UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Pratyaksa and Dharmakirti's Soteriology

by

Christina Roberta Yanko

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

July, 2008

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate

Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Pratyaksa and Dharmakirti's Soteriology" submitted by Christina Roberta Yanko in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

Supervisor, Leslie Kawamura, Department of Religious Studies

Christopher Framarin, Department of Religious Studies

Michael Hawley, Department of Religious Studies, Mount Royal College

Date

ii ABSTRACT

The development of a system of logic by Dharmaklrti (and Dignaga before him) is often considered by modern scholarship to signify a division between logic and religiosity.

This logical system, often referred to as the pramana, attempted to rationalize the process of how we gain knowledge through direct perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana).

Presumably, by understanding how one gains knowledge through a cognitive process, one can ultimately learn how to acquire correct knowledge.

While Dharmaklrti's logical system is certainly rational, this does not necessitate its separation from Buddhist religiosity. Upon close scrutiny, one notices that his logic actually works in harmony with Buddhist soteriology, and in fact it serves to make the

Buddhist practitioner's mind more receptive to the dharma. In particular, Dharmaklrti's tenet of pratyaksa offers a clear and concise explanation as to how one perceives the world in terms of the particular defining characteristics rather than universals. This leads to the recognition of the momentariness of perceived objects, and ultimately to an absolute awareness of reality.

This thesis attempts to show that Dharmaklrti's system of logic, being a "Buddhist" logic, is essentially a system of soteriology by which the practitioner can achieve enlightenment or liberation.

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Leslie Kawamura. Without his guidance, breadth of knowledge and attention to detail, this thesis would simply not exist. Further, Dr. Kawamura opened the door for me to experience many new and exciting things that might have once been an impossibility, and for this reason, amongst many others, I am eternally grateful.

I am also indebted to Dr. Chris Framarin, who exercised the utmost patience and tenacity while helping me work through my translation, and teaching me Sanskrit in general. I hope that one day I will be fortunate enough to develop his level of kindness.

A special thanks goes to Dr. Michael Hawley, the external examiner on my thesis committee, for the careful time and attention put towards reading my thesis and preparing for my examination.

Were it not for the continued support from Dr. Anne Moore, it is difficult to imagine myself actually completing my studies. Her constant encouragement (sometimes by force) to keep working to achieve my goals enabled me to overcome some pretty immense obstacles.

Many thanks also go to the following: Dr. Parimal Patil for receiving me at Harvard

University and presenting me with some very effective tools with which to write this thesis; the Department of Religious Studies and in particular Dr. Virginia Tumasz for helping to find ways for me to make this process financially possible; Yumi Onozawa for the many wonderful and inspirational conversations; Jordan Otrhalek for the morning coffee work sessions that helped get me rolling; Chien Hsu for always trying to clarify my confusion;

Sarah Gallant for always smiling at me, no matter what; Cori Bender for keeping me

iv together while I was writing, and actually listening to me read my thesis out loud; Willow

Keeling for always keeping her door open; Jackie Ho, who taught me so much about how I want to be; Bill and Kinara Labrenz for opening up their home to me and always being a wall of support; and my family for their love and understanding.

Finally I want to also mention Mark Segawa, who tirelessly dedicated hours listening to me work out my argument, encouraging me to study, and reminding me that I am actually good enough. It was certainly a struggle, but regardless he answered every single phone call and read every single chunk of illegible writing that I sent his way.

Thank you so very much.

v DEDICATION

For my two beautiful nieces Tobyn and Sophie. I love you both very much.

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Dedication vi

Table of Contents vii

Introduction:

1. Outline and Thesis Statement 1

2. The Issue at Hand 4

3. Chapter Organization 6

Chapter 1 : Dharmaklrti

1.1 Biography 10

1.2 Dharmakirti's Works 12

Chapter 2 : Historical Foundation of the Pramana Tradition

2.1 Samdhinirmocana Sutra 17

2.2 Mahayanasutralankara and Bodhisattvabhumi 20

2.3 Dignaga 23

2.4 Dharmaklrti 25

Chapter 3 : Valid Cognition

3.1 Two Kinds 27

3.2 What Direct Perception is not 29

3.3 Nyaya-VaiSesika 33

vii Chapter 4 : Direct Perception in the Nyaya-bindu

4.1 Four Kinds of Direct Perception 36

4.2 Sense Perception and Causal Efficiency 41

4.3 Mental Cognition 45

4.4 Self-Awareness of the Mind and Mental States 47

4.5 Yogic Perception 49

4.6 Progressive Structure 50

Chapter 5 : Phenomenology

5.1 The Conventional and the Ultimate 53

5.2 What is Being Cognized? 58

Conclusion 61

Bibliography 65

viii 1 INTRODUCTION

1. Outline and Thesis Statement

When discussing the soteriological1 value of epistemological literature, certain common quandaries come to mind such as the understanding that religions are faith based, and thus reason and rationality are not applicable. These paradigmatic notions tend to separate epistemology and soteriology into two opposing categories, namely logic and religion. In its most reduced form, logic is "the science of reasoning," whereas religion is said to be concerned with "the belief in and worship of a God or gods."4 While on the one hand logic is considered "scientific" and has to do with "reason,"5 on the other hand religion has to do with "belief6 and "worship"7 of a deity in some form. Epistemology and soteriology divided as such become effectively "trapped" within the very limited boundaries that our language and definitions created.

The epistemological literature of the pramana philosophers often suffers a similar fate. Their work is considered to be external to the Buddhist tradition, insofar as the pramana literature is believed to fulfill a completely separate purpose, distinct from

1 Within the context of this thesis I will be understanding "soteriology" strictly from a Buddhist perspective, and thus as literature helping a practitioner achieve nirvana. 2 Recognizing the many different discussions, debates and definitions of both terms "logic" and "religion," the definitions here are taken from the Oxford English Dictionary in order to expound on the most commonly held understandings of these two terms. 3 Catherine Soanes, eds., Oxford English Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 492. 4 Ibid., 705. 5 "The power to think, understand and draw conclusions logically" (understood as "correctly") Ibid., 695. 6 "A feeling that (something) exists or is true, especially one without proof." Ibid., 70. Thus it is necessarily lacking in empirical truth. 7 "admiration and devotion," Ibid., 979. 2 liturgical scripture, with no Buddhistic benefit. When discussion on religious significance becomes a matter of importance within the pramana literature, one can almost sense a sort of defiance in scholarly material. It is as though this method of reading the text would somehow remove all levels of rationality and reason. However, to the best of my knowledge, there does not seem to be a rule that states no form of rationality may present itself within a religious context, nor one that suggests that religion may not have the right to

"transcend" itself into the realm of rationality.

Of the pramana philosophers classified as epistemological, Dharmakirti is prominent. Until the discovery of the pramanasiddhi chapter of his Pramanavarttika, all of his works were considered epistemological, with little relevance to the Buddhist tradition.

However, it is in this chapter that Dharmakirti discusses the Buddha as a means of valid cognition and takes up such themes as samsara and karuna. Still, scholars are reluctant to transfer any of these ideas in interpreting his other works. This reluctance, in my opinion, is not cautious, but short-sighted. Dharmakirti's texts not only lend insight to the Buddhist tradition, but at the same time offer a form of soteriology that teaches his followers how to properly cognize, and thus gain right knowledge, which is essential to attaining the

Buddhist "bodhicittd" or awakened mind, and by extension, to leading one to eventual nirvana. It is my intention to investigate Dharmakirti's philosophy in order to show the soteriological benefit of this supposedly stringent epistemological philosophy.

In order to discuss the soteriology that appears in Dharmakirti's philosophy, focus will be placed on the pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu. This chapter was selected for two reasons. The first, and primary reason was that the topic of discussion found in the text is direct perception (pratyaksa). As will become clear, it is only through direct perception that an individual can gain ultimate knowledge of an existent reality, and therefore directly perceiving things properly is one of the primary components that lead some to nirvana. If one does not have the ability to gain correct cognition, then one will not acquire correct knowledge. If one does not know how to acquire right knowledge, the potential to have an awakened mind cannot be actualized.8 The second reason for choosing this chapter of the

Nyaya-bindu was due to its brief, yet concise style. Each Moka of this selection is abundant in significance, and upon developing the different concepts and intentionality contributes a great deal of information as to the soteriological value of Dharmakirti's philosophy.

In discussing the Nyaya-bindu and Dharmakirti's philosophies in general, a two- dimensional framework, namely epistemic and instrumental rationality that seem to be present in his work is presupposed.9 The term epistemic rationality is used to mean that if the propositions are supported by evidence they are favoured, and if they are not supported by evidence, they are considered improbable. Epistemic rationality is used in

Dharmakirti's methodology in order to show his readers that his system of cognition is a system of choice. In apparent contrast to this, "instrumental rationality" is used to mean the kinds of rationality displayed when one takes a means to an end. The means to an end, for

This consideration is made specifically within a Yogacara context. Although there have been many debates on Dharmakirti's lineage, I agree with Tom Tillemans: "Dharmakirti's espousal of idealism, especially in the third chapter of the Pramanavarttika and the discussion on pramanaphala (effects of means of valid cognition) or sahophalambhaniyama (i.e., the argument from "necessary co-apprehension" of subject and object states) is undeniably Yogacara inspired, and leads to the conclusion of there being no external world." Tom Tilleman, "On the Semantic Theory in the Yogacara Chapter of Bhavaiveka's MadhyamakakahrdayakarikasT Yogacara Buddhism Symposium (Calgary, September 2002). 9 This framework was introduced to my by Professor Parimal Patil at Harvard University, so to him I owe a great debt for giving me some of the tools necessary for this thesis. 4 Dharmakirti, is to teach elements of Buddhism through his logic, in order to defeat his foes, convince others that his way of thinking is the right way, and in so doing teach his followers the doctrines of Buddhism so that they might ultimately gain the ability to correctly cognize and thus become awakened. This two-dimensional framework is not bi­ lateral, but the epistemic rationality for Dharmkirti lies below the umbrella of instrumental rationality.10 Simply put, Dharmakirti's epistemology exists for the fundamental purpose of serving the instrumental rational.

2. The Issue at Hand

The present study of Buddhist logic is largely indebted to the works of Th.

Stcherbatsky in the early 1900's, whose contribution such as Buddhist Logic, includes the first translation of Dharmaklrti's Nyaya-bindu and the Nyaya-bindu-tika by Dharmottara.

Were it not for Stcherbatsky, the engagement in pramana literature in its present form would undoubtedly be less fruitful. However, while the academic scholarship on the pramana philosophers continues to grow exponentially, some of the critical thoughts towards this literature unfortunately remain bound within restraints similar to those of their predecessor, Th. Stcherabatsky.

