Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Practice: an Investigation of Its Process on Ex-Combatants in the Post- 2005 South Sudan

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN PRACTICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF ITS PROCESS ON EX-COMBATANTS IN THE POST- 2005 SOUTH SUDAN

DOMINIC MICHAEL GENGE

RESEARCH THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER DEGREE OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA

SUMMER 2019 DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that this work is my original endeavor and has never been submitted to any other college or university other than the United States International University-Africa for academic credit.

Sign: ………………………………………. Date: …………………………………

Dominic Michael Genge (654545)

Student.

This thesis report has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

Signed………………………………………Date: ………………………………….

Mr. George Kabongah

Supervisor.

Signed…………………………………….... Date……………………………………

Professor Martin C. Njoroge

Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences.

Signed……………………………………...Date……………………………………...

Ambassador Professor Ruthie Rono

Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic and Students Affairs.

All rights reserved. No part or section of this thesis may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without prior knowledge and permission in writing from the publisher, except by the reviewers, who may quote brief passages in a review.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to the loving memory of my dear late father, District Education

Officer (D.E.O), Mr. Michael Kumbobakiri, whose advice to us at a very tender age remained in my mind thirty years after his untimely death in September 1989. Before his sudden death, he used to advise us at round table that all the certificates he acquired and the achievements he attained would not be inherited by any one of us when he passed on from this world. For us to be respected in our society and be recognized by our relatives, we must take education seriously. Education would take us higher, bring people closer to us and make us significant in the society. Those wise words had been permanently embossed on my brain. And to you my lovely mother, our heroine, and iron lady, almost thirty years ago this year, after the death of our father, you remain an icon and compass in our family. As a single mother and widow during the darkest days of the history of the then Sudan, with wars and challenges eclipsing our future, you never faltered in guiding us to stick to the basic and fundamental principles of life, obedience, attitude, respect, mannerism and self discipline. All your advice kept us alert and focused on the goal despite how we were scattered by war in search for better education. I remain indebted to you for eternity. To all my siblings, closest relatives and family friends, I remain committed to the service of our common good and thanks for being supportive.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My appreciations and thanks to Lt. Gen. Akol Koor Kuc and his team for his selflessness and visionary leadership style. After understanding what our late father wanted us to be, he was touched by the story and gave me the opportunity to seek more knowledge as to realize the dreams and aspiration of our father. Again, his unceasing commitment to transform South Sudan to a better nation whereby members of the diverse and rich cultures can live in harmony, work and develop together, is a testimony of his kindness and proactive leadership style. I would like to thank my uncles Monsignor Father

Anthony Bangoye, Monsignor Father Mark Kumbonyeki and His Lordship Barani

Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala for advice and guidance to remain focused and maintain discipline throughout my lifetime. I have been inspired to double my efforts by Honorable

Jemma Nunu Kumba, Honorable Joseph Bakosoro, and Honorable Patrick Zamoi, Rite

Honorable Anthony Lino Makana, our elders especially Dr. Samson Wassara and my colleagues in your different capacities. Thanks for your advice and support one way or the other to ensure that our common vision is paramount to a viable and upright society void of conflict and backwardness. To my colleagues and friends with whom we started the journey from Sudan, to Central Africa, Uganda and Kenya; thank you much for your cooperation. May we continue to give a helping hand to each other throughout our unending ventures. Thanks to United States International University (USIU) management and the teaching and support staff for giving me more opportunity and imparting knowledge. Finally, my sincere thanks go to Dr. George Kabongah my wise supervisor and the Department of International Relations’ Chairperson for guidance.

ABSTRACT

Many studies have been carried out on post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in many countries including the Republic of South Sudan. However, to this date, there is no comprehensive literature or empirical data on the process of DDR on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement in 2005 up to date, there has not been sustainable peace in the world’s nascent state. This vexes the mind as if the world neglected the newly born country, South Sudan or the country is crippled by natural phenomena which hinder it to learn how to crawl, walk and grow? It is also confusing and paradoxical that after many years of wars for liberation and self rule, and attaining independence in 2011, South Sudan is still listed among fragile states with high risks of sliding into a failed state. To this very day, the country continues to experience institutional and infrastructural challenges; with only one major asphalt road connecting the East African countries through the Nimule-Uganda borders. This main supply route is also under threat by insurgents and lack of maintenance. Many countries have undergone political instability akin to that of South

Sudan, yet they successfully conducted DDR programs despite the challenges encountered. The urge for collective responsibility of all stakeholders is key at this juncture. Such successes registered elsewhere during post-conflicts era need a replica in the South Sudanese case.

Keywords: DDR, UNMISS, Post-conflict, State-building, Militia, Resources.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU - African Union

AUC - Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia (paramilitaries)

CAR - Central African Republic

CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CTSAMVM - Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

ELN - Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, Colombia) EU - European Union

FARC - Fuerzas Armas Revolucionarias de Colombia (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) ICBF - Colombian Institute for Family Well being

IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IOM - International Organization for Migration

JMCC - Joint Military Ceasefire Commission

LRA - Lord’s Resistance Army

PIU - Project Implementation Unit

PoC - Protection of Civilians Site

PCTSA - Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements

PTSD - Post-traumatic stress disorder

RJMEC - Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

RUF - Revolution United Front

SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons

SDSR - Strategic Defense and Security Review

SLPP - Sierra Leone People’s Party

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SSDDRC - South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission SPLA - Sudan People’s Liberation Army

SSPDF - South Sudan People’s Defense Forces

SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSR - Security Sector Reform

UNDP - United Nations Development Fund

UNMIS - United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

WAAF - Women Association with Armed Forces and Groups

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Four Stage-process of the conflict cycle ...... 35

Table 2: Mixed method design………………………………………………………...43

Table 3: Percentage representation of obstacles to successful DDR IN South Sudan…66

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig 1: Multiplicity Constraint between State-building and Stability ...... 36

Fig 2: Schematic representation of the mixed methods ...... 39

Fig 3: Do you keep records of weapons in your institution? ...... 61

Fig 4: Are weapons all labelled and numbered? ...... 62

Fig 5: Have you heard of firearms being sold or smuggled from the stores? ...... 62

Fig 6: Those with idea about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration ...... 64

Fig 7: Do you think DDR was properly conducted in South Sudan? ...... 64

Fig 8: Was DDR successful? ...... 65

Fig 9: Highest level of Education ...... 68

Fig 10: Age bracket ...... 69

Fig 11: Do many guns in the hands of civilians encourage cattle raiding? ...... 72

Fig 12: Proliferation of firearms are responsible for insecurity in South Sudan ...... 75

Fig 13: Is it a good practice to own a gun or guns in South Sudan? ...... 76

Fig 14: Multiplicity Constraint between proliferation and violence ...... 77

Fig 15: Have you ever heard about unknown gunmen? ...... 78

TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION ...... ii COPYRIGHT ...... iii DEDICATION ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... v ABSTRACT ...... vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... vii LIST OF TABLES ...... ix LIST OF FIGURES ...... x CHAPTER ONE ...... 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Background Study ...... 1 1.2 Problem Statement...... 5 1.3 Purpose of the Study ...... 6 1.4 Specific objectives ...... 6 1.5 Research questions/hypotheses ...... 6 1.6 Significance/Importance of the Study ...... 7 1.7 Scope of the Study ...... 7 1.8 Definition of terms ...... 8 1.9 Chapter summary...... 10 CHAPTER TWO ...... 11 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 11 2.1 Introduction ...... 11 2.2 Theoretical Framework ...... 11 2.3 Empirical review ...... 13 2.4 Stakeholders in the implementation of DDR in South Sudan ...... 27 2.5 Stockpile management system in South Sudan ...... 28 2.6 Major obstacles for a conclusive DDR in South Sudan ...... 30 2.7 Proliferation of firearms among civilians in South Sudan...... 32 2.9 ChapterSummary ...... 37 CHAPTER THREE...... 38 3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 38 3.1 Introduction ...... 38 3.2 Research Design ...... 38 3.3 Sources of Data...... 40 3.4 Data collection Techniques ...... 40 3.5 Target population...... 40 3.6 Data Analysis...... 41 3.7 Ethical Issues ...... 41 3.8 Risk Analysis ...... 42 3.9 Limitations of the Study ...... 42 3.10 Chapter Summary ...... 43 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 44 4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS ...... 44 4.1 Introduction ...... 44 4.2 Assessment of stakeholders in the DDR process ...... 44 4.3 Stockpile Management System ...... 60 4.4 Major obstacles for a conclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration ...... 63 4.5 Armed Civilians and Pastoralists ...... 71 4.6 Chapter Summary ...... 79

CHAPTER FIVE ...... 80 5.0 DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION ...... 80 5.1 Introduction ...... 80 5.2 Summary and Discussions of Key Findings ...... 80 5.3 Recommendations ...... 90 REFERENCE ...... 101 APPENDICES ...... 106 APPENDIX I: BUDGET ...... 106 APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE...... 107 APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON DEFENSE AND VETERANS’ AFFAIRS ON MAY 9 AND 10, 2019 ...... 110 APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH UNICEF, CHILD PROTECTION SPECIALIST ...... 111 APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH STATES OFFICIALS ON LRA (E- MAIL INTERVIEW) ...... 112

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the preamble of the study. It highlights the chronological order of the study, starting with the background to the study, stating the problem under study, explaining the purpose of the study while laying the objectives of the study. The research questions guide the researcher to stay on track. The significance or importance of the study gives more value to the study. The scope limits the study to a specific field of interest. And the organization of the study shows how the different chapters are tailored one after another.

1.1 Background Study

It is an international norm that the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration takes place in the post-conflict era. This is to contain ex-combatants and reintegrate some to their respective communities and others back to the different units of the organized forces. The year 2005 was characterized by the signing of a Comprehensive

Peace Agreement (CPA), between the Khartoum regime under President Omar Hassan Al

Bashir and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army under the late Dr. John

Garang de Mabior on January 9, 2005 at Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi after many attempts of mediation processes. This international practice was supposed to take the central stage of the State building as stipulated in the Security Arrangement Protocol of the Peace

Agreement (Deng, 2007).

Idris (2016) in “Lessons from DDR Programmes” noted that the traditional DDR were designed to address the needs of ex-combatants in post-conflict era. This concept came about in the 1960s and has thereafter evolved considerably in managing variable circumstance and the ever-growing global challenges. The focus was on organizing

1 military units and armed forces. One of the prerequisites for DDR program to take place was that there should always be a signed and binding negotiated peace agreement. This would give a legal framework for DDR by compelling parties to the conflict to have mutual trust to implement DDR with minimum monitoring and supervision. The traditional DDR programs used to be implemented after the end of international or civil wars, in a win-lose situation where one party had total victory over another. Examples of initial DDR programs implementation was straightforward included El Salvador,

Guatemala, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Cambodia, Haiti and the Philippines.

Second generation DDR programs came about because of the changing agendas for peace and security operations. The second generation was in recognition of the previous DDR programs and to fill the gaps that were lacking. A United Nations’ Interagency Working

Group was established in 2005 following Brahimi’s report at the UN Head Quarters to streamline DDR programs immediately to ensure post-conflict stability and mitigate possible relapse of violence thereafter. The agency came up with the Integrated DDR

Standards (IDDRS) which was published in 2006, to provide guidance that would address political and security issues in the post-conflict era. The IDDRS abandoned fixed sequential program of preconditions, DDR and adopted human security-oriented approach. However, the first two generations shared same objectives of supporting peace processes and creating political space that would contribute to international peace and stability. Second generation DDR was mainly applied during the wars in South East Asia, the Balkans, Western and Central Africa.

The subsequent generations of DDR programs were more flexible to address the gaps in the preconditions of the former DDR generations. Reintegration was identified as the weak links in the DDR. The third generation had to cater for economic recovery plan other than pacification and management of ex-combatants alone (Idris, 2016).

According to Knight and O÷ zerdem (2004); the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of fighters in the aftermath of conflict is as old as war itself. They further stated that more than sixty DDR initiatives have taken place since the late 1980s, implemented multilaterally by the United Nations or assisted through bilateral partnership. The Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) was established in 2005 to improve United Nations’ performance in DDR. The IAWG comprised of twenty-two UN entities and the UN

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) all chaired by the United Nations

Development Fund (Knight and O÷ zerdem, 2004).

Many countries that have concluded the process of DDR after having gone through armed conflicts are peaceful and serve as the best examples in post-conflict peace building and stability. In Sierra Leone, a lead-state approach was adopted involving the United

Kingdom to drive the state-building agenda. The political power in the state was consolidated in one mainstream party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), while the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was included in the Government of National Unity.

This approach however, faced numerous threats from other factions that held to their arms. The integration of the various factions holding to their arms was a key to sustainable political settlement during the crisis. In contrast to Sierra Leone, there was no winner in the Liberian conflict; the international community implemented a power- sharing deal between the three warring factions. In addition to the post-conflict reconstruction, there was an extensive international intervention involving UN-led police reconstructing DDR program and US-led military reform. The central state or international donors assumed an upper hand in policy-making functions related to DDR and security sector reform. In other contexts, like in Afghanistan, multiple international

3 actors agreed on a burden-sharing approach involving donors. International actors can influence internal state-building and power relations within the state while formulating policies (Von Dyck, 2016; pp. 24-46).

According to World Peace Foundation, South Sudan inherited the UN intervention after conflict from the United Nations Mission in Sudan, commissioned by the UN Security

Council resolution/1590 (2005) until July 9, 2011 (Independence Day). The United

Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established under UNSC/RES/1996

(2011) on July 8, 2011. Its mandate by contrast reflected an expansive role. It aimed to support the newly established government to accomplish large goals in areas of development, security, institution building, and rule of law. The UN troops deployed also had the mandate for the protection of civilians (PoC) including proactive deployment and patrol to fill the gap, where government fails. This included but not limited to: incidents affecting civilians at the border areas, rebel-militia activities, inter-communal violence; threats to civilians during security operations and Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) activities.

According to the Small Arms Survey report (2016), the Human Security Baseline’s

Assessment (HSBA) was designed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the

United Nations Mission in Sudan, UNDP, and other non-governmental partners in 2005 to carry out research on small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Sudan. The latter phases of the second civil war showed that fighting mainly took place between competing armed groups with shifting allegiances and orientations to Khartoum. The Comprehensive

Peace Agreement did not adequately resolve the contested legitimacy of the SPLA among the numerous groups that identified themselves as South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF).

Following the 2010 contested elections, and the independence of South Sudan in 2011, many wartime commanders who felt sidelined returned to rebellion, supported by

Khartoum’s regime. Many commanders with communal support bases, and following the

2013 crisis, violence spiraled to almost all parts of the country with insurgents mushrooming across all the 64 tribal divides. The temporary post-conflict DDR in Sudan and South Sudan was a massive operation and the HSBA provided numerous explorations of its nominal successes and significant failures as evidenced by an outcome far below the expected 180,000 demobilized men. SPLA never fully embraced DDR. On the eve of

South Sudan’s secession, DDR had no important meaning on the forces size; on the contrary new recruitment outpaced the demobilization of fighters possibly because of security dilemma that Sudan might reinvade South Sudan (LeBrun, 2016).

1.2 Problem Statement

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 between the Khartoum regime and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

(SPLM/A), at Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi, the interim establishment of the then Southern

Sudan had a difficult task to implement DDR as stipulated in the security arrangement protocol of the CPA. The human security baseline assessment (HSBA) asserts that South

Sudan’s DDR Commission (SSDDRC) was instituted in April 2011 to manage and oversee the process of DDR. Despite the establishment of the SSDDRC, South Sudan continues to experience high levels of insecurity due to mosaic militia groups scattered all over the country and high degree of lawlessness among pastoralist communities, along with the unlawful acquisition of small arms and light weapons.

Despite the success stories recorded by the United Nations missions in Liberia, and other war-torn areas which fought wars of self-determination and an elaborate mandate by the

Security Council Resolutions on South Sudan, the DDR process has been inconclusive within the internationally accepted standard. There have been many cases of unknown gunmen and insurgencies that continue to wreak havoc across the country. Guns are still

5 many in the hand of civilians and in cattle camps. Many research projects have been conducted about DDR In South Sudan but have not met the threshold to qualify DDR in

South Sudan as post-conflict DDR. This is because of the relapse of violence and ongoing regional efforts to resolve the conflict in the country. The rate of crimes systematically increased with many reports of armed robberies and killings in some parts of the country.

That state of affairs escalated after the December 15, 2013 war out-break and violence has persisted on despite relative stability after the Khartoum declaration of September 12,

2018 and the December 21, 2017 cessation of hostility agreement which seems to be holding (HSBA, 2013).

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The aim of this study was to investigate the process of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, (DDR) as a prerogative of state-building in South Sudan since 2005 to

2019.

1.4 Specific objectives

To assess the extent to which all stakeholders participated in the disarmament process;

To investigate stockpile management system in South Sudan;

To determine the major obstacles for a conclusive Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration in South Sudan;

To further probe the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians and pastoralists.

1.5 Research questions/hypotheses

To what extent did the stakeholders implement the DDR program in South Sudan?

How is stockpile managed in South Sudan?

What were the major obstacles for a conclusive DDR in South Sudan?

How did weapons end up in the hands of civilians and in cattle camps?

Could there be relationship between state-building and state stability? How about proliferation of small arms and light weapons and violence/crime rate?

1.6 Significance/Importance of the Study

International relations students, political science students, strategic security studies, strategic management and law students among others can use this study to further their knowledge and research on the same or different case of similar phenomenological occurrences to find solutions and contribute knowledge to the data mining processes. The research can also be used for decision-making process, where policy makers like government’s parastatals, ministries of interior, national security services, defense, international organizations and foreign affairs for references and informed decisions. It would help regional institutions like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU),

United States, United Kingdom and Norway (TROIKA), and Intergovernmental

Authority on Development (IGAD) during crises assessment and management. The research will widely open an avenue for international nongovernmental organizations and

South Sudanese nongovernmental organizations with the benevolence to assist in the rehabilitation of war veterans through programs like mental health, vocational training and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) initiatives.

1.7 Scope of the Study

This study was conducted among the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, now South Sudan

People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), war veterans and other security organs in the Republic of South Sudan from April 21 to June 30, 2019. The researcher travelled to Juba, the

South Sudanese capital and Tambura State where he collected data through a cross-

7 sectional sample survey design (random probability and non-random probability methods).

