ANVIKSIKI 34T-Tfyai

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

ANVIKSIKI 34T-Tfyai Vol. IX, December 2013 ISSN 2231-3680 ANVIKSIKI 34T-tfyai Chief Editor Shriprakash Pandey Editors: Ananda Mishra Sachchidanand Mishra BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY an Act of Parliament An Tl Importance Established by RELIGION DEPARIM FPHILOSOPHY AND 4ARNNAN ANTI ASCEPTIC? REALIST Ou SRIERALAM.NAIR considered as . 7rndition le has nurked popularly skeptic in Amowledye, Indian specifically its eriticizedfoundationalist Nyaya that the Nvuya attempt to foundationalist metahy'SKal realism is use Mion pramanas of reality hile illegitimate for it cope a pre for reading of constructing Michael Dumn pramanas like Nagärjuna as an r too anti 1o the argues that metaphysical realist's we cannot Granting thut notion r there are of mind Nägrjuna's indications of anti- ble to call writings, the paper Nagrjuna a argues that, keeping in mind,mind the skeptie than fact that in an anti had a positive role to Indian play in hare thesame same concern for truth knowledge philosophy with analysis and SKEPTICS have been epistemoiogists. the temple of ditionally truth. There is considered as a common intruders tophers that skeptics are consensus among ROCemed.about the cognitive negative, progress of destructive and his is a misnomer. It is human known to all civilization as UCerns f that one epistemology is to determine of the chief mans we to how we can employ quire be sure that s that it is knowledge are imperative even for appropriate. This eiully at challenges to ali epistemologists to look is is exactly what knowledge also acquiring ping skeptics do. In this enterprises and epistemologists in sense, ans of their endeavor skepties are knowledge. The to identify traditional role of adequate skeptics as those who maintained that no knowledge is Nigaltyuna tIS indeeddeed a skeptic. Mark possible stands two reasons: Siderits in his primarily it is self revised now for Anti Reali proposes as that a paper titled manner: if we can defeating. Nigaryuna know we though in wider nothing, cannot a trivial Nãgaryuna would reveal that his aim was reading of we know nothing. also kno not to Secondly, there has of universalarsal doudoubt, rather his cstablish the consensus that come this- that skeptics have a up a general is motivation, quite genuine case Michael Dummett, to to ichael propose an similar philosophic hat present thatof community deserves a an physical scenar anti-realist when serious o Countering position in skeptics propose that our hearing. Th the ndhan Matilal's ordinary rjuna as a Siderits of are in andards of skeptie argues that depiction vulnerable many ways it makes orefore. a justific t to the Ngrjuna's real the serious intentions prove other hand, in the name of demand impossibility of skeptie on us, if close offff a route to knowledge, but that we do not anyone On o common know this or that, goes to rallher metaphysical well, we yya theory ofaf In realism via skeptical about it.' As B. K. have the pramnas. this paper I tilal to wish to a right argue the better learn to live with observes, following thes Iis true that the skeptics, for philosopher Ngärjuna's the same they both are anti-realism. But theory exhibits en. ements of beyond that it activity, namely the search for goes up to engaged in of which refute the skeptic shares same concern for owledge. He very pos knowledge, truth with the says, "A hinders or at least to human cognitive reluctant accept else. A philosopher to human cognitive progress, which place anything is and s hurdles has been Skeptic first and effectively enquirer". Though both the sisted by /tsyyana, once again skeptic and foremost an reinstating involved in philosopher The Nyya Analysis of seeking and the alike are owledge. paper gets divided into three probing of sections. The efforts are possibilities with Matilal's first skeptic's knowledge, the section deals thesis on distinguished by his as a nature of unyielding and Ngrjuna the which second the skeptic, enquiry, according to the persistent ection provides anti thesis of blown out of philosopher is Siderites proportion. This in turn, severely N,riuna as an anti-realist and in the depicting fetches him the ill third section I being But this fame of counter shall place impractical. accusation, as Vatsyyana's osition to is rightly pointed out Ngrjuna's in skeptics. beside the It is by the of critique order to point. one to save Nyya analysis knowledge. truth. without thing search on the earnestly for compromising application of Nãgarjuna popularly claims that all bhävas and another to methods (existent quite worry about the chosen, empty of their svabhäva entities) pragmatic of (devoid of inquiries. Further, as inputs such meaning). This Indian skeptics would of Nägärjuna about all