Vol. IX, December 2013 ISSN 2231-3680 ANVIKSIKI 34T-tfyai

Chief Editor Shriprakash Pandey

Editors: Ananda Mishra Sachchidanand Mishra

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

an Act of Parliament An Tl Importance Established by

RELIGION DEPARIM FPHILOSOPHY AND

4ARNNAN ANTI ASCEPTIC? REALIST Ou SRIERALAM.NAIR considered as .

7rndition le has nurked popularly skeptic in Amowledye, Indian specifically its eriticizedfoundationalist that the Nvuya attempt to foundationalist metahy'SKal realism is use Mion pramanas of hile illegitimate for it cope a pre for reading of constructing Michael Dumn pramanas like Nagärjuna as an r too anti 1o the argues that metaphysical realist's we cannot Granting thut notion r there are of mind Nägrjuna's indications of anti- ble to call writings, the paper Nagrjuna a argues that, keeping in mind,mind the skeptie than fact that in an anti had a positive role to Indian play in hare thesame same concern for knowledge with analysis and SKEPTICS have been epistemoiogists. the temple of ditionally truth. There is considered as a common intruders tophers that skeptics are consensus among ROCemed.about the cognitive negative, progress of destructive and his is a misnomer. It is human known to all civilization as UCerns f that one is to determine of the chief mans we to how we can employ quire be sure that s that it is knowledge are imperative even for appropriate. This eiully at challenges to ali epistemologists to look is is exactly what knowledge also acquiring ping skeptics do. In this enterprises and epistemologists in sense, ans of their endeavor skepties are knowledge. The to identify traditional role of adequate skeptics as those who maintained that no knowledge is Nigaltyuna tIS indeeddeed a skeptic. Mark possible stands two : Siderits in his primarily it is self revised now for Anti Reali proposes as that a paper titled manner: if we can defeating. Nigaryuna know we though in wider nothing, cannot a trivial Nãgaryuna would reveal that his aim was reading of we know nothing. also kno not to Secondly, there has of universalarsal doudoubt, rather his cstablish the consensus that come this- that skeptics have a up a general is motivation, quite genuine case Michael Dummett, to to ichael propose an similar philosophic hat present thatof community deserves a an physical scenar anti-realist when serious o Countering position in skeptics propose that our hearing. Th the ndhan Matilal's ordinary rjuna as a Siderits of are in andards of skeptie argues that depiction vulnerable many ways it makes orefore. a justific t to the Ngrjuna's real the serious intentions prove other hand, in the of demand impossibility of skeptie on us, if close offff a route to knowledge, but that we do not anyone On o common know this or that, goes to rallher metaphysical well, we yya theory ofaf In realism via skeptical about it.' As B. K. have the pramnas. this paper I tilal to wish to a right argue the better learn to live with observes, following thes Iis true that the skeptics, for philosopher Ngärjuna's the same they both are anti-realism. But theory exhibits en. ements of beyond that it activity, namely the search for goes up to engaged in of which refute the skeptic shares same concern for owledge. He very pos knowledge, truth with the says, "A hinders or at least to human cognitive reluctant accept else. A philosopher to human cognitive progress, which place anything is and s hurdles has been Skeptic first and effectively enquirer". Though both the sisted by /tsyyana, once again skeptic and foremost an reinstating involved in philosopher The Nyya Analysis of seeking and the alike are owledge. paper gets divided into three probing of sections. The efforts are possibilities with Matilal's first skeptic's knowledge, the section deals thesis on distinguished by his as a nature of unyielding and Ngrjuna the which second the skeptic, enquiry, according to the persistent ection provides anti thesis of blown out of philosopher is Siderites proportion. This in turn, severely N,riuna as an anti-realist and in the depicting fetches him the ill third section I being But this fame of counter shall place impractical. accusation, as Vatsyyana's osition to is rightly pointed out Ngrjuna's in skeptics. beside the It is by the of critique order to point. one to save Nyya analysis knowledge. truth. without thing search on the earnestly for compromising application of Nãgarjuna popularly claims that all bhävas and another to methods (existent quite worry about the chosen, empty of their svabhäva entities) pragmatic of (devoid of inquiries. Further, as inputs such meaning). This Indian skeptics would of Nägärjuna about all existent skepticism point out, it is not that entities/all skeptics chose to embrace was uncertainty; it is just that accused of philosophical positions pre-judge