1.8 Definition of terms

According to Beswick and Jackson (2015, p.157), DDR is one of the most common types of external interventions in post-conflict environments (state and human security). They defined DDR as: Disarmament being the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of both combatants and civilians. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of identified and active combatants from armed forces and other non-state armed groups. Reintegration is the process by which former combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment or a sustainable livelihood or income in a civilian capacity. Furthermore, rehabilitation is the means through which former combatants can overcome psychological issues, drugs and alcohol problems, post-traumatic stress disorders, and other issues related to communities which might impact on the combatants. Reinsertion refers to a form of transitional assistance designed to cover the basic needs of the ex-combatants as they establish themselves. This includes, transitional security cost, food, shelter, medical assistance, training, employment or tools. And Resettlement/repatriation refers to many issues out of a whole program of settling former combatants who may have been removed from their communities (Beswick and Jackson 2015).

Disarmament: According to Oxford English Dictionary, Disarmament is the process of reducing or eliminating military forces and weapons through cooperation, treaties, and oversight.

Demobilization: Is the process of taking (troops) out of active service, typically at the end of a war.

Post-conflict: Following or occurring after a military conflict.

Reintegration: Is the action or process of restoring elements regarded as disparate to unity. It can also be the action or process of integrating someone back into society.

Reinsertion: the action or process of placing back or integrating combatants into their previous places or communities.

Rehabilitation: The action of restoring someone to health or normal life through training and therapy after imprisonment, addiction, or illness. Rehabilitation is also the action of restoring someone to former privileges or reputation after a period of disfavour. It’s the action of restoring something that has been damaged to its former condition.

War veterans: A person who has had long experience in a field or an ex-member of the armed forces.

Warlord: A military commander, especially an aggressive regional commander with individual autonomy.

Insurgent: A person fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or revolutionary.

Counter-insurgency: Military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.

1.9 Chapter summary

Section one encompasses the introduction, background, problem statement, purpose and objectives of the study, the research questions/hypotheses, the significance or importance/justification, the scope of the study and summary of the section one. Section two shall encompass literature review, brief introduction of the literature review, focusing on the research questions or specific objectives and conceptual/theoretical framework; and summary of section two. Section three shall encompass the Research methodology, brief introduction of the section, research design, the population to be studied and sampling design, data collection techniques, data analysis, ethical issues, limitation, budget and summary of section three.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Several studies had been conducted on the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, rehabilitation and reinsertion (DDRRR) elsewhere in the world. However little or no research based on comprehensive primary data collection, has been conducted on Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), now renamed as the South Sudan

People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF). To understand how the process of Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration was conducted on the Sudanese People’s Liberation

Army (SPLA), the researcher will append empirical literature from previous researchers’ publications from Global, regional and local perspectives so as to make analogy to the

DDRRR process and outcome in the South Sudanese perspective. This chapter conceptualizes the process of DDR on Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) now

South Sudanese People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), and theorizes the impact of DDR on those who benefited from the process as opposed to those who didn’t benefit. The literature review is organized into introduction; relationship between variables derived from the objectives, and tackled each as subtopic under this section, the theoretical framework, conceptual framework, section summary and conclusion.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This is an examination of the existing theories in relation to the research objectives. It refers to a set of interrelated variables, definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of a phenomenon by specifying relations among variables to explain that phenomenon; it’s descriptive in nature. The assumption that the independent variable has

11 some influence over the dependent variable is what the researcher will try to justify in the theoretical framework by explaining how and why (Yuko & Onen, 2016).

2.2.1 State-building theory

Lake (2010) in The Practice and Theory of US State-building, analyzed state-building in terms of legitimacy and employed three models to differentiate the various levels of state- building notably: ‘State-building 1.0’ which focuses on creating loyal and politically stable subordinate states and was used by the United States from 1890 through the end of cold war. The second model was ‘state-building 2.0’ which focused on building legitimate states and was employed after the fall of the Soviet Union. The third model was ‘state-building 3.0’, which is believed to have emerged from issues associated with state-building in Iraq. This model focused on building legitimacy for the state by providing security and social services to the population (Lake, D. 2010; pp. 257-284).

According to public domain, David A. Lake is the Gerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs professor of Social Sciences and distinguished professor of Political Science at the

University, San Diego. He was born on August 10, 1956. He is the author of: State builder’s dilemma (2016), Hierarchy in International Relations (2009), The Spread of

Ethnic Conflict (1998), Entangling Relations (1999), and Power, Protection and Free

Trade (1988).

According to Greven (2014), An Analysis of State-building: The Relationship between

Pashtun ‘Para-State’ Institutions and Political Instability in Afghanistan, pp. 46-66; state- building is defined as the “Creation of new government institutions and strengthening of existing ones”. The author argued that international community should identify ways for transferring strong institutions into developing states. Seth Kaplan (2009: 446) discussed state-building in terms of national identity and a cohesive society formation, lack of

12 which a state will never progress. Brahimi (2007), one of the most influential fellows of state-building at the United Nations discusses state-building in terms of democratization functions and processes: Constitution-making, electoral processes, reintegration and national reconciliation, and rule of law (Greven, 2014).

2.2.2 Structural Functionalism

According to Babbie (2007), structural functionalist or social systems paradigm sought to discover what functions the many elements of the society perform for the whole system. It is a social construct theoretical framework that sees society as complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and peace. It is related to the research problem because of structural motives and management constraints (Babbie, 2007).

According to public domain, Earl Robert Babbie is an American Sociologist who holds the position of Campbell professor emeritus in Behavioral Sciences at the Chapman

University. He was born 8th January 1938 in Detroit, Michigan in the United States of

America. He is from the Field of Sociology and attended Harvard College, University of

California and Berkeley. He is best known for his books: The Practice of Social Research,

The Basics of Social Research, Survey Research Methods, and Essential Research

Methods for Social Work.

2.3 Empirical review

According to Ehrhart and Schnabel (2005), in post-conflict societies, the remnants of wartime military and security apparatuses pose significant threats to internal security.

This is as result of inflated armies with little or no civilian control; irregular and paramilitary forces; an overabundance of arms and ammunition in private and government’s hands; weak internal security forces; and lack of trust in and legitimacy of the government’s control over police and military forces.

The former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who his “Agenda for Peace” introduced the concept of post-conflict peace building as an importance step in the sequence of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. He briefly defined post-conflict peace building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict”. This has become an inherent UN component for in preventing and resolving conflicts, and preserving international peace and security. Kofi Annan defined post-conflict peace-building as the actions undertaken at the end of conflict to consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of armed confrontations. Kofi Annan further suggested that peace-building involves the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting Human

Rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation program, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peace-building is not a substitute for ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. However, it seeks to reorient such activities to mitigate the risk of return to violence by contributing to create conducive conditions for reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery (Ehrhart and

Schnabel, 2005) a general view of security sector reform which does not necessarily represent the case under study.

However, according to Knight (2008), the cornerstone of the DDR process was former

UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros Ghali’s conception of post-conflict peace-building framework to prevent recurrence of violence. Peace-building first came in UN official discourse in 1992 when Boutros Boutros Ghali used the term in his “Agenda for Peace”.

For Boutros Ghali, the concept of peace-building was an activity which had to take place immediately after conflict. From this conceptualization, one can without doubt allude to the idea of DDR process after conflict. Some of the elements akin to DDR in Boutros

Ghali’s conceptualization of peace-building include: disarming warring factions, restoring

14 law and order, decommissioning and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, reintegrating internally displaced persons, de-mining, training and building capacities of military and police personnel, institutional reforms, improving judicial systems and facilitating socioeconomic development activities (Knight, 2008; pp. 24-52).

According to the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (SIDDR) initiated in 2006, some one hundred thirty participants, representing twenty seven governments, twenty four non-governmental organizations, academic institutes and government agencies, fourteen United Nations agencies and

International Organizations (including African Union, the European Union, and the

World Bank); convened at plenary meetings, round table discussions and electronic consultative networks; to deliberate on a predictable framework for the planning and implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes. The

SIDDR final report stated that the primary aim of DDR programs is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which an overall peace process and transition can be sustained. It was asserted that it’s the only enabling environment that political and security restructuring, as well as socio-economic reconstruction, and longer-term development can be realized (Stockholm Initiative, 2006).

2.3.1 DDR in Colombia

According to Theidon (2007), a key component to peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction is the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex- combatants. The program is multifaceted: from combatants who gave up their weapons, to the government that seeks an end to an armed conflict, to the communities that receive or reject the demobilized fighters. Colombian war is the oldest and lengthiest civil-war in the western hemisphere, which was ignited by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de

Colombia (FARC) rebels in 1966, Marxist revolutionaries against an exclusive political

15 system over resources. Other target groups for DDR program were the Ejército de

Liberaciòn National (ELN) and the Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), commonly known as the paramilitaries.

During the country’s 50 years internal conflicts, each successive president has declared military victory sort of in the face of uncertainty, or peace deal. The United Nations

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines DDR in the peace process context, where disarmament consists of collection, control and elimination of small arms, ammunitions, explosives, and light weapons from combatants and civilians depending on circumstances. Demobilization encompasses concentration, quartering, disarming, management and licensing of ex-combatants who may receive compensation or motivation package for laying down their weapons and enter civilian life. Reintegration and reinsertion as the final phase, involves measures that build the capacity of ex- combatants for improving their socio-economic reintegration into the society (Denissen,

2010; pp. 328-352).

Initially, the DDR failed because it was squarely located within the military or security framework. This approach failed to consider the host communities, and to the need to consider, local, cultural and gendered conceptions of what really constitute the rehabilitation and resocialization of the ex-combatants. The author further quoted other writers in their evaluation of DDR programs in sub-Saharan Africa that long-term integration should serve as the yardstick for measuring the success of DDR programs, and general view that reintegration is the weakest phase of the DDR process, should answer the call for more reforms. The United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (UNIDDRS) on this view insists on “the needs for measures to be conducted in consultation and with the collaboration of all stakeholders and that DDR programs focus on locally appropriate development incentives. Under the Betancur administration (1982-1986), law 35 was the

‘Law of Unconditional Amnesty in Favour of Peace’, a legal environment in which blanket amnesties were offered in exchange for peace and stability. This law served as

Uribe 1984 legal basis for demobilizing and reconstituting the FARC as a political party.

It failed when three thousand members of the FARC were assassinated by the paramilitaries (Theidon, 2007).

In mid-90s the issue of child-soldiers began to be visible when minors started to disengage from the non-state armed groups, with the aim of restoring their rights, building their citizenships and socially integrating them (Instituto de Bienestar Familiar, 2016).

Before 2005 all disengagements were individual. However, from 2005 onwards disengagements became collective. The article emphasized more on intersectionality as a way of understanding social location in terms of crisscrossing systems of oppression.

They can also be based on age difference, religion, culture as well as division of adults, minors and victim for understanding the issue and formulation of DDR programs

(Hernàndez, 2017).

2.3.2 DDR in Timor-Leste and Kosovo

According to the UN Department of Public Information (2008), the former dependent

Territory declared its independence on May 20, 2002 as Timor-Leste; following active engagement by the United Nations over many years of struggle for self-determination

(UN Today, 2008 chapter 7). The Security Council established a United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), to assist the newly formed state in structural and institutional development, including contributing to maintenance of internal and external security. Up on completion of its mission in May 2005, UNMISET was replaced by

United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which worked for the next year to support the development of critical state institutions, such as the police, border patrol unit, and to provide training in democratic governance and human rights observance. After

17 dismissal of 600 members of Timorese armed forces in March 2006, fighting ensued resulting in many casualties. The Security Council deployed international police and military assistance to secure key government’s installations upon a request by the government (Strating, 2018; pp. 391-404).

On August 25, 2007, the Security Council established a new and expanded operation under the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), to complement the government’s efforts in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and facilitating dialogue among Timorese stakeholders. As a result, calm and rule of law have been maintained in the country. UNMIK was successful in re- establishing normalcy and ensured long-term economic reconstruction. The KLA was completely demilitarized by September 1999 and its members reintegrated in civil society. In March 2002, UNMIK completed the transfer of local provisional institutions, but kept control over security, foreign relations, protection of minority rights, and energy pending determination of the province’s final status (Muggah, 2008).

2.3.3 DDRR in Liberia and Sierra Leone

According to Paes (2005), a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the government of Charles Taylor and the two-armed opposition groups, Liberians United for

Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia

(MODEL), with Taylor’s going in to exile in Nigeria, Liberia became a temporary host to the world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission with an annual budget of US $846 million.

In November 2004, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was composed of 14,

100 military personnel from 47 countries, with 750 civilian police officers and 607 international civilian staff who operated under a robust Chapter VII mandate. The

UNMIL primary mandate was the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants of all armed groups to complement the National

Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

(NCDDRR), established under the CPA and with representatives from all the armed groups. Most of the actual planning and implementation of the program was left to

UNMIL’s Joint Implementation Unit (JIU). JIU sub-contracted local service providers mainly for technical and educational aspects of the cantonment process, usually the

Monrovia-based international humanitarian organizations, such as UNICEF and the

Norwegian Refugees Council (NRC).

The UNMIL succeeded to disarm and demobilize more than 100, 000 former fighters between December 2003 and November 2004 after fifteen years of civil war. This success was attributable to a well-structured DDRR program which consisted of three weeks

(later reduced to five days). In the absence of the registers kept by the armed groups, eligibility was based on informed consent by the ex-combatants to hand over their firearms at cantonment D1 site, then those disarmed were transported to D2 site, where they were registered, received medical attention, human rights and peace training as well as career counseling. Fighters were separated from civilian population during this process and quarantined to the camps. At the end of the camp period, food ratio and stipends of

US $ 150 were distributed to ex-combatants, along with free transport to the location of their choice within Monrovia. Foreign nationals were to be transferred to their countries of origin or could opt for refugee status in Liberia. Despite the success, UNMIL DDRR program encountered many challenges like fewer than 28,000 guns and six million rounds of ammunition were collected, about one gun per four fighters with absence of heavier weapons and less than one hundred 120mm mortars; and similar number of anti-aircraft guns was collected (Paes, 2005; pp. 253-261).

Lt. Gen. (Rtd) Daniel Ishmael Opande (2018), in an interview with the African Renewal magazine, attributed the success the Liberian peace and DDRR process to the multi-

19 national peacekeeping forces for which he was the first commander. When he arrived in

Liberia from Sierra Leone on October 1, 2003 there was practically no functioning government, Monrovia was besieged, without effective security arrangement and the entire country was in turmoil; and in the danger of falling apart. Because of Gen.

Opande’s dedication, courage and diligence of international peacekeeping service, he managed to address the appalling security situation by engaging all armed groups to give peace a chance. He successfully fulfilled the duty that the UN Security Council gave to

UNMIL. If there is a group in Liberia that Opande could congratulate and appreciate for tirelessly working to bring about peace, it was the women who used to sit in an open field near the Spriggs Payne airport praying on daily basis and discussing how to realize everlasting peace in Liberia. Although the men also played major role in the peace process, it was the women who were consistent in their quest for peace. It’s difficult to compare countries in conflict with the Liberian success stories. Post-conflict Liberia is a hallmark that a country like South Sudan can overcome the worst and end its sufferings

(Mitton, 2018).

Kaldor (2014), explains how Denov described the process of “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (DDR) in Sierra Leone between 1998 and 2003. UN identified the process as an important aspect of human security agenda, where women and girls who took part in violence during wartime were systematically discriminated against.

The DDR process was characterized by gender role (war was fought between men alone) and neglected women’s role during the war. DDR in Sierra Leone failed to address the after-effects of sexual violence against girls, but rather put them together in an overcrowded DDR camps where they were exposed to more violence from their male counterparts. However, the Sierra Leone post-conflict DDR seems to have been about gender/feminism challenges but it achieved its objective because guns have fallen silent

20 and years are counting. The South Sudan case might not be the same, because of many warring factions, culture and independence (Kaldor and Rangelov, 2014). UNAMIL got a shot in the arm after the British and International community stepped in with economic and technical back up; after a series inadequate ECOWAS and UN monitoring forces in

Sierra Leone bore little fruit.

In December 2003, the Liberian Women in Peace-building Network (WINET) helped

United Nations Mission to calm down ex-combatants and reducing the tension at cantonment sites. The women network also played key role in identifying the unfulfilled needs of demobilizing female combatants at the cantonment sites and disseminated information about the importance of DDR programs to the target groups (Kaldor, &

Rangelov, 2014).

2.3.4 DDR in Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR)

According to the World Bank report (2017), the Transitional Demobilization and

Reintegration Program (TDRP) have been providing technical assistance to the government of Central African Republic from August 9, to September 2, 2017; on the preparations for the planned national DDR Program. A second mission was held from

September 18, to October 6, 2017 which participated in the 8th Consultative and

Monitoring Meeting on August 24-25, 2017. The meeting brought together government, armed groups, and representatives of the international community including the AU,

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA), the

European Union Training Mission, and the US. The mission is reported to have attended the launch of DDRR/SSR Pilot Phase in Bangui on August 30, 2017. Note that DDRR is not the same as security sector reform (SSR). Some US $30 million was earmarked by the

World Bank IDA Grant to help rebuild the effectiveness of the Reintegration of ex- combatants Project, that’s the DDRR-Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The report also

21 shows that thirteen of the fourteen armed groups have submitted list of forty combatants each, and identified to take part of the pilot DDR. Due to prior eligibility, half of the combatants were referred for integration into the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), and the remainder is being considered for socio-economic reintegration activities

(Perazzone, 2017; pp. 254-279).

According to the GSDRC (2016), Governance, Development, Humanitarian Conflict; the

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), is part of the

UN Peacekeeping Operation in CAR, is implementing a pre-DDR project. Its mid-term evaluation report (UN DDR Section, DPO, 2016) found that it was contributing to stabilizing communities, ex-combatants who have been engaged in productive activities.

Some of the Project’s weaknesses are attributed to limited coverage due to lack of resources and mission support, weak national ownership and insufficient linkages with other relevant projects like the reintegration program funded by UNICEF and failure to mobilize all armed groups (Idris, 2016).

