Nāgārjuna's Theory of Causality: Implications Sacred and Profane Author(s): Jay L. Garfield Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 4, Nondualism, Liberation, and Language: The Infinity Foundation Lectures at Hawai'i, 1997-2000 (Oct., 2001), pp. 507-524 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400165 . Accessed: 06/08/2013 15:51

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NAGARJUNA'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY: IMPLICATIONS SACRED AND PROFANE

JayL. Garfield DepartmentofPhilosophy, Smith College, and School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania

Introduction

Ndgdrjunaproperly emphasizes that one understandsthe fundamentalnature of reality(or lackthereof, depending on one's perspective)if, and onlyif, one under- standsthe nature of dependent origination: Whoeversees dependent arising Alsosees suffering Andits arising Andits cessation as wellas thepath. (XXIV:40) Andhe devotestwo importantchapters of the MalamadhyamakakjrikJ to the anal- ysis of causalityper se and of dependentarising more generally.The analysis developedin these chapters permeates the rest of the treatise. I have largelysaid my piece abouthow thesechapters are to be readand abouttheir role in Nagdrjuna's largerphilosophical enterprise (Garfield 1990, 1994, 1995). I will reviewthat ac- countonly briefly here as a preliminaryto some applications. I thinknot only that Nagarjuna is rightabout the fundamentalimportance of causality,and ofdependence more generally, to ourunderstanding ofreality and of humanlife but also thathis own accountof these matters is generallycorrect. Given thesetwo premises,it followsthat our conductof naturalscience as well as the pursuitof our moral life should be informedby Nagarjuna's account of these matters. Here,I willdevelop some of these implications. I caution, however, that my devel- opment,at leastin the case ofethics, is heterodox-although,as I willargue, abso- lutelyorthodox Madhyamaka-within at leastone majorliving tradition in which Madhyamakais preservedand practiced:the dGe lugspa school of TibetanBud- dhism.As a consequence,we willhave reasonto questionboth certain substantive claimsmade within that tradition about the necessary conditions of the cultivation of bodhicittaand thedoxographic strategy of the tradition. My claimsabout the philosophy of sciencemay be less controversial,but will nonethelessoffend some. And that (on bothcounts) is as itshould be. Forthe phi- losophyof science has been steadilymaturing into a moreBuddhist framework over the past few decades (even ifmost Western philosophers of science would not rec- ognize thatcharacterization). But thereare residues of pre-Buddhistmodernism in practice,and even those who opt fora more enlightenedapproach to these matters do not always see the big picture.

PhilosophyEast & WestVolume 51, Number4 October2001 507-524 507 ? 2001 byUniversity ofHawai'i Press

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I willfirst sketch Nagarjuna's view. The accountwill be straightforward,and I will notdefend my reading any further here. I willthen turn to the implicationsof thisview for the philosophy of science,arguing that Nagarjuna's account of inter- dependenceshows how we can clearlyunderstand the nature of scientific explana- tion,the relationshipbetween distinct levels of theoreticalanalysis in thesciences (withparticular attention to cognitivescience), and howwe can sidestepdifficulties in understandingthe relations between apparently competing ontologies induced by levelsof description or explanationsupervening on one another. Finally,I will examine rGyal tshab's exposition of DharmakTrti'saccount, in the pramanasiddhichapter of the Prampnavarttika, ofthe necessity of a beliefin rebirth forthe cultivation of bodhicitta.This account is acceptedin thedGe lugstradition bothas an accuraterepresentation of DharmakTrti's views and as authoritativere- gardingbodhicitta and themahakarunJ, which is itsnecessary condition. But, I will argue,DharmakTrti, rGyal tshab, and theirfollowers are, by virtueof acceptingthis argument,neglecting Nagarjuna's account of dependent arising and inconsequence are implicatedin what might be seen froma properPrasangika-Madhyamaka point ofview as thevery subtlest form of self-grasping. We can use Nagdrjuna'saccount to extirpatethis final self-grasping, thus freeing the morally central notion of bodhicitta fromunnecessary and perhapsimplausible metaphysical and cosmologicalbaggage. Thisalso suggestssome caution regarding a doxography that takes as axiomaticthe consistencyof DharmakTrti'spramanavada and Nagarjuna'sMadhyamaka. We will concludewith a fewobservations on commonlessons emerging from these appli- cationsof Ndgarjuna'sinsights in two such radically different domains.

TheEmptiness of Causality

Nagarjunais oftenerroneously understood as a nihilistwith respect to causalityand dependentarising. On thismisreading he is takento arguethat in factthere are no relationshipsof mutual dependence among phenomena, and eventhat no phenom- ena in factexist. Nothing could be furtherfrom the truth.Ndgdrjuna assiduously defendsthe co-relativity of emptiness and dependentarising, and insiststhat to say thatall phenomenaare emptyjust is to saythat they are dependentlyarisen: Whateverisdependently co-arisen Thatis explained to be emptiness, That,being a dependentdesignation, Is itselfthe middle way. Somethingthat is notdependently arisen, Sucha thingdoes not exist. Thereforea nonempty thing Does notexist. (XXIV:18-19)

Since nobody-particularly anyone who would offera nihilisticreading of N~garjuna with respectto the conventionalworld and pratitya-samutpada-would seriouslyclaim thatN~garjuna denies the emptinessof all phenomena,nobody who

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions readsthe Malamadhyamakakarikathrough to the end could seriouslydefend the nihilisticreading. Since one of the principalphenomena that Nagarjuna analyzes as emptyis causation,it is notsurprising that some readthe first chapter of the Malamadhya- makakarikaas an attackon thereality of causation. After all, inthe very first verse he asserts: Neitherfrom itself nor from another, Norfrom both, Norwithout a cause, Doesanything whatever, anywhere arise. (1:1) Butagain, given a correctmiddle-path reading of Ndgdrjuna'sprogram, we can see immediatelythat such a readingmust be erroneous.Ndgdrjuna's strategy throughoutthe MOlamadhyamakakdrikJ is to argue that the phenomena we normally taketo be inherentlyexistent, to have convention-independentnatures, and to exist as theydo preciselybecause of their natures are infact empty of inherentexistence, existonly conventionally, and existprecisely because of theiremptiness and inter- dependence.To quote a favoriteTibetan Prdsangika-Madhyamaka saw: we do not saythat because things are emptythat they do notexist; we saythat because things existthey are empty.The converse,of course, is equallyassertible. Now, as I have arguedbefore, in the case of causation,in chapter1 of the MalamadhyamakakarikJ,Nagarjuna proceeds by distinguishinghetu (rgyu)from pratyaya(kyen). He uses the formerterm to denote the cause of the meta- physicians-anevent capable ofbringing about another by virtue of a powerthat is partof itsnature. The latterdenotes an eventor phenomenonwhose occurrence or existenceis correlatedwith that of another-a condition:

Thesegive rise to those, So theseare called conditions. (I: 5a, b) "When thisarises, so does that.When thisceases, so does that."Of course Nagdrjunaidentifies four kinds of conditions, in roughharmony with standard Bud- dhisttaxonomies of causality (for more detail see Garfield1995). He arguesthat the midpointbetween reification of causation-the adoption of a realisticview with re- spectto causal powers-and nihilism-theview of a randomand inexplicableuni- verseof independentevents-is theacceptance of the realityof conditions,and a regularistaccount of explanation. On sucha view,what counts as explanansand as explanandumdepends on explanatoryinterests and uponconventions for individu- ationand classification.Hume is oftenread (properlyin myview) in roughlythis way. Such a view is,hence, far from a nihilism.This is insteada moderate,sensible approachto explanationand to understanding. N~garjuna's reasons for rejectingcausal powers anticipate the argumentsof Hume and of Wittgenstein:causal powers are never observed; causal powers, if sufficientfor explanation, can never inhere in isolated events or things,which always require cooperating conditions; causal powers cannot be explanatoryon

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions painof regress(what would explain the arising of the powers, or theirgiving rise to effects?);and positingcausal powersimposes implausible uniformity on the explan- atorylandscape. These arguments are by nowfamiliar, ifstill controversial, and this analysisof the first chapter of the Malamadhyamakakarika is by nowfamiliar, ifstill controversial.I have defendedthese positionselsewhere (Garfield 1990, 1994, 1995),and merelyrecall them here in order to use themas a platformfor extension. Nagarjuna'sconventionalist regularism, when joined with his eclecticview aboutthe dimensions of explanation represented in the account of the four kinds of conditions(efficient, supporting, immediately preceding, and dominant),gives rise to a reasonablystraightforward analysis of explanatoryand predictivelanguage: we explaina phenomenonwhen we identifyitas of a kind;when we connectoccur- rencesof things of that kind with the occurrence of other related phenomena; when we connectthe macroscopicand easily observablewith the microscopicand harder-to-observe;and whenwe place itwithin a networkof events, purposes, and connectionsthat form patterns enabling rational action, prediction, and cognitive access to theworld. The seriouscausal realist(really a reificationistin Ndgdrjuna's sense) can be expectedto pressagainst Ndgdrjuna the obviousquestion for any such regularist: whatexplains these regularities, ifnot genuine causal powersinhering in genuine causes?' Afterall, anyone who is evenas realisticas Nagarjuna,and as committedto theenterprise of explanationas Nagarjuna,must be committedto explainingwhy theexplanans appealed to in anyexplanation in factexplains and, in theend, why theworld is regularat all. Appealto causesand theirpowers would do this;anything less leavesthe entire structure mysterious.2 Ndgarjuna'sreply in chapterVII of the Malamadhyamakakarikais straightfor- ward:each regularity,each pattern,each connectionposited in any explanation mustindeed be explicable.That is the contentof pratitya-samutpjda.But each is explainedby stillfurther regularities, patterns, connections. Deeper understanding consistsof the increasinglyricher embedding of interdependenceinto larger, more articulatedpatterns of interdependence.And theresimply is no explanationof whythe entire universe is interdependent.There is no suchwell-defined totality to explain: Thearisen, the nonarisen, and that which is arising Do notarise in any way at all. Thusthey should be understood Justlike the gone, the not-gone and the going. (VII: 14) Ifanother arising gives rise to this one, Therewould be an infiniteregress. (VII: 19a, b) Thatis the problem of the limits leading to the unanswerable questions. Explanatory questionsare always local. Attemptingtranscendental explanations of the possibilityof explanationis notonly fruitless, it is meaningless:what could explainwhy explanation itselfis possible? Certainlynot powers. What could explain them,or, more deeply, theirexplanatory potential, if not the patternsinto which theyare embedded?

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions We have,then, in the Malamadhyamakakirikr, articulated principally inchapters I and VIIbut supported in a myriadof ways throughout the text, an accountof explana- tionand causation that, like Hume's, grounds ontology in the conventions that underlie ourexplanatory interests and the sortals we chooseunder which to collectentities, and notin a self-evidentor self-presentingpartition of natureinto things, properties, and relations.This is, of course, an ancientview, developed and defendedlong before the riseof modernscience. For all ofthat, it provides a naturaland compellingguide to thelandscape of the world as capturedby the scientific image. Let us nowturn to the importantimplications of this way of seeing things for contemporary science.

A MadhyamakaView of Scientific Explanation and Ontology

Ifwe surveythe world as itis understoodin contemporaryscience, and contempo- raryscience as it developsin orderto understandthe world,we are immediately struckby thefact that from whichever way we approachthe enterprise-whether fromthe standpointof theoryor fromthat of the object(s)of theory-multiple levels of explanationor of ontologypresent themselves. Economics, sociology, anthropology,psychology, neuroscience, ecology, cell biology,physiology, chem- istry,fluid dynamics, macrophysics, and quantumtheory each proceedand indeed progress.Each developsa proprietaryvocabulary, methodology, explanatory strat- egy,and ontology.We havebecome accustomed-or at leastwe had betterbecome accustomed-notonly to thepeaceful coexistence of departmentsof each ofthese disciplinesin ourscience faculties, but also to thepeaceful coexistence of the phe- nomenathey posit at theirvarious levels of description and explanation:not only do departmentsof economics and oftheoretical physics both exist, but exchange rates and neutrinosboth exist as well. Thismultiplicity of kindsof theoriesand of thingssets much of the agenda for contemporaryphilosophy of scienceand metaphysics.For as soon as a categorial multiplicityis countenanced, there is an imperativeeither to reduceor to system- atize it.Is themultiplicity real, or onlyapparent? Is one levelfundamental? Are the relationsbetween the levels uniform? Ordered? What determines a level? And so on. Ontologyand methodologybecome even morevexed when a singlephenome- non appearsto be explicableon multiple,prima facie orthogonal axes of explana- tion:is a movementof myarm to be explainedby appeal to musclecontractions, neuromuscularsynaptic events, and a neurophysiologicalstory? Is itto be explained by referenceto mybeliefs and desires,by referenceto thecultural practices of my fellows,or by referenceto theneed to greeta friend?If one levelis to be privileged, whichone, and why?But if multiple levels, how can such mutuallyindependent, individuallycomplete accounts of the necessaryand sufficientconditions of the same object be equally acceptable? Now, as anyone who has even a passing familiaritywith contemporarymeta- physics and philosophy of science knows, debates about these issues quickly become baroque. But we can cut throughthe Gordian knotif we slice at the right angle, and here is where N~garjuna's analysishelps us; forall of these questionsand

