Security & Intelligence
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Serious and Organised Crime Strategy
Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Cm 8715 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty October 2013 Cm 8715 £21.25 © Crown copyright 2013 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us [email protected] You can download this publication from our website at https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications ISBN: 9780101871525 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 2593608 10/13 33233 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Contents Home Secretary Foreword 5 Executive Summary 7 Introduction 13 Our Strategic Response 25 PURSUE: Prosecuting and disrupting serious and 27 organised crime PREVENT: Preventing people from engaging 45 in serious and organised crime PROTECT: Increasing protection against 53 serious and organised crime PREPARE: Reducing the impact of serious and 65 organised crime Annex A: Accountability, governance and funding 71 Annex B: Departmental roles and responsibilities for 73 tackling serious and organised crime 4 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy Home Secretary Foreword 5 Home Secretary Foreword The Relentless Disruption of Organised Criminals Serious and organised crime is a threat to our national security and costs the UK more than £24 billion a year. -
Australian Criminal Intelligence Management (ACIM) Strategy 2017
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2017–20 AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 2017–20 INTELLIGENCE PARTNERSHIPS FOR A SAFER AUSTRALIA Attorney-General’s Department Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Australian Federal Police ACT Policing Australian Securities and Investments Commission Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Australian Taxation Office Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Department of Immigration and Border Protection/Australian Border Force New South Wales Police Force New Zealand Police Northern Territory Police Queensland Police Service South Australia Police Tasmania Police Victoria Police Western Australia Police 1 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2017–20 CONTENTS FOREWORD 1 AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE LANDSCAPE 2 AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL 3 DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE 4 OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION 5 WHAT WILL SUCCESS LOOK LIKE? 6 HOW WILL WE ACHIEVE SUCCESS? 7 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 10 HOW WILL WE MEASURE SUCCESS? 10 EVALUATION MODEL 11 MATURITY MODEL 12 CONCLUSION 14 REFERENCES 14 2 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2017–20 FOREWORD The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes criminal intelligence as “... the lifeblood of the fight against transnational organized crime. It is the foundation for -
Track, Capture, Kill
Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya March 2017 www.privacyinternational.org 2 Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya Acknowledgements Privacy International acknowledges the many individuals and organisations with whom we spoke who cannot be named. This report is primarily based on interviews conducted by Privacy International and documentation provided in confidence to Privacy International. Privacy International is solely responsible for the content of this report. 3 Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya Contents Acronyms 5 Executive Summary 6 Introduction 7 Background 8 Extended Powers: But short on Detail 11 Spying First, then ‘making it proper’ 16 On Your Marks: Infiltrating Telecommunications Networks 19 Getting Ready: Sharing Intel and Preparing Ops 24 Closing in: Surveillance in Kill or Capture Operations 26 Elections and Accountability 32 Recommendations 36 Annex 1: Response from Safaricom 38 4 Track, Capture, Kill: Inside Communications Surveillance and Counterterrorism in Kenya Acronyms AP Administration Police ATPU Anti-Terrorism Police Unit BTS Base Transceiver Station CA/CCK Communications Authority, formerly Communications Commission of Kenya CDR Call Data Record CID/DCI Directorate of Criminal Investigations DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence, Kenya Defence Forces GSU General Services -
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan T S R T Global Justice a I P C
NT O E F M JU T S R T A I P C E E D United States Department of Justice Solutions and approaches for a cohesive plan to improve our nation’s ability to develop and share criminal intelligence October 2003 T O VersionEN 1.0F M JU National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan T S R T Global Justice A I P C E E D Information Sharing Initiative United States Department of Justice The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Solutions and approaches for a cohesive plan to improve our nation’s ability to develop and share criminal intelligence October 2003 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Version 1.0 This document was prepared under the leadership, guidance, and funding of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This project was supported by Award No. 2000-LD-BX-0003, awarded by the Office of Justice Programs. Version 1.0 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Table of Contents Executive Summary .....................................................................iii Acknowledgements ................................................................... ix The Rationale for the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan ...............................................................................1 -
TTIC Privacy Policy Annually Based Upon Recommendations by the TTIC’S Director Or Designee, Changes in Applicable Law Or Legal Counsel
