SPACE A PRIORITY FOR Transport AUSTRALIA

Prepared by Senator Grant Chapman with the assistance of the Agribusiness Advisory Group (SPAG)

Mining and Natural Resources

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Coastwatch Financial Transactions Carbon Management Weather ICT Infrastructure Printed by: Senate Printing Australian Parliament House December 2005

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SPACE: A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

Prepared by Senator Grant Chapman with the assistance of the Space Policy Advisory Group (SPAG)

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Preface

It is with great pleasure that I present my space policy submission. Since April 2005 I have been developing and refining these proposals with the assistance of my Space Policy Advisory Group made up of academic, industry and other experts from across Australia. I have convened two meetings of the Space Policy Advisory Group and have had numerous follow-up communications in the interim. I have valued their input and support and together we have ensured that my space policy submission establishes that this issue is of critical national importance. Specifically, I appreciate the untiring efforts of Mr Roy Sach who accepted my invitation to Chair the Space Policy Advisory Group. My thanks also to the wide range of experts outside of the Advisory Group who supported my effort in various ways.

Space technologies are essential to resolve vital national interest issues which span a wide range of portfolios together with products and services used by industry, government and citizens. Our growing dependence on these technologies can be seen in the uptake of services supporting vital national interests such as national security, water management, agribusiness, mining, bushfire management and transport.

Tools using integrated space-based and space-related technologies are beginning to emerge, offering the opportunity for government and industry to find new and more effective ways to manage and use resources. Governments are becoming increasingly reliant on space- based and space-related technologies to monitor, assess and manage strategic risk on the domestic and international fronts. ii

Australia has not assessed the strategic importance and relevance of space and has, therefore, been unable to make well-informed, nationally coordinated decisions on space-related issues. It will be fundamentally important to make a policy agency, such as Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, responsible for overseeing an Australian space policy framework. Present arrangements are not in our best national interests. Failure to take appropriate nationally coordinated action will be to our peril.

My submission calls for action.

Grant Chapman Liberal Senator for South Australia

(December 2005)

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CONTENTS

Preface i Contents iii Executive Overview 1 Space and 5 Background 6 – Australian Space Governance 6 – Other Nations 7 Strategic and Security Implications 8 – Dependence and Vulnerability 8 – Complete and Accurate Data 8 – Future Access Assurance 9 – The Implications of Space Tensions 10 – Australian Sovereignty 11 – Self Sufficiency 11 – New International Relations Constructs 12 Action Agenda – Eight Initiatives 14 – A. Quantify 14 – B. Reduce Vulnerabilities 14 – C. Improve Validation 15 – D. Enhance Access Assurance 16 – E. Contribute to Reducing Space Tensions 16 – F. Exert Australian Sovereignty 17 – G. Review Self Sufficiency 18 – H. Increase Dialogue 18 Governance 20 Conclusions 21 Recommendations 22

Appendix A. Space Policy Advisory Group Membership 24 Appendix B. Nations and Space Programs 25 Appendix C. Bibliography and Acknowledgements 27

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

Introduction 1. We are fifty years into the space age but Australia does not have a government-endorsed national space policy, or a or a space agency.1 More seriously, we have no effective whole-of- government mechanism for addressing the wide-ranging implications for our national security of the now fast-moving developments in space- related strategic policy, international relations or technology − issues which most other comparable economies have long since taken up as a matter of national priority. 2. We have become dependent on and space services, including many essential services that could be affected detrimentally, with little warning, by international developments beyond our control. We need to develop safeguards to address these weaknesses. 3. Currently, we are operating in a high-risk environment. Even the temporary loss of many key, space-based services, which we take for granted, would damage the nation. Our continued access to these services is far from assured and our capacity to manage without them is very limited.

The Issues 4. Australia's current use of, and dependence on, space hardware and software is comprehensive. Space technology underpins our everyday communications, navigation and earth observation. Indeed, it affects almost every aspect of the routine business of government, industry and the community at large. In short, space-based systems have become integral components of our daily lives, are central to the realisation of our national interests and provide core functions in our national infrastructure. They: a. support the operations of the Australian Defence Force at home and abroad;

1 Australia purportedly has a ‘Space Policy and Engagement Framework’ drafted within the Industry, Tourism and Resources portfolio. The document was apparently neither endorsed by Cabinet nor formally agreed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet. The strategic significance of space has now increased to the point where it cannot appropriately be regarded as essentially an industry-related issue, noting that DITR does not have the delegated authority to administer broader strategic issues underpinning our national security or sovereignty. 2

