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CHAPTER 5 Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind

Georges Dreyfus and Evan Thompson

Abstract Introduction

This chapter examines Indian views of the In discussing Asian views of mind and con- mind and consciousness, with particular sciousness, we must start from the realiza- focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition. To tion that this topic presents insurmountable contextualize Buddhist views of the mind, challenges. The diversity of Asian cultures we first provide a brief presentation of some from China to India to Iran is so great that of the most important Hindu views, particu- it is impossible to find coherent ways to dis- larly those of the Sarp.khya school. Whereas cuss the mental concepts of these cultures this school assumes the existence of a real over and above listing these conceptions transcendent self, the Buddhist view is that and noting their differences. Hence, rather mental activity and consciousness function than chart a territory that hopelessly extends on their own without such a self We focus our capacities, we have chosen to exam- on the phenomenological and epistemologi- ine Indian views of the mind, with a spe- cal aspects of this no-self view of the mind. cial focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition, We first discuss the Buddhist Abhidharma which can be traced back to the first cen- and its analysis of the mind in terms of turies after the life of Siddhartha Gautama, awareness and mental factors. The Abhid- the Buddha (566-483 BCE), and which con- harma is mainly phenomenological; it does tinued to develop in India through the 7th not present an epistemological analysis of and 8th centuries CE. This approach allows the structure of mental states and the way us to present a more grounded and coherent they relate to their objects. To cover this view of the mind as conceived in the Indian topic we turn to Dharmaklrti, one of the philosophical tradition and to indicate some main Buddhist epistemologists, who offers areas of interest that this tradition offers a comprehensive view of the types of cogni- to cognitive scientists and philosophers tion and their relation to their objects. of mind. THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In talking about the mind, it is impor- ily amount to a classical mind-body dualism tant to defirie the term, for it is far from (of the sort found in Descartes' Meditations unambiguous. In most Indian traditions, the or Plato's Phaedo). Moreover, although they mind is neither a brain structure nor a mech- agree in rejecting the materialist view, they anism for treating information. Rather, mind strongly disagree in their presentations of the is conceived as a complex cognitive process mind. consisting of a succession of related mental In this chapter, we focus mosdy on the states. These states are at least in principle Buddhist tradition, exploring some of its phenomenologically available; that is, they views of the mind. One of the most salient can be observed by attending to the way features of this tradition is that its accounts in which we experience feeling, perceiving, of the mind and consciousness do not posit thinking, remembering, and so on. Indian the existence of a self According to this tra- thinkers describe these mental states as cog- dition, there is no self, and mental activity nizing (jna) or being aware (buddh) of their cannot be understood properly as long as object. Thus, the mind is broadly conceived one believes in a self The Hindu tradition, by traditional Indian thinkers as constituted by contrast, maintains that mental life does by a series of mental states that cognize involve a permanent self Thus, to contextu- their objects. alize Buddhist views of the mind, we begin This general agreement breaks down with a brief presentation of some of the most quickly, however, when we tum to a more important Hindu views. We then present the detailed analysis of the nature and struc- Buddhist Abhidharma and its analysis of the ture of the mind, a topic on which vari- mind in terms of awareness and mental fac- ous schools entertain vasdy different views. tors. Traditionally, the Abhidharma makes Some of these disagreements relate to the up one of the 'three baskets' into which ontological status of mental states and the Buddhists divide their scriptures - Sutra or way they relate to other phenomena, partic- sayings of the Buddha, Vinaya or monas- ularly physical ones. Such disagreements are tic discipline, and Abhidharma, which sys- related to well-known ideas in the Western tematizes Buddhist teachings in the form of tradition, particularly the mind-body dual- detailed analyses of experience. In examin- ism that has concerned Western philoso- ing the Abhidharma, we examine the ways phy since Descartes. But many of the views in which this tradition analyzes the differ- entertained by Indian thinkers are not eas- ent functions of the mind without positing ily mapped in Western terms, as we see in the existence of a self These analyses are in this chapter. certain ways reminiscent of those in cogni- Most Indian thinkers do not consider the tive science that aim to account for cognitive ontological status of mental states to be a processing without invoking a homunculus particularly difficult question, for most of or 'little man' inside the head who over- them accept that there is an extra-physical sees the workings of the mind (or merely reality. Among all the schools, only the passively witnesses the results; see Varela, Materialist, the Carviika, reduces the men- Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, for further dis- tal to physical events. For its proponents, cussion of this parallel). The Abhidharma, mental states do not have any autonomous however, is phenomenological; its concern is ontological status and can be completely to discern how the mind works as evidenced reduced to physical processes. They are just by experience (but especially by mentally properties of the body, much like the ine- disciplined and refined contemplative expe- briating property of beer is a property of rience). Although thus it is also epistemo- beer. Most other thinkers reject this view logical, the Abhidharma does not present forcefully and argue that the mind can any developed epistemological analysis of neither be eliminated nor reduced to the the structure of mental states and the way material. Their endorsement of an extra- they relate to their objects so as to produce physical reality does not, however, necessar- knowledge. To cover this topic we tum to ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND

Dharmakirti (c. 6oo CE), one of the main mind has been largely adopted in the Hindu Buddhist epistemologists, who offers a com- tradition and beyond.' prehensive view of the types of cognition The Sarpkhya approach rests on a dual- and their relation to their objects. istic metaphysics built on the opposi- The phenomenological analyses con- tion between material primordial nature tained in the Abhidharma and the epis- (pradhana) or materiality (prakrti) and a temological analyses of Dharmakirti offer spiritual self (atman) or person (puru§a). 2 significant resources for cognitive scientists Nature is the universal material substratum and philosophers of mind in their efforts to out of which all phenomena other than the gain a better understanding of consciousness. self emerge and evolve. These phenomena, These analyses also constitute the theoretical which make up the world of diversity, are framework for the ways in which the Bud- physical transformations of the three quali- dhist tradition conceives of meditation and ties (gutul) that compose primordial nature. mental training, both with regard to the phe- These three qualities are sattva (trans- nomenology of contemplative mental states parency, buoyancy), rajas (energy, activity), and the epistemology of the types of knowl- and tamas (inertia, obstruction). They are edge that these states are said to provide. principles or forces, rather than building Given the increasing scientific interest in the blocks. All material phenomena, including physiological correlates and effects of med- the intellect and organs of perception, are itation and their relation to consciousness understood to be made up of a combina- (see Chapter 19), it is important for the sci- tion of these three principles. The one prin- entific community to appreciate the phe- ciple not included in this constant process of nomenological and philosophical precision transformation is the self, which is perma- with which these states are conceptualized nent, non-material, and conscious or aware. in the Buddhist tradition. The self is also described as the conscious presence that witnesses the transformations of nature, but does not participate in them. Self and Mental States: As such it is passive, though it witnesses the A Sa:rpkhya View experiences deriving from the transforma- tions of the world of diversity) One of the most important views of the Although the Sarpkhya analysis of mind mind in the Hindu tradition is found in the is dualistic, it does not fit within classical Sarpkhya school. Traditionally this school is mind-body dualism. For the Sarpkhya, the said to have been founded by the philoso- mind involves a non-material spiritual ele- pher Kapila, a legendary figure who may ment, namely the self The self, however, is have lived as early as the 7th century not the same as the mind. Rather, the self is BCE, but the earliest Sarpkhya text we pos- the mere presence to or pure witnessing of sess dates from the 3fd century CE. The the mental activities involved in the ordi- Sarpkhya tradition is one of the six classical nary awareness of objects. This pure wit- schools of Hindu philosophy (Nyaya, Vais- nessing, untainted by the diversity of the esika, Sarpkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and material world, is not sufficient for men- Vedanta). Its influence extends to the other tal activities, for mental activities are rep- schools, particularly the Vedanta school, resentational or semantic and require more which later became especially important in than passive mirroring. Mental activity is the the development of Hindu thought. The apprehension of an object, and this activity Sarpkhya was in fact less a school proper than requires active engagement with objects and a way of thinking based on the categoriza- the formation of ideas and concepts neces- tion of reality. It was crucial in the forma- sary for purposeful action in the world. The tion of Indian philosophical thinking before self cannot account for such activity, how- and after the start of the Common Era, and ever, because it is changeless and hence pas- hence it is unsurprising that its view of the sive. To account for our cognitive activities, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS we therefore need other elements that par- The intellect's reflecting the self and tak- ticipate in the world of diversity. Because ing on the form of an object are not, how- any element that participates in the world ever, sufficient to fully determine experi- of change must emerge out of primordial ence. To become fully cognitive, experience materiality and hence be material, it fol- requires the formation of subjective and lows that the analysis of mental states can- objective poles. Experience needs to be the not be limited to their spiritual dimension experience of a particular individual appre- (the self), but must also involve material hending a particular object. The formation elements. Hence, for the Sihpkhya, mental of the subjective pole is the function of the activity requires the cooperation of the two 'ego-sense' (aharrzkara), the sense of individ- fundamental types of substance that make ual subjectivity or selfhood tied to embodi- up the universe, passive consciousness and ment. This sense colors most of our expe- material nature. riences, which involve a sense of being a Having described the Sarpkhya meta- subject opposed to an object. The determi- physics, we can now sketch its influential nation of the objective pole, on the other analysis of mental activity.4 This analysis hand, is the function of 'mentation' (manas), starts with buddhi, which is usually trans- which oversees the senses and whose spe- lated as 'the intellect' and is the ability to cial function is discrimination. This function distinguish and experience objects. This abil- allows mentation to serve as an intermediary ity provides the prereflective and presubjec- between the intellect and the senses. Men- tive ground out of which determined men- tation organizes sensory impressions and tal states and their objects arise; it is also the objects and integrates them into a temporal locus of all the fundamental predispositions framework created by memories and expec- that lead to these experiences. The intellect tations. In this way, our experience of objects emerges out of primordial matter and there- in the world is created. fore is active, unlike the non-material and Although the dualistic metaphysics asso- passive self The self is described metaphor- ciated with this view was rejected in the ically as a light, for it passively illuminates history of Indian philosophy, the Sihpkhya objects, making it possible for the intellect model of the mind was taken over by other to distinguish them. The intellect operates Hindu schools. It serves as a foundation in a representational way by taking on the of the philosopher Pataiijali's (c. 2nd cen- form of what is known. This representational tury BCE) Yoga view of mind, which is ability works in two directions - toward the similar to the Sihpkhya.5 The Yoga view conscious and uninvolved self and toward also rests on the opposition between pas- the objects. The intellect, thanks to its qual- sive self and active mental activities ( citta), a ity of clarity and transluscence (sattva), takes rubric under which intellect, ego-sense, and on the form of the self by reflecting it. AB a mentation are grouped. Similarly; famkara result, it seems as if the self experiences the (788-820 CE), who savaged the dualism of diversity of objects, when it is actually the the Sarpkhya, took over its model of the intellect that undergoes these experiences, mind in his Advaita Vedanta, emphasizing the self being the mere witness of them. This the contrast between the transcendence of ability of the intellect to usurp the func- the self and the mental activities of the tion of consciousness helps the intellect in 'inner sense' (antabkarava) belonging to the its apprehension of objects, for by itself the person. 