CHAPTER III

ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN DIGNAGA'S SCHOOL

1. Roots of Dignaga's school in Yogacara-Vijnanavada Dignaga was a Buddhist philosopher whose main period of literary activity was in the first half of the sixth century. Although the early part of his career seems to have been devoted to produce the exegetical tracts on various aspects of Mahayana Buddhist doctrines and investigating various issues in epistemology and polemical critiques of rival philosophical systems.

Dignaga is supposed to have lived around the years 480-540 A.D.' He was bom in a Brahmana family in south India near KaiicT (in the present Madras state) and was ordained by a teacher of the VatsTputriya school. Being dissatisfied with the doctrine of that school, he left his teacher and traveled to the North. He became a pupil of Vasubandhu, and under the influence of that great scholar, he obtained mastery of the Vijiianavada theory and of logic (Nydya), the field in which he excelled. As Hattori said that what we can say with certainty is that Dignaga was well conversant with Vasubandhu's works. The Abhidharmakosa, of which he made an abridgment, is referred to in the Pramanasamuccaya. He wrote a commentary on the Vadavidhana of Vasubandhu. In composing the Nyayamukha, he seems to have followed the pattern of Vasubandhu's work on logic. In many others of his works we can point out the influence of Vasubandhu's Sautrantic and Yogacaric thoughts.^ Dignaga's great contribution to Indian logic is his invention of the Hetucakra, that is, the table which shows nine possible relations between the Reason (hetu) and the Sddhyadharma or predicate of the thesis (paksa, sddhya) to be proved. This invention makes clear in which cases a certain Reason is valid

' But Hattori had fixed Dignaga's date at 470-530 A.D. in the article ''The Dates of Dignaga and His Milieu", p. 79-96. M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 3.

153 and in which cases it is invalid. It was already known to Vasubandhu and even to Asanga that, in inference, a Reason should satisfy three necessary conditions: it must be a property of the Dharmin or subject of the Thesis (pak^adharmatva); it must exist in all or some homogeneous instances (sapakse sattvam); it must never exist in any heterogeneous instance (vipakse' sattvam eva)? Perhaps Dignaga succeeded in making the table while he was examining individual cases of valid and invalid reasons as shown in Vasubandhu's logical treatises/ Dignaga went only one step further than Vasubandhu. Preparatory works had already been done by the latter.

Thus with Dignaga the philosophical research of the Yogacara School centers itself specially in logic and theory of knowledge.

As it is mentioned in the previous chapter that consciousness aspects with the two divisions which refer to the seeing part (darsana-bhdga) and the form division (nimitta-bhdga); with there aspects consciousness represents itself in the form of subject (grdhaka) and object (grdhya). Thus Asanga and Vasubandhu advocated that consciousness manifests itself into subjects as well as into objects. It arises out of its own seed and then it manifests itself as an external sphere of objects. In the same line of thought, it seems, Dignaga discussion about the consciousness in his fielded.

Dignaga based the entire edifice of his epistemology on distinction between the realms of things-in-themselves and commonsense-experience, which they named respectively as svalaksana and sdmdnya-laksana. The former is the sphere of first ultimate (paramdtha-sat), whereas the latter is the sphere of empirical reality (samvrti-sat). The most important point about the distinction between svalaksana and sdmdnya-laksana is that they are contrasted respectively as the non-constructed (nirvikalpa), and the constructed (kalpita), the non-imagined (andropita) and the imagined

' Tucci., Pre-Dignaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. 13. " See Tucci., Buddhist Logic before Dignaga, p. 451-488.

154 (dropita). This shows that the distinction between sdmdnya-laksana and svalak^ana, and the entire philosophy behind it, were already implied and meant by Asanga and Vasubandhu when they distinguished between parikalpita and parim?panna, or parikalpita-dtma and anabhildya-dtmd. In other words, the central insight of the school of Dignaga was inspired by the school of Asanga and Vasubandhu: the central theme of the former school has kept clear continuity with that of the latter school. This implies a continuity of essential details of the same theme too. Now, Dignaga and his followers thought that a realistic pluralism was essential to their central theme namely, the distinction between svalak?ana and sdmdnya-laksana.

Kochumuttam has also pointed that the doctrine presented in the Viinsatika as a seminal influence on the fully developed theories of the pramdfia school of Dignaga. This school holds that the moment of perception (pratyaksa) is essentially pure and free from imagination (kalpandpodha), and A.K. Chatterjee in his work, "'The Yogdcdra Idealism " says, "Their essential teaching was that of the Yogacara as is evident from Dignaga's Alambanapariksa"^, Carmen Dragonetti also said in his work, ''Being as Consciousness''': "The Alambanapanksd is one of the most important texts not only of Dignaga but of the Yogacara School of Buddhism in general. This work together with Vasubandhu's Vimsatika and Trimsika are fundamental texts of the Yogacara School; in them we find expounded the principal philosophical tenets of the school, centered around the thesis of the sole existence of consciousness."^ However, I also think that some of the texts like Pramdnasamuccaya that they take the Yogacaca doctrine as their theoretical basis.

While thinking that svasamvedana or svasamvitti is not differentiated as act and result, Dignaga and Dharmaklrti both are presupposing the doctrine of

' Chatterjee, Ashok Kumar., The Yogacara Idealism, p. 41. * Fenando Tola Carmen Dragonetti., Being as Consciousness (Yogacara Philosophy of Buddhism), p. 11.

155 Vijnaptimatratd of the Yogdcdras. According to this theory the expressions dtman, dharma, etc. which stand for subject and object, are really metaphors applied to the transformation of the consciousness {yijhdnaparindma). In reality there is neither subject nor object -they are simply constructions of imagination. When one attains the stage of Ultimate Reality one will avoid this imaginary distinction and will realize the state of pure consciousness iyijnaptimdtra) which is free from all sorts of dichotomies. Keeping such theory of pure consciousness in mind the Buddhist Logicians regard that for empirical purposes the undifferentiated fact of svasamvedana is presented in the form of the difference between pramdna and prameya.

Thus we see that in the epistemological context the Buddhists are attempting to provide a rational frame for human practice so that it becomes meaningful both in everyday life and in the pursuit of the ultimate goal indicated by Lord Buddha.

2. On DignSga's Epistemology

The basic set of intuitions inherited by Dignaga is perhaps most clear in Dignaga's Alambanapariksd (Examination of Intentional Objects). In this short text, Dignaga argues that cognition can be explained satisfactorily if we posit mental phenomena as the "objects" intended thereby—and, indeed, that we cannot coherently posit any nonmental, external objects as what is directly intended by cognition. The latter is true, for Dignaga, insofar as any account of external objects necessarily presupposes some version of minimal part atomism, which Dignaga argues cannot be adduced coherently to explain our cognition of macro-objects. Dignaga's argument here clearly owes something to Vasubandhu's later Yogacara work, the Vimsatika.^ As with the latter work, there is considerable scholarly disagreement over whether Dignaga is best understood as arguing here for an idealist metaphysics or simply for

' Kapstein., On Vasubandhu's argument against atomism in the Vimsatika, p. 181-204.

156 something like a representationalist epistemology involving sense-data (which allows the possibility of bracketing the question of what might finally exist in the world). Nevertheless, what is most relevant here is a clear allusion by Dignaga to o the passage from Vasubandhu (considered above) on the "two truths." Arguing that there is an unbridgeable gap between atoms as the putative cause of cognition and medium-sized dry goods as the content thereof, Dignaga says: "Things like jars are conventionally existent, because if the atoms are removed, the cognition that appears with respect to them is destroyed. In the case of what is substantially existent, such as color, even when one has taken away what is connected with it, there is no removal of the cognition of the color itself."' Like Vasubandhu, Dignaga thus argues that what qualifies medium-sized dry goods (of which jars are a standard Indian example) as merely "conventionally existent" {samvrti-sat) is the fact of their being reducible, while the constituent aspects to which they can be reduced (such as "color") in turn exist "substantially" {dravyatah). In the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga alludes to the same discussion, this time explicitly putting the issue in terms of what is "ultimately existent" [paramdrthasat). Thus, arguing that a cognition cannot properly be named after the object that produces it, Dignaga says: "that cognifion which possesses the appearance of a given gross form is not produced from that external object; because in the case of a gross form's being cognized the five kinds of sense-cognition take for their object the aggregate of atoms, which, being unreal, has no faculty of presenting its form in a cognition. On the other hand, if a cognition be produced from an object, that object must be a real entity, and what is real is unnamable in the ultimate sense because it is an invisible atom. Hence the cognition produced from that object cannot be named after the object."

' AKB. VI.4, p. 333-334: t 3# Tf^ ffc^Rflry' tTOTTsfeoT W. ' M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 34.

157 If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other senses would be admitted as objects of cognition. This is because they also exist, in the ultimate sense, in different forms from those appearing in a cognition, and yet they become the cause of such cognitions as the representation of something blue, etc., or of a double moon, etc. so the cognition cannot be designated without reference to the nature of object.

A cognition is designated according to the name of its object as, for instance, 'a cognition of color' (rupa-Jndna), 'a cognition of taste' (rasa- jhdna), etc., and can never be designated without reference to the nature of its object.

However, it is designated according to universal feature of this object. For instance, the word 'color' {mpa) in 'a cognition of color' {mpa-jfidna) stands not for a particular color but for the universal, color-ness {rupatva). Accordingly, the object of cognition is inexpressible in the ultimate sense.'^

The objects of the five kinds of sense-cognition are denoted by the word expressing their universal feature {sdmdnya-rupa), but not their particular feature (sva-rupd). The objects are called 'color' etc., in conformity with their universal feature. However, their particularity is never expressed in words. Therefore, the objects of five kinds of sense-cognition are essentially in expressible.'^

'" M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 35.

TITRRRS^ "^^mf^r^^ oyijR^ild TRW U>x|HI i^^TRRT H^ T ^^ oHq^^ ffT//

158 The specifically ontological point that Dignaga thus retains the basically Abhidharmika notion of the "two truths" is clearly evident here. Let us, however, leave that point for the moment. Dignaga's text here affords an opportunity for elaborating the basically epistemological way in which Dignaga advances these ontological commitments. With regard to the text just adduced, one might ask: why must it be the case that a "real" entity is ultimately "unnamable"? And how does this relate to the question of causal efficacy, such that it is precisely a cognition's being produced from an object that entails its being unnamable? The whole trajectory of thought initiated by Dignaga can be reconstructed by answering these questions. The approach is to argue that only those cognitions that can be known to have been caused by their objects (that are, as it were, constrained by something actually existent) can be judged inerrant—and, insofar as only "ultimately existent" (paramdrthasat) things are causally efficacious, for a cognition thus to have been caused just is for it to stand in demonstrable relation to what is ultimately the case iparamdrthasatya). It then stands to reason that these truly existent causes of cognition are not themselves the referents of language (hence, "unnamable"); words, in order to be applicable in innumerable cases, necessarily designate relatively invariant types of things. It is constitutive of discursive thought not to remain constrained by specifiable causes.

Accordingly, Dignaga's specifically epistemological point is that there is a particular kind of cognition (yiz., pratyaksa that is constitutively nonlinguistic and that therefore yields cognitions that are formed only by their causal interactions with unique particulars, and not by any unconstrained discursive activity. Dignaga begins his Pramdnasamuccaya by asserting:

159 Perception and inference are reliable warrants. There are only two, since there are only two kinds of warrantable objects; there is nothing warrantable other than svalaksana and abstractions. It is perception that has svalaksana as its objects, and inference that has abstractions as its objects.

The exposition of the Buddhist counterpart of the theory of the universal, viz, requires of a brief statement of the basic structure of the epistemology of Dignaga. Apoha '^ can be understood and appreciated only against the background of Dignaga's system. As already stated, the fundamental principal of his system is the sharp differentiation between two kinds of knowable object (prameya), and the consequent differentiation of the two kinds of means of knowledge (pramdna) which comprehend these two kinds of objects. Objects, according to him, are of two kinds: (i) the unique particulars (svalaksana) which are external reals, and (ii) the universals, the generalized objects (sdmdnya-laksana) which are merely mental entities. Likewise, the means of knowledge are also of two kinds: (i) perception (pratyaksa) which means pure sensation and grasps only the particular (svalaksana), and never the generalized form: and (ii) inference (anumdna) which grasps only the generalized form (sdmdnya-laksana), and never the particular. It has already been pointed out that the sphere of the two kinds of pramdna is sharply demarcated, i.e., each of the two kinds oipramdna operates only in its ov/n sphere. Pratyaksa comprehends only the particular, and anumdna only the generalizes form, and not vice versa. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika

'^ PS. V. 2: Ur^T^nr^lirt xT Xrm It fs[dlH"JIV ^l^ ddl^l^ll^f ^ ^TUDIRTT «r^ //^// see also Tripatthi, C.L., "The Problem of Svalakjana in Sautrantika Epistemologv", Journal of Oriental Institute, No. 20, 1970-71. " PS., chapter 5: ^ ^RMRTT 71^ ST^HHId 7T«IT % TTTT/ <^H*rci|f^c(H T5I?hr 3R)TOtt^ 'mk// «4H^<'«Pl^fe)<^ "H^^tisf 3Tf?t?raT/ TfTJ31^r^T^^^r5cr?[Tf^?rfoggf^#://; see also Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts; P. Hayes Richard., Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, p. 185, 252-300; Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, p. 287; Shastri, D.N., The philosophy of Nyaya-Vaisesika and its Conflict with Buddhist Dignaga School, p. 306, 351-355; and Sharma, D., Buddhist Theory of Meaning (Apoha) and Negative Statements, Philosophy East and West, Vol. XVII. Matilal, B.K., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology - Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language, p. 143, "Apoha and §iiTisapavrk?a".

160 schools, the same object may be comprehended by pratyaksa, anumana or any oih&x pramaiia. The 'particular' of Dignaga is the unique particular, and not the so-called particular object of our experience like a particular jar or a particular piece of cloth. The unique particular (svalak^ana) of his system is a transcendental reality which is not only shorn of all qualities, but is also shorn of duration in terms of time and of extension of terms of space. It is differentiated and distinguished from anything else in the world (sarvato-vydvrtta). Having no duration, it is vertically cut off from all other reality in terms of time, and having no extension, it is horizontally cut off from all other reality in terms of space. It is, therefore, discrete, disconnected, and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the unique particular, svalaksana means 'of its own kind' or 'unique' which has no 'similar' of it in the whole universe. It exists only for one moment, because no sooner is it bom than it is destroyed and replaced by another unique particular which, although similar to it, is quite different from it. Lasting only for a 'moment', it is called momentary (ksanika). But as a matter of fact, there being no separate reality called time, which is the temporal receptacle of objects as understood in the realistic systems, the unique particular itself is called the moment (ksana). It is not only shorn of duration, but also of extension; and therefore, the best English term for the Buddhist particular would be 'point-instant', a terni used by Stcherbatsky. Svalaksana, k^ana or 'point-instant' '^ alone is real, because it alone is efficient, i.e., capable of producing purposive action {arthakriyd-ksana). Only that fire which exists externally can bum, and not the 'image of fire' in our thoughts.

'"ps. 3T^ ^rmof RRyAc)/ -^^j lin^ vM/ ^fimMdj^iuii'cif f^^^R^r^/ y^l-uHi ^^nf^/

" See also Stcherbatsky. Th., Buddhisi Logic, p. 79-118.

161 Unique particulars, i.e., the external reals are grasped by sensation, the pure passive sense-reflex, in which there is not the slightest admixture of thought or intellection. A unique particular is never grasped by thought which comprehends only a generalized form. We can ne\^er be conscious of a pure sensation, because consciousness means activity of thought which grasp only a generalized forms. Thus, although we have a sensation in terms of our thought. There is only a sort of awareness of something. It is, therefore, held that pure sensation is beyond the purview of thought. Inasmuch as it is without any conceptual constructuction {kalpand) or without any mode or determination (vikalpa), it is called nirvikalpaka pratyaksa (indermination perception). According to the Buddhist, a pure sensation is immediately and necessarily followed by a thought-process'^ which gives an image, a mode, a predication or determination to the sensation, and is therefore called a determinate part company. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that the generalized form and other attributed ascribed to the object belong to thought, and not to the external particular. They are only ideal, and have no correspondence in the external world of reality. Hence a determinate perception is not a pure perception.'^

There is, according to the Buddhist, a sharp line of demarcation between sensation and determinate perception as there is between the objects comprehended by them. Those objects are: (i) the unique particular or the point-instant which is external objective reality, and (ii) the image, the generalized form and other attributes which are only modes of thought and have no external existence. We know in the det(;rminate perception ideal images as if they were present in the external world. Determinate perception, which falsely comprehends unreal images as real external objects, is therefore no real perception; it is only a pseudo-perception. According to the Buddhist,

'* NBT., p. 4: UrlJiyW WIS^Ir*lfttt|-o:iMTr t^^c^HI^'Mt^ // Shastri, D.N., The philosophy of Nya^'a-Vaise^ika and its Conflict with Buddhist Dignaga School, p. 345.

162 pramdna (a means of knowledge) is defined as 'comprehending an object not already comprehended'. "^ Determinate perception, therefore, which is supposed by the realist systems to comprehend what has already been comprehended by sensation, cannot be held to be a genuine pramdna- The Buddhist asks: "when the nature of an object which is only one, and not manifold, has already been perceived (by sensation), what else remains unperceived that is supposed to be comprehended by other means of knowledge (i.e. by determinate perception).'^

Now, a question may arise: if a cow comprehended in a determinate perception is only a thought-image and no objective reality, how is it to be differentiated from a cow of memory which is also a thought-image? The two are obviously different; the former is efficient as it yields milks, but the latter does not, and is therefore unreal. The Buddhist answer is this: the thought- image, in the case of a determinate perception, follows immediately in the wake of a sensation; in fact, determinate perception is aroused by sensation, and as a consequence thereof, the two, the external real particular and the thought-image, are falsely identified in the conceptual or perceptual judgment (adhyavasdya), 'this is a cow'. Here, the word this refers to the transcendental particular, the external real, and the word cow to the thought- image. The two are absolutely different, and there is not the slightest similarity or affinity between them, the one being an efficient real particular and the other only an ideal entity. Yet the two extremely dissimilar things are identified, because of the non-comprehension of difference {bheddgraha) between them. The thought-image is projected externally l3y being falsely

" PS. THca, p. 11: 31^TO^8f•-"f^^* ¥TT[DR ff^ ^tTM-HIHI-^-eR^nW// " it is a Buddhist verse quoted in NM. Part I, p. 227

It is a Buddhist verse quoted in NM. Part I. p. 227 Determinate perception, according tC' Dignaga, may be described as a perceptual judgment or what is the same, as a conceptual judgment, see also, Stcherbatsky, Th., Buddhist Logic, Part 111, p. 204-229.