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions puzzles can be sortedinto two closely related, but nonetheless distinct classes: the ontologicaland themethodological. The first class asks to whichentities and proper- tieswe oughtto commitourselves. The secondasks how we shouldunderstand the relationshipbetween theories and explanationspitched at distinctlevels of analysis. A Madhyamakaanswer to questionsof the first kind is a straightforwardcatholic realism:accept the deficits of economics, the kinship relations of anthropology, the classes of sociology,the beliefsof psychology,the moleculesof chemistry,the nichesof ecology,and thequarks of physics.Ndgarjuna's version of theQuinean dictumis thatto be is to be thevalue of a boundvariable is simply"to exist is to exist conventionally,dependently." The relevantconventions here are thoseof scientific theory,and therelevant dependencies are givenby the laws discovered by science. Fromthis perspective there is motivationto disparageneither the "high"-level phe- nomenaof the social or biologicalsciences in favorof an ontologicalprimacy accordedto the "low"-levelphenomena of thephysical sciences (see Churchland 1978) northe "unobservables"of the latterin favorof the manifestentities of the latter(van Fraassen 1980). Forour purposes, it is importantto see thatthis ontological generosity emerges preciselyfrom Nagarjuna's analysis of causality and explanation.It is bestto comeat thisthrough a via negativaor, as I shouldsay in the presentcontext, a prisanga: the urgeto privilegeone levelover another always emerges in scienceand in the philosophyof sciencefrom a view aboutwhere genuine causation is to be found. We might,following Churchland (1978), arguethat because genuinecausation is physicalcausation, by virtueof realcausal powerinhering in subatomicparticles, onlythe physical is reallyreal, and all phenomenadescribed at higherlevels are real onlyto theextent that they are reducibleto thephysical. Or, following van Fraassen (1980),we mightreject the unobservable because realcausal lawsconnect observ- ables.3In eithercase, we justifyan ontologicaldistinction based on a claimabout wherecausal powersare to be located,and thisbecause the only genuine explana- tions,explananda, and explanansare thoserespectively adverting to, deriving from, and possessingcausal powers.But once we freeourselves from the thrall of this im- age of explanationand itsground, the motivationfor these distinctions crumbles. Thenwe can pay attentionto pratitya-samutpada-tointerdependence and itsmul- tiple,multidimensional, inter-level, and intra-levelcharacter-and let a thousand entitiesbloom, requiring of each thatit genuinely toil and spin,accomplishing some realexplanatory work.4 Maintainingour focuson thisnotion of "explanatorywork" as the bulwark againstontological profligacy, we can returnto disposequickly of the second class of puzzles notedabove: thoseregarding not levels of ontology but levels of theory. Wherecompeting explanations are offered,or wherecompeting sciences vie as candidatesto explainparticular phenomena, which of these-otherthings being equal-should claim our theoreticalallegiance? Of course, ifwe seriouslybelieved in the cementof the universe,the answerto thisquestion would be easy: the theory or the science founded in that very cement. The rest would then properlybe regardedas pretendersor "what to do untilthe real science comes along." But ifall

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions thatexplanation tracks is regularityand, as Ndgdrjunawould have it,the increas- inglyrich embedding of regularity, the answer to thequery is equallysimple: if other thingsare reallyequal, thentake 'em all. Again,this does notmean that we should acceptjust any conjecture or explanation,together with the ontology it implicates. All of the standarddesiderata of good theoriesapply-economy, elegance, pre- dictivepower, confirmation, coherence with other theories, and so forth.The point is ratherthat these desiderata are all thatmatter. And that is becausebeyond pratitya- samutpddathere are no occultcausal powerslurking as the uniqueand genuine targetsof our theoretical activity. Theseissues are particularlysharp in cognitivescience, where naturalistic, inten- tionalexplanations vie witheliminative and cognitiveneuroscience, nonlinear dy- namictheory, computational models, and so forth.Now, many of these debates are straightforwardlyempirical debates about how best to understanda particular cognitive phenomenon,and aboutwhether a particulartheory is successfulon itsown terms. NeitherNdgarjuna nor any other philosopher of science has anythingto contributeto thesedebates. This is as itshould be. Theseare all issuesto be settledin the laboratory. But some (e.g., see Churchland1978 and Fodor1987, amongmany others) would resolvethese debates on a priorigrounds, arguing, for example, (1) because naturalisticallyindividuated states cannot have causal powersthey cannot explain anythingand are notreal psychological states, and so psychologymust be individ- ualistic,or (2) because causationin the mindis ultimatelya neuralphenomenon, and so no phenomenaother than those described in the languageof neuroscience are psychologicallyreal, that only neuropsychology is possible. Others (see Burge 1979) arguethat since all psychologicalphenomena are intentional,and since itis underintentional descriptions that they are causallyactive, psychological phenom- ena can onlybe individuatedand explainednaturalistically. To all ofthese, Ndgdr- juna's analysisof pratitya-samutpddashould lead us to answer,using a Sanskrit technicalterm from pramina theory, "fiddlesticks." As manyphilosophers of cognitive science have argued (see Garfield1988, Hard- castle1996, and von Eckardt1995), many empirical domains comprise phenomena whoseexplanation must proceed simultaneously at distinct levels of description, using theoriesand vocabulariesthat are, while mutuallyconsistent, methodologically orthogonalto one another.Such theoriesmay be mutuallyirreducible, and their vocabulariesoften comprise terms indefinable interms of theories at distinct levels. The onlyrelations between such theories might be thoseof global supervenience. None of this,however, requires anything but robust realism regarding each level,and regarding theentities posited by each theory.Only a dogmaticideology regarding the unity of sciencecould lead one to anydifferent conclusion.5 Nagarjuna would smile.