the issue at they refuse to hand prior to Valsyâyana for paradoxically/inconsistency by Naiyyikas. need to experience. It is here that we instance, in his place as a commentary out that if Ngrjuna marked philosophical theories are points all philosophers. In skeptic among Indian devoid of their he svabhva or essence, as Vigrahavyvartani, a series of Nägarjuna claims, his own arguments that provides theory is no coherently a to provides critique to the therefore, the thesis exception this, and epistemology, and Nyya gets cancelled at once. anyone who On the other if goes through these on Nagaryuna claims hand, Nyaya analysis of attacks the exception to this knowledge would Tave to particular we summarily conclude that say that there theory, well, will is at least one 106 ais to counter example to what he SREEKALA M. NAIR prove. To this Ngrjuna gives a befitting reply. In IS NAGRJUNA AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 107 other he Is lound like by means raging pported there igrahaiartani need o detend (which may lack that sanct which e a funher thesis to this've these, no lack any leads to proposition. himself "If the would have been guilty of the faule. Ssence). If thesis. I ults you ascribe proof of infinite re had any pramanas, ther the therefore. I have no then not fault. In there prama But other would annas me. I do mavasth). There be that no philosophic thesis rds. he would be no an were hy to be arguing has svabhava proof ( in seems f the inite re Matilal is ot the opinion that this va is last". Ngárjuna's this first a thesis. roft or of irselfnot or critique the that thesie stancient critique against "It is quite possible every crit should h as he s. foundatior middle. for. say acks essen The pramna valism remain so even if entified as the and this will therenere isis sence rists have or sabhva. no regress. Iik Western counter defended the as a . body who0 asserts it thesis. To Dutput in (not even Ngrjuna) ofknow oy charge of another means knowing which this thesis will get falsified only if anyone asserted it. We do not insisting infinite some that them as are require there world when all assertions made ar can nowing they any are a possible are empty, but tor funher imagine supportingtheories self-evident crucial assertion heories happened to be These to make the that all ace the rock there is nobody function of hasic. self- to assertions are suphas the bottom, wanted which the Probably Ngrjuna assert thathat everything supporting emnt the while provid anything that foundation of content. but this must rema them. arall is lacks svahhra or empty self-support. In erected unsaid belong to a privilege class the brief. is to it. set of the because assert it falsify the while the other pramänas thesis that all hhavas are svabhva porting items, Frn his basic items, viz. self-evident. self- question this yus, as prameyas., are further to question the very cor grjuna ichotomy well as not so. Nagrjuna precedes of behind it. the pramana. the Nyya method of knowing. Note that Nägrjuna did lying Thus, we have of principle arrived at the why is it that certain the like of his western counters parts, to noins question: theories, like the fundarmental not choose. many of have a privileged tatus. The theory of our endeavor to attain knowledge. no prumüna the fallibility like have foundationalists. the responsibilit not to an Irom illysIon, but rather choc grjuna, to according Descartes raised argument to only shake the very foundations upon which the superstructure of and the superstructures, but should distinguish the basio belief also tell us are distinct? why knowledge is erected. In simple language his argument can be put Nagarjuna clearly demands that they the may be spelled out. for such are the ones that reveal the rentiation Yet this way: If pramFas nature of tho another is that this of problem raised world. that bring us the knowledge of the world as it is, we should Nägaruna type toundationlism by their proposed by stretch out the reasoning further and ask ourselves, what bring contrad original thesis, that Nyäya everything is made known by In other words, we need to some pramna. Worldly are knowledge of these means? know what objects defined as objects of is the causal route through which these mcans are produced and knovanwledge (prameya) and tnere 1S a category distinction between n and At the same revealed to us? Naiyyikas often concede that at times pramnas prameya. time Nyya also function as prameyas, thus opening the possibility of the that are not urges pramänas bsolutely independent, but are mere means of knowing becoming the object of knowing. But this does stopping points in the causal justification chain. If this is the case not set the problem to rest, if the means of knowledge are asks how could then. Ngrjuna, they draw the desired distinction