In the introductory section of Buddhist Logic vol. 1, Stcherbatsky makes his assumptions clear with regard to the pramana philosophers. He states, "In the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection within Buddhism as

10 A discussion of the two kinds of rationality, and the existence of epistemic rationality occurring as a species of instrumental rationality, insofar as instrumental rationality serves to fulfill some goal is found in Thomas Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: a Critique," Philosophy of Phenomenological Research (vol. LXVI, No. 3. May 2003) 612 - 640. 5 religious, ie. as the reaching of a path towards Salvation."11 Instead, according to

Stcherbatsky, what these philosophers offered was a very strict epistemological structure with the intended objective of strictly gaining knowledge. This opinion was carried throughout the academic study of the pramana literature, by influential scholars such as

Conze, who stated with regard to the pramana tradition:

At variance with the spirit of Buddhism, it can indeed be tolerated only as a

manifestation of 'skill in means.' Logic was studied 'in order to vanquish one's

adversaries in controversy,' and thereby to increase the monetary resources of the

order.. .The importance, validity and usefulness of Buddhist logic is circumscribed

by its social purpose, and the works of the logicians can therefore exhibit the holy

doctrine only in a distinctly truncated form.12

In the eighties, scholars such as Ernst Steinkellner13 and Leonard van der Kuijp14 started to counter this misrepresentation of the pramana tradition within Buddhism, but to date

11 Theodore F. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Volume 1 (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962) and Theodore F. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Volume //(New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962). 12 See Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1980) 265-267. 13 Ernst Steinkellner, "The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism," Nanto Bukkyo, (vol. 49, 1982) 1-15. He explains the difficulty: "It seemed to be incompatible that the Buddhist philosopher with his basically practical and religious goals would waste his efforts on investigations of seemingly purely theoretical, non-religious problems, such as the possibility and nature of perception, truth and falsity of cognition, logic, the meaning of words," 3; and later suggests, "Dignaga's program contains the idea of a philosophical foundation of Buddhism, understood as human practice orientated by the words of the Buddha," 12. 14 Leonard van der Kuijp, "An Early Tibetan View of the Soteriology of Buddhist Epistemology: The Case of 'Bri-gung 'Jig-rten mgnon-po," Journal of Indian Philosophy (vol. 15, 1987) 57-70. 6 progress has been slow and bogged down, presumably by the fear that the tradition will no longer be taken seriously or misrepresented.15

Within the last four years there has been a re-emergence of scholars willing to focus on the soteriological aspects, such as Helmut Krasser,16 Birgit Kellner17 and Parimal Patil18

(and Steinkellner's work continues to represent the potential for a soteriological reading throughout his publications), but this form of academic study is still clearly in its developmental stages and much work remains to be done in this regard.

3. Chapter Organization

The first chapter of this thesis will briefly account the life of Dharmakirti and will include both historical and mythological accounts in order to show the importance that

Dharmakirti must have had in the early years of the Buddhist tradition. It is common practice within Buddhism to mythologize philosophers of high status and influence, and often times what is mythologized about them offers insight about their influences, and possibly their intentions. Also within this chapter, one will find a brief explanation of

Dharmakirti's seven major works, with a concentrated focus on the Nyaya-bindu and his magnum opus, the Pramamvarttika.

Richard Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). When discussing the potential for using the term "soteriology" for the pramana tradition, Hayes retorts skeptically that the word: "implies the aid of a saviour (soter) and makes no sense at all in most Buddhist contexts." 34. 16 Helmut Krasser, "Are Buddhist Pramanavadins non-Buddhistic? Dignaga and Dharmakirti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation," Horin, (November, 2004) 129 - 146. 17 Birgit Kellner, "First Logic, then the Buddha? The Controversy about the Chapter Sequence of Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika and the Soteriological Relevance of Inference," Horin, (November, 2004)147-167. 18 Parimal Patil, "On What it is that Buddhists Think About: Apoha in the Ratnaklrti-Nibandhavali" Journal of Indian Philosophy (vol 31, 2003) 229-256. 7 The second chapter gives an historical background from whence the pramana tradition developed. It discusses the development of the concept of ^nyaya" or logic and the purpose and function for it within a Buddhist context. There are many different discussions on this matter within the Buddhist canon, but for the purpose of this thesis, the starting point will be a discussion on logic within the Samdhinirmocana Sutra. In this discussion, the development of the five sciences as discussed in the MaMyanasutralamkara and the Bodhisattvabhumi are presented. These foundational texts explain the fundamental purpose of logic within Buddhism and why it is necessary for someone on the Bodhisattva path to ultimately undertake this practice.

This chapter next discusses the purpose of logic for Dharmakirti's predecessor

Dignaga. In the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga explains that his intentions for engaging in this work are so that he can correct the mistaken views held by others. He shows them why they are wrong and then convinces them by arguing his own, more acceptable, view.

Dignaga explains that once his view is adopted, the rival will be led closer to the dharma.

Finally, this chapter touches upon some of the statements made by Dharmaklrti with regard to his intention for writing his texts. Just like Dignaga, Dharmaklrti writes in order to convince those who have been led astray by heretics of the correct path so that they can distance themselves from that which is "harmful" and can attain that which is "helpful."

In the third chapter, Dharmakirti's theory of valid cognition as presented in the

Nyaya-bindu and its relationship between language and the directly perceivable world is discussed. The contents of this chapter are intended to provide Dharmakirti's linguistic and hermeneutic limitations on direct cognition. Within Dharmakirti's assertions of what direct 8 perception is not, he effectively rules out any connection between himself and his main adversary, the Nyaya school. This view of "what perception is not" functions not only as a tool for his reader, but at the same time, as an intentional expression so as to indirectly single out his adversaries and present a strong case for Buddhism. Due to the cyclical style of Dharmakirti's writing, a slight difficulty is created with regard to interpreting the Nyaya- bindu. Each section assumes some understanding of the previous and preceding sections, and thus when one first encounters the pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu, it is often necessary to flip forward and backward through the chapter. For the sake of clarity, in this thesis, the same order of explanation as Dharmaklrti presented in his text is followed, and items that will be expanded upon in future chapters are mentioned briefly.

Chapter four is an in depth presentation of Dharmakirti's fourfold separation of direct perception. The first form of direct perception is sensory perception {indriya-jnana), which is the cognition of the external, phenomenal world through the senses. The second is mental perception (mano-vijnma), or the ability of the mind to produce an immediate reflection of the image that is similar to the object being perceived. This mental reflection utilizes the senses to connect with phenomena, and ingests sensory cognition. The third perceptive cognition (atma-samvedana) is completely internal and refers to the practitioner's self-awareness of one's own mental processes and emotions. According to

Dharmaklrti, these inner tensions affect our experience of the external world unless we know how to properly interpret them. The last of the fourfold categories of direct perception is yogic perception (yogi-jnana). It is in yogic perception that there is a culmination of the previous three forms of direct perception. 9 The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an explanation of how the four varieties of direct perception can be taken as a step by step process, in which each is mastered before moving on to the next. Each kind of direct perception presupposes the mastery of the prior.

Chapter five of this thesis examines the relationship between "universals" and

"particulars" and their correlation with the ultimate and conventional forms of reality as developed within the Buddhist tradition. Discussion is undertaken about the similarity between Dharmakirti's understanding of the two kinds of realities and that of Vasubandhu as presented in his Abhidharmakosa and the Abhidharmakosabhasya. How these two levels of reality are reflected in the object of perception is then discussed. Then how the two levels are reflected in relation to samsara and nirvana is discussed, in accordance with some of Dharmakirti's own writings.

Finally, the concept of instrumental and epistemic rationality is revisited in an attempt to show that the two supposedly differing elements, namely religion and logic, actually serve to complement each other in the pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu, rather than operate in strong opposition to each other. 10 CHAPTER ONE:

Dharmaklrti

1.1 Biography

The historical background on Buddhist philosophers usually consists of both historical and mythological materials. Certain elements of their lives can be shown on the basis of historical accounts, chronicles, and through scientific methods, but there are certain events that must be filled in by relying upon a scholar's best guess or recorded myths.

These myths set the philosopher apart from the mundane, often bestowing upon them a sagacious and reverent position. Much of Dharmaklrti's historical background falls into this very category.19

It is said that Dharmaklrti (approx. 600-670)20 was born in southern India, in a place called Trimilaya to a Brahmin family and received a Brahmin education.21 According to

Vidyabhusana, Dharmaklrti was an exceptional child, who was endowed with a sharp intellect and fully developed skills in fine arts, the Vedas and Vedangas, medicine, grammar, and philosophy of Tirthas before the age of sixteen.22 He is said to have attended many lectures by the Buddhists, and after coming to the realization that Buddhism was

19 There is an extensive historical biography written by T. Vetter in his work Erketnisprobleme bei Dharmaklrti (Vienna: Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1964), but unfortunately it is only available in German. 20 This is in accordance with John Dunne Encyclopedia of Buddhism, vol. 1 p. 225. E. Steinkellner gives 600 - 660, see "Dharmaklrti," Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. p2336-2337. 21 Stcherbatsky, vol. 2, 34. 22 Mahamahopathyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1909), 103. 11

"without fault," he decided to become one. After becoming a Buddhist, Dharmakirti traveled to the Nalanda and there took his vows under Dharmapala, a pupil of

Vasubandhu.24 It is rumoured that Dharmakirti mastered the entire Tripitaka and knew all of the sutras and dharanls by heart.25

While at Nalanda, Dharmakirti developed an interest in logic, and specifically in

Dignaga's works. Unfortunately, Dignaga was no longer alive to instruct him on logic, but

Isvarasena, a previous pupil of Dignaga's, took Dharmakirti as a student, and it is reported that Dharmakirti understood Dignaga's system better than Isvarasena did.26 It is said that the founding father of the pramana philosophical school is Dignaga, but the philosopher who systematized and developed the philosophy is said to be Dharmakirti.

According to legend, Dharmakirti sensed that the end of Buddhism was drawing near in India. He therefore decided to leave Nalanda and to travel around India to debate with philosophers from other schools in public forums so that he could show them the falsities of their beliefs and thus maintain the Buddhist tradition.27 He returned to Nalanda and received Dharmottara and Devendrabuddhi as his pupils who wrote commentaries of their own based on Dharmakirti's works.

It is said that Dharmakirti was an arrogant person with whom it was difficult to get along. In Bu-Ston's History of Buddhism, there is a story telling of Dharmakirti's

23 Ibid., 34. 24 Stcherbatsky, vol. 2, 34. 25 Vidyabhusana, 34-35. 26 Stcherbatsky, vol. 2, 34. 27 Vidyabhusana, 35. 12 arrogance. According to Bu-Ston, some of the monks at Nalanda who grew tired of

Dharmakirti's arrogance, tied one of his works to the tail of a dog and set the dog loose.

The dog ran, scattering his papers throughout the streets. However, their ill will did not affect Dharmaklrti; instead it is reported that he said: "just as this dog runs through all streets, so will my work be spread in all the world."28

1.2 Dharmakirti's Works

There are seven works on logic that have been attributed to Dharmaklrti: 1)

Pramanavarttika, 2) Pramanaviscaya, 3) Hetu-bindu, 4) Sambandhapariksa, 5) Vadanyaya,

6) Santanantarasiddhi and 7) Nyaya-bindu. Among these, the work most often celebrated as his magnum opus is the Pramanavarttika, a commentary to Dignaga's

Pramanasamuccaya, and his last work, the Nyaya-bindu is the work considered in this thesis. Therefore before giving an explanation of those, the remaining works will be explained succinctly.

Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniicaya is an abridgement of the Pramanavarttika. The

Hetu-bindu29 is an entire treatise dedicated to Dharmakirti's theory of causation, which is

Bu-ston. The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, trans. E. Obermiller, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997). 29 See translation by Pradeep P. Gokhale, Hetubindu of Dharmaklrti: a Point ofProbans, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997) and discussion by Mangala R. Chinchore, Dharmaklrti's Theory of Hetu-Centricity ofAnumana, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989). 13 then followed by the Sambandhaparlksa, which discusses Dharmaklrti's theory of relations. The Vadanyaya31 outlines different rules for debating, and the

Santanantarasiddhi32 discusses the proof of the existence of other minds.33

The Pramanavarttika is so skillfully written that it is viewed today as a work in its own right. It consists of four major chapters. The fact that there is a fourth chapter is of particular significance, because Dharmaklrti includes an entirely new section in this work that was not discussed by Dignaga in his Pramanasamuccaya. The four chapters are 1) direct perception (pratyaksa), 2) inference (anumana), 3) inference for the sake of others

(pararthanumana), and 4) the Buddha as apramana (pramanasiddhi). Although the fourth chapter, prammasiddhi was not discussed in Dignaga's works, according to many scholars, it is particularly compelling, as it comes at the beginning of the Pramanavarttika. Before scholars studied the Pramanavarttika, the traditional chapter arrangement was direct perception, inference, and inference for the sake of others. There is considerable debate as to the significance of the chapter on the Buddha coming first.34 Kellner states:

Translated by V.N. Jha, The Philosophy of Relations: Containing the Sanskrit and English Translation of Dharmaklrti's Sambandha-parlksa with Prabhacandra's Commentary, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990). 31 Translated by Pradeep P. Gokhale, Vadanyaya of Dharmaklrti: The Logic of Debate, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992). 32 Translated by Mangala R. Chinchore, Santanantarasiddhih and Santanantarasiddhi Tika of Acarya Dharmaklrti, (Delhi: South Asia Books, 1996). 33 Stcherbatsky, 37. 34 For an excellent study on the chapter sequence of the Pramanavartika, see Birgit Kellner, "First Logic, then the Buddha? The Controversy About the Chapter Sequence of Dharmaklrti's Pramanavarttika and the Soteriological Relevance of Inference," Horin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur, (vol. 11, 2004). 14 Soteriological relevance of forms of knowledge can be seen from two

perspectives: a certain form of knowledge can be said to help an adept on the

Buddhist path to attain liberation or it can be assumed to assist in the overall

justification of soteriological goals or practical methods.35

Thus, according to Kellner, the inclusion of this chapter in the Pramanavarttika certainly points to a significance of soteriology within the pramana tradition. The controversy has perpetuated an interest in the Pramanavarttika, and currently many different scholars such as Richard Hayes,36 John Dunne,37 and Eli Franco,38 to name just a few, work on and translate it. However, to date only one English translation of the chapter on pratyaksa

(direct perception) has surfaced.39 Unfortunately it was criticized as a poor translation to the point of being unintelligible, and to date no other person has undertaken this project.40

The Nyaya-bindu was the first of Dharmakirti's texts translated into English by the ground-breaking scholar Theodore Stcherbatsky and first published in 1932.41 Its publication was preceded by Stcherbatsky's edited Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, which were

35 Kellner, 164. 36 Richard Hayes, "On the Buddha's Authority, A Translation of the Pramanasiddhi Chapter of Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika,'" in progress; "Dharmaklrti onpunarbhava," Studies in Original Buddhism and Mahayma Buddhism (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshodo. Vol. 1 111-30. 37 John Dunne, Foundations of Dharmaklrti's Philosophy (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004). 38 Eli Franco, Dharmaklrti on Compassion and Rebirth (Wien: Arbeitskreis Fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1997). 39 C.S. Vyas, Buddhist Theory of Perception, with Special Reference to Pramana Varttika of Dharmaklrti (New Delhi: Navarang, 1991). 40 Maasaki Hattori, "Reviewed work(s): Buddhist Theory of Perception by C. S. Vyas," Journal of the American Oriental Society (Vol. 119, No. 3, Sept. 1999) 498-500. 41 Theodore F. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic Volume //(New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962). 15 first published in 1904 (Tibetan)42 and 1918 (Sanskrit).43 After Stcherbatsky finished editing a version of the Sanskrit text, he sent the manuscript back to India and somewhere en route from Russia to India, the original Sanskrit version was lost.44 Owing to this, scholars have relied on the Sanskrit edition compiled by Stcherbatsky and correlated it with the Tibetan version.

The Nyaya-bindu is thought to be an abridgment of the Pramanaviniscaya which is itself thought to be an abridgement of the Pramanavarttika. The Nyaya-bindu occupies a total of four folios in the Tibetan Bstan 'gyur.45 However, even though it is small in size, the discussions within are exceptionally terse, to the extent that they border on being cryptic. The text introduces different topics, but if one is to fully understand from which text the topics arise, it would be necessary to consult Dharmakirti's other works. For this reason, the Nyaya-bindu is considered to be a primer of sorts, in that it introduces the reader to the main themes of his philosophies, without getting into much detail. The main topics that Dharmaklrti discusses are pratyaksa (direct perception), anumana (inference) and pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others).

According to Dreyfus, commentators to Dharmakirti's works are:

...the school of literal exegesis of Dharmakirti's disciple, Devendrabuddhi (630-690

c.e.), and the latter's student Shakyabuddhi; the religious school of Prajnakaragupta

42 Dharmaklrti, Edited Tibetan Nyayabindu with Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara, eds. Th. Stcherbatsky (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1904). 43 Dharmaklrti, Edited Sanskrit Nyayabindu with Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara, eds. Th. Stcherbatsky (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1918). 44 Introduction to Sankrit edition by Stcherbatsky (in Russian) i-ii. 45 Dharmaklrti, "Rigs pa'i thigs pa shes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa," Sde Dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan Hgyur. (Tokyo, 1981) 232 - 235. 16 (750-800 c.e.); and last, the philosophical tradition of Dharmottara (750 - 810

c.e.)46 and Shamkarananda. Although the differentiation between the three latter

authors is less clear, a clear difference lies between the first tradition and the later

commentarial traditions. Whereas the former attempts a literal rendering of

Dharmaklrti, the latter present a comparatively remote stage of interpretation. Here,

the necessity to respond to repeated criticism from Hindu orthodoxy has taken

precedence over literal gloss. This second group differentiates itself from

Devendrabuddhi, whom they accuse of having misinterpreted Dharmaldrti's

thought.47

This list of commentators is certainly not exhaustive. It is seriously undersized in relation to the amount of Tibetan commentators on Dharmakirti's works, which includes philosophers such as Atisa (1005-1064),48 Ngok Lo-dza-wa (rngog lo tsa ba bio Idan shes rab, 1059-1109), Cha-ba (phyapa chos kyi sengge, 1118-1251 ),49 Sagya Pandita (1182-

1251),50 Yak-don (g.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal, 1348-1414), and Rong-don (rong ston

&akya rgyal mtshan, 1367-1449)5.1

46 Notice the dates given for Dharmottara. These dates are widely circulated amongst scholars, and according to those dates, it would not be possible for Dharmottara to be a direct pupil of Dharmaklrti (approx. 600 - 660 c.e.). 47 Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) 21. 48 Atisa's commentaries reflected his belief that the pramana tradition was not relevant to Tibet, and argued against its inclusion in Tibetan studies. Dreyfus, 22. 49 Cha-ba is often credited with writing the first commentary on Dharmakirti's philosophies in Tibet. Dreyfus, 22. 50 Interestingly, he has exactly the same dates as Cha-ba. 51 Dreyfus 22-33. 17 CHAPTER TWO:

Historical Foundation of the Pramana Tradition

There are many contributing factors to the development ofthepramana tradition, making it difficult to determine the exact lineage. For example, the public form of debate practiced by the pramana philosophers evolved from a long, historical tradition of early

Hindu scholars who argued varying viewpoints with regard to the Upanisads.52 Within the context of these debates, multiple sets of rules were presented and discussed by different historical figures, many of whom were prominent Buddhist philosophers, such as Asahga53 and Dharmaklrti.54 Therefore we must turn first to a discussion on the earlier Mahayana schools that may have contributed to the formalization of Buddhist logic

2.1 Samdhinirmocana Sutra

Among the Mahayana schools founded in India, the Madhyamaka and Yogacara schools had great influence on the development of Buddhist logic, but for the purpose of this thesis, the Yogacara schools will be the focus. Among many sutras and commentaries

For an in depth study on the development of the system of debates within the Indian culture, see Amartya Sen's book The Argumentative Indian, (New York: Allen Lane, 2005). 53 See translation by Alex Wayman, "Asanga's Rules of Debate from the Yogacarabhumi? A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, vol. 1, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999). 54 See translation by Pradeep P. Gokhale, Vadanyaya of Dharmaklrti: The Logic of Debate, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1993). 18 within Yogacara, the tenth chapter of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra is significant for the discussion on logic.

In chapter 10 of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the Buddha is questioned by

Manjusri.56 Manjusri asks: "Bhagavan, of how many aspects is the Bodhisattvas' pratimoksa?"57 In responding to this question the Buddha begins to discuss logic. He first distinguishes two different types of characters, the conventional and the ultimate. Then he expands on the conventional and the ultimate, and within this expansion emerges logic:

Manjusri, view the conventional character as being of three types: the

teaching of persons; the teaching of the own-being of the imputational nature; and

the teaching of the activities, moments, and workings of phenomena.

View the ultimate character in terms of the teaching of suchness in seven

aspects. View the character of the objects of observation in terms of the teaching of

all aspects of things that are objects in knowledge. View the character aspects in

terms of the teaching of the eight types of analytical reasoning. What are the eight

types of analytical reasoning? [They are analytical reasoning concerning]: truth,

55 See translations by Etienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana Sutra: L'Explication des Mysteres, (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1935) and John Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra, (Berkley: Dharma Publishing, 1995). 56 Manjusri is also the Bodhisattva most often honoured in the dedicative sections of the different Pramanavadins. He is known to be the Bodhisattva of wisdom, doctrine and awareness. Donald Lopez, The Story of Buddhism: a Concise Guide to its History and Teachings, (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), p.260. "Powers, 281. 19 positings, faults, good qualities, modes, engagement, reasoning, and condensing

and elaborating.58

On the basis of the quotation from the Samdhinirmocana Sutra above, there are four aspects of reasoning: 1) analysis of dependence, 2) analysis of performance of functions, 3) analysis of logical correctness, and 4) analysis of reality.59 Regarding the analysis of logical correctness, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra states:

.. .there are two types of logical correctness: pure and impure. The characteristics of

the pure type are fivefold. The characteristics of the impure type are sevenfold.

The five characteristics of the pure type are: the characteristic of directly observing

something, the characteristic of directly observing the basis of something, the

characteristic of providing an example of its own type, the characteristic of

establishment, and the characteristic of teaching in the manner of delineating very

pure scriptures.60

In the Arya-Samdhinirmocana-bhasya61 Asanga explains the analysis of logical correctness as "indicating the reasonings that establish individual meanings through the correctness of the three valid cognizers [tshad-ma, pramma, ie. direct perception, inference, and believable scriptures]."62 In addition to Asanga's observation, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra states later that "analysis of logical correctness is purified through: direct valid perception,

58 Powers, 283-285. 59 Ibid., 285. 60 Ibid., 287. 61 "Arya-Samdhinirmocana-Bhasya" Two Commentaires on the Samdhinirmocana-Sutra, trans. J. Powers, (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 62 Ibid. 206: 271.2 valid inference, valid believable scriptures, and through these five characteristics [of omniscient persons]."63 Therefore in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra

the concept of nyaya, or logical reasoning, serves a twofold function: first, of understanding conventional character of all things, which then will effectively lead to the ultimate character of phenomena known by omniscient beings.