Bodhicittaand Rebirth:A HeterodoxMadhyamaka View

So much forthe profane.Now we will turnour gaze back to Buddhistmetaphysics and epistemologyproper. We will findthat even in thatdomain the full importof N~garjuna's views has not always been appreciated. I will argue thata claim about

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions thepreconditions for the cultivation of bodhicitta-the most ethically and soteriologi- callysignificant motivational state in Mahdydna Buddhist ethics-that is takenas well establishedin the dGe lugspa traditionof Tibetan Buddhism is infact inconsistent with Nagarjuna'saccount of dependent arising, involves a subtleform of self-grasping, and so, bythe lights of the tradition itself, should be rejected.That claim is this:the cultiva- tionof bodhicitta-the altruistic aspiration for buddhahood for the sake of the liber- ationof all sentientbeings from samsara-requires the belief in rebirth. There is a hermeneuticfallacy in Westernphilosophy that I call "Farabi's fallacy,"after its most spectacular exponent. It goes roughlylike this: X was a really smartphilosopher. Y was a reallysmart philosopher. Two such smartguys were undoubtedlyboth right. So, eventhough it might look liketheir views aren't consis- tent,they must be, and thetask of a successfulphilosophical hermeneutics is to weld themtogether. Farabi tried it for Plato and Aristotle.Aquinas, inspired by that noble failure,tried it forGod and Aristotle.In the Tibetantradition the gold medalfor Farabi'sfallacy undoubtedly goes to thefounder of the dGe lugsschool, rJe Tsong khapa,who at somepoint said, "Ndgdrjuna-what a smartguy! DharmakTrti-what a smartguy! So, despitethe fact that sunyavada and pramanavadamight look like two vadas divergingin a yellowwood, theymust be consistent."Tsong khapa (unlikeFrost) devoted much of the rest of his philosophicallife to thetask of dem- onstratingand workingout the consequences of their consistency, trying to take both roadssimultaneously. Now, I have enormousadmiration for Tsong khapa as a phi- losopher,and he is arguablythe titan of the Tibetan philosophical tradition. But in thisrespect I findhis influence less than salutary. The locus classicusfor the dGe lugs argumentfor the conclusionthat belief in rebirthis a necessarycondition of thecultivation of bodhicittais Tsongkhapa's studentrGyal tshab's commentary on the praminasiddhichapter of DharmakTrti's Pramanavarttika.On reading this chapter one mightwell wonder why immediately after a discussionof bodhicitta Dharmakirti sets out to prove the existence of past and future lives.rGyal tshab's commentary on thispassage explains this juxtaposition by setting up a materialistargument against the establishment ofrebirth and argues that such a viewis inconsistentwith the cultivation of bodhicitta.The argumentis interestingfrom our pointof view not only because it is spectacularly bad, but also becauseits error consists preciselyof its failure to appreciate the import of Nagarjuna's account of causality and its implicationsfor the selflessnessof the person.As a consequencewe shall see DharmakTrtiand rGyaltshab caught up inwhat I thinkof as thesubtlest form of self- graspinga Buddhistcould imagine,but a self-graspingnonetheless.

[252.2]When the one endowedwith great compassion became a sage,that required precursors:first, having developed a compassionatedesire to freebeings from all their sufferings,itwas necessaryfor him to familiarizehimself with a methodfor thoroughly pacifyingthe suffering inorder to becomea teacher.

Withrespect to greatcompassion: it is arisenneither causelessly nor from irrelevant causes. Itarises from previous familiarity with things of the same kind.Great compassion itselfis whatestablishes one on thebeginning of the practice of the Mahayana path.

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions [252.11]It isn't accomplished through familiarity with various kinds of compassion, and itdoesn't come fromprior births. That is becausesince the conceptual mind depends on thebody, if the body is destroyed,the mind will be destroyedas well. Forexample, just as lightcomes from a lamp,it [mind] is theeffect of a body,just as theability to getdrunk frombeer is a characteristicofthe body; just as a picturedepends on thewall; through its verynature, it [mind]depends on it [body].

[252.18]With respect to theconceptual mind: this body is neitherits cause norits sup- portingcondition, and thereforethe minddoes notdepend on it.This is because since that[the body] is thebasis [ofthe mind and] can be refutedthrough reasoning, itwill be rejected.Moreover, from giving reasons for the nonexistenceof past and futurelives [253] itwould follow that familiarity with the arising of the various compassions would notbe appropriate.Since this is notthe case, throughrefutational reasoning this will be rejected.Therefore, since through good reasoningpast and futurelives are established, it followsfrom this-and on thefruit to be discussedbelow-that it is clearlyestablished thatone can obtaina favorablerebirth in a futurelife. Having proven this, and thus havingestablished the FourNoble Truths,in thatway one provesthe excellentcon- sequences of abandonment,of causes and effects,upon which beingsof the three capacitiesshould meditate in common.Thus [the practitioner,] adorned with constantly increasingboundless compassion, through having achieved a completerealization of the FourNoble Truths establishes the way to achievingomniscience.

[253.17]With past and futurelives having been well established Andwith their absence having been refuted Selfis refutedand on thatbasis evil is abandoned.