existent skepticism point out, it is not that entities/all skeptics chose to embrace was uncertainty; it is just that accused of philosophical positions pre-judge the issue at they refuse to hand prior to Valsyâyana for paradoxically/inconsistency by Naiyyikas. need to experience. It is here that we instance, in his place as a commentary out that if Ngrjuna marked philosophical theories are points all philosophers. In skeptic among Indian devoid of their he svabhva or essence, as Vigrahavyvartani, a series of Nägarjuna claims, his own arguments that provides theory is no coherently a to provides critique to the therefore, the thesis exception this, and epistemology, and Nyya gets cancelled at once. anyone who On the other if goes through these on Nagaryuna claims hand, Nyaya analysis of attacks the exception to this knowledge would Tave to particular we summarily conclude that say that there theory, well, will is at least one 106 ais to counter example to what he SREEKALA M. NAIR prove. To this Ngrjuna gives a befitting reply. In IS NAGRJUNA AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 107 other he Is lound like by means raging pported there igrahaiartani need o detend (which may lack that sanct which e a funher thesis to this've these, no lack any leads to proposition. himself "If the would have been guilty of the faule. Ssence). If thesis. I ults you ascribe Nagarjuna proof of infinite re had any pramanas, ther the therefore. I have no then not fault. In there prama But other would annas me. I do mavasth). There be that no philosophic thesis rds. he would be no an were hy to be arguing has svabhava proof ( in seems f the inite re Matilal is ot the opinion that this va is last". Ngárjuna's this first a thesis. roft or of irselfnot or critique the that thesie stancient critique against "It is quite possible every crit should h as he s. foundatior middle. for. say acks essen The pramna valism remain so even if entified as the and this will therenere isis sence rists have or sabhva. no regress. Iik Western counter defended the as a . body who0 asserts it thesis. To Dutput in (not even Ngrjuna) ofknow oy charge of another means knowing which this thesis will get falsified only if anyone asserted it. We do not insisting infinite some that them as are require there world when all assertions made ar can nowing they any are a possible are empty, but tor funher imagine supportingtheories self-evident crucial assertion heories happened to be These to make the that all ace the rock there is nobody function of hasic. self- to assertions are suphas the bottom, wanted which the Probably Ngrjuna assert thathat everything supporting emnt the while provid anything that foundation of content. but this must rema them. arall is lacks svahhra or empty self-support. In erected unsaid belong to a privilege class the brief. is to it. set of the because assert it falsify the while the other pramänas thesis that all hhavas are svabhva porting items, Frn his basic items, viz. self-evident. self- question this yus, as prameyas., are further to question the very cor grjuna ichotomy well as not so. Nagrjuna precedes of behind it. the pramana. the Nyya method of knowing. Note that Nägrjuna did lying Thus, we have validity of principle arrived at the why is it that certain the like of his western counters parts, to noins question: theories, like the fundarmental not choose. many of have a privileged tatus. The theory of our endeavor to attain knowledge. no prumüna the fallibility like have foundationalists. the responsibilit not to an Irom illysIon, but rather choc grjuna, to according Descartes raised argument to only shake the very foundations upon which the superstructure of and the superstructures, but should distinguish the basio belief also tell us are distinct? why knowledge is erected. In simple language his argument can be put Nagarjuna clearly demands that they the reason may be spelled out. for such are the ones that reveal the rentiation Yet this way: If pramFas nature of tho another is that this of problem raised world. that bring us the knowledge of the world as it is, we should Nägaruna type toundationlism by their proposed by stretch out the reasoning further and ask ourselves, what bring contrad original thesis, that Nyäya everything is made known by In other words, we need to some pramna. Worldly are knowledge of these means? know what objects defined as objects of is the causal route through which these mcans are produced and knovanwledge (prameya) and tnere 1S a category distinction between n and At the same revealed to us? Naiyyikas often concede that at times pramnas prameya. time Nyya foundationalism also function as prameyas, thus opening the possibility of the that are not urges pramänas bsolutely independent, but are mere means of knowing becoming the object of knowing.
