The Dœtrine of Atondieni' in the Theology of Paul Tillich

THE DŒTRINE OF ATONDIENI'

Art.hington Frank Thompson, B.A., B.Th.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Researeh in partial .f'ul.filment of the requirements for the degree of Mast er of Sa.cred Theology.

Depa.rtment of Divinity, McGill UniversitT, Montreal. April, 1960. ii

The author of this thesis wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. James S. Thomson of the Faculty of Divinity, McGill University for his patient direction of a sometimes hazardous enterprise.

Mention should be made too of the author' s indebtedness to Dr. William R. Coleman, of Huron College, London, Ontario, through whom he was first intro duced to the writings of Paul Tillich. iii

TABIE OF CONI'ENrS

Page

INI'RODUCTION 1

I. A SYSTEMATIC APOIDGETIC THEOLOGY 5 An Apologetic Theology 6 The Method of Correlation 13 Tillich t s Ontolo~ am The Problem of The ystem 20

II. THE HUMAN Sri'UATION 32 Existentialism and Atonement. 33 PhilosoJfly and The Fall 39 Estrangement 45 Evil 52

III. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT 59

God as 1Being-Itself' 60 Images and Atonement 69 God and The Processes of Atonement 74

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF ATOrmŒ:m'

The New Being S5 Atonement in Christ 94 Atonement as The Act of God 100 Atonement in The Cross and The Reasurrection 106 Atonement in History llO

COJ.CWSION ll7

BIBLIOGRAPHY INI'RODUCTION

The doctrine of atonement attempts to elaborate the statement of the Creed that it was "for us men and for our salvation" that Jesus

Christ was born, lived, died and rose again. It has tried to show how these facts are central for the establishment of a new community between

God and man. The fact that this doctrine has never been defined as dogma may derive pa.rtly from uncertainty about the use of language; but most certai~ it derives from the fact that what is here spoken of is the mystery of an •act of God 1 • Atonement bas been made and is established from beyond the human world. The resulta of atonement can not be set out finally and concretely within the huma.n world: atonement is the dominion of man brought into the Kingdam of God.

Opinions have varied as to the extent of the area of theology which may be brought within the scope of the consideration of the atonement.

Among modern writers, Hodgson has pointed out that the word •atonement 1 may stand for the whole message of the Church, or, more narrowly, for

"theories attempting to explain the precise nature of what was effected 1 by God in and through the earthly ministry of Christ." Taylor, similarly, is concerned precisely with 'the atonement ', but his analysis of what the term implies spreads rapidl.y to constitute, finally, a 2 summary of the faith of the Church. But this is inevitable, since

1. Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of The Atonement, (London, Nisbet and Co., 1951), p. 13.

2. Vincent Taylor, The Atonement in New Testament Teaching, (London, The Epworth Press, 1940). See, for example, the number of ideas which the primitive Church associated with •the atonement 1 • pp. 72, 73. - 2- the pa.rticular events in which the Church has recognized atonement are understood in the light of the history of the discovery of God's gracious purpose to covenant with man.

Tillich's presentation of the doctrinenof atonement follows the lines here suggested in that he s~s that atonement takes place, in sorne sense, in Jesus Christ. He too finds the rest of Christian theology nec- essacy for sorne ldnd of adequate explanation of how this is so. But there is one other element of importance in Tillich's presentation. All biblical theories of atonement have insisted, implicitl7 or explicitl7, that atonement has meaning for ali of history. This is perhaps a rudimenta.ry consciousness, a.t beat, in parts of the Old Testament. But it is there none theles s. For Christians, since the first days of the Church, it is clear that what has been accanplished in Jesus, the Christ, has meaning for ali mankind. Tillich rejoices in the task of attempting to show how this is so: that the doctrine of atonement has wide, even universal, implications.

The way in which he attempts to carry out his task is affected by very many considerations.

There is first of ali the fact., implied in what is said above, that

Tillich claims to be a theologian of the Church, a.nd to be irrterpreting 1 the faith of the Church. BUt there are a number of reasons why he reels that it is not enough for him merely to e.x:pound what he has received as tradition.

The problem is that of making the Christian message intelligible to

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 3. - 3-

1 •the modern mind'. Tillich is conscious of the difficulty of making Christian doctrine intelligible in a culture which has ceased to depend ver.y much on the Christian message for its meaning and purpoee.

The problem is perhaps even greater: it is the tendency to reject aey explanation of life in 1religious' terms in favour of a materialistic view of life which simply does not ask certain questions. Such a material istic view of life is frequently motivated by the desire to face and to deal with the concrete problems of man's historical existence. Here

Tillich is concerned to show that the atonement has meaning and promise for man in the tensions of man's historical existence; it has significance for man not merely as a 1religious 1 experience, but as an experience determining his whole destiey.

Then there is the problem of the relation of Christian 'solutions' to those proposed by other religions. Tillich is conscious of having to solve this problem, a.nd, in attempting to do so, he is conscious of havi:ng to fight against a kind of 'Christian parochialism 1 vis-a-vis other religions which consista in proclaiming that there is no salva.tion outside of a particular doctrine or a particular kind of religioue experience. As against such a point of view Tillich is amcious to admit some ~lidity in the religious experience of men of different 1religious backgrounds'.

One important consideration bearing on his marmer of going about his task is the extraordinary comprehensiveness of his mind. He has been influenced to sorne extent by almost ever.y important think:er in the

1. Ibid.' p. 8. - 4- history of the l'lest. This is Tillich 's strength and greatness: he has remoulded the classical thought fonns of western 'christendom'. But because this is so it is also true that there are many influences on his thought, some of which may have bad considerable importance in shaping his presentation of the doctrine of atonement.

This thesis, then, aima to set forth Tillich' s statement of the doctrine of atonement as this is presented by him in the context of his system. It will attempt to expose sorne of the influences which demand and shape this statement. And, fina.lly, it will attempt to judge the adequacy of his statement in the light of the central character of 1 the New Testament experience, which Taylor describes as reconciliation-

The structure of this thesis takes into account the necessity of giving seme prior consideration to the nature of Tillich 's thought, and to the aim and method of his theology. After this is accomplished in the first section, subsequent sections will consider in turn the 'human situation' in relation to which the need for atonement is understood, the doctrine of God in relation to the doctrine of atonement, a.nd, finally, Tillich 1s statement of the doctrine of a.tonement.

1. Vincent Taylor, The Cross of Christ, (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1956), p. SS. I

A SYSTF>fATIC APOWGEI'IC THEOLOGr - 6 -

An Apologetic Theologr

Theology finds its foundation in the life of the Christian Church, for Tillich, to the extent that it may be described as 11the methodical 1 interpretation of the contents of the Christian faith." How ie 2 1apologr 1 related to this 'interpretation'?

The aim of an apologetic theology is communication. For Tillich, .3 apologetics is not the construction of defensive rationalizations. Rather it is an inescapable part of the theological task, and is "an 4 omnipresent element and not a special section of systema.tic theology." There is an imperative which issues from the nature of revelation itself, in Tillich's view; the demand for theologr as an apologetic endeavour is derived from the fact that. revelation is -for human knowledge. Theology.is, by its own nature, an apologetic endeavour; it is logos of theos.

This is true, s~s Tillich, in all religions, but especiallr in Christ- ianity where the claim is made that the logos has been manifested.

1. Tillich, op. cit., p. 15. 2. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, (London, S.C.M. Press Ltd., 1947) defines apologetics, distinguishing it from the task of 1apology 1 • 11 Apologetics deals with the rela.tionship of the Christian faith to the wider sphere of man's 1secular' knowledge - philosophy, science, history, sociology, and so on - with a view to showing that faith is not at variance with the truth that these enquiries have un covered. In every age it is necessary that this task should be under taken; • • • apologetics as a theological discipline is a kind of intellectual stock-taking on the part of Christian thinkers • • • apologetics is primarily a study undertaken by Christiane for Christ ians • • • a necessary preparation for the work of an apologist." pp. 19, 20. Tillich l'Tould agree with the initial definition, but would reject the view that apologetic theology must be a special branch of theology •

.3. Tillich, op. oit., p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. .31. - 7 -

Communication presupposes relation. This is not only demanded by the nature of revelation, on Tillich 1 a grounds; it is implicit in the fact that theology shares with other disciplines a common 1concern 1 , a common rational structure, and a common 1being 1 of which reason is the structure. The third of these grounds of communication must be left 1 to a separate treatment under the heading of ontology. The other two must be considered here.

The work of the theologian, according to Tillich, is directed by an 1ultirnate concern 1 • This, Tillich sa.ys, is the abstract translation 2 of the great camnandment to love God. This awareness of an ultimate 3 concern is one of the formal criteria of the work of theology, and the other formal criterion stated by Tillich attempts to indicate the content of this concern. 11 0ur ult:imate concern is that which determines our being or not-being. On!Y those statements are theological which deal with their ob,iect in so far as it can become a matter of being or not- 4 being for us." This second criteria of theology raises important questions which can not be entered upon at this point. But both criteria direct attention to Tillich 1 s view of theology as a ( often una.cknowledged) · universal enterprise. That intellectual enterprise which is directed by an 'ultimate concern 1 can not be con:fined to a particular group or tradition since, presumably, such a concern is not so confined. In fact,

1. Infra, p.

2. Tillich, op. cit., p. 11. 3. Ibid., p. 12. 4. Ibid., p. 14. Tillich 's 'italics '. - s - ail religions give expression to such a concern. Christian theology, in this view, is bound to attempt to enooage in communication. And, again in this view, a ready point of contact will be round.

A rurther consequence of this point of view is that it emphasizes that theology must be existential. It cannot be merely, or even primari~, a deduction from past events. It is an interpretation, rooted in faith, of the constant factors of man 1 s contemporary situation. Theology emergea from an existential connnitment: its source is man's and the Church 's present concern. It follows that theology wi~l have something to say wherever it finds a similar concern expressed. And it will find evidence of such concern in ail authentic interpretations of man's life.

Reason is another 1 ground' which supports and necessitates the endeavour of apologetic theology to communicate its message. Reason must be

1looked at from different points of view1 , and from these different points of view it appears to be different things. But one must regard reason, says Tillich, as in some sense the structure of reality without which it would be impossible to speak at all. He distinguishes between 'subjective reason' and 'objective reason', but holds that these are structures which are complimentary. "Subjective reason is the rational structure of the mind, while objective rea.son is the rational structure of reality 1 which the mind can grasp and according to which it can shape reality. 11

Thus theology, as one interpretation of the huma.n situation, shares with other special interpretations of man's life a common field of discourse created by the structure of reason wh:b h is presupposed by

1 • .!!?14., P• 70. - 9- all of man's intellectual life.

But it does not follow from this, in Tillich 's view, that reason is itself revelatory. Rather, he says, reas on has a depth which is revelatory, and which is not itself reason. Reason and revelation stand in a relation of mutual dependance.

Tillich's conception of the 1depth of reason1 shows the influence upon him of vitalistic and existential philosophy. Reason must be conceived of as structure, in this view, but it is a structure whictr is the structure of life and of being. Tillich may be thought of as taking

Kant ls conception of reason ae the mysterious unity 'behind 1 and guiding lmowledge, and as making this conception expressive of the power experienced in all of life, not merely in the life of the intellect. 'l'hus he holds that 'objective reason1 no lesa than •subjective reason' is dynamic, creating new possibilitiee. 11Reality itself creates structural possibilities 1 within itsel:t. Lire, as well as mind, is creative. 11 The expression

'the depth of reason' recognizes this creative power. "The depth or reason is the expression of samething that is not reason but which precedes reason and is manifest through it. Reason in both its objective and subjective structures points to sanething which appears in these 2 structures but which transcenda them in power and meaning."

Thus an apo1ogetic theo1ogy recognizes that it shares both the structure of reas on ani a1so the awareness of the 1 speaking 1 of the depth of reason as a common ground with other disciplines. or course

1. Ibid., P• 7S•

2. Ibid., P• 79. - 10 - this common ground is not easily am happily shared. This is because reason in existence is finite. It partakes of the ambiguous character of man's life. Reason 'points beyond. itself 1 in a true way, but it is 1 11threatened with disruption and self-destruction. 11 It is for this reason that theology cannot hand over its work to reason., or allow reason to take possession of revelation. Revelation must come to reason, says Tillich, but when it does come it cornes as the 'ful.filment;.1 of reason and does not des~ reason.

Revelation occurs, says Tillich, when reason faces mystery, being

11driven beyond itself to its 'ground and abyss 1 , to that which 'precedes 1 2 reason., to the f'act that 'being is and nonbeing is not 1 • • • " It occurs in a state of •ecstasy 1 where reason stands outside itselt and receives an intimation of its ground. There is bath a positive and a negative side to revelation. The negative side is the experience of the depth of reason as the 1abyss 1 • The positive aspect of revelation over comes the potential destructiveness of' this experience.

"The positive side of the :mystery - which includes the negative side - becomes manif'est in actua.l rev elation. Here the mystery appears as the ground and not only as abyss. It appears as the power of being, comuerin.g nonbeing. It appears as our ultimate concern. And it expresses itself in symbole and myths which point to the depth of' reason and its mystery. " .3

In both its positive and also its negative character, revelation

1. Ibid., p. $3.

2. ~., p. uo. .3. Ibid• -11- is needed by reason; it establishes reason. As was pointed out above, apologetic theology is based on the fact that revelation is ~ human reason. This is true, says Tillich, in three ways. First there is the fact that faith, as a Christian speaks of it, bas a cognitive dimension.

11There is a kind of cognition implied in faith • • • It bas a completely existential, self determining character and belongs to the faith of even the most primitive believer. Whoever pa.rticipates in the New Being participates alao in ita truth. The theologian, in addition, is suppoaed not only to participate in the New Being but also to express its truth in a methodical wa:y-. 11 1

Secondly, there is the fact that revelation does not proceed through

1private 1 media: it is mediated by nature, history (through groups and individuals in history) and language. This implies a third way in which revelation must be held to be !Q!: liuman Irnowledge: that there is a 'his tory of revelation•, an account of how the mystery discloses itselr.

From this point of view, it is clear that aey separation of reason and revelation is ruled out. The fact that apologetic theology deals with a revelation that is received points to its task as a mediating work.

From this point of view, 11any theology which in terms of a geœral prop- osition excludes the crea.tions of reason, that is, man 1s cultural life, from an indirect participation in the history of revelation must be 2 rejected."

The theology which Tillich feels he must reject is the 'kerygmatic• theology, with which he contrasta his conception of an apologetic theo-

1. Ibid., P• 53.

2. ~·, P• 141. -12-

1 logy. The kerygmatic theology is inclined to emphasize that the theologian must take his stand 1w:i.thin revelation' and unfold the contents of revelation more or lesa as a series of deductions. Such a school would take a very different attitude to that of Tillich towards the importance of cultural creations and of general 1ideas of God 1 • Such a standpoint would den;r that there is substantia.l 1common ground' between the theo- 2 logian and 1secular 1 thinkers on the human situation.

On the other hand, Tillich declares his acceptance of the warning given by a kerygma.tic theology against abandoning the basie of theology in revelation. It is an important question as to whether or not he has succeeded in defending himself against this peril. The apologetic theology proposed by Tillich intends to base itself "on the kerygma as the 3 substance and criterion of each of its statements." But. it intends to work deliberately toward a reconciliation of Christianity with the

'modern mind 1 • It will thus attempt to solve what Tillich feels has been 4 the great problem of the last two hundred years of Christian theology.

Such a reconciliation seem.s, on the face of it, eminently desirable.

1. Tillich seems to have Barth in mind, yet he does not accuse Barth of holding just the static position he bas in mind. Rather he calls attention to a lively dialectic in Barth 's theology: "Barth 's greatness is that he corrects himself again and aga.in in the light of the 'situation'." Tillich, op. cit., p. 5.

2. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 25f, joins Tillich in declaring that there is a 'point of connection' for the theologian with the thinking of the world, and that this is reason. He attacks what he takes to be Barth's denial of this 'point of connection1 • (p. 22)

3. Tillich, op. cit., p. 7.

4. Ibid., pp. 7, S. - 13-

But such an aim will have sorne éffect on Tillich's presentation of a doctrine of atonement. Any Christian doctrine of atonement must hold out the :immemorial Christian hope of •at-one-ment' in eternity, but it will not be etrange if Tillich concentrates rather on attem.pting to show the existential and historical implications of a doctrine of atonement, since it is with the discovery of such a 'way' that the modern mind is so desperatelY concerned.

Tillich's apologetic theology uses a specifie method for the construction of a syatematic attempt to show that the Church's proclamation of Jesus as the Christ is the answer to the questions of the modern mind.

The Method of Correlation

The 'method of correlation' has been adopted by Tillich (although the na.me is given 'without special emphasis') as the only proper method for theology to follow. It always has been used, he says, consciouslY or unconsc iouslY.

11 Systematic theology uses the method of correlation. It has always done so, sometimes more, sometimes less, consciously, and must do so consciously and outspoken lY, especially if the apologetic point of view is to prevail. The method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependance." 1

He intends to use this method consciouslY and syatema.tically because he believes that it ha.s validity through a 'Wh.ole range of problem.s. It is adopted not merely in principle, but as a programme to be followed.

1. Ibid., p. 60. -14-

Theologv is to bring into relation a question and an answer.

Tillich speaka also of the correlation of •situation' and •message'.

It is important for an understanding of his position that each of these terms is granted an 'independant right 1 to sorne e.xtent.

11The following system is an attempt to use the 'method of correlation 1 as a way of tmiting message and situation. It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message. It does not derive the answers fram the questions as a self-detying apologetic theology does. Nor does it elaborate answers without re lating them to questions as a self'-defying kerygmatic theology does." 1

The actual interdependance of the two terms is to be demonstrated by theologv. The 1answer' (like the 'depth of reas on') lies 1beyond 1 the question and cames to answer it. 11The answers are contained in the revelatory events on which Christianity is based and are taken by systematic 2 theology from the sources, through the medium, under the nonn. 11

(The sources are rna~: Church history, the Bible, material from 'cultural analysis 1 as this has reference to an lultimate concern 1 • The medium is experience, in one form or another, and the norm is the 'New Being'. )

The Christian message, he suggests, has its own validity and impoees its own standards to some e.xtent. But it can be received oricy' in so far as it cornes as the answer to known questions to which it is the answer.

The 'question', therefore, seems to be the key term, inasmuch as knowledge of it determines whether the 'answer' is to be heard. In point of fact, Tillich speaks of tw kinds of questions: there is the 'question'

1. Ibid., P• S. 2. Ibid., p. 64. - 15 - which is the peremial situation of man in existence, and there are other questions which formulate specifie demanda experienced in this situation.

Tillich 1s understanding of human existence as a 'question', a.s the

•situation 1 dema.nding the message of revelation, has already been indicated in some of its dimensions. It may be seen in his view of reason as a structure 'Which 'points beyond itself 1 and so acknowledges its in- 1 completeness. Tillich, like Heidegger, understands the Kantian analysis of the operations of reason as a description of the 'finitude 2 of reason'. Considered existentia~ {as Tillich and Heidegger do consider this ana:cysis) this description of the finitude of reason is the description of the experience of finitude. The human awareness of finitude is, in Kant., an understa.nding of the limita to the operation of reas on. But beyond this is the question wh:ic h expresses an inclusive human~, awareness of 1limit 1 : 'why there is sanething, and not nothing1 •

This question of 1being' is, for Tillich, the central question. It expresses man's universal awareness of an ultimate, in virtue of which he must a.sk the question of his own being and the question of God.

"Being human means asldng the question of one 's own being and living 3 under the impact of the answers given to this quest.ion."

The dimensions of this question, according to Tillich, are indic ated by ontology. Ontology is the description of the structure of being, which

1. ~ Martin Heidegger, Kant et le probl~e de la mé'taphysigue , trans. Alphonse de Waelhens and Walter Biemel, (Paris, Librairie Ge.llima.rd, 1953).

2. Tillich, op. cit., p. 92.

3. ~., p. 62. - 16 - is the permanent. situation of man. It is in this connection that Tillich says that "The ana.lysis of existence, including the developnent of the 1 question imp1icit in existence, is a philosophical task • • • " The description of Tillich's ontology is taken up immediately below.

But other questions arise - in the different cultural situations of different times. Reason is never 1balanced' under the conditions of existence: "In the actual lite of reason essential and existential forces, forces of creation and forces of destruction, are united and disunited 2 at the same time." Thus it happens that questions arise which reflect man's strugg1e to achieve an integration of his reason and his lite.

