2 SIMPLE SENTENCES This Chapter Will Deal with the Classification of Simple Sentences. Both Linguists and Philosophers of Langua
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2 SIMPLE SENTENCES 2.0 INTRODUCTION This chapter will deal with the classification of simple sentences. Both linguists and philosophers of language have classified sen- tences: the former according to the formal properties of the syn- tactic system, the latter according to the formal properties of some semantic system(s). While there is general agreement among linguists as to the classification of sentences, there is no such agree- ment among philosophers of language. This lack of agreement on the part of the philosophers is, I believe, due to two factors: the comparative difficulty of their task, and their occasional inability to separate what I will call the "linguistic system" from the "real world". As has been observed by a number of people before me, an utterance must, at one and the same time, conform to two systems: that of linguistics and that of the real world. It is in terms of the linguistic system that we speak of an utterance as being or not being a sentence of a certain type, and as being or not being grammatical. It is in terms of the real world system, or some world imagined by the speaker,1 that we speak of an utterance as being true or false, as making or not making sense, and as describing or not describing some aspect of that real or imagined world. This chapter, then, will discuss both the linguists' and the philoso- 1 For a proposal of how the grammar might treat imagined worlds, see G. Lakoff, "Counterparts, or the Problem of Reference in Transformational Grammar" (L.S.A. paper, summer 1968). SIMPLE SENTENCES 37 phers' classification of simple sentences, particularly from the point of view of the linguistic evidence for the classification proposed by the philosophers; and, since this work deals with complementation, with particular attention to those aspects of the philosophers' classification which sheds some light onto the processes involved in complementation. In other words, then, the purpose of this chapter is to examine how the philosophers' classification of sentence types is related to and reflected in the linguists' classification of sentence types. I hope to show that the relationship between the two clas- sifications is not one-to-one with respect to simple sentences, but is one-to-one with respect to embedded sentences, particularly with respect to complements. Before turning to the main topic of this chapter, I should like to clarify the terminology to be employed here and throughout the rest of this work. For the sake of convenience (i.e. not for any principled reason), I will employ the label "(linguistic) sentence type" for the syntactic classification of sentences by linguists, and the label "description types" for the philosophers' classification of which aspect of the real world an utterance describes. 2.1 SENTENCE TYPES Grammarians usually recognize the following sentence types for simple sentences: declarative performative2 interrogative imperative3 Grammarians say that a sentence "is a" declarative, interrogative, 2 For justification of why performatives constitute a separate type of sentence, see section 2.1.1, below. 3 Some grammarians have added "negation" as a separate sentence type, but it is clear that negations do not constitute a sentence type because they can be applied to at least three of the sentence types listed above; i.e. there are ne- gative statements, negative questions, and negative imperatives. 38 SIMPLE SENTENCES or imperative sentence. From the point of view of philosophy of language (and the real world), however, we cannot speak of sen- tences, but we must speak of declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives as what the different sentence types of the same label "express". Although the semantic and the grammatical terms are identical, the difference is that sentences are grammatical or un- grammatical, while statements are true or false, questions are an- swerable or not, commands can be carried out or not, and per- formatives are appropriate or not. Austin4 points out that, "it does not make sense to ask whether a sentence is true or false, but only if it is grammatical or not". More important, while a sentence like Today is Tuesday is grammatical at any time, the statement it expresses is true only on Tuesdays. This difference, Austin declares, is due to the fact that "a statement is made, and its making is an historic event... The same sentence is used in making different statements (I say, 'It is mine', and you say, 'It is mine'.) ... We speak of 'the statement that S', but of 'the sentence "S"', not of'the sentence that S"\ 2.1.1 Declarative vs. Performative Sentences Austin5 also shows that it is necessary to separate what he calls "declarative sentences" from "performative sentences", because of their semantic and syntactic differences. With respect to their semantic structure, performatives