163 identified with the external particular. There is, thus, in the perceptual judgment of the determinate perception (adhyavasdya), an element of reality.

Of the two elements of the judgment 'this is a cow', the cow represents a mere mental image, and this refers to the unique particular, the external real. It has, however, been maintained that the determinate perception or perceptual judgment does not really grasp the external particular, and that the unique particular cannot be expressed by any word.^' The term 'this' therefore in the perceptual judgment cannot refer to the real external particular which, by its very nature, cannot be reflected in a judgment, but can refer only to the shadow of the real particula- {svalak^ana). Thus, the svalaksana referred to in the perceptual judgment is unreal. The question, therefore, arises: how can then the worldly course and behavior of human beings, which is based on determinate perception, be possible, and how does the same lead to the real unique particular which alone is capable of purpose action? How do human beings reach, on the basis of the thought-image of water or of a cow, the real water which can quench thirst or a real cow which can yield milk? The Buddhist answer is that the 'this' element in the perceptual judgment indirectly leads to the real object which was reflected in the immediately preceding sensation. "Perceptual judgments of the people," says Vacaspatimisra while explaining the Buddhist position, "actuate the seekers of particular objects, and indirectly leading to those requisite or efficient {samartha) objects do not deceive them"." The Buddhist, as quoted by Jayanta, explains it by an apt illustration. 'A man, who has first cognized in sensation the original object (the real unique particular, and then gets a

^' NBT. p. 11: Hli^Hli4-"?fFnf-#f^nr/ The very minute and subtle difference between the real svalaksana and its unreal shadow has not usually been noticed. It is only Vacaspatimi§ra who refers to it. NVT., p. 684. " NVT. p. 685: HTT-H^-STi^ oqc(^ ^fW?hl1% #gT-t^cf,VMl:, L|KUji[u| TTW^ W^ ^fj *H, the Vizianagram edition reads 'pravartante'. The Calcutta edition, which we have followed, suggests 'pravartayanti\ According to Stcherbatsky, it should read 'pravartayantah,' Buddhist logic, Vol. 1, p. 426.

164 perceptual judgment of its generalized image), moves towards it and actually grasps it. For instance, a man, who sees the luster of a diamond, kept in a closed chamber, issuing out of a key-hole, and proceeds towards the luster thinking it to be a diamond, reaches the real diamond. (Similarly, a person, who grasps in a determinate perception only an unreal image of a real object, say, of water, ultimately grasps the real object, water). But where the object does not exist even originally (i.e., in the prior sensation), a person proceeding towards it (as in the case of an illusion) is deceived like a person who proceeds towards the luster of a candle, thinking it to be a diamond. Thus, (where the original object has been grasped in sensation), there arises, with reference to perceptual judgment (vikalpa) which is devoid of any contact with external reality, an erroneous idea (abhimdna) of a common man, "I cognized the real object, proceeded to it, and actually grasped it."'^'* It has been said: "A man proceeds by identifying what is given by the sense (drsya, real) with the thought-image (vikalpa), and the actually grasps the real object.""

Now, it is clear how the thought-image of determinate perception and that of memory are different from each other, although both of them belong to the domain of thought. The former, coming immediately in the wake of sensation, is indirectly in touch with external reality and gets, on that account, vividness (sphutdbhatva) which the memory-image lacks. Vividness is held to be a characteristic of sensation, which is the direct sense-reflex of an external reality. It may, however, be asked as to how a sensation of which we are not even conscious can be held to be vivid. It is no doubt true that in terms of our thought, we are never conscious of pure sensation. Nevertheless, as pointed

^^ NM. Part 1, 281: 3W H" •tH4"r(H*iMH«r yc(rii

" NM. Part 1, p. 282.

165 out by Santarak§ita. "When the attention of a person is engaged elsewhere, there is awareness of the bare presence of something, undifferentiated by any of its adjuncts."^^ Dignaga has quoted a passage from the Abhidharma-sutra: "A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is."^^ As soon as sensation of an object takes place, memory-associations are aroused, and forthwith a thought-image is produced. But a pure sensation precedes our though-process, and we have an awareness of it. A pure sensation is the direct sense-reflex of reality, and it has the nature of being vivid (sphutdbha). The sensation imparts vividness and a sense of reality to the determinate perception which follows in its wake.

The Buddhist insists that the sensation and determination knowledge are wholly dissimilar {atyanta-vilaksana). The two are also quite heterogeneous, one being objectively real, and the other, ideal and objectively unreal. There can, therefore, be no question of any similarity between them. When, however, the Buddhist speaks ofsdrupya (similarity) between the two, that similarity is only a sort of co-ordination between them. The unique particular being the cause of the thought-image, the causal relation between them is expressed by the term sdrupya, but, as already pointed out, this is a similarity between two things which are absolutely dissimilar. According to the Buddhist theory of causation {pratitya-samutpada), there need not be any similarity between the cause and the effect. The unique particular and the thought-image being essentially dissimilar, similarity between them is illusory and is perceived by overlooking the difference between the two.

The Buddhist insists that the relation between the external reality and the thought-image is a case of the 'non-comprehension of difference'

^* TSP. p. 241: Sr^T^-TRT-f^TTPr ^ TT^tqc^rWW, -^Tgfqifl^-f^^^^ •HrT ^ ^cT^/ " psv. 1.4: 3Tf^rti#s'gtFJr-xr^f5,riHmi^^ ^ Q^JIIHIQ ^ ^ %w; ^, arefs^hTfTrfr ^ f «mT?T# '?W/; Stcherbatsky.Th., Buddhist logic, Vol. 1, p. 153; M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception , p. 88- 89.

166 (bheddgraha), and not that of the imposition of identity between the two {abheda-graha). Vacaspatimisra explains the Buddhist position thus: "externality of the thought-image consists in the non-comprehension of the difference of the external (from the internal), and not in the comprehension of the identity of the external (with the internal), because identity of the thought- image (which appears as internal) is not possible with the unique particular." If identity between the two be accepted, it will mean comprehension of the unique particular in a perceptual judgment which is impossible; hence the Buddhist insists on holding it to be a case of 'non-comprehension of difference between' (bheddgraha), and not a case of the comprehension of identity between the two (abheda-graha). If identity between the two be accepted it would amount to comprehension of the unique particular in a perceptual judgement, for the statement made on the basis of the image in cognition is surely a step way from the object but towards conceptual construction. In such a situation would be unwelcome to the Buddhist theory ofpramdnavyavasthd. The Buddhist, therefore, rightly underlines Sdrupya as non-comprehension of difference between the object and its image in cognition and not as imposition of an identity between the two. With this general consideration about the epistemology of Dignaga's School let us see what is had talked about consciousness.

3. Dignaga's School on Consciousness.

Like Yogacara, Dignaga also advocated the principle of consciousness- only (vijnaptimdtm). Dignaga advances a theory of two aspects {dvayarupd) of consciousness which is also accepted by Yogacara^^. According to this doctrine the consciousness or cognition itself appears as subject {svdbhdsa.

^' NVT. p. 682: ^I^T-^^^nTf^ ^JUFT ^THr^ ? ^ ^TW^cT-TI?": l^^iW-^itxR ^ tT^-

Shastri, D.N., The philosophy ofNyaya- Vaise^ika and its Conflict with Buddhist Dignaga School, p. 351 '" MSA. XI.32: I^imtW -^ »Jl!^yi6*WIW: //; MVKB. 1.2: cr?%<4ft*

167 grdhakdkdra, grdhakam) and as an object {visaydbhdsa, grdhydkdra, grdhyarn)- This is called the dual-form of consciousness. The cognizing of itself as possessing these two appearances or the self-cognition {svasamvitti) is the result of the cognitive act.^'

In the Ch 'eng wei shih lun we also see that, like Dignaga's branch of the Vijnanavada, he accepted and placed great importance on the existence of a self-cognition (svasamvitti; svasamvedana) not distinct from the mind which divides itself into subjective and objective divisions (bhdga). These latter two 'parts' consist respectively in the 'image' or 'aspect of the object' {vi§aydkdra; arthdkdra) and the 'aspect of the awareness itself (^va^m), or in other equivalent terms the objective aspect {grdhydkdra) and the subjective aspect {grdhakdkdra).

The above passage shows that, in considering svasamvitti as pramdnaphala,^^ Dignaga takes the Yogacaca doctrine for his theoretical basis. And Hattori also agrees with this point, he said that svasamvitti is phala from the Yogacara viewpoint. The Yogacacas do not admit the existence of the external object. They note that the object of the cognition in a dream has no corresponding reality, that one and the same object is variously cognized by different persons, etc., and they assert that the object is essentially immanent in the cognition. Here Dignaga observes that when a man is aware that something blue appears in his cognition, this thing of blue in the

" PSV. I.9a: &<

168 cognition is conceived as the object. As there is no object, for the Yogacaras, apart from this appearance of something blue in the cognition, it is estabUshed that the awareness of the cognition of something blue, i.e., svasamvitti, is the result of the act of cognizing the object.^'*

Dignaga explains in his Alambanapariksd^' that: 'The potentialities (sakti) of riipa which reside in the consciousness (the eighth consciousness) are given the name of "the five indriyas". These potentialities and the ''riipa object" {visayarupa) have, since before the beginning of time, been reciprocal causes, producing each other.

That force is not contradictory to the consciousness.

That force be in consciousness, or in its self which is of indescribable nature; there is no difference in production of the result.

Thus the objective aspect (visayarupa) of consciousness and the force (sakti) called sense-organ go mutually conditioned from immemorial time.

Depending upon the force (sakti) called eye, and the interior form (antah riipa) arises the consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated from the perceivable object. These two acts mutually conditioned without beginning in time (anddikdla). Sometime, when the force called vdsand gets matured, consciousness is transformed into a form of object (visaydkdratd) and sometime the force arises from the consciousness endowed with the form of object. The consciousness and force, both may be said to be either different from or identical with one another as one may like. Thus, the interior object which is not different from consciousness is endowed Avith two factors, image and cause and therefore it

" M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 104. " See also, P. Hayes, Richard., Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, p. 173.

169 is logically concluded that consciousness alone is transformed into external object {vi?aya).

According to Dignaga, it is consciousness itself which appears in the form of an external object and it is this external object which serves as the object-condition (dlambana-pratyaya).

It is the object (artha) which exists internally in knowledge itself as a knowable aspect and which appears to us as if it exists externally.

Though the external things are denied, what exists internally in knowledge itself (i.e., its linowable aspect) and appears to us thought it is existent externally, ser\'es as a condition of the actual object {dlambanapratyaya) to consciousness.

Because consciousness is the essence of the external object and that object essence of which is consciousness acts as the condition to consciousness.

The internal consciousness appears as manifold external object {artha) and also arises from that objective aspect of its own. Thus the internal consciousness is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and causes) which circumstance is absent in all the previous propositions and therefore what exists internally in the consciousness (i.e. the objective aspect) is the object- condition {dlambanapratyaya) to the consciousness.

If only the objective appearance of consciousness is experienced, it will be a part of the consciousness and appearing simultaneously with it. How can

KSYYL [mm^mk], T. 31, NO. 1624, p. 888c29-889al: m±^mt ^EISSSS, I^IPi^fe, ^5^5

170 a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness itself. From the time immemorial this objective aspect (visayarupa) and the force which transforms consciousness into the subject-object relationship, that is, the sense organ, continue to be mutually conditioned. Therefore, according to Dignaga, this subject-object discrimination (vikalpa) carries more reality than the material external object, which has no reality whatsoever. Thus, Dignaga is supposed to have completely discarded the reality of the external world and taken the side of Idealism. As Dharmakirti follows Dignaga he is bound to follow the same view.

Dignaga denies the paramdnus as the object of knowledge, because the form of paramdnus is not produced from vijndna. Dignaga tries to examine the object of knowledge from the epistemological point of view. Dignaga explains dlambana-pratyaya one of the causes of perception. According to him both form and substance are required for knowledge. Paramdnu are substance (dravya).

Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness (vijnapti) of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense-organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms.

According to Dignaga, consciousness grasps only the form of its own; because it arises in that form the atoms are causes of consciousness just like the sense-organs. Therefore they cannot become its actual object (dlambana).

" ALAM. 6: ^tini^^^U f wf|^^gr»ira^l #5«if f^^TFRc\qT^raKl7?l7JH^ xTII

KSYYL mmf^Utm, T. 31, NO. 1624, p. 888c29-889a 1: ^MU^^ MmmB-^ rFMffiS^ Stl±

171 Though aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness, they 38 cannot become its actual object; Dignaga in his Alambanapanksd tries to argue against the parmdnus as dlambana of knowledge. Dignaga as well as Vasubandhu denied the existence of paramdnus and its aggregates as the condition of object of knowledge only. They did not consider the paramdnus or samghdta from metaphysical point of view.

Dignaga while arguing for dlambana of knowledge, proclaimed the characteristics of object namely, it must be the substance as well as form of vijfidna only. Every knowledge of object has to satisfy these conditions. For example knowledge of pot is about the object, i.e. pot, and it is characterized by form of pot, produced from v//nana-consciousness. Dignaga denied the paramdnus as object of knowledge. Paramdnus are dravya, but they do not have form of vijfidna as sense organs have no form of vijfidna. They are matter.

According to philosophers like Vaisesikas, aggregate has form of knowledge, yet it cannot be the cause of knowledge, being unreal. The form of aggregate is not produced from paramdnus. Accordingly, samghdta cannot the object of knowledge, because its form of knowledge is not produced from fheparamdnu. It is unreal like the knowledge of form of two means of knowledge.

What object produces in the consciousness is endowed with the image of the object. It is said that it is the actual object (dlambana) of the consciousness; because that alone is spoken in the sdstra as the productive cause of consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so (i.e. do not give rise to consciousness).

'* ALAM. v.l: "qinftl^t^lf^^TiMw^: (=3M^:) ^JHW ^1

^m ^ w(^ ^^cvijAci fttrf^i dcii*HHKumi wn^ T TH^:

172 "Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon.

The double moon is perceived by a man on account of defects of his sense-organs. But this perception is not produced by the double moon, as there exists no object like the double moon. Similarly the aggregates of atoms do not exist in substance and cannot act as causes of consciousness. Hence they are not its actual objects.

Thus both the external things are unfit to be the real objects of consciousness. The external things, atoms and their aggregates cannot serve as the actual objects of consciousness, as both of them are defective in one or other respect.^^

Knowledge determines the characteristics of objects. Dignaga has mainly dealt with the object of knowledge. He determined the necessary conditions for the object of knowledge. Accordingly in the Pramdnasamuccaya, Dignaga again focused on the dlambanapratyaya for the valid knowledge, i.e. prameya.'^^ He maintained that prameya to be apprehended by perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumdnd). By perception, svalaksana is apprehended and by Inference, sdmdnyalaksana is apprehended.

Dignaga holds a different position from Vasubandhu. He tries to reconcile Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness only with the Realist's theory of realism. Dignaga accepted the reality of paramdnus, since there are expressions about the aggregates. However, he denies that both of them cannot be perceived. What is the dlambana oiparamdnusl Dignaga said it is twofold svalaksana and sdmdnyalaksana. He accepted prameya-dlambana in two level, prameya i.e. svalaksana is from realistic point of view and

^' ALAM. V.2:

173 sdmdnyalaksana is accepted from ego-centric point of view. Svalaksana means thing in its own. Thing 'as it is' i.e tathatd. It is free from all external characteristics. It is knowledge which is free from anthropocentric point of view, it is without constructions.

Thus, igrdhya) the object of knowledge is cognized by five vijhdnas. However, pammdnus the pEirt of knowable, cannot be object of knowledge, it is incapable to produce knowledge because indriya is not the object of knowledge.

In Alambanapariksd, Dignaga continues to examine the theories concerning the object of cognition {dlambanaY^, and proves that nothing existing in the external world, whether it be a single atom {anu) or the aggregate (samcita) of atoms or the gathering (samghdta) of atoms, can satisfy the necessary conditions that the object of cognition must fulfill.'*^ In conclusion, he supports the Yogacaca doctrine that the object of cognition is nothing other than the appearance of an object in the cognition itself.'*^

\n Alambanapariksd, k.1-5, as well as in Viqis. II and Vimsv., and Triirisb., k.Iad, realists are divided into three groups to their theories concerning the object of cognition (alambana). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is a dravya (substance), viz., an individual atom (paramdnu) or an avayavin (a substance possessing parts), the second that it is the aggregate {samcita) of atoms, and the third that it is the gathering (samghdta) of atoms. It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is report Kuei-chi to be the Vaibhajika. M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 118: in Alambanapariksd, Dignaga mentions two necessary conditions which the object of cognition (dlamband) must fulfill: first, the object must be the cause (kdrana) of a cognition, and, second, it must possess the same form (dkdra) as that appearing in the cognition. That is to say, a cognition must on the one hand be produced by the object (tad-utpatti), and on the other hand have coordination of form with the object (tat-sdrUpya). To satisfy the first condition, the object must have a gross form (sthUldkara), because a subtle, invisible form is never represented in a cognition. Taking these two conditions into account, Dignaga examines the views of the realists (1) the object of cognition is a single atom (pramdnu), (2) that it is the aggregate (samcita) of atoms, and (3) that it is the gathering (samghdta) of atoms. According to Sautrantika, any object which is constituted by many elements is considered as samvrttisat (or prajnaptisat), because it is no longer cognized when it is destroyed or analyzed by intellect into its elements. That which is neither destroyed nor analyzed into elements is admitted as paramdrthasat (or dravyasat, ultimate reality). Dignaga adopts these Sautrantika concepts of samvrttisat and paramdrthasat in examining the views of the realists. A single atom may be the cause of a cognition because it is paramdrthasat, but it has no gross form which corresponds to that appearing in the cognition. The aggregate of atoms or the gathering of atoms may have a gross form, but it cannot be the cause of a cognition because it is samvrttisat. "' ALAM. V. 6: ^et-rlfl'il^M -^ ajRJ^cj^m^ / #5SJf Q^flH^Mr^Mdloilild-lliro ^ //; KSYYL {Wf^B-W |il,T. 31, No. 1624, p. 888cl7-18: l^feWfH, :SiimE^, llFtSfflffil, M^±W^ °

174 He further remarks that what is called the sense-organ (indriya) in relation to the object is not the physical organ, but the ability (sakti) to produce a cognition'*'* or the ability to cognize the appearance of the object.

Though the external object is only a part of the internal consciousness, it is a condition (pratyaya) to the consciousness, because it is invariable associated with the consciousness.

