of time.

China has a long history of avoiding establishing longstanding military bases overseas which could be regarded as a violation of its long-lasting non-interference policy – a directive of China’s relations with foreign countries.119 Previous official publications regarding China’s defence policy have noted that the Chinese

118 Li Jie, “Zhongguo Haijun Huhang Rengxu Kefu Diqing Fuza Deng Sanda Wenti [Li Jie: China’s Escort Operation Still Faces Three Major Challenges],” Xinhua News, January 13, 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2014_01/13/32964139_0.shtml (accessed January 15, 2014). 119 For more discussion of China’s “non-interference” policy, see Zhu Zhiqun, China’s New Diplomacy: Rational, Strategies and Significance (Farnham, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 14; Yang Gongsu and Zhang Zhirong, Contemporary China Foreign Relations: Theory and Practice (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009), 119-124; Chu Shulong and Jin Wei, ed., China’s Foreign Strategy and Policy (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2008), 70.

293 government will continue to follow this policy when modernising its forces and conducting military operations overseas. For instance, China’s 1995 “Arms Control and Disarmament” white paper argued that “China unwaveringly pursues a foreign policy of peace and independence. It resolutely protects its national independence and sovereignty and opposes foreign interference.”120 Subsequent Chinese defence white papers also reiterated its reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.121 Nevertheless, even though Beijing has never made an official claim regarding the revision of its non-interference policy, it appears that in the past few years there has been an internal debate over whether China should revise this policy and expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean littoral to ensure that the PLAN can more effectively to undertake the escort operations.122

Some Chinese military strategists constantly advocate a plan for developing overseas military bases in support of the PLAN’s escort operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa. They argue that China should use the Somali Campaign as a stepping-stone to enhance its military cooperation with littoral countries in the Indian Ocean region given the PLAN’s weakness in providing supply services to its warships far from home.123 For instance, Colonel Dai Xu asserts that China should build overseas military bases to safeguard its national interests and world peace. He believes that having overseas military bases is a prerequisite step for a

120 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, 1995 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1995), http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-2.htm (accessed August 22, 2012). 121 For instance, see Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2006), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html (accessed April 9, 2012); Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2009), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm (accessed April 9, 2012); Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm (accessed April 9, 2012). 122 Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?” China Brief 9, no. 19 (2009), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/archivescb/c b2005/ (accessed August 22, 2012); Kostecka, “Places and Bases,” 59. 123 Xinhua News, “Jian Haiwai Jidi Juedui Zhongyao [It Is Absolutely Important to Build Overseas Military Bases],” December 7, 2011, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/16523258.html# (accessed May 2, 2012).

294 country which wishes to become a global power, as does China.124 To support his claims, Colonel Dai contends that China cannot serve as a responsible stakeholder without have the strength to fulfil its commitment. “China’s endeavour to maintain world peace relies on more substantial actions and the building overseas military bases will be one logical choice,” claims Dai.125 In particular, Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, despite being one of the authors of China’s 2010 Defence White Paper which reiterated the non-interference policy, also argues that China eventually needs to develop overseas military bases.126

In terms of the locations for China’s future overseas military bases, littoral ports in the Indian Ocean region, such as those of Karachi, Colombo, and Victoria (the Seychelles) have been nominated by the PLA strategists as ideal candidate bases for supporting future naval operations in the Indian Ocean.127 According to advocates of the development of Chinese overseas military bases, the merits of these littoral ports are evident as they: (1) are well-developed commercial ports with extensive supply and logistic networks; (2) serve as bases for foreign naval fleets currently deployed in the Middle East and have full experience in replenishing warships; and (3) have a advantageous location as they are either close to the Gulf of Aden or midway points between China and East Africa.128

In contrast, as non-interference has long been a doctrine of MFA,129 Chinese diplomats try to maintain Beijing’s current non-interference policy and avoid politicising any Chinese projects with littoral countries in the Indian Ocean region.

