DOMEX: the Birth of a New Intelligence Discipline by Colonel Joseph M
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DOMEX: The Birth of a New Intelligence Discipline by Colonel Joseph M. Cox The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Introduction Prior to 9/11, Document and Media Exploitation and what steps can be taken to enhance operations, (DOMEX) capabilities were neither well defined and then offer recommendations on how the IC and nor sufficiently developed or understood to ad- the Department of Defense (DOD) can better orga- equately support combat operations. Despite les- nize, train, man, and equip itself to meet DOMEX sons learned from previous conflicts, U.S. forces challenges in the future. entered the War of Terror without mechanisms Historical Context to properly collect, process, and disseminate in- The U.S. military and other branches of our govern- telligence derived from DOMEX. In the past 18 ment relied on what was originally titled Document months, the volume of captured digital information Exploitation (DOCEX) for as long as we have prac- from law enforcement, intelligence, and civil court ticed the art of intelligence. Discovering the enemy’s cases has exploded. Recent investigations of Umar intentions through examination and exploitation Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged terrorist who of captured documents was nothing new. In war- attempted to detonate plastic explosives on board fare, exploitation of adversary documents normally a commercial airliner, and U.S. Army Major Nidal begins at the point of capture and progressively Malik Hasan, the man accused of killing Soldiers becomes more detailed and sophisticated as the at Fort Hood, rely extensively on close examination document moves through a process of triage, trans- of personal computer data by federal law enforce- lation, and promulgation.2 ment agencies. These are just two cases amid an The Civil War provides many examples of troops avalanche of harvested digital media that create a capturing and attempting to exploit enemy doc- national security issue which merits a system that uments. The assassination of President Lincoln can reliably sift intelligence and quickly share it in caused a detailed review of captured Confederate order to protect lives and preserve security. documents once thought trivial or of little value for In response to a recent congressional inquiry, two military operations, seeking proof that Southern respected leaders of the Intelligence Community (IC) leaders were linked to the assassination plot.3 commented that “there is no doubt that “DOMEX By 1920, the U.S. Army War Department intelli- provides critical intelligence unavailable through any gence regulation emphasized the value of DOCEX: other discipline.”1 Without question, our DOMEX ca- “Experience has shown that the information derived pabilities have evolved into an increasingly special- from documents is second in value only to that se- ized full-time mission that requires a professional cured by the actual examination of prisoners. Too force, advanced automation and communications much stress cannot be laid upon the importance of support, analytical rigor, expert translators, and the rapid and systematic examination of every doc- proper discipline to process valuable information ument captured.”4 into intelligence. Unfortunately, DOCEX was never a high priority This article will examine the historical roots of in terms of training and resources as the Army en- DOMEX operations to present day activities, explain tered World War II. In Europe, the 1st Army had a to- why DOMEX should be an intelligence discipline, tal of five personnel assigned to their DOCEX team review how the Army improved DOMEX capabilities, for combat operations from January 1944 to May 22 Military Intelligence 1945.5 This team would disseminate intelligence manpower at our level to conduct any type of ex- reports after documents were reviewed and trans- tensive DOCEX.”9 From the outset of Operations lated, usually 48 hours after capture. But with the Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF), capture of between 250 to 1,000 pounds of docu- there was a shortage of trained HUMINT collec- ments each day, the organization was of marginal tors and they were a precious resource. Major assistance to tactical operations. General Barbara Fast, the Multi-National Corps- Iraq C2, stated that “it became imperative once we 1st Army reached several conclusions about were in Iraq to establish a strong HUMINT capa- DOCEX intelligence: “documents arrived too late for bility to understand the situation on the ground, operational exploitation” and “sufficient personnel but we lacked the number and some of the skills were not trained to help Corps and Division levels”.6 