108 SREEKALA M. NAiR IS NAGÄRJUNA AN ANTIREALIST OR ASCEPIIC? 109 Anovledgeand its ject. whic Nyya proclain- ay pramna and prameva ims point between ittercnce.11 Matilal p follow the method that commences with an initial do hat they [n fact foresees a their od embracint Skepticism. The possib essential or the other ubt, and embracing third for agar subsequently. by applying some pramna Nagarjuna from plunging Quite unlike skeptitypossibilit certitude (Nirnaya). head sned to reach Cartesian own metaphysical ould the doubt takes us ahead. The inis: doubting in his mp. all the whe the Nyya system initial doub in standard means of But remove through the knowing. they seem II this method at some point (precisely to have dropped iderits. in his paper arrive at the pramFas) abruptly. Therefore. if someone Mark latilal in Nagarjuna as An preterential/privileged ssuewith characterizing Ng realist takes for erediting status f charges as a Nyya thathat inin rjuna true ligrahayyävartani, she cannot be accused. If Naiyyika were to say that pra inas, skeptic. It is of ourse a T ossibility of giving consistent Ngrjuna bottom need no further as account at the rock vidences. there of questions the exists psnga critiqu the of them. it cannot be granted. far an Nyya theory inner certitude for for one thing pramänas, thus Nãgrjuna, Siderits be taken nhdtng of claims wledge. But a subjective certainty cannot validf would reveal wider ascertaining versal ablish the possibility of that his certitude. universal aim skeptics in Western camp. doubt, as An alternative to the self-evidence (foundationalist) Curiously done by race anti-realist elements in enough, one could may be that a piece of knowledge derives its authority Nagarjuna's theory and fact. should be something other than itselt. Matilal points out three that Na as an concludes ing out that understood someone pointins ealist's anti-realist. as possibilities. realismnone via pramFas should be closed for good.route to 1. A piece of knowledge deriving its justification f metaphysical from exercised in Indian another piece of knowledge. Realism philosophy engages three key 2. A piece of knowledge being validating by its object. theses- of correspondenc Means of knowledge and objects validate each other 1o 1) loption notion: that truth between involves The first alternative is rejected on of the infinite a correspondence belief and the factual regress representation of the world. involves since The second alternative circularity we posit the pramänas to validate the world and use this very world to validate 2) Aind-independence of the reality: that physical reality third alternative of exists of our änas. The mutual dependence has the independently awareness of it. great possibility of establishing the Buddhist . includino 3) Truth exist independent/beyond assertion: that there is one true theory that perfectly fits the reality. ? that of Nägrjuna's. As Matilal observes: "lf the object depends upon the means and the means upon the object, then both may be Nãgärjuna counters (1) that arguing pramânas cannot be said to be knowledge dependent.. If we locate the object in what sfablished without committing the logical flaws of circularity or appears in experience and identify knowledge with what makes it With regard to he infinite regress. (2) points out that the Nvva appear the way it does, we court some sort of mutuality between to use to construct attempt pramanas a metaphysical realism is

110 SREEKALA M. NAIR IS N AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 111 above thing oVer and the as it and illegitimate carries over the assumptions ceurrence abo..ut stay aside of constructing pramna theory self. tyc1s LerPhysics for a the lunination Therefore. the reality while correspondence theory of truth to reach Aovi along with commonse and pon metaphysica realismwhile se ourney îrom yjtlintain that we not it fails. Hence he advises the need posil a is to power as Te: th. nonsense Naiyyikas give explain the occurrend of some a and resort to tor explain asonable lo separa justification. Th idence tor its existence is replacement of correspondence intuition This spondencesuggested nder just thatphenomenon il entity n with that of isto be ined. Arguing the not to block the routes to col urrence is in phenome only possible knowledge, m is this enomenon whoe argues herentism separate existen if the line, we to impress us that our empirical world is having carcannot posit nothing but .a Siderits. conceptual but igthtonlyas evidence. lowever, in the illumination of objects s fabrication case of (prapañca). If pramFas cannot be vidence for its existence, be establishe ihbependent evi escaping the faults of circularity/infi uthe light. there regress, it transparent uring with nedia theiffraction phenomenon use of them necessarily involves our conceptionimplies of thathat the being best ed that the and light ol example. Therefore. can be elude knowledge justified thillunmination only in a co reality argument objects are Havine manner. Ngrjuna's ight does not distinct rentist ents. fack with same force. illuminate In the we 1ome again Siderits itself previous section have seen that also is among the of argunument even it we stretches ways to establish a line were to out a possible pramäna, four tierent grant that yyikas othing more tharhan the objects the the list. viz.. prefer the 2nd n mined. light is one pramja establishing another. In order for analogy of to water here. pramnas it from the flaw of are. for light doe regress they seek the aid of an protect hold sure, t distinct logy: sul. the cognitioraition of objects. from light illuminates itself. so too a just as Naiyay1kas. in pramana may pen fact, of establish itself te and its speak succeeds in that this qUSsal rela pramna resultant Nagrjuna proving claim is false, then product , n the ar veridical cognition. pram absence of any other counter example, and in the presence of such Naiyyik attempt to stop the positive evidences as the fact that a knife cannot cut regress also We by itself, KK theory that be in the will the Knowing one justified rejecting assertion that a pramFa denying Knows), the establishes have knowi one must know theory that the to knowledge that one itself. Countering light analogy employed by Naiyavikas order knows. Nyva pramanyavadaav/wada clearly out that an clearly pronouns that it is Nagärjuna promptly points object can be illuminated in their only cognitionnition isis verified as a of contingent only if it exists in darkness. since cannot, a given piece light by exist hat knowledge; one may to dodo thithis and in an unilluminated state, this condition cannot be choose yet may poSsess met. Hence it knowledge. Such a is consistent with to is Nyya of meaningless say that light is illhuminated. Matilal, observes nosition theory knowledge: the ry of subscribed Siderits, causal justification by countering Ngrjuna's argument, posits that light Nyya maintains that owledge is a matter of a true belief illuminates itself is a mere variant of *there is having with the sort stylistic light or right of This externalist version there is of causalasal ancestry. of illumination objects', for, the two events, occurrence of justification allows and the to clainm justified status to their belief light illumination of objects are inseparable events. Siderits them without being able to now examines this show justification. problem: Is it true that the occurrence of light is