In the case of South Sudan, there’s very little progress made so far. Since 2005 up to now only few adult combatants seem to have benefited from the program. There is no such major support from the World Bank IDA Grant, European Union and the UNMISS. This needs to be assessed, why the levels of support in other countries are not realized in South

Sudan.

2.3.5 DDR in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

According to Zartman (2015), the monitoring of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration (DDRR) of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement, by the United

Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was deficient on every count: mandate, rules of engagement (ROE), funds, and troops, until MONUSCO was

22 given a mandate in 2013 to take the offensive and clear out insurgents. The Angolan civil war had ideological and ethnic identity dimensions, as outlined in the Bicesse accords in

1991 partly because the UN monitoring was carried out inadequate budget, raised by the then UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Margaret Anstee

(1996); the 1994 peace agreement in Mozambique lasted for two decades, partly because of the large sums provided to RENAMO to stick on its DDRR approach (Zartman, 2015).

According to GSDRC (2016), DRC which had the largest DDR program, demobilized around 102,000 ex-combatants, but reintegration proved far less effective with only 58 per cent reintegrated. Other problems encountered included capacity issues, corruption, and lack of support from parts of DRC’s government leading to delays and disruption in

DDR efforts. An evaluation report showed that the performance of donors and international implementing partners varied significantly. Organizations like Save the

Children UK successfully reintegrated more than 3000 child soldiers; UNDP struggled to attain their targets (only 83 ex-combatants out of the target of 10,000 in reintegration projects) and they were slow to respond. This clearly shows the disparities between the actors in managing the DDR program (Idris, 2016; p. 10).

2.3.6 DDR in Uganda

According to Omeje and Hepner (2013), the National Resistance Movement (NRM)-led government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony conducted peace negotiations in Juba, South Sudanese capital between 2006 and 2008. It was facilitated by the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy, President

Joaquim Alberto Chissano and the chief mediator for the host government, Dr. Riek

Machar Teny Dhurgon, the then vice president of the Government of South Sudan

(GOSS); who later became rebel leader after falling out with President Salva Kiir

Mayardit, followed his sacking from office plus other cabinet ministers in the summer of

2013. The talks unfortunately did not culminate in peace agreement like the case of South

Sudan versus Sudan, despite the parties’ clear road map for DDR of the former LRA combatants through a process of Implementation and Management Mechanisms (IMM);

Joint Liaison Group (JLG); and an oversight forum. Another key agenda in the agreement encompassed accountability and reconciliation, which would address human rights violations (inside and outside the country) that took place during the war. The agenda were based on judicial and cultural forms of justice, as well as reconciliation and healing among the aggrieved communities. The government of Uganda since the failure of the talks has undertaken many institutional reforms as a means of addressing some of the causes and grievances; which include the 2000 Amnesty Act, the Human Rights

Commission Act, and the Land Act (Omeje and Hepner, 2013).

Although the government of Uganda succeeded to flash out LRA from Northern Uganda to South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic there are still pending grievances such as: land distribution, the “lost counties” of the Banyoro, and integration of all ethnic communities into a national identity. The second task is to tackle economic and political marginalization, particularly in the northern region. The third is long-term process of demilitarization of the conflict and to stem the use of violence and small arms and light weapons. The fourth is to address the ideology of ethnicized politics with an objective of tolerance and national cohesion. Ugandan DDR seems not have many challenges like the case of South Sudan because the government of Uganda (GOU) managed to control the

LRA and SALW menaces very well that’s why many South Sudanese refugees are living in Uganda. It was almost around the same time South Sudan signed peace agreement with the Sudanese government of Al Bashir in 2005.

2.3.7 DDR in Sudan

According to Idris (2016), UNDP implemented a four-year project on the reintegration component of the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program from

2009-2012 in an on-going conflict interface with limited access to many areas. The final evaluation report found that there was insignificant progress where ex-combatants could not re-establish livelihoods in their communities. The project’s contribution in dealing with conflict, insecurity and arms proliferation was limited with long lag between disarmament/demobilization and reintegration (cited by Idris, 2016 in Bhattacharjea,

2012: 4). The failure was also attributed to lack of independent verification and political interference by the Sudanese authorities coupled with poor coordination and the cross- border crisis with South Sudan (Idris, 2016; p. 10).

2.3.8 DDR in South Sudan

According to Frahm (2016), a DDR framework was established as part of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiations and was meant to last initially between 2005 and 2012. The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment and other observers strongly believe that DDR in South Sudan during the period was an all-round failure since only 13 per cent of the targets took part (leave alone completed) the program. Many factors are responsible for the failure of DDR in South Sudan. First it was stipulated in the CPA that around 90,000 combatants would qualify for DDR, there was no specific targets and no details of the forces and strength that SPLA was to have.

Secondly the recurrent integration and defections into and from the army since independence to date by former militias and warlords; and the ongoing internal conflict have contributed significantly to the failure of DDR in South Sudan. Mainly the challenges of institutional reforms and government’s structures coupled with bureaucracy

25 and lack of political will have led to the failure to realize DDR success in South Sudan

(Frahm, 2014).

According to Prince Isaiah (2012), the DDR was successful as described in the case of

Aisha Yahiya, an ex-combatant and mother of nine children benefited from the DDR program and was reintegrated to her community in Wau, one of the States in Bahr el

Ghazal region. Prince Isaiah a UN Volunteer narrated how Aisha lost her husband and decided to join the SPLA in 2004 and was deployed to the 40-km bridge, one of SPLA’s famous detachment. After the peace accord, Aisha was deployed to Mangala where she was enrolled for the DDR program. Aisha is said to have received livelihood support from both UNMISS and International Organization for Migration (IOM). She started her retail business by selling basic commodities such as charcoal, sugar, soap, salt, tea, peanut butter and candles in a kiosk. Aisha was reported to have been in position to pay for her children’s school fees, put meal on the table and build a house for herself and her mother

(Isaiah, 2012).

Ernie (2015), in his own words suggests that for war to be prevented, conflict should be progressively disarmed. Furthermore, the availability of tools of violence in the hotspot areas, as is the case of South Sudan is a precursor of more conflicts. The absence of war is not by itself a confirmation of the presence of peace. There exist many countries where war has been avoided but the conditions for war remain abundantly present. The Global

Peace Index (GPI) recently ranked 162 countries for their stability, based on indicators such as the number of violent deaths in political conflict, violent deaths due to organized crimes, levels of crimes more broadly, terrorist activity, and relationship with neighbors, police per capita, levels of military spending, the presence and availability of small arms; and other factors. All the above-mentioned, give excuses for peacekeeping operations, but they do not warrant peacekeepers to take side at the peril of the other warring parties. To

26 stabilize a country, it is important to grab the chance that avoiding war creates focus on the constitutional, political and socio-economic conditions on which peace can be built and the local and national institutions or mechanisms to mediate the political and social conflicts that all societies face (Ernie, 2015).

According to the Small Arms Survey report (2016), the central issue in the DDR process in South Sudan can be traced to early disagreements between the SPLA and its institutional partners; UNDP, UNMIS now UNMISS and others about what the DDR was supposed to achieve. The SPLA saw the process as a means of providing benefits to former soldiers, whereas the international community which funded and guided the operation saw it as a downsizing and security-building exercise.

2.4 Stakeholders in the implementation of DDR in South Sudan

Lamb and Stainer (2018) asserted that over the past three decades, coordination has been an important component within peace support operations to increase DDR programs with the help of regional organizations, private sector companies and civil society organizations as additional actors (Paris 2009). Lamb and Stainer contended that it has always been very difficult to achieve effective coordination in a traditional post-conflict society. Such challenge has been raised by some practitioners and scholars.

They further asserted that the coordination of multi-agency operations is not limited to peacebuilding, but it has been identified by scholars in the discipline of disaster management. They highlighted some of the coordination problems in terms of disordered nature of the operational environment; the diversity of organizations; lack of adequate resources; and lack of collaboration among stakeholders (as cited by Lamb and Stainer in

Salmon et al. 2011; Balcik et al. 2010). Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

(DDR) of ex-combatants are key components of peace support operations. In other words,

DDR is the process through which armaments mainly firearms, are collected from combatants who would like to go back to civilian life. For a successful DDR process, there’s need for coordinated support of government, international organizations and civil society organizations to ensure smooth transition.

According to Lamb and Stainer, the United Nations published in 2006, an integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards (IDDRS) as a means to promote greater coordination and harmonization of its DDR programming. This was in response to the fragmented manner through which DDR was carried, inadequate coordination and planning; and institutional rivalries (Lamb 2008). However, Lamb and Stainer cited

O’Donnell (2015) that the IDDRS were not strict standards but rather detailed guidelines for the design and implementation of DDR interventions by the UN which became its official model for in South Sudan. The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) have been critiqued by some scholars for being inadequate in the context of complex operational environment (Lamb and Stainer, 2018).

2.5 Stockpile management system in South Sudan

King, B. (2014). Small Arms Survey, Issue brief number 6, found that South Sudan is overwhelmed by the number of small arms and light weapons. The report attributed the saturation to the prolonged wars of self-rule and autonomy from their northern neighboring country. The survey targeted four security institutions notably; South Sudan

National Police Service (SSNPS), South Sudan Prison Service (SSPS), the Fire Brigade and Wildlife Protection Service. The Issue Brief described the stockpile management practices observed during several visits to the armories of each of the four security forces.

A checklist outlining the basic requirements of Physical Security and Stockpile

Management (PSSM) systems was used to ensure that the observations at each site followed a consistent pattern. The Twelve site visits were made in May and August 2012;

28 eight in Warrap and four in Jonglei states, including three armories for each service. The national army and national security were exempted because of their national mandate.

However, the findings revealed that South Sudan lacked a comprehensive national policy despite new legislation. New structural changes affect surplus levels. There were no regular inventory audits conducted. Security forces ability to identify obsolete surplus was a positive step forward. Since independence to the time of survey, South Sudan never systematically destroyed surplus of weapons (King, 2014).

According to Garcia (2011) in Disarmament Diplomacy and Human Security, Oscar

Arias said at a Geneva Summit on Armed Violence and Development Ministerial

Conference held on June 7, 2006 that: “The notion that arms manufacture and trade are good for a nation’s economy has no credibility in a world as connected as ours. In a world as connected as ours, a gun fired at one of us is a moral and monetary loss to all of us. A job in an arms factory may be one small economic step forward for a worker, but it is two giant leaps back for mankind.” In this book, Garcia examines concrete but unconventional arms, notably small arms and light weapons (SALW), which do most of the killing in contemporary conflicts and armed violence around the world. Garcia further explained that it is in many senses that a scattered regime that lends itself to an interesting and uncharted theoretical analysis. To illustrate more Garcia outlined the legal and political framework of the small arms and light weapons regime, which was only a decade old by then and faced many challenges prior to its establishment. Garcia further examined where the complexities surrounding implementation were most daunting. Garcia asserted that it is time for addressing ways to reduce armed violence with a view of improving human security (Garcia, 2011).

2.6 Major obstacles for a conclusive DDR in South Sudan

The question of obstacles in any state building process and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants reflects political will of all leaders in that state, after wars for self-determination and autonomy. It shows how all government stakeholders contribute individually towards building a state. It encompasses leadership style which is key to guaranteeing a successful transition from a country at war into a viable and prosperous state.

Despite SPLA’s real powers in terms of deciding the eligible candidates for the DDR, they had mixed feelings about the DDR program. It is argued that the SPLA demobilized some ex-combatants, while at the same time they were recruiting and absorbing other youthful forces especially from different militias. Consequently, the SPLA rather than shrinking grew despite the on-going DDR. Whereas, intrinsically, they wanted a big force that would potentially counteract any threat from Sudan, they were under pressure from the donors to reduce the size of the army.

Moreover, the unpredictable inflow of donor money complicated and stifled progress. The

DDR program that was supposed to kick off immediately after the signing of the CPA was delayed for four years partly due to delayed funding and logistical challenges.

Further, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), which was the sole funder of its DDR commission, on many occasions was too weak economically, to pay the commission workers’ monthly salaries on time. This was attributed to meagre revenues, exacerbated by the dynamics and complexities in the export of oil through Khartoum’s oil pipeline to the seaport. It is imperative to note that over 90 percent of South Sudan’s income is generated from oil revenues and therefore, any halt in production makes virtually all government programs stand still. It is remarkable that on some occasions, the offices of

South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) remained closed due to lack of money to buy

30 fuel for the generators and driving to the field. Financial constraints also affected the

UNDP’s operations as many activities could not be carried out on time because money to procure necessary logistics would not be readily available at times (Warner, 2013).

According to Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012) in “Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict, The

Carnegie Papers, pp. 1-23. Washington DC”; less than a year after the secession of South

Sudan from Africa’s largest country, the Republic of Sudan, the two countries were in a state of war again. The concerted efforts and resources invested in one of Africa’s longest conflict by the international community seemed futile. The world was disappointed because of the attitudes of the leaders in the two neighboring countries. The sufferings of the peoples in the two countries, the level of devastation and loss of lives were threatened by this new development. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9,

2005 gave South Sudanese the chance to overwhelming vote in a referendum to secede.

Outstanding protocols were due to be negotiated the next six months but there was no will and interest by the north to do so. The conflict initially involved clashes along the disputed border between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and their southern neighbors, the

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). With oil being one of the central drivers of the conflict, Khartoum intensified aerial bombardments on both sides of the borders. Sudan’s revenue was about 75 percent reliant on South Sudan’s oil. This left Sudan’s revenue significantly reduced and hence the tendency of survival rather than sovereignty over resources. South Sudan cut exports through the northern pipelines and conflicts heightened across the two borders.

The attempts to control territories along the border between the North and South, in South

Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Abyei were other set of conflicts which required urgent attention to salvage the comprehensive peace agreement project. Across the two borders, governments were struggling with political and tribal conflicts with South Sudan being

31 the most affected because of lack of institutional structures. All this suggested that the divorce within the greater Sudan to the Republics of Sudan and South Sudan was not the end of a conflict but rather the beginning of multiple new ones (Ottaway and El-Sadany,

2012).

2.7 Proliferation of firearms among civilians in South Sudan

Adeba (2015) in “Making Sense of the White Army’s Return in South Sudan”; clearly examined and expressed how firearms ended up in the hands of non-state actors in South

Sudan. Firstly, guns scattered across Southern Sudan before independence because of the protracted wars for self-determination and autonomy since 1960s and more modern weapons scattered in the hands of many southerners during the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement/Army civil strife which escalated on the 16th of May 1983. Secondly, because there was no proper stockpile management system during the guerilla warfare, many fighters who managed to get extra firearms during different engagements, didn’t surrender all of them to their unit commanders. Some hid those firearms and others took them to their villages or sold them.

The white army is a group of armed civilians and pastoralists from the Lou Nuer subsection. They are in Eastern Bieh, former Akobo County. The group has been well known for its role in shaping the conflicts between Sudan and Southern Sudan; and in the ongoing internal conflict, the white army aligned with the rebels of Dr. Riek Machar again to fight the government under President Salva Kiir Mayardit. Generally, their primary purpose is to protect the community against external threats and to defend property and livestock. This is a common practice among the Nilotes in South Sudan.

They have been one of the major non-state actors in the Jonglei triangle cross-border conflicts with the Murle in Boma and Dinka-Bor in Jonglei.

Among the Dinka a dominant tribe in South Sudan, the “Gelweng” is the primary-line of defense. The Monyimiji is a youth defense group among the Otuho in Imatong State, former Eastern Equatoria State. Their primary responsibility was to protect the community and confront the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) when they were based in that region while fighting the Ugandan government because of its proximity to the border with Uganda. The emergence of the “Arrow-boys” among the Azande, one of the most populous and pronounced tribes in South Sudan; was a rapid response and necessity to pre-empt and avert the menace that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels caused when they relocated to Western Equatoria region. During that time from 2006 to 2009,

South Sudan was the host country of the talks between Ugandan government and the

LRA rebels of Joseph Kony. Dr. Riek Machar Teny the current main armed opposition leader was the chief mediator and vice President of Government of Southern Sudan before and vice President of South Sudan after independence.

Around the same time emerged the “Cobra Faction” from the Murle. This group caused havoc and mayhem in the country until recent years when Juba reached an agreement to reintegrate them into the organized forces. However, many insurgents and militias have mushroomed during the ongoing conflict that has claimed many lives, displaced thousands, destroyed properties and weakened the country’s economy; and social fabric.

These include but not limited to the “Agwelek” of the Shilluk, the Mathiang Anyoor, different factions of the arrow-boys, and the toposa among others. The scale of violence has taken different dimensions from interstate conflicts of grazing, to cattle rustling and extrajudicial revenge killings (Adeba, 2015).

Safer world report (2012). South Sudan Civilian Disarmament enumerated how the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in civilians’ hands exacerbated insecurity across South Sudan before and after the independence. The report cautioned against piling

33 blame on proliferation as the major cause for insecurity in terms of cattle raiding, carjacking, armed robbery, rape and other forms of violence. He further noted there are many factors that contribute to insecurity in South Sudan. The possession of SALW in civilians’ hands is unquestionably impedes on the stability and development of South

Sudan. It was reported that disarming civilians in the shortest term was a good idea but in the longer-term disarming civilians alone does almost nothing if the root causes of the proliferation are not addressed. The Safer world reported that before the secession of

South Sudan, there was an estimated 1.9 to 3.2 million small arms in circulation. Two thirds of the SALW were in the hands of civilians across the whole Sudan.

In Lakes State, it was reported that government distributed guns to cattle keepers to protect themselves and their communities from cattle raiders. The arming of the pastoralists shifted the focus of the then SPLA from community policing to concentrate on the war against the Khartoum regime. With the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, SPLA did not collect back those guns from the civilians. The continued arming of militias like those of Paulino Matip, Riek Machar, Messiriya and

Lam Akol by Khartoum to destabilize the southern region contributed a lot towards the growing numbers of guns in the hands of civilians. Supplying weapons to the South

Sudanese militias and other logistical supplies was a strategy devised by Khartoum to engage SPLA by proxy and slow the ambition of expanding their ideology across the northern border. Other factors reported were a combination of poor training and meager pay caused the sales and smuggling of small arms and light weapons by some members of the organized forces to civilians who saw that owning gun was a form of empowerment.