The objective aspect of consciousness, though arising simultaneously with it, becomes condition to the consciousness which is produced by other conditions. "Logicians (naiydyika) say as below: the possession of existence (bhdva) by existence and of non-existence (abhdva) by non-existence is the characteristic sign of successive productions of the cause and result, this result possessing the cause. It becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force (sakti).

It is also possible successively that the objective appearance of consciousness {arthdvabhdsa), in order to give rise to a result homogeneous with itself, makes the force (sakti) seated in the store-house consciousness, and it is not contradictory to the reasoning.

The opponen|^ays^ if only the self of consciousness constitutes the object-condition; 'how should we explain the saying that the visual consciousness arises depending upon the eye and form (rupa)!

What is the sense-org;m is nothing but the force itself in consciousness by virtue of its acting simultaneously with the object as an auxiliary cause (sahakdrin) for raising up of consciousness.

The sense-organs are inferred from the nature of their result to be only the forces of consciousness, but never constituted ol' matter."*^

•^ Ibid, 7cd: "HI^3#ar5Traf^ ^\'i^¥\\ [TTrT] ?f^[^ // "' Ibid., Vjtti; 3^'d(^^H^^>ild'!jM^m^ 7# •S^^U^ ^ Sfftenrf^f^^^^: ST^^TW^gTeTWTO??!^://

175 This ability is considered to be the cognition's appearance as itself (svdbhdsa) in contract with its appearance as an object (visaydbhdsa). When svasamvitti is regarded as pramdnaphala, the role of pramdna, which takes the cognition for its prameya, must be attributed to the svdbhdsa of the cognition itself

Thus Dignaga acce]Dts that there are in fact three aspects of consciousness: the object (grdhya), the subject (grdhaka) and the self- cognition (svasamvitti) of the perception. The first is prameya (the object of cognition), the second the pramdna (the means of cognition) and the third is th.Q pramdnaphala (the resulting cognition).

In Pramdnasamuccaya-vrtti, Dignaga comments that every cognition is produced with a twofold appearances, namely, that of itself (as subject) (svdbhdsa/ grdhakdkdral grdhakam) and that of the object (visaydbhdsa/ grdhydkdra/ grdhyam/ arthdbhdsa/ arthdkdra). Hence, the self-cognition (svasamvitti) of both of these appearances is to be considered as result of cognition (pramdnaphala).'*^ As being svdbhdsa a cognition cognizes itself As being visaydbhdsa it establishes its truth because of its being in the form of the object (arthasarQpya), i.e., non-discordant with its object. To be in the form of the object is the sufficient condition of its being true. Thus a cognition is never devoid of a form of its own. The resulting cognition is called 'cognition of the object' (visayddhigati). Since cognition or consciousness essentially consists in cognition and assumes the form of the object, it is also called cognition with object form (sdkdrajndna), and it also

^ dw^cJMcmm T3;gr ^^/ ^w d^ch^ifi: 4^^-JIH: y^'W./ TJORT^T: yr^'Uli^ldid, w^sf^

"* PSV. I.9a: iMWW % W^^^ T^m f^(mmm ^ /; dWl^^mWW W iA^

176 becomes aware of its awareness of the object which is called self-cognition {svasamvitti). Since the appearance of an object (visayabhdsa) is a projection of the consciousness (i.e. cognition) itself, the cognition of the object (yisayddhigati) is then the cognition of cognition, which is the same as self- cognition {svasamvitti). In other words, to quote Dharmakirti, cognition (citta) and its caitta are of the nature of self-cognition {dtmasamvedana). There is no distinction between the means of cognition (pramdna) and its result ipramdnaphala). Therefore, pramdna is the pramdnaphala. Regarding this perspective we can discuss the relation of the means of cognition {pramdna) and resulting cognition {pramdnaphala). The Dignaga School maintains identity between the two.'** This position can be justified as follows.

A pramdna by definition is the most effective factor {sddhakatamam karanam).'^^ According to the Dignaga School, in a cognitive situation, the cognition has potentiality or function {vydpdra) of assuming the form of the object. When it assumes the form of the object it is called the cognition with the form of the object {sdkdra-jndna), which is a resulting cognition {pramdnaphala). In this case, the apprehension of the object {visayddhigati) and the self-cognition {svasamvitti), which is also a result {phala),^^ are the same. But in another sense, its function {vydpdra) of assuming, or the ability {yogyatd) of assuming the form or the object is the immediately preceding and the most effective factor which is followed by the effect, i.e. the resulting cognition {pramdnaphala), so it is called a cognition {pramdna)-^^

"' NB. 1.10: ^cfRlxl-^TlHmirM^'^ciHM // "' PS. I.8c-d: flo^NUUQHttJId WIW ibH^cl W //; also Pramanavarttika, 11.301-319; Nyayabindu, 1.18-20: -^ ^ y^ra?" "^ UMIUIV+I^M / artfeftl^WI^ / srafw^^amw ymumy/ and Nyayamukha, [HH^ lEMf^m^l T. 32, No. 1628] pp. 3b21-23: XS^i^llg^^}- ° t^flfS^iHISj^SO-^JlJll: ° XS^Mtt

"' pv. 111.311: TTsh^rgq^sf^ ct»Kchiuii dfpjt pi^ / ZR^ "^ H^r HH; -^mignrf -Rrnr //; also NBT., p. 91.7-8: Snr: ^WchdMrlWMId ymuilJ^c) -^ -^ -JTH^ // '" PS. I.9a-b: fc)^(^R|: TJKT ^T^ // '' See, Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of Dharmakirti's Philosophy), p. 57-77.

177 Commenting on this, Hattori writes in asserting the identity of pramdna and pramdnaphala. According to him, Dignaga is basing his thought upon sdkdra-jndnavdda, the theory that the cognition possesses the form (dkdra) of the object within itself. The; cognition as pramdnaphala is the apprehension of an object (vi?ayddhigati). If, as maintained by the nirdkdra-jndnavddins, the cognition were formless (nirdkdra) while the object had form (dkdra), then the cognition itself (anubhava-mdtra), as distinguished from the object, would remain the same whether it cognized something blue or something yellow or any other object. Accordingly, the cognition as the apprehension of an object must be admitted to be sdkdra: it has assumed the form of an object {vi?aydkdrdpanna). The sdkdra cognition is thus understood to possess the function (vydpdra) of assuming the form of an object. For this reason Dignaga considers it as pramdna, although primarily it is phala in its aspect as the "apprehension" (adhigati) of an object."

4. Dignaga's Deviation from Yogacara and Sautrantikas

Now, let us try to elaborate the point. The identity of pramdna and its result (phala) is the common tenet of different Buddhist schools like VijMnavada and Sautrantika School. Dignaga in his own commentary on karika 9b, points out the difference between the views of the two schools concerning pramdna and pramdnaphala: The Sautrantikas consider the apprehension of the object (visayddhigati) has been regarded as pramdnaphala, and the similarity (sdrupya) of the forms of the cognition and the object as its means of cognition (pramdna). This pramdna is referred to by the Sautrantika as visaydkdratd or visayasdrupya. The Vijiianavadin however, considers self-cognition (svasamvitti) as pramdnaphala and the appearance of

" M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 98; see also Tattvasamgrahapafijika, p. 399.13-16: TTTT % f^N^i*K^^aiiiH i^^ •qfti^F^f^ fiodjmKfticii'ijif^ / 3T^ri|^yNU|oiiNKl fiHw ... iTFinr

178 a cognition to itself {svahhasa) or the ability (yogyatd) of a cognition to cognize itself as a mean of cognition {pramana)P It is to be emphasized in this context, that the Sautrantika and the Nyayavadi Baudha (whose epistemology is influenced by both Sautrantika and Yogacara views) concur with the Vijnanavadin in recognizing svasamvitti (self-consciousness of a cognition) as an underlined factor in every cognitive situation. As a consequence, the Sautrantika and the Nyayavadi Baudha do not hesitate to admit it's as a pramamphala in addition to the factor of visayddhigati (specific cognition of the object) as pramdnaphala.

Santarak§ita and KamalasTla also distinguish the views of the two schools concerning pramdna and pramdnaphala. The Sautrantikas admit the existence of an external object (bdhydrtha). Thus, the similarity {sdrupya) of the form represented in a cognition to that of the object is held to be pramdna of the resulting visayddhigati. The Yogacaras, on the other hand, maintain that the object is merely the appearance of an object {yisaydbhdsa) in the cognition. Accordingly, visayddhigati is nothing other than the cognition of the cognition itself i.e., self-cognition (svasamvitti). This ability (yogyatd) of the cognition to cognize itself is considered as pramdna of the resulting self- cognition, because it is the predominant cause of the later. However, the theory set forth here that the sdkdra cognition is both pramdnaphala and pramdna is amenable to both schools (ubhaya-naya).^^

Although all schools of Buddhism recognize the self-illuminating character of cognition, the Yogacara idealist, however, interprets the term

"M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 102, Slokavarttikavyakhya, p. 139.11-21: ^3f^ +Hl;ilRl*tHjHAq ^zira:^ UEiyssf": V^ / Q^HW QM^l*Kdl TUluf Wfif^Ri: ihdfUfil ... -^^ -qVlMugj^sf^ ... ^ ^d^^lHM / W^ "^ni^ / R^HV^ rai

179 svasamvedana in a technical sense in addition to interpreting it in the general sense mentioned above. The Yogacara does not admit the existence of external objects. When a man is aware of a blue-sensation appearing in his cognition, the sensation is conceived by him as the external blue object. It follows that, from the Yogacara point of view, the awareness of the cognition of something blue which is a form of cognition cognizing itself (svasamvitti), is the result (phala) of an act of cognition. It is this sense of svasamvitti that Hattori has in his mind when he maintains, "in considering svasamvitti as pramdnaphala Dignaga takes the Yogacara doctrine for his theoretical basis".^^ However, in our opinion, as we shall demonstrate later, the fact that Dignaga state that svasamvitti is pramdnaphala is no definite proof that Dignaga is making this statement from Yogacara point of view.

After stating in Pramdnasamuccaya-vrtti, on the eighth kdrikd that the awareness of both appearances of the cognition and that of the object is the pramdnaphala, Dignaga makes the statement, "the determination of the object conforms with it" {tadrupa hy arthaniscaya).^^ Hattori interprets the word, tadrupa as meaning in conformity with self-cognition (svasamvittirUpa).^^ The remark, 'tadrupa hy arthaniscaya', thus means, in his opinion, 'the determination of the object is in accordance with self-cognition' (svasamvitti). Accordingly, Hattori takes this remark as a further confirmation of the fact that Dignaga's epistemological position is identical with that of a Yogacara idealist.^*

We would, however, like to point out that the above cryptic statement of Dignaga is no definite proof that Dignaga's position is identical with the Yogacara one. This statement is amenable to an alternative interpretation from the epistemological perspective adopted by the NyayavadT Bauddha,

" Ibid., p. 102. ** Ibid., p. 103. "ibid., p. 103. " Ibid., p. 105.

180 which has a strong Sautrantika influence. As a matter of fact, Santaraksita and KamalasTla introduced such an alternative interpretation in Tattvasamgrahapanjika. They interpret the term, 'tadrupa' as meaning 'jndnasthabhasarupa'. ^^ Interpreted in this way, Dignaga's cryptic remark would mean: 'the determination of the object is in accordance with the form that appears in cognition'. In other words, they mean to say that the cognition of the object is determined in accordance with the form of the object {vi^aydkdra) as it is impressed on the cognition. And this interpretation, by no means, corresponds with the Yogacara viewpoint that a cognition itself is the only pramdnaphala.

Professor Hattori remarked, as we have noted, that because Dignaga believes svasamvedana to be pramdnaphala he must be an interpreter of Vijfianavada idealism. It seems, however, the svasamvitti is a self-conscious cognition which is a common tenet of the Vijnanavadin and the non- svasamvitti (in the sense of a self-conscious awareness) is a pramdnaphala in addition to visayddhigati, in every case of knowledge. Hence, the fact that Dignaga recognized svasamvitti as dipramdnaphala is not a definite indication that Dignaga based himself on Vijnanavada idealism.

In Pramapasamuccaya-vrtti, Dignaga shows that svasamvedana is pramdnaphala both from the Yogacara and Sautrantika points of view, (i) He first explains the Vijnanavada/Yogacara standpoint. According to that standpoint, a cognition conceives itself in the form of an object (savisayam jndnam) and looks upon that object as desirable or undesirable. ^^ svasamvedana is considered as a pramdnaphala. The resulting cognition, according to Vijnanavada, is not cognition of the external object. Rather, it is a cognition cognizing itself as a visaya (object), (ii) Dignaga goes fiirther to consider the view of the Sautrantika. Inasmuch as a cognition is held by the

''TSP.Vol.I,p.483. * PSV. I.9b: rRT fc(^*^ciHI^«^Mij4" yitmicT prrf^ m//

181 Sautrantika to cognize an external thing for its object, it is proper to say that svasamvitti is the result of the cognitive process, since svasamvitti signifies that the cognition itself is the object of cognition. But Dignaga believes that the cognition is itself-cognized even in that case. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignaga's position as follows: Even if there is an external object, it is thought to exist only in conformity to the cognition, and not by its own nature. It is not that the cognition conforms to the object which exists by itself prior to the cognition. This observation is very close to the Yogacara theory in denying the independence of the object from the cognition. ^^

However, svasamvitti is considered by the Sautrantika to be pramdnaphala in the general sense that every act of cognition is self- revealing. Dignaga comments that the Sautrantika admits the self revealing character of knowledge, yet he does not regard svdbhdsa as constitutive of pramdna. On the contrary, he regards arthdbhdsa=visaydkdrdbhdsa or appearance of the object in a specific form in a cognition os pramdna!'^

After discussing the indispensability of svasamvitti (self-cognition) from both the Sautrantika and Vijnanavada point of V'IQW,^^ Dignaga reiterates his position that every cognition of object is self-revealing. If the self-revelatory character of a cognition is not recognized, the distinction between the cognition of the object and the cognition of the cognition can not be maintained. The cognition which cognizes the cognition of the object has: (i) the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and also (ii) the appearance of itself

However, as far as we understand it, the case may be the other way round. It may be that Dignaga has more sympathy with the Sautrantika position (even though be does not accept the Sautrantika position in its totality). And,

*' M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 105. "ibid., p. 105. " ibid., p. 105. ^ Ibid., p. 28-29,108. For a more exhaustive discussion see p. 165-167.

182 after explaining the Sautrantika view (of pramana and its phala and the svasamvedanatva ofJndna), with which he largely agrees, he may be trying to show that the Vijnanavada view on these points is also justifiable. That we are proceeding in the right way can be demonstrated by referring to the way different commentators belonging to the NyayavadI Bauddha tradition explain Dignaga and DharmakTrti's comments in their works, as meaning to reconcile the Vijnanavada position with the Sautrantika one, with which they largely agree.

Manorathanandin, commenting on kdrid 338 of Pramanavarttika, writes: "therefore correspondence with object (visayasdrupya) is pramdna and arthasamvit (cognition of the object) is the phala in the (Sautrantika) theory of the reality of the external object." Again, commenting on the verse.339 the writes: "it is not contradictory to Vijfianavada either...there, in Vijnanavada also, it is not contradictory to say that the form of the object is pramdna and arthasamvit is the phala."^^

The above comments, by Manorathanandin, show that kdrikds 338 and 339 are written respectively to point out the similarity between Sautrantika and the Vijfianavada points of view. The expression 'vijndnavdde'pyaviruddham' clearly indicates that Dharmakirti maintains that even the Vijnanavada position is justified to a certain extent (as far as the epistemological issues are concerned). Had Dharmakirti (following Dignaga) supported the Vijiianavada position, he would have discussed it first and then would have sought a partial justification of the Sautrantika position also as ik- as the views of the identity oipramdna and its phala are concerned.

Another factor that promoted Professor Hattori to rank Dignaga as an idealist is his opinion that Dignaga in Alambanapariksd categorically refuted

" PV. with vrtti of Manorathanandin, on icariica 339, Ch. 11, p. 201. f^MHctl^iUlf^^-ArPoill^ "q^...TnTII/

183 the existence of the external world including the external atoms. Accordingly, as a committed idealist, Dignaga would explain pramana and its phala from the idealist standpoint. In our opinion, however, Dignaga did not categorically deny the existence of external atoms.

Dignaga in Alambanapariksd accepts atoms as the cause (kdrana) of cognition. Yet he does not accept the atom to be the object (dlambana) of cognition. To quote his actual words.^^

We would like to point out in this context that Vijnanavadins and NyayavadT Bauddhas have radically the different views on some basic ontological and epistemological issues. For example, DharmakTrti was critical of the theories of dlaya-vijndna and trisvabhdva held by the Vijfianavadin. The Vijfianavadin, in his turn, cannot possibly agree with the concept of svalafqiana as enunciated by Dignaga and his followers. It would thus be not correct to say that he followed Vijiianavada theories per se. as compared with the theories of realist like the Naiyayika and the MTmamsaka, theory of the NyayavadT Bauddha can be said to be influenced by idealistic thoughts. According to the NyayavadT Bauddha, the objects as presented in the so- called determinate perception (admitted as valid by the Naiyayika and the MTmamsaka) do not correspond to things as they exist in the external world. These objects are supposed to be qualified by universals {sdmdnyas) inhering in them. In the opinion of the Buddhist, however, universals are not real; they are products of imaginative construction (kdlpand). Inasmuch as our knowledge of the external world contains elements of constructions, Dignaga and his NyayavadT Bauddha followers can be represented as idealist in a sense. However, since a determinate cognition arises, according to these philosophers, strictly by being caused by an indeterminate perception ipratyaksa) which grasps real unique external svalaksana, it is really based on

^ ALAM. I.l:

184 reality. Seen in this light the epistemology of Digniiga and his followers have affinity with that of the realist Sautrantika School also.

Strictly speaking, the label of either Sautrantika realism or Yogacara idealism cannot be applied to the NyayavadT Bauddha School. The epistemology of the latter has a speciality which cannot be subsumed under the specific Sautrantika or Yogacara epistemology. At most we can say that the Nyayavadr Bauddha embraces a composite from of Sautrantika-Yogacara epistemology.