124 For more on Colonel Dai’s argument, see China Review News, “Zhongguo Yingjian Yuanyang Jidi Fuqi Daguo Zeren [China Should Build Overseas Military Bases as a Responsible Stakeholder],” February 5, 2009, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1008/7/7/8/100877861.html?coluid=4&kin did=16&docid=100877861 (accessed May 2, 2012). 125 Ibid. 126 Zhong Jian, “Zhongguo Haiwai Junshi Jidi Chuanwen [China’s Alleged Overseas Military Bases],” Phoenix News, February 24, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/fhzk/detail_2012_02/24/ 12763667_0.shtml (accessed November 29, 2013). 127 Wenwei Po, “Zhongguo Junjian Fang Saisheer [Chinese Warships Visit Seychelles],” July 16, 2013, http://news.wenweipo.com/2013/07/16/IN1307160052.htm (accessed November 29, 2103). 128 Xinhua News, “Zhongguo Kejian Sanxian Jidiqun.” 129 Kong Yongle, “Zhongguo Ji Xifang Dui Feizhou Yuanzhu De Yi Yu Li [China’s and Western Countries’ Assistance to Africa: Responsibilities and Interests],” Twenty-First Century no. 2 (2011): 27-31.

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The proposal of constructing overseas military base is therefore opposed by MFA and Chinese diplomats have reiterated that China does not intend to do so.130 One notable example that demonstrates the diverse positions between the PLA and MFA is the alleged Chinese military base in the Seychelles. During an official visit to there in late 2011, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie welcomed more in- depth and comprehensive military cooperation between China and the Seychelles, including the possibility of creating a Chinese military base in the island country.131 Nevertheless, Chinese diplomats there later denied General Liang’s remarks and claimed that it was not cost efficient to replenish the PLAN task forces in the Seychelles given its high commodity prices.132 In addition, MFA officials argued that building overseas military bases would be violating China’s long-lasting non- interference policy and it would be impossible for the PLA to do so without a series of internal debate as well as the process of authorisation.133

As MFA argued, any proposal to alter China’s current non-interference policy should be processed through internal discussions and developed through rounds of negotiations among government agencies. Such an incremental policy process can lead to a phenomenon that decisions are made on a short-term basis with room for further negotiation and adjustment. For instance, as mentioned previously, during the first PLAN escort mission, only the supply ship made two brief port calls. This approach was not only due to the lack of experience in replenishing warships in distant waters but also a consequence of Chinese decision-makers’ concern about the negative implications of port calls for regional order.134 The question of how to cope with the difficulty of replenishing Chinese worships was discussed based on

130 People’s Daily, “Waimei Cheng Zhongguo Zhenzhulian Zhanlue Zhubu Chengxing [Foreign Media Claims that China’s String of Pearls Strategy Has Established],” May 24, 2010, http://news.sohu.com/20100524/n272303124.shtml (accessed September 6, 2012); Saibal Dasgupta, “Post Taliban Attack on Naval Base, China Won’t Invest in New Pakistan Port,” The Economic Times, May 25, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-25/news/29581807_1_ naval-base-gwadar-port-china-pakistan (accessed September 6, 2012). 131 Wangyi News, “Saisheer Chen Zhongguo Zhengkaolu Zaisai Jianli Junshi Jidi Kexingxin [The Seychelles Claims that China Is Considering the Possibility of Developing Overseas Military Base in the Seychelles],” December 12, 2011, http://war.163.com/11/1212/09/7L2I6Q6300011MTO.html (accessed May 4, 2012). 132 Zhong, “Zhongguo Haiwai Junshi Jidi Chuanwen.” 133 Ibid. 134 You, “The PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Mission as Capability Building against NTS Threats,”38.

296 the experiences learned from subsequent escort task forces. A compromise was reached between Chinese advocates and those who are sceptic about overseas military bases, with an expedient design for replenishing Chinese warships introduced, that is, to search for temporary “overseas places (yuanyang lizudian)” while postponing the quest for long-term military bases overseas.135

This search for “overseas places” means that, for the time being, the PLAN aims to develop its replenishment networks in the Indian Ocean littoral which will allow its task forces regular access to these ports’ facilities to obtain supplies, such as fuel, food and freshwater. 136 As one American strategist has argued, “China is in the process of developing a network of what the U.S. military refer to as places in the Indian Ocean in order to support forces deployed for non-traditional security missions, such as the counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. In most instances, these locations will be places on an informal basis where the PLAN relies on commercial methods to support its forces.”137 Given that details of China’s policy on long-term overseas military bases are open to further debate, this search for “overseas places” is more likely a short-term policy able to be changed should a new consensus be reached. 138 It is unlikely to see a determined Chinese policy about replenishing the PLAN’s following task forces in the near future.