Recommended publications
  • MA Philo. Credt Semester I-II
    Syllabus M.A. (Philosophy) (Semester and Credit system) (Semesters I and II Operative from 2008-9) (Modified from year 2010-2011) Department of Philosophy Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Bhavan University of pune, Pune-411007 Tel. 020-25601314/15 E-mail: [email protected] General Instructions 1) In Semesters I and II the first two courses (viz., PH 101, PH 102, PH 201, PH 202) are compulsory. 2) Out of the list of Optional courses in the Semester I and II and out of the Group A and Group B in the Semester III and IV two courses each are to be offered. 3) A student has to successfully complete 16 courses for the Master’s Degree. 4) A student can choose all the 16 course in the Department of Philosophy OR A student desirous to do M.A. in Philosophy has to choose at least 12 courses(of 4 credits each) from the Department of Philosophy (i. e., at least three courses -including compulsory courses, if any,- each semester) and 4 courses (i. e., at the most 16 credits in all, one course of 4 credits per semester) from any other department/s as interdisciplinary courses, such that the total number of credits is at least 64 out of which 75% credits are from philosophy department. 5) Dissertation and Open Course: In addition to a wide range of options, the syllabus provides for (i) Dissertation and (ii) Open Course in semesters III and IV the details of which will be declared separately. 6) The lists of readings and references will be updated by the Department and by the respective teachers from time to time.
    [Show full text]
  • Unit 1 NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY
    Unit 1 NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY Contents 1.0 Objectives 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Epistemology 1.3 Theory of Causation (Asatkāryavāda) 1.4 Self and Liberation 1.5 The Concept of God 1.6 Let Us Sum Up 1.7 Key Words 1.8 Further Readings and References 1.9 Answers to Check Your Progress 1.0 OBJECTIVES In this unit, you will learn the Nyāyika’s doctrine of valid sources of knowledge and their arguments on self and liberation. Further, you will also learn the Nayāyika’s views on God. After working through this unit, you should be able to: • explain different kinds of perception • discuss nature and characteristics of inference • elucidate Nyāya concept of self • illustrate Nyāyika’s views on liberation • examine Nyāyika’s arguments on testimony as a valid source of knowledge 1.1 INTRODUCTION The Nyāya School is founded by the sage Gotama, who is not confused as Gautama Buddha. He is familiarized as ‘Aksapāda’. Nyāya means correct thinking with proper arguments and valid reasoning. Thus, Nyāya philosophy is known as tarkashāstra (the science of reasoning); pramānashāstra (the science of logic and epistemology); hetuvidyā (the science of causes); vādavidyā (the science of debate); and anviksiki (the science of critical study). The Nyāya philosophy as a practitioner and believer of realism seeks for acquiring knowledge of reality. 1.2 EPISTEMOLOGY The Nyāya school of thought is adhered to atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is atomistic pluralism on the account that atom is the constituent of matter and there are not one but many entities, both material and spiritual, as ultimate constituents of the universe.