These questions may arise as the desire of a pa.rticular era to discover a true form for social life or to discover a true freedom for individual life. These questions achieve form in all areas of man's cultural lite, but especially in the realm of art and literature. Tillich 's early work 3 The Religious Situation is an attempt to give a theological interpretation of the contemporary- culture of western society. Another stud;r finds that paintings produced in distinct phases of western culture, from the middle ages to the present, reflect the severa! chara.cters of the se epochs: the sense, in each of them, of the situation of man in his total 4 setting at that time. Such analysis, for Tillich, is the first part of the theological ta.sk. The theologian 11makes an analysis of the h'tD'llan

1. Ibid., p. 63. 2. ill!!•, P• S3. 3. Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, Living Age edition, New York, Meridian Books, 1956, (copyright, Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1932).

4. The Christian Answer, ed. Van Dusen, (London, Nisbet and Co., 1946). , P• 13. - 17 - situation out of which the existential questions arise~ and • • • demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the 1 answers to these questions."

The correlation, in theological work, exista on different levels of reality.

"There is a correlation in the sense of correspon dance between religious symbols and that which is symbolized by them. There is a correlation in the logical sense between concepts denoting the huma.n and those denoting the divine. There is a correlation in the factual sense between man's ultimate concern and that about l'lhich he is ultimatel.y concerned." 2

The basic correlation is that between man and God. Although there may be an enormous difference between finite man and God~ still there must be, according to Tillich, a measure of identity also, permitting a relation. There must be that which justifies symbolic language about God and the use of concept.:s (like finite and infinite) which relate man and

God.

The basic question, as has been noted, is 'being'~ and the answer to this question is 1God'• This, in fact, is a description of the first part of Tillich 1s theological system (although it follows a section on

'reason and revelation'). This section describes what is mea.nt by 1being', and, as a reply to the 'question' thus revealed, describes what is meant by 1God'. This easy relation of the concept of 1being1 to what the Christian means by •God 1 may seem a little arbitrary. It may be

1. Paul Tillich, Systema.tic Theology, I, 62.

2. ~., p. 60. - lS - as same critics of Tillich have suggested~ that the 'answer' is put 1 too much under the power of the 'question t •

Of course any answer is under the power of the question~ ina.smuch as in most processes of communication the answer must be the answer ~ that guestion. Tillich is aware of this~ and says that~ in his view~ the ~of the answer is determined by the question~ but that the real 2 content of the answer is not thereby reduced. A certain uneasinesa must remain on this point~ however. The reas on for it may be seen in

Tillich 1s example of how the notion of God appears in correlation with the 1threat of nonbeing 1 implied in existence. If this is howthe question of God appears~ 11 God must be called the infinite power of being which 3 resista the threat of non-being." The feeling that this is not after ail a very specifie character to apply to God as he ha.s been aclmowledged in the Christian Church carries with it further questions as to how the name 1God 1 appears at ali~ and as to how it is related to 1being1 •

The latter expression has been used abstractly and impersonally.

The rest of the programme directed by the concept of correlation enlarges upon the basic correlation in one ~ or another. The section entitled 'Existence and the Christ' analyses the situation of man in

1. George F. Thomas~ 1The Method and Structure of Tillich 1s Theo logy', an essay in The TheoloBf of Paul Tillich, edited Charles w. Kegley and Robert w. Bretall, New York~ The Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 104. Also William F. Hamilton, 'Tillich 'a Method of Correlation', The Canadian Journal of Theologv, V, no. 2~ (April, 1959), p. fr{.

2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 64. 3. Ibid., P• 64. - 19 -

'existential estrangement 1 and describes the 1New Being' as the answer which cornes to this .form of the question of man 1s being. Another projected part of the system is 11based on the fact that the essential as weil as the existential characteristics are abstractions and that in reality 1 they appear in the complex and dynamic unity which is called 1life r. 11

This section is to be called 1Life and the Spirit'. The .final section of Tillich 1s systematic theology will att.empt to give 11an analysis of man's historical existence ••• and of the questions implied in the ambiguities of histor;r; and it must give an answer which is the Kingdom 2 of God. 11 The final section, therefore, is to be called 1History and the Kingdom of God".

Tillich's method assures a sympathetic attention to the social and persona! problems of modern life. And such sympa.thetic attention is boum to be helpful to communication - besides being in the beat tradition of the Christian apologist at least in this respect, that he approaches as a friand. Tillich has achieved a wide reputation for his deep understanding of the stresses of the contemporary culture. This is not without its importance .for theology, and especially for a theology of atonement which aima to enlarge upon the existential and historical implications of the doctrine.

But the real core of the support for this method remains to be examined. It is Tillich 1s ontology, which has an important, it may be a central, role in the developnent of his theology.

1. Ibid., pp. 66, 67.

2. Ibid., p. 67. - 20 -

Tillich' s Ontology, and the Problem of the System

Tillich's ontologr is important for his theological system as a basic description of reality. The problem of the system arises more in relation to it than it does in relation to Tillich' s theological system as such.

Tillich insista on the inevitability of the ontological question.

"The structures of being and the categories and concepts describing this structure are an implicit or explicit concem of every philosopher and 1 theologian. Neither of them can avoid the ontological question."

Tillich maintains, with Heidegger, that the ontological question bas always be en the central concern of western philosophy, from the t:ime of Heraclitus and Parmenides. And this concem of ontology, Tillich adds, has always been shared, implicit:cy or explicitly, by biblical 2 theology. Ontology is "the word of being, the word which grasps being, makes its nature manif'est, drives it out of hiddermess into the 3 light of knowledge. n

This concern ldth the question of being, for both Tillich and

Heidegger, is not concern with an abstraction. The elaboration of an ontology, for them, is not to be carried out as the construction or

1. Ibid., P• 25.

2. Paul Tillich, Biblical Reli ·on and the Search for Ult:imate Reality, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955 , p. 59: "Faith includes the ontological question, whether the question is asked explicit ly or not. The Church, from the earliest times, was aware of this fact and made the question explicit in the mœtent in which it met the onto logical concern of the Hellenistic world •"

3. Ibid., P• 6. - 21- description of a presumed objective sphere under which subjective experience is subsequent~ subsumed. So far they are with the 'existent- ialists '. Rather, the elaboration of an ontologr is the description of an experienced structure in which 'objective' and 'subjective' elements are interwoven and united. Heidegger's basic term for being-as-it-is experienced is Dasein ( 'Being there'). This term suggests the unity, the objectivity and the overtness of the fact of being, together with the indication that it must be approached through and in the determined structure of man existing. Heidegger ma.kes it clear tha.t he is concerned with being, with ontologr, and not with mere 1philosophical anthropology-1 which does not intend to raise the more fundemental question. His major 1 work pro jects a system on this ba. sis. Tillich follows him, if not in the details of his analysis 1 at lea.st in the intention to give a systematic a.ccount of the structure of being.

This ta.sk is attempted by Tillich in a modest way. He discla:il!ls the intention of entering 'into the theological question as such'. He a.ttempt.s to treat only those 'central concepts' which are important in 2 the construction of his theological system.

His analysis of the ontological structure distinguishes four

1. Werner Brock, Existence and Being, (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1949), p. 36. Brock offers a brief description of Heidegger's intention in his major work, Sein und Zeit: 11The work was to consist of two main parte. Each of them was divided into three divisions. The first was to contain the fundemental preparatory analysis of Dasein, the analysis of the temporality of Dasein and the analysis of time as the transcendent al horizon of the problem of being. The second part was to offer a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology • • • n

2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theologr, II, (dniQago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 164!. · - 22 - major elements.

11 (1) the basic ontological structure which is the im~licit condition of the ontological question; (2) the elements which constitute the ontological structure; (3) the characteristics of being which are the conditions of existence; and (4) the categories of being and knowing. 11 1

Tillich begins his description of the ontological structure by saying that neither 1 self 1 nor 'world 1 exists by it self as such. Within the totality of being, and within the structure indicated by the word 2 1reason', these elements exist together in inter-dependance. The correlation of r self r and 'world r implies both a distiœtion and a relation between the two tenns - as there is between the terms 'subject 1 and 1object 1 which, Tillich holds, follow fran the 1self-world corre!- ation'. The 1world 1 , Tillich points out, is more than a mere 'environment' in relation to the selt. Environment determines \'dlat a thing is.

But man does not have just an environment: he has a world in which the manifold of experience is held together in a rational etructure which can be grasped and shaped by him. The human sel.f in this way transcenda determination by environrnent. Man has neither self'-consciousness without 3 world-consciousness, nor world-consciousness without self-consciousness.

Both of these aspects or human experience are present as basic polar elements in the ontological structure.

1. ~., p, 164. 2. Ibid., p. 172.

3. ~., P• 171. - 23 -

Within this relation of self with world there are 'polar elements 1 giving a degree of definition to the ontological structure. These are principles which must be understood in relation to each other and as expressions together of the basic structure of being. They are 1individ- ualization and participation', 'dyna.m.ics and fonn 1 and 1freedom and destiny'.

The first polarity derives from the fact that man is a 1microcosrn 1 •

While this sets h:im apart from the 1ma.crocosm 1, it expresses, at the same time, his capacity for a theoretically unlimited participation in his world. His use of 1universals 1 shows this. That man is a 1self 1 expresses man 1 s power of acting, as was noted above, but means also tha.t. there is a decided limit to his participation in the world. The self tends toward auton~, but in so doing depends on its participation in a reality which is over against it. Tillich cites nominalisrn as the expression of a too-exclusive emphasis on the individual, and suggests that knowledge becornes irrelevant as it denies reality as the structure in which the 1 individual must participate and which he must express.

The duality of 1Qynamics and farm' seems to be a version of the familiar opposition between 'form' and 'content'; it is one, however, which bas the advanta.ge of indicating that 'content 1 , in the case of hwnan beings, is not static. Tillich points to Schopenhauer as one who assigned a metaphysical statua to the dynamism in being, calling it 'Will'.

He took this way of pointing, says Tillich, 11to that which cannot be 2 named."

1. ~., P• 177. 2. Ibid., P• 179. -24-

In artistic creations, Tillich points out, one sees how 'dynamics and form' fail to hold together; one sees too how they should be united in an integral expression.

Tillich' s treatment of the third dichotorny illumina.tes the nature of treedom as the spont.aneity of the self toward destiny' (and not over against 'determinism', which is a concept peculiarly appropriate to scientific calculations, Tillich points out). Freedom is the action 1 of the ~1ole self in deliberation, decision and responsibil1ty.

This freedom is based on, and is polar to, destiey. "Our destiny' is that out of which our decisions arise; it is the infinitely broad basis of 2 our centred selfhood." Tillich speaks of treedom in anot.her cont.ext in a way which further illuminates the point he makes here, and which shows, at the same time, how close this pair of elements is to

'individualization and participation'. Discussing the concept of 'personality' (which he defines as 'that being which has power over itself 1 ) he says that "The unconditiona.l demand to be free does not come from outside man (but) • • • is the expression of his own being, of the 3 grmmd and airn of his existence."

The polarities in being indicate the tensions that are in it.

11 Being is essentially threatened with disruption and self-destruction; the tensions of the ontological elements under the conditions of finitude

1. Ibid., P• 184.

2. Ibid.

3. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, Phoenix Books ed., (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957; first published 194S,), p. llS. - 25 - 1 indicate this." Tillich goes on to the conclusion that these tensions can not finally disrupt being. But existentially they do.

This insight, as noted a.bove, leads to the discovery of 'questions 1 in existence which seek the 1answer 1 of revelation. It is pa.rtly in the need for the 1balancing 1 of the se elements tha.t the need for atonement becomes obvious.

It is in the recognition that the distortion of existence nevertheless presupposes something like an 1 original balance 1 that Tillich cornes close to stating scmething like a philosophical doctrine of atonement. This is in simply postulating the origiœ.l unity of being as the centre toward which the forces in existence point. Existence presupposes essence. Most philosophera have maintained this distinction in one way- or another, says Tillich. "Whenever the ideal is held against the real, truth against error, good against evil, a distortion of essential being 2 is presupposed and is judged by essential being." The essentia.l, 3 a.s being-itself, stands somehow 'behind 1 what exista, empowering it and at the same t:ime judging it.

Tillich 's doctrine of being may properly be ca.lled mystical, to a degree. He himself finds this mystical view of being even in Heidegger.

11 I, myself, was prepared in a threefold way to accept, hi s philosophy. First, by an exa.ct acquaintance with

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 202.

2. Ibid.

3. I nfra, - 26 -

Schelling's final period, in which he attempt,ed, in opposition to Hegel•s philosophy of being, to pave the way for a philoso}ily of existence. Second ly b;r my - even if limited - knowledge of Kierke gaard, the real founder or the philosophy o:t exist ence; and thirdl3'", by my dependance upon the phU osophy of life. These three elements, comprised and submerged into a sort or Augustinian-coloured mys ticism, produced that which rascina.ted people in Heidegger•s }:ililosophy." 1

It is donbtful whether Tillich would still maintain that Heidegger 1s view of being is • Augustinian-coloured • ; the Nothing that appears in

Heidegger •s essay •What is Metaphysics? • is of a more sombre hue than

Augustine would have seen in the universe of God.

But Tillich does maintain a view of the primacy of being - which owes something to Sein und Zeit - together w.i.th a certain 'Augustinian- 2 coloured 1 mysticism of his own. It is surprising, in this connection, how Tillich looks like 'Augustine on his head'. Tillich endeavours to 3 be Augustinian in his view of the relation between reason and revelation.

But, wh ile Augustine thinks in terms o:t a 'hierarchy of being ', Tillich

1. Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of Histor;y, trans. by" N.A. Rasetzld and E.L. Talmay, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 39. 2. Here Tillich may have absorbed the influence of Rudolf Ot.to. At one point he refers to and interpreta the description of 'the holy' given in Otto 's famous book, The Idea of the Holy. ''When Otto calls the experience of the holy 'rnuninous' he interpreta the holy as the prese:œe of the divine. When he points to the mysterious character of holiness, he indicates that the holy transcenda the subject-object structure of reality. When he describes the mystery of the holy as tremendum and fascimsum, he expresses the experience or 'the ultirnate' in tlie double sense of that which is the abyss and th~ which is the ground of man 1 s being. 11 Systema.tic Theology, I, 215, 216. 3. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959), P• 29. - 27 - finds the sac red power (hieros - eacred) ma.nifest in •the depths'.

Man riees, in Augustine, through the operation of divine grace in res toring the ascending 1order of being'; for Tillich, man finds healing

1 in the depths ', am it is in the depth of reas on that God speaks to 1 man. In either case, rea.son seelœ for the 'grace' of revelation, 2 11for revelation me ans the reintegration of reason."

The third factor in the ontological structure, the 1characteristics of being which are the conditions of existeœe 1 opens up a •vertical dimension 1 within ontology. Tl«> facts stam out: the first is that being, as it appears under the conditions of existence, manifesta and iœludes an element of non-being; the second, which may be derived from the first, is that being is experienced as finitude. It is necessa.ry, Tillich says, both logically and in the larger view of reality, to posit a form of ~ non-being in dialectical relationship with being. To d~ this would be to deny the living character of ille. For ~n, this relation of being to non-being means that man is threatened by non-being. 11Being crea;ted out of nothing means having to return to nothing. The stigma. of having 4 origina.ted out of nothing is impressed on avery creature. 11

But these facts have also their positive aspect. It is in this wey that they open up a 'vertical dimension 1 within ontology. The element

1. Paul Tillich, Szstema.tic Theology, I, 79, SO.

2. ~., p. 94. 3. Ibid., pp. lBS, 189.

4. ~., p. lBS. -2S- of non-being, as was noted, is necessary for any dyna.mic view of life.

It is, in this view, the occasion for the possibility of new and unique being. In relation to finitude, Tillich says, 11 Infinity is a dem.and, 1 not a thing. 11 And without the experience of finitude the experieœe of this 1demand' would also be impossible.

11The process of self-transcendance carries a double meaning in each of its manent a. At one and the same time it is an increase and a decrease in the power of being ••• All the structures of finitude force finite being to transcend itself and, just for this reason, to become aware of itself as finite. 11 2

Tillich's discussion of the categories constitutes the fourth part of his description of the ontological structure. The categories, Tillich holds with Kant, are the 11forms in which the mind grasps and shapes 3 reality." But Tillich' s analysis is different from that of Kant in that it is oriented toward the discovery of the immediate existential import of the categories. Thus the categories - t:ime, space, causality and substance - are the necessary fonns under which the mrld is understood. But they must be considered at the same time as the constant conditions of inner experieœe: they are the fonns under 'Wldc h and agai:œ t which the self must live. 11Each category- expresses not only a union of 4 being and nonbeing but also a union of arud.ety and courage. 11

1 • .lli5!·, p. 190. 2. Ibid.

3. ~., p. 192.

4. ~., P• 193. -29-

Time arrl spa.ce, in spite of their apparent :fina.lity for experience, constantly pa.ss away: they are nat final. The self, living under these forms, must both opJX>se their finality and also affirm. them. Both of the se conceptions come together in that of •the present', which is always pre sent, but which is always pa.ssing away. Causality has the same kind of sa- biguity: while it is necessary to think of things as caused, still there is no knowledge of causes in themBelves as causes. There is only the awareness that nothing known to man is absolutely self-caused. "The anxiety in which causality is experienced is that of net being in, of and by one•s self', of not having the •aseit:r• l'.ttich theology tradition- 1 ally attributes to God." Substance, similar~, is the conception or a changeless substrate. But, while sorne such reality must be recognized, huma.n beings experience the anxiety that their substance will be lost.

The awareness of 1having to die 1 arouses the anxiety of the losa of sub- 2 stance and idenl:iity.

This consideration of the ontological structure •sets the stage'

:for the development of Tillich's description of the 1human situation', which is given in the section following. The description of the human situa.tion will constitute the outline of the situation in wh::b h the need for atonement is discovered. But it will be noted that two possible dimensions of atonement may already be seen: a 'horizontal' d1mension in which the necessity of the 1balancing' of lite forces must be recognized, and the 'vertical' dimension which recognizes some kind of resJX>nsibility toward an 1ultimate•.

1. ~., p. 196.

2. ~., PP• 197, 19S. - .30-

The problem of the system cornes up with this ontology, as it does with theology. This problem is recognized by Tillich in relation to his theological system. There it is eœountered as the fear of the .fina]jjt.y of the system. There is the fear that the system forces together elements of iUl interpretative pattern. There is the .fear that it does not allow

.for developnent, or (the emoti onal correla te of this) that it stifies 1 the creativity of spiritual life. These fears are dismissed by

Tillich. His systematic theology is not intended to be a final statement, he point:.s out, but merely one which may serve a purpose of definition at the present time.

But the ontological system, although only partial.ly elaborated, can not be intended as in aey sense a temporary statement in the way that his theology is. It is claimed to be temporar,y, because it is 2 11the expression of a state of existence rather than a fornmlated question. 11

But t:ime is one of the 'categories' under which reality is experieœed.

The ont:.ology moves on from description of existence to a statement about essence, and this has the affect of making ontological state- mente final - unless the concept of •being' can be given dynamic power. It is questionable whether Tillich' s use of the term non-being in relation to being is sufficient to do this.

Thus there is at least the possibility that history will not be taken quite seriously in Tillich •s system. And, from the point of view of the doctrine of atonement, there is at least the possibility that

1. Ibid., PP• 58, 59.

2 • .!!2i

Tillich 18 language will not be able to express the 1coming into being'

of a new historical lire which is expressed in the lire of a human

cormnunit;r, the Church. Should this be the case, history would be dissolved

into ontology.

While this ma.:r be so, it is true on the other hand that Tillich's

ontological anal.ysis furnishes him with the equipnent with which to deal with some neglected aspects of a doctrine or atonement. II.

THE HUMAN SITUATION - 33 ....

Existentialism and Atonement

The modern movement known loos ely as 'existentialism' has con- tributed so much to Tillich's fresh approach to a theological descrip- tiop. of human existence that it would be weil to begin this section with some description of the movement and its effect on Tillich.

Although existentialism has important antecedents in many periode of western thought, it is generally agreed that modern existentialism be gins from the protest of Kierkegaard aga.inst Hegel' s monolithic system. Kierkegaard' s protest wa.s that he, he himself as an erlsting individual, could not be subsurned under the system. It followed, for

Kierkegaard, that the task of philosophy was precisely to understand the dimensions of the life of the existing individual. No longer was existence to be regarded as being capable of being subsumed under the system,_ deduced from an 'ideal' structure of abstract thought. • Hegel 1 h:imself evolved the concept of estrangement, says Tillich, but he proceeded to conquer this estrangement through effecting a reconciliation - in his system! Against this kind of reconciliation both

Kierkegaard and Marx protested, though each was concerned with a different aspect of man's existeœe. ''The individual is estranged and not reconciled; society is estranged, and not reconciled; existence is estrangement. In the strength of this insight they became revolutionaries and .2 were existentialiste long before the twentieth century. 11

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theologr, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957), II, 45.

2. Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p. 63. - 34 -

Tillich is S,Ympathetic with the insights of both of these thinkers, and has recognized the validity of their protesta - in spite of a measure of continuing Hegelianism in his own thought, which is, as has been noted, explicitly systema.tic. Marx was led by his insight to the concept of the alienation of the masses from their true life, and to a progrélllD'Ile for their emancipation. Both here and in the work of Kierkegaard, Tillich feels that the idea of 'truth' has received a new dimension.

''With the repudiation of the closed system of the doctrine of essence, a new conc~ption of truth arises: truth is bound to the situation of the knower, to the individual situation in Kierke gaard and to the social situation in Marx. 0nJ.y so much knowledge of essence is possible as the degree to which the contradictions of existence are recognized and overcome. In the situation of despair • • • and in th~ situation of the class struggle • • • every system of harmon;r is untrue. "1

In this connection Tillich thanks Marx for an insight into the dangers of ideology and for the revelation of "the fund.Bmental significaœe of economie structurœand motives for the social and intellectual forms 2 and changes of a period."

But, more general.ly, this 'new view of truth t is simply the recognition that truth must express the dynamic character of life. Heidegger attempts to express this insight, as Tillich came to do, by saying that 3 the question of truth has ontological dimensions.

1. Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of Historr, p. 63.

2. ~., p. 65.

3. Martin Heidegger, 'Essay on Truth', in Brock, op. cit.,p. 336, expresses this in a very uncompromising way. Truth is "a revelation through which something overt comes into force." - 35 -

In accordance with this way of loold.ng at events as ariàing out of more than intellectual determinations, it is possible to regard existentialism as more a general movement than a philosophy-. Tillich points out that existentialism may be regarded not olÜ3"" as a protest against abstract thought, but as a movement also against the rule of abstractions in social life, against the rule of merel;y •teoh~cal' conceptions.

"Existentialism • • • is the protest against the spirit of industrial society within the framework of industrial society. The protest is directed against the position of man in the system of production and consumption in our society. Man is supposed to be the master of his world and of hllnBelf. But actually he has become a part of the realit:r he has created, an object among object.s." 1

2 This movement achieves statement in the arts. The art inrluenced by existentialism expresses contlict, and endeavours to move toward a new awareness of 1depth ', in Tillich 1s view.

There is in the writing o:f the existentialiste a vivid description of human states of being. 'Amdetyt and tcare' become concepts by which an understanding is conveyed of the peculiar dimensions and tensions o:f huma.n existence. The use o:f this sort o:f insight is elevated by

1. Paul Tillich, Theologv of Culture, p. 46. 2. Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 87. Here Tillich describes this movement in the arts, particular:cy in painting; 11With a will to create objective:cy, cézanne battled with :form, and restored to things their real metaphysical meaning ••• van Gogh revealed the creative dynamio in light and colour and· the Scandinavian, Mùnch, showed the cosmic dread present in nature and in mankind." - 36- 1 Heidegger to the level or a philosophical technique. He is followed, to sorne extent., by Tillich. Tillich recognizes the difficulty or the selection or appropriate 1phenomena •, but nevertheless uses the method as 11 a way or pointing to phenomena as they • give themselves •, without the interference or negative or positive prejudices or explan- 2 ations."

Existentialism places a new emphasis on • action •. The decision or the individual assumes a new importance in this way or looking at things: man comas to kmw himself as he •stands out • from his world in decision and action. One or the consequences or this is a new awareness or guilt, quite apart, so it "WOuld seem, from the coœept or an externally-validated

•moral law1 • Heidegger is one or those who seem to ma.ke an 'independant • discovery or guilt as the inevitable consequence. or huma.n resolve and 3 action. Tillich conments on this in an essay entitled •The Trans- moral Conscieœe 1 , observing that Heidegger•s discovery is directed by u4 "participation in a realit;r which transcenda the sphere or moral cOimii8Jlds •

The problem or existent.ialism, in this regard, is that there is little consensus as to the specifie character of this 1realityt. Tillich reels that the ;J.mpulse to action in existent.ialism must find direction througb revelation, if it is not to succumb to the temptation or empty self- assertion. 11Existentialism says •no 1 to this world, but, in orcier to

1. In this Heideg~er was influeœed by Husserl, who used the tech nique ( • }ilenomenologv • ) as a method for examining the contents or con sciouaness.

2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, l, lo6.

3. Brock, op. cit., p. 96.

4. Paul Tillich, The Protestant; Era, P• 145. - 37- say 1yes 1 to scmething elsa, it has either to use controlling lmow- 1 ledge or turn to revelation,"

Basides raising for philosophical discussion the whole question of the importance of the action of the individual, existentialism has constituted a part of the modern 'discovery' of history. For existent- ialist thinkers, history assumes importance not as the scientific study of the life of past ages (although the developnent of historical stud;r may have had sorne influence on thEml) but; as the decisive quality am climate of the life of man. Man, in this view, can not be considered as merely a part of nature - a.rry more than he is mere]Jr part of an

'ideal' realm, The li.fe of nature is not in itself historical. The li.fe of man is historical insofar as man ie conscious of •stan:ling out' from nature, listening to the past, and hoping to create a tuture. In this approach 11Histor;r will cease to be a mere field of knowledge, and become once again a question of the consciousness of lite and of existence; it will cease to be an a.f'fair of aesthetic culture, and become 2 again the earnestness of hearing and response."

History has something of this importance for Tillich. 11History became the central problem of :rey' theology and philosophy because of the historical reality as I found it when I returned from the first 3 World War" he says. Tillich has entered into an awa.reness of

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theolog,v, I, 111.

2. Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of Histor:y, Trans., Michael Bullook, (London, Routled.ge & Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 266. 3. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, Introduction, p. xiii. - 3S- history as the uniquely human field of man's lite and of man's decision.

This awareness of history is combined, in his thought, with ontology.

11The structure of a being which has a histo:ry underlies ail historical changes. This structure is the subject 6f an ont.ological and a theo logical doctriœ of man. • • • Ont.ology and theology deal with historical man as he is given in present experience and in historical mEillOry." 1

This understand.ing of the historica.l, whicb Tillich shares with the existentialiste, has at least two important consequences for the subject of this thesis. The atonement ot which Ghrist:ia.ns speak is made in history and, if Ghristians are right, makes history. Tillich may be expected to pay attention to this, as indeed he does, not onlY with regard to •sacred history1, but also with regard to world history.

"World history is the basis of the histo:ey of revelation, and in the 2 history of revelation world history reveal.s its mystery. n This may be regarded as one consequence ot attent.ion to history. The other is the recognition ot tragedy in history. In order that he might express an awareness of the 'dark torees t in history, Tillich, in his early book 3 The Interpretation of Histo:rz;, employed the concept of the 'demonic '•

The forces of history are seen to have ambiguous meaning. They give rise to destructive contlicts so that men in history cry out for re- coœiliation. Atonement must bring a concrete promise of restitution with which to meet the experieœe of loss and tragedy.

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology:, I, 1B5, 1B6.

2. ill.!!·, p. 174.

3. Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of Histo:ry, PP• 77t. - 39-

Philosopny and the Fall

On the basis of the ontology ~1ich has been described, and using, at important points, the phenomenological method of the description of

1t;rpical 1 huma.n st,tes of being, Tillich attempts, in the second volmne of his Systematic Theology, to describe hu.Iœn existence. He uses 1the

Fall1 and 'estrangement 1 as concepts mediating a valid interpretation 1 of existence. These are suggested to him at once by 'the Bible 1, by the 'secular' vision of the existentialiste, and by the perennial distinction between 'essence and existence'.

Man discovers that he is 'thrown into existence', says Tillich.

This perception of the brute givenness of the situation is not unique in the writings of Heidegger. Rather it is expressed, says Tillich, in the ancient knowledge or ma.n 's situation expressed in the myth or the 2 Fall. It is the Platonic view which sees in existence a 1lapse' from the realm of true being. And, saye Tillich, 11 on.ly in Plato does the contrast between the existential and the essential become an onto- 3 logica1 and an ethical problem." This view expresses the position or the problem in most subsequent western thought, in Tillich 1s opinion, until the time of the Reœissance. The 'gap' between the t"WO '1evels of being' was reduced by the Renaissance and the Enlightement., however1 ina.smuch as both 1movements 1 began to look on existence not as 1lapsed ',

1. Infra, p. 45r.

2. Paul Tillich, Systema.tic Theology, II, 22, 29f.

3. ~., p. 22. - 40 - 1 but as the ephere in which •essence' is progressively better actualized.

Tillich points to Hegel as the apotheosis or this tendency, inasmuch as Hegelallows the objective dialectic or history to terminate in his own time am in his own system. But the existentialiets, as hae been observed, revealed once again that history is not, on the face or it, the arena or reconciliation, but of contradiction.

Here it would be wil!le to observe that Tillich is not canpletel.y removed from the point of view which he ascribes to the Renaissance am to the Enlighterment.. He canes close to stating the Fall positive]y in a view of it as a •Fall into freedom •. In Tillich 1 s view, this is made necessary, for the Christian, by the prior doctrine of Creation.

Not only the initiation of the process of the lite of the universe is understood by the Christian in tenns of creation: the ongoing task of life is al.so underst ood as being dependent on creation. From this 2 point of view, 11Actualized creation and estranged existence ie identical."

Tillich insista that it is impossible, without resorting to the 'literal.. 3 ist• fiction of an ideal stage of human history, to hold otherwise." 4 He thus defends himselt against the criticisms of Reinhold Niebuhr, and there is no doubt that he is right •

The positive element in Tillich •s doctrine of the Fall is derived

1. ~... p. 23. 2. Ibid., P• 44. 3. Ibid. 4. Reinhold Niebuhr's essay •Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich 1s Theology', in Kegley and Bretall, op. cit., pp. 219t. -41- from an attempt to recognize the reality and the basic goodness of the created order: "• •• the good is not considered an arbitra.r;r command- ment imposed by an all-powerful existent on ether existenta. It is the 1 essential structure of reality." Tillich, in tact, demanda that

Christian theology make clear its positive doctrine of man.

11Theology • • • must emphasize the positive valuation of ma.n in his essential nature. It must join classical huma.nism in protecting man's created goodness against na.turalistic and existentialistic deniais of his great ness and dignity•" 2

Tillich couples the above statement with a recognition of the reality of 'sin' in the human situation. For an expression of this he

1 would prefer to speak of •moral and tragic elements in human experience 1 rather than 1 original sin' • It may be that Tillich do es not recognize 3 tully enou.gh the element of •sin' in the huma.n situation, but he must be right in saying that an emphasis on the reality of the problem ot 'sin' must be held in bala:œe wi.th a positive doctrine or man's potential dignity. Man is not merely 'fallen', 1thrown into existence'; he is propelled from Creation into more creation.

Tillich thus de:f'ines the Fall as 11the transition from essence to 4 existence." The language is borrowed fran philosophy. The expression de:ootes, for him, not an event which occurred 'once upon a time', but

1. Paul Tillich, §Ystematic Theologr, I, 204.

2. Paul Tillich, §Ystematic Theologr, II, 38. 3. vide, criticism of this doctrine, Intra. W• ;o, 51. 4. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 29. -42- a situation, ~ situation of man's life. It is 'prepared for' in Creation, which establishes the character of man's life as "finite freedom." But man himself actualizes his existence: 11alone, the serpent is without power. On.lJr through man can the transition from essence to 1 existence occur.•• And the actualization, which is huma.n existence in history, is distorted.

While Tillich dismisses the Genesis story as the account of an event 'once upon a time 1, he recognizes in it the profound meaning of the true myth. He uses the story for the developnent of his accourt of 'the transition from essence to existence t. The possibility of the

Fall bas been described in terms of the actualization of Creation.

But in man this is a dyna.mic process in which ma.n may choose to be and to create solely for himself, and even against himselt.

1'Man is free, in so far as he can play and build imagina.ry structures above the real structures to which he, like all beings, is bound. Man is free, in so far as he bas the faculty of creating worlds above the given world, of crea:ting the world of technical tools and products, the world of artistic expressions, the world of theoretical structures and practical organizations. Finally, man is free, in so far as he has the power of. contradicting h:i.mael.f and his essential nature." 2

This is Tillich's interpretation of the suggestion •You shall be as 3 God'; it depends upon man being made 'in the image of God 1 • From this cornes man's power - for good or for evil.

There is, in the story of the Fall, a stage of man 1s innocence.

1. Ibid., P• 39.

2. ~., p. 32. 3. Genesis 3:5. - 43-

This, again, must not be understood as the state of the individual at one time: 11The s:ymbol 'Adam before the Fall' must be understood as the 1 dreaming irmocence of undecided potentialities." This corresponds, for Tillich, to the stage of every man as he goes forward into further experieœe. And here, again, the existential philosophy has helped

Tillich to describe the processes in which the potentialities of a free 2 but finite being are actualized. Finite being, as has been observed, faces the demand of the awareness of infinity. But to respond to the derna.nd means decision (literally, 'cutting off' of possibilities, as

Tillich points out). Thua arises the state of anxiety.

11 In the last decade the term 1anxiety1 has become associated with the German and Danish word Angst, which itself is derived from the latin an,gt.!stiae, 'na.rrows ' • Through s"ôren Kierkegaard the word Angst. has become a central concept of existentialism. It expresses the awareness of being finite, of being a mixture of being and non-being, or of being threatenèd by non-being. All creatures are driven by amdety; for finitude and anxiety are the sa.me. But in man freedom is united with anx:iety. One could call man's freedom 'freedom in amdety• or 'amdous freedom' •" 3

The concept of amd.ety points to the fact that man's freedom is constantly being e.:x:pressed, his 'potentiality1 being actualized, in a situation which is threatened with loss. This was noted in cormection 4 with Tillich •s account of the existential implications of the categories.

But the danger of losa affects inner life as it affects the outward

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, ·34. .

2. Supra, P• 2S. 3. Paul Tillich, §ystematic Theology, II, 34. 4. Supra, pp.. 2St. ... 44,-

expression of life, and the danger of losa is as great in non-actualization 1 of potentialities as it is in action.

Worse than this, man is freedom must be actualized in a situation

which is, in some sense, already lost. Tillich uses the 1nzyt,h of the 2 transcendent Fall1 to illustrate this. It is one recognition of

the tragic nature of man's existence, at least in one dimension. Tillich

stands with Augustine against Pelagianism in recognizing that there is 3 auch a thing as 'bondage of the will•. So too he speaks of a 1uni- 4 versal estrangement•. But he dissociates himself from a~ implicit

Manichaeism by the assertion that the decisions of human freedom have

effect: the decisions of human freedom are not made in isolation from

man's desti:ny. Quite the contrary, on Tillich's principles, because

•the ult:i.mate' must always have its effect as hwna.n lives are orga.nized

( albeit unconsciousl.y) in relation to it. Freedom "is the possibility

of a total and centred act of the personality, an act in which ail

the drives and influences which constitute the destiny of man are

brought into the centre unity of a decision • • • the universe

participates in every act o:f human :freedom. It representa the aide o! 5 destiey in the act of freedom."

But even the universe, as the word is generally used, is not

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theo~ogv, II, 36.

2. Ibid., P• 38. 3. !!Ë&•t P• 41. 4. Ibid., P• 44. 5. !!Ë&•, pp. 42, 43. - 45 - unambiguously good. Nature is involved in the Fall, says Tillich.

Tillich justifies such a view in two ways. First of ali there is the fact that sorne aspects of man's being (the 1unconscious 1 , fol' example) must be thought of as parts of •nature• while belonging to man's lite. There is, secondly, the fact that nature tolerates •structures of evU 1 • "Just as, within man, nature participates in the good and evil he does, so nature, outside man, shows analogies to man's good 1 and evil doing." Nature too, then, must be redeemed.

For the :tùrther consequences of •the Fall 1 , it will be necessary to examine Tillich 1s exposition of the concept of 1estrangement 1, and

Tillich 1s understanding of 1evil1 •

Est rangement

Tillich's interpretation of the need for atonement arises from his understanding of man • s stat e as being one of 'estrangement ' •

Estrangement:, follows from •the Fall' • But the word has the adva.,nta.ge of indicating at once a separation and an original unity. A man and wife, if unhappy circumstances warrant, are spoken of as •estranged'.

It is a .familiar tact that Christian theology has alwa.ys made two assertionS about man which are very different:, from one another, but which are held together in spite of tension. Christian theology says, on the one band, that man is 1 in the image of God' • On the other ham it says that man is fa.llen and sinf'ul. Calvin, for example, says that

1. Ibid., p. 43. - 46 -

11 it is not the will of God that we should forget the primitive dignity conferred by him on our rather Adam, which ought justly to awaken us 1 to the pursuit of righteousness and goodness," but his emphasis falls not so much on the potent.ial greatness of Jllên's nature as it does 2 on "the depravation of a nature origina.lly good and pure." Since

Calvin is, on this point at least, one with the other voices of Christ- ian tradition, it follows that Tillich's doctrine here agrees with the voice of tradition - if not with the accent and choice of phrase.

The word estrangement expresses for Tillich the real content - up to a certain point - of the Church 1s traditiona.l teaching about sin.

By using this word he hopes to bring out the fact that this teaching points to a state of man in which nan is divided against himself. This, one of the basic meanings of the word •sin', has been obscured, in

Tillich 1s view, by excessive emphasis on •sins' as individual anti- moral acta. Such an em}ilasis does not reveal that sin is more of a

'situation' than a simple choice; it does not throw light on tlié pligbt- of man in existence as he is menaced by 'structures of evil 1 •

Tillich would keep the ward •sin' to denote the fact that estrangement:. is not merely a 'state•, but has a 1personal centre'. Sin "expresses 3 the personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs."

Tillich •s exposition of this theme keeps before it a concern with

1. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John Allen, I, (Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication, n.d.), 223.

2. ~., P• 226.

3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, lP. - 47 - persona.l life and also with the life of society. This must be so, because estran.gement appearè as a reality in the life of both, and not as a deduction from the apparently abstract grammar of the theologians. Indeed, Tillich suggests that the Church of today should concern itself to recognize and to publish the 1bounda.ry situation' to which man is driven, individuall.y and in the present social reality wh:ic h faces 1 the threat of disruption and meaninglessness.

"The man of today is aware of the human ambiguity of 'Which we have spoken. He is aware of the confusion of his inner life, the cleavage in his behaviour, the demonic forces in his psychic and social existence. And he sense that not onl.y his being, but also his knowing is thrown into confusion, that he lacks ultimate truth, and that he faces, especiall.y in the social life of our day, a conscious, almost demonic distortion of truth. In this situa.tion in 'Which most of the traditional values and fonns of life are disintegrating, he often is driven to the abyss of complete meaninglessness • • • He also knows that this situation is not the result of mechanical necessity, but of a destiJV 'Which implies freedom and guilt." 2

This is the situation which reveals estrangement - of man from himself, of man in his society, and of man as he stands individually in sorne relation of responsibility to an ultimate.

But Tillich's analysis in the second volume of his §Ystematic Theo-

~ is weighted in the direction of attempting to show what estrange ment and sin must mean for the ind.ividual. He defines three of the 3 •marks' of estrangement as 'unbelief 1 , 'hubris' and 'concupiscence 1 •

1. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 199f.

2. Ibid., p. 202.

3. Paul Tillich, êystematic Theologr, II, 47t. -4-S-

Unbelief might better, perhaps, be described as 'un-faith', says Tillich, to indicate clearly that it should not be thought of mer ely in relation to doctrine. Unbelief is 11an act of the total person- 1 al:ity." As auch, it is 'un-love' or wrong love; it denies the infinite ground of life. After establishing the central character of unbelief in this way, Tillich says that it is also "disruption of man's 2 cognitive participation in God."

Hubris follows from unbelief. It is a ki nd of 1 giant:.ism • resulting from treating the self as the cent:.re of one 1s world. It is the attempted 3 "self-elevation of man into the sphere of the Divine. 11 This aspect of man's estrangement is sean, says Tillich, in the attempt, of man to :g~B.ke h.imself or his culture absolute. ''The divine answer to man •s cultural hubris comas in the disint;egration and decay of every great 4 culture in the course of histocy."

Concupiscence is the nature of the striving of a life thus tund- amentally disarranged. Tillich enl.arges the usual meaning of the word so that it goes far beyond the reference to sexual appetite. It is 5 ldistorted libido t or the 'will to power'. He accepta the partial insights of Freud and Nietzsche in this wa;y. The term 'concupiscence' seems to Tillich to describe: man 1s turning to finite objecta with the

1. !!Ëà•, p. 47.