7.5 Concluding Remarks

At the ceremony marking the first PLAN task force’s departure from Sanya Naval Base in Hainan Province on December 25, 2009, the PLAN Commander-in- chief Wu Shengli stated that “it is the first time for us to organise a naval force on an international humanitarian mission and the first time for our navy to protect

135 Yao, “Zhongguo Haiwai Jidi De Xianshi Yu Mengxiang.” 136 Kostecka, “Places and Bases,” 61. 137 Kostecka, “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” 5. 138 Yao, “Zhongguo Haiwai Jidi De Xianshi Yu Mengxiang;” Zhong, “Zhongguo Haiwai Junshi Jidi Chuanwen.”

297 important shipping lanes far from our shores.”139 Undeniably, the unprecedented PLAN operations in the waters off the Somali coast unveiled China’s ascending military power and the achievement of its naval modernisation endeavours during the past few decades. Nevertheless, China’s Somali Campaign also led to some Western strategists’ being wary of its implications for the balance of power in the Indian Ocean region. With the nature of China’s strategic intentions unclear, the increasing number of its naval activities in the Indian Ocean region will continue to be a significant issue among Western strategists and governments despite their welcoming China’s contribution to the world’s counter-piracy endeavours.

While the existing literature has conducted some in-depth analysis of the drivers behind this unprecedented naval campaign, it pays little attention to the implications of domestic political structure for China’s decision to deploy its escort task forces. The analysis of the policy process for China’s counter-piracy operation merits more attention as the Chinese bureaucracy is characterised by loosely coordinated institutions and strong stakes of government agencies. Through an analysis of the policy process of China’s decision to send escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden, this chapter argues that Beijing has not conducted a long-term plan for guiding its counter-piracy endeavours and relevant manners conducted in the Indian Ocean region, although the PLAN’s has made some remarkable contributions to the world’s counter-piracy endeavours. Some key findings are summarised in the following.

Firstly, even though Chinese policy actors in the political process, in general, have supported the escort operation, the reasons behind their actions are diverse. These reasons include the bid for more bureaucratic power, the endeavour to enhance its operational capability and the quest for more business interests. Secondly, as the fragmentation of authority is a primary dimension of Chinese political system, each policy actor in the decision-making process has its channels to exert influence on the formulation of the policy while no one can directly

139 Agence France-Presse, “Chinese Navy off on Historic Counter-piracy Mission.”

298 interfere with others’ “own business.” Decisions have been made through rounds of bureaucratic bargaining and extensive debate. Thirdly, the fragmentation of Chinese authority imposes some impacts on its counter-piracy operations. One impact is that fully coordinated policy outcomes are still absent while some efforts to better the inter-agency coordination have been made. The other impact is that relevant decisions concerning the escort missions have been made on a short-term base and, in the near future, a clearer Chinese plan for replenishing the PLAN’s subsequent task forces is unlikely to be reached.

In short, as Thomas Moore and Yang Dixia has claimed, when China has deepened its integration into the global economy and becomes more dependent on foreign trade and imported energy, no foreign issue will simply fall into a distinct functional, institutional or regional category. Therefore, any Chinese foreign policy would be of interest to various domestic actors in the policy process, making the “domestic structure” another key element in the study of China’s policy-making.140 Their argument is also applicable to characterising the making of China’s decision to deploy counter-terrorism naval task force to the Gulf of Aden. As the pursuit of bureaucratic/individual interests and the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority are expected to continue, it is unlikely that it will establish a well-planned policy for expanding its military presence in the Indian Ocean in the near future. Moreover, there are still numerous challenges facing Beijing, such as the pros and cons of dispatching more task forces in the future as well as the PLAN’s adolescent capability to undertake long-range escort operations. China is still searching for the future route regarding its escort mission which is expected be developed throughout rounds of bureaucratic bargaining.

140 Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, “Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 214.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

This thesis has provided an analytical discussion, through four case studies relevant to China’s maritime interests and territorial integrity, of the decision-making process regarding Beijing’s maritime security policy. The theoretical foundation of it is the fragmented authoritarianism (FA) model, a conceptual framework for analysing China’s political system and policy-making. This thesis finds that while China’s national wealth has been rapidly rising in the past three decades and Chinese leaders have an overarching policy guideline to build this country into a maritime power, relevant policies to protect its maritime interests and territorial integrity are to a certain extent inconsistent. In addition, there is no clear or dominant driving force guiding the making of Beijing’s maritime security policy. Due to the fragmentation of China’s decision-making authority, relevant decisions have been made through extensive bureaucratic bargaining among loosely coordinated policy actors with different weight of individual influences. Consequently, relevant decisions regarding maritime security issues have been made disjointedly and slowly, which causes the inconsistent nature of its maritime security policy.

There are three parts in this conclusion chapter. Firstly, it further elaborates the above arguments and summarises major findings of the empirical analysis of China’s maritime security policy conducted in this thesis. It proceeds to address the implications of these major findings for regional order in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, it discusses the significance of the argument of this thesis and areas for future research.

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8.1 Summary of Major Findings

Four case studies – the making of Beijing’s policies on the East and South China Sea Disputes, the Chinese aircraft carrier program and the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden – have examined the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy when it faces different security challenges (see Table 8.1 for some explanations of the key features of the various case studies).

Table 8.1 Four Case Studies in This Thesis

The East China The South China Aircraft Carrier Counter-piracy Issue Sea Dispute Sea Dispute Program Operation

China’s The East China Gulf of Aden The South China neighbouring Region Sea/the Diaoyu and the Indian Sea waters and Islands Ocean region western Pacific

Time of Late 1960s Early 1930s Early 1980s December 2008 Origin

Military/ Territorial Territorial Military Nature peacekeeping dispute dispute modernisation operation

First aircraft Unresolved; the Unresolved; carrier establishment of Latest possible commissioned; Mission an air defence Development establishment of possibly more continued identification an ADIZ1 under zone (ADIZ) construction

1 Numerous reports have speculated that China has been planning to establish another ADIZ in the South China Sea region to protect its sovereignty rights there. Nevertheless, no confirmation has been made. See Ankit Panda, “Chinese Foreign Ministry: No South China Sea ADIZ: China Says that Reports of a South China Sea ADIZ Being Imminent Are Baseless Rumors,” The Diplomat, February 4, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinese-foreign-ministry-no-south-china-sea- adiz/ (accessed February 5, 2014); Michelle Arrouas, “China Denies Plan for South China Sea Defence Zone, Time, February 4, 2014, http://time.com/#3972/china-denies-plan-for-south-china- sea-defense-zone/ (accessed February 5, 2014).

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These four case studies have informed the empirical analysis made in this thesis. Some major findings are summarised in the following.

A Broad Policy Guideline without Clear Policies to Support It

Over the past three decades, as China’s economic development has been increasingly dependent on marine resources in its neighbouring waters as well as imported energy and foreign trades transported via sea lines, Chinese top decision makers have regarded the protection of its maritime frontier as one of their primary tasks. As early as 1992, Chinese President Jiang Zemin had introduced the concept of “building China into a maritime power” which aimed to protect the country’s maritime interests and territorial integrity. This concept was later endorsed by Jiang’s successors − Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. 2 Despite the fact that Chinese leaders have reiterated it thereafter, this concept is just a broad policy guideline by nature and needs to be supported by concrete policies developed by relevant government agencies. However, due to the fragmentation of its decision-making authority, the Chinese government has encountered a longstanding problem in adequately translating this policy guideline into specific decisions to protect its maritime interests and sovereignty rights.3 Consequently, policy actors can take various actions to pursue their own interest, which often leads to inconsistent policy outcomes.

2 Nevertheless, Xi Jinping still contends that China will uphold Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “shelving disputes and carrying out joint development for areas over which China owns sovereign rights” when managing its territorial disputes with regional countries. See Xinhua News, “Jinyibu Guanxin Haiyang Renshi Haiyang Jinglue Haiyang [More Care, Understanding and Management of Maritime Affairs],” July 31, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0731/c64094-22399483.html (accessed January 4, 2014). Duowei News, “Haiyang Zhanlue Ji Shier Zi Fangzhen [Twelve Words of the Guideline for Maritime Strategy],” July 31, 2013, http://china.dwnews.com/big5/news/2013- 07-31/59293750.html (accessed January 3, 2014). 3 Author’s interview in Beijing, November 3, 2011.