Weapons were said to be supplied to both Sudan and South Sudan by external actors mainly from Asia. Apart from the national and international suppliers, civilians were reported to have had access to SALW through porous borders (Skinner, 2012).

2.8 Conceptual Framework

This is a diagrammatic or schematic illustration of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It shows the visual explanation of the variables.

The conceptual framework demonstrates the multiplicity constraints between variables, notably the independent and the dependent variables; showing the strength of relationship between them. The extraneous variables however, can be controlled so as to minimize their impact on the relationship between the dependent and independent. If the influence of independent variable is strong on the dependent variable, then the multiplicity constraint is strong.

2.8.1 The four stage-process of the conflict cycle

Beswick and Paul (2015) put forward a four-stage process of conflict cycle in their topic, when do conflicts become post in the following table.

Table 1: Four Stage-process of the conflict cycle

Stage Nature of conflict International Peace Operations response Escalation Gradual escalation of Diplomacy aimed Conflict prevention activities, violence culminating in at conflict primarily diplomatic formal start of armed prevention conflict Armed Battle death casualties Mitigation Humanitarian and conflict under formal conflicts peacekeeping interventions conditions including armed interventions, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations Post- Gradual decline in Termination ceasefire absolute levels of violence, and change in nature of violence Peace Few or no conflict Recovery Peacebuilding operations, casualties small arms and light weapons control

The ultimate goal of state building after conflict is peace building in conjunction with

both international and national actors through structured programs designed to prevent

relapse of violence (Beswick & Jackson, 2015).

Fig 1: Multiplicity Constraint between State-building and Stability

Intervening variables

State building Security and Stability

- Politics - External influence

- Social factors

STATE INSTITUTIONS

Government structures CHARACTER OF CITIZENS

Incentives Nationhood Spirit

Social status Good practices

Housing Discipline

Staff shelters Attitude

Allowance Community building

Health scheme Exemplary lifestyle

Health facility Parental control

Pension scheme Mental health

Retirement benefit Sick

VocationalIn fig 1 above,training there’s a strong relationship between State-buildingHealthy and Stability. In other

Dutywords, bearers State -building has direct impact on peace and stability Attitudeof a country. towards Hence the State army- and building is the independent variable, which has effect ongovernment the dependent in general variable

36 Positive

Negative

- (Stability). So, Stability is caused by good governance and institutional reforms. There are other factors which interfere with the process of state-building to attain stability of a country. Such factors like political will, external influence, and social factors are the intervening variables; once controlled or taken care of, will lead to stability.

2.9 Chapter Summary

Chapter 2 provided review of the literature, it summarized the gaps to fill when implementing DDR programs, the working models, and red lines to be avoided so as to achieve a successful DDR program. It has also explained that DDR and Security Sector

Reform (SSR) are not the same but complement each other. The Literature review has also highlighted that there are systemic and systematic phases in the implementation of

DDR which need not to be skipped. Several DDR programs have been carried out in many countries in the world, but they all vary in terms of space, time and content or dimension. The empirical literature emphasized the nexus between availability of tools of violence and war if not managed well.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This research design is premised on transformative world view and change of attitude.

This chapter discusses the arrangement of conditions for the collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure. In other words, methodology is the conceptual structure within which the research was conducted. It constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. As such the design included an outline of what the researcher did from writing the hypothesis and its operational implications to the final analysis of data. The design answers the following questions: what was the study about? Why was the study conducted? Where was the study carried out? What type of data was required? Where was the required data found? What was the period of the study? What was the sample design?

What were the techniques of data collection used? How was the data analyzed? In what style was the report prepared (Kothari and Garg, 2019).

3.2 Research Design

This research used both quantitative and qualitative methods (triangulation) to collect data. Survey and correlation designs were used to understand the degree of associations between variables. The qualitative design on the other hand is process oriented, it focused on meanings, the researcher was the primary data collection tool, it employed fieldwork and it is inductive in nature. Qualitative design asked the why, when, what, which questions; which are explanatory in nature to exhaustively describe the process of DDR in

South Sudan, the actors/stakeholders, stockpile management system, major obstacles to successful DDR and proliferation of firearms in civilians’ hands. Under this design the

38 researcher could get descriptions and meanings through explanations; what benefits and challenges the DDR program encountered in South Sudan. The researcher used narrative, phenomenological and case studies to collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures. Qualitative interviews were used to check the correctness of the quantitative data to validate the survey data.

The quantitative design on one hand analyzed the numerical aspects of data collected.

Quantitative design put together puzzles about ex-combatants who underwent and those who did not undergo DDR program, when and how many times the program was conducted. Hence quantitative research is deductive in nature. It answered the “How many” “How much” questions. Under quantitative design the researcher investigated how many actors participated in DDR program in South Sudan. It required exploratory approach to investigate and analyze the process of DDR on ex-combatants in South

Sudan.

Fig 2: Schematic representation of the mixed methods

Research questions/Objectives

Qualitative Quantitative method method

Descriptive SPSS analysis analysis

Results

3.3 Sources of Data

The study used both primary data and desk top review to come up with comprehensive findings about the DDR program on ex-combatants in South Sudan. The researcher travelled to South Sudan and met with an already commissioned team for the research in

Juba, South Sudan. The secondary sources included journal articles, interviews, books, websites, reports, video clips and audio files. The primary sources of data included the target population, and actors in the DDR program in South Sudan.

3.4 Data collection Techniques

The researcher administered structured questionnaires and interviews using probabilistic random sampling techniques and non-probabilistic sampling techniques (snowball, quota, purposive and convenience) to comprehensively understand how DDR program was conducted, success stories, challenges and failures encountered. Face to face interview, observation method and unstructured questionnaires were also conducted with the target population.

3.5 Target population

The researcher initially wanted to reach out to three hundred population size, due to resource constraints, a point of saturation was attained at two hundred sixteen. The researcher had interviews with the Presidential Advisor on Defense and Veterans’ Affairs, the UNICEF Child Protection Specialist, together with the commissioned team in Juba who had planned interviews with officials from the National Security Service. However, the researcher after several attempts could not meet South Sudan DDR Commission because the commissioner was replaced and the acting one was not ready interviews though the researcher used snowball technique to gather information about the SSDDRC and UNMISS. The researcher went to UNDP officials twice to seek appointment, but was

40 repeatedly told no one could give the information needed except the program officer/director who was up country by then. The researcher used back door to get the program director’s e-mail and sent him message for an online interview, but there was no response up to date. However, after using back door search and secondary data, it was found out that UNDP had many flaws and challenges as explained in the chapter 4 below.

The same applied to United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

3.6 Data Analysis

The researcher organized the data in tabular and graphic formats; and interpreted the data collected from questionnaires using Excel and Statistical Package for Social Sciences

(SPSS), which are software tools used by many researchers for measures of central tendency. This entailed separation of the data collected into logical and constituent parts or elements, and examined the data to distinguish its component parts separately in relation to the whole. To reduce the field of bulky information to a usable size, the researcher used descriptive statistical analysis. Inferential analysis was applied to draw conclusions concerning the relationships and differences that were found in the research results under the quantitative design.

3.7 Ethical Issues

The researcher got recommendation or introductory letter from USIU administration to conduct study in the mentioned case study. The researcher used informed consent between the researcher and the respondents/target population by not asking for names on the questionnaires or disclosing location. The researcher observed high level of confidentiality in order not to expose the target population to third party who might abuse the data collected for selfish and wrong motives other than USIU-Africa only. The researcher kept the participants anonymous to keep their status confidential and private.

The researcher used appropriate language, dress code and show responsibility compatible with different categories of target groups using the ethical theory. The researchers carried

USIU identification card and up to date passport stamped with students pass. The researcher therefore acknowledged all sources of data collected and thanked the participants in the research process taking into consideration the academic original sin of plagiarism. The researcher deliberately avoided audio recorder during interviews for security reasons.

3.8 Risk Analysis

The researcher was in contact with, relevant authorities like the police, traditional leaders, area members of parliament and other security agents during the process of data collection and interviews. The researcher kept low profile and was humble in approaching different target groups. The introductory letter and identity documents helped the researcher in the field. The researcher had to carry in his bag raincoats, plastic bags for protecting writing materials, communication devices for timely reporting of incidents in case of any eventualities and credit cards for communication. The researcher transcribed raw data immediately on storage devices to mitigate loss due to theft and destruction. The researcher had to keep abreast of cultural practices among the target groups to avoid cultural conflicts.

3.9 Limitations of the Study

The researcher was not able to travel to the initial three regions which were proposed as clusters because of financial and time constraints. The recommendation that was issued was sent on e-mail and unstamped, which made it difficult in some areas to use, because the respondents wanted original stamped recommendation letter not printed copy from e- mail. However, this did not prevent the researcher from collecting data but it would serve

42 as an advice to always issue researchers with stamped documents early enough prior to going for data collection in the field. Despite lack of funding, the researcher managed to only meet the cost of return ticket, feeding, communication, transport in the field and accommodation during the three weeks spent in South Sudan. At some point, the researcher had to walk long distances under scorching sun, though walking has health benefits. The researcher had to wait for someone to offer a lift to some respondents to conduct interviews with key government officials.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This section therefore presented a detailed description of research methodology. The methodology answered the research questions including the design, sampling techniques, instrumentation and data analysis techniques. It described in detail what was done and how it was done. The researcher opted for triangulation so that the results of the investigations of one method were cross-checked by the findings of another method.

Mixed method (triangulation)

Quantitative design Qualitative design

Descriptive Case study

❖ Correlational studies ❖ Participant observation

❖ Case reports ❖ Unstructured interviews

❖ Cross-sectional surveys (personal ❖ Narrative research

interview intercepts, mail, in-house, ❖ Micro ethnography self-administered and telephones) ❖ Focus group discussions ❖ Structured questionnaires

Table 2: Mixed method design

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This study was to investigate the process of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration, (DDR) process as a prerogative for state-building in South Sudan since

2005 to the present moment. This was in light of the level of insecurity in the Republic of

South Sudan after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 up to the present moment. There have been many guns in the hands of the civil population and pastoralists, which shows that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was inconclusive. This has been justified by a relapse of violence and lawlessness. The data was collected using interview and questionnaires. Data analysis was done using

Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS). To achieve this, the researcher started data collection using exploratory research design; then descriptive research design. Data were mainly collected in Juba the capital of South Sudan because of lack of funds in the budget.

4.2 Assessment of stakeholders in the DDR process

The researcher conducted interviews with a keynote informant. It was reported that there is a total of sixty-seven thousand (67,000) wounded heroes in the Republic of South

Sudan. The report further ascertained that the wounded heroes and heroines were not disarmed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Because the post-2005

South Sudan has been characterized by warlordism and relapse of violence, the leadership decided not to disarm the wounded heroes. There were limited efforts to rehabilitate the ex-combatants because of financial constraints. One vocational training center was established at Mapel Military Training Center. This facility was not enough to

44 accommodate all the ex-combatants because of limited resources. It was suggested that the DDR program be decentralized to the States so that the program could be manageable at the States’ level. This posed big financial and logistical challenges to the government.

As a result, majority of the wounded heroes and ex-combatants converged to the South

Sudanese Capital, Juba. This is where they stage demonstrations or cause disruptions when they are bankrupt or annoyed because their predicaments.

It was reported also that some of the wounded heroes resorted to selling out their firearms just to put something on the table for their families. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/ rehabilitation that was done in Mangala, was never sustainable. Other accounts indicated that, the transitional period that ushered in the Independence of South

Sudan on July 9, 2011 was marked by security dilemma. There were speculations that

Southern Sudan by then and Sudan under President Al Bashir would go back to all-out war, if the country opted to secede from the north. So, where there is constant insecurity, veterans cannot fit.

Many ex-combatants deserted their military bases after the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement. They ended up in their villages and cattle camps with their rifles. This made it extremely difficult for the Transitional Government of Southern Sudan to carry out stock pile management system. The situation was further aggravated by the untimely death of the Southern leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabior in a helicopter crash en route to

New Site from Ugandan capital on July 30, 2005. The region lived in a precarious situation of high risk and tension of the unknown as many questions remained unanswered following the demise of Dr. Garang. According to the senior government’s official, joint DDR implementation with International NGOs was successful only for three months and many challenges arose. The conditions within the army triggered weapons proliferation into the cattle camps. This proliferation turned into dispute

45 resolution army made some wounded heroes and soldiers to start selling out their rifles.

Some resorted to drinking alcohol, others committed suicide and homicide. They were depressed and traumatized. Cattle raiding came about because of the small arms and light weapons strategy within the pastoralist communities. This has led to spillover to neighboring States. The main hot spot areas in the early days after 2005 were the Jonglei triangle comprising of Greater Boma, Greater Akobo and Greater Bor.

Another major cause of inconclusive DDR reported, was the issue of many militia groups supported by the then Khartoum regime to destabilize the South. According to the

Interview, The Government of South Sudan has been engaged in fighting off insurgents and militias on the northern border with Sudan. Most of those militias are based inside

Sudan where they get all financial and military support. Weapons have been smuggled to

South Sudan unceasingly from 2005. This was worsened by the relapse to violence during the December 15, 2013 armed struggle between government forces and the various rebel groups in South Sudan. As stated by Knopf (2016) Ending South Sudan’s Civil War,

Centre for Preventive Action, South Sudan’s level of polarization has gone beyond the binary claim that the ongoing war is between two ethnic groups over power and dominance. Other actors from across the country have directly or indirectly joined the battle field. Most of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons come through the northern border with Sudan. However, Kate’s assertion that Equatoria is another ethnic group is not correct because Greater Equatoria is home to diverse ethnic groups and cultures. Amalgamating such diverse ethnicity to draw a conclusion as mentioned in the

Council Special Report is not backed by any evidence whatsoever (Centre for Preventive

Action, 2016).

Since 2005 up to the current moment, the longest borderline between South Sudan and

Sudan remain one of the protocols that have not been implemented, and long overdue.

Khartoum continues to control the entire airspace of the two Sudans because of the impasse over border demarcation, despite the special panel for border demarcation led by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki and the International Court of Arbitration ruling. There has been a chronology of events after the signing of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement. In November 2006, scores of people died after flares between the

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the Khartoum regime and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Army (SPLA) erupted in Malakal. In March 2008, tension reached escalation point in the contested oil rich area of Abyei between the Ngok Dinka and the Arab pastoralists (Messiriya) over grazing rights and ownership of the North-South divides. In

July 2009, the North and the South pretended to agree with the Court of Arbitration’s ruling that guaranteed the ownership of Panthou or Heglig to Sudan. In December 2009, leaders from Khartoum and Juba agreed on the terms and conditions for conducting a referendum on possible break away and independence of South Sudan. In 2010, after disputed gubernatorial elections, George Athor took up arms against his comrades whom he accused of rigging the results in favor of his opponent. In January 2011, the people of

Southern Sudan unanimously voted to secede from Sudan. In February the same year, regular army and rebel elements clashed in Jonglei State leaving around one hundred people dead. In May 2011, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) occupied the disputed Abyei area. In June 2011 Khartoum and Juba reached a consensus to demilitarize Abyei and handed it to Ethiopian United Nations Contingents; known as the United Nations Interim

Forces for Abyei (UNISFA). South Sudan attained independence on July 9, 2011. A month later, UN reported six hundred people killed in Jonglei clashes, between rival factions. In January 2012, more than one hundred people fled violence between ethnic rival groups mainly the Cobra Faction, led by then renegade David Yau Yau, and regular forces. In April 2012 following weeks of intensified fighting between Sudan and South

Sudan over disputed oil rich Heglig area, the southern army SPLA dislodged Sudanese forces (SAF) and occupied Panthou before succumbing to international pressure from world leaders to withdraw, giving an upper hand to Khartoum to bombard and repulse the

SPLA from Heglig. This led to the closure of oil exploration because of damaged facilities in the oil field and bitter relations between Khartoum and Juba. Juba decided to stop the flow of oil through the pipeline to the north, and declared austerity measures as a cope up mechanism. That period was characterized by regular aerial raids/bombardments by the Khartoum regime in areas like Bentiu, Jau, Maban and parts of Renk in the Upper

Nile region. In August 2012, more than two hundred thousand refugees fled to Yida camp in South Sudan following subsequent military campaigns by the Bashir regime against rebels in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile (James Copnall, BBC news July1,

2011).

Right before and after independence South Sudan was engaged in fighting militia groups across half of the country. All the militias were fully supported and backed by the

Khartoum regime, ranging from those under Abdel Bagi Ayii, to the South Sudan

Liberation Army (SSLA), under Peter Gatdet (late), George Athor (late), Cobra faction under David Yau Yau, Gabriel Tanginya (late) among others.

On April 30, 2019 the researcher held another interview on Child DDR. United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1612 unanimously adopted on July 26, 2005 Children and

Armed Conflict after the recalling previous resolutions 1261, 1308, 1314, 1325, 1379,

1460 and 1539. It was reported that Child DDR is a nationally led but internationally monitored program in the Republic of South Sudan. During all the violence that took place before and after 2005, warring parties were accused of the six grave violations:

Recruitment and use of Children, killing and maiming of children, sexual violence against children, attacks against schools or hospitals, abduction of children, and denial of

48 humanitarian assistance. In her keynote speech, Graça Machel, the United Nations

Special Representative of the Secretary General said that: “It is unforgivable that children are assaulted, violated, murdered and yet our conscience is not revolted nor our sense of dignity challenged. This represents a fundamental crisis of our civilization”. This was attached to UN note of the Secretary General, A/51/306 (1996), Para.317 (UN, 2013).

The tripartite cooperation in the implementation of DDR in South Sudan involved mainly:

The National DDR Commission as the nationally led implementer, the UNICEF and

United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as the internationally monitoring agents. There was relatively limited cooperation between government and the international partners in the implementation of the DDR program. It was reported also that relationship started to improve after the cessation of the hostilities agreement signed in December 17, 2017 and after the Khartoum declaration of September 12, 2018 where government’s motivation increased to be delisted from the countries with the six grave violations of Children and Armed Conflict. Early 2019, the Republic of South Sudan was the latest to sign the Optional Protocol on the Convention of Child’s and Political Rights.

United States and Somalia continue to be the only countries that have abstained from signing the Protocol. This protocol was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; and entered into force on 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 9.