6 Hence, the Sarpkhya view can be intellect is active but unconsious. Awareness taken as representative of the Hindu view of of objects arises only when the intellect takes the mind, especially in its emphasis on the on the light of the self and reflects it on difference between a passive witnessing con- objects, much like pictures are created when sciousness and mental activity. light is projected onto a film. In this way, the According to this view, as we have seen, intellect becomes able to take on the form mental events come about through the con- of the object and thus to discern it. junction of two heterogeneous factors - a ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 93 transcendent self and a diversity of men- the diversity of opinions and debates that has tal activities. It is a basic presupposition of animated this tradition. the Hindu tradition that mental life involves The object of the Abhidharma is to ana- a permanent self Yet because mental life lyze both the realm of sentient experience also undeniably involves change, it cannot and the world given in such experience into be reduced to this single, motionless factor of its components in language that avoids the the self; hence the need for the complicated postulation of a unified subject. This anal- analysis briefly summarized here. This ten- ysis concerns the whole range of phenom- sion in accounts of the mind and conscious- ena, from material phenomena to nirvana ness between identity and change, unity and (the state of enlightenment, understood as diversity, is of course also prevalent through- the direct realization of the nature of reality; out Western philosophy and persists in cog- including especially the lack of any essen- nitive science. We tum now to the Bud- tial self and the consequent liberation from dhist tradition, which presents a different suffering). For example, there are elaborate perspective on this issue. discussions of the four primary and four sec- ondary elements that make up matter (see de la Vallee Poussin, 1971, I: 22). There are also The Abhidharma Tradition lengthy treatments of the nature, scope, and and its View of the Mind types of soteriological practices prescribed by the Buddhist tradition, a central focus The Buddhist tradition is based on the oppo- of the Abhidharma. But a large part of the site view of no-self (anatman). For the Bud- Abhidharmic discourse focuses on the anal- dhists, there is no self, and hence mental ysis of mental phenomena and their various activity is not in the service of such an entity, components. It is this part of the Abhid- but rather functions on its own. In short, harma that we examine in this chapter. for the Buddhists there is no self that is In considering experience, the Abhid- aware of the experiences one undergoes or harma proceeds in a rather characteristic the thoughts one has. Rather the thoughts way that may be disconcerting for new- themselves are the thinker, and the experi- comers, but reflects its historical origin as ences the experiencer. mnemonic lists of elements abstracted from How, then, do Buddhists explain the the Buddha's discourses. For each type of complexities of the mind? How do they phenomenon considered, the Abhidharma explain mental regularities if there is no analyzes it into its basic elements (dharma), central controller to oversee the whole lists these elements, and groups them into process? the appropriate categories (examples are For an answer, we tum to the Abhid- given below). The study of the Abhidharma harma, one of the oldest Buddhist tradi- thus often revolves around the consideration tions, which can be traced back to the first of series of extended lists. centuries after the Buddha (566-483 BCE). In elaborating such lists of components First elaborated as lists,7 the Abhidharma of experience and the world given in expe- contains the earlier texts in which Bud- rience, the Abhidharma follows the cen- dhist concepts were developed and hence is tral tenets of Buddhist philosophy, in par- the source of most philosophical develop- ticular the twin ideas of non-substantiality ments in Indian Buddhism. But the Abhid- and dependent origination. According to this harma is not limited to this role as a source philosophy, the phenomena given in experi- of Buddhist philosophical development. It ence are not unitary and stable substances, remained a vital focus of Buddhist thought but complex and fleeting formations of basic and kept evolving, at least until the 7th or elements that arise in dependence on com- 8th century CE. In this chapter, we focus on plex causal nexuses. Such non-substantiality two Indian thinkers from the 4th or sth cen- is particularly true of the person, who is not tury CE, Asailga and Vasubandhu, and ignore a substantial self, but a changing construct 94 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS dependent on -complex configurations of It should be clear from this preliminary mental and material components. This anal- characterization that in elaborating a the- ysis, which is diametrically opposed to the · ory of the mind the Abhidharma relies pri- Sarp.khya view, is not just limited to the per- marily on what we would call-a first-person son, but is applied to other objects. approach. It is by looking directly at experi- All composite things are thus analyzed as ence that we gain an understanding of mind, being constituted of more basic elements. not by studying it as an object and attending Moreover, and this point is crucial, these to its external manifestations. This approach basic elements should not be thought of of the Ahbhidharma is not unlike that of as reified or stable entities, but as dynam- such Western thinkers as James, Brentano, ically related momentary events instanta- and Husserl, who all agree that the study neously coming into and going out of exis- of the mind must be based on attention to tence. Thus, when the Abhidharma analyzes experience (see Chapter 4). This approach matter as being made up of basic compo- is well captured by James's famous claim nents, it thinks of those components not that in the study of the mind, "Introspec- as stable particles or little grains of matter, tive Observation is what we have to rely on but rather as fleeting material events, com- first and foremost and always" (James, 1981, ing into and going out of existence depend- p. 185). ing on causes and conditions. Similarly, the As James himself recognizes, how- mind is analyzed into its basic components; ever, first-person observation of the mind, namely, the basic types of events that although it might seem a straightforward make up the complex phenomenon we call enterprise, is not a simple affair and raises 'mind'. numerous questions. What does it mean to This Abhidharmic analysis is not just observe the mind? Who observes? What is philosophical but it also has practical import. being observed? Is the observation direct Its aim is to support the soteriological prac- or mediated? In addition to these difficult tices that the Buddhist tradition recom- epistemological issues (some of which we mends. The lists of material and mental take up in the next section), there are also events are used by practitioners to inform questions about the reliability of observa- and enhance their practices. For example, tion. We are all able to certain degrees to the list of mental factors we examine shortly observe our own minds, but it is clear that is a precious aid to various types of medi- our capacities to do so differ. Whose obser- tation, providing a clear idea of which fac- vations are to be considered reliable? This tors need to be developed and which are to question is significant for the Abhidharmists, be eliminated. In this way, the Abhidharma who may include in their data not only functions not just as the source of Buddhist ordinary observations but also the observa- philosophy but also informs and supports tions of trained meditators. This inclusion the practices central to this tradition. of observation based on contemplative men- In the Abhidharma the mind is conceived tal training and meditative experience marks as a complex cognitive process consisting of an important difference between the Abhid- a succession of related momentary mental harma and James, as well as other Western states. These states are phenomenologically phenomenologists. Nevertheless, the degree available, at least in principle: They can be to which meditative experience is relevant observed by turning inwardly and attending to Buddhist theories of the mind is not a to the way we feel, perceive, think, remem- straightforward matter, as we see shortly. ber, and so on. When we do so, we notice The comparison between the Abhid- a variety of states of awareness, and we also harma and James goes further, however, than notice that these states change rapidly. It is their reliance on an introspective method. these mental states arising in quick succes- They also share some substantive similari- sion that the Abhidharma identifies as being ties, the most important of which is per- the basic elements of the mind. haps the idea of the stream of consciousness. ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 95

For the Abhidharma, mental states do not is the 64th part of the time necessary to arise in isolation from each other. Rather, click one's fingers or blink an eye (see de la each state arises in dependence on preceding Vallee Poussin, 1991, pp. 70-71). Although moments and gives rise to further moments, these measurements differ, one could argue thus forming a mental stream or continuum that given the imprecision of premodern (santana, rgyud), much like James's 'stream measurement, there is a rough agreement of thought'. This metaphor is also found in between these accounts, which present a the Buddhist tradition in which the Bud- moment of awareness as lasting for about dha is portrayed as saying, "The river never 1/woth of a second. This is already signifi- stops: there is no moment, no minute, no cantly faster than pyschophysical and elec- hour when the river stops: in the same way, trophysiological estimates of the duration of the flux of thought" (de la Vallee Poussin, a moment of awareness as being on the order 1991, p. 69, translation from the French by of 2 5o milliseconds or a quarter of a sec- Dreyfus). ond (see Poppel, 1988; Varela, Thompson, Unsurprisingly, there are also significant & Rosch, 1991, pp. 72-79). But consider the differences between James and the Abhid- claim made by a Theravada Abhidharma harma. One difference of interest to con- text that "in the time it takes for lightning to temporary research is the issue of whether flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind- mental states arise in continuity or not (see moments can elapse" (Bodhi, 1993, p. 156). Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, pp. 72- The time scale in this account, which is stan- 79). James's view is well known: "Con- dard in the Theravada tradition, is faster by sciousness does not appear to itself chopped many orders of magnitude. up in bits" (James, 1981, p. 233). Although This dramatic discrepancy alerts us to the content of consciousness changes, we some of the difficulties of accounts based on experience these changes as smooth and observation. For whom are we to believe? continuous, without any apparent break. On which tradition should we rely? More- The Abhidharma disagrees, arguing that over, we cannot but wonder about the although the mind is rapidly changing, its sources of these differences. Do they derive transformation is discontinuous. It is only from the observations of meditators, or are to the untrained observer that the mind they the results of theoretical elaborations? appears to flow continuously. According It is hard to come to a definitive conclusion, to the Abhidharma, a deeper observation but it seems reasonable to believe that these reveals that the stream of consciousness is accounts are not simply empirical observa- made up of moments of awareness, moments tions, but largely theoretical discussions, per- that can be introspectively individuated and haps supplemented by observation reports. described. Hence one must be cautious and not assume Several Abhidharma texts even offer that these texts reflect empirical findings. measurements of this moment, measure- Although some may; they are mostly the- ments one would expect to be based on oretical elaborations, which cannot be taken empirical observation. Yet such claims are at face value, but require critical interpre- problematic, for different Abhidharma tra- tation. Finally, another Abhidharma text ditions make claims that at times are strik- seems to muddy the waters further by claim- ingly at odds with one another. For exam- ing that the measure of a moment is beyond ple, the an important text the understanding of ordinary beings. Only from the first centuries of the Common Era, enlightened beings can measure the dura- states that there are 120 basic moments in tion of a moment (de la Vallee Poussin, 1991, an instant. The text further illustrates the p. 73). Thus it is not surprising that we are duration of an instant by equating it to the left wondering1 time needed by an average spinner to grab According to the Abhidharma, the men- a thread. Not at all, argues another text: tal episodes that compose a stream of con- This measurement is too coarse. A moment sciousness take as their objects either real or THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS fictional entities. This object-directed char- tal states, but goes much further in its anal- acter of mind h-as been called 'intentionality' ysis, breaking down each mental state into by Western philosophers, such as Brentano. its components. According to the Abhid- and Husserl. Brentano claimed that inten- harma schema, which is to olir knowledge tionality is an essential feature of conscious- unique, each mental state is analyzed as ness and proposed it as a criterion of the having two aspects: (i) the primary factor mental. All acts of awareness are directed of awareness (citta), whose function is to toward or refer to an object, regardless of be aware of the object, and (ii) mental fac- whether this object is existent or not. We tors (caitesika), whose function is to qual- cannot think, wish, or dread unless our ify this awareness by determining its qual- mind is directed toward something thought itative nature as pleasant or unpleasant, about, wished for, or dreaded, which thus focused or unfocused, calm or agitated, pos- appears to the mind. Therefore, to be aware itive or negative, and so on. The philosopher is for something to appear to the mind. The Vasubandhu (c. 4th or sth century CE), one Abhidharma seems to share this view, hold- of the great Abhidharmists, explains this dis- ing that every moment of cognition relates to tinction between awareness and mental fac- particular objects, and hence it assumes that tors as follows: intentionality and consciousness are insepa- rable.8 Cognition or awareness apprehends the The Abhidharma also holds that this thing itself, and just that; mental factors stream of consciousness is not material. It or dharmas associated with cognition such as sensation, etc., apprehend special char- is associated with the body during this life- acteristics, special conditions (de la Vallee time, but will come to exist in dependence Poussin, 1971, I: 30}.9 on other bodies after the death of this body. It is crucial to recognize, however, that the The basic insight is that mental states have immaterial stream of consciousness is not a two types of cognitive functions- (1) aware- soul in the Platonic or Cartesian sense, but an ness and (2) cognitive and affective engage- impersonal series of mental events. Buddhist ment and characterization. The mental state philosophers do not believe in an ontology of is aware of an object. For example, the sense substances - that reality comprises the exis- of smell is aware of a sweet object. But men- tence of independent entities that are the tal states are not just states of awareness. subjects of attributes or properties. Rather, They are not passive mirrors in which objects they argue that reality is made up of events are reflected. Rather, they actively engage consisting of a succession of moments. Thus, their objects, apprehending them as pleasant mind and matter are not substances, but or unpleasant, approaching them with par- evanescent events, and mental and mate- ticular intentions, and so forth. For example, rial events interact in a constantly ongo- a gustatory cognition of a sweet object is not ing and fluctuating process. Moreover, Bud- just aware of the sweet taste but also appre- dhist philosophers partake of the general hends the object as pleasant, distinguishes Indian reluctance to separate the mental and certain qualities such as its texture, and so the material. Hence they do not hold that on. It also categorizes the object as being the divide between the material and men- (say) one's favorite Swiss chocolate. Such tal spheres is absolute. Nevertheless, for the characterization of the object is the func- Buddhists, in contrast to the Sa't[lkhya, there tion of the mental factors. We now describe is a sharp divide between the mental, which this distinction between the primary factor of is intentional and conscious, and other ele- awareness and mental factors in more detail. ments. In this respect, Buddhists are perhaps the closest among Indian philosophers to a The Primary Factor ofAwareness classical mind-body dualism. The Abhidharma, however, does not stop The primary factor of awareness ( citta) is at a view of the mind as a succession of men- also described as viji'iana, a term often ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 97 translated as consciousness or cognitive aware- stances, such as fainting, that its presence ness. It is the aspect of the mental state that can be noticed or at least inferred. This con- is aware of the object. It is the very activity sciousness contains all the basic habits, ten- of cognizing the object, not an instrument dencies, and propensities (including those in the service of an agent or self (which, that persist from one life to the next) accu- as we have seen, the Buddhist philosophers mulated by the individual. It thus provides argue is nonexistent). This awareness merely a greater degree of continuity than manifest discerns the object, as in the above exam- cognitive awareness on its own. ple where one apprehends the taste of what The store-consciousness is mistaken by turns out to be one's favorite Swiss choco- the afflictive mentation as being a self In this late. Thus Vasubandhu speaks of awareness way one's core inborn sense of self is formed. as the "bare apprehension of each object" (de From a Buddhist point of view, however, this la Vallee Poussin, 1971, I: 30). sense of self is fundamentally mistaken. It is In most Abhidharma systems, there are a mental imposition of unity where there is six types of awareness: five born from the five in fact only the arising of a multiplicity of physical senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, interrelated physical and mental events. The and touch) and mental cognition. Each type sense of control belonging to one's sense of of sensory cognition is produced in depen- self is thus largely illusory. There is really dence on a sensory basis (one of the five nobody in charge of the physical and men- physical senses) and an object. This aware- tal processes, which arise according to their ness arises momentarily and ceases imme- own causes and conditions, not our whims. diately, to be replaced by another moment The mind is not ruled by a central unit, but of awareness, and so on. The sixth type by competing factors whose strength varies of awareness is mental. It is considered a according to circumstances. sense by the Abhidharma, like the five phys- Thus Asanga, allegedly Vasubandhu's ical senses, though there are disagreements half-brother, posits as many as eight types about its basis (see Guenther, 1976, pp. 20- of consciousness, a doctrine usually asso- 30). ciated with a particular Buddhist school, Some Abhidharma texts, such as Asanga' s the Yogacara. This school contains many (Rahula, 198o), argue that these six types of interesting insights, without which there is consciousness do not exhaust all the possi- no complete understanding of the depth ble forms of awareness. To this list Asanga of Buddhist views of the mind, but there adds two types of awareness: the store- is not space to discuss these insights here. consciousness (alaya-vijnana, kun gzhi rnam Let us simply point out that there are shes) and afflictive mentation (kl4ta-manas, some interesting similarities between the nyon yid; Rahula, 1980, p. 17 ).10 The idea Yogacara and the Sa:qrkhya views. The of a store-consciousness is based on a dis- store-consciousness, in acting as the holder tinction between the six types of awareness, of all the potentialities accumulated by which are all described as manifest cognitive an individual, is not unlike the intellect awareness (pra1J?1:ti-vijnana, 'jug shes), and a (buddhi), whereas the afflictive mentation more continuous and less manifest form of seems similar to the ego-sense ( aha1'[lkiira). awareness, which is the store-consciousness. Furthermore, mental cognition does not This awareness is invoked to answer the fol- seem too different from mentation (manas). lowing objection: If there is no self and the These similarities indicate the reach of the mind is just a succession of mental states, Sarp_khya model, even in a tradition whose then how can there be any continuity in our basic outlook is radically different. mental life? Asanga's answer is that there is a more continuous form of consciousness, Mental Factors which is still momentary, but exists at all times. Because it is subliminal, we usually Mental states are not just states of awareness; do not notice it. It is only jn special circum- they also actively engage their objects, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS qualifying them as pleasant or unpleasant, (lovingkindness), wisdom, equanimity, approachingthem with a particular attitude, and non-harmfulness (compassion). and so on. Mental factors, which are aspects • Six root-afflictions: attachment, anger, of the mental state that characterize the ignorance, pride, negative doubt, and mis- object of awareness, account for this engage- taken view. ment. In other words, whereas conscious- • Twenty branch-afflictions: belligerence, ness makes known the mere presence of the vengefulness, concealment, spite, jeal- object, mental factors make known the par- ousy; avarice, pretense, dissimulation, ticulars of the content of awareness, defining self-satisfaction, cruelty, self-regarding the characteristics and special conditions of shamelessness, other-regarding shame- its object. They qualify the apprehension of lessness, inconsideration, mental dullness, the object as being pleasant or unpleasant, distraction, excitement, lack of confi- attentive or distracted, peaceful or agitated, dence/faith, laziness, lack of conscien- and so forth. tiousness, and forgetfulness. The translation of these elements of the mind (caitesika) as factors is meant to cap- The nature of this complex typology ture the range of meanings that the Abhid- becomes clearer when one realizes that these harma associates with this term. The rela- six groups can be further reduced to three. tion between cognitive awareness and men- The first three groups contain all the neu- tal factors is complex. At times the Abhid- tral factors. They are the factors that can be harma construes this relation diachronically present in any mental state, whether positive as being causal and functional. Factors cause or negative. Hence these factors are neither the mind to apprehend objects in particu- positive nor negative in and of themselves. lar ways. At other times, the Abhidharma The next three groups are different. These seems to emphasize a synchronic perspec- factors are ethically determined. The eleven tive in which cognitive awareness and men- virtuous factors are positive in that they do tal factors coexist and cooperate in the same not compel us toward attitudes that lead to cognitive task. 11 suffering. They leave us undisturbed, open In accordance with its procedure, the to encounter reality with a more relaxed and Abhidharma studies mental factors by listing freer outlook. The twenty-six afflictive fac- them, establishing the ways in which they tors, on the other hand, disturb the mind, arise and cease, and grouping them in the creating frustration and restlessness. They appropriate categories. Each Abhidharma are the main obstacles to the life of the good tradition has a slightly different list. Here we as understood by the Buddhist tradition. The follow a list of 51 mental factors distributed very presence of these factors marks the in 6 groups.12 The mental typology presented mental state as virtuous or afflictive. Thus in this list has a number of interesting fea- it is clear that the Abhidharma typology is tures in relation to more familiar Western explicitly ethical. philosophical and scientific typologies: This presentation also offers interesting insights concerning the cognitive functions • Five omnipresent factors: feeling, discern- of the mind. In particular, the analysis of the ment, intention, attention, and contact five omnipresent factors - feeling, discern- • Five determining factors: aspiration, ment, intention, attention, and contact - appreciation, mindfulness, concentra- shows some of