<<

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Volume 6 Issue 1 Issue 1 - Fall 2003 Article 9

2003

Business, the Arts & the Role of the Copyright Act

Keith C. Hauprich

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw

Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation Keith C. Hauprich, Business, the Arts & the Role of the Copyright Act, 6 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 213 (2020) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol6/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. wo recent court decisions examined, seemingly paternalistic intent of the legislative history addressed, and adjudicated parallel issues potentially underlying the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act,8 determining the scope of rights of legions of the Court ruled in favor of the freelance authors. recording artists and freelance authors. While the The protection of one's copyright interests core of each case centered on the fact that the as secured by the United States Constitution9 cannot agreements between each of the respective litigants exist in a vacuum. Only through legislative did not expressly grant (or reserve) the exercise of amendments and ever-evolving case law can the the particular rights in dispute, the decisions of the intent behind Article I, Section 8, Clause 8' ° be courts have seemingly antithetical results. A review preserved. This article is intended to illustrate the of each court's application of the governing law to evolving nature of the meaning of this clause through the disparate facts of each case presents an a side-by-side review of the two cases set forth interesting illustration of the relationship among above. business, the arts, and the role of the CopyrightAct.' In Greenfield v., Inc.,2 the State Court of Appeals relied on "long-settled common-law contract rules"3 to determine the breadth of rights transferred under the terms of a 1963 recording agreement. The court's seemingly cold and sterile application of common law led it to modify a lower court's ruling,4 rendering such lower court's judgment in favor of the recording artists In 1963, , comprised ofVeronica little more than a Pyrrhic victory. Bennett, 2 , and NadraTalley,signed a In New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, the five-year recording agreement with producer and Supreme Court of the United States considered the composer, . In exchange for a one-time merits of the assertion that section 201 of the $15,000 cash advance 3 and the potential of CopyrightAct 6 permits a publisher to reproduce and additional royalties when, and if, revenue generated distribute contributions to a collective work within from the sales of master recordings exceeded such a searchable electronic database.7 Citing the initial cash advance,' 4 Spector's production company, r CS IS I 44k, ts