2.2 Mahayanasutralamkara and Bodhisattvabhumi

Another Yogacara text, The Mahayanasutralamkara64 corroborates the need for logic within Buddhism, but systematizes the overarching structure into what is commonly referred to as the five sciences or five fields of knowledge.65 Asanga in his

Mahayanasutralamkara-bhasya explains that these five sciences are concerned with

"accomplish[ing] the aims of self and others," and the science of logic specifically is "to understand the faults (in practice and communication) and refute the arguments of others."67 Thus the aim of logic is to see that the "faults" employed by other people might give them a distorted view of reality. Logic is employed (presumably in debate form) in

63 John Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra, (Berkley: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 391. 64 Robert Thurman, The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahayanasutralamkara) By Maitreyanatha/aryasahga Together with its Commentary (Bhasya) by Vasubandhu, (New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004). 65 Krasser, 130 "These five major branches of science are the internal science (adhyatmavidya / nan rig pa), logic (hetuvidya / gtan tshigs pa rig), linguistic (sabdavidya / sgra rig pa), medicine (cikitsavidya / gso ba'i rig pa), and art and technologies (karmasthanavidya / bso rig pa)." An alternate translation of "hetuvidya / gtan tshigs pa rig" as "logic and epistemology" can be seen in David Seyfort Ruegg, Ordre spiritual et ordre tempored dans lapensee bouddhique de I 'inde et du Tibet, Paris, 1995. 66 Thurman, 253. Square brackets are mine. 67 Ibid., 253. 21 order to show those with erroneous views the correct way to cognize worldly phenomena and scripture. In effect, Asahga is suggesting that logic is utilized as a form of transformation through rationality. The Mahayanasutralamkara explains:

The brave bodhisattvas' knowledge of sciences is distinctive by subject matter,

concern, activity, nature, inexhaustibility, and successful fruition. It is contained in

the doors of concentration and retention. It causes the evolutionary development of

beings and the upholding of the Dharma.68

Because it is contained in the doors of concentration and retention, personal cultivation and perfection of knowing the five sciences would occur before examining and refuting those with distorted views. Simply put, if an individual does not understand the correct processes herself, it will be difficult if not impossible to see the faults of others, let alone teach the correct application of these five sciences to another individual.

The discussion in the Bodhisattvabhumi explains why each science would be important for a Bodhisattva to learn and perfect.69 According to the Bodhisattvabhumi:

The science of logic is also of two characteristics: 1) the beneficial characteristic

that demonstrates the taming of the theories of others, and 2) the beneficial

characteristic that demonstrates the freedom from the theories for others.70

Logic is employed by a Bodhisattva in order to refute the opponents and help free others from their differing and erroneous views.

68 Ibid.,, 26-27, 253. 69 James Mullens, Principles and Practices of Buddhist Education in Asanga 's Bodhisattvabhumi, PhD thesis, (McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 1994), 158. 70 Leslie Kawamura, a translation of the Bodhisattvabhumi as part of the Numata Translation Series. In progress. 22 The important role of the five sciences as presented in the Bodhisattvabhumi is examined in detail by James Mullens in his Ph. D. thesis Principles and Practices of

Buddhist Education in Asanga 's Bodhisattvabhumi. With regard to the science of logic,

Mullens explains that logic "endows [the Bodhisattva] with the ability to clearly explain

71

Buddhist teachings and show up the faults of other doctrinal positions," as well as

"convincing others to free themselves from other systems."72 According to Mullens, logic has the direct material value of enabling a Bodhisattva to analyze other doctrinal philosophies, while at the same time maintaining a non-material or pedagogical value by providing the Bodhisattva an instructional tool for convincing others to abandon their beliefs in apparently fallacious systems.

The soteriological value of the practice of the five sciences for a Bodhisattva is clearly stated in the Bodhisattvabhumi:

The bodhisattva seeks all of these five subjects in science in order to accomplish the

great accumulation of knowledge for complete, perfect enlightenment. If he does

not learn all of them, he will not eventually achieve the removal of the obstruction

of all-knowledge.

Thus without the five sciences, the Bodhisattvabhumi states that a Bodhisattva would not be able remove obstructions, resulting in her inability to achieve enlightenment. Logic has a distinct soteriological value for the Bodhisattvabhumi in that it is a measure used to remove obstructions for gaining knowledge.

71 Mullens, 178. Square brackets my own. 72 Ibid., 178. "Ibid., 183. 23 2.3 Dignaga

The most influential of Dharmakirti's predecessors is undeniably Dignaga. His great work the Pramanasamuccaya and his own commentary on it is considered by most to be the text on which the Buddhist pramana tradition was founded.74 It is in his opening verse of the Pramanasamuccaya that Dignaga explains that he is writing this work in order to:

.. .reject the sources of knowledge of my rivals and promote my own, since an

awareness of what can be known depends upon the sources of knowledge, and there

are many competing claims made about them.75

He then goes on to explain that establishing the correct view with regard to the instruments of valid awareness "...is a way of establishing what is in fact the case."76

According to Patil, the opening verse of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya clearly shows that Dignaga has a similar dual purpose as the Mahayanasutralamkara and

Bodhisattvabhumi.11 The Pramanasamuccaya is meant to reject the sources of knowledge of others and promote his (Dignaga's) own. Patil goes on to explain that the structure of

74 Masaaki Hattori, Dignaga, on Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya/rom the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968). 75 Hattori, 23-4. 76 This is from a manuscript presented to me by Parimal Patil in February, 2008 at Harvard University for his forthcoming book tentatively titled Against a Hindu God: Philosophy of Religion in the Final Phase of Buddhism in India. 77 Ibid. 24 the Pramanasamuccaya also has a dual purpose. Each chapter includes both support for

Dignaga's own line of reasoning, and a refutation of his rivals.78

It is not until the conclusion of the Pramanasamuccaya that Dignaga explicitly connects his epistemology with the religious tradition:

I composed this [work] in order to turn those who adhere to (sen pa rnams) the

assumptions of the heretics away from them, because they are without essence as

the valid cognitions (pramana) and their objects (prameya) [as taught by the

heretics] are not fixed properly. However, by [doing] that much (iyata) I do not aim

at their introduction into the teaching of the Tathagata, because his dharma is not in

the realm of logic. But those who are turned away [from the assumptions of the

heretics] can easily understand [dharmata] after hearing it, as it is absent/remote

TO

[from their teaching] and present in/near to [his teaching].

In other words, Dignaga is not suggesting that logic will teach the dharma, but that it will make it easier for the rival to study and access the dharma. Later in the

Pramanasamuccaya Dignaga explains that when one completely relies on logic, it will actually lead that person further away from the teachings of the Buddha.80

Ibid. For an in depth analyses regarding the complicated structure of the Pramanasamuccaya see Richard Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs (Goston: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1988) 224-5, where Hayes explains the difficulty of translating this text due to the structure of the Pramanasamuccaya. According to Hayes, Dignaga also builds on the original promotion of his own argument while refuting his opponent, making it difficult to determine some of the more subtle points of Dignaga's opinion. 79Krasser, 134. 80 Dan Arnold, "Candrakirti on Dignaga on svalaksana "Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, (Vol. 26, 2003), 156-157. 25 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly in a discussion on Dignaga, it is important to note that his ultimate purpose for composing the Pramanasamuccaya was to argue people away from the "heretics" by using reason and rationality to prove them wrong.

These people will then be more susceptible to understanding the dharma, and thus Dignaga is using his logic to help others to take up the path of Buddhism.

2.4 Dharmakirti

In the introductory chapter to the Pramanaviniscaya, Dharmakirti states that he is composing this work in order to show correct cognition to those who do not know, because correct cognition is necessary for "attaining that which is beneficial and for abstaining from that which is detrimental."81 He clearly follows the same example as Dignaga in addressing his intended reader, who is someone who has been lead astray or has not been taught the proper ways to cognize. These people find it difficult to achieve what

Dharmakirti considered "beneficial" and stay away from things that might be "harmful." In the closing section of his Pramamviniscaya, Dharmakirti explains that an individual lacking in the ability to correctly cognize will not gain the ability to perceive conventional reality in its true form, thus perpetuating the likelihood that one's desired end will not be met.

Conventional reality is reality as we perceive it while trapped within the realm of samsara, and ultimate reality is perceptible only to someone who has surpassed samsara. However,

81 Krasser, p. 142. hitahitapraptipariharayor niyamena samyagjnanapurvakatvad avidusam tadvyutpadanartham idam arabhyate. Dharmakirti explains that the ability to perceive ultimate reality only can be gained when someone has the ability to correctly perceive conventional reality.82

In the Pramanaviniscaya, Dharmakirti does not formalize his soteriological intention as explicitly as seen in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the Mahayanasutralamkara, the

Bodhisattvabhumi and in the works of his predecessor Dignaga.

In the discussion above, I have attempted to summarize the historical development of the pramana tradition in relation to its soteriology. Firstly, the significance of logic described in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra clarifies the need for logic in order to grasp conventional reality, which is necessary for one to understand ultimate reality and eventually achieve enlightenment. Secondly the Mahayanasutralamkara and the

Bodhisattvabhumi brought to light a formalized grouping of educational tools called the

"five sciences" (panca-vidya) that are required practices for a Bodhisattva if she is to recognize and point out flaws in other theories, convince others of their own fallacious views, and show her the correct forms of reasoning. An understanding of logic or "valid cognition" in accord with the soteriological views of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, would remove obstructions that hinder one's ability to accumulate correct knowledge and thus aid others to achieve enlightenment.

82 Krasser, 143: "(Correct cognition), which, as long as samsara endures, has an uninterrupted connection [with the result] because its imprints are firm, [could be declared] here [in this world], dependant on its reliability in actions, to be pramana. And it is this nature of the conventional means of valid cognition that has been explained. [Not only with regard to the ultimate means of valid cognition, but] also with regard to this [conventional cognition], others who are confused lead the world astray. Those, however, who cultivate the very wisdom born of reflection realize the ultimate pramana, which is due to its being devoid of error is immaculate [and] without return. Indeed, this too has been explained to some extent." Round brackets my own. CHAPTER THREE:

Valid Cognition

In the previous chapter the historical foundation of the pramana tradition was discussed. We will now turn to Dharmakirti's chapter on pratyaksa chapter in the Nyaya- bindu.

3.1 Two Kinds

The pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu begins:

"The complete attainment (siddhiti) of all human objectives (purusartha) is

preceded (purvika) by valid cognition (samyagjmnam)f3 therefore that [valid

cognition] (iti tad) [is here] to be explained (vyutpadyate).*4 Il\lI

samyagjnanam is also often seen translated by scholars as right knowledge. However, knowledge for the pramana philosophers is understood to be a "knowledge event" rather than "knowledge" in the traditional sense of the word insofar as it is acquired information. Here it is meant as more of a process of gaining knowledge rather than the result of said process. John Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004) pg 19. 84 Unless otherwise noted, the translation of the pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu was completed by the author of this thesis from both Sanskrit and Tibetan. For the Sanskrit version of the text, preference was given to that edited by Stcherbatsky and then correlated with the transliterated version by Wayman. For the Tibetan version, the Tokyo edition of the Bstan Hgyur was consulted and then compared to the Taipei edition. In order to remain concise, and because the Nyaya-bindu was in its original form written in Sanskrit, the translations of the pratyaksa chapter of the Nyaya-bindu will be written in English, with words of significance written in Sanskrit posterior to their translation. The full Sanskrit and Tibetan sentences are provided in footnote form for the sake of the reader. Skt. samyagjnanapurvika sarvapurusarthasiddhiriti tadvyutpadyate/ Tib. yang dag pa'i shes pa ni / skyes bu'i don thams cad 'grub pa'i sngon du 'gro ba can yin pas na de bstan to // Dharmakirti's opening statement does not have an obvious Buddhist under-pining. He places the significance of valid cognition in the forefront to suggest that unless an individual gains the ability to properly cognize, the achievement of one's goal could not be accomplished. According to Dharmottara, this statement should be enough to entice

"reasonable" people to take up the study of this work "since such consideration incites human activity."85 It effectively acts as a "hook" to the reader, inadvertently suggesting that if one does not take up one's strategy for valid cognition, one will ultimately fail.