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

b. provide us with domestic and international communications and support their operations; c. underpin our natural disaster preparedness including fire, flood, cyclone, severe storm and tsunami warning systems, management of emergency response and our routine monitoring and forecasting of weather and climate; d. enable us to research, understand and manage our natural resources and to monitor the state of the environment; e. enable Australian industry across a wide range of sectors to compete on reasonable terms with the rest of the world; and f. are fundamental to transport operations and the safety of people travelling by air and sea in particular. 5. Australia must address urgently the challenge of living in the space age. Space has become an identified issue for most advanced nations but Australia has been left behind. 6. It is imperative that we identify the essential elements of a national space policy and implement a coordinated national effort to enhance our capabilities and reduce our vulnerability through well- defined and relatively low-cost initiatives that will provide pathways to effective use: These are: a. identify and quantify our critical national space interests to highlight issues requiring priority attention; b. reduce our vulnerability to disruption or denial of space data and services; c. improve product validation so we can place greater confidence in space-sourced products; d. ensure to the extent reasonably possible, that we will be able to obtain the space products we require; e. contribute to reducing international tensions resulting from political and other developments; f. exert Australian sovereignty by responding to the use of space by foreign powers that collect intelligence on Australian activities; g. review our self-sufficiency with regard to space and determine appropriate initiatives in line with national priorities; and 3

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h. increase our dialogue with regional and other nations on space-related issues. 7. Australia will need to come to grips with international tensions that are converting space into a strategically less stable environment. With the world moving into a new era of space engagement, there is developing a threat of space conflict driven by the combination of competition, rapidly changing technology and new capabilities. 8. Paradoxically, there also are signs of enhanced cooperation amongst nations with space capability, as evidenced by the determination at the recent Ministerial Summit (of primarily space-committed nations) to proceed with implementation of a Global Earth Observation System of Systems in support of participating country needs in health, energy, water, weather, climate, agriculture, ecosystems, biodiversity and disaster management. 9. Unless Australia becomes a player in the new space era, our ability to benefit from the altruism of other countries, which has enabled us to get by, could be diminished. The costs to Australia's interests of letting the present opportunities slip by and implementing a recovery process later could be immense.

Objectives 10. Australian re-engagement with the global space community and space industry will be a decade-long undertaking which will require the involvement of essentially all Australian Government Portfolios in addition to State governments and the academic and private sectors. Two key objectives are essential and urgent. They are: a. the development and promulgation of a broad and far- sighted whole-of-government space policy; and b. the development of a proposed 10 year action agenda. 11. The purpose of this document is to draw attention to the urgent need for these two objectives to be achieved. 12. The recommendations outlined on the next page point the way forward, proposing the essential foundations required to achieve these objectives. 13. Specifically, my submission proposes, as a first step, that Cabinet consider and implement the following recommendations.

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Recommendations 14. It is recommended that the Government: a. acknowledge that space is of strategic national relevance to Australia. b. formulate a national space policy that will, inter alia, address the following priority requirements to: i. periodically review our critical national space interests; ii. reduce our vulnerability to disruption or denial of space data and services; iii. improve our capacity to validate data and products derived from space sensors; iv. optimise our assured access to space data and products in the future; v. increase Australian contributions to reducing international tensions stemming from space-related competition; vi. make it more difficult to collect intelligence on our activities; vii. periodically review our self sufficiency needs; and viii. increase involvement in the international dialogue on space issues. c. assign to an agency accustomed to managing broader national issues, such as Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, responsibility for coordinating the Australian strategic space policy framework.

Grant Chapman Roy Sach Liberal Senator for Chair, Space Policy South Australia Advisory Group

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SPACE AND SATELLITES 1. Space-related activities include military, scientific, commercial and public-good functions enabled by the satellites orbiting Earth. The changing nature of technology and the international implications of space require Australia to consider adopting a strategic space policy, especially in relation to activities occurring in a band extending from 100 to about 36 000 kilometres above Earth – the region in which most satellites orbit - as well as for activities associated with the ground facilities used to process and distribute data collected in space.2 2. The high speed at which satellites travel and the terrestrial territory their sensors can cover make them a unique resource.3 However, satellites normally remain in predetermined orbits, making their locations predictable and therefore render them vulnerable to intentional interference. 3. Satellites carry a range of instruments. Some earth-observation satellites are capable of collecting detailed information by day or night including through cloud cover. They can observe military and economic activity as well as providing observation, navigation and communication services that enhance the efficiency of terrestrial activities.

2 ‘Space’ has not been formally defined by international law. This submission does not cover deep space tracking or astronomy because, although scientifically valuable, they are not normally central to national interest, grand strategic or security issues. That Australia’s contributions in these fields have been and remain notable is nevertheless understood and recognised.