2. ~·

3. !~Bà·, P• 50.

lh ~., P• 51.

5. ~., PP• 53, 55. - 49- 1 infinite longing that should be the address of the soul to God.

Tillich 1s treatment of the doctrine of original sin has already 2 been indicated, above. He rejects the literalist view which makes of this the act of the 1first man' with its consequeœes, passed on as a kind of hereditary taint. Of course, not even Augustine held that some kind of 'physical' taint of evil is transmitted in this way. But

Tillich is coœerned to ma.ke this very clear.

"Original or hereditary sin is neither original nor hereditary-; it is the universal destiny of estrangement which concerns every man. When Augustine spoke of a massa perditionis, a •mass of perdition', he expressed thé 'insight, in opposition to Pelagius, that man in his estrange ment is a social being and cannot be isolated into a subject able to ma.ke free decisions." 3

Original sin is the name for the tragic element in man's destiny, for

Tillich. It is the darlmess in the social milieu into which man enters: which he comes to share and to express •

Tillich rejects the thought of •sins 1 , considered quantitatively and relatively, as he believes the Roman Catholic Church h.a.s regarded them. Neverliheless he cherishes the insight of the Catholic tradition which, in distinguishing between 'sins' shows 11 insight into the complex- 4 ities of man's spiritua.l life." The strength of the Protestant

1. There are numerous confirmations of this insight in modern litera.ture: Caligula, a play by Camus, or the novels of D.H. La:wreme dealing with such undisciplined strivings in sexua.l rela.tionships.

2. Supra. P• 44. 3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 56.

4. ~., P• 58. - 50 - position, according to Tillich, has been its knowledge or the grace of

God as unconditiona.1, absolute in its saving power. But Protestantism has too orten deteriorated to moralism, which simp:cy- attempts to impose an absolute conuna.nd~ A rapprochement between these two views, Tillich suggests, would recognize the absoluteness or God•s succour and the relativities or man's response.

In his consideration of estrangement 'imividually and collectively''

Tillich asserts, on the one hand, that the group as auch can never be guilty since it does mt have a 'personal centre'. But members of it, on the other hand, must ali share in the guilt of its wrong-doing, siœe each cont.ributes to and is a factor in the working out of the destiny' 1 and life of the group. Tillich seems to have in mim the issues ra.ised by the trials of German •war crimina.ls' a:rter the secon:i World war.

In the course of this consideration of individual and collective responsibility, Tillich rema.rts that »Judaism and Christianity placed 2 emphasis on the persona! guilt or the individual •• •" This remark, which admittedly is not intended to serve as a full statement at this point, but rather to le ad into the matter or his study, nevertheless opens up one dimension in mich Tillich 'a consideration of sin (as estrangement) is clearly deficient from a Christian point or view.

This deficiency is the absence of an element which stands at the

1. Ibid., P• 59. 2. Ibid., p. 5S. - 51 - heart of a ahristian idea of sin, and can not be set aside for purposes 1 of a general consideration: sin as 'breach of covena.nt'. Sin 18 not lmown in its true nature, according to st. Paul, without the Law 2 which detines the way of the Covenant People. In this description of man 1s estrangement there is not included an account of sin as the re .. bellion of men who know themselves called into one conmunity for the service of God. In this one point;, or the lack of it, Tillich 's ennun ciation of Christian theology loses a good deal: it loses the •cutting edge' given by- the knowledge of a specifie challenge and the necessity 3 of a speoif'ic respo:nse. In this, perhaps, lies the danger that

Tillich will 1ontologize awa.y' the reality of the Fall and of estrange- 4 ment as, he says, sorne have suspected him of doing in another connection.

Estrangement ma;y be the general situation of man, 'but. the word has a special meaning for the old Israel, and for the new, both of whom bear the responsibility of lmowing themselves called to the s~ice of God.

1. "All: life is upheld by covena.nt, and the essence of sin is the breach of the coveœbt" says Grayston, giving the Old Testament view. A Theolo cal Word Book of The Bible ed. Alan Richardson, (London, ~Press Ltd, 1950 , p. 227.

2. Romans 7: 7 & s. 3. Tillich seems always to take his stand 1outside' of the Churcb in a general examination of the form of culture. His discussion of •autonomous ', 'heteronomous' and theonom.ous determination of cult.ure is a case in point. He ranges in his considerations from the early middle ages to the nineteenth centu:ry in a most helpful wa.y, 'but. always examining 'culture in general 1 • The 'theonom;r' of the early and high middle ages is the integration of ille in a relation to 1the ult:imate'. The 'ultimate' is not characterized as God as He is known in the faith of the Catholic Church. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, PP• 56f. Help:t'ul as is Tillich 's position 'on the bomlda.rJr', it may be that it does not help him to face sorne speêitic questions.

4. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, TI, 43. -52 ....

Tillich does present, however, what must be the presupposition of the conception of sin as 1breach of covena.nt 1 • This is the understanding of God as 'the living God', which appears in the course of

Tillich 1s presentation of the doctrine of God.

Tillich has a wider and a narrower definition of evil. It may- be regarded as a destructive power which produces sin. But then it becomes a 1surd 1 element, prior to any experience, which deprives the h'UlllB.n situation of an;r final meaning. Tillich prefera a na.rrower definition which recognizes evil as "the consequences of sin and estrange- 1 ment."

This definition must be prefer.red, on Tillich 1s grounds, because it permits of sorne explana.tion of the irra.tional and dynamic forces of evil. The recognition of man's situation as •estrangement 1, for

Tillich, brings the recognition of evi1 as the consequence of estrangement. The contradictions of man's existence move toward destruction: "The elements of essential being which move against each other tem 2 to armihilate each other and the whole to which they belong."

Evil is here tmderstood as a •structure of destruction•. Its partie- u1ar fonn ma.y vary. There may be as many different fonns of evil as there are forma for man 1s experience. But these structures have one thing in connnon: they depend on the created order for their power.

1. ~., PP• 60, 61.

2. ~., P• 60. - 53 ...

Tillich therefore uses the structure discerned by his ont.ology to describe the structures of evil which lead to destruction. As he does this, the treatment of the doctrine of evil is conjoined with a turther treatment of the doctrine of sin. The whole is a remarkably ordered midrash on St. Paul's conunent that sin, 'when it has conceived', brings forth death.

This consideration of evil begins with the self in its relation with the world.

"Selt-loss as the first and basic mark of evil is the loss of one's det.ermining centre; it is the disintegration of the centred self by disruptive drives which cannot be brought into un_ity. So long as they are centred, these drives constitute the pers on as a whole. If they move against one another, they split the person. The :further the disruption goes, the more the being of man as man is threatened. Ran's centred self may break up, and, with the loss of self, man los es his world. 11 1

The explanation of how 'elements of man's being move against each other' is given in terms of the ontological polarities.

Freedom, in man's state of estrangement, is separated rrom destiny" and is directed towa.rd "objecta, parsons and things wh:ich are completely contingent upon the choosing subject and which therefore can be re- 2 placed by ethers of equal contingency and ultimate unrelatedness. 11

This arbitrary flight from integration may be seen also, says Tillich., in terms of the polarity of 1dynamics and fonn'. Either, by itself, is empty, and yet in ·ract the individua.l does 1project' himself without

1. ~., P• 61.

2. Ibid., P• 63. - 54 - finding a 'form' for his lire. Alt.ernativezy, he m.ay- succumb to determination by an allen and oppressive form. These facts about man's situation are documented, says Tillich, by theories which define 1 man in terms of one or other of these concepts. This is true also with regard to the third ot these pola.rities. If an individual is eut off from genuine participation in a social body his resultant; lone liness will prepare the way for the destructive dominaœe of his life by forces which he will not be able to resist. Sociological and psychological descriptions have shawn, says Tillich, 11the interdependance 2 of the loneliness of the individual and his submergence in the collective."

Evil is experienced in these ways as the beginning of a chaos which moves toward annihilation.

Tillich states this conclusion of the tragic processes of man's estrangement in an apparently- uncomprom.ising way. "Estranged from the ultimate power of being, man is determined by his finitude. He is given over to his natural fate. He came from nothing and returns to nothing. He is under the domination of death and is driven by the 3 amdety of having to die." The word •natural' is used here, apparently, in its strictest sense, without the connotation of tright.'

1. ~., P• 65.

2. ~· One of the studies of which Tillich here spealœ may be a recent sociological study exploring the thesis that there has been a significant change in I~rth American attitudes - which is characterized as a transition t'rom • irmer-directedness 1 to 'other-directedness'. It supports Tillich 's staternent, as the title indicates. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, Anchor Books, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1956.

3. Paul Tillich, Systemati c Theologv, I I , 66. - 55 - or 'due 1 • The amdety at having to die witnesses to something about this which is not 1na.tural 1 • Tillich points out that this is 'What he understands by the Pauline language which refera to sin as the

'sting' of death: 11 It transforma the amdous awareness of havjng to 1 die into the pa.inful realization of a lost eternity." The awareness of estrangement, and of one •s guilt and responsibility in it, says

Tillich, transforma the amciety about natural death into the greater amdety of the evil of death. Some awareness of the nature of this 1lost eternity' would seem to be necessary for this to be so. Tillich finis 2 this awareness in 1'the relation to the ultimate power of being. 11

In the course of his attempt to give an account of the workingrJ of evil Tillich takes up the categories again. He must show the darkest side of the ambiguity in them, which has alrea.dy been noted. Man resista determination by these forma. But his resistance is broken down. This experience of defeat, says Tillich, is one element ot the experiènoe 3 of despair. 4 Man is defeated too in the destruction which is attested by suffering.

He is defeated in the experience of rejection, which is an aspect of the 5 loneliness of human beings. Man is defeated in the experi:l roe of meaninglessness. This may be self-produced, to a degree: it may arise out of doubt, which at one level is an indispensable tool of man's

1. Ibid., p. 6S.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 69.

4. Ibid., PP• 70f •

5. Ibid., P• 71. -56- intellect. 11Doubt becomes absolute and drives toward a despa.iring 1 refusal to accept any finite truth." These example of the forma of evil which beset the human situation could".be multiplied almost in definitely, says Tillich. But they may be summed up in the experie:œe of des pair. This is "the final index of man's predicamant; it is the 2 boundary line beyond which man cannot go."

The word itself means 'wi.thout hope', Tillich points out. It is the state in which the contradictions in existe:œe assume a final and imple.c.a.ble fonn. Tillich • s consideration of despa.ir takes up the problem of whether suicide is a possible escape from despair. The problematic character of despair assumes sorne element of 'personal responsibility•. This, in turn points to a relation that goes beyond the individual, so that suicide is not a simple solution.

11 Suicide (whether externa.l, psychological or meta pnysical) is a successful attempt to escape the situation of despair on the temporal level. But it is not successful in the dimension of the eternal. The problem of salvation transcenda the temporal level, and the experience of despa.ir itself points to this truth." 3

Tillich brings forward the traditional Christian 1symbol' of the

1wrath· of God 1 to demonstrate the character of the element of responsibility which orders the situation of man's ],ife. But this symbol is joined with the symbol of the love of God. The two stand together:

1. ~., P• 73. 2. Ibid., P• 75. 3. Ibid., p. 71. - 57 -

11The divine love stands against ali which is against love, leaving 1 it to its self-destruction in ord.er to save those who are destroyed."

Leaving aside for a moment the problematic character of the last assertion, above, and considering Tillich's treatment of the human situation in this, its negative aspect, one must say that he has succeeded in raising the question of atonement as 'a matter of life and death 1 •

Just how far 'l'illich will go in presenting the answer to this questi. on must re_main undecided at the moment. He, unlike the Bible, is engaged in draw.i.ng 'blueprints' and a difficult time awaits him as he attempt;s to say whether or not Christian faith sees extinction as the end of those who are fina.ll.y overcome by evil. But, uncompromising as is the statement that the end of the •natural' ma.n is death, it seems that he is not willing to close the door to the possibility of a canplete

'atonement r in the shape of a 'universal' salvation. 11Both for time and eternity, one must say that even in the state of separation God b creativel.y working in us - even _if his creativity takes the fom of destruction. Man is never eut off from the grotmd of being, not even in 2 the state of condamnation."

Tillich 's description of evil is followed by a section which attempt;.s to show how the 'quest for the New Bè'ing' arises from the very midst of the tensioM which, in their extrema form, ar_e structures of destruction.

Before turning to Tillich's account of •the New Being•, this

1. Ibid., P• 77.

2. .Th!!!·, P• 78. -58- thesis will examine his statement of the doctrine of God. The doctrine of God stands behind the important term 'the New Being', and it is the backgrotmd to Tillich's understanding of 'processes of atonement '. III.

THE DOOTRINE OF GOD AND THE DOOTRINE

OF ATONI!){ENr -60-

God as 'Being Itselt'

''The basic theological question is the question of God" says 1 Tillich. This holds true for a consideration of' the doctrine of' atonement.. Estrangement is, at the centre of' it, estrangerment from God. The axperieme or tragic losa due to finitude and to the forces which oppress man's f'inite existence ha.s been met, throughout the ages, b)r hope centred in God (or gode). Even in this general view, then, the doctrine of God is the necessary theological 'background' to the doctrine of atonement. It is God who wills atonement, in the CM!ist- 2 ian view, and "the atoning processes are created by God am God aloœ."

But how does man cane to name the name of' God? How does man lmow God, and how does man think of God? Tillich bas two answers to these questions. His theology may be rega.rded as an attempt to relate his two answers more closely together. The f'irst answer is that the sources of' theology ( which is thought about God) are definitive expressions

(the Bible, material from Church histary) which reflect the lire and faith of the Church in part.icula.r times and in relation to certain Ol.lt- 3 standing events • The second answer that Tillich malœs is that man is immediately aware of' God as the 'depth of' reason' and as the power 4 of' life. His approach to theo1ogy1 as has been observed, rules

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 163.

2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theo1ogy, II, 173.

3. Supt"!, p. 14. - 61- out the possibility of the separation of these two answers. Bath indicate what is revelator.y of the nature of God.

But, in tact, the first answer does not obtrude itselt in Tillich•a

Systematic Theology until the discussion on the doctrine of God is well adva.nced. The initial appraach to the statement. of the doctrine of God is made from a standpoint within philosoph)r, where Jililoso~ :1a held to reflect the general awarenesa or God as it speaks or ita dis covecy or the question of being. The question arises (with Parmenides and Heraclitus) in reflection on the experieœe of the 'shock or 1 possible non-being'• Tillich stands with the philosophera or ancient. Greece, rather than with the Fathers of the Cburch, as he ma.kes the diseovecy that God appears in the face or tragic losa - or threatened losa - in human existence as "the infinite power of being which resista 2 the threat or non-being."

There can be no doubt that Tillich is here mald.ng a great effort to a void what seems to be the 'arbitrariness' of much theological lahguage.

He tries to give more dept,h and relatedness to the idea of God. Language is arbitraey and unreal, in 'l'illich 's view, 'When God is spoken or as

1 a 'higbest being • This makes h:Sm a being baside other beings 1 albeit .3 the highest. He rejects this view, as he also rejects a •natur- alistic' view which, in the interests of relatedness, ident.if'ies God

1. Paul Tillich, Systema.tic Theologr, I, 16.3. 2. Ibid., P• 64 • .3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 6. - 62 -

1 with the universe. He attempt;s to indicate that God ia 1beyond naturalism and supernaturalism'.

In attempting to avoid the seeming arbitrariness of traditional theological language Tillich uses the language of }ililosophy. But this is because 1 in Tillich' s view, }ililosophy expresses a universal human awareness. Philoso}ily, as has been observed, comes to an awareness or finitude; but just as strongly it acknowledges an unconditional element in the light ot which finitude is lmown to be what it is. This aware- 2 ness is described in the account already' given or Tillich's ontology. The element which is at ome the power of the ontological structure and the 1dept,h or reaaon' is recognized, says Tillich, in both amient and modern thou.ght.

"The preseme of an element within finitude which transcenda it is experienoed bath theoreticall1 and practical:cy. The theoretical aide has been elaborated by Augustine and the practical aide by Kant. • • • Neither side bas constructed an argument tor the reality of God1 but all elaborations have shawn the preseme of sanething unconditional within the selt and the world." 3

Tillich recognizes this element in expressions auch as 1the power of being1, (in the second volume or his §l!tematic Theologr, "the intinite 4 5 and unconditional power of being"), and 'the ground or being'•

1. ~., P• 7. 2. Supra, p. 'Z7. 3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theoloq, I, 206.

4. ----~ Systematic Theolo.q, II, 7.

5. ----~ Systematic Theologz, I, 234, 235. - 63 -

This awareness of the 'power of being' bas been aclmowledged,

says Tillich, by' the traditional proots tor the existence or God. In Tillich' s understanding or the word 'existence' - as a specitically' human mode of being - God cannot be said to exist. Some ot the arguments

tor the existence or God have, however, deep meaning. They are expressions 1 in this view, a.t once ot man's existential sel:t-understanding and of his awareness of the unconditional. The ont.ological argument shows 1 ''the unconditional element in the structure of reason and or realit:r." The cosmological argument., similarly, is said to show an awareness that the unconditional affects drastically' man's conditioned awareness of

his world. It shows that "finite being is a question mark. It aslœ the question or the 'eternal now' in which the temporal and spatial 2 are simultaneously accepted and overcome." The teleological

argument brings together and expresses the question of meanill!, and, 3 in TUlich's view, opens a perspective toward the 1gratmd' of meani~.

But this awareness must have some 'form' or content;. The presence ot this unconditional element in human experience, says Tillich, is

partially determinative of the evolution of an idea of God. It is the most important factor1 but it is not the only factor •

"The developnenti or the idea of God is not a dialectical thread spun out of the implications of ultimate concern, independant of universal hi story-. On the other band neither the rise nor the developnent of the idea of God can be explained in terms of social and cultural factors

1. ~., P• 200. 2. Ibid., P• 209.

3. ~., P• 210. - 64-

ind.ependent of the given structure of lultimate coœern 1 which logically precedes each of its historical manifestations and every particular notion of God. 11 1

Tillich suggests that the developnent of an idea of God arises out ot a meeting between 1ultimate concernt and a tconcrete concern1 , the concern of man for his life which is, in one dimension, the expression of a soteriological quest. The character of the 1concrete concern t would be very much inf'luenced by historical situations.

Tillich uses this approach to solve the problem raised by compara- tive religion. All ideas of God have some validity, in this view. They may be said to exhibit different admixt;ures of elements belonging to the dimension of finitude; along with the expression of that which transcenda finitude. Tillich uses the example of the picture p1t on a screen by a slide-projector. The gode of mythology may be described as

'projections 1 (in the sense of this analogy, or presumably, in Feuer bach's sense), but they must, on seriOW5 consideration, call attention to that against which they are projected, the 1screen1 , which is experienced ultimacy. ''The real.m a.gainst which the divine images are projeoted is not itself a projection. It is the experienced ultimaoy 2 of being and meaning. It is the realm of ultimate ooncem. 11

It is true to say, then, for Tillich, that religions offer at least a beginning of the definition of the character of Gpd. The insight of this approach is applied to biblical religion in the course

1. ~., p. 220.

2. Ibid., p. 202. - 65 - of Tillich 1B approach to the statement of the doctrine of God. The God of Israel satisfies the demand that God should be a god who is comerned with man's concrets situation. God in the Old Testament; is 1ultimate' as well, however. This combination ·;satisfies both poles of the demam: as 1the lord 1, who nevertheless reveals Himselt in personal relation- 1 ships, the God of Israel is 1concrete and absolute•. This idea ot God, then, must be taken very serious]3r in attem.pting to judge the character of God.

Whatever be the value this approach my have in weighing the problems or the field of canparative religion, it must not be overlooked that the 'names' of God are here judged by a }ililosophical notion (or, at lea.st, by an •awareness 1 which is given a designation from the Jitil osophical lexicon). This conclusion would not embarra.ss Till1ch. He urges that theology make use of philoso:Iilical insights - for theological ends, or course. And in the question of the relation or ontology to religion he feel.s that ontology is a related quest and an indispensable a.id to religion • Ontology saves religion fran the dangerous consequences of an extreme 'personalism', in Tillich's view. Not o~ this, but ontology is necessa.ey also to interpret wha.t is meant by the statement that God !!•

"The God who is !. being is transcended by the God who is Being itselt, the ground and abyss of every being. And the God who is a person is transcended by the God who is the Personal-Itselt, the ground and abyss of every person. In statements like these religion am ontology meet. Without }ililosoJities in which the

1. Ibid., p. 227. -66-

ontologieal question we have raised appears 1 Christian theology would be unable to interpret the nature or the being or God to those who wanted to k:now in what sense one can say that God !!•" 1

Tillich' s tullest attempt to relate ontology and biblical thought is made in his book Biblical Religion and the Search tor Ultimate Realitz.

