Few Safety Improvements Seen Since JCO Accident
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TOKYO Nov./Dec. 2000 NUKE INFO Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center No. 80 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN URL: http://cnic.jca.apc.org/ e-mail : [email protected] Few Safety Improvements Seen Since JCO Accident On 30 Sep. 2000, a year after the JCO accident, about 110 people dressed in mourning clothes gathered in front of the Science and Technology Agency to remind the officials and the public of the accident and the victims who are still suffering physically, mentally, and economically. 400 people attended a symposium following this protest. The day was rapped up with a candle light procession through down town Tokyo. Similar protests and symposiums were held across the country. A year has passed since the JCO criticality power plants would not have such accidents. accident, but little improvement can be seen in The myth of safety was backed by the the safety regulation of the nuclear industry. industry’s implementation of measures from This accident was a tremendous shock to a perspective that gave precedence to “acci- Japan’s nuclear power industry because in a sin- dent prevention,” which meant that accidents gle instant it destroyed the myth of safety that could be prevented if facilities were provided the industry had built over time. The conclu- with engineered safety devices. But the JCO sion of the report by the Accident Investigation CONTENTS Committee established by the Nuclear Safety Few Advances Seen Since JCO Accident 1-3 Commission (NSC) says, “We must discard the MOX Court Case / Accident Simulation 4-5 ‘myth of nuclear safety’ and idealist slogans Tribute: Dr. Jinzaburo Takagi 6-9 about ‘absolute safety’.” This shows that the Renewable Energy in Japan No.3 10-12 NSC itself has abandoned the myth of safety. DATA: Japanese Separated Pu Inventory 13 But some argue that the JCO accident did not Who's Who: Michiaki Furukawa 14 occur in the generating sector, and that nuclear News Watch 15-16 2 Nov./Dec. 2000 No.80 Nuke Info Tokyo accident occurred where accidents supposedly who were temporarily near JCO at the time of the couldn’t. Its occurrence exposed the industry’s accident and now claims that 667 people were flaws and showed that the accident had been exposed due to the accident. People in Tokaimu- bound to happen. Specific flaws included the ra have formed a victims’ association that is lack of geometrical control on the precipitation negotiating with the government and JCO for the tank, and no measures at all to prevent accident issuance of accident victim IDs and coverage of worsening. A major reason for this was the medical expenses (See NIT No.77). facility’s flawed safety inspections, which are NSC’s report on the accident therefore is too the responsibility of the NSC and of the Science general and offers no hope of a solution. But and Technology Agency (STA), the government through several revisions of laws, STA and NSC administrative agency in charge of the industry. have somewhat improved measures for prevent- Apparently STA had also neglected to check ing accidents and the worsening of accidents. how the facility was being operated. The NSC has made 103 proposals to the gov- Improvement of Nuclear Regulatory Law ernment and to the industry meant to prevent a Until recently, periodic inspections were only reoccurrence, but all are symptomatic and leave mandatory for nuclear power plants and repro- doubts as to whether they can effectively prevent cessing plants. All other nuclear-related facili- a repeat. In fact, one of the items changes the ties were not subject to periodic inspections and approach on accident prevention that has pre- therefore, following the accident, periodic inspec- vailed until now by saying that we must have a tions were made mandatory at all nuclear facili- complete turnaround in perception, from “abso- ties. However, periodic inspections would not lute safety” to “an assessment of safety based on have prevented the JCO accident. The accident risk criteria.” This represents a switch from the was triggered by the deviation from normal pro- previous philosophy of putting “accident pre- cedures which was brought about under pressure vention” before everything else to an approach to reduce cost by rationalizing the work process. based on preventing the worsening of accidents This “inside manual” was prepared by the com- and mitigating their impacts. In other words, it pany itself. However, such manuals aren’t in the introduces the doctrine of risk assessment. Such criteria for periodic inspections. Similarly, the a change is hard to accept. education of workers on radiation has been made Some of the proposals are mere sugarcoating. mandatory as well, but the education manual One proposal to the government is to “perform stresses the safety of radiation instead of concen- a follow-up