However, in the very next verse Dharmakirti goes on to explain valid cognition.

Valid cognition (samyagjnanam) is twofold (dvividham), direct perception

(pratyaksd) and inference (anumana)?6 I 111 I

Although anumana is merely mentioned here, it should be noted that it is divided later into two main categories: inference for the sake of ones self (svarthanumana) and inference for the sake of others (pararthanumand).

Inference, generally speaking, does not have to do with a direct interaction with an external substance. Instead, it deals with contemplation and communication. For example, when thinking about a prior event, or when contemplating certain signifiers, and that to which they might allude (such as smoke might lead to fire), or when considering scripture,

Dharmakirti constructs a method of knowing that would lead to valid knowledge based on these ways of cognizing. In contrast, pratyaksa or direct perception does not involve discursive action, but is a direct experience of something.

85 Scherbatsky, vol. 2, 2.22, 4. 86 Skt. dvividham samyagjnanam / pratyaksam anumanam/ Tib. yang dag pa'i shes pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa'o // 29

3.2 What Direct Perception is not

Before explaining what direct perception is, Dharmakirti clarifies what it is not:

Among them [pratyaksa and anumana] {tatrd), direct perception (pratyaksa) is

Q-J non-deceptive (abhrantam) [and] freed (apodham) of conceptual thought

(kalpana)™ 1/3/1

According to the Pramanavarttika, "[Nondeceptiveness consists] in the readiness [for the object] to perform a function." In other words, for something to be non-deceptive, it must be ready to "perform a function that relates to the way it is cognized."90 For example, in perceiving an object, that object must produce its appropriate effect. If one were to cognize fire, but the fire did not produce heat and instead emitted cool air, this would be a deceptive perception. Another example: imagine that you are walking in the desert and suffering from intense dehydration. Suddenly in the distance you notice a refreshing lake. Upon reaching the lake, you attempt to drink from this lake, but it is impossible. The image of the lake would be abhrantam, or a deceptive cognition.

87 For a detailed discussion on the translation of abhrantam, see Tilmann Vetter's Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscayah, 1. Kapi- tel, Pratyaksam: Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Ubersetzung, Sanskrit-fragmente, deutsche Ubersetzung. Sitzungsberichte, phil.-hist. Kl. (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966) chapter 1. It is also worth noting that this is the firstinstanc e in the Nyaya-bindu where Dharmakirti starts to alter his definition slightly from Dignaga's by adding the word "abhrantam," Hattori, 83. 88 Skt. tatra pratyak§am kalpanapodhamabhrantam/ Tib. de la mngon sum ni rtog pa dang bral zhing ma 'khrul pa'o // 89 Dreyfus, 289. 90 Ibid, 289. 30 Dharmaklrti states valid cognition through direct perception must be free from conceptual thought (kalpana). It is explained as:

Conceptual thought (kalpana) follows from (pratltih) an apprehension (pratibhasa)

capable (yogya) of coalescing (samsarga) with language (abhilapa).9i 11 All

Cognition (jnanam) without (rahitam) [conceptual thought] not affected (anahita) by

the disturbances of eye disease (timird), dizziness (asubhramana) or jolting

(vyanasamksobha), etc. is direct perception (pratyaksa). I 151 I

The defining feature of conceptual thought is the correlation between a perception of something with a word. For example, when one is walking in a field and comes across a cow, that person may think "cow." That cognition is a coalition with a word, and therefore it is no longer a direct perception. The perception has become polluted, in a sense, with whatever has been preconceived and now conceptual thought has taken over to produce the notion "cow." Returning to the example of thirst, suppose one were thirsty and one came across some water. One would not perceive this water in its true, directly perceived form, but it would be seen as something that could quench your thirst. In such a case, rather than the water being perceived just-as-it-is, the water is conceived as that which quenches your

91 Skt. abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasapratltih kalpana/ Tib. rtog pa ni / shes ba la brjod pa dang 'drer rung bsnang ba ste// 92 Skt. taya rahitam timiraSubhramananauyanasamk§obhadyanahitavibhrahamam jnanam pratyaksam/ Tib. de dang bral ba'o /rab rib dang / myur du bskor ba dang / grur zhugs pa dang / 'khrugs pa la sogs pas 'khrul pa ma bskyes pa'i shes pa ni mngon sum mo // 31 thirst, and therefore it would be understood through kalpana (conceptual thought). A valid direct perception is not conceptual and must be inexpressible by words.93

Dharmottara suggests that the distinction between that which can coalesce with language and that which cannot is the differentiation between inference and direct perception.94 The "mental reflex" necessary to connect the word and the object is the same cognitive process that is present when reflecting on something or speaking on a topic. The words make connections with other experiences and opinions that have occurred in association with that word; those other experiences and opinions will then be mirrored in the current experience.95 Another of Dharmottara's interjections is that there is a period of time that elapses between the moment one directly perceives something, and the time it takes this apprehension to coalesce with language. Further, there is an even longer period between the initial experience when one was led to understand the meaning of a word, and the moment one reapplies the same word to a similar experience or situation. An original experience associated with the word fire might have been connected to a tragedy; in such a case, the tragedy would pervert any future comprehensions of fire-like things. The same may hold true for someone who has been bitten by a spider, who then might become terrified of all spiders. According to Dharmottara, such a correlation could not be known through a means of direct perception.96 This is unlike the direct perception of a yogi:

Hattori, 83. Stcherbatsky, vol.2, 7.12,17. Ibid, 8.1,20. Ibid, 8.23, 23. 32 .. .the meaning of all words is present to [the yogis], (they know it directly). It is

not synthetic knowledge however, it does not grasp former experiences which

happened at the time of the formation of language.97

A yogi is not hindered by the same defilements that common people are. A yogi's thoughts can coalesce with language because his cognition has the ability to supersede conditions such as momentariness and past influences. As Katsura suggests: "Without yogic power, however, we are incapable of recognizing each moment distinctly: hence we are forced to deal with a sort of apparent continuum (santana) of moments instead of moments themselves."98

Lastly, Dharmaklrti points out that direct perception cannot be a valid cognition when influenced by obstructing conditions such as blindness, rapid motion, or jolting. That is to say, someone who suffers from a sensory disorder such as blindness or cataracts will not have the capacity to perceive the object in its true form. That person would be visually obstructed and will describe what has been visualized as appearing opaque or blurry.

Direct perception while undergoing rapid motion would be equally obscuring. For example, to a passenger in a speeding train it may appear as though they were standing still and the outside world was moving around them. If one were jolted while observing such an object, one's vision would be temporarily distorted and in that moment one would not recognize that particular quality, and thus the true nature of that realty (of standing still).

Ibid, 9.2, 24. Square brackets my own. 98 Shoryu Katsura, "Dharmaklrti's Theory of Truth," Journal of Indian Philosophy, (vol. 12, 1984) 216. 33 3.3 Nyaya-Vai£e§ika

In stating that valid cognition is twofold (direct perception and inference), and that direct perception is free from conceptual construction and other disturbances, Dharmakirti is knowingly entering debate with the other schools of Indian philosophy, in particular, the

Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas." Although the Nyaya-Vaisesika school held metaphysical beliefs different from the other schools of Indian philosophy, the other schools:

...accepted the general methodology of Nyaya-Vaisesika school and soon, thanks to

their efforts, instead of remaining a mere school of philosophy, it attained a position

of pre-eminence in the science of methodology. Thus in ancient India a pupil was

first required to learn grammar and then Nyaya or logic. Unless a student took

lessons in Nyaya he was not supposed to be competent to study Purva Mimamsa or

Vedanta."100

This, combined with the fact that Dignaga's main challenges came from Uddyotakara of the

Nyaya school101 and Kumarila of the Mimamsa,102 made them worthy adversaries for

Dharmakirti.

Dreyfus names the Nyaya school as Dharmkirti's main target as he often directly references the Naiyayikans, and even goes so far as to openly make jokes at their expense in PV 11:84-86, 52-58. 100 S.S. Barlingay, A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic (Delhi: National, 1975), 5. 101 J. N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, New York: (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc., 2000), 7. 102 Dreyfus, 52. The Nyaya-Vaisesika also believed that valid cognition could arise from direct perception and inference, but added two additional categories of "comparison" and

"word." The Nyaya-Vaisesikas explain that a perceptual cognition requires a contact between the mind and the senses, and the self with the mind. This creates a two tiered act of direct perception: nirvikalpaka or sensory experience, followed immediately by savikalpaka or linguistic cognition (or perceptual judgement).104 This is in clear opposition to Dharmakirti's theory of valid cognition.

When Dharmaklrti posits that there are two different kinds of valid cognition, he is not only giving information, but also immediately declaring his stance as a Buddhist. The

Buddhists were the only philosophical system at the time who accepted only two categories for valid cognition. The very next thing Dharmakirti mentions is that direct perception is not deceptive and free from conceptual thought. This is a major point of differentiation between the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisesika. Without overtly stating so, Dharmakirti immediately begins to criticize the Nyaya-Vaisesika and effectively says that any person following their system will not have the ability to correctly cognize, and by extension, will not have the necessary tools to help them attain their desired ends. Thus, it would seem that Dharmakirti does not merely oppose the Nyaya-Vaisesika, but that his intention is twofold: to argue with his rivals, and to turn them away from the incorrect teachings offered by those opponents. Dharmakirti states in the Pramanaviscaya:

Mohanty, 17. Mohanty, 19. 35 .. .others who are confused lead the world astray. Those, however, who cultivate

the very wisdom born of reflection realize the ultimate pramana, which due to its

being devoid of error is immaculate [and] without return.105

Krasser, 143. CHAPTER FOUR:

Direct Perception in the Nyaya-bindu

The term 'pratyaksa' is defined in Monier-Williams as an object "present before the eyes, visible, perceptible... [an] apprehension by the senses."106 This definition was both recognized and expanded upon by Dharmaklrti. In the Nyaya-bindu, he expands it to include mental perception (mono-pratyaksd), self-awareness (atma-samvedanam), and yogic cognition (yogi-jnanam).107

4.1 Four Kinds of Direct Perception

The relationship between us and the environment around us is very important. It affects every aspect of life from the time we wake up in the morning until the time we go to sleep, and even during the time of sleep. In short, we are continually interacting with phenomenal world, and take these interactions for granted. Further, the connection between ourselves and the phenomenal world is commonly thought to be understood by means of sensory data that we believe to provide correct information about the world around us.

However, when differing metaphysical positions are presented, often a lacuna is formed between the conventional paradigm and what is explained as reality "as it is"

(satya). It is that very understanding of reality "as-it-is," that is at the basis of

Dharmakirti's definition of pratyaksa.