Here the criterion seems to be 1ultimate reality1 • As the result or his consideration ot biblical religion in relation to this concept

Tillich says "The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and the God of the 2 Philoso}ilers is the seme God."

Thus Tillich comes to his :important definition: God is 'being- itselt, deus est esse. This definition is related to the other defin itions which have been mentioned, most notably to the concept of God as 'the power of being 1 • But Tillich maintains that the expression

'power of being' as applied to God is symbolic, whereas the term

'being-itself' is not symbolic in its application to God, but ie rather 3 the direct statement:. of an experienced ultima.cy. 'l'his definition is intended to :becognize the ult:imate as ultima.te, and yeti to make room for the tact that this ult:l.mate is experienced. It is intended to suppress inadequate symbole of the divine. t'The concept. of being as being, or being-itselt1 point.s to the power inherent in everything1 the power of resisting nonbeing • • • A theology which does not clare to identity God and the power of beirig as the fust step toward a

1. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search tor Ultimate Reality , pp. B3, 84.

2. ~., p. 8.5.

3. Paul Tillich, Szstematic Theologr, I, 238. - 67 - doctrine of God relapses into a monarchie monotheism, for if' God is 1 mt being-itselt he is subordinate to it."

The tremendous importance of this definition far Tillich •s theology lies in its being regarded as applying, non-symbolical..ly, to God. other expressions, such as 1the power of being', ae noted above, or 1Father1 or 1Lord 1, are regarded as symbolic. or course it goes without saying that 1symbolic 1, for Tillich, does not mean 'unreal'. Symbole pa.rticipe.te in the reality to which they point, and are the means of other persona 2 pa.rticipating in the same realit7. The importance of TUlich 1s assertion that the definition 1God is Being-Itselt' is not a symbolio statement. lies in the tact that, if this is so, the expression will serve as a 'north star' guidirJ8 theological discussion and determi~ the degree or reality of other •symbolic 1 statements about God.

'lhe stand taken by Tillich has great value in at least two ways.

First, the stam is taken in the m:idst of a culture for which the word

'God t has lost its meaning and power to a considerable extent., so that aey speaking about God seems to carey with it an air of unreality.

Perhaps this bas always been true at all times, but it is especially true of the situation in 'Which Tillich worlœ. TUlich's definition,

God is Being-Itselt, is a way of declaring that the renlity of God must be reckoned with. The second wa.y in ldlich Tillich •s stand is of value, at least potent1al.ly, is that· ·it carries with it the suggestion

1. ~., P• 236. 2. Paul Tillich, Theolo&r of Culture, p. 59. -68- that symbole be shown as far as possible in their relation to reality.

It may be that Tillich 1s definition originated in the desire to 1 •anchor 1 symbol.s in a concrete assertion.

But the consequences for theologr it this allege~ non-symbolic statement were, in tact, symbolic also, would be quite serious. If the term 'being-itselt' as applied to God. were also symbolic, Tillich1s use or it as a non-symbolic designation would mean that his theology was dominated by a symbol which did not, in tact, point beyond itselt unambiguous~. It would become a high~ abstract image which would rinal..ly' weaken, rather than support, other 1symbol.s 1 or God, simp]3r because or the importance it h&d been given in the system.

The importance or this question for the doctrine of atonsent is acknowl.edged by Tillich in one or his l.ate writings. Here he maintaiœ his position that the knowledge of the immediate awareness of God is expressed by' saying that God is 'being itselt 1. He goes on to say that. the (apparent~ inevitable) thought or God as & 1highest being' is

11a symbol for that which is not symbolic in the idea or God, namely,

'Being Itsel!'•" But this non-symbolic statement. can not stand alone.

He continues, "ln our relations to this ultimate we symbolize and must symbolize. We could not be in camnunication with God it he were onl.T 2 1ultimate being'•" Tillich may !!!!!Il an immediate awareness of God, by the useof this term. But can his intention overcane the tact that

1. Paul Tillich, in •Reply to Interpretation and Criticism 1, Kegley and Bretall, op. cit., P• 334, makes this suggestion. 2. Paul Tillich, Theology or Culture, p. 61. 1Ita11cs 1 mine. language bas a necessaril;r symbolic character in considerations or this sort? 1Being itself' tends to becane, in spite or Tillich 's in- tentions, a static :image. Atonement or reconciliation with 1being itselt' is an extraordinaril;r difficult proposal, beca.use it is an abstract proposal.

Images and Atonement

Images or thought and speech pertorm the function, within the ille or the Church, of mediati~ the selt-understanding of the Church. This goes on in any earthly comnnmity: Tillich spealœ or the source or symbols as the 'collective unconscious'. He does not go into the question or how different symbole have developed in different traditions.

But Tillich bas a fa.irl;r precise understanding of the nature ot the various types or image which may have influence on thought. His account or them is usetul in distinguishing their various roles.

He gives a quite general definition of ~h. But he distinguishes sharply between 'signa 1 and 1 symbole 1 • Tillich thinks of IJIWth and 2 cult 1 as "expressions of the depth or reas on in symbolic rorm."

Wh.en the question or 1demythologizing' canes up in the second volume or his §ystematic Theologr, Tillich rejects this as a programme for theology. It might mean ''the remonl. of Jeyth as a· vwbiclè··ot' religious

1. Paul Tillich, Szstematic Theologr, I, 241. 'l"here is a reference also to the origin or symbole in the 'collective unconscious 1 in the Theology of Culture, p. 5S. 2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, .t,.. Sl. - 70 - expression and the substitution of science and morals '' which would "deprive religion of its language; and silence the experience of the 1 hol.y."

Signa and symbols are both representations: they point beyond themselves to something else. But they must be distinguished from one another, B&y"S Tillich: 11 signs do not participate in 8.'113' wa.y in the 2 reality arxl power of that to whi.ch they point." Symbols do participate, in his view, in that which they express. The basic origin of symbols seems to Tillich to be "the depth dimension ot 3 reality itself." This is the realm of the Hol.y: the depth where man is aware of the infinite power of God. Although t:illich does not say, in writing general.l.y on the subject, why certain symbole emerge rather than others, he does say how it is possible, in his view, to judge between the various religious symbole. It is by the use ot the coœept of •the ultimate 1 that discrimination is made: one has only' to ask -what is the relation to the ultimate which is symbolized in 4 these symbols?11 Tillich asserts that symbole can not be 1killed 1 ; they can, however, 'die' if the situation passes in which they were created and in mich they have meaning. Theology thus attempts to give an abstract statement of the meaning of symbole, but in doing so it

1. Paul Tillich, §ystematic Theologr, II, 152.

2. ------~ Theology ot Culture, P• 54. 3• .!!Êà•1 P• 59. 4 • .rug_., p. 60. -71- does not 'ld..ll' symbole. Symbole - and even myths - are necessar,y 1 for the life of the mind.

The doctrine of the analogia entis refers to the use of the language of the human world in speaking about God. In myth and in symbol

"material taken fran finite reality" is used in speaking about; the infin- 2 ite. Tillich is quite right in say-ing that this must be so.

It may be, however, when he goes on to assert that the ana.logia ent.is 3 is based on the fa.ot tha.t God must be understood as 'being-itself', that his emphasis is falling rather heavily on the entis term in the expression, rather than on the tact that to use the language of the real.m of lmman being for speaking about God is 1 contessedly'• to use analo&r• One would wish, in this connection, a tuller aecount ot how the symbole used by the Christian Church came int.o being, or, it this is not possible, an attempti to explain how just these symbole came into use. Such an account. might reveal that the expression used by Barth, 4 a.nalogia fidei, bas at least as much to recoomend it, insotar as the analogies which the Christian Church uses in speaking about God are those which have come into use within the 'household of faith •.

1. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, Doubleday Anchor Books, (New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1953; copyright 1944), PP• 52t. , gives an account of the positive influence of symbolic understandill,! in mental developnent. Amther aut.hor gives the 'negative' side of this picture in writing on myth: ~he most profound characteristic of a myth is the power which it wins over us, usually without. our knowing it." Denis de Rougement., !ove in the Western World, trans. by Montgomer,t Belgion, (Anchor Books ed., New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957),p.5.

2. Paul Tillich, §z!tematic Theolo&!, I, 131.

3. ~., P• 240. 4. Karl Barth, Church Dop.tics, trans. G.T. Thomson, I, 1, (Bdinburgh, T. & T. Clark Itd., 1960; tiret printed 1936), PP• mt. - 72-

Tillich points to the danger that besets the use of religioU8 eymbols. It is the danger that they will beoome 'idols '.

11 In all sacramental activities of religion, in all ho]y ob jects, ho ]y boolœ, ho].y' doctrines, hol;r rites you .tim the danger 'Which we call 1demonizat!on1 • They becane demonic at the manent in which they becœe elevated to the un conditional am ultimate character o.r the HolT itsel.t. 11 l

The symbol which stands above all Christian use of symbols, says Tillich, is the symbol of the Cross, which expresses the surrender ot the .tinite 2 to God. 3 Tillich argues elsewhere that there is an atonement wh:fc h must be carried out in the mim of man. The danger of the m.isuae of religious symbole may be taken of an illustration of this. Men are

•aware • ot God, but there is a tragic process by 'Which this awareness is converted into images which conceal or den;y the trut.h. This is no more than st;. Paul argues in the epistle to the Romans.

"Ever since the creation of the world His invisible nature, namel.y, his eternal power and deity, bas been clearly perceived in the things that bave been made. fBut men, ) • • • althou~ they knew God they did not honour Him as God • • • Cl.aiming to be wise, they became .tools, and exchanged the gl017 of the imnortal God for images • • • " 4

l. Paul Till:ich, TheologY of Culture, P• 60.

2. ~., P• 67. 3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 94.

4. Romans 1, 20-23. -73-

No doubt this statement was directed original.ly agaiœt idolat17 in the literal meaning or the word. But; its implications may hold good tor other 'images', religious and philosophical. Atonement in the mind of man would then imlude a radical re-ordering of the images through which the self lives1 so that the gloJ.7 or God might nat be obscured by them.

Tillich does nat. take seriously enOU!h the possibllity that even comeptïs like 'being' become images or the reality of which one is aware. im lthen such an image is established as a directive for thought, it does not point to God, the Father of Jesus Christ, in an unambiguous way. 'l'he God or Abraham, Isaac and Jacob H, the God of the Philoso}ilers J but. philosophera, apart from the faith of the Church, do not ma.ke this discoveryl

It the name 'God', as the Chureh spealœ it, be taken serious:cy-, the conoeptïs 'power of being• and 'ground of being' point to Him, as do the other symbol.a which the Church has used to speak of ~·

But the image crea.ted by the words 'being itselt' is suspect. The 1 bei~' known ."to man is the beillS of.' the creation, primaril;y; while the Being of which he wuld speak is that of the Creator. The designation 'being itself' becomes, in use, abstract and impersonal, as is illustrated by the inevitable references to Godas 'it•. Even the expression 'the power of being ' 1 acceptable as it is, does not, bY' itself, establish the character of God. It is thererore fort.una.te that Tillich, although his ontolog continues to supply important;, assistance to the developnent of the doctrine of God1 turns imreasingly to the biblical images through which the •action' or God is described. - 74-

God and the Processes of Atonement

The doctrine or God has been reterred to as the necessary back ground to the theology of atonement. But. the Christian understanding or God is not or an unchangin! 'backdrop' to human lite. The lite or

God is, indeed, a myster;r, the processes or which it would seem 1mpudeŒ to attempt to de scribe. Nevertheless 1 the Christian rinds his understanding of the lite or God primipally in tems or what. can only' be called • actions t. This is true in the central event. in 'Which •the Word became nesh and dwelt among us'. It is true in the Old Testament doctrine of God as 1the living God' and as the Lord or history, and, aboYe all, in the dœlirine or God as Creator. The Christian doctrine ot atonement depends upon God being not only the 'power or being1, but also the God who acta in history. TUlich pl.ainl.y has a sense or this when he declares that 1'the doctrine or the living God and the doctrine 1 or atonement coincide."

Tillich 's presentation of the doctrine or God as the llv~ God is given f'iret in term:s or his ontology: God 18 seen as ''the eternal 2 process in which separation is posited and is overcome by reunion." am the doctrine is present:.ed also in terms or the more traditions! biblical comepts, and in terms or the doctrine or the Hol;r Trinity-.

The onl;y section or the ordiological structure used more or less directly in the attempt to describe what must be the processes or the

1. Paul Tillich, s,ystematic Theology, II, 173. 2. _____ Systematic Theology, I, 242. - 75 - lire or God is that constituted by the ontological elements. 'The religious mind 1, says Tillich, must see these polar elements in full and inclusive balance in the divine lite.

11God is called a person, but he is a person mt in finite separation but in absolute and uncon ditiona.l participation in everything. God is called dynamic, but he is dynamic mt in tension with fonn but in an absolute and unconditional unity with form • • • God is called 'free ', but. he is free mt in arbitrariness but in an absolute and unconditiona.l identity with his destit:\1 so that he himsel!' is hie destiny • • •" 1

Tillich endeavours to make clear that this description does mt imp:cy a god who is in any sense (whether with Whitehead, or with the actus 2 purus of Thomas Aquinas) sheer, ongoing, actualized process.

The dynamic element in the life of God bas real character, he says.

This is the element which is demanded in the thought of God's participation in history, or in the consideration of the 'will' of God.

Tillich finds that the dynamic character of God is given expression in another designation, that of God as Spirit. Here again, the ontological elements have an important part to play in Tillich •s definition. Spirit is defined as "the unity of power am meaning", and the des ignat ion ot

God as Spirit is said to be 11the most embracing, direct, and unre!tricted symbol for the divine lite. It does not need to be balanced with 3 another symbol because it includes all the ontological elements."

1. Ibid., PP• 243, 244. 2. !èi!!•, PP• 246, 247. 3 • .rug,., P• 249. - 76 -

The doctrine of God as li'rl.n« is also, implicit~ or explicitl,y, the doctrine ot the Ho~ Trinit7. "Aq discussion of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity" saye Tillich, "must begin with the Christ- 1 o1ogical assertion that Jesus is the Christ." He points out that the doctrine of the Trinity must be regarded as, in one sense, a deve1opnent from the event ot, and the faith in, Jesus as the Christ.

It was this that made necessar,y the presupposition that the lite of God is the lite of the Trinit;r. This lite is unified, in Tillich •s view, as Spirit. "God 's lite is lite as spirit, and the trinitarian 2 pr!Œiples are moments within the process of the divine lite."

Tillich is at ill speald.ng of 'the living God. 1 • The signiticanee of this wa:r of speaki~ is d:rawn out by Tillich in his discussion of the meaning of the three 'princip1es' of the life of the godhead. The first principle of this life is the m;ysterious and untathomab:œ power of God. The second principle is that of logos: meani.ng and structure by' which the power of the divine life is mediated.

"The classical term logos is most adequate far the second principle, that of meaning and structure. It unites the meaningtul element with creativit:r ••• Without the second priœiple the tiret 1«>uld be chaos, burning tire, but it would not be creative gr oum. n .3

Spirit, in Tillich's view, is the •actualization' of the first two principl.es - although he adda that it is alao true to say that God

1. ~., P• 250.

2. Ibid., P• 251 •

.3. ~· .,., .. 1 !'!!!.a Spirit, as he has the logos. Atonement. muat mean the bringing or man into the lif'e here described.

The doctrine or God as Creator is ome again the doctrine or the

'living God 1 • It too bas important consequences for an understanding or the lif'e of man and tor an understanding or the processes or atone- 2 ment. TUlich spealœ ot God 1s 'originating creativity', His 3 . 4 1sustaining creativity', and His ~ecting creatirlty'.

This symbol of creativity, says Tillich, points to the abundaœe ot the divine lite; it denies any ultimate dualism and asserts that God 5 is •au in aU •.

Turning to the implications of this doctrine for human existence,

Tillich points out that the Christian doctrine is of creation ex nihilo.

This doctrine expresses two truths.

"The tiret is that the tragic character of existeme is not rooted in the gratmd ot being; ••• am the second truth • • • is that there is an element ot non-being in creatureliness; this gives insight into the natural necessity ot death and into the potentiality but nat. necessity ot the tragic." 6

Against the background of the divine creative act human lite is seen

1. ~.

2. ~·· P• 253. 261. 3. ~·· P• 4. Ibid., P• 263.

5. ~ •• P• 252.

6. ~•• p. 254. -78- as the .tultilmerrt. of creation. But such .tultilment means that man must meet the possibility of loss. Man bas "le.tt the ground in order to stand upon'himselt, to aotualize what he essential.l.y is, in order 1 to be finite freedom." The creation is, then, through the grace and forbearance or God, the space for the action of real human treedom, where man races genuine danger of 1oss. It is also the place where man, as a responsib1e spirit, is con.f'ronted with the challenge of his destirJY•

Tillich cal.ls the idea of 1continuous creativity1 "the only 2 adequate understanding or preservation." This concept,ion, brought together with Tillich's designation of Godas 'being itselt•, and with his view of being as 'structured 1, su~ests that lite is capable of producing the new, and also of re-ordering the 'old'.

Atonement, in this perspective, muet be the recognition of the power of God, together with the re-creation and re-ordering of lite. But such a re-world.ng of the stutf of lite must be more than something that happens to the individual. 'lhere is a mutual interpenetration of lite with lite, and of human lite and nature, that a117 •reunion

1 vith the ground of being must be partial and preliminary1 awaiting reconciliation of the who1e. Tillich •s statement or this Christian hope of a new creation is given in terme of his description of God as 'being-itselt': 1'What happens in the microcosm happena by mutual. 3 participation in the macrocosmes, for being itselt is one."

1. ~., P• 255.

2. ~., P• 262.

3. Ibid., P• 261. -79-

Tillich uses the expression 'directing creativityt to express what bas sanetimes been called God 's 'prorldeœe '. He endeavours to suppress deterministic notions of various kinds 'Which have been connected with the idea of proTidence. He asserts that there is a directing creativity which guides the world, man and histor,y; but he suggests that this 'providence' is hidden, and waits for the participation of persona in Him. "Providence is not interference; it is creation. It uses all factors, both those given by treedc:a and those given by destiny, in creatively directing everything toward 1 its fulfilment.n

A turther insight into the possible processes of atonement is given in Tillich's presentation of the doctrines of God 1 s holiness, love and power, and of the doctrines or God as 'lord' and 1Father•.

Again, these doctrines are presented with a rlew to seeing them as a cont;ext. for human existence. The doctrines of God' s holiness and

God' s love will be. considered last here, because they present (theo logians have generally agreed) special problems in relation to a doctrine ot atonement.

In describ~ how, in his view, the idea of power must be used of God, Tillich uses the words 'omnipotence', •eternity' 1 'omnipresence' and bmniscience 1 •

1. ~., P• 267.

2. ~., P• 273. -80-

This 1s, it seems., the note &truck by faith: coarage., a degree ot integration, affirmation. The quality or eternit:r as realized by human èein«s sho'Wl!l a degree of •atonement' within them.

"Faith in the eternal God is the basis tor a coura~e whick conquers the negativities or the temporal pro cess. Neither the anxiety or the pe.st nor that of the Mure remains. The amd.ety of the past 1s conquered by' the treedan or the pe.st and its poten tialities. The anxiety of the tut'Ol"e is conquered by' the dependence ot the new on the unity of the divine lite. 11 1

A beliet in God's omnipresence shows his "creative participation in 2 the spatial existence ot his creatures. 11 This tends to overcane the anxiet.y of •not having a space for onesèlt 1 • In a beliet in God •s anniscience ''the amdety or the &rk and the hidden is overcane in 3 the faith of the divine caniaéience •''

The sense of God•s power is present also in the description of

Godas •IA:>rd 1 and as •Father•. Yet these are "the two main s,mbols 4 ot a person-to-person relationship with God" (the possibility of which must be examined in connection w:l.th the beliet in God's holiness and love). Tillich presents the titles •Lord' and 1Father' as main symbol8, each serving to org.anize a lesser constellation or symbol.s. Under the former title, Tillich recogn:bles God 1s ma.jesty.,

1. Ibid., P• 276. 2. Ibid., P• m.

3. ~ ... p. 279.

4. ~., P• 286. - 81 - justice and power. Under the latter, he sees the symbol.s which point 1 to God as creator, helper and saviour. Both or these sets ot symbola point toward an atonement which culminates in a personal comnunion or man with God, but a coomunion in which God remains God.

