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Negotiations in Aceh Came to an Abrupt Halt on Thursday When GAM Refused to Meet the Indonesian Govt Delegation

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Negotiations in Aceh Came to an Abrupt Halt on Thursday When GAM Refused to Meet the Indonesian Govt Delegation INDONESIA Briefing Jakarta/Brussels, 9 May 2003 ACEH: WHY THE MILITARY OPTION STILL WON’T WORK I. OVERVIEW II. THE COLLAPSE OF NEGOTIATIONS In June 2001, ICG wrote of the situation in Aceh: “The military solution is certain to fail as long as Negotiations in Aceh between the Indonesian the security forces are incapable of exercising the government and GAM came to an abrupt halt on 24 degree of control and discipline over their troops April 2003. The cause of the breakdown seemed necessary to prevent behaviour that alienates appallingly petty: GAM refused to accept the date ordinary Acehnese”.1 set by the government for a critical meeting and demanded that it be delayed by two days. As the 12 May 2003 deadline set by the Indonesian government for the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan But the peace process set in motion by the historic Aceh Merdeka or GAM) to accept Indonesian Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 9 sovereignty or face all-out war draws closer, nothing December 2002 had been steadily unravelling for has changed. Military reform has stalled over the last weeks.2 A demilitarisation process scheduled to start two years, and there is no reason to believe that the on 9 February 2003 had gone nowhere, obstructed planned offensive will be conducted any more by mutual distrust and unresolved differences over carefully than those in the past. It will only be precisely what was involved. A series of attacks in bigger. The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional March and April on the offices of the Joint Security Indonesia, TNI) is not using the phrase “shock and Committees (JSC) set up to monitor both sides’ awe”, but the stream of reports on the number of compliance with the agreement meant that troops, tanks, and weapons being prepared for Aceh international monitors were pulled back to the is designed to have the same effect. provincial capital. Violence, which had dropped dramatically since December, began to escalate. At the same time, the insurgency in Aceh poses a genuine security threat, and the Indonesian In early April, the Indonesian government called for government’s options are limited. This briefing a meeting in Jakarta of the Joint Council, the highest explores some of those options and suggests that if body established by the December agreement. The an offensive cannot be prevented, opportunities for Council consists of top Indonesian and GAM resumption of negotiations should at least be officials, as well as the director of the Centre for continuously explored and all possible effort made Humanitarian Dialogue (the Henri Dunant Centre, to ensure that military operations are kept as limited, HDC) in Geneva, the nongovernmental organisation as transparent, and as short as possible. The move that has facilitated the talks from their inception in toward war in Aceh also underscores the urgent need May 2000. for military reform to get back on track, and for domestic and international pressure to be exerted GAM refused to go to Jakarta, on the grounds that toward that end. the security of its delegation could not be guaranteed. The Indonesian governemnt offered several other venues, including Tokyo. GAM insisted on Geneva; the Indonesian government finally agreed, and talks were set for 25 April. At 1 ICG Asia Report N°17, Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t 2 See ICG Asia Report N°47, Aceh: A Fragile Peace, 27 Bring Lasting Peace, 12 June 2001. February 2003. Aceh: Why The Military Option Still Won’t Work ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 9 May 2003 Page 2 the last minute, GAM requested another two days, situation ahead. and the Indonesian government pulled out in exasperation. ! The Indonesian government is not going to work out an amicable coexistence with GAM as As this briefing went to press, diplomats and donors, long as it remains a guerrilla movement. No led by Japan and the U.S., were trying desperately to government willingly tolerates an armed rebel salvage the agreement and at least get the Joint group inside its borders. There is no point in Council meeting rescheduled. In the meantime, on 6 calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict May, President Megawati announced what many unless there is a realistic chance that GAM can Acehnese had been dreading: an “integrated be persuaded to abandon armed struggle, albeit operation” in which restoration of security would be gradually. combined with humanitarian, law enforcement, and governance elements. No details were forthcoming ! GAM is not going to give up its aim of of what the latter three might entail, but the first was independence. The question throughout the clear. Combat-ready troop reinforcements were negotiations was whether it would be willing to already arriving in Aceh. put that aim on hold, cease hostilities, and agree to an indefinite period of autonomy under Both GAM and the TNI are to blame for the Indonesian