The argumentin outline runsas follows. Great compassion (mahakarun5-the highestlevel of compassion achieved by the bodhisattva,characterized as com- passion in regardingsentient beings as emptyof inherentexistence) is essentialto the enlightenmentof a bodhisattva. It is also hard to achieve, requiringmany rebirthsin which one accumulates its causes, and in which one becomes fam- iliar with compassion and with the view that underlies it. Now, bodhicittais the altruisticaspiration to gain enlightenmentfor the sake of other sentientbeings, and a fortiorithe aspirationto achieve this level of compassion. But that is only possible given many rebirths.So one cannot coherentlydevelop this aspirationif one does not believe in the requisiterebirths. So even to develop bodhicittaone must believe in rebirth.This is the argumenton which I want to focus, and note that it is independentof the preceding argumentspecifically for the existence of rebirth. Thinkabout the bodhisattvaresolution in any of itsstandard formulations: I will attainenlightenment for the sake of all sentientbeings; or, in Santideva'smore poetic words,from Bodhicaryavatira 10.55:

Foras longas space remains; Foras longas transmigratorsremain; So longwill I myselfremain, and thereby I willrelieve all transmigrators'suffering. (Bodhicaryavatara 10:55)

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Butwho, or what,is this"I"? Andwhat is itsrole in theexpression of bodhicitta, particularlyin thecontext of a Buddhistdoctrine of anatman?Now, of courseit is notintended to be a substantialself of the kind that all Madhyamikasreject. And we don'twant simply to dismissthese formulas as confusedor nonsensical,as a nihilist aboutthe self might. But just noting that it is Madhyamaka'sfamiliar conventionally realbut ultimately nonexistent "mere I" willalso be too facile.For, the argument we havejust surveyed for the connection between belief in rebirthand thecultivation of bodhicittahinges directly on the need to positthis "I" in past,present, and future livesas thebasis of the causal continuumlinking the extraordinarily many causes of buddhahoodand theeffect. It is, hence,doing real metaphysical work, well above and beyondwhat any "mere," nominally posited "I" couldever do: itis functioning as thebasis for a realcausal relation.If it were not needed for this, there would be no barto a farsimpler account of the aspiration for the liberation of all sentientbeings (theone I willshortly defend) according to whichthe relevant aspiration is justthat someonewill attain Buddhahood, and thatlots of people will have to do lotsof stuff to makethat possible. These causes will cooperate over time to enablethe requisite enlightenment,and the practitionerresolves to contributeto thataccumulation of causes. The factthat this option is noteven consideredby DharmakTrtior rGyal tshabsuggests that another view of the relevantcausal processis at work.Let us explorethis in moredetail. FollowingDharmakTrti, rGyal tshab takes himself to be respondingdirectly to a materialistopponent who deniesthe reality of rebirth, arguing:

Itisn't accomplished through familiarity with various kinds of compassion, and it doesn't comefrom prior births. That is because since the conceptual mind depends on the body, ifthe body is destroyed,the mind will be destroyedas well.For example, just as light comesfrom a lamp,it [mind] is the effect of a body;just as theability to get drunk from beeris a characteristicofthe body; just as a picturedepends on the wall; through itsvery nature,it[mind] depends on it[body].

It is arguedby rGyaltshab that there must be rebirthprecisely because "[compas- sion]arises from previous familiarity with things of thesame kind"and that"from givingreasons for the nonexistenceof past and futurelives it would followthat familiaritywith the arising of thevarious compassions would notbe appropriate." On the otherhand, if, and onlyif, there is rebirth,he assertsthat "adorned with constantlyincreasing boundless compassion, through having achieved a complete realizationof the Four Noble Truths[the practitioner]establishes the way to achievingomniscience." That is, itis onlypersonal rebirth-here defined explicitly interms of a singlemental continuum independent of the body-that for rGyal tshab (and DharmakTrti)and the subsequentdGe lugs pa traditionmakes buddhahood possible, and so only a belief in this possibilitycould groundbodhicitta-the reso- lutionto achieve buddhahood forthe sake of sentientbeings. Note that this implicates two specific theses: one regardingcausality and one regardingthe contentof compassion. Both,I will argue, are misguidedfrom a Madhyamakaperspective. The first,especially, is inconsistentwith N~garjuna's own

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions accountof causality.The second is implicatedby it and is inconsistentwith the doctrineof anatman. A centralclaim in rGyaltshab's argument is thatwithout rebirth there cannot be any causal connectionbetween the accumulating causes of bodhicittaand maha- karuni(accumulation of merit and wisdomand familiarizationwith compassion and itsobjects) and thecrucial effect. That is whyrGyal tshab can saythat "from giving reasonsfor the nonexistence of pastand futurelives it would follow that familiarity withthe arising of the various compassions would notbe appropriate."And that is whyhe can say thatthe fact that there are pastand futurelives enables "the excel- lentconsequences of abandonment,of causes and effects,[and] ... constantly increasingboundless compassion, through having achieved a completerealization ofthe Four Noble Truths establish[ing] the way to achievingomniscience." Butwhy should rebirth be necessaryto mediatethis causal link?We (where "we" includesboth DharmakTrtiand rGyaltshab) are quite familiarwith causal chainsin which important causes are presentin one groupof entities and theeffect inothers (a tinderboxand flintgive rise to a firethat burns in a candleand is usedto lighta lamp;a teacher'swords together with the text in a book give riseto under- standingin the mind of a student;etc.). And this last provides a plausiblealternative modelfor the accumulation of causes of mahakarund,bodhicitta, and omniscience: theacts, insights, writings, and discoveriesof one individualmake possible deeper insights,more profound realizations, and moreinformative writings on the partof another.Knowledge and compassiondeepen over the generations, and, after a time, some individualattains buddhahood as a consequenceof the accumulationof causes byothers. Call thisthe transpersonal model of attainment, as opposedto the intrapersonalmodel embraced by thedGe lugspa tradition,following DharmakTrti and rGyaltshab. The questionswe mustask, then, are these:(1) Whydoes rGyaltshab embrace the intrapersonalrather than the transpersonal model? (2) Is hisdoing so consistent with accountof causation? I thinkthat the answer to thefirst is obvious, Ngdgrjuna's and thisis confirmedby the oral tradition:6 only an interpersonalcontinuum could mediatethe connectionsbetween the relevantcauses and effects.Remove this premiseand theargument loses all plausibility.After all, given that it is reasonableto believethat buddhahood is difficultto achieve,one could argueconvincingly that bodhicittarequires a beliefin the past and thefuture, but not in one's own pastand futurelives, unless one thoughtthat the relevantcausal chaincould onlybe intra- personal.But why would rGyal tshab believe that? Well, the only reason I can come up withis thathe thinksthat causation requires a substantialbasis-something in whichthe causal powersinhere. That basis, for rGyal tshab, would be the mental continuumor subtleconsciousness that continues across rebirths. Andthat implausible view leads us to thenext question: is thatconsistent with N~garjuna's account of causation,which rGyaltshab and the dGe lugstradition also endorse? No, of course not. For N~g~rjuna, insistingon the emptinessof causation, insistsprecisely on the absence of the need forany causal powers or forany sub- stantialbasis forcausal chains. Causation is re-describedin his Madhyamaka anal-