According to the Nyayavadi Bauddha, there are only two sources of valid cognition (pramana), viz. perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumdna). The exclusive object of perception is svalaksana, and the exclusive object of inference is sdmdnyalaksana^^ According to Dharmaklrti, pramdnas are twofold inasmuch as their objects are twofold {mdnam dvividhaip vi?ayadvaividhydt).^^ Dharmakuti develops his theory of the restriction of (two) particular pramdnas to (two) exclusive objects, known technically as pramdnadvaividhya from certain remarks made by Dignaga. In Prawdnasamuccaya-vrtti Dignaga states that svalaksana alone is the object of perception, and sdmdnyalaksana alone is the object of anumdna:^^

According to the Buddhist, there is a distinct polarity between two kinds of objects of knowledge iprameyas), svalaksana and sdmdnyalaksana. Svalaksana is momentary, unique, and different from everything else. Because it is unique, it cannot be referred to by the words {anabhildpya). (Whatever is verbally referred to has a common characteristic that is shared by others). It alone is real, as it alone is causally efficacious. Sdmdnyalaksana, on the other hand, being a conceptual construction, has no such efficacious

*' Manorathanandin's commentary on PV. II. 1, p. 98:1^3" fc^WmHR^uiK^raRrpl "^nl^ / rtfHrclI&q«r^

*'PV.II.l. *' PS. -M^t^uit^q^ it Hr^ra?" ^f[RRi?r8Fii^^^rR^^THf^ uRm<|ili>i[Ffr:/'/

185 power. Sdmdnyalaksana is not to be understood as a real universal. It drives its designation from the fact that its so-called common property {lak$ana) is common (sdmdnyd) to many. Yet, this so-called common property does not stand for any objective reality. It is a conceptual construct created by the human intellect on the basic of observed similarity of producing similar effects by members of classes of individuals. A detailed discussion of the svasamdnyalaksana distinction will be taken next part.

It is to be noted in this connection that the Buddhist distinction between perception and inference is based on the immediate objects of these two modes of cognition. The immediate object of these two modes of cognition. The immediate object (grdhyavisaya) of perception is svalaksana, while that of inference is sdmdnyalaksana. The ultimate object attained on the basis of both of these modes of cognition, however, is svalaksana. ^° The same svalaksana is known directly in perception, in its own form (svampena), while it is known indirectly by inference, in its form as compared with that of others ipararupena)^^

The Buddhist theory of the restriction of pramdnas (pramdnavyavasthd) to their exclusive objects (prameya) is opposed by the Naiyayika theory of the co-operation of different meant of valid cognition (pramdnasamplava). According to the Naiyayika, the same object can be known by different means of valid cognition (pramdna), viz, perception, inference, verbal testimony, etc.,

Dignaga maintains that we call the cognition itself a means of cognizing (pramdna), because it is usually conceived to include the act of cognizing.

™ PV. 11.53:"^ r^ TF^cT^/ " PV. 11.54: HW fc|g<^L||«qr "T^T ^\^i.4 iTrT/ when it is said that svalaksana is Icnown in its relation to other (prarupena), it is meant that the knowledge of samanyalak^ana owes its origin to comparing one svalaksana with another in respect of its having similar causal efficacy.

186 though primarily it is the result. ^^ Commenting on this verse, Dignaga epitomizes his position, when he says: Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (pramdna-phala) differs from the means of cognition (pramdna). The resulting cognition arises, bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and this is understood to include the act of cognizing {savydpdra). For this reason, it is metaphorically called pramdna or the means of cognition, although it is ultimately speaking, devoid of activity (vydpara). For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although in fact it is devoid of the act of assuming the form of its cause. Similar is the case with this resulting cognition. ^^

On the theory of "awareness-with-a-form" (Sdkdravijndnavdda), both the Sautrantika and the Yogacara metaphysical positions can be explained. If the Sautrantika standpoint of the existence of the external object (bahydrtha) is to be derived, then the co-ordination (sdrupya) of the form represented in a cognition with the external object is taken as pramdna and the resulting cognition {visayddhigati) as pramdnaphala. In case the Yogacara standpoint that the external object is merely the appearance of an object {visaydbhdsa) is to be justified, then the ability iyogyatd) of the cognition to cognize itself which is the predominant cause is to subserve pramdna and the resulting cognition {visayddhigati) is pramdna phala. In this case visayadhiyat is the same as the cognition of cognition or self-cognition (svasamvitti).

With this sufficient background, let us see theory of Knowledge in School of Dignaga.

" Ibid., V.8, p. 28. "•mMff^dlf^ct, ^ ^R^T^ +4^RW ^oyiUKUcfldr^ld ¥RM T?u=W Tj;^ W// " Ibid, p. 28.

187 5. Dignaga's School on knowledge^^ In a strict sense, knowledge is not worth its name if it is not right, true or valid. Therefore, 'wrong', 'false' or 'Invalid' are some of the adjectives that are not required for knowledge. When in Indian philosophy we use the word pramd, the strict sense of knowledge is intended. Our beliefs are accredited as knowledge when they are proven to be true or valid. The function of pramdna-sdstra in Indian philosophy is to establish criteria for and characteristics of knowledge so that we can set limits to what we can legitimately know and distinguish it from mere beliefs which are not proven to be true. Any evaluation of knowledge as right or wrong, valid or invalid, true or false is intrinsically linked with the question of the sources or means of knowledge. The cornerstone of pramdnasdstra is the premise that for each piece of knowledge there is some well-defined and accredited means, viz., perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumdnd), comparison (upamdna), testimony {sabda). etc.^^

Valid knowledge (pramd), according to the Nyaya, is true presentational apprehension {yathdrtha anubhdva). Anubhava or presentative knowledge is divided into yathdrtha or real and ayathdrtha or unreal. Pramd excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument (tarka) etc. and pramdna is the specific cause of valid knowledge as distinguished from its general causes.

Dignaga repudiated sabda or dptdgama held as valid means of knowledge by Asanga and Vasubandhu. Sabda, according to Dignaga, is not an independent means of knowledge. The knowledge derived from sabda indicates its own object through the "exclusion of other objects" (anydpoha). It is an inference as a means of knowledge, which operates through the

'" See also, P.Hayes, Richard., Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, p.l 11 " Stcherbatsky. Th., Buddhist Logic, N^ol. 1, p. 59-63; see also Lata S.Bapat, Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of Dharmakirti Philosophy), p. 57-68.

188 process of excluding other objects. Thus sabda can be subsumed under anumdnaJ^ Dignaga rejects independence of Upamdna by the following arguments. If the cognition identifying an object with its name is derived from hearing the words "a 'gavaya' is similar to a 'cow'", then the process of cognizing is not different from sabda. Alternatively, if the identification of the object with its name is made by the cognizer himself, then it boils down to relating two things separately perceived through the operation of mind which is possible in anumdna. Having rejected other pramdna besides the two i.e. perception ipratyaksa) and inference {anumdna), he lays the foundation of his theory of two pramdna on a radical distinction between two objects of knowledge (prameyas) and known as pramdna-vyavasthd or pramdna viplava^^ as against pramdna samplava in terms of which there is no one-to- one relation between means of knowledge (pramdna) and object of knowledge (prameya). Dignaga maintains distinct polarity between the two kinds of objects - the unique particular (svalaksana) and the universal {sdmdnyalaksana).^^ What is cognized by the senses is never subject to cognition by inference and what is cognized by inference can never be subject to cognition by the senses. Cognition is either direct or indirect, perceptual or inferential.

Pramdna-vyavasthd of Dignaga rules out the possibility of any other means of cognition besides perception and inference. He takes the specious example of cognizing a patch of fading colour in which along with the perception of a particular patch of colour, we also grasp the non-eternity (anityatd) of the colour which is a universal {sdmdnyalaksana). In this type of cognition mind (manas) relates a unique particular (svalaksana) to a universal

'^SP. '^ UHIU|IT1< TTier ar^mw Traif^, ^KRii^ll^ ^grsf SJ-^LII^H ^irat/; See also Stcherbatsky. Th., Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 459. " See, Mangala R. Chinchore., Studies in Buddhism, p.79-94.

189 {sdmanyalak^ana). But combining perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumdna) i.e, perceiving the particular patch by pratyaksa and anityatd a sdmdnyalaksaria by anumdna, the phenomenon of cognizing a 'fading' patch of colour can be explained, The need for providing a third means of cognition does not arise. Dignaga explains the phenomenon of recognition (abhijnd) as repeated perception of one and the same object-series and does not go in for a separate means of knowledge, for such uncritical and reckless addition to the necessary-and sufficient means of cognition i.e. pratyaksa and anumdna would lead one into the fallacy of infinite regress {anisthd). If separate means for abhijnd is provided then a flood gate would have to be opened for recollection (smrti) and such mental faculties as desire (icchd), anger (dvesa), for they also thrive on an-object once cognized.

Dignaga extends his pramdna vyavasthd to its logical culmination when he holds that sparsa which is apprehended by the tactual sense and rupa which is apprehended by the visual sense are different svalaksana. By means of kalpand, sparsa - svalaksana might be conceived as a ghata and this ghata might be recognized as identical with a ghata that has been conceptually constructed on apprehending rupa-svalaksana. For Dignaga, corresponding to each sense organ there is a distinct svalaksana, and more than one sense organ cannot be said to grasp one and the same svalaksana.

In his Alambanapariksd, Dignaga denies all forms of reality, and teaches that the object of cognition is to be understood as nothing other than the form of the object within knowledge. In this context, Dignaga discusses the problems in epistemology.

Dignaga accepts that there are two conditions that object has to satisfy for being the object of cognition: 1) it is the cause giving rise to the cognition; and 2) that it possesses the same form as the image. The form of the object within knowledge obviously fulfills the second condition. But in regard to the

190 first condition the opponent objects: how is it that something which is a of knowledge, and thus arises simultaneously with knowledge can be a cause of knowledge? Dignaga gives of answers to this question. First, he argues that to say that the form of the object is the cause and the knowledge which is aware of the object is the result does not mean that there is temporal succession between the two; it rather means, that they are necessary connected.

Although it (the form of the object within knowledge) is simultaneous with knowledge, because it is in a relation of necessary connection with knowledge, it is the cause of knowledge.

A "relation of necessary connection" here means a relationship of logical consistency- which is to say, when A exists B exists, and when A does not exist B does not exist. When such a relationship holds between A and B, although A does not temporally precede B, A is considered the cause of B. for example, the substance is the cause of the attribute; for only when there is the substance does the attribute exist, and where there is no substance the attribute does not exist. The relation of the form of the object within knowledge to the knowledge which is aware of that form is precisely such a relationship. This is Dignaga's first answer to the opponent.

Of course Dignaga does not deny that in addition to this cause there are other causes which bring about the occurrence of knowledge. It is an established theory of Abhidharma philosophy that the "mind (citta) and mental activities (caitta) arise from four types of causes." ^^ In particular, for any thought the immediately preceding thought {samanantara-pmtyaya) is an important cause. Like the staff on which the man leans his body in order to support himself, the form of the object within knowledge is the "support"

" PS. Chapter pratyayk§3.

191 (dlambana-pratyaya) for the thought or knowledge arising from other causes, and in this sense it is seen as a cause. Second answer is given by Dignaga says that the form of the object within knowledge is a cause temporally preceding knowledge. Knowledge is momentary; and when one moment of knowledge is extinguished, the form of the object of that knowledge leaves its impression in the subconscious.^*' That impression gives rise in the knowledge of the next moment to a similar form. Therefore, the form of the object in the knowledge of the first moment is the same as the form in the knowledge of the second moment; and, assisted by the impression left in the subconscious, becomes the cause of the latter.

The question of how something simultaneous with knowledge can be seen as a cause of knowledge was further examined in detail by DharmakTrti. According to him, what is to be considered the primary cause of knowledge is not a cause common to any knowledge, but must be that element which limits the knowledge as a specific knowledge. The reason why a given cognition is a cognition of blue and not of yellow is because it possesses some cause other than the sight organ common to all cognitions of color. What gives to a knowledge its specificity is nothing other than the form of the object appearing in that knowledge. Without that form, individual knowledge that must be seen as the principal cause of knowledge. In this case the cause is understood, not as "the producer" (janaka) of the effect, but as "the determined" (vyavasthdpaka) of the effect.^'

6. Dignaga's School on nature of Self-cognition

Like Yogacara, Dignaga also accepts that a cognition is produced with a twofold appearance is made from the Yogacara standpoint. In his Alambanapnksd, Dignaga examines the theories concerning the object of cognition and proves that nothing existent in the external world, whether it be

' Stcherbatsky.Th., Buddhist Logic, p. 102-3. Paul Williams., Buddhism Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. V, p. 61.

192 a single atom (am) or the produced of atoms (sancita) or the collection of atoms (samghdta), can be considered as the object of knowledge. In conclusion he supports the Yogacara doctrine that the object of cognition is nothing other than the appearance of an object in the cognition itself. That form which is known internally but appears as external is called the object. What we call the sense organs (indriya) in relation to the object is not the physical organ but the ability to produce a cognition or the ability to cognize the appearance of the object. This cognition's appearance of itself as opposed to the appearance of the object in cognition (visaydbhdsa). Thus when svasamvitti is regarded as the result of cognition (pramdnaphala), the role that of the svdbhdsa aspect of cognition. The Yogacara do not admit the existence of any external object. In their view when a man is aware that something blue appears in his cognition, this theory of blue in the cognition is conceived as the object. As there is no object apart from the appearance of something blue in the cognition, it is established that the awareness of the cognition of something blue, i.e. svasamvitti is the result of the act of cognizing the object. So when Dignaga views svasamvitti as the pramdnaphala he is upholding the Yogacara position.

From the statement of Dignaga it may appear that the doctrine of svasamvedana or svasamvitti holds for the Yogacara philosophers only who do not admit any external object over and above the cognition itself and not for the Sautrantikas who admit the reality of external objects. But the doctrine holds equally with the Sautrantikas School. The Sautrantikas admit that when an external object (bdhydrthah) is apprehended by cognition {buddhydmdha), the cognition possesses similarity (sadrsya) to the form of the object {visaydkdra); then there arises the awareness of this cognition, namely the svasamvedana. Inasmuch as this awareness is regarded as the pramdnaphala,

'^ ALAM. V. 6.

193 the prameya or the object is the cognition itself and not the external object. However Dignaga justifies the application of his theory from the Sautrantika standpoint by regarding similarity {sarupya or vi?aydbhdsa) as the pramdna, the means by which an external object is cognized. For this case we overlook the true nature of the cognition as that which is to be cognized by itself and regard its having the form of a thing as the means of knowing that" thing. It may be said of the thing that it is known only through the cognition's having that form. Whatever form of a thing appears in the cognition, as for example something blue or non-blue, it is an object in that form which is cognized.*'* Thus the above line of Dignaga exhibits that according to him the svasamvitti thesis is true for the Sautrantika position also. Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary presents the position of Dignaga in clear terms thus:

Even if there is an external object, it is though to exist only conformity to the cognition and not by its own nature.

It is not the fact that the cognition conforms to the object which exists by virtue of itself prior to the cognition, but rather the other way round. If the object existed by itself, there would have been the absurdity that a single object has various natures since it is cognized variously by different persons. When a man is aware of a pot in his cognition, it is the cognition of a pot that is cognized, and not the pot as something external. But in so far as there is such awareness a pot is said to exist in the external world. Thus determination of the object {arthaniscaya) is in accordance with the svasamvitti and it holds even when the object of cognition or prameya is considered to be something external. If it is the case that the cognition of a pot is cognized then there must be immanent in the cognition the self-cognizing faculty which functions as

" PS. karika 10: (^i|

194 pramdna taking the pot-formed cognition for prameya and producing svasamvedana as its result iphala). Though this can be easily accounted for in the Yogacara framework, there is a limitation in the Sautrantika position, since unlike the Yogacarins they hold that the prameya is external. If the Sautrantikas in agreement with the Yogacaras had admitted the self-cognizing faculty, that is, if svdbhdsa=grdhakdkdra were accepted as pramdna, their doctrine would have been violated, since grdhakdkdra never takes external object as tkQ prameya. Because of such limitations in the Sautrantika doctrine, Dignaga considers the cognition's taking the form of the object {visaydkdratd) as the pramdna, the external object is cognized by means of it and it is self- cognized. Dignaga repeats the same idea in a subsequent verse:^^

The form in which a cognition appears is regarded as the prameya or the object of cognition. The means of cognition {pramdna) and the resultjint cognition (tatphalam) are respectively the form of the subject apprehending the object (grdhakdkdra) and the cognition cognizing itself Therefore, these three factors, the object, the means of cognition and the resultant cognition, are not separate from each other.

The Mimamsakas, the Naiyayikas and the Vaibha§ikas unanimously believe that a cognition simply represents the form (dkdra) of an external object but does not itself have any form. Cognition being thus formless (nirdkdra) has only appearances {svdbhdsa) regardless of the variety of objects to be cognized. Or it can be said that the cognition in which an object is represented has only arthdkdra or the form of the object but has no form of its own. Thus those who maintain the view that knowledge does not have any form {nirdkdrajndnavddins) hold that cognition is of one form only (ekarupa). Dignaga opposes this one-ibrmedness feature of cognition and offers some argument to prove that cognition has two forms (dvirupa) and so the theory of

'' PS. Karika 11:'?^;^!^ ^T^ ddiMiUlM 3TST dfihHi{ / 'W^firaJroiTllfTr Wt 1\^: ^f^J^TW//

195 svasamvedana gets established. These two forms are the form of the cognition and the form of the cognition of cognition {visayajndna tajjndna-visesdt tu dvirupata). ^ In this context the first argument presented by Dignaga is-that, cognition has two forms. This argument follows from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that cognition. The cognition which cognizes an object, such as a blue pot, has a twofold appearance- namely the appearances of the object and the appearance of itself as subject. And, the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object, has also two forms -on the one hand the appearance of the cognition which is in conformity with the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself If it were not so, that is, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the object or the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.^^

It is further asked to Dignaga that according to the doctrine of the twelve ayatanas or the eighteen dhdtus taught by the Buddha, "visual cognition results from the sight organ (caksur-indriya) and the material entity." But if there is no external material entity, then does it not follow that the sight organ as wells cannot perform the function of producing cognition? To this Dignaga gives the following reply.

As is shown by its name, 'm^n^a' (belonging to indri), and the essence of the organs of cognition is efficacy. That is, the organs themselves cannot be perceived; rather, fi-om the fact of cognition which is a result of their functioning, we infer theij- existence as the efficacy bringing about such cognition. The Sarvastivadins say that they are special transformations of the primary elements; there is the view of Buddhadeva that they are the elements

^ Vibhuti, quoted by M. Hattori., p. 108. " PS. Karika 12: i^«

196 themselves; and there are also those such as the Samkhya who hold that they are transformations most immediately of the sense of self (ahamkdra) and ultimately of primordial matter (prakrti). But these are all dogmatic assertions, and not based on proper inference. All that can be inferred is that the organs are the efficacy which results in cognition. And, if we suppose that efficacy to be within knowledge itself, then there is no necessity for an external entity.