112 SREEKALA M. NAIR IS N AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 113 that following this Many a think philosophers that the ohserve; ethod ar rejeetin. correspondndence ny the from encethe c secures pramna theory falling of KK hesi the hey beliel prey to spurious to roclann i1s quite The argument is that, being a Budd be consider culd hist, Ngärjuna infinitesubs ske his position d a KK theory, which results in subjecting knowledge as skeptical challenge. To justfied Niigatyuna uTWarran as ifif th the clain put Tegress. sound itin Siderits tanted. tt infinite regress. But here we go wrong. subscribes o made is Ngrjuna r alysis nay schemes the this: maintained of the fallacy of infinite regress not lysis to these one we since w wordy from an epistemic ch of havve arrived NCat. cannot know the issue atives we mijmight have The intension behind the regress arrive at charge, do not under or accordino we in one rect, act not to prove the impossibility of position. differo of the pramna theory pramaas, and praprameyas. possess derits, is The is before light the underlying metaphysical but to bring point ge presupposi iplicity ot possiblhlc Tatherknowledge that abosumptionsout in an otherwise innocent and fair ns involved the nmultipbr schemes that since, on the looking epistemologica process of refles: a the lective might of Through forceful argument he the augh brium be exposes practice, it follo arbitrarinece with our lows equilibrium, our arrived at in the pranmna theory. The force of the theory Lcond that the itbetween beliefs beliels argument tha involved and world is notion of would in was purely intended he empty."6 the one right Vigrahavyvartani to persa merely denies thethe possibilitycihility ofof in that is employs denies at brief, recognize our pramna doctrine nothing but us to external wvorld. Her arriving one lie!s, inthe he myth-making or make-believe, the inherer seems to right fitNagarjuna for value of onvenient that if there are echo the Our only in making day-to-day life work which tectionn lifferent sets of smoothly, and lieslie warrant, then anti-realist pistemic the notion eliefs, each subjective communication." By this we are renderinsg inter- of a not to and world must be idle and right fit having Nãgarjuna is utterly against the very judge To betweeNeen possibility of knowledge. thatOx possible to gjis useless. put in knowled. not give a other the contrary, he concedes that we do have is quite conceptual knowledpe vorld is independently of our knowing. words through valid pramFas, but a journey from understanding of the pramna theorv This way Siderits world as such, which Nyaya theory convincingly argue his proposes, is sometk tention behind case objectionable. hing forcing inlinite that gainst prämpavdaada is to us regress A closer look at the theory of corespondence impress that both argument established prameyasare mut ally pramFas and between pramna and the state of attairs in the dependent. Pramnas can be external worla of a only with certain established would make it clear that reflective equilibrium is assumptions about the world largely bein together leaving us the and vice used: we start with a set of basic beliefs and versa, message that it is trace the cansol hard to compartmentalization make a conditions that produce such in us. ertight etween the belief Having arrived at th is and our cognitiveanitive t we phenomenal world we apparatus. reduce provisional causal account, observe whether it accords this with to mere a position of other fresh beliefs we arrive at about the world. And what Nagrjuna , theory that follow her proposes that the Subject with partial fail would be a series of either in our wpoints to see the adjustment pramFas or truth in our biases, we would undistorted or and the by personal miss the beliefs both, process continues until we arrive point. Now at a that