Nāgārjuna's Theory of Causality: Implications Sacred and Profane Author(S): Jay L
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Nāgārjuna's Theory of Causality: Implications Sacred and Profane Author(s): Jay L. Garfield Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 4, Nondualism, Liberation, and Language: The Infinity Foundation Lectures at Hawai'i, 1997-2000 (Oct., 2001), pp. 507-524 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400165 . Accessed: 06/08/2013 15:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NAGARJUNA'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY: IMPLICATIONS SACRED AND PROFANE JayL. Garfield DepartmentofPhilosophy, Smith College, and School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania Introduction Ndgdrjunaproperly emphasizes that one understandsthe fundamentalnature of reality(or lackthereof, depending on one's perspective)if, and onlyif, one under- standsthe nature of dependent origination: Whoeversees dependent arising Alsosees suffering Andits arising Andits cessation as wellas thepath. (XXIV:40) Andhe devotestwo importantchapters of the MalamadhyamakakjrikJ to the anal- ysis of causalityper se and of dependentarising more generally.The analysis developedin these chapters permeates the rest of the treatise. I have largelysaid my piece abouthow thesechapters are to be readand abouttheir role in Nagdrjuna's largerphilosophical enterprise (Garfield 1990, 1994, 1995). I will reviewthat ac- countonly briefly here as a preliminaryto some applications. I thinknot only that Nagarjuna is rightabout the fundamentalimportance of causality,and ofdependence more generally, to ourunderstanding ofreality and of humanlife but also thathis own accountof these matters is generallycorrect. Given thesetwo premises,it followsthat our conductof naturalscience as well as the pursuitof our moral life should be informedby Nagarjuna's account of these matters. Here,I willdevelop some of these implications. I caution, however, that my devel- opment,at leastin the case ofethics, is heterodox-although,as I willargue, abso- lutelyorthodox Madhyamaka-within at leastone majorliving tradition in which Madhyamakais preservedand practiced:the dGe lugspa school of TibetanBud- dhism.As a consequence,we willhave reasonto questionboth certain substantive claimsmade within that tradition about the necessary conditions of the cultivation of bodhicittaand thedoxographic strategy of the tradition. My claimsabout the philosophy of sciencemay be less controversial,but will nonethelessoffend some. And that (on bothcounts) is as itshould be. Forthe phi- losophyof science has been steadilymaturing into a moreBuddhist framework over the past few decades (even ifmost Western philosophers of science would not rec- ognize thatcharacterization). But thereare residues of pre-Buddhistmodernism in practice,and even those who opt fora more enlightenedapproach to these matters do not always see the big picture. PhilosophyEast & WestVolume 51, Number4 October2001 507-524 507 ? 2001 byUniversity ofHawai'i Press This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I willfirst sketch Nagarjuna's view. The accountwill be straightforward,and I will notdefend my reading any further here. I willthen turn to the implicationsof thisview for the philosophy of science,arguing that Nagarjuna's account of inter- dependenceshows how we can clearlyunderstand the nature of scientific explana- tion,the relationshipbetween distinct levels of theoreticalanalysis in thesciences (withparticular attention to cognitivescience), and howwe can sidestepdifficulties in understandingthe relations between apparently competing ontologies induced by levelsof description or explanationsupervening on one another. Finally,I will examine rGyal tshab's exposition of DharmakTrti'saccount, in the pramanasiddhichapter of the Prampnavarttika, ofthe necessity of a beliefin rebirth forthe cultivation of bodhicitta.This account is acceptedin thedGe lugstradition bothas an accuraterepresentation of DharmakTrti'sviews and as authoritativere- gardingbodhicitta and themahakarunJ, which is itsnecessary condition. But, I will argue,DharmakTrti, rGyal tshab, and theirfollowers are, by virtueof acceptingthis argument,neglecting Nagarjuna's account of dependent arising and inconsequence are implicatedin what might be seen froma properPrasangika-Madhyamaka point ofview as thevery subtlest form