Philles Records, Incorporated, acquired ownership industry standards.23 of the master recordings embodying the Ronettes musical performances. Despite the commercial success of Billboard-charting songs such as "," "Walking in the Rain," and "Do I Love You,"'" In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,25 numerous as well as recording and delivering dozens of freelance authors26 were separately engaged as additional masters to Philles, 6the Ronertes never independent contractors by one or more of the received any royalties. In 1967, the Ronettes publishers of such periodicals as The NewYork Times, disbanded, and shortly thereafter Philles Records New York Newsday, and Sports Illustrated to provide went out of business. However, even when Philles articles for their periodicals.2 7 Each article was Records went out of business, the rights in and to registered with the United States Copyright Office the Ronertes'masters were retained by Philles' owner, in the name of the respective author. Additionally, Phil Spector. Subsequently, with the resurgence of public interest in '60's music and the advent of Wi new recording s technologies, most notably,the compact disc or "CD," Spector began to grant third parties the a right to synchronize the N Ronettes' masters in audio-visual works, such as the use of "Be My Baby" in the 1987 film .7 Not stopping with the granting of these synchronization each edition of the periodicals was registered, as a rights, Spector also began to grant third parties the collective work, in the name of the respective right to produce and distribute the Ronettes' masters publisher. for redistribution within the United States. 8 Despite , New York Newsday,and this new market for their music, and the resultant Sports Illustrated each had separate agreements with newly found revenue streams, the Ronettes never Lexis/Nexis, the owner and operator of NEXIS, a received any royalties from Philles or Spector. computerized database that stores information such In 1987, the Ronettes brought suit against as periodicals in text-only format.28 These Spector in New York state court asserting that the agreements authorized Lexis/Nexis to copy and sell 1963 recording agreement did not provide the any portion of the articles previously appearing in defendants with the right to license the subject the publishers' periodicals. 9 NEXlS subscribers were masters for synchronization or for domestic able to search for articles within the database using 9 redistribution. The trial court awarded damages a diverse range of criteria such as author, subject, or and interest to the plaintiffs on the theories of breach key terms, as each article was "coded" to facilitate of contract and unjust enrichment.20 On appeal, the computerized retrieval." Such search results would Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's appear as separate, isolated, stories without any decision concluding that the defendant's actions were visible link to the newspaper or magazine in which not authorized by the agreement because such an article originally appeared.3' A subscriber could agreement did not specifically transfer the right to then view, print, or download each article generated issue synchronization licenses or third party by their search.32 2 distribution licenses. ' TheAppellate Division further In December 1993, the freelance authors held that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive 50 filed a copyright infringement action in the United percent of income derived from synchronization and States District Court for the Southern District of third party licensing" consistent with current New York against the publishers of the various periodicals, specifically alleging copyright media and the failure of an existing written infringement." In response to the plaintiffs' suit, the agreement to address such exploitation, the issues defense filed a motion for summary judgment before the courts were framed in substantially asserting the privilege accorded to collective work different manners. As the creation of the masters in copyright holders pursuant to section 201 (c) of the Philles pre-dated the extension of federal statutory Copyright Act. The District Court granted the copyright protection to master recordings, which defendants' motion for summary judgment, 4 holding did not occur until 1971. 9 the parties' dispute and that the use of the articles within NEXIS was subject its resolution were not governed by the United to a statutory privilege extended to the owners of a States Copyright Act. Rather, the issue before the copyright in a collective work.35 On appeal, the trial Philles court was whether the recording artists' court's decision was reversed, and the use of the transfer of full ownership rights to masters also articles within NEXIS was found to be beyond the conveyed the unconditional right to redistribute the scope of section 201 (c).36 same in any technical format.' However, in Tasini, both the authors' articles and the publishers' 4 periodicals were subject to copyright protection. 1 The issue, therefore, was whether use of an article in a searchable electronic database was subject to In both Philles and Tasini, one of the central the privilege granted to the owner of a collective problems was that the agreements between each of work featuring such article pursuant to section the respective parties, the Ronettes and Philles in 201(c). 42 This privilege allows a publisher to Philles and the authors and the publications in Tasini, reproduce and distribute an article as part of any of did not expressly grant (or reserve) the exercise of three categories of collective works: (i) "the collective the particular rights upon which the plaintiffs' claims work to which the author contributed such work;" and the subsequent litigation were based. Indeed, (ii) "any revision of that collective work;" or (iii) "any 43 the Philles court noted that, although the plaintiffs later collective work in the same series." conceded that the agreement unambiguously granted the defendants unconditional ownership rights to the masters, the plaintiffs then argued that the agreement "does not bestow the right to exploit The Philles court set the parameters of its such masters in new markets or mediums since the decision by noting that if an agreement is,on its face, agreement is silent on those topics."37 In Tasini, the reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, a court authors were engaged pursuant to agreements that is not free to alter the agreement to reflect its did not secure consent for the placement of an personal notions of fairness and equity.44 The court article, by the publisher or any other third party, then stated that the standard for introducing within an electronic database. 8 extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of parties Although each case pertained to the to the agreement at issue turned on the issue of exploitation of artistic works in new markets and ambiguity - extrinsic evidence could only be introduced if the agreement or any pertinent part thereof was found to be ambiguous.The question for the court thus became: did the agreement's silence on synchronization and domestic licensing create an ambiguity which permitted the court to examine extrinsic evidence beyond the four corners of the Fl

agreement?4 Resoundingly,the court concluded that the court did find that the schedule of royalties which there was no ambiguity, and that, therefore, there addressed domestic sales included the sale of was no need for examination of any extrinsic records, compact discs, and other audio reproductions 46 evidence. by entities holding third party distribution licenses from Philles.55The agreement thus permitted Philles/ Spector to y sexercise complete ownership rights h' r-el r he -,without any