    [Show full text]
  • B.A. Honours in Sanskrit Choice Based Credit System Semester
    B.A. Honours in Sanskrit Choice Based Credit System Semester Pattern Semester Core Course Ability Enhancement Skill Enhancement Elective Discipline Specific (DSC) Elective Generic (CC) Compulsory Course Course (GE) (AECC) I English-1 Environmental Studies GE - 1 -Darshana DSC-1A –Vyakarana DSC-2A –Hindi DSC-3A –Marathi II English-2 Sociology & MIL GE – 2 -Darshana DSC-1B –Vyakarana DSC-2B–Hindi DSC-3B –Marathi III English-3 SEC 1 – Acting & GE – 3 -Darshana DSC-1C –Vyakarana Script Writing DSC-2C –Hindi DSC-3C -Marathi IV English-4 SEC 2 - Music GE – 4 -Darshana DSC-1D –Vyakarana DSC-2D –Hindi DSC-3D -Marathi V** DSC-5- Vyakarana DSE – 1- Veda DSC-6– Sahitya DSE – 2-Puran DSC 7- Darshan shastra DSE –3-Science in Sanskrit (Theory) VI** DSC-8-Vyakarana DSE – 4 Veda DSC-9 – Sahitya DSE –5 Puran DSC 10- Darshan shastra DSE –6 Science in Sanskrit (Project Work) B.A. Honours Sanskrit Choice Based Credit System Semester Paper Subjects Credits Total Marks I 1 English-1 6 X 1 6 100 2 DSC-1A –Vyakarana 4 X 1 4 100 3 DSC-2A –hindi 4 X 1 4 100 4 DSC-3A Marathi 4 X 1 4 100 5 Environmental Studies 4x 1 4 100 6 GE - 1 - Darshana 4 X 1 4 100 Total 26 II 1 English-2 6 X 1 6 100 2 DSC-1B –Vyakarana 4 X 1 4 100 3 DSC-2B -hindi 4 X 1 4 100 4 DSC-2B Marathi 4 x 1 4 100 5 MIL 4 X 1 4 100 6 GE - 2 - Darshana 4 X 1 4 100 Total 26 III 1 English3 4 X 1 4 100 2 DSC -1C –Vyakarana 4 X 1 4 100 3 DSC 2C Hindi 4 X 1 4 100 4 DSC 3C Marathi 4 X 1 4 100 5 GE – 3 - Darshana 4 x 1 4 100 6 SEC1 – Acting & Script Writing 4 X 1 4 100 Total 24 IV 1 English 4 4 X 1 4 100 2 DSC-1D
    [Show full text]
  • A Survey of Indian Logic from the Point of View of Computer Science
    Sadhana, "Col. 19, Part 6, December 1994, pp 971-983. © Printed in India A survey of Indian logic from the point of view of computer science V V S SARMA Department of Computer Science & Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India Abstract. Indian logic has a long history. It somewhat covers the domains of two of the six schools (darsanas) of Indian philosophy, namely, Nyaya and Vaisesika. The generally accepted definition of In- dian logic over the ages is the science which ascertains valid knowledge either by means of six senses or by means of the five members of the syllogism. In other words, perception and inference constitute the sub- ject matter of logic. The science of logic evolved in India through three ~ges: the ancient, the medieval and the modern, spanning almost thirty centuries. Advances in Computer Science, in particular, in Artificial Intelligence have got researchers in these areas interested in the basic problems of language, logic and cognition in the past three decades. In the 1980s, Artificial Intelligence has evolved into knowledge-based and intelligent system design, and the knowledge base and inference engine have become standard subsystems of an intelligent System. One of the important issues in the design of such systems is knowledge acquisition from humans who are experts in a branch of learning (such as medicine or law) and transferring that knowledge to a computing system. The second important issue in such systems is the validation of the knowl- edge base of the system i.e. ensuring that the knowledge is complete and consistent.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy, Eighth Edition
    P.G. 2nd Semester Paper: PHL801C (Core) Western Epistemology (1850-1964) Credits: 4 = 3+1+0 (48 Lectures) 1. Rationalism-empiricism debate Cartesian method of Doubt and modern epistemological foundationalism; Spinoza’s threefold division of knowledge; Leibnitz on knowledge, Rationalist notion of innate ideas and Locke’s critique of it; Locke’s account of knowledge acquisition, Berkeley’s idealistic empiricism; Hume’s sceptical empiricism; Relations of ideas and matters of fact. 2. Kant’s critical idealism: Kant’s Copernican revolution; Notion of the transcendental; structure of sensibility and understanding; Division of judgements and possibility of synthetic a Priori judgements; Transcendental idealism. 3. Knowledge as justified true belief 4. The Gettier problem; Responses to it Reading List: 1. Cahn, Steven M., ed. 2012. Classics of Western Philosophy, Eighth Edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 2. Pojman, Louis P. 2003. Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Third Edition. Andover, UK: Cengage Learning. 3. Rescher, Nicholas. 2003. Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Series: SUNY Series in Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York 4. Crumley II, Jack S. 2009. An Introduction to Epistemology, Second Edition, Series: Broadview Guides to Philosophy. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. 5. Copleston, Frederick. 1993. A History of Philosophy, 11 Volumes. New York: Image. (relevant portions). 6. Zalta, Edward N. ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/(relevant articles) Paper: PHL802C (Core) Indian Epistemology and Logic Credits: 4 = 3+1+0 (48 Lectures) 1. The Indian method of Purvapaksa and Siddh푎nta; Anviksiki and Anumiti 2. Theories of error (Khyativada): Yogacara Buddhist’s atmakhyativada; Prabhakara mimamsaka’s akhyativada; Naiyayika’s anyathakhyativada; Advaitin’s anirvacaniya- khyativada; Bhatta mimamsaka’s viparitakhyativada; Samkhya’s sadasad-Khyativada; Visistadvaitin’s Satkhyativada 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Logic
    pratyaksa linga anumana vyapti upamana INDIAN paksa sabda LOGIC sadhya Hetu TAKE IT EASY I am Priyanka Chatterjee. Website: unifystudy.com Email: [email protected] TELEGRAM channel name : Unifystudy-NET JRF Paper1 Unifystudy- Computer Science UGC NET Qualified with 99.46 Percentile. (Dec 2019) 5 years Industry Experience. MCA (2008 – 2011 ) BSc. Honors in Computer Science (2004 - 2007) WE WILL DISCUSS • Introduction of Indian Logic • Means of Knowledge • Structure and Kinds of Anumana • Constituents of Inference • When there will be fallacies Logic in general is the science and art of a right thinking, it is not concerned with reality about which we are thinking but only with the operation of thinking itself. In ancient time the Indians called Sastra̅ that means ‘precept’, ‘rules’, ‘manual’ etc. about which no science indeed, but which every science pre-supposed. Ashtadasha̅ vidya (18 types of Sastra̅ ) was accepted by ancient Indian seers. Among these eighteen (18) vidyas̅ Nyaya̅ , that is also known as ‘Anviksiki’ (Logic) is most important. It has been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues. ‘Atmavidya’ that was identified ‘Anviksiki’ in the later period, got a crucial role in ancient Indian scholastic circle. ‘Anviksiki’ is an incorporation of two subjects viz. the soul and the theory of reasons. The theory of reason is also known as hetu-sastra̅ or hetu- vidya.̅ It is also called as tarkavidya̅ or vadavidya,̅ the art of debates and discussions. Kautilya, the author of Arthasastra̅ has referred it as the lamp of all vidyas or discourses.
    [Show full text]
  • The Image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms
    The Image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms Hanna Hnatovska1 Ph.D., Associate Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv, Ukraine) E-mail: [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9699-1037 Hnatovska, Hanna (2020) The Image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms. Future Human Image, Volume 13, 2020: 14-23. https://doi. org/10.29202/fhi/13/2 The article is devoted to the analysis of etymology and semantic connotations of Sanskrit terms: anvīkṣiki, darśana, vidyā, tarkavidyā, tarka, tattvajñāna, jñāna, tattvavidyā, tattva, tārkikatva, indriyāsaṅga for the purpose of disclosing the complete image of the philosophy in the Indian culture. The author abandoned the most popular approach in the scientific literature, which is to clarify the philosophical content of the creative achievements of Indian thinkers by defining one term as close as possible to the meaning of the “Western” concept of philosophy. The article recognizes that each of the chosen terms is untranslatable, and the specificity of their meanings creates and explains the integrity of the general image of philosophy in Indian culture. The importance of the etymology in explaining the meanings of the vocabulary of Indian philosophy and in identifying common and distinct terms that are used for consideration has been demonstrated. The article reveals the connection between the meaning of “philosophy” and “science” and “logic” in Indian culture. It clarifies which terms are the key ones and which are marginal to the history of Indian philosophical thought. Keywords: Indian culture and philosophy, etymology, untranslatability, anvīkṣiki, darśana, vidyā, tarka, tattva, jñāna, tārkikatva, indriyāsaṅga Received: February 14, 2020; accepted: March 6, 2020 Introduction The instruction to “justify” the search for philosophical thought in Eastern cultures only by the presence of direct analogs with the categorical apparatus of Western philosophy is vulnerable and imperfect.