106 Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit - English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1995)674. 107 See the following section 4.1 for details. 37 As mentioned above, direct perception is cultivated through the senses, but by adding on three additional types, Dharmakirti understands it to be fourfold:

[Direct perception] is fourfold (catur-vidham):m

• Cognition by means of sense organs (indriya-jnanam);109 1161 I

• Mental cognition (mano-vijnana), [which] is that {tan) cognition produced

(janita) through cognition by sense organs (indriya-jnana) that has as its

immediately preceding cause (samantara-pratityayend) the simultaneity of

production (samkariri) of the object itself (sva-visaya) [in the mind] and the

object itself (visaya), without interruption (ananatara-visaya).no 111II

• Self-awareness (atmasamvedanam) of the mind and all mental states (citta-

caittanam).]n I 1811

• A yogi's cognition (yogi-jnanam) born from the ultimate limit (prakarasa-

paryanta-jha) of the ascertainment (bhavana) of actual existence

(bhutartha).112 11911

108 Skt. taccaturvidham/ Tib. de ni rnam pa bzhi ste / 109 Skt. indriyajfianam/ Tib. dpang po'i shes pa dang / 110 Skt. svavisayanantaravisayasahakarinendriyajnanena samanantarapratyayena janitam tanmanovijnanam/i Tib. rang gi yul gyi de ma thag pa yul lhan cig byed ba can dbang po'i shes pa mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen gyis bskyed pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa dang // 111 Skt. sarvacittacaittanamatmasamvedanam// Tib. sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad kyi rang rig pa dang // 112 Skt. bhutarthabhavanaprakarsaparyantajnam yogijnanam ceti/ Tib. yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi nit ha' las byung ba'i rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa'o // 38 This fourfold division presupposes that our interaction with the phenomenal world goes far beyond the mere sensory relationship between us and the world around us. In other words, there is a process of cognition that does not rely simply on what we think, but rather is a direct perception of what really is.

Although cognition through the senses gives the impression of being the paradigmatic cognition of phenomena, we must revisit the topic discussed in the previous chapter, which explains what a valid cognition through direct perception was not. A valid direct perception is not a deceptive (abhrantam) and not a conceptual thought (akalpana).

This means that one is able to perceive the phenomenal world without error or without enforcing any language constraints. In Dharmaklrti's fourfold definition of direct perception, some further guidelines with respect to each of the fourfold division are given:

• in

The particular characteristic (svalaksana) of that (tasyri) is the sensory object

(visaya).114 //10//

The distinction (bheda) which appears in a cognition (jnana-pratibhasa) owing to

the closeness (samnidhana) or farness (asamnidhana) of its object (yasyarthasya) is

the particular characteristic (svalaksanam).115 Ill Ml

Only that (tad-evd) [particular characteristic] exists as the ultimate reality116

113 or "particulars." 114 Skt. tasya visayah svalaksanam/ Tib. de'i yul ni rang gi mtshan nyid de / 115 Skt. yasyarthasya samnidhanasamnidhanabhyam jnanapratibhasabhedastatsvalaksanam/ Tib. don gang nye ba dang mi nye ba dag las sbes pa la sngon ba tha dad pa de ni rang gi mtshan nyid do // 116 Sometimes also translated as absolute truth. (paramarthasaf) .11X211

On account of the fact that [the characteristic] of real objects (vastu) has the

characteristic nature (laksanatvad) having the capacity (samarthya) of causal

efficiency (arthakriya)m 11X311

The other (ctnyat) is universal character (samanyalaksana).n9 I 11411

It, [the universal characteristics] is the domain (visaya) of inference

(anumana).m 11X511

Only that is (tad-eva) cognition directly perceived {pratyaksam

_ _ 1 o 1 i oo

jnanam) is the cognitive result (pramana -phalam), 11X611

because it takes the form (rupatvat) of the artha (object) completely ascertained

(pratlti).123 11X111

The cognition (pramanam) having the sameness of form (rupyamasya) is the artha (object) of that [cognition directly perceived],124 //18// because, on account of that, (tadvasad) the complete understanding (pratlti) of the

"7Skt. tadeva paramarthasat/ Tib. de nyid don dam yod pa ste / 118 Skt. arthakriyasamarthyalaksanatvadvastunah/ Tib. dngos po'i mtshan nyid ni don byed mtshan nyid kho na yin pa'i phyir ro // 119 Skt. anyatsamanyalaksanam / Tib. gzhan ni spyi'i mtshan nyid de / 120 Skt. so 'numanasya visayah/ Tib. de ni rjes su dpag pa'i yul yin no // 121 Dunne translates this word as "instrument of knowledge," 22. 122 Skt. tadeva ca pratyaksam jnanam pramanaphalam/ Tib. mngon sum gyi shes pa de nyid tshad ma'i 'bras bu ste / 123 Skt. arthapratltirupatvat/ Tib.: don rtogs pa'i ngo bo kho na yin pa'i phyir ro // 124 Skt. arthasarfipyamasya pramanam/ Tib. don dang 'dra ba nyid de'i tshad ma ste / artha (object) is established. //19//

These guidelines add specific information applicable to each of the four pratyaksas that will help us to systematize the cognitive process.

In light of these guidelines, the previous discussion with regard to the paradigmatic understanding of sensory perception as being the phenomenal world cognized by the senses is unlike what Dharmaklrti is purporting. According to Dharmakirti, we access the world through four different kinds of perception. The phenomena we access through our senses do not have the comprehensive existences that we believe they have, but instead they are made up of particular characteristics rather than universals. It is from the particular characteristics of anything that we derive our sensory cognition. The next chapter will be devoted to explaining the difference between the particular and universals, and thus it is sufficient to note that the difference between the particular and universals is the difference between a part and the whole.

Each of the four perceptions, when considered on their own according to

Dharmakirti's exclusions and guidelines, have slightly different alterations in that each reflects differing aspects of cognition. Thus, what follows is an attempt to highlight and explain the four pratyaksa's in order to clarify Dharmakirti's meaning underlying his discussion on them, and through that clarify his soteriology.

Skt. tadvaSadarthapratitisiddheriti/ Tib. de'i dbang gis don rtogs pa 'grub pa'i phyir ro // 41 4.2 Sense Perception and Causal Efficiency

In Dharmaklrti's framework, cognition through the senses has a much different flavour than the previously discussed 'paradigm.' The development of sensory perception in accord with what is provided for us to follow produces different and more specific results. To begin, with it is explained that a proper cognition must be of a particular, rather than an universal, which then begs the question, what is a particular characteristic?

It is difficult to interpret the explanation of "particular characteristic" (svalaksanam) in the Nyayct-bindu. However, this much seems clear. A particular characteristic of perception is the sensory object which depending upon distinction such as farness or closeness will change our perception of the sensory object. But only the particular characteristic exists in reality because a thing perceived has causal efficiency.

For example, if one considers a table from different angles, it will appear entirely different from viewing it from any other angle. If one were to look at it from the side, it would appear like a thin flat surface; if it were considered from above, the surface would appear quite expansive. Insofar as "nearness" and "farness" are concerned, one can imagine how tiny the table would look from a distance of fifty meters, in contrast to standing right beside the table. In these cases, distance or the angle of vision produce certain factors about the object that remains specific to that object. These constitute the defining characteristics of the object. The particular aspect of the object is not only a valid cognition, but it is also the absolute reality, or paramarthasat. That particular is what sets it apart from other things. It is not the table's "tableness" that constitutes a table's particular characteristic, but it is the particular capacity of the object to be causally efficient (arthakriya). This can be understood in a few different ways.

Nagatomi explains that there are two ways to view causal efficiency.126 If one were to translate arthakriya as a locative tatpurusa compound, it would have the sense of

"fulfilling a human purpose." In this case, artha could be translated "purpose" or "goal," and kriya as "action." However, if one were to translate artha as a "thing" or "object," and kriya as "causal power" or "activity," the compound could then be considered as a genitive tatpurusa, in which case the translation would become something like "an object's causal power."127 The difference is between fulfilling a human desire, versus an objects capacity to produce an effect. Nagatomi suggests that Dharmakirti uses arthakriya in the

Pramanavarttika in both ways,128 a suggestion that further complicates the potential for translation.

The si oka that was translated above as:

On account of the fact that [the characteristic] of real objects (vastu) has the

characteristic nature (laksanatvad) having the capacity (samarthya) of causal

efficiency (arthakriya). 11X311 [genitive tatpurusa] could then be changed to:

Masatoshi Nagatomi, "Arthakriya," Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, (1967-1968), 31-32: 52-72. 127 Other discussions on this matter can be found in Dunne, 273-84, and Stephen Phillips' "Dharmakirti on Sensation and Causal Efficiency," Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 3, (September, 1987)231-259. 128 Nagatomi, 56-57. 43 On account of the fact that [the characteristic] of real objects (vastu) has the

characteristic nature (laksanatvad) having the capacity (samarthya) to fulfill human

purpose (arthakriya). 111311 [locative tatpurusa]

According to Phillips, the dual interpretation does not only occur in the Pramanavarttika alone, but also in the Nyaya-bindu.129 If, as Nagatomi suggests (and Dunne concurs),

Dharmakirti uses the compound with an intended dual sense in the Pramanavarttika, whether that is occurring in the Nyaya-bindu must be addressed.

In //13// [genetive tatpurusa], arthakriya is understood as the object having causal efficiency, thus it would be the object having the ability to produce something. What is produced by the object is indriya-jnanam or sensory perception. The difficulty that arises when one translates the sloka in this way is the cyclical relationship that is occurring through the senses. That is, in order for the perceiver to perceive through the senses

(indriya-jnanam), perception must take place through the senses. By the same token, for an object to produce a cognition, it must rely on the senses. There is a dependent relationship that necessitates the existence of one for the existence of the other, because without the ability to perceive something, how would it be possible to say something exists? Further, if there were nothing to perceive, what would be the point of perception? As many scholars have already pointed out, Dharmakirti often describes things in a cyclical fashion,130 but because Dharmakirti, in true Buddhist fashion, perceives the world as causally dependent, translating the sloka from the perspective of genitive tatpurusa does appear contextually possible.

129 Phillips, 240. 130 See Nagatomi,! 959; Vetter, 1964; Franco, 1999; Hayes, 1984. 44 Understanding the verse from the perspective of locative tatpurusa, one would cognize an object based on its uniqueness, and that would result in the sense of the capacity to fulfill human purpose. The opening stoka of the Nyaya-bindu states:

The complete attainment (siddhih) of all human objectives (purusartha) is preceded

(purvika) by valid cognition (samyagjnanam); therefore that [valid cognition] (iti

tad) [is here] to be explained (vyutpadyate). 11X11

From this verse, it could be understood that a valid cognition of the object's particular characteristics would have the ability to fulfill "human objectives." There is certainly a correlation between Sloka 1 and sloka 13. For example both state that valid cognition has the ability to lead to the attainment of human objectives. It does not say that the cognition necessarily will. Further, the two verses seem to agree with the overall objective that

Dharmaklrti states he wants to accomplish, which is, to explain valid cognition for the purpose of achieving human objectives.

Based on the Buddhist primacy placed on causality, if one were to side with the prior reading, then this section of the text could effectively offer a practical example for causation, one of the main Buddhist tenets.131

Here we have a very prominent Buddhist concept (causality) being practically applied in cognition, but on the other hand, the verse can explain how valid cognition is necessary to achieve ones goals. This interpretation lends particular insight into the soteriology of the Nyaya-bindu. This may have been Dharmakirti's way to exercise

131 Steinkellner also prefers to translate arthakriya as causal efficiency. See his work "On the Interpretation of the Svabhahetuh," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv fur Indische Philosophie, 18 (1974), 117-129. 45 compassion because valid cognition helps in "explaining] what correct cognition is to those who do not know, as this cognition is necessary for attaining that which is beneficial and for abstaining from that which is detrimental."132

4.3 Mental Cognition

In Dharmakirti's concept of pratyaksa, the external world and the cognizer are both dependent on each other for cognition to occur. If there is nothing to perceive, no cognition will take place. On the other hand, if there are no senses operating, regardless of how many objects might be present, no cognition will take place. In expanding his discussion on the application of the sensory organs, Dharmaklrti explains that a relationship occurs between a person's mind and one's sensory organs. That is, Dharmaklrti says that mental cognition is knowledge that is attained simultaneously in the mind when the senses come into contact with an object. This mental cognition, as with sensory cognition, must be the defining characteristic of the object, and thus the image that is created in the mind necessarily possesses that unique quality.