Sobligation to remit royalties to the plaintiffs for synchronization licenses. Philles/ Spector was Accordingly, the court did not allow the found, however, to be subject to the payment of the admission of extrinsic evidence to modify or applicable royalties for domestic redistribution. Such supplement the express terms of the 1963 royalties were to be calculated pursuant to the terms agreement.4 7 Again, as the masters' creation of the schedule of royalties included within the 1963 preceded the extension of copyright protection to agreement (as opposed to the current industry such works, the court proceeded to scrutinize the standard 50/50 as initially assessed by the lower 5 6 agreement using the applicable case law. NewYork court) case law has a well-established precedent stating that an artist/grantor does not retain any rights to artistic property once it is unconditionally transferred.4" Indeed, in analogous contract disputes, other courts In Tasini, the defendants had argued that have recognized that broad contractual provisions reproducing and distributing each article within a convey "virtually unfettered" 49 reproduction rights database is subject to the publisher's "privilege of to a grantee absent specific exemptions to the reproducing and distributing the articles as part of contrary.5 0 ...a revision of that collective work, 5 7 The Tasini The court then cited a provision within the Court began its analysis with a look at the privilege Ronettes' agreement as being dispositive since it set forth in section 201 (c) of the CopyrightAct.The granted the "defendants the right to make court applied this privilege to the facts before it by phonograph records, tape recordings or other delineating the two distinct sets of copyrights reproductions of the performances embodied in such concerned 8 - a copyright in each separate recordings by any method now or thereafter known, contribution to a collective work 9 and a copyright and to sell and deal in the same."'" The court in the overall collective work. 0 Prior to the 1976 concluded that the Ronettes' agreement, read as a revisions to the CopyrightAct, authors risked losing whole to determine its purpose and intent, is their rights when their articles appeared in collective 2 susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: works without the requisite copyright notice.6' If a the defendants are authorized to license the masters publisher printed such article only in the publisher's for visual media (such as movies and television name, the author's work became part of the public commercials or broadcasts) and for domestic release domain." With the 1976 revisions, Congress clarified 3 by third parties in audio formats. the confusing and frequently unfair legal situation 6 The court therefore ultimately held that the regarding rights in contributions. ' The Court then agreement, read as awhole, permitted the defendants reinforced the legitimacy of Congress' intent, saying to exercise complete ownership rights without any that Congress' adjustment of the author/publisher payment of royalties to the Ronettes for the revenue balance is permissible expression of the "economic 4 derived from synchronization licensing. However, philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause] '64(i.e.,"the conviction that encouragement of individual effort authorial rights which Congress established in [motivated] by personal gain is the best way to section 201 (c), the Court affirmed the judgment of 6 advance public welfare"). 1 the Court of Appeals, 76 finding the defendants liable 77 The language of the statute itself says that a for infringement. publisher is privileged to reproduce and distribute an article only "as part of" any of three categories 1M.~ Cuet S.ltrat agemLa of collective works: (i) the contribution as part of "that particular collective work," (ii) "any revision of that collective work" or (iii) "any later collective The basis of the Copyright Act (and the 66 work in the same series." In an attempt to clarify copyright protection which theAct creates) is found the statute, the Court explained that the statute is in Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States intended to adjust a publisher's copyrights in the Constitution.78 This clause grants Congress the collective work to accommodate a freelancer's power "to promote the Progress of Science ...by 67 copyright. Accordingly, if there is demand for a securing [to Authors] for limited Times ...the freelance article standing alone, or in a new collection, exclusive Right to their Writings."79 Even with this the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit constitutional protection of copyright, the interests 68 from that demand. of business, as embodied by those entities wielding In applying this section of the Act to the capitol and power, have historically trumped the facts at hand, the Court began its inquiry by noting rights of artists, who are often lacking industry that in determining whether the articles had been experience, business acumen, and/or the benefit of reproduced and distributed "as part of ' 69 a legal counsel.80 It is for this reason that the "revision '7 of the collective work in issue, the focus fortification of copyright protection through both is on the articles as presented to, and perceived by, a legislation and case law is so crucial to all artists database user. In the case before it, the database seeking the protections promised in the Constitution. presented articles to users absent the context The Court's application of section 201(c) in Tasini provided by the original periodical editions.7' Rather, preserved the integrity of authors' rights throughout a user's search yields articles which appear as wholly- the literary world. Similarly, the advent of copyright separate items. The original graphics and formatting protection in master recordings lessened inequities are not present, and the article lacks the context of throughout the recording industry. In 197 I,Congress being among the other articles with which the article amended the Copyright Act, extending copyright was initially published. The Court emphasized this protection to masters.8' Such legislation secured fact, stating that a user was not viewing the articles copyright protection in masters "fixed" 2 in a "as part of" any larger work but simply as "individual phonorecord83 for the first time after February 15, articles presented individually." 72 The Court summarily rejected the defendants' assertion that reproducing and distributing each P article within a database is subject to the "privilege of reproducing and distributing the articles as part of... a revision of that collective work, '73 as such an encompassing 1972.84 Indeed, for those masters "fixed" after construction would diminish the author's exclusive February 15, 1972, the outcome of a dispute such as rights.7' To entertain the publisher's argument would that upon which Philles was based would theoretically scarcely preserve the author's copyright in their work have been substantially different.8 A decision on par as contemplated by Congress.7" Affirming the with that of the Tasini Court would be anticipated. Much like the publishers' efforts thwarted by the or hereafter known embodying any Tasini decision, record labels have worked to ebb portion or all of the performances the tide of the expansion of artists' rights that has embodied on Masters hereunder;to resulted from the federal statutory recognition of publicly perform such Records and copyright protection in masters. Typically, a "belt to permit the public performance and suspenders" approach is taken to ensure that thereof in any medium; to import, any masters created by an artist pursuant to a export, sell, transfer,transmit, lease, recording agreement are created as, and remain, the rent, deal in or otherwise dispose property of such . Common industry of such Masters and Records practice dictates that an artist is paid in one of two derived throughout the Territory ways, both essentially a prepayment of royalties. under any trademarks, trade names Either an artist receives recording costs plus an or labels designated by Company; to advance86 or an artist receives a recording fund.8 remix, edit, or adapt the Masters to Regardless of the form of this prepayment of conform to technological or royalties, in exchange for such advance as well as commercial requirements in various royalties upon recoupment,88 a record label typically formats now or hereafter known or 9 2 acquires ownership in the masters performed and developed. recorded by the subject artist.89 Boilerplate The result of the insertion of this provision into provisions in recording agreements of recent vintage recording contracts is that a label owns (or is entitled usually include a two-fold, fail-safe approach to to own) the masters and has the unfettered circumvent the Copyright Act and the reach of discretion to exploit the same, solely as it deems section 102(a)(7) as follows: appropriate. Each master, video, and artwork Innumerable parallels between these made under this agreement or boilerplate provisions and post- Tasini book publishing, during its term, from the inception magazine, and newspaper agreements may be drawn. of its recording, will be considered Indeed, it has been stated that the sole purpose of a "work made for hire" for the so-called "all-rights" contracts93 now tendered 90 Company; by publishers is to undermine the crucial principle [I]f any such master, video, or that each right in a contract must be claimed artwork is determined to be not separately and specifically and that any right not such a "work,' it will be deemed claimed (i.e., expressly granted to the publisher) transferred to Company by this remains with the author.4 agreement, together with all rights A recent trend has 9 allowed artists to and title in and to it. 1 negotiate the reversion (or assignment) of the subject The effect of these provisions is to cause masters from the label to the artist directly into the copyright ownership in and to the masters to vest, recording agreement. A typical provision would from inception, with the record label. Under the provide that after an agreed upon number of years work-for-hire doctrine, the record label (as opposed (most often between 10 to 15 years) from the later to the artist) is deemed to be the author of the of the expiration of the recording agreement or masters. This doctrine is supplemented by the recoupment of any and all advances paid to the artist, requirement that, in the event the masters do not the label agrees to assign any and all copyrights in vest with the label for whatever reason, the artist and to the masters (recorded pursuant to the will assign any and all interest in therein to the label. recording agreement) to the artist. This artist- Moreover, it has become industry practice friendly95 trend has allowed less-established labels for the following grant of rights provision to be to compete with the majors and has also driven included within recording agreements: down the initial advance that labels pay to the artist. 6 Company and any Person While not yet mainstream, this idea of a reversion authorized by Company has the or assignment represents a substantial inroad toward unlimited and exclusive rights to establishing a balance between business and artists manufacture and/or distribute within the industry. Records by any and all methods now "o See id.