    [Show full text]
  • The Six Systems of Vedic Philosophy
    The six systems of Vedic philosophy compiled by Suhotra Swami Table of contents: 1. Introduction 2. Nyaya: The Philosophy of Logic and Reasoning 3. Vaisesika: Vedic Atomic Theory 4. Sankhya: Nontheistic Dualism 5. Yoga: Self-Discipline for Self-Realization 6. Karma-mimamsa: Elevation Through the Performance of Duty 7. Vedanta: The Conclusion of the Vedic Revelation 1. Introduction The word veda means "knowledge." In the modern world, we use the term "science" to identify the kind of authoritative knowledge upon which human progress is based. To the ancient people of Bharatavarsha (Greater India), the word veda had an even more profound import that the word science has for us today. That is because in those days scientific inquiry was not restricted to the world perceived by the physical senses. And the definition of human progress was not restricted to massive technological exploitation of material nature. In Vedic times, the primary focus of science was the eternal, not the temporary; human progress meant the advancement of spiritual awareness yielding the soul's release from the entrapment of material nature, which is temporary and full of ignorance and suffering. Vedic knowledge is called apauruseya , which means it is not knowledge of human invention. Vedic knowledge appeared at the dawn of the cosmos within the heart of Brahma, the lotus-born demigod of creation from whom all the species of life within the universe descend. Brahma imparted this knowledge in the form of sabda (spiritual sound) to his immediate sons, who are great sages of higher planetary systems like the Satyaloka, Janaloka and Tapaloka.
    [Show full text]
  • The Samkhya System
    THE HERITAGE OF INDIA _ . (The Right Reverend V. S. AZARIAH, Bish P f Dornaka1 Editors (j. N. FARQUHAR, M.A., D.Lnr. (Oxon.) Already published. The Heart of Buddhism. K. J. SAUNDERS, M.A. Asoka. REV. J. M. MACPHAIL, M.A., M.D. Indian Painting. Principal PERCY BROWN, Calcutta. Kanarese Literature. REV. E. P. RICE, B.A. Subjects proposed and volumes under preparation. SANSKRIT AND PALI LITERATURE. Hymns from the Vedas. Prof. A. A. MACDONELL, Oxford. Anthology of Mahayana Literature. Prof. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, Ghent. Selections from the Upanishads. F. J. WESTERN, M.A., Delhi. Scenes from the Ramayana. JAMES MORISON, M.A., PH.D., Oxford. Selections from the Mahabharata. THE PHILOSOPHIES. The Philosophy of the Upanishads. Sankara s Vedanta. A. K. SHARMA, M.A., Patiala. Ramanuja s Vedanta. The Buddhist System. FINE ART AND MUSIC. Indian Architecture. R. L. EWING, B.A., Madras. Indian Sculpture. Principal W. M ? ZUMBRO, Madura. 11 Indian Music. H. A. POPLEY, B.A., Erode. The Minor Arts. Principal PERCY BROWN, Calcutta. Indian Coins. BIOGRAPHIES OF EMINENT INDIANS. Gautama Buddha. K. J. SAUNDERS, M.A., Rangoon. Ramanuja. Akbar. F. V. SLACK, M.A., Calcutta. Lahore. Tulsi Das. S. K. DUTTA, B.A, M.B, Cn.B., VERNACULAR LITERATURE. The Kurral. H. A. POPLEY, B.A., Erode. and FRANCIS Hymns of the Adiyars. G. E. PHILLIPS, M.A., KINGSBURY, Bangalore. Hymns of the Alvars. Tayumanavar. ISAAC TAMBYAH, M.A., Bar.-at-Law, Penang. Hymns of Hindustan. Murshid- Chaitanya Hymns. O. STURSBERG, PH.D., Berhampore, abad. Poona. Marathi Abhangs. NICOL MACNICOL, M.A., D.LiTT., Gujarat! Hymns.