In the pramanasiddhi chapter of the Pramanavarttika, Dharmaklrti explains the relationship between the mind and the senses:

...if the senses, etc., (i.e., exhaling, inhaling, and cognition) were produced

independently of [causes of] their own kind, [then] just as there is a transformation

Krasser, p. 142. hitahitapraptipariharayor niyamena samyagjnanapurvakatvad avidusam tadvyutpadanartham idam arabhyatc. 46 of one [thing], there would be a [transformation] of everything, because there is

no difference [in the transformation]. //38//133

[Nor are the senses, or the body together with the senses the cause of cognition, for]

even when every single one of the senses is damaged, the mental cognition is not

damaged. But when the [mental cognition] is destroyed, their (i.e., the senses)

destruction is observed. 113911134

According to this statement, if the body, senses, and the mind were all independent causes, then they could not function in conjunction with each other. Each one would change and operate on its own. Dharmakirti states that even when the body and senses are damaged, mental cognition remains intact, whereas if mental cognition ceases, then the body and the senses also cease to function. Dharmakirti concludes:

.. .mental events and physical events simply occur together at the same place and

the same time, each being the result of separate chains of antecedent conditions.135

In the Nyaya-bindu, the relationship between mental cognition and the sensory organs is the same. Mental cognition and sensory cognition occurs simultaneous but there are the separate chains of "antecedent conditions." Although they are separately operating functions, still they interact simultaneously so that sense data becomes cognized, and thus the phenomenal world is cognized. Still we must remind ourselves what Dharmakirti says a direct perception cannot be with respect to mental cognition. A direct perception is freed from conceptual thought, and thus it could not coalesce with language. Therefore, when

'"Franco, 184. 134 Franco, 186. 135 Hayes, "Dharmakirti on Rebirth," Studies in Original Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism, vol. 1 (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshodo), 119. 47 one considers mental cognition, there is a risk; one may fall back into this trap.

Although, mental cognition is not considered to be a process of discursive thought, it is an awareness, ie., an awareness of a particular characteristic of the phenomenal world.

4.4 Self-Awareness of the Mind and Mental States

When discussing self-awareness of the mind and mental states, Dharmakirti states that there is an awareness that can occur when an individual gains self-knowledge. For

Dignaga, this awareness occurs as another form of mental cognition. In the

Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga states:

...there is also mental [perception which is of two kinds] awareness of an [external]

object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental activities as] desire and the

like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction.136

He then explains in his commentary:

The self-awareness (sva-samvedam) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc.,

is [recognized] as a mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-

137

organ.

In analyzing self-awareness, a hierarchy exists, in that someone who has gained the capacity for valid cognition through self-awareness possesses a developed form of mind.

Dignaga asserts that an individual who has self-awareness knows one's own mental states to be freed from conceptual construction. Herein, there is a sense of immediacy, in that the

Hattori, 27, k. 6ab. Hattori, 27. 48 emotion arises prior to conceptual process, and thus self-awareness (sva-samvedana) cannot be connected to language in any way if it is to be valid.

Self-awareness as a separate category in Dharmakirti's fourfold pratyaksa seems misplaced, because in our previous discussion we have seen that direct perception had some kind of relationship with the phenomenal world. However, here we find that self- awareness is concerned strictly with the individual. What is the reason for this? To this question, Nagatomi provides a response:

An external influence is not necessary for an individual to experience desire. An

individual can suddenly wish for something without that item being present. Mental

sensation is self-cognizing, rather than being implemented with regard to external

reality.138

In other words, a direct perception arises within an individual. Mental states create their own cognition, as well as affecting other forms of cognition. Therefore, the cognizer must cultivate self-awareness so as to understand the effects of emotions and how they distort true reality.

" M. Nagatomi, "Manasa-pratyaksa: a Conundrum in the Buddhist Pramana System." In M. Nagatomi, B.K. Matilal, J.M. Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978) 257 - 8. "Accordingly, pleasure and so forth are conscious (1) of themselves as well as (2) of the objects that (cognitively) manifest (their own images) transposed onto them: they (viz. pleasure and so forth) are none other than (an aspect) of themselves: (hence) the former is directly experienced by the latter. It is to this effect that (conventional) mention is made of the 'direct experience of the object (by sensation)' (only in a figurative sense). But (ultimately) the object (alambana) means (the cognition's manifestation in that (form)." 4.5 Yogic Perception

Of Dharmaklrti's fourfold division of pratyaksa, although yogic cognition is the most profound, it is the least researched. It purports a way of perceiving reality possessed only by an individual with special abilities. Dharmaklrti explains the fourth kind of a direct perception as:

A yogi's cognition (yogi-jnanam) born from the ultimate limit (prakarasa-paryanta-

jna) of the ascertainment (bhavana) of actual existence (bhutartha).

This means that a yogi's cognition is a form of non-conceptual knowledge that arises from a conceptual object. It seems to be a form of intuition emerging out of an intense meditation that develops into an apprehension of the ultimate limit of existent reality.139

The perfected practice of a yogi furnishes him with valid cognition of any and all things, completely removed from conceptual constructions. A yogi has the ability to perceive objects that are inaccessible to the ordinary person, because he has "direct, non-conceptual experience of the sixteen aspects of the Nobles' Four Truths."140 He can perceive things such as emptiness and momentariness directly that other, ordinary people, can learn about only through inference.141 In the pratyaksa chapter of the Pramanavarttika line 285,

Dharmaklrti explains yogic intuition as follows:

Raynald Prevereau, Dharmaklrti's Account of Yogic Intuition as a Source of Knowledge, M.A. Thesis: McGill University, 1994) 77. 140 Dunne., 305. 141 Ibid., 305. .. .that to which one meditatively conditions oneself, whether it be real or unreal,

will result in a clear, non-conceptual cognition when that meditative conditioning

reaches its culmination.142

In other words, if a yogi were to meditate on some object, it would result in a clear, non- conceptual cognition, because the yogi has the ability to cognize without any need to link that object with language. It follows, therefore, that the practitioner who has mastered this form of direct perception has the ability to view all phenomena in that very manner.

McDermott suggests that it is not only things that are meditated upon, but also the four noble truths can become the objects of meditation.143 According to McDermott,

"yogipratyaksa ... alone affords a full penetration into the nature of the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism and their sixteen aspects."144 From her statement, it can be inferred that only an individual who has the ability to view reality in its ultimate defining characteristics will have the ability to comprehend the four noble truths.

4.6 Progressive Structure

The fourfold division of Dharmakirti's concept of direct perception contains a potential for a progressive development of cognitive theories. The steps of development begin with indriya-jnana and ends with yogi-jnana. This progression reflects Dharmakirti's soteriological intent, in that it develops the subject matter of cognition that envelops aspects requiring more practice, more concentration, and more Buddhist knowledge.

142 Ibid., 226, fn. 4. 143 Charlene McDermott, "Yogic Direct Awareness," Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978) 149. 144 Ibid., 149. 51 With regard to indriya-jhana, Dharmaklrti discusses, in very simple, clear terms correct cognition that is approachable from many different levels. The potential for a double reading of the text hinted at Buddhist underpinnings such as causal conditions.

Dharmaklrti's explanation of mental cognitions and their connection to the senses indicated that these were necessary for a valid cognition of a perception. According to

Dharmaklrti's Pramanavarttika, mental cognition is a higher level of cognition, because it does not necessarily depend on a sensory cognition, and thus, valid cognition could not occur without this connection.

The third aspect of direct perception, self-awareness, accentuates the move from exterior phenomena, to the interior and it elucidates the necessity to harness the mind and mental states before a valid cognition can occur. One's mental states affect what one cognizes, and can produce a different cognition within the perceiver. Once one learns to harness one's emotional states, one's cognition will no longer be affected by them, and the individual will not need to be concerned with emotion.

The fourth aspect of direct perception, yogic cognition, is the highest level and the most difficult to attain. It presupposes that the other three have been mastered. It would be difficult for a yogi to meditate if one did not understand the interaction between sensory objects and the senses, and their representations as particulars. Further, if the yogi did not understand the relationship between mental cognition and the senses, it would be impossible for him to recognize the causal relationship between the mind, body, senses, and the object. Through self-awareness the yogi would learn to harness his mind and mental states so he would have the ability to meditate without any interruption from emotions. 52 The Nyaya-bindu does not say that any one of the fourfold is less valid than the other. Each is correct, and Dharmakirti does not say that learning one makes the other less valid. According to Dunne this is Dharmakirti's way of separating conventional cognition from ultimate cognition.145

Dunne, 143-144. 53 CHAPTER FIVE:

Phenomenology

In the previous chapter the fourfold dimension of direct perception and the process of development within its structure was explored. Now, it is necessary to discuss the object of cognition, and what is perceived in direct perception. Therefore, in this chapter on phenomenology, the object of perception, or prameya,146 and its representation as universals or particulars will be investigated and explained in view of how this representation becomes significant in the process of direct perception. Dharmaklrti explains the distinction between the universal and the particular in terms of two differing kinds of reality, the conventional and ultimate. These designators of reality play an important role in the discussion on the relationship between soteriology and epistemology within the Nyaya- bindu.

5.1 The Conventional and The Ultimate

In Buddhist history, the division into the conventional and the ultimate has been discussed at great length in the Abhidharma literature, and such text as Vasubandhu's

Abhidharmakosa and the Abhidharmako§abhasyam. Exploring Vasubandhu's discussions on the conventional and the ultimate will be helpful for understanding Dharmaklrti's use of those terms because he seems to rely on Vasubandhu's works for his understanding of them. In discussing the difference between the two, Vasubandhu states:

146 Dunne, 35: "...prameya refers to the object of the indubitable knowledge derived from an instrument of knowledge or pramana, and to clarify that a prameya is specifically an object of this kind of knowledge, I will generally translate prameya as "instrumental object." The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in the

mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that resembles them,

exist relatively. The rest exist absolutely.147

In other words, one's belief of a perceived thing to be this or that particular can only subsist so long as the components that make it up remain intact. Thus the concept a of jug exists conventionally. A thing conventionally designated has a relative existence in that it is believed to be this or that particular thing only in the context of its relationship to other things. Thus if the jug breaks into small pieces, whatever remains can no longer be perceived as a jug, but instead it is perceived as a bunch of broken pieces. Technically a jug never existed as something substantive. The belief in a jug is a mere convention.

For Vasubandhu, the ability for someone to perceive the ultimate, rather than the

14.R conventional depends largely on one's cultivation and reflection on the teaching. After reflecting, one would then practice meditation by means of which one may gain wisdom that allows one to see the 'particular,' and thus the ultimate.149 This practice is not only advantageous, but fundamental for a Buddhist adherent, because as Vasubandhu explains, what prevents one from seeing an objective referent for its universal characteristics are attachments that stem from craving.150 People crave colours, shapes, tangibles and honours.151 So long as one is craving, one is trapped within the cycle ofsamsara.