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Extensive Bargaining among Loosely Coordinated Policy Actors

China’s maritime security policy is a product of bureaucratic bargaining among various loosely coordinated players with different weight of influences. Two groups of policy actors in the decision-making process can be identified – primary and marginal actors. As China’s main organs in charge of foreign and security policy, the top leadership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the military serve as primary actors in the making of China’s maritime security policy. In addition, due to their enhanced presence in China’s neighbouring waters, civilian maritime law enforcement agencies are another primary policy actor in this regard. On the other hand, while having no direct responsibilities in formulating foreign policy and managing China’s maritime affairs, some state or non-state actors have been involved in the making of its maritime security policy in recent years as well. To protect their individual interests, these actors, such as Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Public Security, the state-owned enterprises, local governments, academic institutes, public media and Chinese netizens have made some effects on this policy even though they do not necessarily attempt to have an active role in the policy process. Finally, it is worth mentioning that as the arena for decision-making has become more crowded in China in recent years, MFA’s bureaucratic authority over the making of China’s foreign and maritime security policy has been gradually waning. In particular, MFA constantly faces other hardliners’ criticisms and challenges which have made it placed between a rock and a hard place.

Bureaucratic bargaining is evident in the policy process. Even though policy actors with diverse positions on a certain issue is a quite normal phenomenon concerning a country’s policy-making process, a fragmented structure of China’s decision-making authority particularly contributes to extensive and prolonged bargaining among policy actors even though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government remains an authoritarian regime. Given that relevant policy actors involved in the policy process for China’s maritime security policy rank

303 approximately in the bureaucratic hierarchy and a functional policy coordination mechanism is somewhat missing, it would be difficult for one to wield influence over the others. For instance, the Chinese passport controversy discussed in Chapter 5 demonstrated that MFA could not have the authority to override the Ministry of Public Security’s decision albeit the former was reluctant to see the issuing of a new version of Chinese passport. Similarly, the PLAN had no authority to direct Ministry of Transportation’s relevant behaviours when it prepared for dispatching its first counter-piracy task force to Somalia. Consequently, any decision normally requires negotiations and compromises among people with different bureaucratic backgrounds and individual interests. Extensive inter-agency bargaining has to be conducted in order to reach a consensus while such bargaining may consume a great deal of time or even become never-ending.

Impacts of the Fragmentation of Authority on Policy Outcomes

The fragmentation of authority in China has some major impacts on the outcomes of its maritime security policy. Firstly, decisions are made inconsistently. As decisions are made through an extensive bureaucratic bargaining process, the search for accommodating each policy actor’s individual interests could result in a phenomenon that they are developed on a case-by-case base that possibly makes relevant policy outcomes quite disjointed. For instance, China’s controversial oil/gas drilling projects in the disputed East China Sea gas fields considerably spoiled MFA’s effort to seek joint development with Japan there. This is because Chinese oil companies had their own approaches to bargain for rights to exploit the oil/gas deposits there even though their drilling projects could have negative impacts on the Sino-Japanese negotiation regarding the delimitation of borders of the East China Sea exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and relevant joint development projects there.

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Secondly, decisions are made slowly. As previously mentioned, extensive inter-agency bargaining is normally time consuming and sometimes it is difficult to reach a win-win situation that all policy actors are willing to accept. Consequently, the process for formulating a certain policy may be considerably protracted, which is particularly evident in the case of China’s aircraft carrier program. While Chinese people had long desired to obtain an aircraft carrier, it still took the Chinese government for more than thirty years to commission its maiden aircraft carrier Liaoning. Such a prolonged process is largely due to enduring bargaining and debates conducted between not only different factions in the military but also civilian government agencies and the military. Although the Liaoning carrier has been undertaking sea trials since mid-2011, the future path of the development of this program is still unclear and expected to be discussed through another round extensive bureaucratic bargaining. A detailed plan is unlikely to be developed shortly.

