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Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, MARCH 1995-JUNE 1995 AUSTRALIA WITH INDIA ARGENTINA AUSTRALIA 5/21/95 Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans tells a news conference that Indias deploy- ment of Prithvi missiles is a destabilizing factor in the region. Evans also says that INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS Indias missile programs are a threat because they can trigger reciprocal arms build-ups 5/95 5/26/95 by other countries in the region. Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella Australia launches its first liquid-fueled Radio Pakistan Network (Islamabad), 5/21/95; in says that suspension of the Condor missile rocket, the Asroc-2 Mark 2, from an in- FBIS-NES-95-099, 5/21/95 (5208). project and the accession of his country to clined rail at Woomera Rocket Range. A the MTCR, together with other arms con- malfunction in the helium pressure regula- trol policies, elevates Argentina to an ex- tor of the liquid oxygen tank reduces the AUSTRALIA WITH ISRAEL emplary position in the international com- rockets range, speed, and altitude by half. munity. Peter Shann Ford, Space News, 6/5/95-6/11/95, p. 4/23/95 27 (5110). Susana Merlo, Ambito Financiero (Buenos Aires), Australian Defense Minister Robert Ray vis- 5/17/95, p. 16; in FBIS-LAT-95-098, 5/17/95 (5006). its Israel and discusses possible purchase of the Israeli Aircraft Industries/Rafael Barak- AUSTRALIA WITH FRANCE AND 1 point-defense missile systems for the Aus- UNITED STATES tralian Navys FFG-7 frigates. Flight International, 4/26/95-5/2/95, p. 14 (5088). The numbers listed in parentheses following the 3/95 bibliographic references refer to the identification Australia announces its intention to make a number of the document in the International final decision, before the end of 1995, on AUSTRALIA WITH RUSSIA Missile Proliferation Project Database, from which the news summaries are abstracted. whether to equip the RAAFs F-111C/Gs, Because of the rapidly changing nature of the and possibly F-18s, with Rafaels Popeye 4/95 subject matter, The Nonproliferation Review is or Rockwells AGM-130 air-to-surface mis- The Russian enterprise STC Complex and unable to guarantee that the information reported sile. Deliveries of the missiles could then the Australian Space Office initiate a study herein is complete or accurate, and disclaims commence by FY 1996-97. into the feasibility of launching Russias Start liability to any party for any loss or damage Flight International, 3/29/95-4/4/95, p. 9 (5087). SLV from Australia, taking into account caused by errors or omissions. Moscows MTCR obligations. The study is expected to be complete by the third quar- ter of 1995. Russia could then begin ship- The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995 153 Missile Developments ping rockets to Australia in 1997. 4/95 personnel demobilized from the Belarusian Warren Ferster, Defense News, 4/24/95-4/30/95, p. Bahrain seeks the U.S. Army Tactical Mis- strategic missile forces. Duffy assures 29 (4982). Warren Ferster, Space News, 4/24/95- Belarus that Congress will continue to sup- 4/30/95, p. 24 (5062). sile System for its existing MLRS but, ac- cording to a Pentagon official, the U.S. is port U.S financing for disarmament. The restricted from transferring this system un- U.S. plans to give Belarus $6 million for der the MTCR. the destruction of approximately 15,000 tons AUSTRALIA WITH UNITED STATES Philip Finnegan, Defense News, 4/17/95, pp. 1, 45 of rocket fuel left behind by Russian troops. (5048). Belapan (Minsk), 1/25/95; in JPRS-TAC-95-001, 5/95 2/14/95, p. 48 (5024). Australian officials say plans to develop software as part of a cooperative ground- 5/95 based theater missile defense research project Belarus First Deputy Foreign Minister with the U.S. will not violate the ABM BELARUS Valeriy Tsepkalo says that the U.S. has Treaty and do not reflect a change in granted Belarus an additional $6 million for Australias opposition to Star Wars re- the destruction of dismantled missile launch search. The software will be designed to facilities at Krona. There were 81 such locate and destroy incoming missiles. launch sites in Belarus following the breakup Graeme Dobell, Radio Australia (Melbourne), 5/ INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS of the former Soviet Union. 19/95 (5082). Interfax (Moscow), 5/18/95; in FBIS-SOV-95-097, 5/18/95 (5137). 12/27/94 Belarusian President Alyaksandr 6/23/95 Lukashenka says that every country of the The U.S. agrees to give Belarus $19 mil- AZERBAIJAN former USSR has the right to sell its share lion to monitor the physical protection of of military technology developed while part nuclear materials in Sosny, to destroy liq- of the Union. Lukashenka confirms that uid rocket fuel and missile launching pads, Belarus has sold S-300 missile system com- and also to destroy the nuclear infrastruc- ponents, but claims that no one intends to ture. sell a complete system. AZERBAIJAN WITH IRAN Valentin Menshikov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 6/23/95; Zenon Starchenko, Khreshchatyk (Kiev), 1/20/95, in FBIS-SOV-95-122, 6/23/95 (5123). p. 2; in JPRS-TAC-95-001, 2/14/95, pp. 50-51 6/95 (5065). Azerbaijan sells six Kub air defense missile launchers to Iran. Due to their poor condi- tion, Iran is forced to cannibalize them to BELARUS WITH RUSSIA BOSNIA make three serviceable launchers. Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 6/6/95, p. 5/26/95 3; in JPRS-UMA-95-025, 6/6/95 (5104). The head of Russias Strategic Missile Troops, Staff Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, says 18 ICBMs remaining in Belarus will INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS be transferred to Russia by the end of 1995. BAHRAIN Yesin states that Russia maintains opera- 5/95 tional control over the missiles. Photographs taken of improvised weapons Doug Clarke, Omri Daily Digest, 5/29/95 (5041). deployed by Bosnian Serb forces in the Interfax (Moscow), 5/26/95; in FBIS-SOV-95-103, 5/26/95 (5117). Majevica mountain region show a 127 mm air-to-surface rocket launcher, which may have come from a MiG-21, and an AA-2B AHRAIN WITH NITED TATES B U S (Atoll) AAM on an improvised mount. BELARUS WITH UNITED STATES [The weapons have been modified for a sur- 1/95 face-to-surface role.] The U.S. agrees to sell Bahrain a Hawk air 1/95 Janes Defence Weekly, 5/13/95, p. 12 (5103). defense battery. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Philip Finnegan, Defense News, 4/17/95, pp. 1, 45 Gloria Duffy meets with Belarus govern- 6/95 (5048). ment officials to discuss disarmament, de- Press reports indicate that the improvised fense conversion, and housing needs for rocket system which the Bosnian Serbs used 154 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995 Missile Developments to attack Bihac in the spring of 1995 may de Satelites (VLS) SLV, which is still under BRAZIL WITH RUSSIA AND have employed Saggar anti-tank missile development by the Instituto de Aeronautica UNITED STATES components in order to control the simulta- a Espaco. The three-stage, solid-fuel VLS neous ignition and cut-off of its four 122/ is based on the Sonda 4 sounding rocket 5/95 128 mm rockets. The weapon has a 10 km and stands 19 m high with four strap-on The Clinton administration determines that range and is launched from a truck mounted motors. The VLS is capable of placing a Russia recently transferred advanced mis- rail. This improvised design allows Bosnian 200 kg payload into a 750 km, 25-degree sile technology to Brazil but indicates in a Serb forces to deliver heavy ordnance, in- orbit, or a 500 km sun-synchronous orbit. secret memo to Congress that it will waive cluding fuel-air bombs, without aircraft. The VLS is scheduled for its first launch in sanctions. According to a Clinton adminis- Janes Intelligence Review Pointer, 6/95, p. 6 (5100). 6/96. Although its development has been tration official, the decision to waive sanc- slowed by MTCR restrictions, Brazil is said tions over the sale of carbon fiber, which is 6/28/95 to have obtained advanced technology, in- used in building rocket motor cases, comes The Republic of Serb Krajina displays the cluding micro-electronics, from Russia and after a Russian promise to stop sales to Bra- indigenously-designed and produced K-15 elsewhere via the black market. Construc- zil. A Brazilian official says that Brazils Krajina missile. The K-15 has a 150 km tion of a nuclear submarine in Rio de Janeiro 2/94 [as published] promise to adhere to range. will be completed in 2000. The total num- MTCR guidelines applies only to the sale Tanjug (Belgrade), 6/28/95; in FBIS-EEU-95-125, ber of Brazilian vehicles capable of carry- and not to the purchase of missile technol- 6/28/95 (5081). ing nuclear warheads may rise to several ogy. U.S. officials say the decision to waive hundred in the future, possibly to include sanctions is part of an effort to encourage several cruise missiles. Brazil to become a full MTCR member. Nilolay Kuchin, Novoye Vremya (Moscow), 5/95; BRAZIL in FBIS-LAT-95-106, 6/2/95 (5017). Tim Furniss, Other U.S. officials are quoted as saying the Flight International, 6/21/95-6/27/95, p. 50 (5235). waiver could trigger instability in South America, prompting Argentina to renew its 6/8/95 Condor program. A Washington-based non- Brazilian Space Agency President Gylvan proliferation expert says the lack of com- Meira Filho says Brazil is preparing to im- mercial demand for Argentine and Brazil- INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS prove existing export control mechanisms ian space launch vehicles may lead to an for sensitive technologies.
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