do not make a statement, but constitute a performance on the part of the speaker. With respect to their syntactic structure, performatives can only have a first person (singular) subject, must be in the present tense, and are not true or false. Statements, on the other hand, can have subjects in any person, and can be in any tense. Statements are also true or false. Thus, a sentence like (1) (a) John ate the meat. 4 See J. Austin, Philosophical Papers (London, Oxford University Press 1961), 86ff. 5 See J. Austin, "Performative Sentences", in Philosophical Papers. SIMPLE SENTENCES 39 is a statement, because it is either true or false. Sentences like6 (2) (a) I (hereby) christen this ship Queen Mary. (b) I (hereby) bet you sixpence that it will rain tomorrow. (c) I (hereby) sentence you to six months in jail. are performatives. Notice that either a change in person, to, e.g. (3) (a) He (*hereby) christens this ship Queen Mary. etc. or a change in tense, to, e.g. (3) (b) I (*hereby) christened this ship Queen Mary. makes the performative sentences into declaratives, because they are now either true or false, and no longer allow the adverb hereby. From these observations it can be concluded that performatives constitute, indeed, a separate sentence type. 2.1.2 A Classification of Sentence Types If we consider the four sentence types under discussion from the point of view of their semantic reading, they can be seen to fall, among others, into two cross-classifying classes, depending on whether only the speaker performs an action, or whether he also requests an action on the part of the addressee, and depending on whether the action(s) are purely verbal or not. Thus, a declarative sentence expresses a purely verbal action on the part of the speaker only, while a performative expresses an action that is not purely verbal. An interrogative expresses the speaker's request for a purely 6 The examples in (2) are adapted from Austin's "Performative Sentences", 222f. Austin also notes that all performatives permit the adverb hereby to be inserted where they are shown in parentheses. It should be pointed out that Austin also differentiates between statements and propositions. For him, propositions are philosophical, mathematical, etc. statements whose truth is not immediately obvious by inspection of the real world, while the truth (or falsity) of statements can be found out immediately by inspecting the real world. For my purposes, however, this distinction is not needed, and I will, therefore, use the term proposition for both Austin's pro- positions and statements. 40 SIMPLE SENTENCES verbal action on the part of the addressee (to answer the question), while an imperative expresses the speaker's request for a non-verbal action on the part of the adressee (to carry out the command or request). These observations can be captured by the (short hand) semantic features (4) [+/—SPEAKER=AGT] [+/—VERBAL] The four sentence types can then be seen to have the following semantic features (among others): (5) (a) declarative: [+SPEAKER=AGT]; [+VERBAL] (b) performative: [+SPEAKER=AGT]; [—VERBAL] (c) interrogative: [—SPEAKER=AGT]; [+VERBAL] (d) imperative: [—SPEAKER=AGT]; [—VERBAL] 2.2 DESCRIPTION TYPES Philosophers of language have classified sentences according to which aspect of the real world they describe and have thus arrived at the following sentence types: proposition event process action state property relationship In this section, I will attempt to establish the defining properties of at least those descriptive types which shed some light on comple- mentation. This means that there are two reasons for ignoring those structures describing a "relationship". In the first place, a relation- ship can hold between any two or more objects, regardless of whether these objects are in any specific grammatical relationship SIMPLE SENTENCES 41 or not. That is, relationships of certain types hold, for example, between the two nouns in the noun phrasjs below: (6) (a) a glass of beer (b) Fred's father (c) the roof of the house and are not confined to sentences. I am, however, dealing with sentential complementation. Second, relationships do not appear to explain complementation in any way. For these reasons, I will not consider relationships in this work. 2.2.1 Propositions It has been noted by philosophers of language that propositions are either true or false, and some of them7 have taken this to be the the defining property of propositions : (A) Propositions are either true or false. This means, of course, that any time a hearer is confronted with a proposition, his question "is it true or false" is appropriate. This question, as was noted above, is appropriate for only one linguistic sentence type; namely, declaratives. That is, in terms of the linguis- tic sentence types discussed in section 2.1, above, only declarative sentences correspond to the philosophers' class of propositions, because the question "is it true or false" is only appropriate for this sentence type, cf.