In 2018, UNICEF adopted a six-step case management model to be implemented within six to twelve-month period or more; notably: Identification to know the beneficiaries of the process, assessment of the conditions in which the beneficiaries are found. The third step was to conduct case planning of child and the family. The fourth step was the implementation of the case plan. The fifth step was to follow up and review the process as

49 monitoring and evaluation procedure. And the sixth step was case closure of the entire process.

The early phase of reintegration case management focuses on the priority needs: The case planning (child/family empowerment) which is referred to the following key services:

Health checks, psychosocial support, identification of community mentors, and education.

Child’s global development needs to encompass physical development, cognitive development, social and emotional development; and mental development. Under

Sustainable Reintegration Individual Case Management, UNICEF adopted the following program schedules: Three months post release, case worker/manager meeting with child/family and consultation on available support options for survivors under the age of fifteen years. Meanwhile there would be a promoting education track for other survivors.

The alternative tracks were supported according to preferences like practicalities and available opportunities, and resources. Such tracks under the sustainable reintegration individual case management are: vocational training track, livelihood income generating activities track and education track.

The UNICEF also designed a demobilization and Reintegration System Model in 2018 as follows: Risk Level would involve symbolic disarmament (lying down of arms), release certificate and release ceremony on one hand; and Interim Care Centre followed by Initial

Assessments Case Management (risk assessment) on the other hand.

Under the reintegration kits the UNICEF planned reunification with the family and regular caretaker. And for children without appropriate caretaker, best interest of the child would remain under the care of interim child care (ICC) and Case worker then family tracing and reunification (FTR) continues. UNICEF has a plan of supplies supporting child’s Transition back to civilian life: civilian clothes, sandals, beddings,

50 toiletries/sanitary pads, mosquito nets, soap and utensils, mats and backpacks among other Non- food items (NFIs).

According to UNICEF Child Protection, there is lack of full cooperation between all the actors to ensure a successful DDR process in South Sudan. Another constraint is lack of adequate funds to implement all the winning model that UNICEF South Sudan thinks could serve as internationally accepted model for DDR programs. Another challenge according raised was the underfunding to support and work with the communities to bridge the gaps in the hostile environment; where 2.2 million of children are enrolled in schools without basic requirements. However, the good news is the consensus reached in

February 2019 between the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the

Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), the main rebel group led by

Dr. Riek Machar Teny to avoid the six grave violations. Global guidelines on child protection case management will be incorporated into the new model (Individual Case

Management) together with the old model Child DDR (Interim Care, Family

Tracing/reunification, psychosocial support, education, vocational training, livelihood and subsistence farming).

In her book “South Sudan the Untold Story: From Independence to Civil War”, Hilde

Johnson emphasized mainly on the dream come true for the people of South Sudan, a country without a state, an incomplete divorce between Sudan and South Sudan, Jonglei: the UN between rock and hard place, the leadership, the nightmare, the heart of the matter: security, and waging peace in South Sudan. Prior to serving as the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission In South Sudan from July 2011 to July 2014, Hilde F. Johnson played a pivotal role in the peace process between Khartoum regime and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

(SPLM/A) leadership led by its late leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior.

As raised earlier in the interview with the keynote informant, the situation that followed the CPA and demise of Dr. John Garang was of high risk and uncertainty. Communities especially the commanders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army kept large stockpile of weapons amidst speculations and the unknown. Hilde’s findings correspond to the pilot survey the researcher conducted between April 23 to April 30, 2019 where most communities in South Sudan armed themselves with the aim of consolidating power and influence in the rather precarious circumstances (Johnson, 2016).

Hilde (2016) in “The Untold Story from Independence to Civil War, clearly explained how the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in

Sudan (UNMIS) and how the United Nations Mission in South Sudan came about after the secession and independence of South Sudan in 2011. She talked about the challenges the mission faced in its mandate of the responsibility to protect and maintain peace after many years of protracted war between the Khartoum regimes against the predominantly

Christian south. Joyner (2006) in “The Responsibility to Protect: humanitarian concern and the lawfulness of armed intervention. Va. J. Int'l L., 47, 693” quoted by Frederking and Diehl (2015) raised a key question centered on whether it was ever lawful for a state or group of states to take military action against a sovereign state in order to protect that state’s citizens from their government. None of the cases from Rwandan genocide to

Kosovo, and other cases involving large-scale human rights violence like the Kurds in northern Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, East Timor and now South Sudan, Syria,

Yemen, Sudan, Libya among other were not well handled. It is believed that there is an acute failure now as it was before over the capability and responsibility of the United

Nations, when confronted by the impenetrable nature and limits of state sovereignty

(Frederking and Diehl, 2015).

Regehr (2015) in disarming conflict contended that, the impulse to do something is and should be powerful, and through a myriad of diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, legal and political instruments. That the international community does get engaged up to the multilayered deployment of military and or police forces. To ensure sustainable peace, there is need for spicing up the tasks with stability and security, and in some cases well- trained international and constabulary forces to prevent those who are hell bent to spoil peace and stability. He explains that such deployments can only be successful if there is a conducive interface and cooperation else interventions could exacerbate rather than stop violence.

One of the major indicators of conflict is the availability of the tools of war in hotspot areas as is the case of South Sudan. The report also noted that the absence of war is not justification of the presence of peace. There are many countries which managed to prevent war while conditions for escalation remain visibly present. The global peace index (GPI) recently ranked 162 countries for their peacefulness based on indicators such as the number of violent deaths in political conflict, violent deaths due to organized crimes, levels of crime like terrorist activities, interdependence with neighbors, police per capita, levels of military spending, the availability of small arms and other concerns. All this he claimed, should not give peacekeepers to take side at the peril of the other warring parties. Similar case scenario happened in South Sudan when a Kenyan commander of the

United Nations Peacekeeping force was sacked by the UN Secretary General on grounds that he failed to protected civilians during the July 2016 relapse of violence in the capital

Juba. As reported by keynote informant, the environment for such a decision by the

Kenyan General was rather unconducive and confusing because the opposing forces sought cover and shelter at the protection of civilians’ camp. Another issue was the sovereignty principle and international relations (Regehr, 2015).

Unlike the other militia groups reported of fighting for their identity and land disputes, the arrow boys on the other hand started as a vigilante group that was mobilized after the collapse of the Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army Peace deal mediated by Dr. Riek Machar

Teny, currently leader of the main rebel SPLM/A-IO. Because of the level of polarization in the country, the government was overwhelmed by waves of attacks across the northern border with Sudan and the greater Upper Nile insurgencies and inter-communal fighting.

The arrow-boys were not only fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army, but they also confronted Arab militias/nomads known as the “Ambororo” who have been responsible for illegally entering the South Sudanese territory without any knowledge of the authorities. The menace caused by the Ambororo/Arab nomads over the past years continues to raise security dilemma along the South Sudan, Central Africa and the

Democratic Republic of Congo’ tripartite borders. The Arab nomads are accused of giving directions to irregular forces to wage attacks in parts of the States bordering

Central African-Democratic Republic of Congo. The nomads nowadays are reported to be heavily armed, move together with their families, herds of cattle, sell sugar, salt and are engaged in extracting natural resources along the borders as mentioned above. The arrow boys did commendable job until when the LRA was flashed completed from the Western

Equatoria region and after the support of the American Technical team, the Uganda

People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and African Union’s forces involvement in the pursuit of the LRA fighters from Uganda into the jungles of Congo and Central African Republic.

The arrow-boys started to get infiltrated by some selfish interest of individual politicians who saw them as a threat to advancing their ambitions. In 2012 it was reported that a section of the arrow-boys was duped to go and attack Obbo, a town in Central African

Republic closer to South Sudan where the African Union and Uganda People’s Defense

Forces were based. Seven of the boys lost their lives, some of them were arrested, injured

54 and the rest scattered in disarray. Since then the events that proceeded the December 2013 political and security crises between soldiers who aligned themselves to the former Vice

President, Riek Machar and those under the current President Salva Kiir Mayardit took a different turn. The arrow-boys started mobilizing themselves along grievances lines for not being compensated for their sacrifices and efforts to kick out LRA from Western

Equatoria region. Because of the level of security situation in South Sudan, some started aligning themselves with the rebels while others preferred to be on their own with the objective of getting recognition from the Central Government.

The case scenario of the arrow-boys is akin to the Nigerian vigilante groups that are fighting the notorious Boko Haram. Nigerian vigilante groups however, are currently being disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into their communities with sustainable income generating activities and capacity building being provided. This has not been the case of the South Sudanese arrow-boys in the Western Equatoria region. Some voluntarily abandoned fighting and joined the locally brokered peace deal with the government.

Others got reintegrated into the various units of the organized forces but have not undergone the other components of DDR that’s rehabilitation and reinsertion. Many ex- arrow-boys continue to suffer mental health (post-traumatic stress disorder), psychosocial challenges and low self-esteem because they don’t feel worth staying within their localities. Some have resorted to petty crimes just to sustain a living with majority abandoning the idea of going back to schools.

According to Turyamureeba (2014), the DDR program initially attracted attention of the funders because it was viewed as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation process. However, when the CPA expired, donors became a bit hesitant in dispensing money for the program that was after all not registering convincing results.

Besides, the UNDP, which was technically in charge of the reintegration component of

DDR, never addressed the question of extravagance and misappropriation of funds. A case in point was the UNDP’s failure to account for USD$450,000 and the disappearance of 44 laptops in 2010. This raised skepticism and mistrust about UNDP’s motivation and willingness to improve the wellbeing of ex-combatants. The UNDP became too independent to the extent of contracting the implementing partners without consulting the government DDR Commission. The World Bank was viewed as the best substitute after the UNDP’s mandate expired at the end of 2012. The attitude and willingness of primary stakeholders especially the politicians and technocrats is essential if fruitful results are to be achieved. No interventions can ever effectively take place in the absence of a positive attitude among policy makers and practitioners. In his analysis of the factors that account for a successful DDR program, Turyamureeba asserts that the will of political leaders, guidance and active participation of ex-combatants is a very crucial ingredient. Similar study of the World Bank’s DDR experience in Africa also reiterates that the success of

DDR is a function of mainly political will, transparency and accountability of participating institutions, consulting and listing of the needs of ex-combatants according to their categories and vulnerability. None of these factors was fully achieved in the case of South Sudan.

Turyamureeba found out that, the economic life of women ex-combatants and their associates was worse despite calls from women activists to prioritize the specific needs of women. Women relentlessly fought alongside men until the end of the war. They were in different departments serving as nurses, gun carriers, cooks, cleaners, and caretakers for children born during the war, caretakers for the injured, not to mention being involved in espionage among other things. However, the independence they fought for is yet to deliver tangible outcomes in terms of access to basic needs and equitable ownership of properties such as land to mention but a few. Their vulnerability was compounded by lack

56 of participation in decision making and low literacy levels, which made them unqualified for most of the jobs in government and the private sector. Generally, women were economically marginalized as men controlled household incomes. This study found that female-headed households were particularly more vulnerable mainly due to inaccessibility to land, which directly translated into food insecurity. Most women headed household families indicated that they lacked sufficient food and school fees for their children. They also lacked specific medical needs and suffered from stigmatization and trauma associated with the war mayhems they went through. Fifteen percent of women ex-combatants revealed that their husbands perished during the war and therefore, denial of the “national cake” meant failure to recognize the contribution made by their husbands during the war (Turyamureeba, 2014).

The researcher had access to the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the

Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, a peace accord document brokered by the

African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This signifies that there has been no post-conflict era in South Sudan because of the relapse of violence across the country. Barely two years after the independence on July 9, 2011; an all-out internal conflict ensued on December 15, 2013 up to this moment where a permanent ceasefire seems to be holding except for few armed opposition who declined to sign the Khartoum Declaration on September 12, 2018. Both the August 26, 2015

(ARCSS Chapter 2, pp.20-26) and September 12, 2018 (RJMEC Chapter 2, pp. 10-12) agreements catered for permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements.

However, the August 2015 agreement was not implemented in letter and spirit as stipulated by the parties to the conflict. This was because of DDR timeframe and process going against the intended outcome. Parties to the conflict used cantonment as cover up for rearmament, mobilization and preparation for another war instead of sticking to the

57 rationale of conducting DDR. The fact that two parallel but opposing forces with two army chiefs of staff was a lethal experiment. This manifested itself in the serial clashes between government forces and the opposition forces in the capital Juba within the first week of July 2016 less than a year after the signing of the Agreement (IGAD, 2015).

Breitung (2017). South Sudan’s stalled Peace Process: Security arrangements in need of adjustment, asserted that, one key component of the transitional security arrangement was the establishment of cantonment sites where fighters had to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into a unified army. The process was supposed to kick start immediately after the signing of the disputed agreement. However, this was not the case because of delays in the implementation processes and the July 2016 fighting that erupted again between the opposing forces in the capital Juba. DDR process never took off and when the main armed opposition leader, Dr. Riek Machar Teny returned to Juba, he established as many cantonments as possible across the country. Claudia further asserts that many conflict analysts are convinced that Dr. Riek Machar utilized cantonments as an instrument for strengthening his forces and extend his military power base since the short-lived agreement brought him much closer to the capital Juba (Breitung, 2017).

According to Verjee (2019), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD)

Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) was established to monitor the

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed by the Parties in January 2014 following the December 15, 2013 South Sudanese internal conflict. In August 2015, the

MVM became the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring

Mechanism (CTSAMM) following the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the

Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS). The ARCISS stipulated that the CTSAMM be responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire

58 and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA) as laid out in Chapter II of the

Agreement and the PCTSA workshops that took place thereafter.

The convening of the High-Level Revitalization Forum on the ARCISS in December

2017 led to the signing of a new Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). With the signing of the Revitalized ARCISS in Addis Ababa in September 2018, CTSAMM transitioned to become the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM). The R-ARCISS also provided for inclusion of the signatory Parties in the monitoring of the PCTSA. The major provisions of the

2017 agreement remain the same as those in previous agreements. However, the new agreement allowed for Other Armed Groups like the South Sudan Opposition Alliance

(SSOA) to be considered as Parties to the ceasefire framework and mandated

CTSAMVM monitor the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

The CTSAMVM Board comprises representatives from the signatory Parties, the Former

Detainees, Other Political Parties, the Women’s Bloc, South Sudan Women’s Coalition,

Civil Society Organizations, the Youth, Eminent Personalities, IGAD, the African Union,

China, the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway), the United

Nations Mission in South Sudan, the European Union and the IGAD Partners Forum.

The CTSAMVM reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers and the Reconstituted Joint

Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). The RJMEC has the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement and is the parent body, not only to the CTSAMVM, but also the National Constitution Amendment Committee (NCAC), the

Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), the Economic and Financial Management

Authority (EFMA), the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), the National Pre-

Transitional Committee (NPTC) and the Board of Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF).

In turn, the RJMEC reports to IGAD, the African Union and the UN Security Council among others (http://ctsamm.org/about/background/)

In the revitalized agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South

Sudan (R-ARCSS) which was signed on September 12, 2018; chapter two talked about permanent ceasefire which came into effect on July 1, 2017. The parties remained committed to the cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA) signed on December 21,

2017, which required providing protection of civilians (including women and girls) and humanitarian access. It also required accountability, and compliance with international humanitarian law while enabling safety and dignity. This latest agreement seems to be holding despite the delays in the pre-transitional period and cantonment sites. The cantonment and DDR were supposed to be implemented within the eight months of pre- transitional period which ended in May 2019. An extended six-month period was requested by the main armed opposition under Dr. Riek Machar. This means cantonment and DDR processes continue to face major setbacks one due to lack of funds, and the decline by some international partners to the peace process who first want an inclusion of the few armed groups that refused to sign the Khartoum declaration; and some adjustments in the September 12, 2018 agreement (IGAD, 2018).

4.3 Stockpile Management System

The researcher used non-probability snowball technique and questionnaire to ascertain stockpile management system within the organized forces. It was found out that there are stores within all the organized forces where stockpiles are kept and managed. This system however, has been abused on one hand by undisciplined soldiers and on the other hand by the relapse of violence following the December 15, 2013 armed conflict that befell South

Sudan. It was reported that disgruntled soldiers and those who are not happy with the current regime have managed to smuggle weapons from the stores to the rebels and have

60 switched allegiance. Illegal sale of firearms and ammunitions have also been a source of income. The researcher managed to interact with some fighters from both the regular forces and rebel returnees. It was reported that meagre salaries or no salaries at all are one of the major reasons for the sale of weapons and ammunition so that the soldiers can put food on the table for their families.

The respondents were asked if they keep records of weapons in their institutions or not.

The analysis shows 64% keep records while 36% do not as shown in the figure below.

Fig 3: Do you keep records of weapons in your institution?

Lack of record keeping of stock taking is an indicator of mismanagement and recipe for corruption in the stockpile management. This boils down to the question of command and control. Do unit commanders evaluate their stock and personnel? What came out of the findings is that some commanders are so negligent and ignorant of how to manage their personnel and stockpile.

The respondents were asked if they label and number their weapons or not. The analysis shows 56% have their weapons labels and numbered while 44% do not have labeled and numbered weapons as shown in the figure below.

Fig 4: Are weapons all labelled and numbered?

Lack of labelling some weapons explains veracity of proliferation across South Sudanese porous borders. The rate at which weapons are smuggled across borders is alarming. Lack of control over the norther border is one of the major factors responsible for the proliferation. Since 2005, South Sudan does not have control over the northern border and its own air space because Khartoum deliberately refused to implement the protocol of border demarcation between Sudan and South Sudan.

The respondents were asked if they have heard of small arms and light weapons being sold or smuggled from the stores. The result showed that 50% of the respondents have heard while 50% have never heard as shown in the figure below.

Fig 5: Have you heard of firearms being sold or smuggled from the stores?

The feedback on sale and smuggling of firearms and ammunition shows lack of proper command and control in terms of inventory of the stockpile. Some informants reported

62 how firearms and ammunitions have exchanged hands for money. Some attributed the sale to delays in payments of the salaries, while others said the government is infiltrated to the extent that weapons can easily be smuggled under the watch of the security apparatuses.