investigation taking into consider- trating on the dangers of it. ation matters like how people living near JCO have been taxed mentally,” but in fact the exact Improvements of the NSC opposite is being done. The Health Management NSC is responsible for keeping on eye on Review Committee established by the NSC after whether the controlling agency is properly con- the accident claims there is nothing to worry ducting periodic inspections and other safety con- about because the exposure dose was under 200 trol measures. However, it will only be looking mSv. It just emphasizes that the situation is safe, at documents and thus little is expected from this. and does not lend an ear to what area residents Two major improvements were made for the have to say. What is more, JCO paid for only pre-operation safety review. First, manufactur- the first health diagnosis, leaving citizens to foot ing process has been included in the criteria for the bill even if they succumb to illness and have the safety review. Not only the facility but the to see a doctor. The STA has recently added to use of it will be included in the evaluation as its list of exposed people a number of delivery well. At JCO they were dissolving uranium servicepeople, members of the press and others with nitric acid to purify it, then made it into Nuke Info Tokyo Nov./Dec. 2000 No.80 3 uranium powder, and following that were disaster prevention and countermeasures, the re-dissolving it. The process for that final Law on Special Nuclear Disaster Countermea- re-dissolution was never made very clear, and a sures was enacted in December 1999. The separate line for that process was never set up. law has made it mandatory for companies to The process was thus carried out with existing prepare an accident countermeasure plan and equipment. There should have been separate to set up a disaster countermeasure section. equipment for this process since the concentra- This is a welcomed improvement since such tion of uranium was highly different. It will requirements were never made before. It also become easier to identify the insufficiency of calls for the strengthening of the role of the equipment now since the manufacturing pro- central government and a speedy reaction by cess has been included into the safety review. it during a nuclear disaster. However, this law However, deviations carried out company- requires countermeasures to be taken for the wide will be difficult to identify even with this residents only when the radioactive leak has new improvement. Wherever there is even a reached 10,000 times the normal reading. This remote possibility of criticality, a criticality is extremely insufficient from the view of pre- accident could be fully prevented if safety con- venting residents’ exposure. trol is limited to only geometrical-control and Though many improvements have been not extended to mass control and other controls made or are in the process of being made, they which rely on humans. Unfortunately, such are not enough. In the background of the acci- regulation does not exist yet. dent was the intensifying of economic com- Following the fact that JCO was handling petition which led to the negligence of safety. uranium concentrate to 18.8%, NSC has It is expected that economic competition will revised its safety review guidelines for nuclear- further intensify. Such projections should force related facilities which handle uranium con- the government to further strengthen regula- centrated by 5~20%. The guideline requires tions and safety reviews/inspections. Safety facilities to come up with measures to prevent culture alone cannot prevent accidents. criticality. However, though the guideline has The JCO Criticality Accident Compre- geometrical control as the basis for critical- hensive Assessment Committee organized by ity prevention, it allows companies to rely on CNIC and the Japan Congress Against A-and mass control by setting a limit to the amount H-bombs released its final report in September to be handled when it is difficult to equip their 2000 and made seven suggestions to the NSC equipment with geometrical control. But the including demands for a reinvestigation of the JCO accident has taught us that we cannot rely accident and a commitment to take care of the on humans and that only physical geometrical residents’ physical and emotional health. The control can prevent criticality. In addition, this committee also carried out research into the new guideline will only apply to newly built effects of the accident on the life of local resi- facilities and not to the existing ones. dents. It was found through this field-research that 25% of the residents who were within 350 The enacting of the Law on Special Nuclear meters radius of JCO had experienced nausea, Disaster Countermeasures metallic tastes in their mouths, headaches, rashes, Many were exposed due to the accident and many other symptoms after the accident.