While answering the objections of his opponents, Dignaga demonstrated that there is within knowledge, on the other hand, the form of the object, and on the other, the efficacy lo know that form. Dignaga's conclusion, then, is that, although the external object does not exist, through the interaction of these two factors there has come down from a beginningless past a stream of momentary knowledge.

7. Dignaga on kind of Knowledge

The nature of cognition which is accepted by Dignaga is reflected in his theory of Perception {pratyaksa) and Inference (amimdna). According to him "perceptual and inferential cognitions", there is an identity between Pramdna and Pramdnaphala.

What is the nature of perceptual cognition and inferential cognition according to Dignaga's School.

7.1. Nature of Perceptual Cognition^'

According to Dignaga, the means of validly cognizing an object directly is perception {pratyaksa), and the means of validly cognizing an object indirectly is inference (anumdna) is a direct awareness of an extreme particular (svalaksana) bereft of any conceptual understanding. As all conceptual understanding is the result of constructive imagination (kalpand), conceptual knowledge is neither a direct awareness, nor an acquaintance with

" See, Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A fresh Study of DharmakTrti's Philosophy), p. 82-

197 the real object as it is in itself (viz. svalak^ana). The function of perception is to directly reveal the object present perceived with words (names) and concepts (vikalpas). It is then called perceptual judgment (adhyavasdya), resulting in the wake of the non-conceptual perceptual awareness (pratyasaprsthabhdvyadhyavasdya). However, all this interpretation is the function of constructive imagination (kalpand). In order to differentiate perceptual judgment fi-om perception proper. Dhairnottara in NBT remarks: "perception (pratyaksa) is the source of knowledge whose function of directly revealing an object is followed by the construction of a conceptual awareness."^" Perception thus stand for pure (sense) perception shorn of all constructive conceptions and nmemic elements.

The essentially non-constructive nature of perception is expressed by Dignaga in Pramanasamuccaya as (i) perception is free from conceptual construction (ii) that in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. ^'

Dignaga quotes the Abhidharma treatise's analysis of perception in support of his thesis of the non-conceptuality of perception. In Adhidharmakosavydkhyd it is stated: "the eyes along with consciousness perceive something blue, but do not conceive that this is blue. In respect to an object, one has the sensation of the object itself, but does not possess any notion of its name".^'^

The expression, ''caksurvijndnasahgi nilam vijdnatr implies that the eyes along with consciousress has an immediate (non-conceptual) awareness

'*' NBT. vol. I, p. 4: Ur^mW fll5yir«hlRc<^oiimK: f^'^J^'^^n^TiTjj^/ " PS. ^TrW *C^HN1 ^m • m:iLm^mn^m - &T^^m • mm mm' m^mm.; AJE mm, T. 32:12b: ^WIE^ • n^mm • m^ ^ ii^mw^^sy • mmmm, UL^ m&' 92 AKB. p. 64: xr^ff?irmfTt ^ R>J1H|Q ^ ^ -ddfi^f^, 3T?f3?5r?t#, ^ ^ y4'H^//

198 of the object (blue) itself. On the other hand, ''na tu mlamiti (yijdnati)" signifies that this direct awareness is distinguished from a conceptual and judgmental awareness in which the name 'blue' is associated with the object of awareness. It is thus clear that the above Abhidharmakosavydkhyd passage expresses the point that perception is devoid of conceptual construction and verbal expressions.

A perceptual awareness is described here as "'arthe'arthasamjm", meaning thereby that it is an awareness of the object {artha) in its essential nature {svarupasamjnd). It is not an awareness (samjnd) of the object (artha) by its name (dharma). It is thus clear from the Abhidharmakosavyakhya remark, that a judgmental cognition {savikalpakajndna) is not only conceptual awareness, but it is also verbal awareness. In contrast with it, a pure perceptual awareness is a non-conceptual and non-verbal awareness.

According to Dignaga, the object is common (sddhdrana) to many cases, for it is a cause of mental cognition {manovijndna) and perceptions in other persons {anya sdmantikavijndna) as well as one's own perception. A designation is appropriate, if it is based on the specific cause. The Sanskrit words 'bheri sabda' (sound of drum) and yavdnkura (sprout of barley) are so named because they epitomize the specific causes to the exclusion of common causes, though 'sound of dmm' is produced by a stick to beat the drum and 'sprout of barely' is dependent on the earth for its emergence. But the stick in 'bheri sabda' and the earth in 'yavdnkura' would have, if incorporated, spelt inexactness and ambiguity of the worst kind. In this explanation, Dignaga follows the analysis on the lines of Vasubandhu in calling a vijndna in accordance with the name of the sense and not with that of the object, viz., caksur-vijndna. The two reasons that are adduced by him are: (1) clarity of vijndna is directly proportional to the strength of the sense and (ii) the sense is the specific cause (asddhdrana hetu) of vijndna. Visual sense (caksur-indriya)

199 is the specific cause, since the object {rupa) is the cause of visual perception in other persons also. Dignaga defines perception as that cognition which is free from conceptual construction [kalpanapodha). ^^ This calls for a detailed understanding of what is meant by kalpand. Kalpand^^ consists in associating an immediate awareness with a word which can be classified into five categories, viz. (i) name (ndma), (ii) genus (jdti), (iii) quality (guna), (iv) action (kriyd) and (v) substance (dravya). According to Hattori, Dignaga's classification of sabda seems to have been adopted from the Vaiyakaranas, who classify words into four categories {catustayf sabddndm pravrttih, jdti sabda guna-sabddh, kriya sabda yadrccha sabdas caturthah- Astadhyayi of Panini, l.i, 2).^^ In mentioning these live categories of words, maintains Santaraksita, Dignaga should be construed as following the general usage of words in classifying sabda into five categories and unlike the Naiyayikas for whom the genus ijdti), gum (quality) and dravya (substance) are real entities ipaddrthas). For Dignaga, the genus word 'cow' does not mean any real entity

'" "^ ^: yryf^,HiiHcifw wir(4idiRc(d/ ^n^ *cMHml(i -'im>Jiiryiati'^d*(; NB. 1.4: TTW *c^iNI

200 'cowness' but instead simply indicates 'exclusion of non-cows' (janya vyavrtti). The same holds good of other action-words such aspdcaka etc. In his Pramanasamuccaya, while explaining the theme of association with name, genus etc., Dignaga says: "In the case of arbitrary words or proper nouns (yadrcchd sabda), a thing (artha) distinguished by a name is expressed by a word such as ''dittha". In the case of genus words of common nouns (Jdti sabda), a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word such as 'go' (cow). In the case of quality words or adjectives (guna-sabda), a thing distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word such as 'sukla' (white). In the case of action words or verbal nouns (kriyd-sabda), a thing distinguished by an action is expressed by a word such as pdcaka (a cook, to cook). In the case of substance- word {dravya sabda), a thing distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word such as 'dandin' (a staff-bearer) or vi$dnin (homed, a horn-bearer).

Accordingly for Dignaga conceptual construction is the process of associating name etc. with a thing. Whether or not inclusion of genus or universal in whose existenc(j Dignaga did not believe was in wittingly posited by him in his clarification of conceptual construction (kalpand), surged a controversy which was laid to rest by Santaraksita and KamalasTla through their ingenious interpretation that jdtyddiyojand which is a heretical (Nyaya- Vaise§ika) theory should not be taken in the sense in which the Nyaya- Vaise§ikas take it, for Dignaga did not accord reality to Jdti etc.^^ Santaraksita further holds that even if \jdtyddi yojand' were hypothetically accepted as implying real entities it is certain that these are related to a thing by means of names or words. Therefore, while speaking oi jdtyddiyojand, Dignaga is merely observing the general usage of words in classifying words in five

•fct/ f^^IRT^ %W tllxl^ f^/ ^oy^io^^ ^[^ ^^ f^muflQ/ -a.^ oR?q^ -JTlfeT ^ ^R^T^/ see also M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 83. '* M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 84.

201 types.^' Apart from slipping into the mire of un^'ittingly positing heretical entities in his explication of kalpand, Dignaga seems to have incautiously used language. It is therefore apparent that Dignaga here lays himself open to the charge of loseness of expression in enumerating jdti, gum, dravya and kriyd alongside ndman in association with which conceptual construction arises. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee is quite right when he says that Santaraksita has taken pains to save the master from this unenviable position by resorting to familiar scholastic devices, which the elasticity of Sanskrit idiom easily lends itself to.'"'^ We thus find that in defining kalpand as association with universal ox jdti, the grammarian in Dignaga is witnessing the logician's ftineral, as it were. An objection of Dignaga's explanation of kalpand is to be effect that since Dignaga does not believeya^z (universal) to be a real category, he is not entitled to maintain that kalpand is ndmajdtyddiyojand (association with name, universal etc).

7.1.1. Kinds of Perception- pratyak$a

Perception, according to the Buddhists, is of four kinds; namely, indriya- pratyaksa (sense-perception) mdnasa-pratyaksa (mental perception), svasamvedana-pratyaksa (self-perception) and yogaja-pratyaksa (perception of meditating yogins).^^^ However, it is be noted that Dignaga did not make any clear cut distinction between mdnasa-pratyaksa and svasamvedana- pratyaksa. Later on, Dharmaklrti clearly distinguishes between mdnasa- pratyaksa and svasamvedana-pratyaksa. According to him, mdnasa-

^ Ibid., p. 85. "^ Mookerjee. S., The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 284. '"'xr^f5^HWH% •'ftcf Q^JlMlQ ^ "5^ftHftf^/; Vrtti on PS. I. 4; M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 88.

Vrtti on PS 1.6; Ibid., p.93-94. Cf. NMukh, T. 32, No. 1628, p. 3b.20-2I: EtfeiJlFWISi^^J-S'JIitfTW ' X yk-^mmum'rf - WSJII: ° '^^^'^^^^ )]^R?fi?iio4)raf^?ii4MN^*. vnti on ps. 1.6; iwa., p. 94. cf. NMukh, T. 32, No. 1628, p. 3b.21: ^j$^^M^^^^l^^MR ' See also Lata S.Bapat, Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of Dharmaklrti's Philosophy), p. 77-82.

202 pratyak^a is a non-conceptual perception which arises in the next moment of the generation of indriya-pratyaksa, and from which conceptual cognition ultimately emerges. Svasamvedana-pratyaksa, on the other hand, stands, according to Dharmaklrit, for the self-cognition of consciousness (vijnana), feeling of pleasure, pain, desire and hatred.

7.1.2. Sense-perception (Indriyapratyaksa / Indryavijiiana)

Of these four, sense-perception may be described as the perception by the senses or due to the senses. To be specific, it is that variety of cognition which originates by depending on the five external sense organs, like eye, etc, and has as its object the five external qualities like colors, etc. for example, visual cognition has color as its object, the olfactory one has smell for its objects, the gustatory one has taste for it object, the auditory one has sound for its object and the tactual cognition has touch for its object.

According to Dignaga, by sense perception, one perceives only the object in itself (svasamvedya). Such a perception does not distinguish between an object and its diverse properties. Distinguishing a property (dharma) of an object, like its blue color is possible only by conceptual construction (kalpand). An object is cognized as blue only when it is excluded from non-blue objects. Such an exclusion (vydvrtti) is not possible without indulging in conceptual construction. Thus, many different properties of an object are constructed by the intellect through the process of excluding them from their complementary properties. Hence, sense perception cannot make us aware of objects as possessor of different properties.'*'^

It is of five kinds: 1) Visual sense-perception, it is the apprehended of an object through eyes, e.g., the perception of color. 2) Auditory sense- perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the ears, e.g., the hearing of sounds. 3) Olfactory sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an

'^"^ PS. 1.5: yRuili^ch^MW ^R

203 object through the nose, e.g. the smeUing of fragrance. 4) Flavorous sense- perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the tongue, e.g. tasting of butter. 5) Tactile sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the body, e.g. touching of an object with hand or any other bodily organ.

7.1.3. Mental-perception (Manasa-pratyak§a/ Manovijiiana)

Mental perception is defined as the cognition which is generated by sense-perception, which immediately precedes it and is its homogeneous cause and which co-operates with the immediately succeeding facsimile, i.e. the second moment of its proper object. In respect of cognition and in respect of object, mental perception and sense-perception are the same since they are co-operative with each other.

Mdnasa-pratyak^a is an intermediate awareness between indeterminate indriya-pratyak^a and the following conceptualized determinate judgment (savikalpakddhyavasdya). At this stage manas starts interpreting the non- conceptual date of indriya-pratyaksa. Yet, since mdnasa-pratyaksa is not a fiill- fledged judgment awareness, it is claimed to be a direct presentative knowledge. In Stcherbastsky's words, "it is hall-intelligible, something intermediate between pure sensation and the corresponding intelligible image."'"^

There seems to be tliree stages of the development of determinate perceptual judgment. The first stage is confined to indriyavijndna. This is followed at the second moment by manovijmna which is associated with the object of the second moment {dvitiyaksanabhdvisvalaksand) arising consecutively out of the object of the first moment of indriyajndna. Inasmuch as the object of mdnasa-pratyaksa is produced from that of indriya-pratyaksa, the objects of the two pratyaksas are said to be members {santdni) of the same

'°^ Stcherbatsky.Th., Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 2C6.

204 series '"'* (ekasantdna=samanajdtiya). Mdnasa-pratyaksa gives rise, at the third moment, to determinate judgment cognition. The objects of the two pratyaksas are not identical. The object of mdnasa- pratyaksa is only closely similar to that of indriya-pratyak^a. The object of mdnasa-pratyaksa is a momentary svalaksana produced from the object of indriya-pratyak^a. Only the object series (yisayasantdna) is the same both in indriya-pratyak^a and mdnasa-pratyaksa. Yet the individual members (santdni) of the series are quite different. Hence, mdnasa-pratyaksa provides the cognition of the uncognised (and it is consequently/7rama?7a).

Another possible objection to the validity of mdnasa-pratyaksa is to the effect that since the emergence of the latter pratyaksa is independent from yogi-pratyaksa. The yogin, through his extra-sensory power, is capable of having direct access to the perception of others. Why should then such a yogi- pratyaksa not be identified with mdnasa-pratyaksa^ Dharmottara answers by pointing out that mdnasa-pratyaksa emerges in the same series of thought of a person who had an earlier indriya-pratyaksa. This earlier pratyaksa acts as a samdndntara-pratyaksa for the latter effect, mdnasa-pratyaksa. The yogin's direct knowledge of other's perception does not occur in the same stream of thought which is marked b>' the occurrence of an earlier indriya-pratyaksa as its cause. The other person's perception is only the dlambana-pratyaksa of yogi-pratyaksa and not its samdndntara-pratyaya. Hence yogi-pratyaksa need not confiised with mdnasa-pratyaksa!^^^

Stcherbastsky points out in Buddhist Logic that the concept of mdnasa- pratyaksa can be interpreted both in its psychological and epistemological

"" Ibid, 11.243.

'"* Ibid., p. 13: Hc{^^chW'TiHH^dHH T^JTRHHI" 41P1,HH' tJW^iirraff f^W//

205 aspects. Psychologically mdnasa-pratyaksa refers to the "element of attention following upon the moment when the incoming stimulus has affected the sense-faculty." '°^ After attention is focused on the incoming sensuous stimulation, the intellect starts the function of inteipreting it with the help of concepts. From the epistemological point of view, mdnasa-pratyaksa is a 'direct, non-synthetical, unique moment which, although characterized as a moment of intelligible intuition, nevertheless lacks the most characteristic feature of being intelligible, it is as unimaginable and unutterable as the first something between pure sensation and the corresponding intelligible image."''^^

Stcherbastsky points out, in course of discussing the concept of mdnasa- pratyaksa, several objections against the feasibility and utility of admitting mdnasa-pratyaksa as a special type of pratyaksa. He observes that although mdnasa-pratyaksa is supposed to unite sensation with conception, yet Vacaspati Misra objects that it is impossible to unite two such absolutely heterogeneous elements. If two such cognitions could be made to function in a similar and concerned way, then, Vacaspati Misra says, "even a fly could be made similar to an elephant through the medium of a donkey". "^^

All said and done, one question however remains unanswered. Granting that sense perception is undoubtedly described in the works of the Nyayavadi Buddhist as being capable of giving rise to the later perceptual judgment, yet it is not clear how such heterogeneous elements could be related as cause and effect. The cause need not always bring about a homogeneous effect. And some specific factors besides the general cause are undoubtedly present when the cause produces the heterogeneous effect. Hence the question, how does a non-conceptual perception produce in its wake a conceptual awareness, is a legitimate one. In order to answer such a question Dignaga might have

"" Stcherbatskhy.Th., Buddhist Logic, \ol. 1, p. 162. ^"^ Ibid., p. 206. "*' Ibid., p. 207 and vol. II, p. 423.

206 introduced the concept of mdnasa-pratyaksa as a connecting link between two heterogeneous forms of awareness does not seem to be an irrelevant hypothesis of the part of Dignaga.

7.1.4. Self-Cognition (Svasaipvedana-pratyakjia)

The self-consciousness capacity of all sorts of consciousness makes them different insert material objects. The self-revelation and self-cognition of cognitions and concomitant mental states, in so far as they are forms of immediate awareness, make them a variety oi pratyak^a. All specific acts of cognition, feelings and emotions are immediately self-cognized as soon as they emerge. Because of their immediately self-cognizing and manifest (sphutdbha) character, self-cognitions of cognitions, feelings and emotions, etc. are said to constitute non-conceptual perception. We should remind ourselves, at this point, that perception is not limited, according to the Buddhist, to knowledge due to sense-object-contact but is extended to all sorts of immediate awareness.

Dignaga argues that if the self-cognizing character of a cognition is not admitted, then the distinction between the cognition of the object {visayajndna) and the cognition of that cognition {visayajndna-jndna) cannot be upheld. For example, a cognition of a blue patch has two aspects: (i) the blue aspect and (ii) the cognition aspect. Now, we must all accept that the cognition is itself capable of being cognized. But in that case, the cognition of cognition or self-cognition is to be distinguished from the cognition of the object. Yet, the distinction is inexplicable without recognizing the self- cognizing character of the cognition.'"^ The reason is as follows:

Self-cognition picks out the cognition-aspect as qualified by the blue- aspect while the cognition-aspect picks out the blue-aspect only. Now, if

"°M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 29-30 & 108. f^^W "^NTI^' ^JTrfTIT TTc[sh=3[mTTf. f^t<

207 someone's cognition had only one aspect, then the self-cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition. Now, "suppose that the cognition has only the blue-aspect for it object and another awareness, i.e. self-awareness is taking also the blue-aspect for its object. This will collapse the distinction between awareness and self-awareness. If on the other hand the cognition has only the cognizing aspect (no object-aspect), then also the distinction between awareness and self-awareness will collapse. For both will be marked by the same cognizing aspect.'"