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ysisas a matterof explanatorilyuseful regularities, and the notionof explanatory utilityis furtherunpacked in termsof the embedding of regularitiesin furtherregu- larities.None of this requires the genidentity ofthe objects participating incause and effect.Nor should it, as countlesscounterexamples show. Herethe Carvaka oppo- nentseems to getthings just right:"It isn'taccomplished through familiarity with variouskinds of compassion, and itdoesn't come fromprior births. That is because sincethe conceptual mind depends on thebody, if the body is destroyed,the mind willbe destroyedas well." Or at leastit could be likethat. Moreover,returning to the second thesiscentral to rGyaltshab's account- concerningthe contentof compassion-itwould be morein harmonywith the Mahdydnaunderstanding ofanatman (also defendedforcefully by Ndgdrjunain the Malamadhyamakakarika)to see itlike that. This brings us backto the status of the "1" inverses like Santideva's and thereal content of bodhicitta and themahakaruna that itcomprises. The aim and themotivation of bodhicittais thealleviation of the suf- feringof all sentientbeings. That is beyondquestion. It also comprisesthe view that onlya buddhacould accomplish this task, given its stupendous difficulty. Moreover, bodhicittais morethan a merewish that a buddhaarise and thatthereby sentient beingsbe releasedfrom suffering; itis an altruisticaspiration to bringthis about. And thenotion of "bringing about" is, of course, ineliminably causal. One can see, then, how ifone thoughtabout causality in terms of substantial supporting bases of causal chainsone wouldthen be ledto believethat the only way one couldbring about the arisingof a buddhafor the sake of other sentient beings is to setabout becoming one oneself,and the onlyway one could rationallyadopt that objective would be to believein pastand futurelives-and therest follows. Butonce we haveshed the reified view of causality that Nagarjuna so forcefully criticizes,this argument crumbles. And once we accept somethinglike the trans- missionof knowledgeas an analogyfor a transpersonalcausal chain linkingepis- temicand moralcauses withtheir soteriological effects, we can see thatthe "I" as a future-tensesubject in thebodhisattva resolution is gratuitous.I must develop an altruisticresolve to do something;that something-if we accept moreBuddhist soteriologicaltheory about the necessityof a buddha'scapabilities for the taskat hand-mightbe to bringabout enlightenment (or at leastto contributeto bringingit about);but that enlightenment need notbe mine.And if it need not,there is no entailmentat all betweenbodhicitta properly understood and rebirth. Norshould there be. Fornow we can see thatto confusean altruisticimpersonal aspirationfor enlightenment for the sake of sentientbeings with an aspirationfor one's own enlightenment-toconfuse a convictionthat there is a futurefor the sake of whichone shouldwork with the view that it is one's own future-isa serious, thoughsubtle form of atmanvada or even atmangraha. The reasonis this:the "1" that is positedhere is positednot merely as a conventionallydesignated continuum, but as a substratumfor a causal process. My dGe lugs proponentat thispoint-accusing me of nihilismabout the self-will protestthat the "1" so positedis a mere"1" ("nga" tsam) as opposed to a substantialself. But simplyto say thatthis is what is going on doesn't make it so. Here's the difference:a mere "1" doesn't do any metaphy-

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions sical work-it servesas a conventionallyposited imputation with no convention- independentidentity conditions, and no explanatoryvalue. CandrakTrti (1989, 1994) as well as Nagarjunaand laterTsong khapa (1984, 1988) makethis point with great force.But the "I" positedhere-the "I myself"(bdag ni) of Santideva, the one thatis rebornfor rGyal tshab-has workto do. Itexplains causation, something that neither Nagarjunais in needof an explanationof nor is capableof being explained. To posit such a substantialsubstrate and thento stakethe meaningof one's morallife on itscontinuation through time is to fallback froma viewof emptinessinto a barely disguisedsubstantialism about the self. Only by optingfor a more impersonal bodhicitta,a moreimpersonally bodhisattva resolution, can theMahdydna remain consistentlyMadhyamaka. I have heardthree further objections to thisaccount from dGe lugspa interlocu- tors.Let me rehearseand respondto each quicklybefore turning to myconclusion. (1) In yourview, it doesn't matter what I do in thislife-whether I am Hitleror MotherTheresa, and thisfor two reasons: (a) IfI am notgoing to existin the future, I have no moralincentive to be good; afterall, I will neitherreap the benefitsof morallygood actionsnor suffer the consequences of morallybad actions.(b) Either kindof life might lead to benefitsin the future, so thereis no intrinsicreason to prefer a good lifeto a bad one. The answerin each case is simple.Concerning the first objection,if your only motivation for leading a good lifeis yourown benefitin the future,your motivation is notthat of a bodhisattvain the first place. We are consid- eringthe necessary conditions of bodhicitta, after all, notof self-interest. Concerning thesecond, the reason for thinking that Mother Theresa's life will be morelikely to lead to universalmoral improvement and enlightenmentthan Hitler's is notintrinsic byanyone's reckoning: it is causal (and althoughfallible, plausible). We thinkthat it is simplymore likely that lives like hers generate the relevantmoral benefits better than lives like his. Ifwe thoughtotherwise, altruism might require strange things of us.7 Othersobject (2) thatthere are plentyof independentreasons to accept rebirth (DharmakTrtiand rGyaltshab would agree). Maybe so. Maybenot. It doesn't matter, I say,for the present purposes. My question is this:do you needto believein rebirth in orderto generatebodhicitta? Just as itis trueboth that there are nineplanets and thatit is unnecessaryto believethis in orderto cultivatebodhicitta, it maybe true thatthere is rebirth.But even ifit is, I have arguedthat it is unnecessaryto believe thisin orderto cultivatebodhicitta. It is onlythe entailment that is at issuebetween rGyaltshab and me at thispoint.8 Finally,some of mydGe lugspa colleaguesask, (3) ifthere is no rebirth,how does anyoneget to the pointof buddhahood,given the stupendousdifficulty, or, indeed,to the point of generating bodhicitta, given its still impressive difficulty? Here I givethe same answerI wouldgive regardinghow Kantwrote his Critiqueor how Einsteindiscovered relativity:by takingadvantage of the accomplishmentsof those who go before.(Note thatthis is also a veryplausible and a veryattractive way of understandingrefuge in Buddhistpractice.) And that has been the burden of the foregoingargument.

