Vol. IX, December 2013 ISSN 2231-3680 ANVIKSIKI 34T-tfyai Chief Editor Shriprakash Pandey Editors: Ananda Mishra Sachchidanand Mishra BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY an Act of Parliament An Tl Importance Established by RELIGION DEPARIM FPHILOSOPHY AND 4ARNNAN ANTI ASCEPTIC? REALIST Ou SRIERALAM.NAIR considered as . 7rndition le has nurked popularly skeptic in Amowledye, Indian specifically its eriticizedfoundationalist Nyaya that the Nvuya attempt to foundationalist metahy'SKal realism is use Mion pramanas of reality hile illegitimate for it cope a pre for reading of constructing Michael Dumn pramanas like Nagärjuna as an r too anti 1o the argues that metaphysical realist's we cannot Granting thut notion r there are of mind Nägrjuna's indications of anti- ble to call writings, the paper Nagrjuna a argues that, keeping in mind,mind the skeptie than fact that in an anti had a positive role to Indian play in hare thesame same concern for truth knowledge philosophy with analysis and SKEPTICS have been epistemoiogists. the temple of ditionally truth. There is considered as a common intruders tophers that skeptics are consensus among ROCemed.about the cognitive negative, progress of destructive and his is a misnomer. It is human known to all civilization as UCerns f that one epistemology is to determine of the chief mans we to how we can employ quire be sure that s that it is knowledge are imperative even for appropriate. This eiully at challenges to ali epistemologists to look is is exactly what knowledge also acquiring ping skeptics do. In this enterprises and epistemologists in sense, ans of their endeavor skepties are knowledge. The to identify traditional role of adequate skeptics as those who maintained that no knowledge is Nigaltyuna tIS indeeddeed a skeptic. Mark possible stands two reasons: Siderits in his primarily it is self revised now for Anti Reali proposes as that a paper titled manner: if we can defeating. Nigaryuna know we though in wider nothing, cannot a trivial Nãgaryuna would reveal that his aim was reading of we know nothing. also kno not to Secondly, there has of universalarsal doudoubt, rather his cstablish the consensus that come this- that skeptics have a up a general is motivation, quite genuine case Michael Dummett, to to ichael propose an similar philosophic hat present thatof community deserves a an physical scenar anti-realist when serious o Countering position in skeptics propose that our hearing. Th the ndhan Matilal's ordinary rjuna as a Siderits of are in andards of skeptie argues that depiction vulnerable many ways it makes orefore. a justific t to the Ngrjuna's real the serious intentions prove other hand, in the name of demand impossibility of skeptie on us, if close offff a route to knowledge, but that we do not anyone On o common know this or that, goes to rallher metaphysical well, we yya theory ofaf In realism via skeptical about it.' As B. K. have the pramnas. this paper I tilal to wish to a right argue the better learn to live with observes, following thes Iis true that the skeptics, for philosopher Ngärjuna's the same they both are anti-realism. But theory exhibits en. ements of beyond that it activity, namely the search for goes up to engaged in of which refute the skeptic shares same concern for owledge. He very pos knowledge, truth with the says, "A hinders or at least to human cognitive reluctant accept else. A philosopher to human cognitive progress, which place anything is and s hurdles has been Skeptic first and effectively enquirer". Though both the sisted by /tsyyana, once again skeptic and foremost an reinstating involved in philosopher The Nyya Analysis of seeking and the alike are owledge. paper gets divided into three probing of sections. The efforts are possibilities with Matilal's first skeptic's knowledge, the section deals thesis on distinguished by his as a nature of unyielding and Ngrjuna the which second the skeptic, enquiry, according to the persistent ection provides anti thesis of blown out of philosopher is Siderites proportion. This in turn, severely N,riuna as an anti-realist and in the depicting fetches him the ill third section I being But this fame of counter shall place impractical. accusation, as Vatsyyana's osition to is rightly pointed out Ngrjuna's in skeptics. beside the It is by the of critique order to point. one to save Nyya analysis knowledge. truth. without thing search on the earnestly for compromising application of Nãgarjuna popularly claims that all bhävas and another to methods (existent quite worry about the chosen, empty of their svabhäva entities) pragmatic of (devoid of inquiries. Further, as inputs such meaning). This Indian skeptics would of Nägärjuna about all existent skepticism point out, it is not that