3 Commonly satellites travel at about 17 000 km per hour – the precise velocity depending upon their orbits. The area of Earth within the field of view of a is determined mainly by altitude. The higher satellites orbit some 36 000 km above Earth and can continuously ‘see’ approximately one third of the planet. However, some lower satellites can be placed into orbits from which they will eventually see the entire planet, as the Earth rotates beneath them. 6

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

BACKGROUND

Australian Space Governance 4. During the thirty years 1949 to 1979 Australian space-related activities at Woomera, South Australia, were dominated by strategic, particularly defence, projects. During the early 1970’s most of Woomera’s internationally sponsored space projects were either cancelled or transferred to alternative locations abroad; this as a consequence of technological and other developments. Australia then began to refocus its own approach to space and allocated coordination and policy responsibilities to the science/industry portfolios. 5. When, in 1984, the Minster for Science commissioned a report on Australia’s future in space,4 the terms of reference highlighted scientific, industrial and technological capabilities. However, the appointed Working Party recognised that space required a more strategic thrust and recommended that an authority be established to advise government on space policies and priorities. 6. An Australian Space Board (later replaced by a Council) and an Australian Space Office were established but they remained responsible to the Industry, Technology and Commerce portfolio. The Council and Space Office thus became focussed on technological and industry development, paying scant attention to the emerging higher policy and strategic challenges posed by exploitation of the space environment. In the late 1990s, both the Council and the Office were disbanded with residual responsibilities assigned to the (then) Department of Industry, Science and Tourism.5 7. Meanwhile, the number of space-capable nations was expanding, with new activity centring upon our region. Japan, India, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia all developed space programs reflecting, in part, that technology had reduced the cost of entry into space.

4 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences. A Space Policy for Australia. Canberra. AATS, 1985 (Commonly referred to as the Madigan Report).

5 Australia purportedly has a ‘Space Policy and Engagement Framework’. But it was apparently neither endorsed by Cabinet nor formally agreed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Instead, it was drafted within the Industry, Tourism and Resources portfolio. The strategic significance of space has increased to the point where it cannot appropriately be regarded as essentially an industry-related issue, noting that DITR does not have delegated authority to administer broader strategic issues such as national security or sovereignty. 7

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

8. In contrast, limited existing Australian governance arrangements for space emphasised regulation, together with some recognition of products, services and space-related science. Despite the rapid development, uptake and reliance on space-based and space-related technologies, Australia still does not have a strategic space policy, program or space agency.

Other Nations 9. Of the forty-nine largest global economies only eight, including Australia, lack a national space program.6 These 49 nations are listed at Appendix B – Nations and Space Programs. 10. In addition to focusing on the importance of indigenous space for the provision of a wide range of goods and services, the national space programs of other nations reflect their recognition of the rapidly increasing strategic and security implications of space. In contrast, Australia’s involvement with space, including many Defence programs, has evolved without national space policy guidance critical to recognising and coordinating vital activities that span across Government portfolios. Similarly, Australia’s space industry functions without a sense of national direction to guide investment or operational decisions.

6 Figures sourced from: Kingwell J. Punching below its weight: Still the future of space in Australia? Space Policy, 21,2, p161-163 (2005). London, Elsevier. 8

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

STRATEGIC AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Dependence and Vulnerability 11. Australia requires space data delivered as both products and services. Timing signals derived from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites sequence credit card purchases and stock exchange transactions, as well as coordinating mobile telephone calls, among other applications. GPS navigation signals provide positioning data to aircraft, ships and missiles and are used in fields as diverse as stevedoring and emergency management response. Separate categories of space sensors support weather forecasting, climate monitoring, natural disaster warning, agriculture, resource assessment, cartography and town planning. Satellites are the only means available to communicate the broadband data required by today’s long-range, mobile military units. 12. With few exceptions, the satellites and their sensors providing this support to Australia are foreign owned. 13. Disruption to the space data and services used by components of our national infrastructure would cause serious harm. Yet the technology required to disrupt signals from satellites is inexpensive, readily obtainable and could be operated by minimally trained people. Terrorist activity of this nature could cause more damage than the several Bali bombings combined.7 Australia in this regard is obviously a potential target of opportunity for terrorists. 14. Our reliance on and increasing need for access to space data could also leave Australia open to political pressure from the nations which own satellites.

Complete and Accurate Data 15. Given our national dependence on space assets owned by other nations or foreign commercial enterprises, it is, or should be, of concern that the fidelity and integrity of space-sourced data streams are commonly beyond our knowledge or control. Our national vulnerabilities include the potential for limitations on our access to position, navigation and timing signals, the possible provision to Australia of degraded, outdated or misleading data as well as intercepted or delayed commercial communications. Some forms of interference with signals that carry the data from satellites could be camouflaged to

7 Potent jamming devices can be purchased through the Internet. 9

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

resemble natural phenomena and thus would be likely to escape detection unless monitoring regimes are in place.8 16. Commercial realities constrain these behaviours and provide some safeguards. Nevertheless, all of the major space corporations are subject to controls and limitations imposed by national governments. Political constraints can and sometimes have overwhelmed commercial considerations.