the complexities of Abhid- tion, and intelligence harrnic thinking. These five are described • Four variable factors: sleep, regret, inves- as omnipresent because they are present in tigation, and analysis every mental state. Even in a subliminal state • Eleven virtuous factors: confidence/faith, such as the store-consciousness these five self-regarding shame, other-regarding factors are present. The other factors are not shame, joyful effort, pliability; consci- necessary for the performance of the most entiousness, detachment, non-hatred minimal cognitive task (the apprehension of ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 99 an object, however dimly and indistinctly). on the basis of visual clues. For the Abhid- Hence they are not present in all mental harma, however, this question strikes deeper, states, but only in some. because several meditative states in the Bud- One striking feature of this list is the dhist tradition are described as signless (ani- pre-eminent place of feeling (vedanii, tshor mitta, mthan med).13 Can the mind in these ba) as the first of the factors. This empha- states identify its object without making sis reflects the fundamental outlook of the distinctions? Or is it the case that even in the tradition, which views humans as being first case of signless states the mind still makes and foremost sentient. But it also reflects a distinctions, although they are not linguistic distinctive view of the cognitive realm that or even conceptual? In a short chapter such emphasizes the role of spontaneous value as this one, we cannot delve into this issue, attribution. For the Abhidharma, a mental despite its relevance to the dialogue between state is not only aware of an object but at Buddhism and the sciences of mind. the same time it also evaluates this object. Other factors are also significant. Inten- This evaluation is the function of the feel- tion (cetanii, sems pa) is a central and ing tone that accompanies the awareness and omnipresent factor, which determines the experiences of the object as either pleasant, moral (not ethical) character of the men- unpleasant, or neutral. This factor is central tal state. Every mental state approaches its in determining our reactions to the events object with an intention, a motivation that we encounter, because, for the most part, may be evident to the person or not. This we do not perceive an object and then feel intention determines the moral nature of the good or bad about it out of considerate judg- mental state, whether it is virtuous, non- ments. Rather, evaluation is already built virtuous, or neutral. This factor is associ- into our experiences. We may use reflection ated with the accomplishment of a goal and to come to more objective judgments, but hence is also thought of as a focus of organi- those mostly operate as correctives to our zation for the other factors. spontaneous evaluations. Also important is the role of attention Feeling is not the only important factor, (manasikara, yid la byed pa), another one of however. A mental state involves not only the five omnipresent factors. It is the ability awareness and feeling but also discernment of the mind to be directed to an object. A (sar[!fiiti, 'du shes also often translated as per- contemporary commentator explains atten- ception or recognition). This factor involves tion this way: is the mental fac- the mind's ability to identify the object by tor responsible for the mind's advertence to distinguishing it from other objects. This the object, by virtue of which the object is concept of discernment presents some diffi- made present to consciousness. Its character- culties, however. In its most elaborate form, istic is the conducting of the associated men- discernment is based on our semiotic ability tal states [i.e., factors] to the object. Its func- to make distinctions, mostly through linguis- tion is to yoke the associated mental states tic signs. But for the Abhidharma, the mind's [i.e., factors] to the object" (Bodhi, 1993, ability to identify objects is not limited to lin- p. 81). Every mental state has at least a min- guistic distinctions, however important they imal amount of focus on its object; hence may be. Infants and non-human animals are attention is an omnipresent factor. understood to have the ability to make dis- Attention needs to be distinguished from tinctions, although they do not use sym- two other related factors. The first is concen- bolic thinking. Are these prelinguistic cogni- tration (samadhi, ting nge 'dzin), the ability tions nevertheless semiotic? Do they involve of the mind to dwell on its object single- non-linguistic signs, or do they make dis- pointedly. The second is mindfulness (sm[ti, tinctions without the use of signs? It seems dran pa, also translated as recollection), plausible to argue that some of these states which is the mind's ability to keep the object involve non-linguistic signs, as in the case in focus without forgetting, being distracted, of visual cognitions that distinguish objects wobbling, or floating away from the object. 100 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Both abilities ?-re not present in every men- ousy, avarice, pretense, dissimulation, tal state. Concentration differs from atten- self-satisfaction, cruelty; self-regarding tion in that it involves the ability of the shamelessness, other-regarding shame- mind not just to attend to an object but lessness, inconsideration, mental dullness, also to sustain this attention over a period of distraction, excitement, lack of confi- time. Similarly; mindfulness is more than the dence/faith, laziness, lack of conscien- simple attending to the object. It involves tiousness, and forgetfulness. the capacity of the mind to hold the object in its focus, preventing it from slipping Here again we notice that this list away in forgetfulness. Hence both factors, contains factors that look quite differ- which are vital to the practice of Buddhist ent. Some factors such as ignorance are meditation (see Chapter 19), are included clearly cognitive, whereas others such as among the determining factors. They are anger and jealousy are more affective. They present only when the object is apprehended are grouped together because they are with some degree of clarity and sustained afflictive: They trouble the mind, mak- focus. ing it restless and agitated. They also The factors discussed so far are mainly compel and bind the mind, preventing cognitive, but the Abhidharma list also one from developing more positive atti- includes mental factors we would describe as tudes. This afflictive character may be obvi- emotions. Consider the ethically determined ous in the case of attachment and jeal- factors, starting with the eleven virtuous ousy, which directly lead to dissatisfaction, ones: confidence/faith, self-regarding shame, frustration, and restlessness. Ignorance - other-regarding shame, joyful effort, plia- that is, our innate and mistaken sense of self- bility, conscientiousness, detachment, non- is less obviously afflictive, but its role is hatred (lovingkindness), wisdom, equanim- nonetheless central here, because it brings ity, and non-harmfulness (compassion). about the other more obviously afflictive We would describe several of these fac- factors. tors, such as lovingkindness and compassion, Although there are many elements in the as emotions. These two factors belong to typology of mental factors that we can iden- what we would characterize as the affec- tify as emotions (anger, pride, jealously, lov- tive domain, although here they are under- ingkindness, and compassion), there is no stood not with regard to their affectivity, but category that maps onto our notion of emo- rather in relation to their ethical character. 4 tion. Most of the positive factors are not Hence they are grouped with other fac- what we would call emotions, and although tors, such as wisdom and conscientious- most of the negative factors are affective, ness, that are more cognitive than affec- not all are. Hence it is clear that the Abhid- tive. For the Abhidharma all these factors harma does not recognize the notion of emo- are grouped together. They are all positive tion as a distinct category of a mental typol- in that they promote well-being and free- ogy. There is no Abhidharma category that dom from the inner compulsions that lead to can be used to translate our concept of emo- suffering. tion, and similarly our concept of emotion is The afflictive factors, on the other hand, difficult to use to translate the Abhidharma are precisely those that lead to suffering. terminology. Rather than opposing rational They are by far the most numerous group and irrational elements of the psyche, or and are clearly a major focus of this typology: cognitive and emotive systems of the mind (or brain), the Abhidharma emphasizes the • Six root-afflictions: attachment, anger, distinction between virtuous and afflictive ignorance, pride, negative doubt, and mis- mental factors. Thus, our familiar Western taken view. distinction between cognition and emotion • Twenty branch-afflictions: belligerence, simply does not map onto the Abhidharma vengefulness, concealment, spite, jeal- typology. Although the cognition/emotion ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 101 distinction has recently been called into is the nature of valid cognition (prama1Ja) question by some scientists (see Chapter 29 and what are its types? Hindu thinkers tend and Damasio, 1995), it remains central to present a realist theory, which liberally to most of contemporary cognitive science allows a diversity of instruments of valid and philosophy of mind. The Abhidharma cognition. For example, the Sarpkhya asserts typology offers a different approach, one that there are three types of valid sources in which mental factors are categorized of knowledge: perception (pratyak?a), infer- according to their ethical character. This ence (anumana), and verbal testimony typology could prove fruitful for psychol- (Sabda). The Nyaya, perhaps the most ogists and social and affective neuroscien- important Hindu logico-epistemological tra- tists interested in studying the biobehav- dition, added a fourth type of valid cog- ioral components of human well-being (see nition, analogy (upamana). This fourfold Goleman, 2003). typology provided the most authoritative The analyses of mental factors we have epistemological typology in India. Buddhist reviewed indicate the complexity, sophis- epistemology, however, rejects these typolo- tication, and uniqueness of the Abhid- gies and offers a more restrictive view, lim- harma mental typology. For this reason, the iting knowledge to inference and percep- Abhidharma is often called, somewhat mis- tion. It is in its examination of inference leadingly, 'Buddhist psychology' .'5 Yet the as a source of knowledge that the Buddhist Abhidharma analysis does not answer all tradition analyzes reasoning, in particular the questions raised by the Buddhist view the conditions necessary for the forma- of the mind as lacking a real self In par- tion of sound reasons and all their pos- ticular, it leaves out the issue of the cog- sible types. Hence this tradition is often nitive or epistemic structure of the mental described, also somewhat misleadingly; as states that make up the stream of con- 'Buddhist logic' .'6 sciousness. To examine this issue, we turn The interpretation of the word prama1Ja to another Indian Buddhist tradition, the is itself a topic of debate among Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition of Dignaga and Hindu thinkers. For the latter, this word, and Dharmakirti (see Dreyfus, 1997; Durme, in accordance with its grammatical form, 2004)· refers to 'means of valid cognition'. This understanding also accords with the basic view of this school that knowledge is owned Buddhist Epistemology by a subject, the self, to whom knowledge is ultimately conveyed. For example, the This tradition was started by Dignaga around Nyaya asserts that knowledge is a quality 5 oo CE and was expanded significantly more of the self It is only when I become con- than a century later by Dharmakirti, the scious of something that I can be said to focus of our analysis. Its contribution was know it. This view is energetically rejected the explicit formulation of a complete Bud- by Dharmakirti, who follows the classical dhist logical and epistemological system. Buddhist line that there is no knowing self, The importance of this system in India can only knowledge. Hence, prama1Ja should not be seen in the continuous references to it be taken in an instrumental sense, but as by later Buddhist thinkers and the numer- referring to the knowledge-event, the word ous attacks it received from orthodox Hindu itself being then interpreted as meaning thinkers. It gradually came to dominate the valid cognition. This type of cognition is in Indian Buddhist tradition, even eclipsing the turn defined as that cognition that is non- Abhidharma as the prime focus of intellec- deceptive (avisa11Jvadi-jfiiina): tual creativity. The concern of this tradition is the nature Valid cognition is that cognition [that of knowledge. In the Indian context, this is] non-deceptive (avisarpvadi). Non- issue is formulated as thi,s question: What deceptiveness [consists] in the readiness 102 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