4.4 Major obstacles for a conclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

After conducting face-to-face interviews with the Presidential Advisor on Defense and

Veterans’ Affairs, some security personnel and humanitarian organizations, it was ascertained that despite the political will to constitute a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission (SSDDRC) to oversee the implementation of DDR in the post-

2005 South Sudan, there were still many hurdles to overcome. The first hurdle was the challenge to disarm many militia groups who continued to fight the government of

Southern Sudan (GOSS) right after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement on

January 9, 2005 (Hilde Johnson 2016, pp. 101-105). Breitung (2017) argued that the process of DDR should go simultaneously with the implementation of peace agreement matrix. Claudia blamed lack of political will from the warring parties for the relapse of violence in July 2016. She warns that if DDR is not tailored and implemented alongside the September 12, 2018 Khartoum Declaration, it is high probable that violence will resume. However, the cessation of hostilities agreement signed on December 21, 2017 seems to be holding in many parts of South Sudan.

The views put forward by Breitung (2017) mirror what Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012) stressed after animosity broke out between Sudan and South Sudan along the oil rich border areas in 2012. This led to accusations and counter accusations by both sides of the border divides of support to rebels to destabilize the governments of the two countries.

Following the war in Heglig as named by Sudan or Panthou as known to South Sudanese,

Juba decided to halt the flow of oil through the pipelines built in the north to Port Sudan

63 and imposed austerity measures to cope with the political and economic crises. The security tradeoffs continued until another internal conflict barely one year after the 2012 north-south war. These findings were further supported by some informants that

Khartoum continued to punish South Sudan by proxy.

The research sought to investigate if the respondents had any idea about the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The analysis showed that 86% had an idea about the DDR program in South Sudan, while 14% did not have any idea as depicted in the figure 4.1 below. However, knowledge about the DDR program was not enough to guarantee its successful implementation.

Fig 6: Those with idea about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)

The research sought to investigate whether DDR was properly conducted in South Sudan or not. 53% of the respondents agreed that it was properly conducted while 47% claimed that it was not properly conducted as shown in the figure below.

Fig 7: Do you think DDR was properly conducted in South Sudan?

The respondents were then asked if the DDR was successfully conducted or not. 95% claimed that it was not properly conducted, 4% agreed that it was properly conducted while 1% were not sure about the opinion as shown in the figure 4.3 below.

Fig 8: Was DDR successful?

According to the World Bank’s quarterly report (2017), DDR failed to meet the threshold to be qualified as successful. There are many obstacles that led to the inconclusive DDR program in South Sudan are as follows. One is that national DDR commission (NDDRC) which was tasked to oversee the process lacked the capacity to overcome challenges and successfully implement DDR program. Secondly because of the relapse of violence, armed groups remain at large with the payroll of the Sudan’s People Defense Forces

(SSPDF) and organized forces continue to drain the annual national budget. Thirdly, the fluctuating security and political environment do not permit a successful DDR implementation in South Sudan. This is witnessed in the signed revitalized peace agreement where some parties to the conflict declined to put pen to paper and end the war. These groups are not going to implement the security arrangement matrix under which DDR is a key component for the realization of security sector reform. The fourth but not the last is lack of comprehensive consensus on DDR, technical readiness or operational plan, and donor commitment has not been conducive to operational support.

Therefore, the fact that World Bank wants to roll back another strategy and plan for revitalizing DDR program in South Sudan, is a clear indicator that despite the publicity and well coverage sensitization, DDR program was not properly implemented and continues to encounter many challenges. The bank’s recent work is said to focus on technical assistance to the National DDR Commission on updating the existing

Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). The task team recommends revitalizing and building the capacity of the national DDR commission to properly manage future DDR programming and continue with strategic communication with all stakeholders the board. This would enable national ownership by mobilizing adequate financing to reduce lags in project implementation (World Bank, 2017).

When asked what could have been the reasons for poor conduct of DDR in South Sudan, the results showed that lack of political will had the highest percentage for being an obstacle to the DDR process as shown in the table below.

Table 3: Percentage representation of obstacles to successful DDR in South Sudan

Obstacle for Successful DDR Frequency Percent Yes No Total Yes No Government’s policy 42 173 215 20 80 Lack of political will 109 106 215 51 49 Lack of cooperation with international partners/organizations 32 184 216 15 85 Socio-cultural practices, 22 193 215 10 90

Other motives included but not limited to; biasness because not all weapons were collected from civilian hands. Selected few benefited from the DDR program, leaving the majority unattended to. Corruption during implementation was another setback. This was supported by the insight of Turyamureeba (2014) findings that DDR was mismanaged by some stakeholders. Lack of managerial skills by some government officials also played

66 negative role on the process of DDR implementation. The management deficit was blamed on getting people do work they were not trained to do. Geopolitical interests of western governments were reported to play a part in the implementation process. Level of literacy rate by then slowed the understanding of the DDR concepts and importance in

South Sudan. Below are figures representing respondents’ level of education and age bracket.

De Soto (2014) in his article on Diplomacy and Mediation in the handbook of global security policy, he asserted that post-conflict peace-building was defined by Boutros

Ghali as a set of actions needed to ensure that a conflict will not recur. He emphasized that the concept was different in nature from traditional peacekeeping, and more complex, not least because it would involve, beyond the familiar blue berets and helmets, small armies of civilian technocrats to assist in carrying out these activities. He said that collective responsibility by all key actors is an overarching goal and ethos to prevent the recurrence of conflict by adjusting of some of the players in the process of implementation. He further explained that the variety of tasks to be performed after conflict requires a wide spectrum of specialists who should tether their operation in the same geographical space and competing for the attention of national leaders who must play the decisive role (de Soto, 2014, p. 306).

According to Pinaud (2015) in “Observatoire des Enjeux Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la

Corne de l’Afrique”, or observatory of the political and security stakes/issues in the horn of Africa, the ongoing predicament in South Sudan is attributable to the failure of internationally sponsored state-building project. Clémence Pinaud at the time of writing the note was a post-doctoral fellow at the New York University in Shangai. Pinaud claims that the international community is without doubt to blame for the way funds were streamed into the country after the demise of Dr. John Garang de Mabior in 2005. This

67 negligence by the international community allowed some “warlords” or “roving bandits” to run their businesses and consolidate their military bases both within and outside the army. The demilitarization and state-building projects were key in feeding the system of

“politique du ventre”. After the Juba declaration in 2006, SPLA was transformed from a guerrilla into the national army. The army underwent DDR program which was reported to have failed at inception by corruption. The international partners and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) which took a social media acronym of Government of Self-

Service knew very well that DDR was a total failure or “disgraceful joke” as put by

Pinaud. DDR targeted and rewarded the wrong people and the international community abandoned it quietly when South Sudan attained independence (Pinaud, 2015).

The analysis showed that 11.6% of the respondents were primary dropouts, 25.5% had secondary school as the highest level of education, 26.4% were degree holders, 14.8% were master’s holders, 5.1% had doctorate degree while 14.3% had other levels of education.

Fig 9: Highest level of Education

The respondents were asked to provide their ages. The result showed that 19.5% were of age 9-17 years, 49.8% were of age 18-35 years, 21.9% were of age 36-50 years, 7.4% were of age 51-70 years and 1.4% were 71 years and above.

Fig 10: Age bracket

There are many claims that South Sudan was not ready to become a nation-state (quasi state). This was reported to be another obstacle to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process because of the attitudes of the leaders and international partners.

Some scholars, former government officials and opposition at one point suggested that the country should be put under United Nations Trusteeship. The research found out that such assertions were triggered by the attitudes of some political leaders, crime rate and the level of insecurity across the country which made it look like there is no control. The quest for UN Trusteeship however, was strongly opposed because some of the respondents during the interviews claimed that the problems or conflict in South Sudan can only be resolved by South Sudanese. Some respondents admitted that there are systemic and institutional dysfunctions but what is happening in South Sudan is lack of patriotism and nationalism the leads to conspiracy against the state (Frahm, 2014).

Another major setback to successful DDR in South Sudan was blamed on appeasement and rewarding insurgencies policy by the current regime. It was reported that since 2006 to date, the government in addition to the presidential amnesty policy has been rewarding warlords for taking up arms against the state. During integration into regular forces, the militia groups are given big ranks without following the normal process of promotion.

Their top commanders are given luxurious cars and accommodated in hotels at taxpayers’

69 expense. All this was reported as one of the major motives of recurrent conflict in South

Sudan. The warlords were reported to be using this trick for self-aggrandizement and enrichment.

The graph therefore, shows that the youth are the ones used to perpetrate more violence in

South Sudan. The use of youthful age in protracted warfare is not limited to South Sudan but rather a global challenge. As reported earlier under this chapter, youth have been used in many conflicts to sustain armed struggles. Hence the United Nations came up with

Children in Armed Conflict or Child DDR. Since the history of armed struggles in Sudan in the 1950s up to 2005 and the ongoing internal conflict in South Sudan, it is the youth who are always the engine of violence. Politicians alone cannot sustain armed conflicts but rather mobilize the youth and use them to fight on their behalf (Ensor 2012).

Christopher (2011) explores the importance of sports and other talents among the youth as a post-war reintegration strategy. He asserts that ‘Sport for development and peace’ (SDP) projects has created greater concerns around the world among critical scholars, who seek to interrogate the gains, limitations and challenges associated with sports in advancing peace and development in Africa. He further noted that despite the interest shown by the critical scholars, the role of sports in post-conflict peace building remains poorly interpreted and understood. As a field of study, peace building lends itself to practical approaches that seek to address underlying sources of violent conflict. It is surprising that it has neglected to take an interest in sports, especially its grassroots models. Soccer has a strong impact in Africa because of its ability and popularity to mobilize individuals and communities. Christopher used a case study on Sierra Leone, with main focuses on sports in a particularly prominent post-civil war UN intervention DDR process. His study sought to determine how ex-youth combatants, camp administrators and caregivers perceive the role and significance of sporting activities in interim care centers and cantonment sites or

DDR camps. The findings showed that sports activities in DDR processes bear more fruits for containing the different forms of violence, promote healing and social cohesion among ex-youth combatants during their reintegration process. These views were also reiterated by many participants during the current study (Christopher, 2011).

4.5 Armed Civilians and Pastoralists

The researcher found out that not all civilians are pastoralists and not all pastoralists are civilians because there are former fighters among the pastoralists who retired to look after their cattle. Some members of the civil population also were the armed struggle during the

1950s to 1972 civil war, to the 1983 to 2005 SPLM/A liberation struggle and those who took part in the ongoing internal conflict among South Sudanese, but due to some reasons which they declined to express, they decided to retire in oblivion and melt back to their communities.

A series of interviews were conducted with some elders and security agents about pastoral communities. It was reported that prior to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the level of violence within pastoral communities was minimal to the extent that cattle keepers only used sticks to direct their herds during grazing. The narrative changed due to many factors. One was because of an all-out war that started with the 1950s-armed struggle between the Muslim-north and Christian-South of Sudan. This culminated with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 after seventeen years of civil war waged by “Anyanya 1” as the movement was nicknamed. Another armed rebellion exploded on 16 of May 1983 when the people of Southern Sudan by then took up arms against the Khartoum regime. This time around the civil war lasted for twenty-one years and ended with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement at Nyayo stadium in

Nairobi, on January 9, 2005.

Because of the protracted nature of the war, the pastoral communities like any other South

Sudanese were affected. People got conscripted and recruited to the ranks and files of the

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army; while others joined voluntarily. Almost every community got to know about the use of firearms and light weapons. The pastoralists and many civilians in the liberated areas got to know how to use guns because guns served as instruments for protection and dictating the conditions for negotiations with the Khartoum regime.

The above findings were supported by the feedback from 216 respondents who categorically denied that armed civilians are responsible for cattle raiding.

The research sought to investigate the opinion that many guns in the hands of civilians encourage cattle raiding. The results showed that all the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion. The respondents’ opinion was that the ongoing conflict in South Sudan can never be attributable to guns in the hands of civilians and pastoralists. This point of contention was supported by Mkutu (2016) that proliferation only intensifies violence among the pastoral communities; not the primary cause of insecurity.

Fig 11: Do many guns in the hands of civilians encourage cattle raiding?

The above feedback is also supported by Safer World report (2012) which reported that before the comprehensive peace agreement of 2005, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA) deliberately distributed guns to cattle keepers for their protection and that of their communities from cattle raiders. This view was further supported by other informants who reported that the pastoralist communities were very organized members of the society who only practiced their culture of cattle keeping. They did not know anything about the usage of the guns until the war against Khartoum made them to start using the guns. When asked some members of the pastoralist communities, it was reported that the war was protracted and they had no moral grounds to be bystanders. Fighting swept across the Southern Sudan in phases. All communities in South Sudan participated in the armed struggle by contributing food items and fighters. The message from the leaders of the movement was that the marginalized and less privileged people of South Sudan had to liberate themselves from the yoke of slavery, persecution and underdevelopment. This explained the just cause for the war to even last longer than initially thought.

However, the Forum on the Arms Trade report (2018) blamed the proliferation of SALW, ammunition and commercialization of cattle trafficking, private enclosure of pasture and political polarization as the major causes of conflicts in pastoralist communities. Analogy was made to the attack in Laikipia, Kenya of wildlife reserves, conservancies, people and livestock by armed pastoralists in 2017. Numerous researchers claim that militarized state interventions to contain cattle rustling only aggravate the situation rather than stopping it.

That it is also expensive to divert important resources away from sustainable development

(Bolton, 2018).

Idris (2018) in his “Livestock and Conflict in South Sudan, noted from previous studies that cattle raiding is a traditional practice in South Sudan and across East African region in general. Idris also claims that previous reports indicate a prevalence of cattle raiding

73 among the Dinka, Murle and Nuer. The Murle have also been accused time and again for child abductions. The Jonglei triangle is the main hotspot of cattle raiding involving the above-mentioned tribes (Johnson, 2016). The practice of cattle raiding is enshrined in the pivotal role of cattle in the socio-cultural values and livelihoods. Idris further asserted that there is prestige associated with the ownership of many herds of cattle. Such cycle of violence is to blame for the desire to acquire firearms for defense and revenge attacks by one community against another.

Idris’ report also highlighted that some political and military elites within the three tribes have exploited such intercommunity violence to mobilize and arm pastoralists to fight on their behalf. This leads to vicious cycle of violence because once one of the communities is raided, then the other community takes charge to pay back.

Idris like Jok et al. (2018) reported the intensification and militarization of cattle raiding by military elites to perpetrate more violence. The normal practice among the pastoralist communities who have been traditional tools (spears, sticks/clubs and buttons) for cattle keeping have been introduced to AK-47s and even group weapons including grenades.

Random migration of herders in search for grazing land during rainy season and waterlogged areas during dry seasons continue to pose more violence and conflict between the farmers and the herders. This form of conflict was addressed by the

President through security organs and traditional conflict resolution model. Elite accumulation of cattle has been reported for arming the pastoralists to advance their interests. Both military and political elites have become owners of many herds of cattle

(Idris, 2018).

On the other hand, the research sought to investigate the opinion that illegal possession of small arms and light weapons (SALW) was responsible for insecurity in the Republic of

South Sudan. The results showed that 61.5% of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion that surplus of firearms was to blame for instability in South

Sudan, 16.2% were not sure while 22.2% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion as shown in the figure below.

Fig 12: Proliferation of firearms is responsible for insecurity in South Sudan.

Another factor responsible for proliferation among pastoral communities is cattle rustling.

On one hand cattle rustling is used to steal herds of cattle for wealth and on the other hand it’s used to pay bride price (dowry) in terms of livestock. A third motive for proliferation among pastoral communities is the commercialization of the livestock. There is high value for money attached to the livestock for food among farmers and income for the cattle keepers, although the pastoral communities are known to kill the animals mainly during key events or for special visitor.

A fourth cause for proliferation is the random migration for grazing into the areas of cash crops farmers (mainly Equatoria region). There have been conflicts between cash crops farmers and pastoralists since the independence of Sudan in 1956. However, the conflict started to escalate during the twenty-one-year war for self-rule whereby herders have been crossing to areas predominantly inhabited by cash crops farmers. To protect themselves and the cattle from raids or retaliation by farmers, pastoralists have been reported to have acquired weapons to ensure safety from raids on one hand and farmers

75 on the other hand. Farmers have been accusing herders of destroying cash crops and bee hives. An example is the Voice of America (VOA) radio interview (focus on South

Sudan) conducted by John Tanza in Washington DC and Onen Walter Solomon in South

Sudan on June 18, 2019 explains clearly how pastoralists acquire weapons (Onen

Solomon, 2019). The VOA radio interview opened a hint into how South Sudanese acquired small arms and light weapons across the porous borders, especially the contentious northern border with Sudan. The farmers accuse the herders of getting firearms from their relatives in the army to guard and graze their cattle on farms. The herders on the other hand claimed to have acquired firearms either during the war against

Sudan or during the ongoing internal conflict.

The respondents were asked if it is a good practice to own a gun or guns in South Sudan.

51% said that it is not a good practice while 49% agreed that it is a good practice as shown in the figure below.

Fig 13: Is it a good practice to own a gun or guns in South Sudan?

There were mixed responses to the above question. Some respondents who said yes, it is good practice to own a gun or more; further explained that by owning a gun one could guarantee his or her safety in South Sudan. Others asserted that owning a gun can serve as deterrence against criminals, provided the guns are registered and numbered. On the other hand, those who contended that it is not good to own any number of guns, said by owning

76 a gun, one creates more insecurity and is tempted to use it whenever there is a threat to life and property. Others reported that owning a gun or more raises fear from criminals who could easily target the gun owner and it reduces the work of law enforcement agents.

They reported that government is responsible for the security of its citizens. That if everybody can own a gun, then the level of lawlessness increases resulting even in standoff with the authorities because criminals might resist arrest and cause harm to many people during flight.

Extraneous variables (EV)

Proliferation Violence

(DV) (IV)

Politics

Culture

Fig 14: Multiplicity Constraint between proliferation and violence

The above conceptual framework depicts the relationship between small arms and light weapons proliferation and violence. Proliferation being the independent variable, it has a direct effect on violence. Violence is the dependent variable which is caused by proliferation of small arms and light weapons. There should not be any problem with gun ownership. The problem arises when guns are unlawfully acquired and used to perpetrate violence and instability. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis shows that proliferation of small arms and light weapons has an impact on the security and stability of the Republic of South Sudan. Most of the violent acts reported across the country were attributed to the use of guns by both soldiers and civilians. And the victims have also been South

Sudanese nationals and foreigners. It was reported that guns have time and again been used by the perpetrators as an instrument of dispute resolution.