It follows, Dignaga claims, that every cognition has two aspects: (i) the cognition of the object and (ii) the self-cognition of itself.

Dignaga reinforces his position regarding self-cognition of a cognition with tile help of another argument. Sometimes we have recollection of an object. This recollection is not only of the object perceived but also of the previous cognition. And it is not possible to have recollection without having experienced it before. This proves that a specific cognition is self-cognized."^

Criticizing the Naiyayika and MTmarnsaka positions that a cognition is cognized by a separate later cognition, Dignaga observes that such a position would lead to an infinite regress."^

'" B.K. Matilal., Perception, p. 152. Dharmaklrli endorses Dignaga's argument in the following way:

PV. 11.385-86:

•ildiR^pOui f^ v.\m\\A ^T^

"^ % Tn^ fTJr TTHir 3T^;^J3I#, TT?nw ^^R^HCT f4frl< ^ i]^\ TIW rraw sr^ ^TT^-

'" Ibid.,

208 If it is maintained that a cognition is cognized only by a later cognition, then this later cognition must also be admitted to be cognized by yet another later cognition, and the third one by a fourth and so on ad infinitum.

7.1.5. The Yogi-perception (Yogi-pratyak§a)

Like svasamvedana-pmtyaksa, yogi-pratyaksa (yogijndna) is also admitted by the Buddhist as a pratyaksa which does not own its origin to sense-object-contact.

In Pramaiiasamuccaya Dignaga explains yogi-pratyaksa as the yogin's intuition of a thing in itself unassociated with the teacher's instruction (yogindni gurunirdesdvyatibhinndrthamdtradrk). The expression, 'not associated with the teacher's instruction' {gurunirdesavyatibhinna) signifies that yogi-pratyaksa is not a verbal knowledge. It is not associated with any designating words. As a result, it is also free from kalpannd. Because yogi- pratyaksa grasps only the thing in itself (arthamdtra) and is devoid of kalpand it is considered to be pratyaksa.

The exact nature of yogi-pratyaksa is, however, not clear from Dignaga discussion noted above. In Nyayabindu Dharmaklrti clearly defines yogi- pratyaksa as a cognition produced from the state of the culmination of the development of yogin's meditation on the highest truths {bhutdrtha bhdvandprakarsaparyantajarn yogijndnarn c^?/)."^ The word, 'bhUtdrtha', in the definition, Dharmottara explains, stands for the Four Noble Truths: viz, duhkha (suffering), its cause (samudaya), its cessation {duhkhanirodha), and the way of its cessation (nirodhamdrga). Explaining the state bom of the culmination of meditational development (bhavandprakarsaparyantaja), Dharmaklrti observes that there are three levels of the development of contemplation: (1) the level when the appearance {dbhdsa) of the contemplated

"* PS. 1.6; See also M. Hattori., Dignaga on Perception, p. 94. "^NB.I.ll.

209 object of meditation starts beginning to be clear. "^ (2) The stage when the contemplated reality appears more clearly to the yogin as if it is seen through a transparent plate of mica."^ (3) The stage when the contemplated reality is perceived by \hQ yogin as though it were a dmalaka fiuito n the palm of his hand. In the third level the contemplated object appears in the meditating yogin's consciousness with utmost clarity."^ The final level of the contemplation of the yogin, which is produced out of the sub-culmination point of the development of contemplation, is yogi-pratyaksa. At this level no conceptual construction is present in the yogin's consciousness. This immediate awareness is accordingly treated as perception.

Although in Pramdnavdrttika Dharmaklrti does not offer any precise definition of yogi-pratyaksa, nevertheless, he acquaints us therein with certain aspects of it. Yogi-pratyaksa is the result of deep meditation on truths arrived at through fi-eeing one's consciousness fi"om the net of conceptual construction. Because it is devoid of conceptual construction it is most vivid.'*' Dharmaklrti explains the fact that although not bom of sense-object- coordination, the yogin's cognition can nevertheless be vivid, with the example of the occasional clear vision of even non-existent entities. For example, people can visualize even chimerical entities vividly in front of them when they are grief-stricken or are insane with fear or passion, or when they are dreaming.'^°

It may be asked, why is the yogin's perception claimed to be free fi-om conceptual construction? Dharmaklrti's answer would be that the vividness of the yogin's perception is the proof that it is free from conceptual construction.

"*NBT.p. 15:4^Ioqi^I•^l^lf«lra^f^^ im^ iJ^ii'H^Hi-''^:// "' Ibid., 3ry*oycif^dP)c) Tjcij wozrarf ^^ ^^^. w ^gr^q^^^irg^zir// '"ibid., p. 15: *{HdmtH*c)<

210 A cognition associated with concepts is never vivid. It is always characterized by haziness.^^' Dharmakirti is aware of the fact that the examples of vivid vision of chimerical entities, quoted by him, is likely to lead him to an unwelcome conclusion. One mat argue that if the vividness of awareness be the criterion of valid perceptual awareness then even the vivid vision of chimerical entities bom out of deep meditation on them would amount to valid perception. Dharmakirti avoids this unwelcome conclusion by pointing out that a valid perception must be avisamvddaka, it must lead to real existent objects. Objects of yogi-pratyaksa, the four noble truths, are ultimately real. Hence, yogi-pratyaksa is an avisamvddakajfidna. The vivid awareness of chimerical objects does not lead to real objects. Hence they are invalid perceptions.'^^

The question may arise: does the attainment of yogi-pratyaksa make a yogin omniscient? Dharmakirti makes a distinction between a sarvajnd, one who knows everything, and a dharmajnd, one who knows essential truths. He emphasizes that the greatness and venerability of a yogin lies in his being a dharmajnd. A man may know the exact number of all the insects in the world. But he is not venerated by people. People do not turn to him for advice on purusdrthas, the ultimate ends of life. A vulture can see things from a long distance, yet it is not venerated on account of its farsightedness. A venerated man, whose advice is sought after, is the one who knows the dharmas, the highest truths. A yogin is a dharmajnd, because he has direct vision of the truths of suffering, its cause, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation. The knowledge of these truths are most useful for people who want to know about the ultimate end of liberation. A yogin is not revered for his omniscience. Dharmakirti does not categorically deny omniscience, yet what

''' Ibid,, 11.283:^ R*<^l^

211 he considers to be more valuable is knowledge of dharma. He points out that Buddha is regarded as a venerable teacher and an authoritative ipramdnabhuta) and absolutely reliable person not because he is omniscient, but because he is dharmajnd and prescribes the means to acquire knowledge leading to the highest good, Nirvana.

1.1. Nature of Inferential Cognition

7.2.1. Nature of Inference and Inferential Cogniton'^'*

It is both a mode of knowing and a way form of reasoning. Thus it has epistemic and logical aspects inseparably coalesced into one. The earliest formulation of Buddhsit theory of inference is available in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra of Maitreya and Prakaranaryavaca-sastra of Asahga, though in the Kathavatthu several terms of reasoning and logic are available. A systematic study of the theory of inference is introduced by Vasubandhu in the Buddhist tradition.'^^

Dignaga gave it a nev/ direction and impetus. His analysis of inference made Nyaya circles to take cognizance of it. A distinctive contribution of Dignaga has been to draw a distinction between inference as a pure thought process and its linguistic expression {prakasanalakhyana). The former is purely propositional and the latter is sentential. The other innovation of Dignaga is advocacy of a variety of inference which may be called analytical entailment (svabhavdnumdna), in which one concept is so connected with another concept that the former can be inferred from another. The most important and innovative contribution is presentation of a formal schema of different relations of hetu (reason, probans, middle term) with sddhya

'" PV. 1.33:

^ ^^^^^ WW W Hr^ftF^ tjT?^ / -gqiuf <^{itt^ '^^ Tj^l^MIW^ // ? V/

'^'' See also Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of DharmakTrti's Philosophy), p. 95-100. '" S. R. Bhatt., Buddhist Epistemology, p. 49-60.

212 (probandum, major term) known as hetucakra, and pointing out the conditions of validity of inference on that ground. This is an attempt to construct a formal system of logic. Dignaga's system of inference is further explicated and elaborated by DharmakTrti. His special contribution is systematic formulation of the negative entailment relation with its eleven varieties. Further, in Dignaga we find a new understanding of the concept of anumeya. According to the Nyaya logicians sddhya is anumeya, but for Dignaga it is paksa characterized by sddhya which is anumeya. The later Naiyayikas emphasize the co-locus-hood (ekadhikaranya) of hetu and sddhya in paksa, whereas Dignaga talks of hetu and sddhya as co-properties (dharma) of paksa. Dignaga's formulation of theory of anumdna was further explicated by Dharmakuti in his Pramanavarttika and Nyayabindu and other works. His main contribution lies in elaboration of the doctrine of trairupya lihga.

Pramdna or valid knowledge has been held by the Buddhist to be of two kinds-perceptions (pratyaksa) and inference (anumdna). Of them perception is that variety of cognition where one can have direct apprehension of an object. Where the object cannot be directly perceived or directly apprehended, but can be only indirectly apprehended, then for that indirect apprehension of the object, one has to take recourse of inference.

This definition of Dignaga also is in consonance with the etymological analysis of the term anumdna as has been shown later by Dharmottara and others. From this, it may be said that while delineating the concept of inference the Buddhists are mainly relying on etymological analysis. Their impression may be that one who understands the very etymology of the term anumdna as 'subsequent knowledge' does not need anything else to identify inference and distinguish it from the other pramdnas. But the case is different with pratyaksa, the other variety of valid cognition. There the etymological meaning tells us merely that it is immediate apprehension (sdksdtkdrijndna). But the Buddhist intend to mean by pratyaksa not merely this but also

213 something more, namely that it is non-erroneous and that it is free from conceptual construction.

How far inference is true knowledge? A source of knowledge has been here defined as a first moment of a new cognition which does not contradict experience. It musttherefore be free from every subjective, mnemic or imaginative feature. We have seen that in sense- perception only its first moment, which is pure sensation, satisfies to that condition. But such sensation alone, since it is quite indefinite, cannot guide our purposeful actions. Therefore imagination steps in and imparts definiteness to the crude material of sensation.

The perceptual judgment is thus a mixed product of new and old cognition, of objective reality and subjective interpretation. It assumes the dignity or a source of right new cognition, although, strictly speaking, it has not the foil right to do it. Inference is still more remote from pure sensation. If the perceptual judgment is not quite new cognition, inference has still lesser rights to pose as a source of right knowledge. Dharmottara therefore exclaims, "Inference is illusion l'^^ It deals with non-entia which are its own imagination and (wrongly) identifies them with reality!"

From that high of abstraction from which pure sensation alone is declared to represent ultimate right knowledge attaining at the Thing-in-Itself, the perceptual judgment is, intermingled as it is with elements mnemic, subjective and imaginative, nothing but half-knowledge. Inference which is still more steeped in thought-constructions - two thirds, so to speak, i. e., two of its three terms being imagination - certainly appears as a kind of transcendental illusion. The fact that Dignaga begins by stating that there are only two sources of knowledge and only two kinds of objects, the particular and the universal, as if the two sources existed in equal rights and the two

'NBT. p. 7.12: URHT ST^JTIT//

214 kinds of objects were real objects, i. e., objective realities, this fact is to be explained only by the might of tradition coming from the Nyaya and Vai^esika schools. For after having made this statement at the beginning of his work, Dignaga is obliged to retract step by step all its implications. The universals are, first of all, no realities at all, but pure imagination and mere names. Inference, obliged to manipulate these constructed conceptions, becomes, not a source of right knowledge, but a source of illusion. Nay, even the perceptual judgment is right only at a half, for although it reaches the Thing-in-Itself directly, it is obliged to stand still, powerless before its incognizability. Men must resort to imagination in order to move in a half-real world. Inference from this point of view is a method subservient to sense- perception and to the perceptual judgment. Its office is to correct obvious mistakes.

When, e. g., the momentary character of the sound has been apprehended in sensation and interpreted in a perceptual judgment, the theory of the Munlmsakas must be faced according to which the sounds of speech are enduring substance?, manifesting themselves in momentary apparitions. Inference then comes to the front and deduces the instantaneous character of these articulate sounds, first from the general character of Instantaneous Being, and then from the special rule that whatever is the outcome of a conscious effort is not enduring. Thus inference is an indirect source of knowledge when it serves to correct illusion. Dharmakuti says, "Sensation does not convince anybody. If it cognizes something, it does it in the way of a passive reflex, not in the way of judgment. In that part in which sensation has the power to engender the following right judgment, in that part only does it assume (the dignity) of a rightknowledge . But in that part in which it is powerless to do it, owing to causes of error, another source of knowledge begins to operate.

215 It brushes away all wrong imagination and thus we have another source (viz. inference) which then comes to the front."'^''

Thus, understood pratyaksa and anumdna turn out to be two important modes of knowing, available with us to be able to know any knowable either directly or indirectly, perceptibly or imperceptibly and since whatever we come to know, we know it directly or indirectly we would not require any additional mode of knowing,/^rafvaA^a and anumdna being jointly exhaustive modes of knowing. This way of putting the matter flimishes yet another clue to DharmakTrti's classification of knowables as those known perceptibly and inferentially. Whereas, knowable being given directly is the minimum condition of perceptual cognition, its being indirectly given is that of inferential cognition. '^* This does not preclude, however, objects of perceptual cognition being those of inferential cognition as well in so far as they are not directly giver and also in so far as they have some shareable features, although the converse of this consideration would not hold unconditionally and mechanically.

Nowhere in his different texts, Dharmaklrti has attempted to definite inference. In his Nyayabindu he starts the chapter on inference with classifying inference into two varieties-inferences for oneself (svdrthdnumdna) and inference for others (pardrthdnumdna). Though he himself did not offer any reason for this, his commentator Dharmottara has provided us with an explanation. His argument is that these two varieties of inference are so different in nature firomeac h other that it is not possible to present a definition which will be applicable to both of them.

Dignaga says that the object of inference is conceptual construction {sdmdnyalaksana). The whole business of probans ;md probandum, a relation which is imposed by thought and has no reference to an external existence and

'" Stcherbatsky.Th., Buddhist Logic, vol. 1, p. 241. '^' Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Frush Study of DharmakTrti's Philosophy), p. 100.

216 non-existence. Thus according to him the relation of logical reason and consequence does not depend upon external reality but on the mind. Therefore, the inference according to Dignaga has apriori chfiracteris. The principles of generalization or antarvydpti^^^ is the basis of inference. It is apriori law of our ) Oft mind. It is not derived fromobservatio n or from inference. 7.2.2. Various Definition of Anumana'^'

Anumdna has been defined by Vasubandhu in the Vadavidhi as, '^Nantariyakartha darsanam tadvido anumdnam.''' That is, anumdna is knowledge arrived at on the basis of inseparable relation oihetu with sddhya by a person who knows that relation. This definition is acceptable to Dignaga and Dharmakirti but keeping the concept of trairupyalinga as the focal point they give another definition which is expressed by Dharmakirti in the Nyayabindu as, ''Trairuyallihgad yadanumeye jhdnam tad svdrthdnumdnam. " This definition takes into account the distinction between svdrthdnumdna and pardthdnumdna, the latter being linguistic expression of the former. Dharmottara gives etymological definition as, ""Lihgagrahana sambandhasmaranasya pascanmanamanumdnam. Here anumdna is defined as that cognifion which is implied by the perception of the linga that characterizes the paksa and the remembering of the necessary concomitance between the hetu and sddhya.

'^' Matilal, B.K., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology - Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language, p. 98; and Article: Some thoughts on Antarvydpti, Bahirvydpti and Trairupya - Kamaleswar Bhattacharya. ''" Tripathi, C.L., The Problem of Knowledge in Yogdcdra Buddhism, p. 204-205. ''' Anumdna (anu-Vma+ana) literally means a means of cognition which is preceded by some other cognition. According to the Naiyayikas, which precedes anumdna is perception of a mark {linga) and of the invariable connection between this mark and its possessor {linga), see NBh. linga-linganoh sambandha-darsanam linga darsanam lihga-darsanam ca. Thus the prefix "anu-" is taken by the Naiyayikas to means "pascdt" (afterwards) or "-pHrvaka" (preceded by); tat pitrvakam trividham anumanam; and NBh, ad; mitena lihgendrthasyapascdn mdnam anumdna. Dignaga, however, interprets differently the meaning of "anw". His definition oianumdna for one's own seXi{svdrthdnumdna) is ... (that apprehension of an object which is based upon the triple conditioned inferential mark h svdrthdnumdna); PSV. n.l09a.2-3, V.27a.5 (27b.7); See NB. II.3; tatra svdrtham (anumdna) tri-rupdl lingddyad anumeye jndnam tad anumdna. The prefix "a/iu" is thus replaced by the ablative case-ending and is taken as implying a logical ground. See also, Prasad, Rajendra., Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p.5. and, Mangala R. Chinchore., Studied In Buddhism, p.30

217 Thus inference can be defined as a cognition of an object through its mark. This definition, says Dharmottara, is a definition not of the essence of an inference, but of its origin. The cognition of the concealed fire is revealed by its mark. The mark produces the cognition of the object which it is the mark of The origin of the cognition lies in its mark.

The difference between sense-perception and inference at this depth of Buddhist investigation is the same as between sensibility and understanding. We are told that there are two sources of knowledge, perception and inference. But the deeper meaning is that the two sources are a sensuous one and a non- sensuous one. It is clear from what has been said that inference is not regarded as a deduction of a proposition or judgment, out of two other propositions or judgments, but as a method of cognizing reality which has its origin in the fact of its having a mark. What really is inferred in an inference is a point of reality as possessing a definite symbol, e. g., a mountain as possessing the unperceived, inferred fire. "There are some, says Dignaga, who think that the inferred thing is the new property discovered in some place, because of its connection with a perceived mark of that property. Others again maintain that it is not this property itself, but its connection with the substratum that is cognized in inference. Why not assume that the inferred part consists in the substratum itself as characterized by the inferred quality?" That is to say, the thing cognized in an inference is neither the major term nor the connection of the major with the minor, but it is that point of reality which is characterized by its deduced symbol. The d

'" Stcherbatsky, Th., Buddhist Logic, \ol. 1, p. 238.