Future Access Assurance 17. We are a politically stable nation with a geographic location that is suitable for ground-stations linked to satellites that service our region, including Asia, some parts of Africa and the Middle-East. Foreign ground stations communicating with satellites have thus been located in Australia. This geopolitical good fortune, resulting in foreign investment in ground facilities in Australia, has been of significant value to us. 18. However, satellite interconnect technology – technology that allows data to be transferred directly between satellites - is a current reality. Hence, an increasingly attractive option for designers of satellite constellations is to rely on intersatellite links rather than maintaining a geographically dispersed network of ground stations to connect their services. As this intersatellite technology is more widely adopted, the requirement for ground stations in Australia must diminish. Unless Australia develops counterweight policies, our leverage over some satellite owners and operators might reduce. 19. Within the next fifteen years, commercial space communications systems (which also carry most global military traffic) are likely to be transformed. Under one option, for example, there will be a world-wide- web-like configuration of satellites. Nations which do not monitor these developments from both national interest and technological perspectives are unlikely to understand the emerging changes and will be less likely to secure optimal service support. 20. Space products and services also can deteriorate or lapse for purely commercial reasons. Satellite owners might not, for example, consider replacement of a satellite to be attractive economically. This is more likely to affect the southern hemisphere, particularly in the

8 Until May 2000 civil GPS signals were deliberately degraded to users who were not approved for access to the high-quality, military-standard GPS services. The ‘selective availability’ has since been removed. This type of announced compromise is not of concern as compared with numerous other techniques and arrangements that are designed to escape detection or, worse, to mislead and confuse. 10

SPACE – A PRIORITY FOR AUSTRALIA

Australia-South Pacific region, because it offers a smaller and less profitable market than other locations.

The Implications of Space Tensions 21. The spectre of aggression in space emerged as nations began to understand the strategic and military value of satellites. The United States adopted a policy of global space dominance. Europe, together with China, India, Russia and Japan assumed unfettered access to space. More recent participants, such as Israel, Brazil and North Korea, may complicate an already challenging situation. 22. The technologies necessary for space weapons already exist. These include relatively simple techniques such as signal jamming or laser dazzling but also extend to in-orbit kinetic and other devices including, potentially, weapons to be aimed at terrestrial targets. 23. The detonation of a nuclear device in space would be the ultimate anti-satellite weapon because the consequent electro-magnetic pulse would destroy or degrade almost all satellites.9 Several nations have such a nuclear detonation capability. 24. Most nations, including Australia, could develop limited anti- satellite weapons based on jamming and dazzling devices, as could some non-State actors.10 We do not know how many States and others already have acquired these capabilities, despite the adverse implications of using them. 25. The United States and other nations understand the need to counter threats to their space assets. Details of their responses are closely held but it is probable that a few satellites have been hardened to withstand the affects of some attacks. Stealth technologies have been developed to make satellites somewhat more difficult, but not impossible, to locate. Other satellites have not been registered as required by international law. Most satellites are nevertheless readily detectable, carry minimal protection and are vulnerable. 26. These developments have direct implications for Australia. Hostile action, that limited space capabilities, could reduce the flow of data available to us. Australian ground stations with links to foreign

9 This is not theory. In 1964 the United States detonated a nuclear device in space and recorded the consequences. The effects of more modern nuclear devices detonated in space can be determined by modeling.

10 For example, terrestrial lasers used to temporarily dazzle satellite sensors or to cause permanent damage. 11

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satellites could become targets. The Department of Defence’s only space-based asset could be damaged or destroyed by various means. 11 Australia could be drawn into a wider military conflict as a consequence of action taken against space assets owned by the United States triggering our commitments under the ANZUS Treaty.

Australian Sovereignty 27. Australia is under surveillance by orbiting sensors, some of which can collect data by day or night and regardless of cloud cover. The quality of data collected in space often compares favourably with products obtained terrestrially, yet the activity in space is sanctioned by international law. Any comparable intrusions conducted by sensors on land, sea or in the air would clearly violate our sovereignty and might even be considered acts of aggression. 28. Data collected in space can be used to analyse Australian military capabilities and intentions, estimate our harvests and minerals production, measure our natural resources, monitor our trade, predict our stance in some international trade and other negotiations, as well as offering a comprehensive picture of our physical infrastructure. Australia is not presently equipped to identify such incursions, let alone respond to it.

Self Sufficiency 29. Prudent national planning in relation to space involves striking a balance between the risk associated with relying on other nations or foreign corporations and the cost of establishing a level of self sufficiency through procuring Australian space assets. 30. There is no likelihood that Australia could afford the cost of acquiring all the satellites and associated equipment necessary to meet our space-related requirements, even if we were able to have access to the necessary technologies.12 Nevertheless, eventual acquisition of some modest national capabilities may be justifiable and affordable.

11 The Australian Defence Organisation owns part of a communications payload that is hosted on a satellite owned by a Singapore-based telecommunications company, SINGTEL.

12 The full range of requirements would include, for example, dense constellations of satellites able to deliver global communications and navigation services. The cost of acquiring and maintaining these assets is measured in tens of billions of dollars. Australia would also need a comprehensive range of earth observation capabilities. 12

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31. Given that Australia must continue to rely primarily upon space products and services provided externally, we must develop strategies to reduce the risks that this entails.