there does this perfect equilibrium-a one-to-one correspondence. amountunt to saying can be no Nãgärjuna distinction between IS AN 114 SREEKALA M. NAIR NAG ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 115 grealer vigor In ef, according n:9Yearswilhwih oframana and ramey are ally within an epistemie system? No al error must abandon and all. On hey er Anowedge that there Is/can t their while granting be lism. Asa rue epistemo even praman dependent contary, knowl this alorementioned epister avada or their result ofthis mic rclain the logist Naga as a w sugge at hut ney ay arrived that this also mirrors the program, iit ramanavada an the claim th Warran nature ealism. Side argues wouldn'T that netylysal abandon a mind- an constitute dependent reality. their an anti-realist alternatis..Juna us to The point Nagarjuna ere ts very cnables this: in Poi y suggestinsting Nagarjuna is simply or ler to draw here give like by we canno content to highlighted and ehwly that the Dummemnett, he betWcen cognition we need ofa mind ind correspondence o Nges independent reality i that metaphysicalcal realists isolation tromlronm cachcach othe can reali these in lation be of ther. o establish both tho Rellectin mtims mirrored in Siderits wriles: "The fact Our contention, hat pramünas Nãgarjuna's nniom decpendent in the ma are mulually manner described prameya and co. have no such conception ofof cognition and that we can above shows Acknowledge the merit in that correspond to Pr the set of beliels they Evenas to of a is to world. say heto. Nagarjuna, unlik the argument We would do to thal posed by complement. better say see in them an emply tha Sidetis, I antirealists the pay pan poscs scrious to the smootniy lor us, lhat they cohera threat Western make things go possibility of they help witl and and With our needs, intercet. identilices this raises beliefs we hold and truly effective knowledge. other WatsyayanaofNgrjuna Matilal in fact vividly describesstoppers to this institutions an raise which Mtlenmpt realist may objection, t by Naiyyikas to safeguard The metaphysical the knowledge analysis. He they may argue that even if N is a labors genuine: made curface at least, sounds we thatthat Nagärjuna prove skeptic but a sheer Virtue of the epistemic mot. to skeptic in to S by f the erm. the grant that p belong uchroader sense oft Definitely in nature of world, truth out runs justifios Ngrjuna his virtue the Descartes opinion is and not by of who,0, as to ijsti. characterized, doubts that olten we take proposilions be skeptic upon as man our experience lied. a many It's ot beliefs of the theorists untrue; also there are cases where liundasnenta/ntal pramana as and subsequently find them we possible. He in a extension of the our Justilication on a probable parties proposes application of the find ourselves improving i. term in these lines we may also proclaim that ththese modate Ngärjuna, and further proposition. Arguing kepthe appeals not to would never be justified for attention to these labels, true propositions us, no ich concentrate unjustified ayloo insteadco on the we employ. With th the what practices may Cdhe DOsition and arguments matter epistemic rmnation adduced in favor of it to establish that truth realists attempt outruns Givingwhat isdue to both the parties Matilal arguments observes that the that ruth outruns Justilication can ho justification. This argument charges Ngrjuna makes againstour standards of knowledge do in cases we are an omniscient granted. But in such smuggling nt suggest that they work badly or that there are others which perhaps God, who is in possession of all , who is agency, herter, It only suggests that they are it his own epistemic method. Once Hork logically defective or at justified in accepting employing 18 's logically questionablc. this presupposition is exposed, Nägrjuna original problem kcast

