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IMPROVING the LAW ENFORCEMENT-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP Ndic PRESS Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship

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IMPROVING the LAW ENFORCEMENT-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP Ndic PRESS Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship IMPROVING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP ndic PRESS ndic RELATIONSHIP COMMUNITY ENFORCEMENT-INTELLIGENCE LAW THE IMPROVING Improving the law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship Can’t we all just get along? National Defense Intelligence College national defense intelligence college press PCN 5463 ISBN 978-1-932946-18-5 e Research nc e n g ii l ll ee tt nn I I c c June 2007 i i g g Washington, DC Washington, e e cial policy or position of the Department of t NDIC PRESS t a a Defense of the U.S. Government r r t t S S r o f r e t n e C r o f r e t n e C ect the offi National Defense Intelligence College The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and Can’t We All Just Get Along? All Just Get We Can’t do not refl Improving the Law Enforcement- Improving Intelligence Community Relationship The National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intelligence Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers. Can’t We All Just Get Along: Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship The FBI vs. CIA turf battles of the Cold War are the stuff of Washington legend. Things are much better now. They were getting better anyway, and then 9/11 accelerated the process. But…there is room for improvement. The fi rst essays here lay out some of the intelligence techniques that have proven effective in either Law Enforcement (LE) or the Intelligence Community (IC) and that might be useful to exchange and apply. They are followed by essays that point out some of the diffi culties inherent in integrating the two communities. We conclude with a few abstracts of recent work done at the National Defense Intelligence College on other aspects of this topic. The bibliography is a compilation of key sources from the authors’ works but is by no means exhaustive. The writers, whether faculty, fellows, or students, are professionals with years of experience to inform their scholarship. In addition to the fi rst-hand knowledge they bring to their subjects, they are also well connected, with rolodexes that have opened doors for them into wardrooms and squad bays, as well as offi ce suites, where few academics have access. The writers’ own resources are supplemented by the College, which funds travel and makes introductions for visits both with the top brass and to the remotest outposts. The result, we hope, is a set of articles that is rich in detail. While some “big ideas” have made the cut, the real treasures here are the details of law enforcement analytic technique, the tradecraft of DEA’s counter-narcotic intelligence in Bangkok, the HUMINT collection procedures on the streets of Mogadishu or Chicago, and the like. While maintaining high academic standards, this work aims to be more than academic. This product has been reviewed by senior experts from academia, industry, and government and has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Offi ce of Security Review, U.S. Department of Defense. It is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service (www.ntis.gov). [email protected], Editor Center for Strategic Intelligence Research ISBN 978-1-932946-18-5 Library of Congress Control Number 2006937722 ii CONTENTS Foreword . v Commentary. vii Best Practices in Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community . 1 Developments in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis . 3 Marilyn B. Peterson Unmasking Networks: Drug Enforcement Administration Tradecraft for the Intelligence Community. 21 Gloria Freund Improving Tactical Military Intelligence with Anti-Gang Techniques . 41 Edward Gliot “Home-Grown” Islamic Extremists in U.S. Prisons . 73 Lloyd E. Dabbs Predictive Intelligence: What the Drug Enforcement Administration Can Glean From the Intelligence Community. 93 David W. Spencer Obstacles to Integration . 115 British Military Intelligence-Law Enforcement Integration in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921 . 117 Devlin Kostal The Wall Between National Security and Law Enforcement . 143 Devin Rollis Problems and Progress in Information Sharing . 163 Robert B. Murphy Addressing the Diffi culties . 179 Perceptions of Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Information Sharing. 181 Stacey Smith Challenges and Opportunities of Intelligence Community Membership . 185 Sallie Casto Intelligence Fusion in the Field: Translating National Strategy into Practice . 187 Angelina Hidalgo Semantic Web: Technology for Integration . 189 Rachel Hingst About the Authors . 193 Bibliography . 195 Index . 201 iii FOREWORD Intelligence—vital information about persons and phenomena that would do us harm—has been used to great effect by the Law Enforcement community for many years to support operations and ensure public safety. Human source development tradecraft, technical collection techniques, analytic methodologies and tools, and information sharing policies and systems have been a mainstay of law enforcement operations for many years. Globalization and the decline of the nation state have given rise to new adversaries, many of which resemble shadowy criminal-like networks that use technology to operate across national boundaries and threaten both national security and public safety. Can’t We All Just Get Along? Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship is a powerful and thoughtful compendium that explores law enforcement intelligence techniques and their utility for the National Intelligence Community, as well as proven Intelligence Community methodologies and their potential application for law enforcement intelligence operations. Most importantly, the compendium eloquently reminds us that it is the “soft stuff”—culture, training, trust—that presents the greatest challenge to achieving a partnership between Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community that the threat demands and our citizens deserve. Much has been said about Law Enforcement not “getting” intelligence and about the Intelligence Community not “getting” law enforcement operations. Those of us who have had the privilege of serving in both communities know from experience that neither assertion is true and have urged a thoughtful analysis of facts to tamp down the emotion that surrounds this debate. This work succeeds in moving us beyond surface judgments and emotions, exploring law enforcement intelligence tools and techniques in some depth and pointing to their utility in fi ghting and prevailing over today’s adversaries. Just as importantly, it points to extant Intelligence Community practices that if applied broadly will help Law Enforcement make the transition from prosecution to prevention. There has always been a rather healthy tension between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence. Can’t We All Just Get Along? reminds us that intelligence operations are not conducted for their own sake, but rather to inform the decisions of those who must act in defense of national security/public safety. The value of intelligence is in the eyes of its users, not its producers; intelligence is at its best when it is fully integrated with its users. These simple truths led to the development of intelligence methodologies and techniques as a function of support to specifi c instruments of national power such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and war fi ghting. The nature of today’s threats has blurred the lines between traditional diplomatic, military, and law enforcement concerns, requiring all instruments of national power to work as a seamless network to defeat our adversaries. The rise of joint task forces, intelligence operations centers, and fusion centers has brought together v professionals from across the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities, offering them a unique opportunity to share tools and techniques in defense of the nation. Can’t We All Just Get Along? provides an important foundation for understanding the strengths that each community brings to the joint environment and is a must read for all intelligence professionals. Maureen Baginski Former FBI Executive Assistant Director Intelligence Former NSA Signals Intelligence Director vi COMMENTARY In the fi ve years since 9/11, Law Enforcement has been re-inventing itself, and intelligence agencies have been making changes that run contrary to years of established policy, tradecraft, and procedure. However, old habits die hard and many traditional structures remain fi rmly in place. Whether the ongoing efforts at restructuring are actually effecting change or are mostly window dressing remains an open question. We face an enemy who plans operations strategically and exploits our vulnerabilities creatively. This enemy functions in a manner our institutions are not designed to address. To win, it is imperative that we fi ght more creatively and strategically than our adversaries. That means taking full advantage of ALL the resources at our disposal and wielding them as effectively as possible. As a criminal investigator for the past 20 years and as chief of a transnational criminal investigative section, I have seen the best and the worst of the relationship between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. I have witnessed how acrimonious that relationship can be; to be honest, I’ve contributed to the problem myself. But when the relationship works, it works very well. These two distinct communities can cooperate to great effect without violating privacy rights or precluding criminal prosecution. There is plenty of common ground that is overt, legal, and proper. A few years ago, I investigated an anonymous letter that warned there was a visa fraud operation targeting a U.S. consulate in a large Muslim country. The letter alleged that the operation was being run out of an unnamed textile company that was facilitating Al Qaeda’s travel by sponsoring several terrorists to attend a U.S. trade show. Working with our intelligence agencies, we were able to identify the textile company in question. Then my investigators and the local police located and interviewed the writer of the letter. Both sides contributed their particular expertise and the situation was quickly resolved.
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