New International Relations Constructs 32. Australia’s analyses of international relations issues may be incomplete and possibly misleading unless informed by an understanding of space-related activity. 33. The combination of international competition and cooperation has led to liaisons that are not well understood and may intuitively seem improbable. The United States, for example, has developed a close relationship with Russia and uses Russian motors to power space- launch vehicles.13 Israel and Singapore cooperate closely. Germany’s space industry balances ambivalently between bidding for American projects and supporting national or European hegemony. China has entered agreements with numerous Western nations. 14 34. Some of Australia’s more important space-related programs have focused substantively on arrangements with the United States - which is the pre-eminent global space power – although important agreements exist with other nations to have access to space-sourced meteorological, geodetic and other data. Australia should be cognisant that our relationship with America may unavoidably complicate some other relationships and pose dilemmas for us. Europe together with China, India, Japan and other nations will develop capabilities that concern the United States but could benefit Australia.15 Adroit and well-informed relationship management of such space-related issues increasingly will be necessary.

13 For example, the RD180 engine for the Atlas IIAR came from the Russian company NPO Energomash.

14 The China National Space Administration claimed to have established cooperative agreements and protocols with the United States, Italy, Germany, Britain, France, Japan, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine and Chile.

15 The European dilemma has already touched Australia. We are presently manoeuvring to manage engagement with Europe’s new Galileo global navigation system while not alienating the United States - which has in the past viewed the European initiative as a direct challenge to one of America's most potent global space monopolies. More recently, American concerns have subsided but the United States remains unenthusiastic. Russian and Chinese interest in the European proposal has not reduced American concerns. 13

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35. Other aspects of international space developments are unambiguously positive. With nearly sixty countries pursuing an active space agenda, there are opportunities for enhanced international engagement in national security and disaster monitoring. The Asia- Pacific Region participates in at least five international space fora.16 Australia’s contribution to this component of Asian development has been slight and has, from time to time, been interpreted as illustrating ambivalence toward regional issues. This deficiency could be rectified.

16 The agencies are: the United Nations’ Regional Space Technology Applications program, the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, the Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology, the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites and the Space Cooperation Organization, the latter aiming to provide a regional space executive organization similar in some respects to the European Space Agency. In addition, ASEAN has established a Space Expert Working Group and this may lead to an integrated space program, or even a sub-regional space agency. 14

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ACTION AGENDA – EIGHT INITIATIVES 36. Existing Australian Government arrangements regarding the scientific and industrial aspects of Australian space engagement should, in general, continue. However, we must acknowledge also that space has become a strategic medium whereby specific responses are necessary. 37. The following eight initiatives are proposed to manage the strategic implications of space in practical and affordable ways that will minimise associated risk. Following the first step (quantification) the other seven could and should be implemented concurrently.

A. Quantify 38. To fully comprehend Australia’s reliance on space-sourced products and services and the implications that this has for our national security and well-being, Australia needs to identify and quantify Australian utilisation. This process will highlight the national interest and strategic infrastructure components that are critically space reliant, will inform the targeted and prioritised application of other action agenda initiatives identified below and in particular, will signal to the Government the significance and urgency of these matters. 39. Much of the data necessary to support such an investigation will have been assembled already in support of counter terrorism activities and other initiatives. It will not have been previously coordinated to provide a national perspective of space. 40. To understand the impact and implications of space-related new or expanded activity or dependence, this process would need to be repeated at not less than five yearly intervals.

B. Reduce Vulnerabilities 41. Space-sourced products and services are vulnerable to disruption caused by natural phenomena and by inadvertent or intentional human activity. Policy decisions by other nations or commercial pressures could result also in the reduction or cessation of some services to Australia. 42. Australia should respond by ensuring, where possible, that alternative technologies are in place to provide continuity for nationally important activities that have become space reliant. This could be done for key dependencies using presently available technology.17 It is notable

17 For example, the space-sourced timing signals used for numerous national infrastructure activities can be supplemented by caesium clocks attached to software 15

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that a United States Department of Transportation study of the dependence of transport infrastructure on GPS also has made recommendations along these lines which are being actioned.18 43. To guard against a terrorist attack against signals received from space, Australia must develop the capacity to detect and resolve rapidly both inadvertent and intentional interference with satellite signals. The technology to support such activity exists, is inexpensive and is readily available. 44. Affected Commonwealth agencies should be required by the Government jointly to make such arrangements as part of their overall risk management strategies. Other entities might need advice and assistance to encourage broader compliance.

C. Improve Validation 45. Australia cannot validate the accuracy or completeness of most space-sourced data received. In many cases, the consequences of inaccuracies or omissions might be minimal. In other instances, the data could influence decisions by the Government, including those relating to the application of military force. The Government must have access to the best information available. This implies a targeted validation regime aimed at data that impacts on issues of national significance. 46. The Government should ensure, to the extent practicable, that nationally significant space-sourced data is provided by at least two independent sources, one of which might not necessarily be space based. This will be desirable particularly where space-sourced imagery is involved. 47. This approach may involve new arrangements with international providers of geo-political and economic intelligence. The practice of defaulting to a least costly sole source may prove unaffordably expensive in the long run.

that switches to the clocks whenever interference with the timing signal is detected. Miniature caesium clocks have been developed.