    [Show full text]
  • Pennsylvania Are All to Be Warmly Congratulated on This Addition to Their Series
    BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES. 637 Pennsylvania are all to be warmly congratulated on this addition to their series. For it will be an enduring monument to the ripe scholarship of Dr. Radau and of his mastery of the exceedingly difficult script, languages, and history of early Babylonia. ALAN SPENCER HAWKESWORTH. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/19/4/637/2271936 by guest on 24 September 2021 HISTORY OF THE MEDIAEVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC. By Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1909. Pp. 188. This is a pioneer work in so far as the author has scarcely any predeces­ sors in the field of Indian logic. Buddhist logic has been treated by several scholars, but for his sources of the Jaina logic he has to fall back mainly on unpublished and unedited manuscripts scattered all over Western India and the Deccan, and also preserved in some libraries. The book would have been more useful to Western people if he had considered the general ignorance of Sanskrit which prevails outside of India. A Western reader will probably be deterred from venturing into further study of the book if he reads the first sentences: "Logic is generally designated in India as Nyaya-shastra. It is also called Tarka-shastra, Hetu-vidya, Pramana-shastra, Anviksiki and Phak- kika-shastra." (We here replace in this quotation the accented "s" by "sh.") Since the book is meant for Sanskrit scholars this is scarcely a drawback, but we would suggest to the author if in a future edition he would feel the need of elaborating his work, to take into consideration also the uninitiated who are willing and anxious to learn.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking the History of Philosophy
    DIOGENES Diogenes 222 & 223: 138–150 ISSN 0392-1921 Rethinking the History of Philosophy Marietta Stepanyants Among the radical changes that occurred in the twentieth century (especially in its latter half) and reflected the current trends in the development of a human com- munity, there are quite a few transformations that, though clearly outlined, have failed so far to be sufficiently described and, what is more, to be fully understood. In particular, this concerns a cardinal change in the status of what until recently was commonly known as ‘Oriental philosophy.’ By the early twentieth century the view of Greek ancient thought as the ‘cradle of philosophy’ took deep root in Westerners’ minds. It was believed that the idea of any other philosophy existing apart from Western philosophy was groundless and, therefore, the very expression ‘Western philosophy’ should be regarded as tautology (Husserl). Even those who shared Hegel’s view and recognized that ‘the so called Oriental philosophy was the first to appear in terms of time’ (implying Chinese and Indian thought) nonetheless deemed it out of place in the history of philosophy (Hegel, 1996: 44). According to inflexible Western notions it was customary to oppose the so-called Oriental mode of thought to the Western type of thinking within many parameters. For example, it was stated that philosophy in the East was never detached from reli- gion in contrast to their dissociation in the West; that Oriental spiritualism was offset by Western naturalism; that the dominant characteristics intrinsic to the Oriental type of reflection such as idealism, irrationalism, introversion, cosmocentrism and pessimism differed from Western materialism, rationalism, extraversion, anthropo- centrism and optimism, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY of INFERENCE By
    THE NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY OF INFERENCE by LAXMAN CHANNAPPA MULLATTI B.A., Karnatak University, Dharwar (India), 1954 M.A., Karnatak University, Dharwar (India), 1957 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of PHILOSOPHY We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1972 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. L. C. Mullatti Department of Philosophy. The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date April 4. 1972 i ABSTRACT This dissertation is an attempt to represent the Navya-nyaya (Nn) theory of inference in terms of a contemporary conceptual framework. There exist similar studies by able modern scholars, but these are either piecemeal, or, when comprehensive, rely mainly on traditional (western) logic. The present attempt is both relatively more comprehensive, and employs notions from contemporary logic. Since the Nn theory of inference is couched in terms of cognitions rather than sentences, an effort is made to clarify the notion of cog• nition. It is argued that a cognition is an abstract and ontologically independent entity much in the fashion of the Fregean proposition, and that primarily it, as distinct from its linguistic vehicle, is the bearer of truth-values.
    [Show full text]