'"" was the final Ronettes single released by Philles in late 1966. THE RONETTES, I CAN HEAR MUSIC (Philles Records 1966). Philles did not become the great equalizer between artists and labels. Generations of artists ,2 Now currently known as "Ronnie Greenfield". Also (predating federal copyright protection in master formally known as "" as she was married to Phil Spector from 1968 to 1974. recordings) remain bound to the agreements The discussion of this, and to its application to this matter, is beyond the scope of this which they originally subjected themselves, and - article. unlike the authors' party to Tasini- they consequently do not benefit from the paternalistic intent of the 11Greenfield, 750 N.YS.2d at 567. Copyright Act. Such artists remain subject to the 14 Id. strict terms of their particular agreements due to the application of common law contract rules. 1sBILLBOARD magazine compiles weekly album and singles However, as part of the evolution of the relationship charts based upon U.S. sales and radio airplay."Be My Baby" between business and artists, Philles should not be peaked at No. 2 on the Pop Singles Chart in 1963;"Walking in the Rain" peaked at No. 23 on the Pop Singles Chart in 1964; perceived merely as an albatross but rather should and "Do I Love You" peaked at No. 34 on the Pop Singles serve as a beacon of warning to aid artists in Chart in 1964. navigating the waters of the recording industry. Similarly, while the Tasini decision preserved the 16 Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 567. integrity of authors' rights throughout the literary 7 "Dirty Dancing" (1987) grossed over $25,000,000. See All world, great care must be exercised to preserve such Movie Guide, Dirty Dancing, at http://www.allmovie.com/cg/ in-roads. Although legislative amendments and case avg.dll?p=avg&sql= 1:13874 (last visited Feb. 10, 2004). law may serve to augment artists' rights, overreaching agreements can trump such shifts in the balance of 18Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 568.