147 Abhidharmako&a, 6.4, see Pruden, p. 910. 148 Ibid., 5a-b, 911. 149 Abhidharmako^abhasyam, see Pruden, 911. 150 Ibid., 913-17. 151 Ibid. 55 Vasubandhu uses the meditation on a corpse in order for a monk to learn the concept of momentariness.152 Although Dharmaklrti only alludes to momentariness in the

Nyaya-bindu, according to Katsura:

One of the fundamental doctrines of the Buddhists is that everything is

impermanent, except for some 'uncaused/undconditioned' {asamskrta) items, such

as Nirvana. Dharmakirti believes this doctrine in its most rigorous form: namely,

whatever exists is momentary (ksanika) because only momentary existence can

produce and effect (arthakriya-samartha)}53

His belief in momentariness is detailed in the Hetu-bindu in which Dharmakirti purports the nature of a thing is to destruct.154 It is not necessary for a thing to rely on other causes for its destruction, because that would suggest that an existent thing would not change.155

However, all things are subject to different conditions that effectively alter their existence and contribute to their impermanence. In essence, Dharmakirti is stating that "to be" is the capacity to produce an effect.156

152 Abhidharmakosabhasyam, see Pruden, 950-952 expands upon this concept, and describes sixteen moments that occur in the process of cognizing sensory objects. 153 Katsura, 216. 154 Hetu-bindu, see Gokhale, 2.6, 21. 155 Ibid, 2.7,22. 156 For a detailed discussion with relation to the cause \ effect process, see Katsura, 216-219. 56 The distinction between conventional reality (samvrti oxprajnapti) and ultimate reality (paramartha)157 has been expounded in the Nyaya-bindu by Dharmakirti in the following verses:'5 8

Only that (tad-eva) [particular characteristic] exists as the ultimate reality159

(paramarthasat).160 HUH

On account of the fact that [the characteristic] of real objects (vastu) has the

characteristic nature (laksanatvad) having the capacity (samarthya) of causal

efficiency (arthakriya).161 HUH

The other (anyaf) is universal character (samanyalaksana).162 11X41/

It, [the universal characteristics] is the domain (visaya) of inference

(anumana).163 11X511

Only that is {tad-evd) cognition directly perceived {pratyaksam

jnanam) is the cognitive result (pramana-phalam),lM 11161 I

because it takes the form (rupatvat) of the artha (object) completely ascertained

157 Pruden translates these words (samvrtisat or prajnaptisat and paramarthasat) from Poussin's Abhidharmakosa and Abhidharmakosabhasyam as relative truth and ultimate truth, or the latter occasionally as absolute existence. However, the standard practice with Dharmakirti scholars is to translate these words as conventional reality and ultimate reality. In order to avoid confusion, in this section I will refer to them simply as the conventional and the ultimate. 158 Certain lines or the translation have been repeated due to their relevance with regard to universals and particulars. 159 Sometimes also translated as absolute truth. 160Skt. tadeva paramarthasat/ Tib. de nyid don dam yod pa ste / 161 Skt. arthakriyasamarthyalaksanatvadvastunah/ Tib. dngos po'i mtshan nyid ni don byed mtshan nyid kho na yin pa'i phyir ro // 162 Skt. anyatsamanyalaksanam / Tib. gzhan ni spyi'i mtshan nyid de / 163 Skt. so 'numanasya visayah/ Tib. de ni rjes su dpag pa'i yul yin no // 164 Skt. tadeva ca pratyaksam jnanam pramanaphalam/ Tib. mngon sum gyi shes pa de nyid tshad ma'i 'bras bu ste / 57

(pratltf).165 I mil

The cognition {pramanam) having the sameness of form (rupyamasya) is the artha

(object) of that [cognition directly perceived],166 //18//

because, on account of that, (tadvasad) the complete understanding (pratiti) of the

artha (object) is established.167 1/19/1

It is clear that Dharmakirti believes that there exists some form of reality (or truth). Further, this reality/truth is knowable through the four kinds of direct perceptions and when viewed from the particular rather than the universal.168 The particular is what gives an object the capacity to be causally efficient.

According to Dharmakirti's explanation on valid cognition, both direct perception

(pratyaksa) and inference (anumana) constituted valid cognition. Therefore, as soon as verbal designations are made to refer to an object, that object can no longer be cognized directly. For example, when I say to you "table," you may automatically assume that I am referring to one single object. The word "table" does not refer to "table and chair," nor to

"tables" but grammatically speaking, I am referring to one particular thing. Now, if you were to take an axe and break it into pieces, a "table" would no longer remain. Or, if the top were taken off, and the legs removed, it would be difficult to say that a "table" remains.

165 Skt. arthapratitiriipatvat/ Tib.: don rtogs pa'i ngo bo kho na yin pa'i phyir ro // 166 Skt. arthasarupyamasya pramanam/ Tib. don dang 'dra ba nyid de'i tshad ma ste / 167 Skt. tadvaSadarthapratitisiddheriti/ Tib. de'i dbang gis don rtogs pa 'grub pa'i phyir ro // 168 Dunne, 41. 58 However, if one were to approach an object and cognize it as such, conventionally speaking, this perception can be called a valid cognition. In this case, because there is no use of language, this would be a "direct perception valid cognition."

Once the object is destroyed, a conventional cognition which perceives the "table" as a table could not take place. However, because an ultimate cognition recognizes an object in its minute qualities, regardless of the form it might take, it effectively cognizes the ultimate while avoiding defilements such as language. In this case, it is not the physical matter that persists, but the unique qualities. Physical matter exists conventionally, but the unique qualities cannot be broken down conventionally.

5.2 What is being Cognized?

In the Nyaya-bindu, the subject of cognition falls pray to the common criticism that

Buddhists have debated on numerous occasions. If everything is momentary, and nothing exists in unchanging form from moment to moment, what is the contents of cognition?

Although the Nyaya-bindu does not take the typical question / answer formulation, this is precisely the question of an opponent that Dharmakirti is trying to answer in the latter half of the text. According to Dharmakirti, it is the particular characteristic of an object that is to be cognized. This particular characteristic is what makes an object specific. It is

"formness," but in as much as it is the essence of the form that is graspable, there is only

"essence" to grasp. 59 In a response to an objection in the Hetu-bindu, Dharmakirti discusses how objects can be accessed in view of their particular qualities:

Composite objects occurring in a series have discrete capacities at their respective

moments, because of their association with the respective discrete causes (of their

own). Although they appear to have the same form due to some resemblance, yet

their self-natures are different. Hence only a certain thing is the cause of

something. There the collection of color (i.e. a visible object), the sense-organ and

others, located in a place where there is no obstacle (between the sense-organ and

the object), is the capable cause of the generation of (perceptual) cognition. And

the specific cause which is the basis for these causes coming together is the cause

capable of producing that (final) cause. And they have neither prior nor posterior

nor separate existence. Hence no defects, which apply to prior or posterior or

separate existence apply to these causes although they are capable (causes). So

whatever is the cause of their approaching each other etc., (is not itself the cause

which is capable of producing the effect, but) is the cause of the capable (cause).169

In other words, what appears as an object is a composite accumulated together because of some kind of association or relationship. It appears as one single object because the components resemble each other through this relationship, but each particle has a different self-nature, or particular characteristic. Together they form a perceptible object that must be accessed without any disturbances or hindrances. The perceptual process of sensory cognition is a direct and immediate experience that has the ability to process the

169 Hetu-bindu, see Gokhale, 33. "formness" of the object, and recognize that which sets it apart from all other things, but not so far apart that what is perceived is a completely unconnected entity (causally speaking). In so far as the particular characteristics are concerned, there is no prior or posterior knowledge that is applicable to an object, and thus the cognition produced from this sensory experience yields previously unknown information, making each perception unique from any previous perception. 61 CONCLUSION

In the introduction of this thesis, there was of a two-dimensional framework explained within Dharmaklrti's philosophy of epistemic and instrumental rationality.

Epistemic rationality supposed a form of evidential support, while instrumental rationality was discussed as a means to an end. That the epistemic rationality was, in fact, subsumed under instrumental rationality, and served to help fulfill its proposed end was suggested.

This two-dimensional framework became more clearly depicted when considered from the different element of this thesis.

Within this thesis, many different aspects of the Buddhist pramana tradition were presented. In chapter one, a brief biography of Dharmaklrti's life as currently known, historically and mythologically, was provided. His major works were discussed, with a special concentration on the Pramanavarttika, and on the Nyaya-bindu. In chapter two, the historical development of the pramana tradition was offered in order to show that the intention of the logicians was often to assist someone on the Bodhisattva path to see the true nature of reality and to show valid cognition to those who are being lead astray by

"false" philosophies. Dharmaklrti's most prominent predecessor Dignaga was cited in order to explain Dharmaklrti's obvious soteriological intentions in the Pramanasamuccaya, and Dharmaklrti was also shown to purport something equally as soteriological in one of his other texts, the Pramanaviscaya. Although Dharmaklrti does not make it explicitly clear in the Nyaya-bindu, the common belief that the Nyaya-bindu is an abridgement to the

Pramanavarttika supports the claim for the Nyaya-bindu to have a similar intention. The Nyaya-bmdu was written by Dharmakirti to help those who have been led astray to correctly understand the meaning of valid cognition, so that they might gain the ability to cognize ultimate reality, and thus break the cycle of samsara.

Chapter three discussed the first section of the pmtyaksa chapter of the Nyaya- bindu, and more specifically, it focused on what a valid cognition is not. Dharmakirti explains that a valid cognition is not deceptive and is free of conceptual thought. Thus a valid cognition must not coalesce with language and cannot be visually obstructed. He names only direct perception and inference as valid cognitions. It is here that Dharmakirti positions himself as a Buddhist, specifically in opposition to the Nyaya- Vaisesika. The

Nyaya-Vaisesika believed that in addition to direct perception and inference, there was a need for language to follow immediately after the sensory perception before a cognition could be considered valid. He confidently begins with this discussion, expecting that this discussion is enough to persuade his opponents to read the remainder of the text; he clearly believes that it is enough to at least open the door for potential.

Chapter four explained the four different kinds of direct perception: sensory, mental, self-awareness and yogic. Each of the four were described, and then finally they were discussed in terms of their potentially progressive order. Finally, Dharmakirti's explanation of universals and particulars in relation to the conventional and the ultimate was presented in chapter five. It was suggested that Dharmakirti's understanding of the conventional and the ultimate were closely aligned with Vasubandhu. This is significant, because by understanding Vasubandhu's presentation of the concepts, Dharmakirti's 63 intentions become clarified. They each supposed that the ultimate perception of reality lies in perceiving the particular of an object rather than its universal.

Dharmakirti composed his Nyaya-bindu to help those who are "confused" and thus lead the world astray. Like Vasubandhu, Dharmakirti believed that it was our attachments that kept us trapped within samsara, and this attachment was our desire to perceive objects as colours, shapes, tangibles and honours.

When Dharmakirti discusses perception of reality, he starts at a very basic level, sensory perception. This displays a certain epistemic sensitivity, in that he is starting off with something with which one would find difficult to disagree with. We access the world through our senses. This very basic beginning produces immediate results, both cognitively and logically.

He then follows with mental perception. This is the projection of the image in the mind that is acquired through the senses. This claim is also epistemically strong, in that it is not too far from the original claim, and in fact experience would support it. When someone views something, there is often an image or mental reflection of some kind (smell, taste, etc.), and thus to the common person, it is logically sound and easily conceived.

These two initial forms of perception are both attainable on a conventional level and do not require any self-development.

The two latter move progressively higher up on the epistemic rung. They each require some discipline, be that self-reflective, or meditative, and therefore become more difficult to prove. He implements an epistemic structure, which will eventually lead someone to continue in the practice, and finally pursue a yogic awareness that effectively leads the practitioner towards the specific goal of achieving nirvana. Considering his 64 statements reflected and mirrored the other Yogacara philosophers, it stands to reason that his intentions were equally as religiously focused.

Dhamaklrti's philosophy in the Nyaya-bindu provides a rational framework by which a Buddhist can develop and mature religiously and rationally. It is not necessary to separate the "religious" and the "rational," because they in fact work to compliment each other. This we have seen in Dharmakirti. 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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