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JohnPowers (personal communication) argues that the real reason for requiring a beliefin past and futurelives is the fact that since the bodhisattva vow requiresone to workto attainbuddhahood for the sake ofall sentientbeings, and sincemany of thesesentient beings, in myview, fail to existnow (they have died), and sinceothers willexist only far into the future, the vow would be incoherent.You can't,he argues, save sentientbeings who no longerexist from anything, and a Buddhawho then dies can't save futurebeings. In fact,he argues,if you don'tbelieve in futurelives, the bestway to rescueall sentientbeings from suffering is to killthem all, rightnow. These would be unacceptableconsequences, of course.But they do notfollow. Powers'charges, however, do forcea carefulexamination of the content of the vow and of theaspiration as I mustunderstand them. Bodhicitta must, in myview, be directedonly to actualsentient beings, present and future.One cannothope to do anythingfor the dead. Thatdoes, to be sure,reduce the scope ofthis moral aspira- tion,but only realistically so. Withregard to thefuture, things are less dreary.The buddhathat one strivesto bringinto the world, I wouldhope, would help not only hercontemporaries but also hersuccessors, just as thediscoveries of medicines and vaccineshelp those who follow(the epithet "the great doctor" is a commonway of referringto SiddharthaGautama, and has justthis connotation). Finally, while killingall sentientbeings might indeed relieve suffering, itdoes notthereby bring out happiness,and bodhicittasurely is theaspiration to bringabout happiness as well. "Mayall sentientbeings be happy"is, after all, amongthe most common Mahdydna colophons.I concludethat Powers' objections fail. IfI am rightabout this, the doctrine of rebirth is ofconsiderably less importance to Buddhism-especiallyto MahdydnaBuddhism-than it is generallytaken to be.9 I takethis as confirmationof myview. That doctrine, after all, is an importfrom an ambientHindu culture. Buddhism jettisons a greatdeal of the centralideology of thatculture, including, prominently, the ideal of atman;there is no reasonto think thatthis part should survive, especially if it can be shownboth to be inessentialto thecentral moral theses definitive of the Mahdydna and to be inconsistentwith its centralinsights-those of anatman and ofthe emptiness of causation.10

Conclusions

I have referredto thesedistinct sets of implicationsof Ndgdrjuna'sviews on causa- tion as thosefor the profaneand those forthe sacred. But I could easily have adopteda moretraditional classification of consequences:those pertaining to the selflessnessof phenomenaand thosepertaining to the selflessnessof persons.In each case, Ndgdrjunadraws our attention to the subtle and seductivereification that comesto us so naturally,and to theextent to whichour thinking about causation is implicatedin thatreification. It is almost impossibleto resistthe temptationto seek to go beyond the merely interdependentand to positsome hidden glue-some cementof the universe-that holds in place not only the externalworld but the self,and thatensures the regular transitionfrom link to link. "Surely," we think,driven by our deepest cognitive

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions instincts,"even if everythingwe encounteris merelyinterdependent, that inter- dependenceitself must have some substantialbasis." Butthat commitment, when seen fromthe opposite side ofthe Madhyamaka dialectic, becomes the more insid- ious"surely, even ifeverything we encounteris empty,that emptiness must be truly existent."And once we committhat fallacy, we are seton theroyal road to nihilism about the world in which we lead our lives,and to untenablerealism about thetranscendent. Itthen becomes impossible to makeany sense at all of empirical realityor of itsemptiness. So, temptingas theglue view is, itmerely traps us in an inescapableweb ofmetaphysical illusion. Ndgdrjuna'sanalysis is powerfulnot only because itdissolves the hiddenglue we instinctivelyposit to give coherenceto our world,but also because it demon- stratesthe perniciousconsequences of positingthat glue. While a theoryabout causation-evena prereflectivetheory-might seem to be buta recherchecorner of metaphysicsand thephilosophy of science, it in fact infects and determinesour view of everythingelse-from the philosophyof science to the philosophyof mindto cosmologyto ethics.Getting clear about causality is indeeda prerequisiteto getting clearabout everything else; it is truethat a worldwithout inner and outerglue dis- integrates.Nothing holds the self together; nothing holds causes to theireffects. Raw interdependenceis all we encounter,and thereis no hopeof an explanationto end all explanations.That is the manifestationin the philosophyof scienceand in the existentialunderstanding of the natureof selfof the abyss of emptinessinto which D6gen muchlater commands us to leap. Butthat leap is a leap intoemptiness, and notinto nihilism: just as D6gen reassuresus thatin facinginterdependence in this waythe self and all thingsare affirmed,we haveseen thatin facing the emptiness of interdependencewhile the inefficacious occult cement of the universe vanishes, the empiricalworld and thepossibility of meaningful life therein are affirmed.The mere interdependenceprovides all thecoherence one could coherentlydesire.

Notes

Thanksto ArindamChakrabarti for provoking me, to the Ven. Geshe Ngawang Samtenfor debating this issue, to GuyNewland and MarkSiderits for valuable con- tributionsto theensuing discussion from which this article has emerged,and to Mark fora valuableset of commentson an earlierdraft. Thanks also to GeorgesDreyfus forsending crucial texts, and to theVen. SonamThackch6e for checking and cor- rectingtranslations and forfurther discussion of theseissues. I also thankCynthia Townleyand TriciaPerry for editorial assistance. 1 - I will not use the pejorativeterm "antirealist," for, in the contextof Mad- hyamaka,that begs importantquestions both about the appropriate sense of "reality"and aboutwhat kinds of phenomenawe mightidentify about which to be realists.Moreover, for a Prasanrgika-MadhyamikalikeNdgarjuna, there is an additionalproblem: how do we identifythe common object necessary to generatea realist/antirealistdebate?