Some of the crimes committed mostly are in form of the apartheid-like scenarios: “If they kill, we kill”. But in the South Sudanese context, it was reported that crimes committed are mainly armed robbery and revenge killings which require blood compensation.

When the respondents were asked if they have ever heard about unknown gunmen, 77% agreed that they have heard about them while 22% said they have never heard about them as shown in the figure below.

Fig 15: Have you ever heard about unknown gunmen?

Unknown gunmen are said to be a group of criminals who are behind many deaths due to gun violence. They are also accused of armed robbery, kidnappings, gang rape and carjacking. Many cases of unknown gunmen are unrecorded and with no suspects arrested or paraded before the courts of law. The issue of unknown gunmen happens like movie series. Mostly they ambush passenger vehicles and attack resulting in loss of life and properties.

4.6 Chapter Summary

The researcher administered three hundred questionnaires to assess the opinions and responses from the respondents about pertinent questions for successful DDR in the

Republic of South Sudan after the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in

2005 up to 2019. After spending three weeks in South Sudan, the researcher managed to collect seventy-five feedbacks from the respondents (April 21, 2019 to May 11, 2019).

The researcher commissioned a person to distribute and collect questionnaires from all those he could not wait for their feedbacks. The researcher was in touch with the commissioned respondent by phone and social media applications. The researcher reached point of saturation after ensuring that two hundred sixteen feedbacks were guaranteed. The remaining one hundred forty-one feedbacks were received on June 30,

2019 by hand delivery from a person who volunteered to deliver them up on arrival in

Nairobi. The questionnaire included twelve questions (both open and close-ended) to give more liberty and lesser time to the respondents to answer. Questions were both structured and unstructured or mixed.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

Discussion of results is the interpretation of the findings with regards to the previous research and describing the implication of the findings. Identification and interpretation are the major tasks the researcher is supposed to do. The findings to be identified and interpreted are those which are directly related to the objectives and research questions.

The discussion mirrors the stakeholders who participated in the implementation of DDR, the stockpile management system in South Sudan, the major obstacles to a conclusive

DDR in South Sudan; and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians and pastoralists.

5.2 Summary and Discussions of Key Findings

The main problem is that despite the establishment of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission (SSNDDRC), South Sudan still experiences more violence because of many firearms across the country. This was justified by the fact that, there is no post-conflict scenario in South Sudan. Since the signing of a comprehensive peace accord between the Khartoum regime under the then President

Omar Hassan Al Bashir and the deceased leader, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, there has always been relapse of violence. It implies that the process was inconclusive as shall be discussed in depth in the next paragraphs. The researcher used exploratory mixed design, whereby qualitative through interviews and secondary data were collected first then quantified using the instrument of questionnaires. Under the qualitative data collection, the researcher used narrative and phenomenological approaches to come up with a descriptive analysis.

The researcher used survey technique by designing questionnaires as an instrument for quantifiable data collection. Because the researcher did not meet the entire budget to travel to the three different regions, data collection was limited to one region but two states using probabilistic technique of cluster and systematic sampling techniques.

According to an informant, the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

(R-JMEC) to the recently signed second peace agreement on the resolution of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, ceasefire is largely holding across the country. There have been some isolated engagements between members of the same opposition groups and clashes reported between opposing parties to the agreement. The United Nations

Development Funds recently reported that the Economy of South Sudan is improving because of peace agreement and relative stability across the country. UNDP further reported to JMEC that more than half of South Sudanese population is in dire humanitarian situation with Greater Jonglei being the most hit by the crisis. Government was urged to influence the attitude of South Sudanese who depend on food aid. There are

35 cantonment sites across the country. Twenty-five cantonment areas are under the

SPLA-IO and South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) and 10 barracks for the government. Soldiers were expected to have arrived at their respective cantonment areas on 31st July 2019. Registration of forces in cantonment areas could start by the middle of this August 2019. Government was reported to have released 10 million US dollars only out of 100 million dollars that was pledged for security implementation. Some of this money (4.5 million US dollars) was distributed to security mechanisms notably: The Joint

Defense Board (JDB), SDSR, Joint Transitional Security Council (JTSC), JMCC, and

CTSAMVM for security implementation. Around 83, 000 forces (TGONU and

Opposition) have been earmarked to be trained before formation of the government in

November which will mark the end of the extended six months of pre-transitional period.

These forces will provide security as training of other forces continues for the next three years. Police is expected to provide security as forces move to cantonment areas. SPLA-

IO has vacated all occupied civilian buildings under their control during war, and SSPDF has done so but there are still some few occupied buildings by government forces.

Government was urged to expedite vacation of all civilians’ buildings by the R-JMEC.

More child soldiers have been demobilized and prisoners of war released as good gesture for peace. Peace implementation is behind the schedule because of lack of funds but it is on course. There is hope revitalized government would be formed as was scheduled in

November.

Case (2016) contends the issue of gender mainstreaming in the implementation of a more inclusive peace agreement. The claim is that ex-women combatants were not properly catered for by the first phase of the DDR program. Case argued that transformation can only be realized when war gains of female ex-combatants are equally included in the

DDR process the same opportunities as their male counterparts participating in decision- making processes. It is reported that United Nations peacebuilding programs excluded women in the 1980s. Women were considered as non-combatants because of their female identity. Case strongly believes that if women are neglected in the DDR process, then they will be relegated to subordinate positions and gender stereotyping takes toll on them in the post-conflict society. Women play the most integral role in our society. They bear all the burdens perpetrated by their male counterparts. Excluding women in the DDR process would tantamount to failure to implement the program at inception. It was reported that women are the closest allies to the youth because of their motherly care and discernment. The move by politicians to use young to fuel more violence only adds more misery and suffering to the women. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution

1325 of October 31, 2000 was key affirmative action (Case, 2016).

5.2.1 Assessing the participation of stakeholders in the DDR implementation

The main stakeholder in the implementation of DDR is the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission (SSNDDRC) instituted in December 2012.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR/1325) calls for gender mainstreaming, considering the various needs of female and male ex-combatants and their dependents. This could have been the main motive for the establishment of the South

Sudan DDR Commission.

However, SSDDRC initially did not take the specific needs of female and male DDR candidates in South Sudan into account. Secondly, the SSDDRC set up separate eligibility criteria for Adult Candidates and Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups, instead of having an amalgamated general category for ex-combatants. These criteria underestimate the contributions female DDR candidates made to the war and affirm the patriarchal structures in post-conflict South Sudan. Hence, the design of the South Sudan

DDR process between 2005 and 2011 answer the call of UNSCR 1325. Out of the 216 respondents, 95% (205) said DDR was not successful, 4% (9) said it was successful and only 1% (1) was not sure whether it was successful or not.

5.2.2 Stockpile Management System

Even though South Sudan after the comprehensive peace agreement had instituted a commission to oversee DDR program, many firearms have ended up in civilians and criminals’ hands. Owning firearms is associated with power, class and prestige. This assertion is supported by the Small Arms Survey Issue Brief number 6. 2014. South

Sudan is indeed saturated with weapons following the protracted armed struggle for self- determination since 1960s up to 2005; and the ongoing internal conflict whereby rebellion is waged as lucrative business. The leniency that the presidential amnesty offers to

83 insurgents is skewedly interpreted by those who take up arms against the state. It is common knowledge in South Sudan that a warlord can switch allegiance many times depending on which side supports him. If government agrees to the terms and conditions laid by the warlord, then he orders his fighters to lay down their weapons and be integrated into the regular forces. When economic conditions become unfavorable, and basic services to the insurgents are not met, there’s always high tendency of rethinking their positions either to resume clandestine activities against the state or seek asylum in neighboring countries where they command their fighters and hence relapse of violence.

Schroeder (2015) gives an insight into how firearms should be acquired, stored and managed. He further emphasized on how to label firearms, record-keeping and tracing in case of theft. In the case of South Sudan, however much some firearms were said to be well labelled and stored, a lot needs to be done first in training personnel on how to be committed and dedicated to the national cause. Out of the feedback got from interviews and questionnaires, there is a big gap in the stockpile management system in South

Sudan. Guns are used as an instrument of prestige, class and empowerment. Unless there is change of attitude, it is highly probable that more violence will be happening in South

Sudan because of irresponsible handling and management of firearms (Schroeder, 2015).

5.2.3 Major obstacles for successful and conclusive DDR in South Sudan

After analyzing the respondents’ feedback in the questionnaires, eighty-ninety-point five percent said DDR was not properly conducted in South Sudan. In contrast, only nine- point four percent said DDR was successful in South Sudan, with one-point one saying they were not sure if at all the process was successful. Most of the ex-combatants admitted that they were unhappy and not satisfied by the reintegration package. To portray their anger, the ex-combatants at one time refused to talk to officials of the DDR

Commission and other organizations, accusing them of neglect. In another incident, an

84 ex-combatant reportedly attacked one of the staff of the Commission. However, the trainers argued that high expectations, lack of interest and high levels of illiteracy among ex-combatants were one of the stumbling blocks towards meaningful reintegration.

Lack of political will was the majority culprit for inconclusive DDR, with biased DDR, selected few beneficiaries, corruption, lack of proper management by some key stakeholders, geopolitical interests and low levels of sensitization because of limited resources and illiteracy were other factors that hindered a successful process. The Center for Preventive Action report (2016; pp. 8-12) and International bodies asserted that some of the major causes of instability in South Sudan are tribalism, the creation of twenty- eight states and deployment of heavily armed national security service personnel in plain clothes in and around the capital Juba. This view was contended by some keynote informants who reported that the increase of number of states is a popular demand which was done after consultations because of interstate-border disputes. That many people supported the idea to increase the number of states, though some regions decided to apportion more states with few counties for themselves, which seemingly justifies the irrationality for the creation of more states. In the September 12, 2018 Khartoum declaration, an independent boundary commission (IBC) was tasked to conduct a survey and consultations on the same. Their report remains clumsy and it would seem a referendum is an ideal instrument that would determine the number of states. When asked about the allegations of government deploying heavily armed national security personnel in plain clothes in and around Juba, another informant said, the August 2015 IGAD- brokered agreement was a deadly experiment carried on the people of South Sudan. That nowhere in the world has mediation subjected conflicting parties to have two parallel armies in one country.

That the security arrangement in the agreement on the resolution of conflict in the

Republic of South Sudan was a total conspiracy to allow the armed opposition to reorganize, mobilize more resources and forces, come closer to the capital city Juba and launch another campaign against the government. To further back his contention, the informant said the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit declined to append his signature to the agreement which was unilaterally signed by the opposition in Addis

Ababa on August 15, 2015 on the basis that it was only designed to escalate more violence and suffering of the masses but benefit a few who are used by external actors.

President Salva due to growing pressure and threats of sanctions as alleged by the center for preventive action, indeed signed the agreement on a later date not in Addis Ababa but in Juba, on August 26, 2015. According to security experts, “dog fight” took place in Juba less than one year in July 2016 and the subsequent flight of Dr. Riek Machar into the jungles of Congo and hot pursuit by the government forces. This opinion was supported

Breitung (2017), project manager at the Bonn International Center for Conversion. Some parties to the conflict have taken rigid stances not to sign the Khartoum declaration because of issues they think are still unresolved.

Another key factor that led to lack of full implementation of the DDR in South Sudan is the terms of amnesty policy and politics of appeasement by the government under the leadership of President Salva Kiir. It is a befitting gesture to pardon insurgents on one hand, but a burden to the nation when the good gesture is abused and misinterpreted on the other hand. Some key informants blamed the failure of DDR program because warlords are using insurgency and rebellion as an instrument for enrichment. Rebellion is a lucrative business in South Sudan. It was reported that South Sudanese could settle their differences politically and mitigate the loss of lives and destruction of properties which came after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. The informant

86 made analogy to the Kenyan post-election violence in 2007 to 2008 which killed hundreds of Kenyans. That incident resulted in the indictment of President Uhuru Muigai

Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto plus four other officials. They had to go and clear their names before the international criminal court (ICC) in The Hague.

Kenyans learnt their lessons and have embraced political and judicial dispute resolution mechanism over military approach. Another example is the 2017 presidential, senatorial, gubernatorial and parliamentary elections that saw the Supreme Court overturning the re- election of a sitting president. The subsequent court decisions to challenge other post holders who were duly elected, show the level of maturity that Kenya and other Africa countries have demonstrated. The reverse is true in South Sudanese politics. When duty bearers are working in the government and holding powerful positions, they do not ring alarm bells on corruption and mismanagement of public resources or even resign from their positions. Once they are relieved from office that is the time they become watchdogs in reporting the rot and corruption in the system. Some take up arms or join armed opposition against the government.

The government of South Sudan through the presidential amnesty and appeasement policies pardons and gives big rewards to the insurgents in terms of expensive cars, financial support and accommodation in hotels at the taxpayers’ expenses. This opinion is supported by Pinaud (2015) in her “Obervatoire des Enjeux Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l’Afrique”. Pinaud argued that after the Juba declaration in 2006, the former combatants also known as “SPLA Proper” as mentioned by some participants were immediately replaced in many circumstances by the militias through the amnesty or appeasement policy. Many of these ex-combatants were frustrated and decided to retire voluntarily especially after the death of Dr. John Garang in helicopter crash in July 2005.

This trend of accommodating militias continues to drain taxpayers’ money and weaken the army because of the incorporation of big ranks and unqualified officers into the ranks and files of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) which changed name not until last year, August 2018 by a Presidential Decree. In fact, one informant blamed such move by the government for the recurrent defections and insurgents that the country witnessed during the ongoing internal conflict. It was reported that some of the soldiers who defect to join opposition, do so because of ranks while others defect from the opposition because of poor living conditions and uncertainties. Many of those who served in the army diligently since the liberation struggle up to the independence find themselves subordinate to high-ranking militias who because of one reason or another took up arms against the government but are rewarded more than the loyal counterparts (Pinaud, 2015).

5.2.4 Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians and pastoralists

The narratives among many South Sudanese on the possession of firearms are conflicting but interesting. After conducting in-depth interviews and administering questionnaires, it was found that, acquisition of firearms by the civil population and pastoralist communities is illegal. However, some participants and respondents preferred to own a gun or more for personal protection. This tendency explains the level of insecurity and fear that South Sudanese are undergoing. The aftermath of one of Africa’s longest wars has witnessed proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of the civilians and pastoralist communities. In some incidents it was reported that some communities even ask dowry in form of different make of the firearms. Leaving armed civilians barely without control has always backfired. This assertion is backed by Brian Adeba (2018) and

Jok, et al. (2018) that the militarization of cattle camps has contributed to high rate of crimes and insecurity.

Small arms and light weapons are not responsible for violence in the pastoral communities per se but they have rather intensified worsened the situation. However, out of the two-hundred-sixteen questionnaires distributed, sixty-five percent disagreed that many firearms in the hands of civilians and pastoralists encourage cattle rustling. This finding is supported by Mkutu (2006; pp. 47-90).

The issue of gun ownership is a national security threat across the world as explained by one key informant. According to the business insider report (2019), of the fifty most violent cities in the world, 42 were reported to be in Latin America, Mexico leading with

15 on top of the list, Brazil with 14, Venezuela with 6, Columbia with 2, Honduras 2 and

Guatemala, El Savador and Jamaica all had one city each on the list. Also on the list was

San Juan, the capital city of Puerto Rico, while four United States’ cities were listed: St.

Louis, Baltimore, Detroit, and New Orleans among others (PULSE, 2019).

The issue of gun violence and control is a global challenge and South Sudan is no exception. The shootings in El Pasȏ-Texas, Dayton in Ohio, Orlando and other parts of the United States is a wakeup call that law makers and law enforcement agents should compromise their comfort zone to salvage the situation. The world has witnessed the use of guns by wrongful elements to terrorize the tranquility of the masses in France, New

Zealand, India, Somalia, Mali, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Sudan and Kenya among others.

If the most industrialized and stable countries have fallen short of the required standards to maintain peace and security of their states, then South Sudan with a high illiteracy rate does not need many guns in the hands of people who only use them for criminal activities.

On August 7, 2019, Claire Parker who writes about foreign affairs for the Washington

Post wrote that Amnesty International has joined a growing list of countries warning travelers about the perils of gun violence in the United States. The travel advisory issued

89 on Wednesday called on people across the globe to exercise caution, restraint and have contingency plan when travelling to the United States of America. The advisory termed gun violence in the United States “a human rights crisis”. Gun violence in the western world has been reported in open sources (Aljazeera, BBC, CNN and France 24 televisions among others).

5.3 Recommendations

After eight months in speculations of exactly what conclusion could be drawn from this research, the researcher has learnt that there were previous studies carried out on DDR in

South Sudan. Some researchers were excited by the signing of comprehensive peace agreement on January 9, 2005 and they embarked on writing about DDR. They thought it was prudent to conduct DDR simultaneously for durable peace to prevail in South Sudan.

Some even concluded that DDR was conducted in a post-conflict South Sudan.

The toughest part of this research like the implementation of DDR itself was financial constraints to reach out to the targeted population. The researcher failed to get enough funds within a limited timeframe to come up with a more coherent and comprehensive report about DDR in South Sudan and how it could come to a logical conclusion.

However, the researcher managed to collect enough data for this study by keeping low profile and cutting cost. The researcher also succeeded to meet key government’s officials in the Executive and Security Organs, some representatives of international organizations operating in South Sudan, professors who had conducted similar study, church leaders and eminent personalities within a span of three weeks. The researcher continues to be in touch with some important personalities through social media platform and e-mail.

To ensure successful and conclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in

South Sudan, there is need for both state and non-state actors to collective shoulder the

90 responsibilities involved in the process of DDR implementation. More focus is needed on youths, women and pastoralist communities because they are the instruments used by politicians. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR1325) calls for gender mainstreaming. This considers the different needs of female and male ex-combatants; and their dependents. For this very reason South Sudan DDR Commission was established to assume full responsibility for the design and implementation of DDR program.