18 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE RELYING ON THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, prepared by the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre, August 29. 2001. 16

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D. Enhance Access Assurance 48. Australia’s access to space data and services could be curtailed by political or commercial decisions that, in most cases, we could neither influence nor, at present, even forecast. Commonwealth agencies with responsibility for data and services enabled by space should therefore be encouraged to develop close relationships with space-data providers. The objective should be to make reductions to space services politically or commercially unattractive. 49. Arrangements might include shared data processing or the provision of reciprocal services. Direct investments intended to provide part ownership of, or to gain some leverage over, selected next- generation satellite and sensor programs also should be considered. 50. Where domestic satellite ownership is the most appropriate strategy then that option should be explored and developed for consideration. In this regard, Australia would benefit from the experience gained in operating a low-cost micro-satellite system, the lessons from which would be scaleable to provide for more ambitious undertakings should they be required.

E. Contribute to Reducing Space Tensions 51. The Government simply must recognise that space-related tensions in any region could have consequences for Australia. Space has become a potential area of conflict and the technologies exist to engage in space-to-space, space-to-ground and ground-to-. 52. Australia already is advocating some mechanisms designed to limit space tension through our opposition to nuclear proliferation, support for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and endorsement of the United Nations space protocols. (The MTCR is particularly relevant given that a nation capable of launching an object into orbit could also deliver a weapon to any populated region on the planet.) 53. The Government needs to monitor space-related developments more closely and keep under review the responses and positioning strategies necessary to enhance our national security and other strategic objectives as they are affected by space politics, technologies or economics. (See also paragraphs 60 – 63.) 54. Australia might also consider advancing a case for the further development of international . At present, the principal United Nations-sponsored space conventions and agreements are imprecise on key issues, were not universally endorsed and are in some respects 17

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commonly ignored.19 20 This does not encourage open debate and might, in some respects, contribute to the increasing space-related international tensions.

F. Exert Australian Sovereignty 55. Australia is not equipped to identify or respond to orbiting intelligence collection capabilities and there is no legally sanctioned mandate to prevent such activity. We should, as one component of our national security architecture, develop an awareness of the orbits and capabilities of space sensors that collect data about us or our interests. 56. Such space situational awareness would allow us to understand to a reasonable degree which space sensors could ‘see’ Australia and when they are operating over our territory. This would be the prerequisite step towards developing targeted denial, seduction and deception responses necessary to make data collection more difficult. 57. These responses might range from techniques as simple as postponing a sensitive activity while within view of a specified satellite to the introduction of more elaborate physical and electronic counter measures. Cost constraints would confine responses to the protection of our most important facilities and activities. 58. We need also to ensure that, where our national interest can be advanced, Australian diplomatic, trade and similar representatives are able to operate from a level playing field by gaining access to the available space-sourced data pertaining to other nations. Such products can be obtained by various means, including through purchase on the open market.

19 The most prominent of these are: Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Agreement on the Rescue of the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. The is commonly flouted.

20 In the past Australia has influenced the drafting of the United Nations Charter and revisions to the law of the sea. It is within our capacity to again make a global contribution in relation to improving the clarity and acceptability of space law. This would be a low-cost and low-risk initiative that could catapult Australia from obscurity to international prominence on space issues. 18

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G. Review Self Sufficiency 59. Given that the domestic acquisition of a comprehensive range of space assets is impractical as well as unaffordable, self-sufficiency should be accepted as one factor among others when space-related procurement decisions are taken; it will never become a primary objective. Nevertheless, Australia should not adopt an antagonistic approach to acquiring modest space-related capabilities. Space technologies are becoming more affordable and so the trade-off between the costs and benefits of ownership will continue to change. 60. With reductions in the cost of both and satellite technology, the procurement of national space assets might at times become justifiable on either national interest or economic grounds or both. In this context, a whole-of-government approach to the identification of requirements would be beneficial. Isolated portfolio needs might not justify an investment that might otherwise be desirable if the aggregated needs of all Commonwealth agencies are taken into account. Public and private partnerships also should be considered in the same vein.

H. Increase Dialogue 61. Australia needs to understand better the politics and economics of space and their implications for us. Increased participation in international space fora would help meet this requirement. Such engagement also would enhance Australia’s profile as a high-technology nation. 62. Despite the challenges already noted (paragraph 34), bilateral space-related cooperation with the United States should be enhanced. The space aspect of our joint and cooperative endeavours, in the past, has been viewed as a sub-component of other activities, such as bilateral defence cooperation. There remains potential to develop an additional and mutually beneficial space focus covering a broader spectrum of national space engagement including next-generation global positioning, development of low-cost small satellites and increased penetration of cost effective technologies into commercial activities. 19

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63. With almost sixty nations pursuing space agendas, there are valuable opportunities also for international engagement in many key fields of national security, disaster warning, environmental and natural resource monitoring and research, communications technologies and through participation in foreign aid programs. The Asia-Pacific region participates in at least five international space fora in which an Australian presence could signal our strong commitment to regional growth and cooperation. Also, we could enhance our image as a technologically advanced nation by participating in such new international cooperative initiatives as the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 64. Increased Australian participation in these fora could showcase many of our advanced capabilities in research, design and manufacture.