required to be as successful as we needed to be.”10 Through the Korean War and into Vietnam, DOCEX Predictably, the scant numbers of HUMINT collec- remained relevant and necessary to gain intelligence tors were in high demand just for their core mis- on the enemy, but it was viewed as something tem- sion sets: tactical questioning, debriefings, source porary in nature. When we needed it, we built or- operations, and interrogation of detainees. DOCEX ganizations to meet the demand, then forgot about wasn’t a priority. lessons learned after conflicts ended. DOMEX Goes National Why was U.S. Army DOMEX Not As the military struggled with DOMEX activities Prepared for 9/11? between 2001 and 2003, the first tangible effort to The first problem was that after Vietnam, U.S. institutionalize DOMEX at the National and strategic Army DOCEX missions and functions were doc- level came with the creation of Defense Intelligence trinally pinned to interrogators: “the first intel- Agency’s (DIA) National Media Exploitation Center ligence specialists who could examine or exploit (NMEC) in 2003.11 The NMEC was created to serve captured documents, in addition to interrogating as the lead government agency for the rapid pro- prisoners of war, and will scan documents and ex- cessing, exploitation, dissemination and sharing of tract information.”7 Accordingly, DOCEX proce- all acquired documents and media between strate- dures became firmly rooted within the interrogator gic/national through tactical/local levels across the Field Manual (FM) under the human intelligence Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI), military, and (HUMINT) discipline. Law Enforcement (LE) communities to enhance the The second problem was the direct result of plac- safety and security of the Nation.12 ing DOCEX responsibilities on interrogators within The swift expansion of DOMEX enterprise created HUMINT. There simply weren’t enough collectors (CI many different efforts across the IC and DOD which and interrogators) to accomplish the DOCEX mis- required significant funding from congress. In 2005, sion. As the Army reduced its force size in the early the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 70s under a transformation initiative called “Army of (SSCI) conducted an audit to review the practices Excellence (AOE),” it became apparent that an inter- of collecting, processing, translating, and reporting rogation force would not be a large one. Close study intelligence obtained from overtly captured and/or of the AOE with respect to interrogator strength re- clandestinely acquired paper documents and elec- vealed early concerns that there weren’t enough in- tronic media.13 The SSCI wanted to analyze and terrogators in Army inventories to conduct HUMINT evaluate the intelligence value of DOMEX efforts 8 missions and equally support DOCEX missions. and assess the budget implications for sustaining What Were the Consequences of Not DOMEX over the long term. The SSCI audit findings Being Prepared? concluded that: One intelligence leader stated: “DOCEX didn’t Ê DOMEX had become an integral source of valuable work; we did our own DOCEX when we could. intelligence information supporting both tactical Otherwise, it was sent to some CJTF-76 DOCEX operations in OEF/OIF and Iraq and strategic anal- section for processing that was virtually a black ysis in national intelligence agencies,14 but there hole because I never received any feedback from was a perception of slight duplication of effort and anything we sent forward. We just didn’t have the redundancy in terms of reporting intelligence. April - June 2010 23 Ê The IC allowed the DOMEX expertise to atrophy Doctrine–DOCEX incorrectly resided under HUMINT after each major conflict which caused a rou- with interrogators as lead. tine “reinvention of the wheel” phenomenon. Organizations–No Army units, to include intelligence This proved insufficient, and allowed for an in- units, were structured to conduct the function. formation vacuum to exist during periods when policy makers and military planners most need Training–Training was never formalized. Theaters DOMEX data. established their own procedures and training. No Ê IC leadership needs to make tough decisions in effective blueprint existed for standardized DOCEX the near term in order to improve the efficiency instruction. 15 and effectiveness of DOMEX activities. Materiel–There was no family of systems to cover a The Office of the Director of National Intelligence DOCEX end-to-end approach. (ODNI), as the head of the IC, oversees and directs Leadership–HUMINT staff directorates were the implementation of the National Intelligence overwhelmed. Program and, by extension, provides oversight to ersonnel–No professionalized force to accomplish DOMEX intelligence activities.