[for the object] to perfonn a function appears to it and in the process reveals the (Dhannakirti, Commentary on Valid object that is apprehended. In this way; Cognition II: 1, translated by Dreyfus, in each mental state cognizes its object. But as Miyasaka, 1971-2). an epistemologist, Dharmaklrti investigates issues left out by the Abhidharma, tackling This statement emphasizes that questions that are central to any philosophi- is not the instrument that a knowing self cal exploration of the mind. In this chapter, uses to know things. There is no separate we examine some of these questions. First, knowing subject, but just knowledge, which we consider Dharmaklrti's analysis of the is pramiay.a. According to this account, nature of cognitive events. We examine his a cognition is valid if, and only if, it is view of the mind as apprehending represen- non-deceptive. Dharmaklrti in tum inter- tations of external objects, rather than the prets non-deceptiveness as consisting of an objects themselves, and the consequences object's readiness to perform a function that that this view has for the issue of whether the relates to the way it is cognized. For example, mind is inherently reflexive (self-revealing the non-deceptiveness of a fire is its dispo- and self-aware). We also examine Dhar- sition to bum, and the non-deceptiveness of maklrti's theory of perception, as well as its perception is its apprehension as burning. some of his views on the nature of concep- This perception is non-deceptive because it tuality and its relation to language. Finally, practically corresponds to the object's own we revisit the issue of intentionality, showing causal dispositions, contrary to the appre- the complexity of this notion and attempting hension of the fire as cold. to disentangle its several possible meanings The scope of the discussion of pramcay.a, within the context of a Buddhist account of however, is not limited to the analysis of the mental. knowledge, but constitutes a veritable philo- sophical method used in investigating other The Reflexive Nature ofMental Events philosophical and even metaphysical topics. All pronouncements about the world and We commonly assume that we have unprob- our ways of knowing it must rest on some lematic access to our environment through attested forms of knowledge, such as percep- our senses. Even casual first-person investi- tion and inference, if they are to be taken gation shows, however, that such access may seriously. No one can simply claim truth, well not be the case. There are cases of per- but must be able to establish statements ceptual illusions, and even when we are not by pinning down their episternic supports. deceived, the perceptions of individuals vary The advantage of this method is that it pro- greatly. Hence philosophy cannot take for vides intertraditional standards of validation granted the common-sense view of percep- and the development of a relatively neutral tual knowledge. Many Western philosophers framework within which philosophical and have argued that our perceptual knowledge metaphysical claims can be assessed, with- goes well beyond the sensible experiences out regard to religious or ideological back- that give rise to it. Although this claim is grounds. This procedure is different from the debatable, we cannot assume without exam- Abhidharmic approach, which presupposes ination that we understand the way in which Buddhist ideas and vocabulary. cognition apprehends its objects. In analyzing the mind, Dharmaklrti starts In thinking about the nature of cognition, from the same view of mind as the Abhid- Dharmaklrti relies crucially on the concept harma. Mind is made up of momentary men- of aspect (akara), a notion that goes back tal states that arise in quick succession. Each to the Sarpkhya, but has been accepted by moment of consciousness comes to be and several other schools. The idea behind this disappears instantaneously; making a place position, which is called in Indian philos- for other moments of awareness. Moreover, ophy sakaravada ('assertion of aspect'), is each moment apprehends the object that that cognition does not apprehend its object ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND nakedly; but rather through an aspect, which the beholding of an internal representation. is the reflection or imprint left by the object From one side, consciousness has an exter- on the mind. For example, a visual sense con- nally oriented feature, called the objective sciousness does not directly perceive a blue aspect (grahyakara). This feature is the form color, but captures the likeness of blue as that a mental state assumes under the influ- imprinted on cognition. Thus, to be aware ence of an external object. The second side of an object does not mean apprehending is the internal knowledge of our own men- this object directly, but having a mental tal states. It is called the subjective aspect state that has the form of this object and (grahakakara), the feature that ensures that being cognizant of this form. The aspect is we are aware of the objective aspect, the rep- the cognitive form or episternic factor that resentation of the object. These two parts allows us to distinguish mental episodes and do not exist separately. Rather, each mental differentiate among our experiences. With- state consists of both and hence is necessar- out aspects, we could not distinguish, for ily reflexive (aware of itself in being aware instance, a perception of blue from a percep- of its object). tion of yellow, for we do not perceive yellow The necessary reflexivity of consciousness directly. The role of the aspect is thus cru- is understood by Dharmakllrti and his fol- cial in Dharmakirti's system, for it explains lowers as a particular type of perception a key feature of consciousness: Conscious- called self-cognition ( svasar[l.vedana). Self- ness is not the bare seeing that direct real- cognition can be compared to what Western ism and common sense suppose, but rather philosophers call apperception; namely, the the apprehension of an aspect that repre- knowledge that we have of our own men- sents this object in the field of conscious- tal states. It is important to keep in mind, ness. The aspect is not external to conscious- however, that apperception does not imply ness. It is not only the form under which an a second and separate cognition directed external object presents itself to conscious- toward a given mental state of which one ness but also the form that consciousness is thereby aware. For Dharmakirti, apper- assumes when it perceives its object. Thus ception is not introspective or reflective, for an aspect is a representation of objects in it does not take inner mental states as its consciousness, as well as the consciousness objects. It is instead the self-cognizing fac- that sees this representation. tor inherent in every mental episode, which The implication of this analysis is that provides us with a non-thematic awareness perception is inherently reflexive. Aware- ofourmentalstates. For Dharmakirti, reflex- ness takes on the form of an object and ivity is a necessary consequence of his analy- reveals that form by assuming it. Thus, in sis of perception, according to which a sub- the process of revealing external things, cog- jective aspect beholds an objective aspect nition reveals itself This view of cogni- that represents the external object within tion as 'self-luminous' ( svayam prakasa) and the field of consciousness. Self-cognition is self-presencing is not unique to Dignaga, nothing over and above this beholding. its first Buddhist propounder, or to Dhar- Self-cognition is the intuitive presence makirti, his follower. It is also accepted that we feel we have toward our own men- by other thinkers, particularly the Hindu tal episodes. We may not be fully aware of Vedantins, who identify consciousness as all the aspects and implications of our expe- the self and describe it as being 'only riences, but we do seem to keep track of known to itself' (svayattvedya) and 'self- them. Tibetan scholars express this idea by effulgent' (svayamprabha; see Gupta 1998, saying that there is no person whose men- 2003; Mayeda, 1979h992, pp. 22, 44). For tal states are completely hidden to him- or Dignaga and Dharmakirti, however, the herself This limited self-presence is not due inherently reflexive character of conscious- to a metaphysical self, but to self-cognition. ness is not a consequence of its transcen- Because apperception does not rely on rea- dent and pure nature, but of its consisting of soning, it is taken to be a form of perception. THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Apperception does not constitute, however, mental states. For Dharmaklrti, as for the a separate reflective or introspective cogni- Abhidharma, suffering and happiness are tion. Otherwise, the charge that the notion not external to consciousness, but integral of apperception opens an infinite regress to our awareness of external objects. Our would be hard to avoid. perceptions arise with a certain feeling-tone, Dharrnaklrti's ideas are not unlike those be it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; this Western philosophers who have argued that feeling-tone is a function of the presence consciousness implies self-consciousness of the mental factor of feeling as described (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such philosophers by the Abhidharma. This feeling needs to include (despite their otherwise vast dif- be noticed, however; otherwise we would ferences) Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Kant, not be aware of how the apprehension Husser!, and Sartre (see Wider, 1997, of the object feels. Because this noticing pp. 7-39). According to Locke, a person is cannot be the function of another men- conscious of his or her own mental states. tal state without incurring the problem of He defines consciousness as "the perception an infinite regress, it must be the mental of what passes in a man's mind" (Essay state apprehending the external object that Concerning Human Understanding II: ii, becomes aware at the same time of the 19). Leibniz, in his New Essays Concerning feeling. This conclusion indicates, for Dhar- Human Understanding (II: i, 19), criticizes maklrti, the dual nature of mental states. Locke, pointing out that this view leads to In a single mental state, two aspects can an infinite regress, for if every cognitive act be distinguished: (1) the objective aspect, implies self-awareness, self-knowledge must the representation of the external object in also be accompanied by another awareness, consciousness, and (2) the subjective aspect, and so on ad infinitum. This regress arises, the apprehension of this appearance or however, only if knowledge of one's mental self-cognition. states is assumed to be distinct from knowl- For Dharmaklrti, a mental state thus has edge of external objects. This assumption two functions. It apprehends an external is precisely what Dharmaklrti denies. A object (alambana) and beholds itself The consciousness is aware of itself in a non-dual apprehension of an external object is not way that does not involve the presence of direct, but results from the causal influence a separate awareness of consciousness. The of the object, which induces cognition to cognizing person simply knows that he or experience (anubhava) the object's repre- she cognizes without the intervention of a sentation. Hence, mind does not experience separate perception of the cognition. This an external object, but beholds an internal knowledge is the function of apperception, representation that stands for an external which thus provides an element of certainty object. Cognition cannot be reduced to a with respect to our mental states. Apper- process of direct observation, but involves ception does not necessarily validate these a holding of an inner representation. This states, however. For example, one can take beholding is not, however, an apprehension oneself to be seeing water without knowing in the usual sense of the word, for the two whether that seeing is veridical. In this case, aspects of a single mental episode are not one knows that one has an experience, but separate. It is an 'intimate' contact, a direct one does not know that one knows. The experiencing of the mental state by itself determination of the validity of a cognition through which we become aware of our is not internal or intrinsic to that cogni- mental states at the same time as we per- tion, but is to be established by practical ceive things. investigation. Several arguments are presented by Dhar- Theory ofPerception maklrti to establish the reflexive nature of consciousness.17 One of his main arguments This view of cognition as bearing only indi- concerns the nature of suffering and hap- rectly on external objects has obvious con- piness as it reveals the deeper nature of sequences for the theory of perception. The ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND theory of perception is an important element ring to argue on the basis of the commonsen- of Dharmakirti's epistemology, for we have sical assumption that external objects exist. access to external reality first and foremost His theory of perception thus has a pecu- through perception, the primary valid cog- liar two-tiered structure, in which he pre- nition. But this access is not as unprob- supposes the existence of external objects, lematic as one might think. Although it which he then ultimately rejects