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GOVERNANCE 65. In recent decades, Australian space-related activities have been managed as if space was an extension of the terrestrial environment. In fact, space is as different to the land, the air and the sea as they are to each other. 66. Australian Government agencies have become involved incidentally with space through regulatory roles, service provision and other public functions. Most of these existing arrangements appear well- managed and should be retained including, to the extent possible, the industry-related coordination functions exercised by the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources. 21 67. The emphasis on understanding and responding to space as a strategic environment would require a new strategic space policy and whole-of-government approach to Australian space activities. It would need to be based upon a strategic and national security framework. An appropriate central agency, one accustomed to managing broader national issues, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for example, should be given responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the Australian strategic space policy. The implementation framework should generally reflect the action agenda proposed above.

21 The Space Engagement and Policy Framework published by Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources covers four activities: ensuring access to services, supporting science and research, growing Australia’s space industries and safeguarding Australia’s national security. DITR is not equipped by experience, resources or delegated authority to progress whole-of-government ‘access to space services’ or to ‘safeguard Australia’s national security’. 21

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CONCLUSIONS 68. Australian space-related governance arrangements emphasise the management and application of space-sourced products and services with some recognition of space-related science. The broader and more significant strategic thrust is missing. We have neither a national space policy nor a national space program to guide us in comprehending or responding to the strategic implications of space. 69. Key components of our national critical infrastructure depend on support from foreign-owned space sensors. 70. Australia does not validate the accuracy or completeness of most space-sourced data received. 71. In the future, our existing leverage over some satellite owners and operators may diminish along with entitlements to data access. Also, within the next fifteen years, commercial space communications systems are likely to be transformed and we need to be actively engaged in this process. 72. The potential for aggressive activity in space has implications for Australia. We could be affected in several ways, including being drawn into a military conflict. 73. Australia’s security, as well as our industrial and agricultural resources, are under surveillance by orbiting sensors conducting activities that, if undertaken terrestrially, would violate our sovereignty. 74. Our analyses of international relations issues may be incomplete and possibly misleading unless informed by an understanding of space- related activity. 75. We cannot afford a comprehensive suite of indigenous satellites and so our emphasis should be upon reducing the identified risks of relying on foreign sources. 76. Eight initiatives have been identified to comprehend and address the strategic implications of space in practical and affordable ways. Following the first step (quantification) they could and should be implemented concurrently. 22

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RECOMMENDATIONS 77. It is recommended that the Government: a. acknowledge that space is of strategic national relevance to Australia. b. formulate a national space policy that will, inter alia, address the following priority requirements to: i. periodically review our critical national space interests; ii. reduce our vulnerability to disruption or denial of space data and services; iii. improve our capacity to validate data and products derived from space sensors; iv. optimise our assured access to space data and products in the future; v. increase Australian contributions to reducing international tensions stemming from space-related competition; vi. make it more difficult to collect intelligence on our activities; vii. periodically review our self sufficiency needs; and viii. increase involvement in the international dialogue on space issues. c. assign to an agency accustomed to managing broader national issues, such as Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, responsibility for coordinating the Australian strategic space policy framework.

Grant Chapman Roy Sach Liberal Senator for Chair, Space Policy South Australia Advisory Group

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Appendix: A. Space Policy Advisory Group Membership

B. Nations and Space Programs

C. Bibliography and Acknowledgements

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Appendix A

Senator Grant Chapman’s Space Policy Advisory Group (SPAG) Members • Senator Grant Chapman • Mr Roy Sach (SPAG Sponsor and organiser) (SPAG Chair) (Principal, Sach Management Support; Board Member, Australian Space Industry Chamber of Commerce (ASICC)) • Mr John Douglas • Dr John Zillman AO FTSE (SPAG Deputy Chair) (SPAG Deputy Chair) (Managing Director - Apogee (President of the Australian Imaging International; Board Academy of Technological Member, ASICC) Sciences and Engineering) • Mr Michael McAteer • Mr Shubber Ali (SPAG Secretary) (Business Development Director, (Office of Senator Grant AstroVision) Chapman) • Mr Bill Barrett • Mr Brett Biddington (Senior Vice President of Asia (Space Initiative Manager Asia Pacific Consultants; Pacific, Global Defence and Space Deputy Chair, ASICC) Group, Cisco Systems; Board Member, ASICC) • Mr Michael Davis • Mr Roger Franzen (Partner, Adelta Legal; Secretary, (CEO, Auspace Limited; Deputy ASICC) Chair, ASICC) • Mr David Hocking • Mr Jeff Kingwell (CEO, Australian Spatial Industry (Centre Manager, CRC for Business Association (ASIBA)) Satellite Systems) • Professor Andrew Parfitt • Dr Paul Scully-Power AM DSM (CEO, CRC for Satellite Systems; NSM Director of the Institute for (Chief Technology Officer, Tenix; Telecommunications Research, Board Member, Austrade) Uni SA; Board Member, ASICC) • Professor Don Sinnott • Mr Warwick Watkins (Chair, Australian Global (Chair, the Spatial Information Navigation Satellite Systems Council) Coordination Committee (AGCC)) • Mr Peter Woodgate (CEO, CRC for Spatial Information) Observers • Air Commodore Dennis Green • Colonel Mike Collie (Director-General, Strategy and (Director, Defence Space Planning, RAAF) Strategy Group, Department of Defence) 25

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Appendix B

NATIONS AND SPACE PROGRAMS

The list following displays the top 49 nations, by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), showing those with and those without national space programs.