Internationally, Under the 2001 United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN

PoA), states undertake to ensure, subject to their respective constitutional and legal systems, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold SALW establishes adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, among other things relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss (Clause 17). The PoA also encourages states to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, particularly physical security measures, for SALW, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and sub-regional mechanisms in this regard.

Regionally, Article 9 of the 2001 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and

Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of

Africa, ‘Disposal of Confiscated or Unlicensed Small Arms and Light Weapons’, requires that States establish an effective mechanism for storing impounded, recovered or unlicensed illicit SALW pending the investigations that will release them for destruction.

Nationally, government needs to study and adopt the organization for security and cooperation (OSCE) Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile

Management and Security, which aims to provide guidelines for the management and security of national SALW stockpiles. It provides some suggestions on how to improve national stockpile management to increase security and safety of both civilians and security personnel. However, government needs to streamline stockpile management with training after reintegration with professionalism where the unified organized forces should display highest degree of statehood, commitment, and discipline by upholding to the National Army Act as shall be stipulated in the Transitional Constitution of the

Republic of South Sudan.

To overcome the major obstacles towards a successful DDR program, politicians and political leaders should put national interest before self-interests. Strong political will should make those in leadership positions desist from, manipulating the national army on tribal grounds and for serving egocentric interests; instead of working for a common national agenda to ensure stability and prosperity. The nation needs a constitution that gives citizens the power to make leaders know that they are in the office because he/she is or was the choice of the citizens. South Sudan needs to establish social welfare/pension to cater for its veterans otherwise the veterans remain big threat to the stability of the state.

The government needs to establish vibrant private sector in a bid to create job opportunities for the youth. Therefore, to ensure uninterrupted service delivery, the government should develop infrastructure across the country.

South Sudan needs to establish and empower independent judiciary to deal with errant politicians. South Sudan should allow democratic transformation, for instance, political parties granted the freedom to hunt for votes through free and fair elections. South Sudan needs to uphold justice and accountability. Nation’s resources should be shared equitably

92 through transparent process across the country. The young nation should invest in quality education to transform youth for a better South Sudan. The young nation needs to seek help of former colony, the Britain, to demarcate communal boundaries as well as the states within South Sudan. There’s need for equal service delivery to the citizens across the country.

On external front, the leadership in government and opposition should put their differences aside and exert more diplomatic efforts to reach out to all countries that midwifed the birth of the independent South Sudan. South Sudanese leaders should replicate the same lobbying strategies which were used during the lengthy armed struggle for self-determination. There is need to apply robust foreign policy tools through a competent and solid Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation. The expression should be: “Money is nothing but image is everything”. If South Sudan loses its image, it has lost everything. It is high time for hard work to improve the already deteriorated image of South Sudan of the ongoing war of shame and egocentrism. There should be a consensus between the government and partners or friends of South Sudan in terms of exploitation of all extractive economies. However, government should not make it appear as if the South Sudan must pay back all those who supported the movement against the Khartoum regimes that persecuted South Sudanese for many years and denied the region economic growth and empowerment for development.

A key component in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is the role of media in disseminating accurate, objective, balanced reliable and fair information to the public about the implementation. Caution should be taken through an outreach programs spearheaded by civil society organizations and government agencies to urge peace spoilers from using social media platforms to stir up unnecessary provocations that would trigger more violence as seen during the ongoing conflict. The level of

93 sensitization should be supported and intensified about the dangers of owning guns especially in the context of South Sudan.

The leaders, who hope to leave a memorable legacy on the independence of South Sudan, should think out of the box by learning good leadership practices from their counterparts on how to compromise their positions and prioritize national interests and the welfare of the people. Duty bearers should not abuse their offices because by doing so, they would frustrate investment opportunities and impede on the potential of South Sudan.

As reported earlier, many of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons continue to find their way into South Sudan from the northern border. There is need for leaders of

South Sudan to implement the pending protocols that Khartoum deliberately refused to implement from the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement, which include but not limited to; the issue of the disputed Abyei region, the border demarcation between Sudan and

South Sudan of 1st January 1956. Khartoum-Sudan should be engaged diplomatically to stop supporting insurgents within South Sudanese territory. Such bilateral relations should be reciprocated by all sides to pacify and normalize relations between the two countries.

In as far as the implementation of the current peace accord is concerned, the revitalized transitional government of national unity (R-TGoNU) should concurrently streamline disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with the implementation matrix so that a repeat of the poorly conducted DDR from the previous experience is prevented.

South Sudan is not an Island but a member of the wider United Nations and regional bodies like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and is in the process of joining the East African Community (EAC) bloc. When there is a crisis akin to the one in South Sudan, all member-states should swiftly act and contain any further

94 escalation. The region should once and for all discourage the tendency of taking up arms as a tool for alternative disputes resolution. Rebellion should be denounced and there should be measures stipulated in the regional legal framework that forbid the use of armed conflict as an instrument to resolving conflicts. The impacts are palpable in and across South Sudanese borders. People have been displaced from their homes, lost dignity and are subjected to abject poverty. Rewarding insurgencies makes it difficult to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration because it only breeds more violence. Warlords time and again use armed struggle to address their grievances and are rewarded by big positions which they may not manage properly and the vicious cycle continues.

Therefore, to ensure sustainable peace, reconstruction and development, there is need for two dimensional approaches. One is to disarm, demilitarize and depoliticize conflict so that in a disintegrated society like South Sudan, recurrence of violence can be avoided and the opportunity for forgiveness, healing, reconstruction and stability is created.

Secondly, there is need to grab the chance of preventing war to focus on constitutionalism, political will and socio-economic conditions on which peace can be restored. All national institutions should have concerted efforts to mediate the political and social conflicts faced by South Sudan. It is wise and even appealing to cease all military approaches to impose political outcomes that political and socio-economic conditions do not sustain as suggested by Regehr (2015).

Leadership needs to change attitude towards the youths who constitute more than 60 percent of the population in South Sudan. Instead of mobilizing them to fight and destroy the little that has been built, there is need to engage them in developmental activities. To start with, youths need to be organized across South Sudan by their talents and capabilities. Those talents need space for improvement and development. This can only

95 be realized through education and vocational trainings. The heart of every young person’s development is sports activities. South Sudanese diverse cultures are endowed with untapped talents. It is not a surprise seeing many young people roaming in major towns and villages across the country. This is witnessed during public holidays and celebrations, where youths do not have recreation centers to demonstrate their skills, build on to become professionals and compete both regionally and internationally. Involving youths and other ex-combatants in the production units like general construction, agriculture, health training and entrepreneurial activities can change the narrative in which the country is stuck to a flourishing, vibrant and prosperous economy.

Professional footballers like Didier Drogba of Côte d’Ivoire, Samuel Eto’o of Cameroon,

Nwankwo Kanu of Nigeria, Mohammed Salah of Egypt, Sadio Mane of Senegal, the

Ayew brothers of Ghana and many other professional players across African continent, have played very important roles of pacifying, unifying and developing their countries just by kicking football across European countries and change of attitude. Among all the

African professional footballers, one George Weah through his success stories in the football arena, ascended to the Presidency of Liberia.

Like the legend late Manut Bol who made history as one of the best basketballer in NBA contributed significantly towards the plight of many South Sudanese during the bloody days. Recently the Toronto Raptors were crowned champions for the very first time in the history of NBA under Masai Ugiri a Nigerian-Kenyan basketball player to become the

Raptors’ club president. Some South Sudanese have also been recognized like the son of the late Manut Bol in the United States, Canada and Australia. Instead of confining many

South Sudanese young talents to refugee camps across the region, politicians need to rethink their position, abandon their egocentrism and change their attitudes for the betterment of South Sudan. The country has full potential to develop faster than many

96 countries which have been stuck in the colonial trap. Subjecting such talents to relief food dehumanizes and renders them dependent rather than creative and innovative.

In similar vein, all ex-combatants (young and old), women and men should be registered afresh in all the States of South Sudan. Then a decentralized DDR program under the supervision of both the State authorities in liaison with the United Nations Mission in

South Sudan, the South Sudan DDR Commission’s state coordination office, the

Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms

(CTSAMVM) together with the Joint Defense Board under the Ministry of Defense and

Veterans’ Affairs, and other partners like the UNDP, the faith-based groups and the

World Bank. This will ensure transparency, inclusivity, larger coverage and successful implementation of the process in South Sudan. There should be thorough monitoring and evaluation on quarterly basis because DDR implementation has been a major challenge to achieving sustainable peace and development in South Sudan. Government should allocate budget and plan for income generating activities that would incorporate the desires and aspirations of ex-combatants into a comprehensive nation plan.

Programs like cooperative and the famous “Savings and Credit Co-operative” (SACCO), would create clusters of beneficiaries with similar ideas and entrepreneurial skills to work together. Some ex-combatants should directly be involved in government’s projects like bridges and road constructions, electricity, water and sewerage corporations, mechanized farming among others. The local and international organizations on the other hand should provide capacity building trainings and financial support to top up the already government’s established programs. Mental health should take precedence among the top priority projects. In the findings many ex-combatants were reported to have committed suicide and homicide as a result of mental health problems. After many years of protracted wars of liberation few combatants and ex-combatants have undergone

97 counselling and proper rehabilitation. The process of transformation and professionalization of the national army should encompass counselling and rehabilitation of all those who are still in active service and the ex-combatants. This would address the burden caused by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Evaluating the feedbacks gathered during the study, many soldiers are engaged in charcoal business which is a major source of income. These activities are threats to the ecosystem with South Sudan being at the brink of desertification. In many instances like after the Korean war in the 1950s, many trees were cut down one because of meteorological reasons and constructions thereafter. After realizing and acknowledging the risks of cutting down trees knowing well that the country is two thirds mountainous;

Koreans embarked on mandatory afforestation policy. Despite carbon emission due to industrialization, South Korea is ever green with trees all-over the mountains. South

Sudanese should join the global agenda as stated in the sustainable development goals

(SDGs) to save the country from climate change and global warming. The rate at which timber has been smuggled from South Sudan because of the ongoing fighting is alarming.

The war profiteers report clearly indicates that few people have benefitted from the exploitation of commercial trees (teaks, mahogany and alike). There has not been proper regulator body to control the cutting and export of the high-quality timber which could have contributed considerably to the non-oil revenue.

Borrowing from the Safer World recommendation, the control and use of small arms and light weapons by civilians in South Sudan needs a concerted strategy to address the demand and supply factors. Considering the level of polarization, security challenges and lack of robust infrastructure to guarantee the protection of the civil population, there is need to apportion strategic measures into short, medium and long-term plan that would improve the structural concerns to facilitate civilian arms possession. Government and

98 civil society organizations need to have a common outreach agenda to disseminate information across the country on the dangers of owning guns and the need to disarm or surrender them to the authorities for proper stockpile management or total destruction altogether. Such process needs to be synchronized with other interventions like food security, hygiene, domestic violence and intercommunal conflicts so that the safety of the community is guaranteed. If the set rules on gun ownership are not adequate to forbid unlawful possession, then it is high time to revisit those rules and enforce them.

With the ongoing efforts to implement the peace agreement signed in 2018, the transitional government of national unity (TGoNU) needs to implement the accord in letter and spirit. This government of national unity should make it also clear that it is committed to the rule of law and constitutionalism. No more insurgencies should be entertained as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The ballot box should replace the bullet box as an instrument for any regime change due to dissatisfaction or grievances whatsoever. South Sudan should focus on economic empowerment to build a nation with all its diverse, rich resources and cultures.

Conclusion

Therefore, it is worth noting that the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was inconclusively done. The militarization of cattle camps is as bad as no

DDR at all which leads to recurrent violence and instability of the country. There’s strong multiplicity constraint between State building and stability of the state. And there is also strong nexus between proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and level of crime rate and violence within that same state. What can be deduced from this assertion is that leadership style guarantees security stability of the state. Once security of the state is stabilized, the country immediately recovers from economic meltdown and foreign direct investment is restored by default. An inclusive DDR process that considers gender

99 mainstreaming, youth empowerment through development activities and regional representation will pave way for sustainability. The country does not qualify to be called a post-conflict state as of now because conflict is still going on. The quest for institutional reforms can only be achieved after full implementation of DDR which is an integral component of security sector reform (SSR). Therefore, the researcher suggests that more funding be earmarked for a longitudinal study on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in South Sudan even after a post-conflict era. All international partners should revisit their position and continue to support the implementation of DDR in South

Sudan. This will ensure accountability, guarantee success and stabilize the country.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: BUDGET

S/N Item Description Unit Cost Estimated

(US$) Amount (US$)

1 Transport Return ticket from South Sudan (3 800 X 3trips 2,400

trips)

2 Accommodation One month 100 3,000

& feeding

3 Stationeries Pens, notebooks, 6 reams of papers 300 300

rulers, 2 calculators, file folder,

mathematical set & 5 bags

(estimated price)

4 Airtime Zain & MTN South Sudan credit 500

for 5 persons

5 Field trips 10 visits 100 1,000

6 Rain coat 5 pieces of raincoats 20 100

7 Gum boot 5 pieces of gumboots 50 250

8 10% Miscellaneous 755

Total Grand total 8,305 USD

Table 2 budget table

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APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire has been solely designed to enable the bearer/researcher with the process of data collection. All information shared by the respondent/participant herein, shall be treated with utmost confidentiality and for academic use only. This information would help other researchers with interest on the same or similar topic, to contribute and impact knowledge for the welfare of the society.

1) Do you have any idea about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration also known as DDR? Yes No 2) Do you think DDR was properly conducted in South Sudan? [Yes] [NO] 3) If Yes, to what extent was DDR conducted? ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… 4) Was it successful? [Yes] [No] [Not sure] 5) If No, what could have been the reasons or obstacles for a successful DDR? a. Government’s policy b. Lack of political will c. Lack of cooperation with International partners/organizations d. Socio-cultural practices, or any other reasons, mention below: ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… 6) Do you think many guns in the hands of civilians encourage cattle raiding? Tick: [Yes], or [ No] 7) On a scale of 1 to 5 do you believe illegal possession of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are responsible for insecurity in the Republic of South Sudan? 1-Strongly 2-agree, 3-not sure, 4-disagree, 5-strongly agree disagree

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8) Is it good practice to own a gun or guns in South Sudan? Yes No 9) How do you feel if at all you own a gun? ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………… 10) Have you ever heard about unknown gunmen? Yes No 11) What is your level of Education? Tick where applicable a) Primary dropout b) Secondary school c) Degree holder d) Masters holder e) Doctorate f) Vocational school g) Non h) Other, mention ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………… 12) What is your age bracket? Tick where applicable 9 to 17 18 to 35 36 to 50 51 to 70 71 and above 13) Do you keep records of weapons in your institution? Yes No

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14) If yes, do you have warehouse with a store keeper? Yes No 15) Are weapons all labelled and numbered? Yes No 16) Have you have heard of small arms and light weapons being sold or smuggled from the stores? Yes No Thanks for your participation and cooperation!

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APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON DEFENSE AND VETERANS’ AFFAIRS ON MAY 9 AND 10, 2019

Good afternoon your Excellency!

My name is Dominic Michael Genge, a graduate student at the United States International University-Africa based in Nairobi-Kenya. I’m here to seek an audience with you, if you may allow me, to conduct a brief interview on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process in South Sudan. Thank you, sir, for giving me time from your busy schedule.

1. How did the government establish the DDR Commission?

2. Was the DDR program implemented to government’s satisfaction?

3. How many ex-combatants does the government have in records?

4. To what extent was DDR implemented among the ex-combatants/wounded heroes?

5. How did other organizations (non-state actors) participate?

6. What were the challenges faced by government in the implementation process?

7. Was there good cooperation between the State and Non-State actors?

8. What do think could be the best approach for a successful DDR?

9. Do you many firearms in the hands of civilians and irregular armed groups are responsible for the ongoing conflict?

10. Would you have more advice and recommendations to help me in this noble cause?

Thank you once more your Excellency for having an audience with me on this very important issue of concern. I beg to leave sir!

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APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH UNICEF, CHILD PROTECTION SPECIALIST

Good afternoon sir!

1. What do know about DDR South Sudan?

2. When do you think the DDR program started in South Sudan?

3. To what extent was DDR conducted in South Sudan?

4. How did UNICEF participate in the DDR process?

5. How many people benefited from the implementation?

6. What were the major obstacles and challenges in the implementation process?

7. Do you really think DDR can succeed in South Sudan?

8. What is needed to realize a successful DDR in South Sudan?

9. Do agree or disagree that firearms are scattered all over the country and in cattle camps?

10. Did the implementation of DDR cover both ex-combatants, child soldiers and active servicemen?

11. What sustainability programs were incorporated in the DDR?

Thank you very much for giving me your time, I appreciate and thanks for sharing your business card. Nice day sir!

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APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH STATES OFFICIALS ON LRA (E-MAIL INTERVIEW)

Good morning!

I'm Dominic Michael Genge, a graduate Student of International Relations at the United States International University (USIU). We met in Tambura State during the well celebrated Easter in April 2019 both at Mupoi and at the governor's residence where we exchanged contacts. I'm writing to remind you about my Thesis on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration among ex-combatants in the post-2005 South Sudan. I'm aware that UN agencies working in the Western Equatoria region helped a lot in stabilizing security and demobilizing and reintegrating the various factions of the arrow- boys.

1. Could you be having any background story of the arrow boys, how the vigilante groups came about?

2. How did the arrow-boys manage to chase the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from that part of South Sudan?

3. According to your findings, how did the group acquire small arms and light weapons?

4. How many arrow-boys have been disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated so far?

5. Is the process of DDR sustainable?

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6. What are the challenges that your organization (s) encounter in the process of DDR implementation?

7. What do you think is the best approach to conduct DDR not only in Western Equatoria but also throughout the Country to be more conclusive?

8. Is the program of DDR well-funded?

9. Is there any statistics of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the hands of civilians and pastoralists?

10. What could be the push and pull factors for having firearms in the hands of many civilians and pastoralists?

11. Any other additional insight into the DDR process in South Sudan among ex- combatants that you could share?

Please, remember all opinions and information shared here, shall be treated with utmost confidentiality and respect.

Thanks, in anticipation for your usual support and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Dominic Michael Genge

+254707642426/Nairobi, Kenya

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