to pro- might seem commonsensical that percep- pound a form of idealism. tion results from our encounter with the Among these two tiers, the one Dharm- world, in reality consciousness does not akirti most often refers to is the Sautrantika directly cognize the object, but only indi- representationalist theory of perception. rectly cognizes it. For Dharmakirti, as we According to this view, consciousness does have seen, the mind has direct access only not have direct access to external objects, to the representational aspect caused by the but grasps objects via the intermediary of object; the object itself remains inaccessi- an aspect caused by and similar to an exter- ble to consciousness. The similarity between nal object. He sometimes replaces this view object and aspect - and hence between by a Yogacara view, which holds that inter- object and consciousnesss, the aspect being nal impressions are not produced by exter- the cognitive form of the object that stands nal objects, but by internal tendencies. This for the object in the field of consciousness- shift into full-blown idealism allows Dhar- is the crucial element in this causal the- makirti to bypass the difficulties involved ory of perception. This similarity ensures in explaining the relation between internal that perception is not locked up in its own perceptions and external objects. Because appearances, as conceptions are. Conscious- there are no external objects, the problem ness is not in direct contact with the exter- of the relation between internal impres- nal world, but only with an internal impres- sions and external objects does not arise. At sion caused by the external object. Hence this level, his philosophy of perception can the external object remains hidden, though be described as phenomenalist, for it holds not completely. that there is no external object outside of When pressed by these problems, Dhar- aspects. makirti sometimes shifts between the views Another major feature of Dharmakirti's of two different Buddhist philosophical account is his sharp separation between schools, using one perspective to bypass perception and conception, a separation problems that arise in the other. These two enshrined in his definition of perception as views are the Sautrantika theory of per- the cognition that is unrnistaken (abhranta) ception, which is representationalist in the and free from conceptions (kalpanapocf.ha) ways just described, and the Yogacara the- (Commentary on Valid Cognition, III: 300 ory, which is idealist and denies that there cd). Because perception is unrnistaken and is anything outside of consciousness. Fol- conception is mistaken, perception must be lowing Dignaga's example and his strategy free from conception. This analysis of per- of ascending scales of philosophical analysis, ception differs sharply from the dominant Dharmakirti holds that the Yogacara theory account in India, the epistemological real- is truer and hence higher on the scale of anal- ism of the Nyaya school and its assertion of ysis. This theory denies that there are any the existence of a determinate (savikalpaka) external objects over and above the direct form of perception. For the Nyaya, percep- objects of perception. Thus its view of per- tion does not stop with the simple taking ception is phenomenalist: It reduces external in of sensory stimuli, but also involves the objects to interpreted mental data, but such ability to categorize this input. Although data are no longer taken to stand for external we may start with a first moment of inde- objects (because it is now held that nothing terminate perception, in which we merely exists outside of consciousness). This theory, take in external reality, we do not stop there however, is counter-intuitive, and so Dhar- but go on to formulate perceptual judg- makirti refers to it only occasionally, prefer- ments. Moreover, and this is the crux of the 106 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS question, these judgments are for the Nyaya sions, which by themselves are not forms fully perceptual. They are not mistaken of knowledge but become so only when conceptual overlays, but true reflections of they are integrated within our categorical reality. schemes. For example, when we are hit on This commonsensical view of perception the head, we first have an impression. We is not acceptable to Dharmakirti, for it leads just have a sensation of pain, which is not to an unenviable choice: either accept the by itself cognitive. This sensation becomes reality of the abstract entities necessary for cognitive when it becomes integrated into a the articulation of the content of percep- conceptual scheme, in which it is explained tion or reject the possibility of an unmis- as being an impact on a certain part of our taken cognition. Because neither possibil- body due to certain causes. It is only then ity is acceptable for Dharmakirti, he holds that the impression of being hit becomes that perception can only be non-conceptual. fully intentional. Prior to this cognitive inte- There is no determinate perception, for the gration, the impression, or to speak Dhar- judgments induced by perception are not makirti's language, the aspect, does not yet perceptual, but are just conceptual superim- represent anything in the full sense of the positions. They do not reflect the individual word. It only becomes so when interpreted reality of phenomena, but instead address conceptually. their general characteristics. Because those This view of perception agrees with Dhar- are only constructs, the cognitions that con- makirti's analysis of the validity of cogni- ceive them cannot be true reflections of real- tions, which consists in their being 'non- ity. Hence for perception to be undistorted deceptive', a term interpreted in practical in a universe of particulars, it must be totally terms. Cognitions are valid if; and only if; free from conceptual elaborations. This posi- they have the ability to lead us toward suc- tion implies a radical separation between cessful practical actions. In the case of per- perception, which merely holds the object as ception, however, practical validity is not as it is in the perceptual ken, and interpretation straightforward as one might think. Achiev- of this object, which introduces conceptual ing practical purposes depends on correctly constructs into the cognitive process. describing the objects we encounter. It is not This requirement that perception be non- enough to see an object that is blue; we must conceptual is the cornerstone of the Bud- also see it as being blue. To be non-deceptive, dhist theory of perception. But it creates a cognition depends on the appropriate iden- problems for Dharmakirti. It would seem tification of the object as being this or that given his privileging of perception he that. Perceptions, however, do not identify should hold an empiricist view, according their objects, for they are not conceptual. to which perception boils down to a bare They cannot categorize their objects, but encounter with reality and knowledge is only hold them without any determination. given to the senses. Dharmakirti should hold Categorization requires conceptual thought the view that the aspects through which we under the form of a judgment. Such a judg- come to perceive reality are fully represen- ment subsumes its object under an appro- tational like Locke's ideas, that they stand priate universal, thereby making it part of for external objects, and that their appre- the practical world where we deal with long- hension is in and of itself cognitive. Dhar- lasting entities that we conceive of as parts makirti's view of perception, however, is of a determined order of things. For exam- more complex, for he shares with Sellars ple, we sense a blue object that we catego- (19 56) the recognition that knowledge, even rize as blue. The perceptual aspect (the blue at the perceptual level, does not boil down aspect) is not yet a representation in the full to an encounter with reality, but requires sense of the word, because its apprehension, active categorization. We do not know things the perception of blue, is not yet cognitive. by sensing them, for perception does not It is only when it is interpreted by a concep- deliver articulated objects, but only impres- tion that the aspect becomes a full-fledged ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND intentional object standing for an external given'. Locke, for example, holds that con- object. Hence, Dharmaklrti's account of cepts and words are linked through associ- perception leads us to realize the impor- ation. The word 'tree' acquires its meaning tance of categorical interpretation in the for- by becoming connected with the idea tree, mation of perceptual knowledge, a position which is the mental image of a tree. Hence that is not without problems for his system, for Locke the representation of the tree is given his emphasis on the primacy and non- not formed through language, but is given conceptuality of perception. Nevertheless, to sensation (Dharmaklrti's perception). We the merit of this analysis is that it disentan- understand a tree as a tree through mere gles the processes through which we come acquaintance with its representation with- to know the world, explaining the role of out recourse to concepts. Dharmaklrti's phi- perception as a way to contact the world losophy is quite different, for it emphasizes while emphasizing the role of conceptual the constitutive and constructive nature of categorization in the formation of practical language. This conception oflanguage is well knowledge. captured by one ofDharmaklrti's definitions of thought:

Thought and Language Conceptual cognition is that consciousness in which representation (literally, appear- In examining thought (kalpanii), Dhar- ance) is fit to be associated which words maklrti postulates a close association with (Ascertainment of Valid Cognition 40: language. In fact, the two can be considered 6-7, in Vetter, 1966). equivalent from an epistemological point of view. Language signifies through conceptual Thought identifies its object by associat- mediation in the same way that thought con- ing the representation of the object with a ceives of things. The relation between the word. When we conceive of an object we do two also goes the other way: We do not first not apprehend it directly, but through the understand things independently of linguis- mediation of its aspect. Mediation through tic signs and then communicate this under- an aspect also occurs with perception, but standing to others. Dharmaklrti recognizes a here the process of mediation is different. cognitive import to language; through lan- In the case of perception there is a direct guage we identify the particular things we causal connection between the object and encounter, and in this way we integrate the its representation, but no such link exists object into the meaningful world we have for thought. There is no direct causal link constructed. The cognitive import of lan- between the object and thought, but rather guage is particularly obvious in the acqui- an extended process of mediation in which sition of more complex concepts. In these linguistic signs figure prominently. cases, it is clear that there is nothing in ForDharmaklrti, the starting point of this experience that could possibly give rise to process is our encounter with a variety of these concepts without language. Without objects that we experience as being simi- linguistic signs thought cannot keep track of lar or different. We construct concepts in things to any degree of complexity. Dhar- association with linguistic signs to capture maklrti also notes that we usually remember this sense of experienced similarity and dif- things by recollecting the words associated ference. This linguistic association creates a with those things. Thus concepts and words more precise concept in which the represen- mutually depend on each other. tations are made to stand for a commonality This close connection between thought that the objects are assumed to possess. For and language, inherited from Dignaga, example, we see a variety of trees and appre- differentiates Dharmaklrti from classical hend a similarity between these objects. At empiricists, such as Locke and modern this level, our mental representations have sense-data theorists, who believe in what yet to yield a concept of tree. The con- Sellars (1956) describes as the 'myth of the cept of tree is formed when we connect our 108 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS representations with a socially formed and plex topic is beyond the scope of this chap- communicated sign and assume that they ter. Suffice it to say that the apoha theory stand for a treeness that we take individ- is a way to explain how language signifies ual trees to share. In this way experiences in a world of individuals. Linguistic mean- give rise to mental representations, which ing poses a particularly acute problem for are transformed into concepts by associa- Dignaga and Dharmakm:i, for they are com- tion with a linguistic sign. The formation mitted to a connotationist view of language, of a concept consists of the assumption that in which sense has primacy over reference. mental representations stand for an agreed- Such a view, however, is difficult to hold in upon imagined commonality. Thus concepts a nominalist ontology that disallows abstract come to