8.2 Implications of the Findings for Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific

Principal findings in this thesis have two strategic implications for regional stability in the region of Asia-Pacific. Firstly, a fragmented structure of authority and extensive bureaucratic bargaining among diverse policy actors suggest that Beijing will require more time to determine its future steps regarding the protection of its maritime interests and territorial integrity. Even though China has an overarching policy guideline to build the country into a maritime power which may be regarded by regional countries as an ambitious plan to break the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, whether it can appropriately formulate relevant policies to achieve its goal is still far from clear.

Sceptics argue that under the concept of “Chinese Dream” − a plan to make the country more powerful in both military and political ways – Xi Jinping has

305 adopted a more assertive stance on China’s maritime disputes which may possibly alter regional status quo.4 However, the nature of this concept has yet been clearly explained and more debates are expected to be carried out by Chinese officials and scholars.5 As one China watcher notes, “in the absence of substance, Mr. Xi’s talk of a dream is creating space for a lively debate over where China should be heading. For the time being, it may suit Mr. Xi to keep the course he will be following unclear. But demands for clarity can only grow louder.” 6 As it will possibly take Beijing a great deal of time to translate Xi’s concept into specific policies, an ambitious plan by the Chinese government under Xi Jinping’s leadership to alter the balance of power in Asia is not is not as imminent as sceptics have warned.

Secondly, on the other hand, a fragmented structure of Chinese authority and lack of a functional policy coordination mechanism also imply that decisions may be made at the expense of well-thought or logical plans and more unpredictable Chinese policies are likely to be observed in the near future. Albeit Beijing does plan to increase its power and pride in the world, a more confrontational external environment is not necessarily a desirable outcome that CCP leaders wish to see. For instance, maritime clashes in the East China Sea have been good examples utilised by right-wingers in Japan to promote their proposal to develop a stronger Japanese military power.7 Nevertheless, unpredictable Chinese policies will not only deepen neighbouring countries’ mistrust of China’s rapid rise but also possibly spark more frictions between China and regional states in the future. Even though attempts to overcome this predicament were made, such as the establishment of National Security Commission (NSC) and State Oceanic

4 The Economist, “Xi Jinping’s Vision: Chasing the Chinese Dream,” May 4, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate- his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his/print (accessed May 20, 2013); Pete Escobar, “China vs. US Sea-to-shining-sea,” Asia Times, December 18, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN- 01-181213.html (accessed January 5, 2014). 5 Jessica Teets, “The Chinese Dream: Still Dreaming?” The Diplomat, September 12, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/the-chinese-dream-still-dreaming-2/ (accessed October 20, 2013). 6 The Economist, “Xi Jinping’s Vision: Chasing the Chinese Dream.” 7 Global Times, “Riben Youyi Zaidiaodao Huo Cedong Dashi Yu Zhongguo Haijun Tanpai [Japanese Right-wing Activists May Seek a Military Showdown off the Diaoyu Islands],” January 16, 2014, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-01/4760087.html (accessed January 20, 2014).

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Commission (SOC), little progress has been made. This implies that unpredictable Chinese policies will possibly continue to ignite more maritime frictions and dark clouds may keep aggravating over the horizon of dispute waters in Asia in the near future.

8.3 Significance of This Thesis’ Argument and Areas for Future Research

This thesis contributes to the existing literature regarding China’s maritime power and foreign policy-making. The contribution can be identified from a number of aspects. Firstly, in addition to the perceived Chinese assertiveness in defending its maritime interests and territorial integrity, this thesis finds that China’s maritime security policy is to some extent inconsistent, a phenomenon which has been little examined. It also challenges existing studies which imply that there is a clear factor, either Mahan’s theory or nationalism, driving the making of China’s maritime security policy over the past decade or so. In addition, this thesis highlights extensive inter-agency competition and bureaucratic bargaining in the decision-making process and provides new thoughts for the future research of China’s foreign and security policy.

The second contribution is that, in addition to verifying the applicability of the FA model to the analysis of China’s maritime security policy-making, this thesis further extends this framework. Based on the existing literature regarding the FA model that simply identified the policy actors as well as determined where and when bureaucratic bargaining normally occurred, this thesis finds that, during the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy, not all policy actors can enjoy the same power in shaping policy outcomes. Instead, some of them have become more influential in recent years while others play marginal roles in the policy process.