power. 9 Id. ENDNOTES 20 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. * Keith C. Hauprich is an attorney and Director, Business Div. 1998). Affairs for Cherry Lane Music Publishing Company, Inc. In 2i Greenfield v. Philles 1996, Keith graduated magna cum laude from the Newhouse Records, Inc., 732 N.Y.S.2d 856 (2001). School of Public Communications at Syracuse University with Id. a B.S. in Public Relations and in 1999 he graduated from St. 22 John's University School of Law. He has been published in 23 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL the UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW as well as the NYSBA: You NEED To KNow ABOUT THE Entertainment,Arts and Sports LawJournal. He has spoken at Music BUSINESS 176, 426 (2000). St. John's University School of Law as well as at NewYork 24 Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts workshops. An obvious reference to the endearing moniker often given to The NewYorkTimes. 'Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1332 (2003). 25533 U.S. 483 (2001). 2 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 26Mary Kay Blakely, Barbara Garson, Margot Mifflin, 2002). Sonia Jaffe Robbins and David S.Whitford. SId. at 170. 27 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 489. 4 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 732 N.Y.S.2d 856 (2001). 28 Id. 5 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 29 Id. 6 17 U.S.C.§ 201. 30 Id. 7 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 493. 32 Id. at 490. 8 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 122 (1976). 12 Id at 49 1.

"See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 33Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., 972 F Supp. 804 16 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 732 N.Y.S.2d 856 (200 1); PASSMAN, note 23, at 176,426. (S.D.NY. 1997). supra

17 New York Times Co., Inc. v.Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,497 (2001). 14 Id. at 806.

5 Id. at 824. s1 Id. at 493-94.

STasini v. NewYorkTimes Co., Inc., 206 F3d 161 (2d Cir. 5117 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2003). 1999). 60Id. 37Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 61 See Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 18, 35 Stat. 1079 (2002). (repealed 1976). 38 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 489. 62 Id.