be through the conjunction of the entities, such as meaning.'s experience of real objects and the social pro- The apoha theory tries to solve this cess oflanguage acquisition. Concept forma- conundrum by arguing that language does tion is connected to reality, albeit in a medi- not describe reality positively through uni- ated and highly indirect way. versals, but negatively by exclusion. Lan- But concept formation is also mistaken, guage is primarily meaningful, but this does according to this view. A concept is based not mean that there are real senses. Rather, on the association of a mental representa- we posit agreed-upon fictions that we con- tion with a term that enables the repre- struct for the sake of categorizing the world sentation to stand for a property assumed according to our purposes. Thus 'cow' does to be shared by various individuals. In not describe Bessie through the mediation of Dharmakm:i's nominalist world of indi- a real universal (cowness), but by excluding viduals, however, things do not share a a particular (Bessie) from the class of non- common property; rather; the property is cow. Matilal describes Dignaga's view this projected onto them. The property is man- way: ufactured when a representation is made to stand for an assumed commonality, which a Each name, as Dignaga understands, variety of individuals are mistakenly taken dichotomizes the universe into two: those to to instantiate. Hence· this property is not which the name can be applied and those real; it is merely a pseudo-entity superim- to which it cannot be applied. The function of a name is to exclude the object from the posed (adhyaropa) on individual realities. class of those objects to which it cannot be This property is also not reducible to a gen- applied. One might say that the function of eral term. In other words, the commonality a name is to locate the object outside of the that we project onto things does not reside class of those to which it cannot be applied in using the same term to designate discrete (Matilal, 1971, p. 45). individuals. Upon analyzing the notion of sameness of terms, we realize that identifying Although linguistic form suggests that we individual terms as being the same presup- subsume an individual under a property, poses the concept of sameness of meaning, analysis reveals that words merely exclude in relation to which the individual terms can objects from being included in a class to be identified. Thus commonality is not due which they do not belong. The function simply to a term, but requires the forma- of a name is to locate negatively an object tion of concepts on the basis of the mistaken within a conceptual sphere. The impression imputation of commonality onto discrete that words positively capture the nature of individuals. objects is misleading. What does it mean, however, for a This theory was immediately attacked by concept to be based on an assumed Hindu thinkers, such as Kumarila and Uddy- commonality? Here Dharmakm:i's theory otakara, who raised strong objections. One must be placed within its proper context, of them was that this theory is counter- the apoha or exclusion theory of language, intuitive, because we do not perceive which was created by Dignaga. This com- ourselves to eliminate non-cows when we ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 109 conceive of cows. Dharmak:Irti's theory of This grounding in perception ensures that, concept formation is in many ways an although conception is mistaken in the way attempt to answer these attacks. It argues reviewed above, it is neither baseless nor ran- that the apoha theory is not psychological, dom and hence can lead to the formation of but epistemological. In conceiving of objects concepts that will be attuned to the causal we do not directly eliminate other objects, capacities of particulars. but instead rely on a representation that is made to stand in for an assumed common- Dharmakfrti and Abhidharma: ality shared by several particulars. It is this Intentionality Revisited fictional commonality that is the result of an exclusion. There is nothing over and above Dharmaklrti's analysis has in certain respects particulars, which are categorized on the a great deal of continuity with the Abhid- basis of their being excluded from what they harma. Both view the mind as constituted by are not. The concept that has been formed a succession of mental states in accordance in an essentially negative way is projected with their ontological commitments, which onto real things. In the process of making privilege the particular over the general. judgments such as 'this is a tree', the real Reality is made up of a plurality of elements differences that exist between the different (here moments of awareness), and general- trees come to be ignored and the similarities ity, when it is not a figment of our imag- are reified into a common universal property, ination, is at best the result of aggregation. which is nothing but a socially agreed-upon This emphasis on the particular derives from fiction. the central tenets of the Buddhist tradition; The eliminative nature of thought and namely, non-substantiality and dependent language is psychologically revealed when origination. In Dharmaklrti's epistemologi- we examine the learning process. The word cal approach, this emphasis expresses itself 'cow', for instance, is not learned only in valuing perception over conception, and through a definition, but by a process of in the problematic but necessary coopera- elimination. We can give a definition of tion between the two forms of cognition. We 'cow', but the definition works only if its ele- do not come to know things by merely com- ments are known already. For example, we ing across them, but by integrating them into can define cows as animals having dewlaps, our conceptual schemes on the basis of our horns, and so on (the traditional definition of experiences. 'cow' in Indian philosophy). But how do we One question raised by this analysis con- know what counts as a dewlap? Not just by cerns intentionality. The Abhidharma tra- pointing to the neck of a cow; but by elimi- dition had assumed all along that cogni- nating the cases that do not fit. In this way, tions were intentional, but did not provide we establish a dichotomy between those ani- a systematic analysis of intentionality. Dhar- mals that fit, and other animals or things maklrti :fills this gap, analyzing the way in that do not, and on the basis of this negative which various types of cognition bear on dichotomy we construct a :fictive property, their objects. But because he makes a sharp cowness. This construction is not ground- distinction between perception and concep- less, however, but proceeds through an indi- tion, his analysis does not yield a single rect causal connection with reality. Concepts concept of intentionality, but on the con- are not formed a priori, but elaborated as trary leads us to realize that this central a result of experiences. Dharmak:Irti's solu- notion may have to be understood in mul- tion to the problem of thought and mean- tiple ways. The cognitive process starts with ing is thus to argue that in a world bereft our encounter with the world through per- of real abstract entities (properties), there ceptions, but this encounter is not enough are only constructed intensional (linguistic) to bring about knowledge. Only when we pseudo-entities, but that this construction are able to integrate the objects deliv- is based on experience; that is, perception. ered through the senses into our categorical 110 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS schemes can we be said to know them in the the flow of thoughts gradually reappears, full sense of the word. Hence, if we under- and we are able to make judgments about stand intentionality as cognitive - that is, as what we saw during our meditation. One is pertaining to knowledge-we may well have then also able to make a clear differentiation to agree with Dharmakirti that perception between the products of thoughts and the is not in and of itself fully intentional. Only bare delivery of the senses and to distinguish when perception is coordinated with con- cognitive from phenomenal intentionality. ception does it become intentional; hence it The analysis of intentionality, however, can be said to be intentional only in a derived may have to go even further to account for sense of the word. Perception is not in and of all the forms of cognition known to Buddhist itself cognitive, but only inasmuch as it has traditions. We alluded above to the Abhid- the ability to induce conceptual interpreta- harmic idea of a store-consciousness, a sub- tions of its objects. This does not mean, how- liminal form of cognition that supports all ever, that perception is completely blank or the propensities, habits, and tendencies of a purely passive. It has an intentional func- person. Although such a store-consciousness tion, that of delivering impressions that we is usually asserted by the Yogaciira to sup- take in and organize through our conceptual port their idealist view, it is known to other schemes. Hence, perception can be said to traditions under other names and hence has have a phenomenal intentionality, which to be taken seriously within a Buddhist acc- may be revealed in certain forms of medi- ount of the mind, regardless of the par- tative experiences. ticular views that are associated with it. Dharmakirti alludes to such experiences But given the particularities of this form when he describes a form of meditation, in of consciousness, its integration within a which we empty our mind without closing Buddhist view of the mind is not without it completely to the external world (Com- problems. The difficulties come from the mentary on Valid Cognition III: 12 3-5, in fact that the store-consciousness does not Miyasaka 1971-2). In this state of liminal seem to have cognitive or even phenomenal awareness, things appear to us but we do not intentionality. Because it does not capture identify them. We merely let them be. When any feature, it cannot be said to know its we come out of this stage, the usual concep- object, like conceptions. Because it is sub- tual flow returns, and with it the concep- liminal, it is difficult to attribute to it a phe- tualization that allows us to identify things nomenal content able to induce categoriza- as being this or that. This experience shows, tion, like perceptions. How then can it be Dharmakirti argues, that identification is not intentional? perceptuat but is due to conceptualization. To respond to this question would neces- In such a state, perception takes place but sitate an analysis that goes well beyond the not conceptualization. Hence, perception is purview of this chapter. Several avenues are a non-conceptual sensing onto which inter- open to us. We could argue that the store- pretations are added. consciousness is not intentional and hence Due to the speed of the mental process, that intentionality is not the defining char- the untrained person cannot differentiate acteristic of the mental, but only of certain conceptual from non-conceptual cognitions. forms of cognitions. We would then be faced It is only on special occasions, such as in some with the task of explaining the nature of the form of meditation, that a clear differentia- mental in a way that does not presuppose tion can be made. There, the flow of thought intentionality. Or we could extend the con- gradually subsides, and we reach a state in cept of intentionality, arguing that the store- which there is a bare sensing of things. In consciousness is not intentional in the usual this state, what we call shapes and colors are cognitive or phenomenal senses of the word, seen barely (i.e., as they are delivered to our but rather that its intentionality consists in senses without the adjunctions of concep- its having a dispositional ability to generate tual interpretations). When one gradually more explicit cognitive states. Some Western emerges from such a non-conceptual state, phenomenologists, notably Husserl and ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND 111

Merleau-Ponty, distinguish 'object directed ing rich phenomenological investigations of intentionality' from 'operative intentional- various aspects of human cognition and ity' (see Chapter 4). Whereas the former exploration of various levels and types of is what we usually mean by intentional- meditative consciousness. This tradition also ity; the latter is a non-reflective tacit sensi- shows, however; that it would be naive to bility; a spontaneous and involuntary level take these investigations of consciousness that makes us ready to respond cognitively as being objectively given or established. and affectively to the world, though it is Rather, they are accounts of experience that not by itself explicitly cognitive. This most are often intertwined with doctrinal formu- basic form of intentionality is important lations and hence are open to critique, revi- in explaining our openness to the world. sion, and challenge, like any other human It also seems an interesting avenue for interpretation. Indeed, these formulations exploring the cognitive nature of the store- need to be taken seriously and examined consciousness. with the kind of critical spirit and rigorous philosophical thinking exhibited by Dhar- maklrti. Only then, can we do justice to the Conclusion insights of this tradition.