This last is also the point or the doctrine or God' 8 holiness. Tillich's understanding or the holiness or God is ot that quality or the divine lite which is other than man and which 1 in a sense, denies man. "God cannot become an object or knowledge or a partner in action.

It we speak, as we JllU.8t, or an ego-thou relation between God and man, 2 the thou embraces the ego." God •s ultimacy does not. permit ot his ccmprehension by man, his majesty does not permit of his being used by man, and the knowledge or him demande the sutmission or nan because it condemns the mere selt-cent.redness or world-centredness or man. ''The holiness or God demande that in relation to him we leave 3 behind the totality or rinite relations."

Tillich qualifies this last statement w.l.th the suggestion that a Calvinist emphasis on God's transcendent hollness,· valuable as it is, has sone too rar. For Tillich, the holiness of God 's lite is a qual:lt, y which qualifies all others (his love or power) as bei~ ot

God. But there is also the tact that Tillich understands the dimension ot the Holy as precisely that dept;h which underlies the lite or all

1. ~., P• 2~.

2. ~. 1 P• 271.

3. ~., P• 272. ·B2-

1 men, and which consistent.ly speaks to men. Thus the holiness ot God which denies man is set in bal.aœe w:l.th an understanding or the holiness ot God as part or a lite 'Mhich is available to men, and which willi to include men. This raises again, but does not solve, the problem or the consequences or man's estrangement from this holy lire.

Tillich 1s treatment of the doctrine of God' s holiness, together with his understanding or the love and grace ot God, leads toward the revelation or a possible process or atonement.. Tillich •s understan~ ot the lG'Ve or God is that God 11works toward the f'ultilment or fiW1l"Y 2 creature" in spite or the ind.epemence or the creature. God 's sz-ace 'goes betore • the creature to bring him back to the coJIIllUnity ot the life of God. In this process of gra.ce, the justice of God is not denied. Justice is ''that side of love which affirms the indepen- 3 dent right or object and subject in the love relationship."

"The final expression ot the unity or love and justice in God is the symbol ot justification. It pointe to the umonditional nlidity or the structure ot jus tice but at the same time to the divine act in which love conquers the imminent consequences or the rlolat.ion of juet.ice. The·· oht ological unity of love and juet.ice is manifest in final revelation as the justification ot the sinner; the divine love in re lation to the divine justice is grace." 4

1. Paul Tillich, Tbeolog.r of Culture, P• 59.: ''The dimension ot ultimate reality is the dimension of the Holy." And from this cilinension, in Tillich •s view, there cane rellgious symbole lfhich mediate a participe.tion in the Ho~.

2. Paul TUlich, Systematic Theology;, I, 281.

3. ~.,p. 282 •• 4. Ibid., PP• 284, 285. - 83-

It is clear that this is a presentation of the Christian doctrine of God. Beeause it is, it gives :insight into the neeessary theologieal baekground of the Christian doctrine ot atonement: it spealœ of what muat be the proeesses in the life of the godhead which make tor aton.ent, and it says somethi~ of the character of God who wills to make atonement.

But to express this mystery Tillich moves farther and fartiher away- from the ordinary language of the ontologist or philoso}i'ler. IV.

THE DOOTRINE OF ATONI!MEN'l' - 85 -

The New Being

Tillich maintains that atonement. is the act of God1 and that it is wrought in seme sense 'in Christ t. But his initial definitive statement draws attent.ion to atonement as a human experience: "The doctrine of atonement is the description of the ~f.fect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in their state of estrall!8- l ment.."

The central term in this definitive statement is •the New Being'.

This term does not occur just in the •Chrietological 1 section of

Tillich 1s work. Rather it appears quite earl;y in Tillich's systematic work as an attempt to state the •material norm' for theologv. The question arising out of human existence at the present time, says

Tillich, is "the question of a. reallty in which the self-estrangement or our existence is overcœe1 a reality of reconciliation and reunion, 2 or creativity1 meaning and hope." This is the question or the

New Being. Tillich is quite explicit as to what he meaœ by this term1 and 'What he intends to express. "Being carries connotations of a metaphysical and logical character; it has mystical implications when used in relation to God as being-itselt. •New' in cormection with 3 •Being' has connotations of creativity, regeneration, eschatolog;r." The New Being as the theme and goal or man's soteriological quest is

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology1 II, 170. 2. §ystematic Theologr, I, 49.

3. ~., P• 55. -86- the theme of Tillich•s theology.

The New Being receives a definitive expression in the person of Jesus, the Christ. Tillich reels that the accoa:nt of this lite given in the Gospels reveals a unique sort. of dynamic. This perception directs him to a statement of the relation between 1the New Bei11« • am the being of Gode

"• •• the term 'being 1 when applied to God as an initial statement about him1 was interpreted as the 'power of being' or, negatively expressed, as the power to resist non-being. In an analogous way the term •New Being' when applied to Jesus as the Christ, points to the power in him which con:tuers existential estrangement, or negatively expressed1 the poaBr of non-being." 1

But the New Being is manif'est in Jesus, because he points to, is

•transparent to' the 'power or bei~'·

At the centre or his description of' the New Being, thererore,

Tillich pute the 1picture' or Jesus as the Christ which is given in the Gospels. He seeka to show that the existeme of this man expresses the unity w.l.th the 'power o:t being' which, for 'l'illioh, is expressed in the term 'the New B'ing •. In present.ing this anal.ysis, Tillich is anxious to stress that no single aspect or the existence of Jesus, his words or his' actions, may be considered in isolation. These separate aspects of' his being must be considered in relation to the 2 whole, which is his being.

1. Paul Tillich, S;ystematic Theology, n, 125.

2. ~., 121. -87-

Most important, in this comection, is the insistence that even the sufferings of Jesus, important as they are for a Christian doctrine of atonement, shall not be considered in isolation fran the rest of his life and being. The point of this insistence is that a narrow]Jr conceived doctrine of the 1work' of Christ has tended to concentrate on his sufferinge. Says Tillich, "The signif'icance of the Cross in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ induced orthodox theologians to separate both suffering and death from his being and to ma.ke these his decisive tunctioœ within the framework of a sacri- 1 fioi&l theoey." 'l'illich does not explain this New Testament pre- occupation wi.th the Cross, at this point, except to say that the life of Jesus involved ''the continuous sacrifice of himselt as a particular individual ••• to himself as the bearer of the New 2 Being." But; he is right in maintaining that the words, deeds or

1. ~., p. 123. Taylor documente the accusation which Tillich here makes, giving, at the same time, a fuller and more eatis.factory explanation of why it was that the Fathers of the Ohurch •concentrated on his su.fferinge '. It was not just the importance of the Cross in the New Testament lbioh produced auch an ~sis. It was also the con ception of sacrifice with which these theologians approached the Gospel story which was responsible. In the Fathers,· says Taylor, f'rom Clement of Rane to Calvin, "while the thought or sacrifice is rree:cy- used • • • ali too .frequently' it is presented as propitiatoey or pl.acatory• • • • 'l'he accepted conceptions· of sacrifice were pagan, and the want. of a scientific exegesis concealed from the minds of the great theo logia.ns of the Church that the Old Testament ideas of sacrifice are mainl;r Eucharistie and representative in character. The consequence was an unethical presentation of the idea of God • ._ • and the fore closure or suecessfùl. attemJ*,s to supp~ a constructive doctrine or the Atonement in whicl;i full justice is done to the representative ministr;r or Christ for men, and to the believer•s appropriation of that work in his penitent approach to a reconcillng God." Vincent Taylor, The Atonement in New Testament Teaching,, PP• 2:16, '277. 2. Paul Tillich, S;ystematic Theolog, n, 123. See also infra, PP• . -as- suf'ferings of the Christ must be considered in relation to his beins.

Tillich finds that the picture ot the Christ given in the Gospela

"coutradicts the marks ot estrangement which we have elaborated in the 1 analysis or man's existentia1 predicament." In spite of an:det.y,

Jesus does not exhibit unbeliet, wbich would be 1the remova1 or his persona1 centre from the divine centre'. He does not Show hubris, 2 conceit or self-elevation, a1thougb he is conscious of a special role.

He does mt show concupiscence. This, in Tillich's view, is empha.sized strongly by the temptation 8t01'7 which deals with "desires for food, . 3 aclmowledgement and power," EYen the term 'good' is rejected 4 insofar as it points to h1m in isolation fran the God he would reveal.

Tillich ext.ends the analysis of the being of Jesus througb a consideration ot the signe of his awareness of finitude, Jesus "as a finite being • , , is subject to the contingency of everything that is - 5 not by itselt but is •thrown• 'into existence." Like every other

1. Ibid, P• 126,

2, 'l'illich saye tair~ clearl.y that Je8US was conscious ot a Messianic vocation. He speake of Jesus responding to his 'divine dest1IJ.y' (p. 1.30), and of him de~ 1hubris' "in spite or his avare ness of his messianic vocation," (p. 126). He aleo speaks in terma ot his being •adopted' as the Messiah (p. 149), An element of uncertainl;y on this point is introduced, however, by the tact that Tillich finds very mnch lees of a •messianic self--consciousness t in the Synoptic account., as against the Joharmine record, and by the tact that he deal.s with this ditticult7 by maldng 'Messiah' a tsym.bo1' applled to Jesus, (pp. 1.37, 1.38), All references to Systematic Theology, II,

.3. ~., p. 126.

4. ~., P• 127.

5. ~., P• 1.31. -89-

.finite being, Jesus exf.sts under the conditions defined by' the basic c•tegories. Examina.tion of the Gospel records shows, says Tillich, the human reaction against these conditions. There is the •temporal' amd.ety of having to die. The existent.ial consideration of Jesus as an individual existing in space reveals the lack or a special place in his society and in his world. He experiences loneliness. nHe experiences all the tensions which follow from the selt-relatedness of every finite person and proves the impossibilit:r or penetrating into the cent;re of aeyone 1

The analysis of the existence or Jesus is not completed at the point where his participation in the estrangement is shown. It JllU8t be said also, says Tillich, that he partakes of guilt insofar as his own being and his own decisioœ constituted a part of the tragic pattern or his rejection. Tillich cites the case of Judas, who was made a member of the 1inner band' according to the will or Jesus, and whose guilt 2 was increased by this very inclusion.

But. the ana.lysis maves on to show a degree or resolution of the contlicts experienced by human be inga. The conditions which have an inevitably negative erfect on the lives of human beings are not E>emoved. Yet their effect is changed.

11The amdety of having to die is not removed; it is taken into participation of the 'will of Godt 1 ie into his directing creativit:r. His homelessness and i.nsecurity with reepect to a phy'sioal, mental and

1. ~., P• 131. 2. !!B,4., P• 133. - 90-

social place are not diminished but rather imreased to the last moment. Yet they are accepted in the power or a participation in the •transcendent place. which is ••• the eternal ground or every place and or every moment in time. His loneliness ••• (is) taken into the divine acceptance or that which rejects God." 1

In the same 'Wa7, doubt; does not obtrude itselt. It is 1'taken into participation in the divine lire and thus indirectly into the divine 2 omniscieme."

It is clear that this anal.ysis reveals more than a •meaning' tor huma.n existeme. Tillich bas taced the tact that to speak mere:cy- or a 'meaning' would be to subordinate this event. to a given intelligible trame or retereme. Christianity bas understood this event in cormection w.tth the thought of the divine logos. But Tillich, who is quick to appreciate the suggestion or a •structure' in experieme, nevertheless points out that 1'The Incarnation of the logos is not metamor}ilosis but his total manifestation in a personal lite. But manifestation in 3 a persona! ille is a dyœmic process i.mrolving tensions, rislœ, dangers."

In the second volume of his Systematic Th!ologr he bas. tourid it necessar.r to emphasize, in speaking or man's existence, that there is no logical 4 step .t'rem essence to existence. Tillich bas endeavoured to face the overt tact or the life or Jesus as this is reflected in the Gospel narrative.

1. ~. 1 P• 134.

2. ~.

3. ~ •• p. 149.

4. !2ià.·' p. 44. -91-

Tillich gives attention also to what has been called the 1parti cularity' of the revelation in Jesus. But it is obvious that, for him, it is nat a grievous scandal. In the first place, Tillich suggests, the individualJit,y of Jesus - 1ike the individuality of any man - may be overemphasized. It is true that every man, as an individual, must act and be for h:imselt. But it is equally' true that eveey man stands in a living context and tradition. This is •destin;r' 1 in Tillich •s termin ologr. The naive point of view which discounts the im:portame of the relations in which human beings live their lives has misunderstood the prophets, as well as Jesus, considering them to be inspired indirlduals.

Jesus, like ffVeey man, emerges from a tradition. His 'sense of destin;r', says Tillich 1 was supplied by the Old Testament. But it must aleo be said, in Tillich •s view, that revelation could take pla.ce (in a final form) in no other ~· It demanda expression in the qualities of personal life. 11The New Being has appeared in a persoœl life, and for humanity it cou.ld not have appeared in any other way; for the potentia- 1 lities of being are completely actual in persona! lite alone."

This quotation is helptul in indicating another possible reason why the fact that revelation appears in a final form in an individual does not disturb Tillich. It is because the problem of the individual bas be en solved by his ontologr. The individual - especially Jesus 1 - is set against the background of 1being t. It may be from this point of view that he says that "the history of salvation and the 1histor.r of

1. Ibid. 1 P• 120. - 92 - the sarlour' are ultimate~ determineè in the same way that history 1 is generally and as the histoey ot f!V'eey ind.ividua1 man." The term 'the New Being' makes retereme to a universal element; 'behind 1 history. Thus it has the same kind of userulness as a definite meta physics has for an historical study: it provides a 'backgroùnd t and a primiple of interpretation according to which events can be seen in a meaningtul pattern.

At the same time, it must be said that Tillich 's use of the expression 'the New Being' produces a needed corrective to a radical pessimism which denies that one can disoover aey kind of historica1 substance providing a ba sis for Christian faith. Such a pessimism is seen in Bultmann, who is driven to say "Christ meets us in the 'WOrd ot 2 preaohing and nowhere else. n Bultmannian soholarship tends to

1eave the kerygma (the message about Jesus) hanging in a void, with a most inadequate expl.anation as to how it has been rormul.ated, and no e.xplana.tion as to how it is to cane to men to effeot atonement - unless it be by sane kind of pure~ spiritual encounter. Against auch a position, 3 'l'illich emphasizes that the ke1'7111111:! has substance: the New Being bas appeared in history. He is supported in this stand by a recent

1. Ibid., P• 130.

2. Rudolf Bultmann, 1Myth in the New Testament 1, an essay in Kerzgme. and K~h, ed. H.W. Bartsoh, trans. Reginald H. Fuller, (London, S.P.C.K., 1953, p. U. TUlich's comment on this position is in Sxstematic Theology, II, 106.

3. Although "The certitude of faith does not imply certaint;y about· questions or historical research." Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, lOS. - 9.3 ... movement in New Testament etudies which hopes to say much more than hae late}3r been said about the being or Jesus in relation to the ker;yp;tn! 1 proclaimed by the Church.

Tillich's attention to the being or Jesus, the Christ, has the greatest i.mportame and value for theology, and for the doctrine or atonement in particul&r. Tillich joins other :important writers on the doctrine of atonement in pointing to the importance of the gemineness 2 of the human life of Jesus, the Chri.et. This em.Jitasis on the being or Jesus goes far to direct at tent ion to history1 &S the field of God 1s work and as the field of the Church's work.

It may be, however, that the term •the New Being' is not able to bear the great weight which Tillich puts upon it. Tillich makes it central in his attempt. to describe the reconciling work of God. A final judgment on this point. must be deferred until the description of Tillich's understanding of atonement has been completed.

1. James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historieal Jesus, (London, SCM Press Ltd., 1959). Robinson finds the possibility of the 1new quest ' in 11the crucial fact that Jesus 1 understanding of his existeme, his selfhood, and thus in a higher sense his life, is a possible sub ject of historical research." (p. 72) This approach takes note of the fact that the meaning expressed in the tway of being' of' Jesus is prior to the kery;ma. Robinson looks at the existential implications of the teaching of' Jesus and says n-[t · is -tl'liis existential meaning latent in Jesus 1 message which is constitutive of' his selfhood, expresses itself in his action, arrl is finally codified in the Cburch 's ke:rygma. 11 (p. 12.3)

2. H.R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, (New York, Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1912), p. 405. 11 It is as Christ became our fellow, moving in a true manhood through obedieme, conflict, and death, that He entered into our condition tully and availed in our behalf' to receive fran God 1s ham the sutf'ering in which is axpressed the Divine judgmert. upon ·sin. Jesus 1 manhood is the corner-stone or reconciliation." .. 94 -

Atonement in Christ

To speak of atonement in Christ, tor Tillich, is to face the problem of the adequate statement of t'NO complement&ry views of atonement.~ atonement:. as a 1realit;r1 in histoey, am atonement as 1victory 1 over the conditions of existence in histocy. The realization of the meani.ng ot the person and work of Jesus, as the Christ, was cr,ystalllzed by the ear:cy Chu.rch in the Christologieal dogma, says Tillich, but there is sane question as to the adequa.ey of the concepts which were used.

The designation •the Christ' points toward the arena of history, he fee!l,s, but ;ret has cane to point awa;r fran history •

Tillich points out that •the Christ• is not a proper name, but a designation which embodies a hope which finds its focus within the lite of this world. He is delighted to adopt the view that the desig nation •Christ' (Messiah) bas roots 'in the Semitic and Egypt;ian world', ' 1 where it wa.s connected with an ideal or ld.ngship. In apocaly'ptic literature, says Tillich, this symbol was eleT&ted to the realm of teternit;y', conceived or as an et.ernal realit;y like the •Law• or the

Wisdom literature. But the symbol never lost its association with histor.y and a capaeity to express a hope which has historica1

1. John A. Wilson, The Culture of Ancient Egypt;, Phoenix Books ed., (Chicago, The Universit;r of Chicago Press, 195'; tiret pablished as The Burden of Egrpt, copyriMt;,Universit;r of Chicago Press, 1951). Wilson continns the opinion that ideas from Egypt may have passed into the 01d Testament hope in the Messiah. The ideal of ld.ngship in ancient Egypt during certain periode embraced auch ideas as 1the good shepberd' (pp. 32, 133) and the god-king (pp. 72, 103, etc.}. -95- ramificatioœ.

". • • the Messiah always remained i"elated to hietoey, ie, to a historical group, its past and its future. The Messiah does not save individuals in a path leading out or historical existence; he is to traœ• torm historical existeme. The individual entera a new reality which embraces society and nature." 1

This view of the nature of the 'symbol' of the Hessiah leads directly' into Tillich •a own interest in the discussion of Christologr: he con ceiTes himselt to be detending •the historical character of Christ- ianity', while attempting to express, at the same time, a m;vstical, non-historical tendency which cannot be denied if man is to speak 2 about the ~tecy of God.

1. Paul Tillich, §ystematic Theolo.q:, II, 88.

2. In spite of his interest in the historical dimension of the Christian reality and the Christian hope, Tillich seems to give too much weight to the influence of the symbole and ideas of GnostiC am apocalyptic literature. He mentions the importame of •the law' and •Wisdom', comeptions found in this literature, as e,mbols "which could be applied to the event or 'Jesus' in a universal way" (~., 89). But he does not put these against the element of •universalism' in the Old Testamenli itselt - in the Pentateuch, in the ProJilets, and in stories like that of Jonah. He spealœ of the 'Christ-m;rsticism' ot Paul, in this connection, but does not acknowledge the complementa.ry stress on the 1boevils it is made by God and for God. Solidarity is the divinel.7 ordained structure in which personal lite is to be lived." J.A.T. Robinson, The Bodz, (London,~ Press Ltd., 19.52), pp. 81 9. In his understanding of John, too, Tillich appears to be undul7 intluenced by the scholarship which has stressed the 'hellenistic' element in the Johamine writinp. A recent study admits the use of hellenistic language in John, but says •'The Old Testament furnishes the essential thought-torms , and the essential language too, tor the conceiving and expressing of salvation." C.K. Barrett, The Gospel According to st. John, (London, S.P.C.K., 19.5.5), p. 66. This carries with it the conclusion that John has an :interest in the dimension ot histor;r. Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ. Tillich holds to two necessar;r elements in this assertion: the •event• of Jesus, am the 'believing reception' of those who tiret called him the Christ. On the one ham, "Christianity must insist on the actual. tact to which the name Jesus 1 ot Nazareth refere", and, on the other ham, without. the believing ' 2 reception of him, "the Christ would not haTe been the Christ."