218 7.2.3. Pillars of Anumana: Pak^a, Sadhya and Hetu

Regarding an argument it is generally held in the classical Indian intellectual milieu that there are three important pillars of it viz., paksa or what Dharmaklrti and many other Buddhist logicians prefer to call sometimes anumeya or dharmi, sadhya and hetu. With the help oivydpti, which is a rule, according to Dharmaklrti, as we wish to elaborately state later on and consider its important implications, we infer sadhya in relation with paksa. Inference is a mode of inferring sadhya on the basis of hetu. In inferential cognition sadhya is never given to us directly, in which case inference would be redundant. In the absence of vydpti or hetu or both, on the contrary, inference would just be impossible. In inference the sadhya is rather cognized in its generality, although such a cognition is no proof of such an object being paroksa, the implications of which we hope to examiner later. What we have, according to Dharmaklrti, in anumana are:

(1) Dharmi or paksa, with which hetu is related as its dharma, as a result of which the hetu is said to haye paksadharmatd,

(2) Hetu related with paksa on the one hand through: paksadharmatd, and with sadhya, on the other hand, through a niyama called vydpti and

(3) Vydpti as avindbhava niyama through which hetu and sadhya are related with each other. Thus, givQn-hetu, paksa and sadhya are enough for one's coming to entertain an argument, no matter whether such an argument is entertained to defend one's own knowledge-claim or to criticize the one held by others.

Given, thus paksa, sddhya and hetu, '^^ the three pillars of an argument we can entertain an argument in principle at any situation yet in a given particular situation certain additional considerations also come to influence our coming to

'" Stcherbatsky.Th., Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 233. see also, Prasad, Rajendra., Dharmaklrti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p.29.

219 entertain an argument in that kind of situation. It is, however, hopeless and too stringent to hold that unless those peculiar conditions are fulfilled entertainability of an argument is even methodologically inconceivable or is bound to be doomed to failure. Pak^a, sddhya and hetu in this way are enough for an argument being entertained, fashioned or formulated.'^'*

In an inference, two of its components are especially important viz. hetu and sddhya. For, as it will be pointed out below that with reference to paksa both hetu and sddhya and dharmas and it is in consequence of this that paksa is also called dharma. Of the two components of anumdna, hetu is an indicator of sddhya and sddhya is that which is indicated by it. In other words, it could be said that with the help of hetu, sddhya is inferred while sddhya is that which is being inferred. Hetu is also called sddhana or lihga. Hetu is indicator of sddhya but from whatever hetu that is available, the requisite and the legitimate sddhya cannot be inferred. A hetu remains a proper indicator of the legitimate sddhya provided there are certain relation between hetu and sddhya. This relation holds that if hetu is obtainable, sddhya cannot fail to be obtainable. Conversely, \i sddhya fails to be obtainable then hetu most fail to be obtainable as well. This relation is determined and regulated by avindbhdva niyama.' ^

The relation between hetu and sddhya is known as vydpti relation. Vydpti is a relation between vydpya and vydpaka. Hetva is vydpya and sddhya is vydpaka. Vydpya depends on vydpaka, '^^ Sometimes, hetu and sddhya are, extensionally speaking, equinumerous. But hetu is never more vydpaka than sddhya. Hence it could be Siiid that hetu is either less than or equal to sddhya in extension but never greater than sddhya.

'^'' Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of DharmakTrti's Philosophy), p. 109. '" NBT.: rl^ UTRT^:- ^ ttj: ^^^

'^* ibid., '^•, fll?^HW "^ T(re^5?f f^qrtr<)chsirT •odj|(i^chyHH\ ^wt^-"'anf^ oi|fM*W HW ^TT^ TJ^, oyiuifd) ^TTtw^^:" ^ ij

220 We mentioned earlier that two relations in the context of anumdna, according to DharmakTrti, play a decisive role, viz., the relation between hetu and sddhya and that between hetu and paksa. We also pointed out that while the former of them is called vydpti which is an avindbhava niyama, the latter is called paksa-dharmatd. Of them, further, vydpti brings, to our notice a never-failing, non-contingent, necessary and excejjtionless relation between hetu and sddhya, while paksadharmatd although a contingent feature of hetu, yet is contextually decisively significant relation between hetu and paksa. There, however, arises a question with regard to both of them: what role have they to play in an anumdna? It is to the consideration of this issue that we now turn.

7.2.4. Necessary conditions for Inference

a. Pak§adharmata and Vyapti

First coming, therefore, to vydpti Sindpaksadharmatd.'^^ As, pointed out above, both of them constitute epistemic conditions of anumdna. Given that svdrthdnumdna is the basis of pardthdnumdna^^^ and given further that the essence of the former is knowledge or comprehension, the kind of comprehension that emerges due to svdrthdnumdna should be said to be determined by the satisfaction of the fulfilment of these epistemic conditions primarily. More importantly, however, any argument that may be considered to be valid, sound or having a true conclusion comes to be considered to be so on the fulfilment of certain appropriate additional conditions and not in spite of the fact that the epistemic conditions are left or accepted to be unfulfilled. Thus, understood vydpti and paksadharmatd appears to be such kind of epistemic conditions in the non-fulfilment of which an argument would

'•" Mangala R.Chinchore., Dharmakmi's Theory of Hetu-Centricity ofAnumana, p.94-101. '" ManorathanadT Pramanavartikavrtti; HW (SF^nT) Hf^W-"?^, U^ ^\ '^ T^ f^ cl*oi)M\ l|,dft^4*c<

221 remain fundamentally to be abortive. Our being given paksa sddhya and hetu is enough for our proceeding to fashion an argument. But an argument would not come to be fashioned and formulated unless epistemic conditions of both vyapti and paksadharmatd are satisfied. Their being fulfilled, however, is in no way a guarantee of its being valid, sound etc., validity or soundness of an argument being uniquely determined by the appropriate differential conditions. Yet merely the latter kind of conditions of being fulfilled without the epistemic conditions of vyapti and paksadharmatd being satisfied would leave arguments to be equally abortive and pointless. It would be tantamount to saying that: there are two conditions, viz. epistemic and constitutive which are to be satisfied by inference Further it is not enough that they fulfil either of these two sorts of condidons. As this would be; untenable so too it would be indefensible to hold that vyapti and paksadharmatd are the necessary and sufficient or epistemic and constitutive conditions of anumdna, no matter whether we wish to consider viability and acceptability of an argument along with validity or soundness. That is why over and above the satisfaction of the epistemic conditions of vyapti and paksadharmatd additional conditions are required to be satisfied taking which into consideration the given argument could be adjudged to be valid, sound etc. We shall consider such conditions according to Dharmaklrti in the sequel. But prior to it we wish to inquire what role and status was accorded to vyapti and paksadharmatd in the Nydya traditional prior and posterior to Dharmaklrti to enable us to understand Dharmakirti's insight in a bolder relief.'^^

In the consideration of vydpti at the hands of Dharmaklrti two important questions gather great significance. They are: (a) how does vydpti relate hetu with sddhya? and (b) what is vydpti of them the first is relatively simpler and we take that for consideration with priority.

'^' See, Mangala R. Chinchore., Dharmakirti's Theory of Hetu-Centricity ofAnumana, p.97-107.

222 We observed earlier that one of the important aspects of vydpti is that it relates hetu with sddhya. We also saw that hetu is a lifiga (indicator) of sddhya which is a /mgf (indicated). Now, something could indicate something else quite accidentally. Moreover, the relation between hetu and sddhya may just be operative from one side, say from hetu to sddhya alone but not conversely. Still further, the relation under consideration may not be regulated through a rule of any kind at all. Under such circumstance the relation between hetu and sddhya would remain merely to be accidental, arbitrary, decorative and ornamental. In order not to allow something of this kind to happen Dharmakirti holds that (a) there must be a tie or relation (pratibandha) between hetu and sddhya such that hetu or lihga or gamaka is pratibdddha while sddhya or lihgiov gamya is the pratibandhakaJ'^^ (b) The relation under consideration between hetu and sddhya should be such that the former of them is vydpya while the latter should be yydpaka-lt is this that makes either anvaya or vyatireka kind of mono-directional relation between them available.''*' This kind of accessibility of sddhya through hetu via anvaya or vyatireka is made available respectively through sddharmya or vaidharmya although in both the cases the same kind of indicator-indicated relationship that is made object of study. As a result it is erroneous to hold either that anvaya and vyatireka give us a classification of \ydpti as Nydya logicians ho Id...in fact we shall argue below that vydpti as a niyama is similarly operative and regulative in both the cases and accordingly is not amenable to any classification as such or that this dual mode of expressing the relationship between hetu and sddhya is indicative of two kinds of things sought to be studied or even that it seeks to bring to our notice a fundamental difference between them. In fact anvaya and vyatrieka are so related with each other that

NBT. f^ Mil-Urlt^IH yfr)o)tcii|....7n^\ Wm[^HH ^ft. Xf.^o. "" PV. Wiyf^HHMftt^ci, WIM^C^R), oqTf$r-a4(L|*W ^ «tra" irq- oi\M*A ^ Ht^ '(m:/ Tj;^

223 they mutually and reciprocally exclude each other and in consequence should be considered to be interdefmable, especially in so far as anvaya and vyatireka are captured through bhdva and abhdva respectively. Now, since any thing cannot simultaneously be captured through both anvayi as well as vyatirekr way, accordingly, anvayavyatireki as a combined mode of comprehending anything in both anvayi as well as vyatirekr way is both redundant and meaningless,'''^ (c) The relation between hetu and sddhya under consideration should be ndntariyaka, '''^ which is explained by DharmakTrti saying that the relation between them should be incapable of being done away with, altered or modified.

These features of relationship between hetu and sddhya are important but they are not in themselves sufficient to explicate how precisely vydpti relates hetu and sddhya. To be able to see this we shall have to probe into what is vydpti. It is to this consideration that we now turn. To begin with, vydpti cannot be contingent and accidental. In its exhibiting certain features non- accidentally and non-arbitrarily it would function and operate in a certain way enabling us to infer an appropriate and legitimate conclusion. Therefore, according to DharmakTrti vydpti is not a samanadi-kdranya kind of relation between hetu and sddhya which is anchored in our comprehending things in a certain way, or our using expression in a certain sense.''*'* To hold that there should be a relation between hetu and sddhya, say of vyapya-vydpaka, is one thing while to construe this relation itself to be vydpti is quite another as Nydya logicians are accustomed to. (DharmakTrti, instead, considers to be a rule (niyama). It is in its being a niyama that it is regulative. A sambandha is

(^) «l*f<^R; ij^nnraiffgr; HW(l

224 not regulative by nature, white a niyama is, whatever kind of niyama it might be. But it is not merely in its being a niyama that the heart and essence of vydpti lies. Although vydpti does not generate vyapya-vydpaka relation between hetu and sddhya, given that it is there, it is regulative of it. Likewise, accessibility of sddhya to hetu in an anvyayi way or that of hetvabhdva to sddhyabhdva in vyatireki way is not generated by vydpti, although it is regulated by it. Vydpti, thus, according to DharmakTrti, is a niyama and through its niyamakatva it regulates the relation between hetu and sddhya, the two important pillars of anumdna. In addition vydpti as a niyama exhibits two more characteristics. First, is an exceptionless (avindbhdva), context-free, universal rule such that it points to hetu which is never-failingly associated with sddhya (sddhydvyabhicdritvani-yamah) through non-obtainability (association) of hetu at (with) vipak^a and not through obtainability at (association with) sapak^a.) We shall have an occasion to return to this point a little later. For the present it is sufficient to note that avindbhdvitva of vydpti is determined by exceptionless non-association of hetu with vipaksa. Secondly, vydpti as a niyama is a necessary rule through which sddhya is context-freely associated with hetu in the absence of which there just caimot be any never-failing association between them. Mere accidentally of their being found together (sdhacarya) through repeated observation of such instances (bhUya darsana) cannot bring forth necessity as Nydya logicians hold that should be inherent in vydpti. That is why DharmakTrti in particular and Buddhist logicians in general never speak of bhuyo darsana as a basis of our coming to comprehend vydpti. Its being occasioned by observation of such an instances is one thing; its being capable of being justified or certified on its basis is quite another. DharmakTrti seems to be aware of the fact that no amount of inductive support can ever give rise to certainty, and if certainty is a feature built into vydpti as its inherent nature then we no longer need any inductive support. That is, such a support would be a dispensable and redundant feature

225 of it. Seeing such a necessary rule being instantiated in same cases is one thing, while to hold that inductive support made available through such instances is what is generative or determinative of necessity is quite another. It is the latter thesis that Dharmaklrti seems never to take seriously infected as it's with number of unsurmountable difficulties. Now, avindbhdva together with avasyambhdvitva make it amply clear as to why that kind of relation between hetu and sddhya which falls within the jurisdiction of vydpti cannot be done away with, altered or modified. Thus understood, the traits of the relation between hetu and sddhya on the one hand and those of vydpti as a niyama on the other, where the latter regulates the former, enable us to discover that sort of relation or association between hetu and sddhya through which we would be in a position to infer the legitimate sddhya in the context of a given argument. Of course, the necessity and never-failingness in such a relation due to which it becomes capable of being done away with or altered becomes available through a certain feature which the items so related exhibit. We shall have an occasion to return to this point later. For the present, suffice it to note that vydpti together with relation between hetu and sddhya constitutes one important determiner of the legitimate, proper anumiti, the other such constituent being that of paksadharmatd. It is to this consideration of it that we now turn.

b. The Concept of Pak^adharmata

Paksadharmatd or paksadharmatva as Buddhist logicians prefer to call it is another determiner of proper anumiti. As pointed out earlier, it establishes relation between paksa and hetu. Paksa, according to Dharmaklrti, in relation with hetu, is a dharmi, although hetu is not the only dharma of paksa, especially because sddhya also is a dharma of it. Paksa in fact has been understood by him to be that inferable dharmi which is a cluster of dharmas. Hetu being one of the dharmas of paksa it is derivatively called dharmi with reference to hetu. Since, hetu is a dharma of paksa, paksadharmatva is that

226 feature of pak^a whereby hetu stands associated or related with it. Although pak^a may have many dharmas yet by paksadharma it means that dharma i.e., hetu is to be taken into account which is vydpta by that dharma of paksa which is legitimately intended to be inferred. Further, in spite of hetu being dharma of pak^a it is not an exclusive dharma of it alone, although it is its distinguishing feature, for otherwise sapaksa itself would fail to be available.''*^

Thus understood, paksadharmatva not only establishes a link or tie between pak^a and hetu but since the hetu is required to be vydpta by the sddhya that is intended to be inferred as a dharma of paksa, it also operates as another important determiner of anumdna. Hetu through paksadharmatva is related with paksa, while through vydpti it is related with sddhya and these two determiners together with three pillars of anumdna, viz. paksa, hetu and sddhya guarantee prima facie viability of it. While the pillars of anumdna bring out principal supports on which it stands, xydpti and paksadharmatd together establish such a relation between them that through their being related with each other, other things remaining the same, intended sddhya alone remains to be legitimately inferable. Thus, xydpti and paksadharmatd jointly determine minimum viability of an argument in such a way that it may come to be fashioned and formulated at all.

But neither vydpti nor paksadharmatd can jointly or severally assure validity or soundness of an argument. This is especially because in an invalid or unsound argument too these two important determiners of the very formulation and form of an argument would figure. Accordingly, if over and above an argument being formulated it is sought to be considered whether such an argument is valid then certain validity determining features will have

'"* pv. 3T?iW" {ryTii4l'ii)cj xr\ ozraf%^ ^xA^ i%iiH|- oyR^chTi*: //

227 to be brought into picture. Such features should be such that they alone independently of vydpti and paksadharmata, should primarily enable an argument to 'be determined to be valid, while non-fulfilment of any of them should automatically render it to be invalid, whatever be the status of vydpti and/ ovpaksadharmata in such an argument.'"*^

From the foregoing it is amply clear, it is hoped, and that vydpti together with paksadharmata determine the general form of an argument. But they in themselves are insufficient to determine validity on soundness of an argument. Even an invalid or unsound argument too has a form, as valid or sound argument has one, though the form of the former kind of argument would be an invalid or unsound argument-form, as that of the latter would correspondingly be a valid or sound argument-form. Since, any kind of an argument has a form and since it is, determined by \ydpti and paksadharmatd, although there are no kinds of the latter, the so-called kinds of the former cannot be said to be determinative of the kinds of arguments. Dharmakirti, of course, is careful to point out, as observed earlier, that the so called anvayi and vyatirekr, vydpti boil down to the same thing, they being two interdefmable modes of expressing the same regulative niyama called vydpti. This being the case validity determinative conditions should be sought to be discussed neither via vydpti nor \\di paksadharmatd. This view of Dharmakirti is markedly different from that of Nydya logicians according to whom that which determines kinds, of vydpti is also correspondingly determinative of kinds of anumdna, as if anumdna means the same as vydpti. We hope to turn to this point late in a slightly changed context. Both Nydya and Buddhist logicians, especially Nagarjuna, Dignaga, Dharmakirti and others, seem to be in agreement in holding: that validity determining conditions roust be sought elsewhere. There is of course, a fundamental, difference between them and it would be clear from the sequel. For the present suffice it, however, to note

''•* Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of DharmakTrti's Philosophy), p. 123.

228 that according to both Nyaya and Buddhist logicians vaHdity determining conditions of an argument originate from the kind of features, the Hetu involved in a given argument exhibits or should exhibit, failing which an argument cannot help being invalid.

c. The Nature of Trairupya of Hetu Therefore, as already mentioned, he defines svdrthdnumdna as indirect cognition of the inferred object in the paksa on the basis, or ground, of a three-featured logical mark (trinipa lifiga). '''^ For example, when A sees smoke coming from a hill, he infers the existence of fire in that hill on the ground that the existence of smoke" in a thing signifies, or is an evidence, or mark, of the existence of fire in that thing. This relation between smoke and fire, being one of invariable concomitance, can be stated in the universal proposition wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Here the hill in which smoke is seen is the paksa or the locus, fire is the sddhya, the object inferred to be present in the hill, and smoke is the linga or hetu, the logical mark, of fire. Smoke is the lihga of fire because it has, as will be explained in the discussion that follows, what DharmakTrti calls the three features, or constitutive properties, of a lihga. The three features of a lihga are the following: paksa Sattva, sapaksa sattva, asapaksa (vipaksa) asattva. ''*^ Before dealing with the issue further, it will be profitable to clarify the significance of the iQvms, pak^a, sapaksa and asapaksa (vipaksa).

1. Paksa is that whose Dharma i.e. sddhya is going to be inferred. Or it could be Sd\d, paksa is that with reference to which we are going to infer sddhya.

2. Sapaksa is that which is similar to paksa in the sense that there also it should always be possible to cognize the dharma that is going to be inferred.

'*' See also, P. Hayes Richard., Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, pi. 146. "*' NB. '^¥^ y^'\'\^^k4\^i\h TR^ I3;5r TWaj TTOT TT^, 3TWr^ -cJIflT^iq IT? f^flTHTT/ fcinijijtjn •^- '7-^^-'^^- See also, Prasad, Rajendra., Dhannakirti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p.42. H.Potter Karl., Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol.IX, p.42-45.