We can now see the richness and the com- plexities of the Indian Buddhist analyses of Glossary the nature of the mind and consciousness. The Abhidharma provides the basis of these Slupkhya analyses, with its view of the mind as a Pradhiina: primordial nature or prakrti, stream of moments of consciousness and its materiality. The primordial substance distinction between the primary factor of out of which the diversity of phe- awareness and mental factors. This tradition nomena arise. It is composed of three also emphasizes the intentional nature of qualities (gutul): sattva (transparency, consciousness, the ability of consciousness to buoyancy), rajas (energy, activity), and be about something else. As we have seen, tamas (inertia, obstruction). They are however, this concept is far from self-evident the principles or forces whose combi- and needs further philosophical clarifica- nation produces mental and material tion. This clarification is one of the impor- phenomena. tant tasks of Dharmakirti's philosophy. In accomplishing this task, Dharmak:Irti criti- Atman: spiritual self or per- cally explores the variety of human cogni- son. The non-material spiritual ele- tions, distinguishing the conceptual from the ment that merely witnesses the men- perceptual modes of cognition and empha- tal activities involved in the ordinary sizing the constructed nature of the for- awareness of objects. mer and its close connection with language. Buddhi: usually translated as 'the intel- Yet, as we have also seen, this philoso- lect'. It has the ability to distinguish and phy is not always able to account for all experience objects. This ability pro- the insights of the Abhidharma, particu- vides the prereflective and presubjec- larly those concerning the deeper layers of tive ground out of which determined consciousness. mental states and their objects arise. It When we look at the Indian Buddhist is also the locus of all the fundamental tradition, we should not look for a unified predispositions that lead to these expe- and seamless view of the mind. Like any riences. other significant tradition, Indian Buddhist Aharrtkiira: egoity or ego-sense. This is philosophy of mind is plural and animated the sense of individual subjectivity or by debates, questions, and tensions. This rich selfhood tied to embodiment, which tradition has a great deal to offer contem- gives rise to the subjective pole of porary mind science and philosophy, includ- cognition. 112 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Manas: mentation. It oversees the senses there is no manifest mental activity, it and discriminates between objects. By also provides a sense of continuity for serving as an intermediary betwe.en the Theravada school, which asserts its the intellect and the senses, menta- existence. tion organizes sensory impressions and Klf.$ta-manas: afflictive mentation. This objects and integrates them into a tem- is the inborn sense of self that arises poral framework created by memories from the apprehension of the store- and expectations. consciousness as being a self From a Citta: mental activities or Buddhist point of view, however, this internal organ. This is the grouping of sense of self is fundamentally mistaken. buddhi, aharrtkiira, and manas. It is a mental imposition of unity where PramiiJJ.a: instrument of valid cognition of there is in fact only the arising of a mul- the self The Sarpkhya recognizes three tiplicity of interrelated physical and such instruments: perception, infer- mental events. ence, and testimony. The Nyaya adds pramiirJ.a: valid cognition. Not the instru- a fourth one, analogy. ment of a self but the knowledge-event itself There are only two types of valid Buddhist cognition admissible in Buddhist epis- temology, pratyak.c;a, perception, and Citta: primary factor of awareness or anumana, inference. vijiiiina, consciousness. It is the aspect Svasarrwedana: self-cognition. This is the of the mental state that is aware of the limited but intuitive presence that we object, or the bare apprehension of the feel we have toward our own men- object. It is the awareness that merely discerns the object, the activity of cog- tal episodes, which is due not to the nizing the object. presence of a metaphysical self but to the non-thematic reflexive knowledge Caitesika: mental factor. Mental factors that we have of our own mental states. are aspects of the mental state that Because self-cognition does not rely on characterize the object of awareness reasoning, it is taken to be a form of and account for its engagement. In perception. It does not constitute, how- other words, whereas consciousness ever, a separate reflective or introspec- makes known the mere presence of the tive cognition. Otherwise, the charge object, mental factors make known the that the notion of apperception opens particulars of the content of awareness, an infinite regress would be hard to defining the characteristics and special avoid. conditions of its object. Alaya-vijiiiina: store-consciousness. This continuously present subliminal con- Notes sciousness is posited by some of the Yogacara thinkers to provide a sense 1. Presenting the SarplBrahman. ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: INDIAN THEORIES OF MIND

3 . The notion of a pure and passive 'witness 14- For a discussion of whether compassion and consciousness' is a central element of many lovingkindness, seen from a Buddhist point of Hindu views about consciousness (see Gupta, view, are emotions, see Dreyfus (2002). 1998, 2003). 15. For a brief but thoughtful discussion of the 4. For a thoughtful discussion of this view of the idea of Buddhism as a psychology, see Gomez mind, see Schweizer (1993). (2004)· 5. Numerous translations of Patafijali's Yoga 16. For discussion of the characteristics ofindian Sutras are available in English. logic, see Matilal (198 5) and Barlingay (197 5). 6. For discussion of the Advaita Vedanta view of On Buddhist logic, see Kajiyama (1966). For consciousness, see Gupta (2003, Chapter 5). an analysis of Dharmakirti's philosophy, see For a philosophical overview of Advaita Dreyfus (1997) and Dunne (2004). Vedanta, see Deutsch (1969). 17. For a detailed treatment of Dharmakirti's 7. For a glimpse of the origins of the Abhid- arguments and their further elaboration in the harma, see Gethin (1992). Tibetan tradition, see Dreyfus (1997, pp. 3 3 8- 8. For Husserl, by contrast, not all conscious- 341, 400-415). ness is intentional in the sense ofbeing object- 18. For more on this difficult topic, see Dreyfus directed. See Chapter 4 and the £nal section (1997) and Dunne (2004). of this chapter. 9. All quotations from this work are translated from the French by G. Dreyfus. References 10. See Rahula (1980, p. 17 ). Although the Theravada Abhidharma does not recognize Barlingay, S. S. (1975). A modem introduction to a distinct store-consciousness, its concept of Indian logic. Delhi: National. bhavaqga dtta, the life-constituent conscious- ness, is similar. For a view of the complexities Bodhi, B. (Ed.). (1993). A comprehensive manual of the bhavaqga, see Waldron (2003, pp. 81- ofAbhidhanna. Seattle, WA: Buddhist Publica- tion Society. 87). Damasio, A. (1995). Descartes' error: Emotion, 11. They are then said to be conjoined (sam- reason and the human brain. New York: Harper payutta, mtshungs !dan), in that they are simultaneous and have the same sensory basis, Perennial. the same object, the same aspect or way of de la Vallee Poussin, L. (1971). L'Abhidhannakosa apprehending this object, and the same sub- de Vasubandhu. Bruxelles: Institut Belge des stance (the fact that there can be only one Hautes Etudes Chinoises. representative of a type of consciousness and de la Vallee Poussin, L. (1991). Notes sur le mental factor at the same time). See Waldron moment ou ksana des bouddhistes. In H. S. (2003, p. 205). Prasad (Ed.), Essays on time. Delhi: Sri Satguru. 12. This list, which is standard in the Tibetan Deutsch, E. (1969). Advaita Vedanta: A philo- tradition, is a compilation based on Asac;:ga's sophical reconstruction. Honolulu: University Abhidhanna-samuccaya. It is not, how- Press of Hawaii. ever, Asac;:ga's own list, which contains 52 Dreyfus, G. (1997 ). Recognizing reality: Dhar- items (Rahula 1980, p. 7 ). For further dis- makfrti's philosophy and its Tibetan interpreta- cussion, see Napper (198o) and Rabten tions. Albany, NY: State University of New (1978h992). For the lists of some of the York Press. other traditions, see Bodhi (1993, pp. 76- Dreyfus, G. (2002). Is compassion an emotion? A 79) and de la Vallee Poussin (1971, II: 150- cross-cultural exploration of mental typologies. 178). ·In R. Davidson & A. Harrington (Eds.), Visions 13. Although some of these states may be sote- of compassion: Western scientists and Tibetan riologically significant and involve the abil- Buddhists examine human nature (pp. 31-45). ity to transcend duality, not all need be. The Oxford: Oxford University Press. practice of concentration can involve signless Dunne, J. D. (2004). Foundations of Dhar- meditative states, and so too does the practice makjrfti's philosophy. Boston: Wisdom. of some of the so-called formless meditative Gethin, R. (1992). The Matrikas: Memorization, states. mindfulness and the list. In J. Gyatso (Ed.), In THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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