116 SREEKALA M. NAIR AN ANTI REALIST OR ISNAGRJUNA A SCEPTIC? 117 hrough inlerence tha Let's note that we get lo not 20 Vtsyayana does interpret light we mcans, kno (conting the way normally approach it for, it ne would analogy in Vatsyäyana alsalso uses the with the prevailing hrot logy of weightin Nyya theories stand the distinct role ntingently and of in played by pramana g praksavãda paralah pramanyavda. mpress mp of gold scale is Accordino " paratah first measured as In knowledge neither nor achne a (lulay u evealing later as the as the Apowledgeand instrument always appraised or known self-validating, Nyäya, or as through another and ther objcCIs, Simi episode. T ilarly the the awevyhtn Vätsyyana comes up with the pramana scal e byecto measure o nterpretation that the NCellentmcasuri ans) (which may play two different roles the role lampLane refore, casuring may take litera of a means as different far as post s pramana without are concerned, and the role of an obi roles, as prameyameans object as far as Ising any the lddyolakara ollers an goes. Thus, for sense of nteresting logical light instance, may play a dua analogy to di sigh be show role, not tself to means when it helps us to see the role need justified act that adifficulty objects, and may a emdence. as become an nplewater colle a piece of when it is itself seen the 'h cted from pool by sense ol sight. This may evidence just as its own yjustify thethe the With its purity the same ontological entity may understandinc h (without play different roles along any purity of reveals that n) so to0o ind the difference between means ke of of knowledge and of yjistilication which implication self is not to object stiands lunctions as be analyzed in terms tilficaloryevide evidence justificd the of ontological type knowledgs distinctie this: the causal different linguistic but as learly inferential pragmatically The Nyaya expressions. Vatsyayana clearly Mstonis that the different use of pronouno. xended oly ifif practical lite justification chain Krakas docs not ly refer to distinct Vyavahara) calls ontological entities, but the different roles the for it, not same obicet othervise. play in multiple usages. upshot of the linguistic Similarly, "... to The argument is be a 'meane that while sienifies nothing but the a lineage to playing role of an show antirealisn it instrument in walngs cannot of and to the be Naparjuna's generation knowledge, be an antirecalism as, 'object' means to proper he does branded fill in the of antirea not share role of an accusative case in a se knowledge antircalists. And also a many ghel fair situation"." Thus, the ld by positions problem raised by to strike evaluation of Ngärjuna, distinctive ckarly reveal,il skeptic outlook with of his fcatures far reveial to his and seem karly regard the writingswrilings pramana prameya amicably resolved we find very by knowle for him reducing it to a mere Vätsyäyana by f asserting that possibility grammatical distinction. and means perception are self of The of ikc knowledge problem inlinite regress with defeating for, in past, or they do foundationalism is also regard to reieal the objects present future. not resolved by He Vätsyayana. starts with Nagärjuna will not be able to Naiyayikas point out general thesis that one necds not a thut cstablish this possess a prior hIs Own theory for it is without means to arrive al a piece of knowledge of sclf-rellective: his harming knowledge to generated by it. It .in itscll, in order to ought be a epistemically inessential to have is negale ouher means, knowledge of the means and gets which Aac hy its own assertion burned to cognition gets generated. For through belore causing does not instance, our visual danger to on our like oie one's others, l is depend prior perception quite burning own in knowledge of the sensec of finger order to burn sight. Sane philosophers have leit that others. 18 Nagarjuna may SREEKALA M. NAIR choose to burn his IS AN NAGARJUNA ANII OR REALISI ASEPIC? 19 tinger it he vould Noint at others But alast le gets des his Nevertheless his contributions to Indian kn as he oyed prin av ignitivant, awakened our eholastie edge then domate shmber philosopt nersAnalysos fron tom Departent of Philosy Sree Sankarachärya University hilosophy Kalady.of Sa Kerala NOTES N

Phulseyh iune thrugh tne ubject, A. C. Gea Otond niversit P'ress, 1O8, p. 44 (ed R Matilal, Perepon An Èssar om Chssical n Anilnir. Clarendon Press, Oxtord, 1986. p.46 Theories Naxaruna. g/ rT.21, (Tinted as appendix to aida's adition ot Alaimm17K ALrikas, verse 1. p. 277 P.L Matilal p cit. verse 2. p. 48 Ibidp Aagrjund. p cu, ONe 2, p. 286. Matlal, Yu.. p. Ibid.p 10 bid.p. Mark Siderits. "Nägarjuna as Anti-realist" in Indian Philosopin CNiem Readings (Roy W. Perret. ed.). Garland Publishine INC, Aen York & london, 2000. p. 11. lbid.p 1 lbid.p.13 Matilal. op cit. p. 67 Sidenits, opcit. p. l Ibid. p. Matilal. op cit. p.50 Ibid. pp. o0-6l. Ibid.po0 lbid.p.o

SREERALAMAIR