229 Regarding the possible association of sddhya with it, there is a similarity between/'fl^a and sapaksa. 3. Asapaksu (vipak^a) is that which is dissimilar with sapaksa. And since, as already observed, sapaksa is similar to paksa, it is .obvious that vipaksa is dissimilar with paksa as w ell. Asapaksa could be dissimilar with sapaksa in any of the following three respects: 1) in being other than sapaksa 2) being opposite of sapaksa 3) Or sapaksa being absent.

Each one of (1), (2) and (3) is a necessary feature of a linga, and conjointly they constitute its common, or, formal conditions because ever}' linga must have all of them. Lacking any one of them would make a liiiga defective, or a non-/mga, because a defective linga cannot yield a valid inference. In the inference of fire on the hill because of seeing smoke on the hill, smoke is the linga of fire because it has all the three features; (I) smoke is certainly present in the hill, the paksa, as it is perceived to be there, (2) it is present only in a sapaksa, like a kitchen, which is similar to the hill, the paksa, in having fire, and (3) it is necessarily non-existent in an asapaksa, or vipaksa, like a pond, which is dissimilar to the hill because of not having fire. 'Sapaksa' means a thing which is similar to, and 'vasapaksa' or 'vipaksa a thing which is dissimilar to, iht paksa. Similarity, as well as dissimilarity, is a one-point feature. To be a sapaksa of the hill, a thing has to be similar to it only in one respect, that is, in the respect of having fire, the sadhya which the hill is being inferred to have. No other similarity is required. A kitchen is similar to the hill only in this and in no other respect. To be an asapaksa of the hill, in a like manner, a thing is to be dissimilar to the hill only in the respect of not having fire. No other dissimilarity is necessary. There may exist other similarities between the paksa and sapaksa and other dissimilarities

"' Ibid, "fft^; 3?^^^ f%?TifM%?t^ y^ / Tofraf ^.^^; NB.: i:n«ra4fimi-^H TTRHVSJ-: "?TWV

230 between ±e paksa and asapaksa. But these similarities, or dissimilarities, play no role in making the sapaksa a sapaksa, or the asapaksa an asapaksa.

Therefore, the condition of paksa sattva. i.e., hetu must either be related with or obtainable on paksa. This means, it is necessary for a hetu to be obtainable on the place where we are going to infer sddhya. This is on of the important feature of hetu.

Sapaksa sattva means hetu should be related with or be obtainable on sapaksa. That is, hetu can exit on those places with are similar io paksa.

Asapaksa asattva means hetu must not be obtainable on or be related with asapaksa. That is, hetu should not be obtainable on those places which are dissimilar with sapaksa.^^^

In technical terms, it could be said that paksa sattva is that feature of hetu where impossibility of non-obtainability of hetu on paksa must be ruled out. Sapaksa sattva is that where the possibility of obtainability of hetu at a place other than paksa but similar to paksa is not ruled out, asapaksa asattva is that where possibility of obtainability of hetu on asapaksa must be ruled out.

Thus, sapaksa sattva and paksa sattva together exhaust the possibility of obtainability of hetu and asapaksa asattva is a counter set of them in the sense that it signifies a set of places where obtainability of hetu is permanently ruled out. The relation between paksa sattva and sapaksa sattva of hetu together with paksa sattva of sddhya given us valid affirmative argument, while that between paksa asattva and sapaksa asattva of sddhya together with paksa asattva of hetu gives us a valid negative argument.

These three essential features of hetu, in DharmakTrti's view, are jointly and severally validity determinative conditions of a valid argument. If a hetu

''° NBT. fHT^ cIc^^imiUM!^:/ -^crrsif uft.Tf.??. H^; 3JWJ^ Sf^lUm H^:/ tTf^tFT 3^W^ Tlz(

231 satisfies these three conditions or has these three characteristics then alone it is possible to validly infer the intended sddha or that the conclusion of an argument follows from they premises, i.e. the argument is valid. If one of these conditions is not fulf; lied then we are not in a position to deduce certain conclusion from the given premises i.e. the argument will be invalid. If one of the conditions is not fulfilled then hetu cannot unexceptionally relate itself with Sddhya in a way which is regulated by avindbhdva niyama. Hence, we are not in a position to say that sddhya logically follows from premises or that sddhya is legitimately and validly inferred.

If hetu does not fulfil certain conditions then avindbhdva niyama does not determine and regulate the relation between hetu and sddhya. For, what avindbhdva niyama suggests is that if and where hetu obtains sddhya cannot fail to obtain and if and where sddhya cannot obtain, hetu must fail to obtain.'^' Now, if hetu is obtainable where sddhya is obtainable and also where sddhya is not obtainable, then it will be against the rule of avindbhava. Thus, hetu has to satisfy these conditions in order to be validly related with sddhya by avindbhdva niyama. Otherwise we will not be in a position to decide whether sddhya is validly inferred with the help of avindbhdva niyama. Of course, it is needless to discuss the conditions due to which we are not in a position to deduce the conclusion from given premises. In other words, it could be said that all these characteristics conjointly make the argument valid and even if one of these characteristics is not fulfilled then we will not be in a position to have a valid argument. Here it may be asked: why there are only three conditions of deciding the validity of an argument? The answer is that these three conditions are necessary as well as sufficient in order to decide the validity of an argument, according to DharmakTrti. For, according to him,

232 while we are discussing conditions determinative of validity of an argument, we should confine ourselves only to these considerations. We should not mix up such conditions with those which determine whether an argument consists of true premises. We should not likewise, mix up such conditions with those which determine whether the sddhya is obtainable or not. This is further so because the conditions which determine the truth of the premises need not necessarily be determinative of validity of an argument. For, it is quite possible that an argument is valid and yet does not contain Hue premises. Hence, general discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions determinative of validity of an argument must be kept free from the determinative conditions which determine whether the argument is about something that is obtainable or not. And this seems to be sound insight on the part of DharmakTrti.'^^

These three characteristic validity determinative features of a hetu which figure in a valid argument is called trairupya of hetu by DharmakTrti. It would be interesting to contrast this view of DharmakTrti that these three features alone are validity determinative conditions of an anumana with that of Nydya logicians, especially to be able to grasp fuller implications of Dharmaklrti's view.

7.2.5. Kinds of Anumana*^^

Inference, according to Buddhist logicians, is of two types-inference for one's own {svdrthdnumdnay^^ and inference for others {pardrthdnumdna)}^^ Here the criterion of distinction is, for whose sake the knowledge, viz. inference, is being made. If the agent uses this inference for his own apprehension of an

"' Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A fresh Study of Dharmaklrti's Philosophy), p. 126; See also Mangala R.Chinchore., Dharmaklrti's Theory of Hetu-Centricity of Anumana, p. 91-97; Matilal. B.K., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology - Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and language, p. 78-85. '^'' See also, Mangala R.Chinchore., Dharmklrt 's Theory of Hetu-Centricity of Anumana, p.l35. '^* Prasad, Rajendra., Dharmaklrti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p.41. '" Ibid., p.ll9. See also, Mangala R. Chinchore., Studied in Buddhism, p.25. P. Hayes Richard., Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, p.232.

233 object which is not directly apprehended, it will be regarded as inference for one's own. It is the knowledge by which the individual himself is apprehending whereas in the case of inference for others, the objective is not the apprehension of one's own apprehension but to malice another individual apprehend the object. So it is for the sake of others.'^^

In svdrthdnumdna, on the basis of trairupya linga paroksa object in inferred, or, it could be said that with the help of trairupya linga inferential cognition is gained in such a way that paroksa object is inferred. In pardrthdnumdna, on the contrary, this already formulated argument is communicated. '^* But many times, importance of making the necessary distinction between them is not taken into account seriously.

The basis of the distinction between them has to be sought elsewhere. In svdrthdnumdna, the person who infers knows the inferred object himself, while in pardrthdnumdna he communicates the knowledge of the inferred object to others. Hence, it could be said that svdrthdnumdna can be independent of social context. Dharmottara also interprets this classification ofanumdna by saying that there are two distinct characteristics of these kinds of anumdna as each of these kinds has a unique and distinctive role to play, svdrthdnumdna is jndndtmaka while pardrthdnumdna is sabddtmaka. '^^ Svdrthdnumdna is jndndtmaka because in svdrthdnumdna, paroksa object is cognized. Pardrthdnumdna is sabddtmaka because the information which is available to us through svdrthdnumdna is articulated and communicated. Thus, pardrthdnumdna is hoih. jndndtmaka and sabddtmaka because it involves two aspects cognition of paroksa object and articulation and communication of

''*Dharmottarapradlpa; ilHI^iJI^H ^^JW-^Ji^^lTJTnHT ^^ yfrlijat) '^xh^ ST^iir fft '^•., y*{UM"«f W

"* NB. Q^Mf?H^i<»yiH inr#5nnmt[.•< ^. '*' NBT. y^ml^MH' ^l«il(^*i< ^3[T8lf^TTFf •^RIFRW/ d41

234 that cognition, while svdrthdnumana involves merely the knowledge aspect. That is why the distinguishing marks of svdrthdnumana and pardrthdnumdna are knowledge on the part of inferring person and communication of it respectively. But, whether anumdna figures as instrument of cognition or that of communication it involves the same kind of components, and determiners of its validity or soundness remain exactly the same. Further, since no knowledge could be communicated unless one has it already and since the instrument of cognition of paroksa object and communication of it is the same, it is a small wonder that pardrthdnumdna bodily and formally involves svdrthdnumdna and since the latter is a fulfledged anumdna it is not a matter of surprise that it is determined by trairupya lihga and it is tridhd as well, its tridhdtva being determined by tridhdtva or triprakdratva of hetu. It, therefore, makes no sense either to say that pardrthdnumdna alone is anumdna in the true sense of the term or even that the basis of making distinction between them is the distinctial purpose they serve.

Thus, in svdrthdnumdna, paroksa object is inferred on the basis of trairupya lihga or an argument is formulated in such a way that paroksa object is inferred through it. In pardrthdnumdna such an argument is communicated. Argument is not communicated unless it is formulated though converse does not necessarily follow. For, I can communicate an already communicated argument for it initial or later communication. This is how, svdrthdnumdna is presupposed by pardrthdnumdna. That is why, between them priority is of svdrthdnumdna}^^

Here, an issue may be raised; what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of an argument being formulated? Over and above, hetu sddhya and vydpti between them together with paksadharmatd, hetu has to satisfy three conditions. These three conditions are necessary as well as sufficient. Because, when we formulate an argument we do not necessarily formulate it

' See also, Mangala R. Chinchore., Studies in Buddhism, pp.25-34.

235 only when we participate in a debate and a controversy. Rather the consideration of a debate and controversy need not be raised when we formulate an argument. That is why, Dharmakirti accepts that there are three conditions that every hetu, has to satisfy. It is pointed out earher that in pardrthanumdna we articulate and communicate the knowledge available to us through svdrthdnumdna. When we communicate this knowledge, it is possible for us to communicate it in two ways: sddharmya (similarity) or vaidharmya sddharmya intended here is of course sddharmya of sddhyadharmi, with drstdntadharmi. Likewise, such a knowledge gained through svdrthdnumdna may be communicated through bringing to one's notice vaidharmya between sddhyadharmi and df-?tdntadharmT. Since communication of the knowledge of sddhyadharmi gained through svdrthdnumdna may be possible in either of these ways, and since a communicated argument is pdrdrthdnumdna. Pardrthanumdna may be said to be of two kinds expressively.'^^Accordingly pardrthanumdna is classified as sddharmyavat and vaidharmyavat pardrthdnumdna. In the former of them similarity between sddhyadharmi and drstdntadharmi is the basis of communication, while in the latter dissimilarity between them.'^^ Though taking into consideration the mode of communication involved there is a difference between these kinds oi pardrthdnumdna, yet the object of both of them is the same, viz, to communicate trairupya lihga}^'^

Since the difference between them is merely expressive or communicative what is communicated via sddharmya may lead to a cognition of a thing through vaidharmya, such as if sddhya is not there then there

' ' See also, Prasad, Rajendra., Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p. MS- IS?, and Mangala R.Chinchore., DharmakJrl 's Theory ofHetu-Centricity of Anumana, p. 138-141. \ parartha pari, pr .47. '" NBT.p. 47:....'?rRF|- «T^5Fr #5Zf T^ / TTW ^M: -^m^J f^^FT^ emfSFT f^tTTjf/ Wx^ ^ •^trRftr/ (jHwyPluji ^^ ^^ntzitif^-- Tn^ f^ Tm^^ irsjt/ aroi^ ^ t^^ -^trRhT

'*^ NB. p. 47: HH4l<«hT: ^rflr^ ^7 ST^^T? M^l'l^i^My

236 cannot be anvaya of hetu with it. Likewise, communication of anumana via vaidharmya may lead to cognition of a thing through sadharmya such as if sddhydbhdva does obtain then hetvdbhdva too cannot fail to obtain. Moreover, since except in the case of those things which are naturally tied with each other through tdddtmya or tadutpatti we cannot infer invariably (niyamena) absence of one thing from that of another,'^^ those things which are svabhdvapratibaddha, it would hardly make a difference whether one of them is inferred from the other through anvaya or vyatireka, sadharmya or vaidharmya and hence in the case of svabhdvapratibaddha things, it is redundant to employ both these modes of communicating an already formulated argument.'^^

It is pointed out earlier that there are three kinds of hetu and that they are determinative of three kinds oi anumana. These three kinds of hetu alone are hetus properly so called because they have trirUpata. Now, when we communicate knowledge available to us with the help of trairupya lihga, we can do so with the help of any anumana of its different kinds. But since communicatively we might communicate on the basis of sadharmya or vaidharmya, as pointed out above, expressively pardrthdnumdna may be of six kinds as follows:

Pararthanumana

Sadharmyavat Vaidharmyavata

1. Svabhavanumana 4. Svabhavanumana

2. Karyanumana 5. Karyanumana

'** Ibid., p. 56: rHI^: "=T WMIciyfi^d-tV J^ ^pfi^ 1^^ 3TqTFT R^A^ %f%:/ Tf ^ %raR:/ TI^

'" Ibid., Ht^: tr % f^^ -3iWM y1^¥^ of41ij:\ HPira; f^^f^xTPr 3Tf^LHUQ5|'«JlMcii>fHi( TT? «Tgft\ ^^^ Ufcl«l-«i)L|c!^fH d^c

237 1 f^R 3.Anupalabdhi Anuniana 6.Ajiupalabdhi Anumana The classification of pardrthdnumdna into sddharmyavat and vaidharmyavat is according to the method through which we communicate. It is on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity between sddhyadharmi and dr$tdntadharmi that we are going to communicate. This classification of anumana is on the basis of expressive form it may assume and not on the basis of differential avindbhdva niyama involved. In fact, avindbhdva is a niyama and a niyama cannot be classified as it is determine in any case in the 169 same way. Thus, anumana considered from the point of \'iew of cognition which it generates, it is svdrthdnumdna only. When considered expressively or communicatively it is pardrthdnumdna. Since any communicated argument has to be formulated already and since any formulated argument may be svabhdvdnumdna, kdrydnumdna or anupalabdhi anumana determined respectively by taddtmya-prakdraka, tadutpatti-prakdraka or anupalabdhi- prakdraka hetu,^^^ there are only three principle kinds of arguments, although expressively they may become of six kinds and even when they do so become, they boil down to the three principal kinds only. We also saw that trairupya of hetu is a threefold validity-determining feature of it, such that non- fulfilment of any of those validity determining conditions would render an argument to be invalid. We further saw briefly that of the five constituents of anumdna accepted by Nydya logicians DharmakMi seeks to do away with pratijna, uddharana, upanaya and nigamana. We need not probe deeper into these nuances. Instead, let us look into DharmakTrti's treatment of hetvdbhdsa-kmds of argument's invalidating determiners, for without their

'*' See, Matilal, B.K., Buddhist Logic and Episiemology- Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of inference and Language, p.77, and Brendan S.Gillon., Dharmakirti and His Theory of Inference. '*' Lata S.Bapat., Buddhist Logic (A Fresh Study of DharmaicTrti's Philosophy), p. 144. '™ See, Prasad, Rajendra., Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference Revaluation and Reconstruction, p.66-79.

238 consideration our study of Dharmakirti's analysis of inference would remain inadequate and incomplete. We saw previously that with the help of trairupya linga we are in a position to decide validity of an argument. These there conditions conjointly and severally determine the validity of an argument, and that these three conditions are both necessary and sufficient to determine validity of an argument. Now, if at least one of these conditions it not fulfilled, we are not in a position to have a valid argument.

As this point I would only reassert that for Dharmakirti, and all other Indian logicians, in both svdrthdnumdna and pardrthdnumdna, that is, in every inference the paksa vdkya and the vydpti are necessary to yield the conclusion. Further, to be elaborated later on, the presence of the hetu (for example, smoke) must be cognized in the paksa (for example, a particular place), and the vydpti must state the relation of universal concomitance, both positive and negative, betv/een the hetu and the sddhya. The hetu (or lingo) has, Dharmakrrti says three features: (1) it is necessarily present in ihQ paksa, (2) it is present only in things similar to ihs paksa, and (3) it is always absent in things dissimilar to the paksa. Since it has these three features, it is called trirupa linga (three-featured, or three-faceted, logical mark of the sddhya). Its three features guarantee that there is a relation of universal concomitance between it and the sddhya. All these things will be discussed in detail later. But let us always keep in mind that the vydpti is indispensable for svdrthdnumdna as well as pardrthdnumdna. It may not be mentioned, but only assumed in svdrthdnumdna and explicitly mentioned m pardrthdnumdna, but it is equally used in both and functions alike in both. The classical Indian logician's way of putting all possible inferences into the two groups, svdrthdnumdna and pardrthdnumdna, has been hailed by almost all modem writers on classical Indian logic as a very purposeful and

239 neat logical division. None of the well-known historians of Indian philosophy, nor any of the early, or recent, modem writers on Indian logic, seem to have felt the need for examining the very principle on which the division is based. Therefore, the deficiency, or lack of clarity, if any, concealed in it, is likely to have remained unscrutinized, or unnoticed. In the course of discussing Dharmakirti's statement on the division and Dharmottara's elaboration of it, the critical observations made here would apply not only to Dharmakirti's statement on it but to the division as such, that is, to its characterization by anyone, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike. This is so because its characterization by all who accept this division runs on similar lines. The objective of these observations is to ascertain whether or not it is as illuminating a logical way of dividing inferences as it has been taken to be.

So, there are some of the important points which emerge in Dignaga's School analysis of inference and object of inferential cognition. Like, the points that figure in his analysis of generality or shareability, an important aspect of human knowledge, too, are significant.

240