sovereignty in exchange for a collapse. Both were quick to disseminate their own meaningful role in the political system. GAM interpretations of the agreement that were at odds would only have an incentive for participating with the truth: on GAM’s part, that it was the first as a political party within the Indonesian step toward independence, on the part of the TNI, system, however, if it could hold out the hope that GAM had agreed to accept autonomy under of independence in some indefinite future. Indonesian sovereignty without qualification. ! Many Acehnese support independence out of GAM exploited the reduction in violence following strong and genuine belief, not because they the December agreement to strengthen its forces. The are under pressure from GAM. The TNI was almost certainly behind the attacks on the Indonesian government cannot make that JSCs, ostensibly carried out by civilians angry over sentiment go away by simply by declaring it their failure to stop GAM abuses. Neither side has illegal or sending more troops to fight the shown any real interest in making the agreement rebels. Unless and until it can win Acehnese work. loyalty, including by addressing seriously the issues of retributive and distributive justice, All things considered, the Indonesian government, if pro-independence feeling will remain high – not its independent minded military, has shown and military operations may only reinforce it. remarkable patience. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ! Autonomy is no incentive to drop support for its Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, independence unless it delivers visible benefits. deserves particular credit for trying to keep the A growing number of voices in Jakarta seem to negotiations alive. However, it would take a miracle be writing the Acehnese off as ingrates who at this stage to resuscitate the December agreement. have rejected the Indonesian government’s The question is how to ensure that the decision to generous autonomy offer. (Special autonomy “restore security” using military force does not set was officially granted to the province in August Aceh off on another downward spiral that will 2001 through Law No.18.) They need to realise produce misery for the civilian population, further that for autonomy to work, it has to be obstacles to decent governance, and a new generation developed in consultation with the people of angry rebels. concerned and administered by a responsive and accountable government. III. THE BASIC FACTS OF THE CONFLICT IV. INDONESIA’S FOUR OPTIONS Four postulates need to be accepted by all parties as Given the above, Indonesia has four policy options, the foundation for policies that can move the none of which are mutually exclusive. It can try to: Aceh: Why The Military Option Still Won’t Work ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 9 May 2003 Page 3 negotiate demilitarisation with GAM; buy it off; ! popular pressure on both sides from a war- marginalise it; or weaken or defeat it militarily. weary populace to move toward a mutually acceptable settlement; The majority of Acehnese would prefer a non- military solution, that is, one of the first three ! economic incentives, such as those offered by options. Most non-Acehnese living in other parts of the December 2002 donors conference in Indonesia seem to favour overwhelmingly a military Tokyo for post-conflict reconstruction, that crackdown, if newspaper polls, politicians’ would draw fighters away from GAM, offer statements, and radio talk shows are any indication.3 alternative livelihoods to war, and reduce the That gulf in itself should send a warning to Jakarta economic interests that some on both sides that a military offensive, unless carefully calibrated have in continuing the conflict; or and closely monitored, could push the Acehnese ! enough trust, pressure, or perceived need to even further away. bring about a simultaneous, phased reduction in forces on both sides. In making its choice, the Megawati administration has to include many factors in a cost-benefit calculus: The prospects are not encouraging. There is simply security considerations, domestic politics, financial no political incentive or imperative at the moment expense, international image and national pride, for GAM to disarm without a clear quid pro quo military capacity, short-term and long-term gains and from the TNI and a stake in the future of Aceh. If losses, and a variety of personal interests. With these the Indonesian army were to pull out tomorrow, factors in mind, how do the four options compare? GAM’s likely reaction would not be to lay down its arms in gratitude, but to step up activities designed to bring about an independent state. A. NEGOTIATIONS WITH GAM Moreover, most GAM negotiators appear to believe This is effectively the strategy that has been pursued that Indonesia’s collapse is simply a matter of time. by the Indonesia government and the Henri Dunant It would thus be foolhardy, in their view, to make Centre since May 2000 (between April 2001 and short-term concessions that could be misunderstood November 2002 in conjunction with military by supporters in Aceh as backtracking or jeopardise operations) and especially since December 2002.
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