Texas Transnational Intelligence Center Privacy and Civil Rights Policy May 7, 2018 I. Background The Texas Transnational Intelligence Center (hereinafter referenced to as “TTIC” or the “Center”) is a collaborative effort of the McAllen Police Department, the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Their mission is to provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the TTIC. The TTIC project is a response from the Texas Legislature to address the increased need for timely information sharing and exchange of crime-related information among members of the law enforcement and emergency management community, and to enhance the cross-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary prediction, prevention, protection, response, and mitigation capabilities for criminal activity facing the Deep South Texas region. The TTIC seeks to facilitate regional data gathering and intelligence sharing to achieve its core mission: “Provide our law enforcement partners information to aid them in their mission, while protecting individual privacy and civil rights of all citizens.” One component of the TTIC focuses on the development and exchange of criminal intelligence. This component focuses on the intelligence process where information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and disseminated. The TTIC consists of its analysts and hosted State and Local agency staff, along with operational stakeholders, which include regional law enforcement, emergency management, fire and rescue agencies. Other supporting and benefiting stakeholders may include city and county administrations, academia, state agencies, elected officials, and critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR) owners and operators. The TTIC communicates with many State and Federal organizations, including the Texas Joint Crime Information Center (JCIC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Centers for Disease Control, El Paso intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). -
February 13, 1992 Volume 4, Issue 4
February 13, 1992 Volume 4, Issue 4 His Excellency Franjo Tudjman President of the Republic of Croatia Radi ev Trg 2 41000 Zagreb Croatia Dear President Tudjman: The U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee is deeply concerned by reports of serious human rights abuses by forces responsible to the Croatian government and by individual extremists in Croatia. Our own investigations of these reports, conducted during a series of fact-finding missions to Croatia in the past year, indicate that many of these reports are well-founded. We call upon you to investigate the abuses enumerated in this letter and to punish those responsible for them. We call upon you to take immediate measures to ensure that such violations of human rights do not occur again. The abuses described in this letter include violations of the laws of war in the current conflict between Croatian and Serbian forces and the Yugoslav army, including the summary execution of civilians and disarmed combatants; the torture and mistreatment of detainees; arbitrary arrests and disappearances; destruction of civilian property and the killing of journalists covering the war. In addition to violations connected with the war, Helsinki Watch has also documented restrictions on freedom of expression and the press and interference with the independence of the judiciary. Finally, we are gravely concerned about the harassment, discrimination and rising violence against Serbs not engaged in the armed conflict in Croatia. Rules of War Violations in Croatia by Croatian Forces Violations of the rules of war are often committed by local police officers and members of the Croatian army1 in areas which are under heavy siege by Serbian forces and the Yugoslav army. -
Law Enforcement Intelligence: a Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition
U. S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies Second Edition David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement #2007-CK-WX-K015 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Points of view or opinions contained in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or Michigan State University. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. Letter from the COPS Office January 2009 Dear Colleague: This second edition of Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement captures the vast changes that have occurred in the 4 years since the first edition of the guide was published in 2004 after the watershed events of September 11, 2001. At that time, there was no Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information-Sharing Environment, or Fusion Centers. Since the advent of these new agencies to help fight the war on terror, emphasis has been placed on cooperation and on sharing information among local, state, tribal, and federal agencies. -
Who's Who in Lossiemouth Baptist Church?
www.lossiebaptist.org Contents 2 Pastor’s Page 3 What’s On? 4 Bits & Pieces 5 Children and Young People in LBC 6 Fellowship News 7 Holiday Club - Kate Wakeford 8 Miller Update 9 Gap Year for God 10 Deborah James Blog 11 BMS News 12 Who’s Who in Lossie Baptist Church 13 2 Who Is God? In an ancient village, a parable tells, all the people were blind. One day while walking on the road, six men from that village came upon a man riding an ele- phant. The six men, who had heard about elephants but had never been close to one, asked the rider to allow them to touch the great beast. They wanted to go back to their village to tell the other villagers what an elephant looked like. The rider agreed and led each of the six men to a different part of the elephant. All the blind men touched and stroked the elephant until they were certain they knew what the animal looked like. In great anticipation they returned to their village to report their experience. The villagers gathered around to hear about the elephant. The first man, who had felt the animal’s side, said, “An elephant is like a great thick wall.” “Nonsense,” said the second man, who had felt the elephant’s tusk. “He is rather short, round, and smooth, but very sharp. I would compare an elephant not with a wall but with a spear!” The third man, who had touched the ear, took exception. “It is nothing at all like a wall or a spear,” he said. -
National Intelligence Authorities and Surveillance in the EU: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies
National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies LITHUANIA Version of 6 October 2014 Lithuanian Social Research Centre Institute for Ethnic Studies Karolis Liutkevičius DISCLAIMER: This document was commissioned under a specific contract as background material for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies. The information and views contained in the document do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. The document is made publicly available for transparency and information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion. FRA would like to express its appreciation for the comments on the draft report provided by Lithuania that were channelled through the FRA National Liaison Officer. 1 Summary 1. The legal framework of surveillance in Lithuania [1]. The main legal act governing surveillance activities by national intelligence authorities in Lithuania is the Law on Intelligence (Žvalgybos įstatymas).1 Surveillance activities by law enforcement institutions, including intelligence authorities, are also regulated by the Law on Criminal Intelligence (Kriminalinės žvalgybos įstatymas).2 However, this law only covers activities of intelligence authorities related to the prevention and investigation of national security-related crimes. a. Types of security authorities involved [2]. Under Article 8 of the Law on Intelligence there are two intelligence institutions in Lithuania - the State Security Department (Valstybės Saugumo Departamentas) and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence (Antrasis operatyvinių tarnybų departamentas prie Kašto apsaugos ministerijos). [3]. The State Security Department is tasked with ensuring national security and carries out intelligence activities in the public political, economic, scientific and technological areas, and in the area of security of the state diplomatic services abroad. -
Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum
COUNTER-TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM CTRC Academic Project Leads & Editors Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel, International Security Director Asia Pacific Foundation Visiting Teacher, London School of Economics & Political Science [email protected] & [email protected] Dr. Peter Forster, Associate Professor Penn State University [email protected] PfPC Reference Curriculum Lead Editors: Dr. David C. Emelifeonwu Senior Staff Officer, Educational Engagements Canadian Defence Academy Associate Professor Royal Military College of Canada Department of National Defence [email protected] Dr. Gary Rauchfuss Director, Records Management Training Program National Archives and Records Administration [email protected] Layout Coordinator / Distribution: Gabriella Lurwig-Gendarme NATO International Staff [email protected] Graphics & Printing — ISBN XXXX 2010-19 NATO COUNTER-TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM Published May 2020 2 FOREWORD “With guns you can kill terrorists, with education you can kill terrorism.” — Malala Yousafzai, Pakistani activist for female education and Nobel Prize laureate NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been at the forefront of three consecutive NATO Summits, including the recent 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London, with the clear political imperative for the Alliance to address a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion. NATO’s determination and solidarity in fighting the evolving challenge posed by terrorism has constantly increased since the Alliance invoked its collective defence clause for the first time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America. NATO has gained much experience in countering terrorism from its missions and operations. However, NATO cannot defeat terrorism on its own. Fortunately, we do not stand alone. -
Police Intelligence Operations
FM 3-19.50 Police Intelligence Operations July 2006 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. Headquarters, Department of the Army FM 3-19.50 Field Manual Headquarters No. 3-19.50 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 21 July 2006 Police Intelligence Operations Contents Page PREFACE .............................................................................................................iv Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 1-1 Background ........................................................................................................ 1-1 Role of Police Intelligence Operations ............................................................... 1-1 Development of an Effective Police Intelligence Operations Network ............... 1-6 Common Police Intelligence Operations Definitions .......................................... 1-7 Application of Police Intelligence Operations ..................................................... 1-7 Army Law Enforcement Policy ........................................................................... 1-8 Chapter 2 LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS ............................................ 2-1 Executive Order 12333....................................................................................... 2-1 Department of Defense Directive 5200.27 ......................................................... 2-2 Army Regulation 190-45.................................................................................... -
Law Enforcement Intelligence (Chapter 2)
Understanding Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence: Concept and Definition 2 CHAPTER TWO Understanding Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence: Concept and Definition In the purest sense, intelligence is the product of an analytic process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources, integrates the relevant information into a cohesive package, and produces a conclusion or estimate about a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to problem solving (i.e., analysis). Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic product intended to provide meaningful and trustworthy direction to law enforcement decision makers about complex criminality, criminal enterprises, criminal extremists, and terrorists. 7 There are essentially two broad purposes for an intelligence function within a law enforcement agency: Prevention. Includes gaining or developing information related to threats of terrorism or crime and using this information to apprehend offenders, harden targets, and use strategies that will eliminate or mitigate the threat. This is known as tactical intelligence. Planning and Resource Allocation. The intelligence function provides information to decision makers about the changing nature of threats, the characteristics and methodologies of threats, and emerging threat idiosyncrasies for the purpose of developing response strategies and reallocating resources, as necessary, to accomplish effective prevention. This is known as strategic intelligence. While investigation1 is clearly part of the information collection2 process, the intelligence function is often more exploratory and more broadly 1 "Investigation" is defined as the pursuit of information focused than a criminal investigation, per se. For example, a law based on leads and evidence associated with a particularly enforcement agency may have a reasonable suspicion to believe that a defined criminal act to identify person or group of people have the intent, capacity, and resolve to commit and apprehend criminal offenders for prosecution in a a crime or terrorist act.