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Having said that, the limitation of this research should be stated as well. Given the political sensitivity of the subject of this thesis and the constraints on the access of primary data in China, it is difficult for the author to provide direct evidence to enable a detailed understanding of the Chinese government’s inside decision-making process regarding its maritime security policy. In fact, this is a general limitation for the study of policy-making in China and will possibly persist for some time until more liberty is allowed for researchers to conduct relevant studies.

Finally, while the analysis in this thesis provides an examination of the decision-making process of China’s maritime security policy over the past several decades, a number of issues for further research deserve some attention at the same time. The first issue concerns Xi Jinping’s new reforms. During the process of completing this thesis, China experienced a leadership transition which formed the fifth generation of the CCP leadership. In particular, the new CCP leadership under Xi Jinping initiated a set of political and economic reforms in 2013. As some have argued, Xi’s new political campaign can be regarded as the “economic reform 2.0” which means that it can possibly have the same impacts on the country’s destiny as the reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s had.8

In particular, one of the major reform areas under Xi’s campaign is strengthening policy coordination. This is clearly reflected by the ideal of top-level design. However, even though the width and depth of Xi’s reforms are considerable, they could become either a prominent achievement of the CCP leadership under Xi or a political fiasco should they fail.9 As Xi’s reforms have been implemented for roughly a year, how the nature of China’s political system

8 The Economist, “Reform in China: The Party’s New Blueprint,” November 16, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/11/reform-china (accessed January 6, 2014.) 9 Duowei News, “2014 Nian: Xi Jinping De Gaige Fengxian [The Year of 2014: The Risks of Xi’s Reforms],” February 18, 2014, http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2014-02-18/59420755.html (accessed February 20, 2014); Jin Zichuan, “Beijing Jingbian Xi Jinping Zao Da Tiaozhan [Turbulence in Beijing: Xi Jinping Confronts Great Challenges],” Mingjing News, February 11, 2014, http://www.mirrorbooks.com/MIB/news/news.aspx?ID=N000011757 (accessed February 13, 2014).

308 will evolve is still far from clear. This thesis did not make a detailed analysis of the impacts of Xi’s reforms on the decision-making process in China as it is too soon to make a judgement now. Nevertheless, it is logical to presume that as long as Xi continues his current reform agenda which, to a large degree, focuses on institutional reform, the decision-making apparatus in China will have some drastic changes. Consequently, a few questions can be further examined in the future: (1) how can Xi’s reforms in relation to restructuring government agencies, such as the establishment of the centralised Chinese Coast Guard, State Oceanic Commission and CCP National Security Commission influence the making of China’s maritime security policy? (2) does launching a series of institutional reforms suggest a possible change of a fragmented structure of China’s decision-making authority? If so, how significant is the change? and (3) what are the implications of Xi’s reforms for China’s future policy regarding the protection of its maritime interests and territorial integrity?

A second issue for further research relates to the implications of domestic unrest for China’s maritime security policy in the future. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the CCP government has been confronting more challenges regarding sustaining domestic stability over the past few years. Domestic riots have taken places from time to time. Particularly, recent violent attacks on the Chinese citizens in populous areas appeared to be the greatest threat against China’s internal stability.10 These attacks also unveiled the deeply rooted ethnic conflicts between the Han Chinese and other minority groups as well as the deteriorating contradictions in the Chinese society.

As a matter of fact, the voice for “securing internal stability (weiwen)” has become increasingly louder in recent years, and the increasing amount of domestic riots suggests that more government efforts and resources will be put in the efforts

10 For instance, on March 1, 2014, there was a brutal attack in the city of Kunming, Yunnan. According to the Chinese government, this attack was carried out by a group of eight knife-wielding men and women and left 29 civilians and 4 perpetrators dead. While no group or individual stepped forward to claim responsibility for the attack, the Chinese government had confirmed that it was carried out by Xingjiang separatist terrorists.

309 for weiwen. Given the State Council’s fixed budget, the top CCP leaders must show more discretion regarding budget allocation. Some questions are worthy of continued research: (1) will the issue of worsening internal security hinder China’s endeavours to build it into a maritime power? (2) how will the Chinese government balance the needs for securing internal stability and defending its maritime frontier and sovereignty rights? and (3) will the issue of weiwen waken a new round of Chinese debate on the virtues of sea power versus land power?

310

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