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THE NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY of INFERENCE By THE NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY OF INFERENCE by LAXMAN CHANNAPPA MULLATTI B.A., Karnatak University, Dharwar (India), 1954 M.A., Karnatak University, Dharwar (India), 1957 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of PHILOSOPHY We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1972 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. L. C. Mullatti Department of Philosophy. The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date April 4. 1972 i ABSTRACT This dissertation is an attempt to represent the Navya-nyaya (Nn) theory of inference in terms of a contemporary conceptual framework. There exist similar studies by able modern scholars, but these are either piecemeal, or, when comprehensive, rely mainly on traditional (western) logic. The present attempt is both relatively more comprehensive, and employs notions from contemporary logic. Since the Nn theory of inference is couched in terms of cognitions rather than sentences, an effort is made to clarify the notion of cog• nition. It is argued that a cognition is an abstract and ontologically independent entity much in the fashion of the Fregean proposition, and that primarily it, as distinct from its linguistic vehicle, is the bearer of truth-values. The semantic model set up by the Navya-naiyayikas (NNs) for a cognition is considered, and its inadequacy brought out with refer• ence not only to universal cognitions, but also to certain modes of expression generally accepted as synonymous. These modes of expression also serve, in part, to bring out the inadequacy of the linguistic criteria that the NNs implicitly use for individuating cognitions. A further defect of the Nn semantic model is that it requires that n-adic predicates be reducible to monadic ones, a requirement that can hardly be fulfilled. Partly in the course of their search for a principle of individuating cognitions, the NNs bring in three notions, namely, expect• ancy, competency, and proximity. Of these, expectancy is viewed as a ii syntactic property, and compared to a certain communication theoretic model for linguistic structure employing a finite state Markov process. Competency is sought to be understood with reference to Ryle's theory of category mistake, and, in the process, the difficulties of the thesis that unexampled (non-referring) terms lack competency are pointed out. Proximity is regarded primarily as an attempt at introducing some kind of word-order, especially into the shorter sentences of Sanskrit (which, strictly speaking, i.e., from a grammatical standpoint, have no rigid order). Next, the Nn definition of inference—that inference is the instrumental cause of the conclusion—is examined, and the usual way of understanding it in a psychological sense is shown to be unsatisfactory. Inference is viewed as a set of cognitions such that the conclusion is a logical consequence of the set of the remaining cognitions. A case is made for understanding the term 'cause' in the above definition in a logical sense to mean an inference-form. It is shown that, on such an understanding, inference for oneself and inference for others collapse into one, and that both have exactly the same number of cognitions, namely, four, as elements. The resulting discrepancy between the number of sentences and the number of cognitions in inference is accounted for by means of non-logical considerations. The nature of each of the four elements is explained with particular emphasis on the second element, pervasion. The representations by Staal and Berg of the Nn definition of pervasion are considered and rejected, and a much simpler representa• tion proposed. It is pointed out that the Nn distinction between positive iii and contrapositive pervasions involves a recognition, with certain m reservations, of the (complete) law of contraposition. The third element of inference, 'consideration', is shown to be superfluous, and Schayer's interpretation of it erroneous. It is argued that the ellipti• cal expressions used to express the third and the fourth elements are intelligible only in relation to the early stages of Nyaya when the concept of pervasion as a member of inference had not yet evolved, and that they cease to be intelligible in relation to the later stages when pervasion is included as an element. This fact is used to point out the untenability of the suggestion that the Nn syllogism is really the Aristotelian argument from example. The paradoxes of relativising pervasion to the inference contain• ing it are brought out, and the theory of confirmation implicit in the Nn account of pervasion is fully reconstructed with special reference to Hempel and Goodman. The Nn account of another (non-syllogistic) form of inference is considered, and Staal's representation of it shown to be wrong. Finally, it is observed that the NNs do not call in question the formal validity of an inference, and that, for them, a fallacy is necessarily 'material'. It is also maintained that the customary view that the Nn notion of accident is a means of converting an unsound in• ference into a sound one is mistaken, and that the true function of an accident is to show up the falsity of a pervasion. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS vii CHAPTER 0 INTRODUCTION 1 1 COGNITION AND SENTENCE (I) 26 II COGNITION AND SENTENCE (II) 55 III WHAT IS INFERENCE? 98 IV THE ELEMENTS OF INFERENCE 126 V A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY OF CONFIRMATION 172 VI FORMS AND FALLACIES OF INFERENCE 211 CHRONOLOGICAL CHART OF AUTHORS 233 BIBLIOGRAPHY 236 V LIST OF TABLES TABLE PaSe 1 Confirmatory Status of Observation Reports 195 vi ACKNOWLEDGMENT I sincerely acknowledge my indebtedness to the members of my thesis committee for the help they gave me in completing my thesis- project. Dr. Howard Jackson first provided me with the incentive for the project, and saw it through many ups and downs. I have greatly benefited all along by his comments. Dr. Richard Robinson patiently put up with my frequent, and not always enjoyable, discussions. I have taken many liberties with him, and he was gracious enough not to mind them. It was a comfort to me just to know that Dr. Donald Brown was always there ready to help. To him, I owe more than I can express: he sustained my strength at a most crucial time when it was about to fail me. These three gentlemen have been extremely helpful in non-academic matters as well, and I deeply appreciate their kindness. Dr. A. N. Aklujkar (of the Asian Studies Department) contributed in no small measure to the shaping of this thesis. He gave me liberally of his time and energy, so that I could see my problems in a clearer perspective. I have heavily relied on him, not only for interpreting the Sanskrit texts, but also for information concerning numerous matters of Sanskrit tradition. I have not been able to agree with him at times, and my disagreements are indicated at appropriate places. vii CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following conventions and devices are adopted in this thesis: A. Translation I try to translate all Sanskrit words and passages as literally as possible. But frequently, considerations of preserving the original sense and/or English usage make it necessary to supply words which are not literal translations of anything in the original. Words thus supplied are enclosed either in square brackets or in round ones. Those in square brackets are necessary for understanding the sense of the given passage and have no counter• parts in the original. Those in round brackets are explanatory in character, whether or not there is anything in the original corres• ponding to them; often, they also mitigate the damage done to English usage by a literal translation. I translate all Sanskrit passages except those the paraphrases or free renderings of which appear in the body of the thesis. In the latter cases, usually the Sanskrit passages alone are cited in footnotes. B. Italics As is customary, I set all Sanskrit expressions and passages (except proper names and their derivatives) in italics. I also use italics (1) for purposes of emphasis; and (2) for indicat• ing in certain cases (e.g., qualifier, qualificand, pervader, viii pervadend, probans, probandum, etc.) that I am talking, not of the italicised expression, but of the entity to which it refers. C. Quotes Quotes are used (1) to form names of expressions (i.e., to mention them) whether in English or in Sanskrit; (2) to indicate that a certain sentence or a passage (but not a word or a phrase) enclosed in quotes is a translation of a Sanskrit sentence or a passage; (3) to indicate that the enclosed expression is used in a rather unusual way; and (4) to show that a certain sentence or passage in English is taken from a foreign source. Generally, double quotes are used for sentences and passages, while single quotes are used for other expressions (e.g., words). D. Vertical strokes When a sentence in Sanskrit or English is bounded by vertical strokes, it means that I am talking about the cognition expressed by that sentence, and not about that sentence itself. When the expression 'conclusion' (or 'inferential con• clusion') is bounded by vertical strokes (i.e., '|conclusion|'), it serves as a translation of 'anumiti'.
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