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 - Notethat while this objection might appear to be a versionof Smart's(1963) "cosmiccoincidence" argument for scientific realism, it is not.For Nagarjuna wouldagree with Smart that one mustbe (conventionally)realistic about any- thingone positsin an explanation.His claim is simplythat in factwe never reallyposit causal powersin explanations(compare Tsong khapa 1984 and 1998 on thequestion of whether for a Prdsanigika-unlikea Svatantrika-we positinherent existence even conventionally).The cosmiccoincidence argu- mentreally does have itshome in realism/antirealismdebates, and thisis not one ofthose. The question here is whetheror notthe concept of causal powers actuallyhas anycontent. The reificationistclaims that it does, Ndgdrjuna that it does not. 3 - The contemporaryphilosophers most explicit about this justification for onto- logicaldiscrimination in science are JerryFodor (1984) and Paul Churchland (1978). 4 - See also Kitcher1993 foranother contemporary argument for the claimthat causal claimsare grounded in explanations rather than vice versa. I thankMark Sideritsfor calling this parallel to myattention. 5 - MarkSiderits (personal communication) charges me withadopting my own dogmaticideology of thedisunity of science,by virtueof underestimatingor ignoringfuture theoretical unifications of the domains of these diverse sciences.This is notthe place to fightthis larger battle in the philosophyof science.I havesaid mypiece elsewhere(Garfield 1988, unpublished).Briefly, though,while I endorsea broadlyphysicalistic view of thesupervenience of the domainsand theoriesof higher-levelsciences on thoseof morefunda- mentalsciences (e.g., psychologyvs. physics),such superveniencedoes not entailfor supervening sciences and domainseither reduction to or absorption by the morefundamental sciences or domains,and thefrequently relational, normative,or gerrymandered character of the ontologies and methodologiesof higher-levelsciences often blocks such reductionor subsumption.Multiple stylesand axes of explanationsare oftennecessary in orderto capturethe irregular,multilevel character of reality(see also Hardcastle1996). Of course, thispoint depends to a certaindegree on whatone countsas reduction.If re- ductionis to be distinguished,as I (1988) and others(see Hardcastle1996 and Churchland1978, to cite buttwo examples)have arguedthey must be, reductioncannot simply be definedas global supervenience.Whether it is understoodas a Nagel-stylereduction by biconditionalbridge laws or inter- level definitions,a systematic reduction as in Haugeland1981 or Cummins 1983,or the preservation ofroughly equipotent theoretical images (Churchland 1978, Hardcastle1996), the pointgoes through:ontological dependence does not entail reducibility. 6 - The Ven. Geshe Ngawang Samten, personal communication,and the Ven. Sonam Thackch5e, personalcommunication.

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 7 - Andthe Jltaka tales include stories of the Buddha doing prima facie rather bad thingsprecisely because on thoserare occasions they conduce to the more rapidspiritual benefit of others. 8 - I leave open theoption of fighting the other issue out later. 9 - The Ven. Geshe NgawangSamten (personal communication) points out that anotherreason for thinking that belief in rebirthis necessaryin orderto culti- vatebodhicitta: one ofthe principal means of cultivation is thepractice of vis- ualizingall sentientbeings as one's motherin past lives and developing a feelingof gratitudefor their past kindness.If this method were necessary forcultivating bodhicitta, then a beliefin past lives would also be necessaryfor cultivatingbodhicitta. But he also pointsout thatthis is notthe onlymethod forcultivating bodhicitta that is recommendedin the tradition,and thatthe exchangeof selffor others does not requirethis belief, and this is widely regardedas sufficient. 10 - Mark Siderits(personal communication) notes that I, like DharmakTrtiand rGyaltshab, rely on causal processesto explainthe possibility of Buddhahood, and so thatI, likethem, presuppose some confidence in causation as a ground ofthe possibility of bodhicitta, even as I reconceptualizethat aspiration. So, he suggests,my view is reallyno differentfrom theirs. Not so. Thereis a bigdif- ference:whereas the orthodoxview I criticizerequires (notwithstanding its own protestationsto the contrary) a substantial basis for a causal relation,and hence morethan mere pratitya-samutpdda, and somethinglike kriya (bya ba) properof the kind Ndgarjuna so properlyrejects, my account merely requires the kindof causal dependencewith which Ndgdrjuna properly suggests we shouldreplace causal powerand substancetalk. What is at issue,I repeat,is neitherfaith in theexistence of the past and thefuture nor the view that Bud- dhahoodhas causes and is difficultto achieve,but rather the claim that per- sonal rebirthis a necessarycondition of enlightenmentand hence thatfaith thereinis a necessarycondition of bodhicitta. And here we differ.

References

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This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Tue, 6 Aug 2013 15:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Cummins,Robert. 1983. TheNature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: MIT Press. Fodor,Jerry A. 1987. Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in thePhilosophy ofMind. Cambridge: MIT Press. Garfield,Jay L. 1988. Beliefin Psychology:A Studyin theOntology of Mind. Cam- bridge:MIT Press. - . 1990. "Epocheand Sonyatd:Skepticism East and West." PhilosophyEast and West40 (3): 285-307. -- . 1994. "DependentArising and the Emptinessof Emptiness:Why Did NagarjunaStart with Causation?" Philosophy East and West44 (3): 219-250. . 1995. FundamentalWisdom of the Middle Way: Nigirjuna's Mala- madhyamakakjrik5.New York:Oxford University Press. - . 2000. "Thoughtas Language:A MetaphorToo Far."Protosociology 14: 85- 101. rGyaltshab rje. 1990. rNam'grel thar lam gsal byed.Sarnath: Central Institute of HigherTibetan Studies Gelugpa Student Welfare Committee. Hardcastle,Valerie Gray. 1996. How to Build a Theoryin CognitiveScience. Albany:State University of New YorkPress. Haugeland,John. 1981. "The Natureand Plausibilityof Cognitivism." Behavior and BrainScience 1 :218-226. Kitcher,Philip. 1993. TheAdvancement of Science:Science withoutLegend, Ob- jectivitywithout Illusions. New York:Oxford University Press. Smart,J. J. C. 1963. Philosophyand ScientificRealism. London: Routledge and KeganPaul. TsongKhapa. 1984. The Essenceof TrueEloquence. In TsongKhapa's Speech of Gold in theEssence of True Eloquence: Reason and Enlightenmentin the Central Philosophyof Tibet,translated by RobertA. F. Thurman.Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress. -- . 1998. Legsbshad snying po. In GesheYeshes Thap-khas, Drang nges legs bshadsnying po. Sarnath:Central Institute of HigherTibetan Studies Press. Van Fraassen,Bas C. 1980. TheScientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Von Eckardt,Barbara. 1995. Whatis CognitiveScience? Cambridge: MIT Press.

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