entities/all skeptics chose to embrace was uncertainty; it is just that accused of philosophical positions pre-judge the issue at they refuse to hand prior to Valsyâyana for paradoxically/inconsistency by Naiyyikas. need to experience. It is here that we instance, in his place as a commentary out that if Ngrjuna marked philosophical theories are points all philosophers. In skeptic among Indian devoid of their he svabhva or essence, as Vigrahavyvartani, a series of Nägarjuna claims, his own arguments that provides theory is no coherently a to provides critique to the therefore, the thesis exception this, and epistemology, and Nyya gets cancelled at once. anyone who On the other if goes through these on Nagaryuna claims hand, Nyaya analysis of attacks the exception to this knowledge would Tave to particular we summarily conclude that say that there theory, well, will is at least one 106 ais to counter example to what he SREEKALA M. NAIR prove. To this Ngrjuna gives a befitting reply. In IS NAGRJUNA AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC? 107 other he Is lound like by means raging pported there igrahaiartani need o detend (which may lack that sanct which e a funher thesis to this've these, no lack any leads to proposition. himself "If the would have been guilty of the faule. Ssence). If thesis. I ults you ascribe Nagarjuna proof of infinite re had any pramanas, ther the therefore. I have no then not fault. In there prama But other would annas me. I do mavasth). There be that no philosophic thesis rds. he would be no an were hy to be arguing has svabhava proof ( in seems f the inite re Matilal is ot the opinion that this va is last". Ngárjuna's this first a thesis. roft or of irselfnot or critique the that thesie stancient critique against "It is quite possible every crit should h as he s. foundatior middle. for. say acks essen The pramna valism remain so even if entified as the and this will therenere isis sence rists have or sabhva. no regress. Iik Western counter defended the as a . body who0 asserts it thesis. To Dutput in (not even Ngrjuna) ofknow oy charge of another means knowing which this thesis will get falsified only if anyone asserted it. We do not insisting infinite some that them as are require there world when all assertions made ar can nowing they any are a possible are empty, but tor funher imagine supportingtheories self-evident crucial assertion heories happened to be These to make the that all ace the rock there is nobody function of hasic. self- to assertions are suphas the bottom, wanted which the Probably Ngrjuna assert thathat everything supporting emnt the while provid anything that foundation of content. but this must rema them. arall is lacks svahhra or empty self-support. In erected unsaid belong to a privilege class the brief. is to it. set of the because assert it falsify the while the other pramänas thesis that all hhavas are svabhva porting items, Frn his basic items, viz. self-evident. self- question this yus, as prameyas., are further to question the very cor grjuna ichotomy well as not so. Nagrjuna precedes of behind it. the pramana. the Nyya method of knowing. Note that Nägrjuna did lying Thus, we have validity of principle arrived at the why is it that certain the like of his western counters parts, to noins question: theories, like the fundarmental not choose. many of have a privileged tatus. The theory of our endeavor to attain knowledge. no prumüna the fallibility like have foundationalists. the responsibilit not to an Irom illysIon, but rather choc grjuna, to according Descartes raised argument to only shake the very foundations upon which the superstructure of and the superstructures, but should distinguish the basio belief also tell us are distinct? why knowledge is erected. In simple language his argument can be put Nagarjuna clearly demands that they the reason may be spelled out. for such are the ones that reveal the rentiation Yet this way: If pramFas nature of tho another is that this of problem raised world. that bring us the knowledge of the world as it is, we should Nägaruna type toundationlism by their proposed by stretch out the reasoning further and ask ourselves, what bring contrad original thesis, that Nyäya everything is made known by In other words, we need to some pramna. Worldly are knowledge of these means? know what objects defined as objects of is the causal route through which these mcans are produced and knovanwledge (prameya) and tnere 1S a category distinction between n and At the same revealed to us? Naiyyikas often concede that at times pramnas prameya. time Nyya foundationalism also function as prameyas, thus opening the possibility of the that are not urges pramänas bsolutely independent, but are mere means of knowing becoming the object of knowing.