19In 1971 Congress amended the copyright code to provide Inc., 750 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2002). copyright protection for sound recordings fixed and first 61Greenfield v. Philles Records, published with the statutory copyright notice on or after 14 NewYorkTimes Co., Inc. v.Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,496 n.3 February 15, 1972.The 1976 Copyright Act, effective January Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 1, 1978, provides federal copyright protection for (200 1) (citing 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). unpublished and published sound recordings fixed on or after UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,CIRCULAR February 15, 1972. 65 Id. 56: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS I (1999), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.pdf (last 66 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2003). visited Feb. 10, 2004). 67 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 493,497. 4 Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 567. 68 Id. at 497 (citing Stewart v.Abend, 495 U.S. 207,229 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2003). (1990)).

12 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 493. 69Id. at 499.

43 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c). 70Id.

4" Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (citingTeichman v. 71 Id. Community Hosp. of W. Suffolk, 87 N.Y.2d 514, 520 (1996); First Nat'l Stores v.Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 72 Id. at 500. 638 (1968)).

45 Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 569 (citing W.W.W.Assocs., Inc. v. 71 Id. at 499; 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2003). Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990)). 74 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499. 11750 N.Y.S.2d at 570. 7 Id.at 499 (citingWendy Gordon, Fine-tuning Tasini: Privilege 47 Id. at 570. of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L.REv. 473,484 (2000)). 41Pushman v. NewYork Graphic Soc., Inc., 39 N.E.2d 249 7 161 (1999). (N.Y. 1942). 'Tasini v. NewYorkTimes Co., Inc., 206 F3d

49 Greenfield, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 570. 77 Tasini,533 U.S.at 506.

" See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v.Walt Disney 78 See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. Co., 145 F3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998). 79 Id. 11 Greenfield,750 N.Y.S.2d at 568-69 (emphasis added). 80See Nancy Updike, Green Eggs and Lawsuits, L.A.WEEKLY, 52 Id. at 570. available at http://www.laweekly.com/ink/O I/35features- updike.php (July 20-26 200 1); Greenfield v. Philles Records, 13 Id. at 572. Inc., 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (2002).

54 Id. S See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2003); also note author uses the terms "sound recording", "master recording" and "master" Id. (emphasis in original), interchangeably herein; ("'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or 13 Major publishing houses have listed all the rights the other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a publisher is acquiring from the author such as the right to motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the license the works to book clubs, to reprint, release as e- nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other books, use in anthologies, digests, magazines, phonorecords, condensations in which they are embodied.") 17 U.S.C. § 10 1 and microfilm. (2003). 2 9'Updike, supra 1 ,"A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when note 80. its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the 91See Phyllis Stark, Artists First at Equity Label, BILLBOARD BULL., authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to Aug. 1,2003, at I. permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 96 For a parallel discussion regarding the subject of reversion A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being as it applies to the field of music publishing and musical transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of compositions, see PETER M.THALL, WHAT THEY'LL NEVER TELL YOU the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission." ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 202, 210-211 (2002). 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).

" "'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.The term 'phonorecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed." Id.

4 1d. § 107.

8 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 572 (2002) ("However sympathetic plaintiff's plight, we cannot resolve the case on that ground uder the guise of contract construction. Our guiding principals must be to neutrally apply the rules of contract interpretation...").

86 PASSMAN, supra note 23, at I10 (The label pays a set amount of money to an artist as an advance. The label then also pays the recording costs to the appropriate third parties).

17 Id. (The label pays a set amount of money to the artist which includes the recording costs as well as an advance).

11Id. (The process of keeping an artist's royalties (i.e., the artists share of proceeds from the sale of an album) to recover any advances paid by a record label is commonly known as "recoupment").

89 M.WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 28 (2000).

90The Satellite Homeviewer ImprovementAct of 1999 amended the definition of"a work for hire" to include "sound recordings". Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 150 1, 150 1A-544 (1999). The Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 deleted "sound recordings" from such definition. Pub. L. No. 106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (2000).

"' MARK A. GOLDSTEIN, MICHAEL L. REINERT & JULIE GREITER SWIDLER, Sound Recordings, in COUNSELING CLIENTS INTHE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 855,908-09 (2003).

92 Id. at 909- 10.