of self-grasping. We can use Nagdrjuna'saccount to extirpatethis final self-grasping, thus freeing the morally central notion of bodhicitta fromunnecessary and perhapsimplausible metaphysical and cosmologicalbaggage. Thisalso suggestssome caution regarding a doxography that takes as axiomaticthe consistencyof DharmakTrti'spramanavada and Nagarjuna'sMadhyamaka. We will concludewith a fewobservations on commonlessons emerging from these appli- cationsof Ndgarjuna'sinsights in two such radically different domains. TheEmptiness of Causality Nagarjunais oftenerroneously understood as a nihilistwith respect to causalityand dependentarising. On thismisreading he is takento arguethat in factthere are no relationshipsof mutual dependence among phenomena, and eventhat no phenom- ena in factexist. Nothing could be furtherfrom the truth.Ndgdrjuna assiduously defendsthe co-relativity of emptiness and dependentarising, and insiststhat to say thatall phenomenaare emptyjust is to saythat they are dependentlyarisen: Whateverisdependently co-arisen Thatis explained to be emptiness, That,being a dependentdesignation, Is itselfthe middle way. Somethingthat is notdependently arisen, Sucha thingdoes not exist. Thereforea nonempty thing Does notexist. (XXIV:18-19) Since nobody-particularly anyone who would offera nihilisticreading of N~garjuna with respectto the conventionalworld and pratitya-samutpada-would seriouslyclaim thatN~garjuna denies the emptinessof all phenomena,nobody who 508 PhilosophyEast & West This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions readsthe Malamadhyamakakarikathrough to the end could seriouslydefend the nihilisticreading. Since one of the principalphenomena that Nagarjuna analyzes as emptyis causation,it is notsurprising that some readthe first chapter of the Malamadhya- makakarikaas an attackon thereality of causation. After all, inthe very first verse he asserts: Neitherfrom itself nor from another, Norfrom both, Norwithout a cause, Doesanything whatever, anywhere arise. (1:1) Butagain, given a correctmiddle-path reading of Ndgdrjuna'sprogram, we can see immediatelythat such a readingmust be erroneous.Ndgdrjuna's strategy throughoutthe MOlamadhyamakakdrikJ is to argue that the phenomena we normally taketo be inherentlyexistent, to have convention-independentnatures, and to exist as theydo preciselybecause of their natures are infact empty of inherentexistence, existonly conventionally, and existprecisely because of theiremptiness and inter- dependence.To quote a favoriteTibetan Prdsangika-Madhyamaka saw: we do not saythat because things are emptythat they do notexist; we saythat because things existthey are empty.The converse,of course, is equallyassertible. Now, as I have arguedbefore, in the case of causation,in chapter1 of the MalamadhyamakakarikJ,Nagarjuna proceeds by distinguishinghetu (rgyu)from pratyaya(kyen). He uses the formerterm to denote the cause of the meta- physicians-anevent capable ofbringing about another by virtue of a powerthat is partof itsnature. The latterdenotes an eventor phenomenonwhose occurrence or existenceis correlatedwith that of another-a condition: Thesegive rise to those, So theseare called conditions. (I: 5a, b) "When thisarises, so does that.When thisceases, so does that."Of course Nagdrjunaidentifies four kinds of conditions, in roughharmony with standard Bud- dhisttaxonomies of causality (for more detail see Garfield1995). He arguesthat the midpointbetween reification of causation-the adoption of a realisticview with re- spectto causal powers-and nihilism-theview of a randomand inexplicableuni- verseof independentevents-is theacceptance of the realityof conditions,and a regularistaccount of explanation. On sucha view,what counts as explanansand as explanandumdepends on explanatoryinterests and uponconventions for individu- ationand classification.Hume is oftenread (properlyin myview) in roughlythis way. Such a view is,hence, far from a nihilism.This is insteada moderate,sensible approachto explanationand to understanding. N~garjuna's reasons for rejectingcausal powers anticipate the argumentsof Hume and of Wittgenstein:causal powers are never observed; causal powers, if sufficientfor explanation, can never inhere in isolated events or things,which always require cooperating conditions; causal powers cannot be explanatoryon JayL. Garfield 509 This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms