Report to the League STRAITS COMMISSION
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[Distributed to the Members of C. 265. 1926. VII. the Council.] Geneva, May 13th, 1926. LEAGUE OF NATIONS Report to the League by the STRAITS COMMISSION for the Year 1925. MEMBERS OF THE STRAITS COMMISSION. President: The T u r k is h D e l e g a t e . General M a r c o f f , Bulgarian Delegate. H.E. M. Henri Ga m b o n , Minister Plenipotentiary, French Delegate. Commander Ma c d o n a l d , British Delegate. Commander M eletopoulos , Greek Delegate. H.E. Prince Livio B o r g h e s e , Minister Plenipotentiary, Italian Delegate. Commander O k a , Japanese Delegate. H.E. M. F il a l it y , Minister Plenipotentiary, Roumanian Delegate. H.E. Admiral V a s sif Pasha, Turkish Delegate. CONTENTS. Page. I ntroduction ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 PART I. A c c o u n t o f t h e W o r k d o n e b y t h e S t r a it s C o m m i s s i o n .......................................................... 5 PART II. I n fo r m a t io n w h ic h m a y b e u s e f u l to C o m m e r c e a n d N a v ig a t io n Chapter I. Conditions for the Passage of Merchant Vessels : (a) Sanitary In sp e c tio n ........................................................................................................ 10 (b) Lighthouses.......................................................................................................................... 11 (c) Life-saving Service............................................................................................................. 16 (d) Customs Form alities......................................................................................................... 18 (e) P o l i c e ................................................................................................................................... 18 (f) P i lo t a g e .............................................................................................................................. 19 (g) V arious.................................................................................................................................. 19 Chapter II. S ta tis tic s ...................................................................................................................... 22 C o n c l u s i o n ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 22 Annexes : 1. Rules of Procedure of the C om m ission...................................................................... 23 2. Map of the S t r a i t s ............................................................................................................. 26 S. d. N. 250 5/26. — Imp. Réunies, Chambéry. — 3 — [Translation.] INTRODUCTION. The Straits Convention, which was incorporated in the Treaty of Lausanne, has put an end to the series of arbitrary systems, born of international suspicion, which, one after another, have been applied to the passage of war vessels from the Black Sea to the Mediter ranean and vice versa. For the first time in history, the problem of the Straits has received a broad solution based on the principle of equilibrium. In laying down simple rules to ensure such equilibrium, and in setting up an International Commission to see that it is maintained, the Treaty of Lausanne has transformed a permanent source of uneasiness and disagreement into an element of stability. A rapid survey of the phases through which the problem has passed will suffice to demon strate this fact. The passage of the Straits only became an international question at the end of the eighteenth century, for up to that time the Black Sea was a territorial sea, the Turks being in possession of its whole coast-line. When, in the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia also obtained a foothold on its shores, she naturally endeavoured to force her way through to the outside world and, in the words of the Empress herself, gain possession of the key to her house. Under the Treaty of Ka'inarji, which was signed on July 10th, 1774, the Russian Empire won the right for its merchant vessels to pass freely through the Straits ; the treaty contained no provision concerning war vessels. The occasions, therefore, on which, during the troubled period which ensued, foreign naval forces were present in the Straits are to be regarded merely as ephemeral episodes in the European wars, in no way affecting international law. This was the case when the Russian fleet, during Bonaparte’s campaign in Egypt, proceeded to occupy the Ionian Islands and then returned to the Black Sea ; or when the Straits were forced in 1807 by the British fleet under Admiral Duckworth, who did nothing more than make a useless demonstration before Constantinople. But this was also the period during which the European States first began to develop the various tendencies of policy, with regard to the passage of war vessels through the Straits, which each in turn prevailed for a time. On the one hand, Russia was striving to obtain access to the open sea for her vessels ; on the other, the Western maritime nations — particularly England — were becoming nervous at the increase of power which the freedom of passage through the Straits conferred on the Empire of the Czars. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, therefore, up to the Great War, the system governing the Straits was in turn advantageous to Russia or to the Western Powers, in proportion to the influence wielded by each at Constantinople, or, in other terms, according to whether the Sultan happened to desire the support of his Eastern neighbour or that of the Mediterranean States. As far back as 1809, England, by the Treaty of the Dardanelles, had persuaded the Sultan to prohibit war vessels from entering the Straits. This provision, which may be regarded as the first contractual act in the establishment of a regime for the Straits, was a direct blow aimed at Russia, who was at that time the ally of the French Empire. As soon as a favour able opportunity occurred, Russia was certain to make an effort to counteract its effects. Although at the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) she was satisfied with obtaining recognition of the right of its merchant vessels to pass through the Straits, three years later, through the influence acquired under that treaty, she secured from the Sultan at Hunkiar-Iskelessi (July 8th, 1833) particularly favourable terms, including not only freedom of passage but special facilities. The serious situation which arose in the East as a result of Mehmet Ali’s expedition prevented Russia from turning the existing position further to her advantage. As one of the concert of Great Powers, she was bound, with them, to sign the Straits Convention in 1841 and consequently to respect the closing of the Bosphorus not only to Turkey but to all of the signatory Powers. Thereafter, Turkey was made the guardian of the Straits. To her, in a manner, were entrusted the keys of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. During the Crimean War, the Straits naturally remained open to her Allies. Turkey’s position was still further improved by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, under which the Black Sea was neutralised and the whole Russian Fleet eliminated. Finally, under the Straits Convention of 1871, the excessively severe measures imposed on Russia were abolished, and the principle of closing the Straits was confirmed, though it was added that Turkey might open the Straits in peace-time to the war vessels of nations in arms or to allies if she thought such a step necessary to safe guard the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin confirmed these arrangements. In the ensuing period, however, prior to the Great War, a broader and more liberal conception of international law was evolving, particularly with regard to maritime law. The general tendency was to minimise restrictions and limit the remaining political obstacles which prevented the freedom of the seas by arbitrarily dividing them into separate sectors. In — 4 — spite of the care taken by Turkey to ensure respect for the principle of the closing of the Straits, that principle was not, in cases of serious crisis, secure from disguised or open violation. In 1904, for instance, during the Russo-Japanese War, two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet — the Petersburg and the Smolensk — passed through the Straits on their way to the Far East under cover of merchant flags, which, as soon as the Straits were passed, they exchanged for naval ensigns. Finally, in August 1914, the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau entered the Dardanelles without any compunction, whereas the Allied naval forces which were despatched to pursue them drew up, out of respect for the treaties, at the entrance to the Straits. A waterway which connects the oceans with a sea bordered by no less than five States is so likely to become a scene of conflict that no single Power could undertake to become its guardian without considerable risk of serious misunderstanding, and even of becoming involved, against its will, in conflicts between third parties. The intention of the Treaty of Lausanne in proclaiming Turkish sovereignty over the Straits was to protect that sovereignty against impulsive action on the part of belligerents misusing their strength to obtain strategical advantage. Any such nation will, in future, be answerable for its acts to