GDP Nations With Space Nations Without Space Ranking Programs Programs 1. United States of America 2. Japan 3. Germany 4. France 5. United Kingdom 6. Italy 7. China 8. Brazil 9. Canada 10. Spain 11. Mexico 12. India 13. South Korea 14 Australia 15. Netherlands 16. Russian Federation 17. Argentina 18. Switzerland 19. Belgium 20. Sweden 21. Austria 22. Turkey 23. Denmark 24. Poland 25. Norway 26. Indonesia 26

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GDP Nations With Space Nations Without Space Ranking Programs Programs 27. Republic of South Africa 28. Saudi Arabia 29. Finland 30. Greece 31. Thailand 32. Portugal

33. Venezuela 34. Iran 35. Israel 36. Egypt 37. Columbia 38. Singapore 39. Ireland 40. Philippines 41. Malaysia 42. Chile 43. Pakistan 44. Peru 45. Czech Republic 46. New Zealand 47. Hungary 48. Algeria 49. Bangladesh

Sources: Largest national economies by GDP, World Bank, World Development Report, 2000. Space Programs, Euroconsult, World prospects for government space markets, 2004, Ca. 27

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Appendix C

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published References:

Australian Academy of Science. Australian 1996-1998: Report to the Committee for Space Research (COSPAR). Canberra. Australian Academy of Science, 1998.

Australian Academy of Technological Sciences. A Space Policy for Australia. Canberra. AATS, 1985.

Department of Defence. Australian Defence Spectrum Strategic Plan. Canberra, Department of Defence, 2004.

Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce. An Integrated National Space Program. DITC, 1992.

Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources. Space Engagement and Policy Framework. 11 October 2004 update.

Dougherty Kerrie and James Mathew L. Space Australia: Investment in Space. Haymarket NSW, Powerhouse Publishing 1993.

Houston, A and Rycroft M. Keys to Space: An interdisciplinary approach to space studies. USA unspecified. McGraw Hill 1999.

International Space University. Tracks to Space. Strasbourg. ISU, 2003.

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre. Vulnerability assessment of the transport infrastructure relying on the Global Positioning System. USA Unspecified. Dated August 29. 2001. Available from: www.navcen.uscg.gov/archive/2001/Oct/FinalReport- v4.6.pdf

Johnson Dana, Pace Scott, Gabbard C Bryan. Space: Emerging Options for National Power. Santa Monica. RAND, 1998.

Kingwell J. Punching below its weight: Still the future of space in Australia? Space Policy, 21,2, p161-163 (2005). London, Elsevier.

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Morton Peter. Fire Across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo- Australian Joint Project 1946 -1980. Canberra. AGPS, 1997 reprint.

Oberg James E. Space Power Theory. Colorado Springs, CO. United States Air Force Academy, 1999.

Williamson Ray A (editor). Dual Purpose Space Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Policymaking. Washington DC. Space Policy Institute Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University, 2001.

Unpublished References:

AUSPACE Limited. Senior Officers’ Space Operations Overview Course. Prepared for Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003.

Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources. Report of the International Space Advisory Group. Canberra 2003.

Space Warfare Centre. Guide to Space Warfare Centre Capabilities. Schriever Air Force Base Colorado. SWC, 2004.

Siemon, Noel. Public policy planning and global space dependence: strategic factors for a national space-related innovation system. Doctoral thesis, University of Western Sydney, 2003.

Commonwealth of Australia Legislation:

Space Activities Act 1998 (Including five United Nations Treaties as schedules to the Act)

Space Activities Regulations 2001

Australian Space Council Act 1994 (Repealed by Statute Stocktake Act 1999) 29

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The paper was prepared following: • consultation with members of the Australian space community, including academics, industry representatives and former bureaucrats; • discussions with executives from the United States, Argentinean, British, Russian, Canadian, French, Italian, Israeli and Japanese space communities; • informal discussions with officials from Australian Government agencies including Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources; Defence; Attorney Generals; Transport and Regional Services; Foreign Affairs and Trade; and with related agencies including Geoscience Australia, the Ionospheric Prediction Service, Australian Communications Authority and Bureau of Meteorology; and • informal consultations with members of the Australian Space Industry Chamber of Commerce National Executive and with executives from industry including CISCO, Auspace Ltd and Electro Optic Systems Ltd.