Event am its interpretation can not be separated, says Tillich. The attempt; to produce an account. or a • Jesus of histor;y.t as a Jesus behin:l am separate from the Jesws who was received as the Christ, is bouM to faU. Tillich may be too pessimistic about the possible resul'ts j ot the 'quest of the historical Jesus' in suggesting that all that theolog:r can do is to state that a •new reality' is expressed 4 in Jesus as the Christ. But; at least the • new reality' ot which Tillich spealœ bas an historical dimension. Tillich is keenlJ' interested in demonstrating that thiâ is so.

Tillich t s interest in the historical implications or the 1Christ. event; • leads him to criticize traditional Chriatological statem.ents.

He would prefer a 'lower' Christology, one which would gin tull recognition to tbe huma.nit;r of the Christ, to the Christology lrilich, he feels, issues from a 'crypto-mompbysitic trend' in the thought or 5 the Church. This originated, Tillich reels, in the Johamine

1. Paul Tillich, Szstematic Theologr, II, 98.

2. ~., P• 99.

3. Supra, P• 93. 4. Paul Tillich, Szstematic Theology, II, 106. .,97- emphasis on "the victor;r of the New Being over the conditions of 1 existence." This trend towa.rd 1mono}:ilysitism t in the Christologr of the Catholic Church was strengt,haned, in Tillich •s view, by the decision of the Cou.ncU of Nicaea that it must be said that the Christ is •or one substance with the Father' (homoousion). This decision was indeed necessary against Ariania, in Tillich' s opinion, but it was not entirel.y successtul. The insistance on the unity with the Father1 exprassed in this form, producad something very close to that which it was intended to defeat. It became dangerous beeauae it permitted a

'diYinizingt tendency: "popalar and mona.stic piet:r wa.s not satistied with the message of the eternal unit;r of God and man appearing undar 2 the conditioœ of ntrang•ent.n This piety, in Tillich •s view tended to obscure the humanit:r of the Christ am to open up a wa:r ot understa.Diing his "MOrk in almost tmagical' terms.

TUlich •s estimate of the other great step in Christological. definition is equa~ critical. The decision of Chalcedon1 that-. Christ is •very Ood and very man', am that he must. be spoken of as possessin& t'MO •natures• coœurring in one person (prosopon), again, was necessar;r. lfore than this, it nsaved the complete el.dmi:nation of the picture or 3 Jesus as the Christ • 11 But it vas inadequate in its concept.ual 4 1 •tools ' 1 especia~ in appl7-ing the term •nature to God.

1. ~. 2. Ibid., P• 144. 3. Ibid., p. 141. 4. Macld.ntoeh, op. cit., p. 214, says that the 'MOrd is mt satie• fact017 because it can not describe an •ethical and persoœl1 relation. - 9S-

Tillich suggests a new solution to the problan of an adequate Christological statement;.

'"l'he assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the personal uni.ty of a divine and a human nature must be replaced by the assertion that in Jesus as the Christ the eternal unitT or God and man has become historical. realitT• In his being, the New Being is real, and the New Being is the re eatablished unitT between God and man. We replace the iœdequate concept; 'divine nature' by' the concepts •eternal God-man unity' orteternal God manhood'. Such concept;s replace a static essence by a dynamic, relition." 1

In these expressions Tillich hopes that merely 'dirlnizing' or merely tanthropolo&i,cal' tendencies are transcended.. His intention is that they should be - although it may be objected that the addition or the word •eternal' to a statement. or relation between God and man does not altogether escape the danger or creating the conception or a 'static essence'.

B.r such modifications or traditional Christological statement Tillich hopes to achieve a sharper awareness or the reality or atonement as the participation or God• in Je8118 tas the Christ •, in the ' 2 dynamics or human lite. It is in line w.i.th this emJilasis that he suggests that an 'adoptioni.st r emphasis should be complementary to 3 an 'inca.rnational' element in Christology, and that .be intima.tes that belier in the virgin birth should give way to aeceptance or a

1. Paul Tillich, Szstematic Theologr, n, 14S.

2. Ibid., P• 1.47 • 3. ill!!•, P• 149. .. 99-

1 human fatherhood far Jesus. Atoneme~ must take place in one who is fully human.

But a f'urt.her observation must be made on Tillich •s understanding of what is meant by 'atonement in Christ t. This is that the word 'Christ t, even while Tillich uses it to poi~ back to history, does mt in arry- way in itself, in his view, po~ to a historical reality. It il!l a symbol which canel!l to give definition to a reality, which 1s that or the 1New Being' manifetfted in Jel!lus of Nazareth. Says Tillich, "christ ological symbols are the way in which the historie&! tact, called Jesus of Nazareth, has been received by those who coœider him to be the 2 Christ." In spite of the renewed int;erest in history which accanpanies thil!! treatme~, it muet be said that there is here an uneasy relation between •event• and 'interpretation•: the actual historical complex, of which •Chril!lt' must be the best designation, tends to lie uneasil.y between two other 'levels of reality' : the leve! of tsymbol' and the level of the under4'ing reality expressed by the symbol, which is that of the •New Being•.

Of course, far Tillich, this underl.ying reality is, in the last, ana:cysis, God. And, while it is true that he does speak of 'the Christ • as a symbol applied to an event. which manifeste the New Being, it is also true that he understands this eve~ as, in sane seœe, an •act- of God' neQeasitating & human respon.e.

1. !!Êà•• P• 160. The •actual storyt is treated by- Tillich as a •m;rth t - rather more in the pejorative sense of the word.

2. ~., P• 152. other 1symbols•, such as •Son of Man 1, 'Son of God ', and 1 Logos' are treated in the same way. -lOO ...

Atonement as The Act of God

Besides his initial description of the doctrine of atonemene 1 1 quoted above 1 Tillich speaks of atonement as the act of God: 2 "&tonement is always both a divine act and a human reaction."

In view of the interest in the existential situation indicated by'

Tillich 1 s anazy-sis of this situation, and in conformity with his Christological interest, one might expect that Tillich's description of atonement in these terms would be heavily inclined on the side ot

•the human reaction'. But this is not the case. He attempt.s to recognize both sides, but his statement. of the principles of a doctrine of atonement stresses the 'divine act• above the 'human reaction'•

Tillich 1s account of the histor,y of various for.ms of the doctrine of atonement, takes note of an alterna.tion between an 'objective' and a 'subjective' emphasis. The 'act of God' or the 1human reaction' have been emphasized one against the other at one time or another in the past. Tillich points to Origèn and, more lately, Aulen, as examples of an 'objective' em}ilasis. These give expression to the view that atone ment:. is not something 'Whieh man can achieve, but is sanething accom plished by God in Christ which involves the defeat of the powers by' wich man is enslaved. 11Chriet - Christus Victor - fights againat am tri'Uill}ils aver the evil powers of the world1 the tyrants under which man is .3 in bondage and sutfering, and in him God reconciles the world to h:im8elt."

1. Supra, p. 85. 2. Paul T111ich, Systematic Theologr, II, 170 •

.3. Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor, trans. A.G. Hebert, (London, S.P.C.K., 1953), P• 20. -101-

Tillich reels that this objectivity is false insofar as it leaves behind the participation of human subjectivity.

"• •• in this formulation of the doctrine of atone ment &n:y' relation to man is completely' lacking. A coemic draa - almost a comedy in the case of Origen - happens above man's head; and the report of the drama provides man with the certainty that he bas been liberated from the demonic power." 1

Tillich feels that this is not a tru.e representation of the biblical objectivity which reflects ''the conquest of existential estrangement" as a process and experieme in which huma.nity shares.

As against this 'objective' picture of the atonement, the theoey ot Abelard recognises the •subjective' side. "The liberating impression made upon men by the picture of Christ the crucified is the impression of his self-surrendering love. This love awakens in man the anawering love which is certain that, in God, love, and not wrath, is the last 2 word." But this subjectivity ( especially in the post-Enlightennent atmos}i'lere in which man is very definitely in the centre of his wor1d) quicklJr 1oses sight of the objective conditions for its concern. Abel.ard te theoey was, therefore, corrected ba.ck towa.rd an objective empbasis.

Tillich mentions, in another context, the position ot Schleiermacher in this respect. Schleiermacher thought of •atonernent' through the •God-consciousness' of Jesus. Tillich makes clear his opinion that this is a subjective estimate ot the orientation of the inner lite.

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 171. 2. Ibid., P• 172. - 102 ...

1 He ditmdsses this view as 'ant:.hropologica1 t.

The important theory of Anl!lelm wa.s also deficient., in Tillich • s view, through inattention to an adequate account o.f the subjective side o.f atonement • Anselm 1s theo1"7 o.f the •satisfaction' offered to the justice of God in the death o.f the Christ had the merit, saya Tillich, o.f showing that "the l!!Ork of Christ makes it possible .for God to exercise mercy without violating the lawe of justice. The infinite worth of the su.ffering or the Christ gives satisfaction to God and makes unnecessary- 2 the punishment or man for the infinite weight o.f his sins."

Anselm 1s theor,y, according to Tillich, does justice to the psychological situation of man in that it reeognizes that human guilt must be dealt with. This, in part, expl.ains the great influence of the theor;r.

Tillich judges Anselm 's theor,y deficient. on three grounds, ani he associates himsel.f with one aspect or the criticism o.f Anselm by

Thomas Aquinas. Tillich criticizes Anselm on the grounds of his subjection to legalistic conceplis, on the grounds o.f his int:.erpretation o.f the issues o.f the divine-human relationship in quantitative terme, and, as indicated above, on the grounds that the subjective aide o.f the atoning process is not effectively represented. This aspect o.f atonement was re-int:.roduced by the criticism o.f Thomas Aqui.na.s, according to Tillich, which said that the work of the Christ was not carried out apart from the participation of the Christian. The Christian participates

1. ~., P• 150.

2. ~., p. 172. - 103 ... in what happens to the head of the Christian body. "The concept of participation", concludes Tillich, seems to be a way to a more adequate doctrine of atonement., in which the objective and subjective sides are 1 bal.anced."

Tillich 1s statement of six principles for a doctrine of atonement, which follows his discussion of 'objective' and •subjective' deviations in the interpretation of atonement, aime to provide a corrective to such deviations. All six principles insist that atonement is a proeess created by' God, an act of God in wh:b h man can share. The first prin:: iple is, in fact, precisely this, that 11atoning processes are created by God 2 and God alone." This principle. emphasizes that the work of the

Christ is the work or the Father1 and it looks back to what the Christ- ian asserts about God, especial.l.y his eternal creativit;y.

The second principle of the doctrine or atonement. is that there can be no conflict in God between his love and his justice. The third principle carries this a step farther in painting ouli that- 11the divine removal or gullt and punishment is not an act or overlooking the reality 3 and depth of existential estrangement ... This cannat be so, because

God repreeents the 1order of being'. (Such is Tillich •s way of putting it.

Perhaps it would be sufficient to s~ tha.t God must be considered to be the author and power or whali is known to man as law.) Therefore, 4 11his rorgiveness is no private matter. 11

1. ~., P• 173. 2. Ibid.

3. ~., P• 174. 4. Ibid. - 104 -

The fourth primiple carries •to the heart. of the doctrine of atonement. • in pointing out that God acte with man to overcome estrange ment.. 'l'his is the living God of biblical religion, or so it would seem: the God who acte, taking suftering upon himself, ( while still maintaining,

Tillich says, his aseitr), 1'by participating in existential estrange- 1 ment or the state of unconquered negativity-.n Tillich says that this is 'a high]Jr symbolic way of speaking'. He perhape does not say quite strongly enough that it is a wa.y- of speaking which the faith of the Church has made necessar.y,

The fifth primiple recognizes the justice or speaki.ng or atone ment as tald.ng place through the Cross of Christ. At the same time it. rejects a theory which has sometimes stood behind this language,

"The Cross is not the cause, but the effective manifestation of God 's 2 taldng the consequences of huma.n guilt upon himself, 11 Tillich point.s out, quite rightl.y, that all attempt;s to make the Cross a sacrifice in the way in which cl.assical paganism understands sacrifice

(as the propitiation of an angry §)d, or the attempt to eecure favour . 3 with an irxiifferent lOd) is quite mistaken. The Cross carmot, on

1. I2!S·, p. 175.

2, ~., P• 176. 3, There is m doubt. that the idea of expiation existed in Old Testament. sacrifices (~Richardson, A Theological Word Book of the Bible, pp. 206t) and has sane effect on the New Testament. But there is also no doubt that all of the Old Testament cultus is set in a con text in which any thought or the propitiation of an 'angr,y God' is radica.lly altered, The cultus, like the Law, is given by the God who chooses and leads His people, giving them a tway- of obedieme' which was a way of access to Himseli'. Pythian-Adams expresses this : the cultus is "a barrier ••• interposed in merciful protection, that Israel might lmow the joy or access to Jehovah, and live,'' W.J. Pythian-Adams, The War of At-one-ment, (Lomon, OOH Press Limited, 1944), P• 30, - 105 ..

Christian grounds, be conceived to 'change God's mind'; it does not 1 reconci1e God, but shows that God is eterna~ reconciled.

The s:lxtih prinoip1e still spealœ in tems of an act of God., and so is 'objective' in the sense indicated above, but it is specitica~ concerned with the subjective side of atonement: the human response and participation. "Through participation in the New Being • • • 2 men also participate in the atoning act of God."

The question of how one is to participate in the atoning act of

God is not answered at this point. It must be answered by a renewed consideration of atonement as seen in the Cross and the Resurrection, and as it is given expression in histor,y.

The six principles set out by Tillich are intended by him to regulate an understanding or how atonement takes place, and perhapa to replace, event.ual.ly, a separate statement. or the doctrine. It seems that, on Tillich's grounds, the doctrine or atonement rea!ly is an expression of the 'Whole faith of the Church, and is brought

'into focus t onl:Y' with ditficult7. It m&Y' be that the Cross, as a particul.ar tway of obedience' points beyond such a generalized treatment or atoneme~.

1. A.G. Hebert, •Atonement' ~ Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. Richardson, relates 'propitiation' in the Old Testament and the New Testame~ in a way which supports the above statemem.. "As the kapporeth, the covering of the Ark in the Tabernacle, was the place ot propitiation as being the place 'Where God 1s torgiving mercy was shawn, so now the cross of Christ is the place where his saving mercy has been manifested." P• 26~ 2. Paul Tillich, Srstematic Theologr, II, 176. - 106-

Atonement in The Cross and The Resurrection

Tillich is right in del\Tf.ng that aspects of the person or work of the Christ can be considered in isolation from his being. It is nevert.heless true that the Cross and the Resurrection - as the most cursocy glanee at the New Testament would show - have central import.ance for showing what is meant by atonem.enli. The Cross is, perhaps, the central experience of the Gospels: certainl.y it is the cl.:iJDax of the stor;y. The apostolic preaching rings with the Resurrection. Neither event is caœelled out in the deve1oping experience of the Church.

The Cross remains central for st. Paul. But it is the Cross as understood in the light of the Resurrection.

Tillich ho1ds that. the Cross am the Resurrection must be understood in relation to each other. The Cross, far him, expresses the subjection of the Christ to existence; the Resurrection expresses the 1 •conquest of existence•. The two s;vmbols have œtura~ come together in the understanding of the Church.

1'The Cross ot the Christ 1s the Cross ot the one who has conquered the death of existential. estrange ment; • • • And the Resurrection of the Christ is the Resurrection of the one who, as the Christ, subjected h1mself to the death ot ex:istential estrangement." 2

This is the meaning of the Cross and the Resurrection for Tillich: besides being, in sane sense, events 'once upon a t:i.me ', they have meaning for present experieme. The Cross means "that he who is the

1. ~., P• 153. - 107-

Christ subjects himsel! to the ultimate negativities or existence 1 and that they are not able to separate him t'rom his unity with God," This, then, is the decisive answer to the question arising out or man's experience of tragic loss in history, And the Resurrection, considered in itselt, points to the possibllity or a reintegration and a recovery from loss in history, The Resurrection points to "the power or the New Being to oTercome the self-destructive consequences of existential estrangement in and through the created structure ot 2 reality,"

But the question arises {and all the more intensely if the being or the Christ is taken seriously as prior to his meaning for the disciples) as to what actual.:cy' happened, Tillich makes some attempt to race this question, In doing so he endeavonrs to be 8crupilows4" fair to the element or indec:il!liveness introduced by' uncertairrty as to the precise delimitation or any 1 ract 1 apprehended by' historical research, Yet he hopes to i Uumi nate the universal l!lignificance or the Crol!ls and the Resurrection or the one in ~om the New Beirig is manifeeted, Theretore Tillich saye that both evente are combinatiorus .3 or symbol and ract. The Crose is seen "as an event:. in spa.ce and t:bne, But, as the Cross of Jesus who 1s the Christ, it is a symbol and a part of a m;yth. It is the m;yth or the bearer of the new eon mo

1. Ibid,, P• 158,

2. ~., p. 161,

3, Ibid,, p. 153. "!be cent;er of my theologica1 doctrine of lmow1edge- is the concept;·, or symbo1" says Tillich, Kegley and Bretall, op, cit., P• 333. - 108- suff'ers the death of' a convict and slave under the powers of' the old 1 eon. n The Resurrection, likewise, is seen as 'event and s;ymbol t :

"A real experience made it possible f'or the disciples to apply' the known symbol of resurrection to Jesus, thus acknowledging him def'inite:cy- 2 as the Christ •"

In Tillich's view, the •tact' element is more accessible in 'the Cross', but both events are sym.bols applied in the context of' an experieme, concerning which it is impossible to say very much def'initel;r.

Tillich 's theoey concerning the actual Resurrection 'experieroe ', which he advances only' tentatively', he calle the 'restitution' theory'.

He rejects, rightly', that the issue at stake in the Resurrection is the revival of an individual man, as auch. The issue is, Tillich thinks, 3 the problem of' "the disappeara.nce of h:l.m whose being was the New Being."

The restitution, then, is of' Jesus to the power of the New Being. "ln an eestatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth 4 became indissolubly' united with the realit;r of the New Being."

Tillich' s presentation of these events is imrolved, to an almost unbearable degree, with problems of the relation of language to the events he attempts to describe. His presenta.tion depends very heavily on his theor;r of' symbole as 'mental constellations 1 mediating the

1. !!:?14·

2. ~., P• 154.

3. ~., P• 156. 4. Ibid., p. 157. - 109-

'power of being 1 • The Cross and the Resurrection are, for him, not important in themselves. "They are symbols of the divine paradox of of the appearance of the eternal God-man unity within existential 1 estrangement.n Tillich •s restitution theo:ey places em:Jilasie, finally, on "the religious meaning of the Resurrection for the 2 disciples." Certaint;y in theee mattere com8from being 11 grasped by' the power of the New Being", and it ie "the certainty of one •s own "rictor:r over the death of existential estrangement which creates the :3 certainty of the Resurrection of the Chriet as event and symbo1."

Tillich•s treatment of the Cross and the Resurrection is an attempt to grapple with the problem of meaningfu1 statement of the

Church 's faith. But he does not allow for the creative character of the events with which he deal.s - except, finally, in the consciousness of the disciples. He does not seem to take account of the tact that. the lite with which he deals is the focus for the lite of an historical comrnunit;r which (literally) stood or fell. with him. Both the Cross and the Resurrection have about them the ~er:r of the act of God.

Bu'\i they stand within the history of the People of God, and must be interpreted in the light of the calling of that conmunity ( to serve God and to witness to Him) and not in their aspect (which they also have) of general truths for the lite of mankind.

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology;, IT, 159.

2. ~., p. 157.

3. ~. - 110 ..

Atonement; in History

Tillich professes great interest in history, and a grasp or the nature or lite as historica1. Actually his thought contains a 1. tension between a historical and a non-historical mode or being. This is given sharpest expression - and its attempted reconciliation - in Tillich 1s little book, Biblica1 Religion and the Search for Ultimate Realitz.

Here the biblical view or history is recognized as 'linear' - as againat other views which do not leave room for meaningtul. developnent towards an 'end'.

"History is the histor;r or sa1vation in biblical religion. Fran the prehistorical fall of Adam to the posthistorical reunion of everything in God there is one straight line, starting with Noah and Abraham am ending with the secorrl coming .or Christ. History is neither the expression of man's natural poten:tüllties mr the tragic circle of man's growt.h and decay; histor;r creates the new. In Christ a new Being has appeared within the world process; history has received a meaning and centre." 2

But this view or history is combined with a view determined by

Tillich 's ontology. This sees "a temporality in wbich past and .future are united, though not negated in the eternal presence. Histor;r then ru:ns towards its em in the eternal, and the eterna.l participates in 3 the moments of time, judging and elevating them tomthe eternal."

1. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 26, 27 presents just this distinction.

2. Paul Tillich, B:lblical Religion an4 the Search for Ult:lmate .. Reality, PP• 40, 41.

3. ill4•1 P• 7S. - 111-

The canbination of these two views of histor;y is seen to good effect in some aspects of' Tillich's presentation of the doctrine of atonemeut,. It has been noted that he talœs very seriously the tact that atonernent is made, in sorne sense, in a life lived within the tensions of existence.' But the crucial question is 'how are other :men related to this event •? One part of Tillich 'a answer has been criticized, namel;r his doctrine of 1 symbole'. The other part of Tillich 1 s answer is that •the New Being 1 is present ~ histor,r and through history. Tillich at one point attacks the kim of' Christian apologetic which requires the one addressed to 11 jump over the millenia to the years

'1 through 30' and to subject himself' to the event upon which Christ- 1 ianity is based. 11 The proposed jump, he says, would be an illusion, because there is a •continuity through histor,r of the power of' the

New Being •. The l.ife of the Christ ie seen to be more than an un related point 'above histo17', and t,his lite is seen in 11the conmunity which he creates" and in "the received manifestations of' 2 the New rieing within it.• 'l'illich, at this point, gives conscious acknowledgement to the element of truth in the Catholic view of' the .3 Church. But it is al8o true, for Tillich, that the New Being is re ally present to and in all of' histor.r.

The traditional symbole of the Church, in Tillich 1s view, tend

1. Paul TUlichi Systematic Theology, n, 136. 2. Ibid., P• 135.

3. ~., P• 136. - 112- to stress the 11inear' view of history - a1though it is true that the Church has passed through stages of attention to history, and to specifie challenges posed for its lite in history, and other stages when history 1 was abandoned. The 'symbo1 1 of the Second Coming looks back to the centre of history in the Christ more than it looks 'forward' in

Tillich 's view. Chiliasm, whenever it has survived as an expression of the Church' s hope, has however continued 11the prophetie tradition 2 in which an irmer-historica1 fulfilment of history is envisaged."

But the 'linea.r• view of history is constantly being disp1aced from the Church's thought. And it seems that in Tillich's thot.Wtt too, this conception or history is swallowed up by the conception of the

New Being as a •background reality' which actualizes itse1f in a universa1 process. The struggle to express both views :may be seen in

Tillich 1s account of the 'eymbol' of •Christ the lord of History' •

11History is the creation of the new in every moment. But the ultimately newtoward which history maves is the New Being; it is the end of histor;y •• • am its aim. Ir one aslœ what the event is behind the symbol or the ruling of history in the Christ, the answer can onzy be that through historica1 providence the New Being 1s actualized in history and through history (fragmentarily and under the ambiguities of lif'e)." 3

The framework _of' Tillich 1s thought enab1es him to see histoi"T as a universal process or atonement, insofar as things, events,

1. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 23, 24.

2. -----J §y!tematic Theologr, II, 163. - 113-

1 individuals or groups are media of revelation. But Tillich does not lay em}ilasis on the real biblical 'line' which is the actual colDDIIli'lity in which there is a recognition of the reality of atonement..

True, other religions and cultures (imluding the Old Testament religion) are held to be in the stage of tpreparatory revelation', 2 with respect to the revelation received by the Church. But being grasped by' the final revelation seems to imp:cy- principal.l.y, for Tillich, something for the individual and something universally, withont the indispensable setting of the actual 'body' in which the recomiling work goes on.

This may be seen in Tillich's description of the •stages' or 3 aalvation, where he passes back and forth from the individua.l to the universal background of the act of God which has effect for all individualB. The procesa by which this atoning work of God ia carried out may be understood, says Tillich, as "participation, acceptance, transformation (in classical terminology, Regeneration, 4 Justification, Sanctification)."

Regeneration, in Tillich •s view, should not be thought of prima.ri:cy- as a change of state within individuals. "Regeneration is a state of of things universal:cy:. It is the new state of things, the new eon,

1. Paul Tillich, Sxstematic Theolog:y, I, 118-126.

2. Ibid., P• 1.44.

3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 165f, describes salvation as healing.

4. ~., p. 176. - 114- which the Christ bas brought; the ind.ividual •entera it ', and in so doing he himself participates in it and is reborn through partici- 1 pation in it." Justification, for Tillich, refera first to an act of God, and seeomly to a subjective reception or the consequemes of this act. Justification is, far Tillich as for Luther, the para doxical act by which God who is righteoœ accepte man who is unright- eous. "JU8tif'ication in the objective sense 1s the eternal act of

God by" 'Nhich he accepta as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt and the act by which he takes them 1nto the unity 2 with him ldlich is manifest in the New Being in Christ. 11 This is an act of God which does not depend on man, and which must; be accepted as a gitt. This,' says Tillich, is the heart and centre of salvation.

In anot;her passage Tillich speaks of the three tenns as interwoven in their significance and as inseparable. "Regeneration as the actual reunion, Justification as the paradoxical charaeter of that reunion ••• Sanctification is distinguished fran both of them as 3 a process is distinguished tram an event in which it is initiated. 11

This process ( traditional.ly the growth or the individual into the life of the Spirit within the Church) is, in this light, considered to be both the atoning act of God and its effect. And this is the secret underlying power of life in all of history, in Tillich's Tiew.

1. ~., P• 178.

2. Ibid.

3~ !Q!g., p. 179. - ll5-

"Sanctification is the process in which the power of the New Being transf'orD18 personalit;r and CODIIIUnit;r, inside and outside the bhuroh. Both the individual Christian and the church, both the religions and secular realm, are objecte of the samtif'ying work of the divine Spirit, who ie the actaalit:r of the New Being." 1

FeW' Christian theologians would care to dissent. fran Tillich •s conclusion that the Spirit of' God speaks to ali men, am is capable of leading them into the new lite. But this do es not alter the tact that a theology which sets aside the 'body'' in which atonement. is made known and through lil:ich the world is called into one oonmunit;y 2 is deficient in the presentation of the work of atonement in histor;y.

The 'middle term' 1s missing.

1. Ibid., pp. 179, lSO. 2. This takes into account the fact that Tillich's rsection' on the Church is still to ·cane. But this term can not be made an appendage. COl'CIDSION - 117-

COIDWSION

An attempt to judge the adequacy of the doctrine of atonement presented in the context; of Paul Tillich' e theological system muet tiret take note of the system itself'. To do this is to admire the grandeur of Tillich 's aim and the considerable ecope of hie accom- plishment. Even a theologr which bases itself emphatically upon Bible and Church can not afford to ignore the necessity of some systematic statement: it is an indispensable aid to clarity of thought and con- sistency of presentation.

The systematic theology of Tillich ie, as has been noted, an apologetic endeavour: it attempts to bring about a reconciliation between 'Christianity 4nd the modern mind' in which the 1answers' of the Christian faith will be seen to have meaning and promise for the questions of modern life. The magnitude of this task has caused comparisons to be made between Tillichte s.ystem and the monumental 1 Summa of Thomas Aquinas, This comparison is more illuminating than might at first appear. True, Tillich is a.ttempting the construction of a system and not a summ.a, as he himself points out. Neverthe- less, he purposes a reasoned statement of faith which ~ serve both the Church and also society at large in providing a measure or unity within which 'the modern mind' can be at ease and can work. The present confusion of society and of philosophy with respect to the recognition of matters of 1ultimate concern' makes it necessary for Tillich to

1. vide, Kegley and Bretall, op. cit., pp. 26, 27, 88. - 118- turn his attention, as a prelimina.ry step, to a certain amount of J:biloso}ilical construction. It goes without saying that the unity of the life of the Church does not provide, in the modern situation, just the milieu which would in itself assist the developnent. of an integral apologetic.

Tillich has no particular massive philosophical system with which he must come to terw~. But he does face the challenge of the contusion produced by upheavals in the European philosophical tradition. Tillich follows Heidegger, as has been observed, in attempting to secure a philosophical basie which will incorporate valid modern insights - particularl.y that of the existentialiste - into the doctrine of being which has been dominant in the western p1ilosophical tradition. Tillich reconciles in this wa.y- the thought of the past and the dsnams of the present, and discovers a position from which he can accept and transfo~ the critical limitation of knowledge implied in Kant's philoso~. This, for Tillich, provides a solution to the modern chaos: he faces skeptics of the order of the logical positiviste with the demand that they admit that the supreme fact of being is prior to their assertions.

Tillich's ontology i8 a permanent contribution to theological thought at least in this respect, that it entorces recognition that theology uses structures of thought which are not arbitrary, but which reflect structures of being. Theology should, as far as possible, be explicit as to wha.t it accepta, in this respect. The developnent, of the existential implications of the ontological structure carries - 119- with it the reminder that theology, insofar as it is concerned to speak to men, must. speak to men who live under the conditions of existence. A great part of the power of Tillich •s thought lies in the fact tha.t he does just thie.

In his mrmer of presenting the 'need for atonement' Tillich has given the Church valuable service. He has supplied a structured, psychologically-informed description of the stresses within human ille and the pressures impinging on human life which constitute a part of what is meant by the Church • s teaching on tsin t and 'evil'.

His doctrine of the 'ontological elements•,and of the possibilitT of their moving against each other, recognizes the need for sane unifying power by which the life of the self may be integrated in itselt and preserved as a centre over against the power of the world.

Hie description of sin as estra:ngement expresses the Church 1s teaching about this dimension of the huma.n situation ( except on two points: sin as having a 'persona! centre', as Tillich points out, am sin as 1 11 breach of covena.nt 11 ) more powerfully than the traditiona.l word has come to do. His doctrine of evU recognizes that there is no tat.omistic t solution of the human problem. Tillich is free from an insipid moralism, and he recognizes the superficialities of olassical liberalism insofar as he recognizes structures of evil bearing power in the huma.n situation and a real element of loss, from the power of which man must hope to be delivered. He is oonscious of the social and historical dimensions of the need for atonement: the quest for atonement, for him, is universal.

1. SuJ?l:&. p. 51. - 120-

Tillich 1 s central tenn for a description of atonement is, as has been noted, 'the New Being'. He describes "the effect of the New

Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in their 1 state of etrangement." This term expresses, for Tillich, the participation of God in human lire. Certainl.y, Tillich 1s uBe of this ter.m does express the possibility of integration and of new creation in human ille. This is the note which Tillich discovers in the Gospel record of the life of Jesus: this life demonstrates that a unity with the ground or power of life can receive real expression under the conditions of existence. 'n'lis indicates a positive treatment of the doctrine ot atonement : atonement is, in one respect, the integration of human life, its •regeneration' through a participation in the power which was 'manifest' in the life of Jesus.

Besides its direct influence, in this way, on the doctrine of atonement, the term 'the New Being' has other important effects. It has been observed how justl1 Tillich's emphasis on the being of Jesus answers a shallow reduction of this central event to •the 1«>rds of

Jesus•, or even to the kerrgma. if this is considered in isolation from the being of Jesus.

Tillich emphasizes also that atonement is the tact of God'. The prineiples which state that atonement is the act of God are intended to provide an essential theological perspective within whieh state ments about atonement can be developed without producing the essentially

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 170; discussed supra, pp. 85t. - 121- sub-Christian doctrinal deviations which den;v this.

Besides providing a theological perspective for the development of the theme of atonement, Tillich •a statement. of the principles of 1 atonement go far toward defining the nature of this 'act of God'.

The act of God ia just; it does not deey- the will of God which is expressed in the order of being. In this it does not overlook the reality of guilt and of tragic loss through misused freedom. Yet God 2 acta 11with man and with his world": he takes . the consequences of human guilt upon himself and, in creative action, mani.tests 'a new state of things' • God 's participation in the human plight is seen, says Tillich, in the Cross. The subjective side of this is 1'the 3 experieree of man that God is eternally reconciled." In this experience it is possible for men to participate in God 1s participation in human existence. Tillich' s language expresses the Christian experience of 'justification by grace through faith' which is very close to the centre of atonement.

Just so far as this, Tillich presents an adequate statement ot the doctrine of atonement. His emlflasis on atonement. as the act of

God is both necessary a:rri valuable, and it is impeccably 'orthodox' 1 as far as it goes. He bas given expression too, as has been observed, to an tmderstanding of the implications of atonement in and for

1. Supr!;, pp. 103f.

2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theo1ogy, TI, p. 174.

3. ~., p. 176. - 122-

history, trans.forming the human situation.

A basic criticism mu.st, nevertheless, be made. This is that

Tillich •s treatmem. of the Cross ani the Resurrection :lmperils any mea.ningf'ul spea.ld.ng about the act of God in Jesus, the Christ, ani

so threa.tens the reality of atonement. An tact r can not be asserted_,merely. It is recognized as the occurrence of something overt : it must have a recognizable form, and be expressive of some intention. It has

been concluded elseWhere that Tillich does not allow a creative 1 character to these events. He says expressl;r that, whUe it may

be useful to the liturgical expression of devotion to speak of atone ment Y! the Cross of Christ, theology must epeak oJÜy of atonemerrt. through the Cross. There is a considerable element of truth in this,

which is that atonemem. must be thought of as a general process. But there seema to be abo the denial of an equaliy' important truth, "Which

is that, ae well as being a general process, ato:nement is a decisive

specifie act of God.

Tillich does say that the Croes 11 is seen as an event that happened 2 in time and space." But his interpretation denies aey solidarity

of an historical community with this event except that mediated by

symbole which, for Tillich, are symbole of •subjection to existence•

rather than symboll!l which exprel!ls the calling of the People of God.

The Crol!ls, "as the Cross of Jesus who is the Christ ••• is a Bymbol and a part of a myth. It is the 11\Yth of the bearer of the new eon

1. Supra, P• 109.

2. Paul TUlich, Systematic Theology, II, 153. - 123- who surfers the death of a coiWict and slave under the powers of that 1 old eon whioh he i~ to coiX{Uer •" Tillich does not take very seriou~ly the fact that the Cross, as far a~ the records show, occurred in the course or the attem.pt of Jesus to proclaim the Kingdom or God and to organize hie followers to do the same thing1 thus tultilling and carrying on the mission of Israel of old. He imposes a meaning which, whUe true in some degree, does not accept:, the rul.l.ness or the inner pln'p<>se of this event as this is disclosed by the event. Instea.d he speaks or symbols showing 11the subjection or him who is the bearer of the New Being", thus relating the event to the ontological backgrcund which must, or course, have been the general background of anything that took place.

Tillich is even lees satisfactory in his treatment of the

Resurrection. This, as has been observed, is treated by Tillich as sorne kind of experie~e in which 11the knmm symbol of resurrection" is applied to Jesus. The religions understanding of the disciples ani, in the contempora.cy scene, the faith of the individual believer, 2 is what tina~ constitutes the Resurrection experience. In wha.t sense this may be understood as an •act of God 1 i~ an open question.

Tillich 1s approach to the question of the meaning of the Cross and the Resurrection reveals the limitations of his entire method. He

1. ~., PP• 153, 154. 2. Supra, PP• lOS, 109. - 124- approaches theee events with the determination to subject them to a the ory of religious lmowledge through symbol8. .And in thi8 caee he does not even use the symbole through which, primarily, the

Church seem8 to have understood these events (the 'servant •, the

•righteous one•).

Tillich 1s doctrine of symbole, as has been observed, sees them as arising in the 'group unoonscious t as products of the dimension 1 of life in which man is aware of •the Holy'. One bas only' to state this view in order to see that Tillich does not take seriousl.y the second condition for Christian theological thought (the first condition is the action of God the Hol.y Spirit) which is the li:t'e of the cormnunity in which adequate symbole arise. Nor does he take into account sufficient- l.y the history or the interpretation of acta of God in relation to history which is round in •the religion of the Old Testament 1. This :1s one element constitutive of the situation in which the Cross and the

Resurrection took place. But Tillich tends, finally, to subjugate history 2 to ontology.

Tillich 1s theological symbols are anchored in ontology. Ontology becomes the 1 depth dimension' or theology as Tillich makes his equation, IGod is Being Itself'. The pernicious efrect or thi8 equation arises through its determinative role with respect to ail language which seeks to express the character of God. What resulta is an abstraction at the heart of things, and a weakening of the supreme insight given by the

Cross and the Resurrection, which i8 the Father•s love.

1. Supra, pp. 68 - 70.

2. Supra, PP• no - 115. .... 125-

The case is similar with respect to the centrally important term.,

•the New Being'. This serve is saved, to sorne extent, from becOiling a mere abstraction, from the fact that the lite of Jesus is taken with great seriousness and made determinative, so far as possible, for the concept. But the concept becanes that or a 'background realityt actual- izing itself through Jesus. The 'symbole' applied to Jesms, and the

•reality' in him to which they are applied, remain uneasily apart. This term is not able to express "reconciliation • • • the restoration of persona! rela.tiou: with God • • • and their permanent security in an 1 ever-growing fellowship or love. n

But Tillich 's use or the term 'being1 expresses the very foundation of his system. Tillich mediates between the 'questions 1 or the world and the •answere 1 or the Church; he reconciles b:i.blical religion and ontology. To do thie he stands outside the Church, in a sense. He employa the concep. of 1the ultimate'. This ie a usetul concept, and one which muet be used in relation to God. But, used by itself, it belongs to the •Mars hill school' or Christian apologetice which is not able to state the

Resurrection in such a way as to express its challenge. The reaily" ultimate criterion of Christian theology is its capacity to express

God's action and God 1s choosing. Such a theology must be f~ based within the life of the Church.

TilJich's theology expresses the general theme of atonement -as this is discovered in the deepest lire of the Church and the world; but he gives inadequate expression to atonement as acted out, and as a specifie challenge to a lite of Holy Communion with God.

1. Taylor, The Cross of Christ, p. SS. - 126-

BmLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

'l'illich, Pau1, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Realitz, Chicago: The Univereity of Chicago Press, 1955.

______.,The Christian Amwer, ed. Van Dusen, Nisbet. and Co., 1946.

------• The Interpretation of History, trans. b;y N.A. Rasezki and E.L. Talmey, New York: Charles Scribner's Sorus, 1936.

------·• The Protestant Era, Phoenix Books ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957; first pbl. 1948.

------· The Religious Situation, Living Age ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1956; Copyright, Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1932. ______., Sz_stematic Theology, Vol. I, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press-, 1951. ------• Systematic Theology, Vol. n, Chicago: The Unive:œ ity of Chicago Press, 1957.

------• Theology of Culture, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Secondary Sources

The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charlee Kegley and Robert Bretall, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1952.

General Sources

Au1en, Gustaf, Christus Victor, trans. by A.G. Hebert, london: S.P.C.K., 1953.

Barrett, C.K., The Gospel Aecording to St. Joan, London: S.P.C.K., 1955. - 127-

Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, traœ. G.T. Thomson, Vol. I, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1960; first publ. 1936. Brock, Werner, Existence and Being, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949.

Bultmann, Rudolf, •Myth in the New Testament.•, Kerygma and M;yth, ed. H.W. Bartsch, trans. Reginald Fuller, London: S.P.C.K., 1953.

Calvin, John, The Institutes of The Christian Religion, ed. John Allen, Vol. I, Philadel}ilia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, n.d.

Heidegger, Martin, ! tWhat is MetaJitysics?•, and 'On The Essence of Truth', Existeœe and Being, ed. Werner Brock, Chicago: Henry Regneey Co., 1949.

-----· Kant et le probl~me de la m'taphysigue, trans. Alphonse de Waelhens and Walter Biemel, Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1953. Hodgson, leonard, The Doctrine of The Atonement., London: Nisbet and Co., 1951. Jaspers, Karl, The Origin and Goal of Historz, trans. Michael Bullock, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953.

Mackintosh, H.R., The Doctrine of The Person of Christ, New York: Charles Scribner•s Sons, 1912.

Pythian-Adam8, W.J., The Way of At-one-ment, London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1944. Richardson, Alan, Chrie1;ian Apologetics, London: s.c .M. Press Ltd., 1947.

Robinson, James M., A New Quest of The Historical Jesus, London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1959. Robinson, John, A. T., The Body, London: S.C.M. Press Ltd., 1952.

Taylor, Vincent, The Atonement. in New Testament Teaching, London: The Epworth Press, 1940.

-----• The Cross of Christ, London: Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1956.

A Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. Alan Richardson, London: SOM Press Ltd., 1950.

Wilson, John A., The Culture of Ancient. Egypt, Phoenix Books ed,, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956.; first p1blished as The Burden of Egypt, Copyright, University of Chicago Press, l951. - 128 ..

Periodicale

Hamilton, William, 11Tillich' e Method of Correlation", The Canadian

Journal of Theology, Vol. V, no. 21 (April, 1959-).