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Ḥamās: the Islamic Resistance Movement

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Ḥamās: the Islamic Resistance Movement Chapter 16 Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement Shaul Bartal Allāh is our goal. The prophet is our leader. The Qurʾān is our law. Jihād is our way. Death in the way of Allāh is our exalted hope. Article Eight, Hamas Covenant (1988)1 ∵ 1 Introduction Ḥamās (or Hamas) is one of the better-known and the largest of several Palestinian Islamist groups.2 Ḥamās, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya), is one faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. It was founded on 14 December 1987 at the beginning of the first intifāḍa by Shaykh Aḥmad Ismā‘īl Ḥasan Yāsīn (also Yassin, 1937–2004). Other opinions believe that it already existed in 1986 (Yousef 2010: 19–20). Ḥamās is usually described as a case study of political entities and, as such, employs and interprets doctrines and beliefs in a flexible and incentive manner. Ḥamās’ call to jihād has been cast in nationalist hues and ‘customised’ to the specific Palestinian milieu (Dalacoura 2011: 66; Dunning 2016). After a brief overview of the history of the movement and the role of women, this chapter will turn its focus to the ideology of Ḥamās. Palestinian (Arab-Islamic) nationalism, the elimination of not just Israeli but specifically Jewish control over Palestinian territory, and both specific and geo-political, and broader theological and cultural, holy war are all essential features of the group’s outlook. Ḥamās sees itself as a movement of the people that is 1 “Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” Avalon Project. At https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/Hamas.asp. Accessed 06/07/2020. This phrase has also been used as a slogan and appears on other Muslim Brotherhood sites. See also ʿAzzām (1989: 25). 2 This study is based on my book, Jihad in Palestine, Political Islam and the Israeli-Arab Conflict. See Bartal (2016: 44–83). © Shaul Bartal, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004435544_021 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.Shaul Bartal - 9789004435544 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 09:08:25AM via free access 380 Bartal responsible to all of the Palestinian public. The establishment of Ḥamās by Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn during the first intifāḍa heralds a new decisive stage, one where the Muslim Brotherhood activists began to carry out their world- view in relation to an Arab-Islamic Palestinian state established in the land of Palestine. This chapter will touch on events such as Ḥamās’ 2006 electoral victory and its connection to the Islamic Movement in Israel to provide further contextualisation for the rise of influence of this religio-political group. 2 The Ideology of Ḥamās Ḥamās is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood which was established in Egypt in 1928. Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the Ḥamās Political Bureau since May 2017, (and the Ḥamās ex-prime minister of the Palestine Authority 2006–2014), has described it as the “Jihad movement of the Brotherhood with a Palestinian face” (Coughlin 2015: 163). Ḥamās was deeply influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s jihād ideology of Ḥasan al-Bannā, Sayyid Quṭb, ʿAbdallāh ʿAzzām, Sa’ad Hava, and other less familiar philosophers (Lajna al- Thaqafiya al-Aama et al. 2013a: 26, 58–59, 82–85, 91–93). The main source of Ḥamās’ philosophy can be seen in the Ḥamās Covenant which was published by Aḥmad Yāsīn on 18 August 1988 (Hamas Covenant 1988). The principles of the charter emphasise that ideologically this is an Islamic revivalist movement with a militant dimension. The two main pillars of Ḥamās ideology are: Palestinian nationalism and Arab Islamism (Gleis and Berti 2012: 134–143). In May 2017, Ḥamās published “A Document of General Principles and Policies” emphasising the nationalistic character of the move- ment (Hamas 2017). According to Ḥamās, the Jews do not have a right to any portion of Palestinian land. The derogation of the Jewish people in Ḥamās rhetoric and strategy has lead scholars like Meir Litvak to propose antisemi- tism as a third pillar of the Ḥamās ideology (Litvak 2005: 41), and jihād, with an end goal of “the destruction of Israel and the elimination of the Jews,” as the fourth (Litvak 2010: 716). 2.1 Arab-Islamic Nationalism On each Palestinian memorial day, such as the day that the Balfour Declaration was issued, the day the State of Israel was established, or the anniversary of the decision to partition Palestine, Ḥamās takes pains to explain its allegiance to only one political solution in all of Palestine and that is that Palestine can- not be divided in any way, shape or form. Take as an example the anniversary Shaul Bartal - 9789004435544 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 09:08:25AM via free access Ḥamās 381 of the sixty-third year of the UN resolution of the partition of Palestine (Resolution 181 from 29 November 1947): Palestine from the sea to the river belongs only to the Palestinian nation. This decision [Resolution 181] is cancelled legally and politically. Palestine from the sea to the river is the private property of the Palestinian nation and an inseparable part of the Arab homeland and the Islamic nation. One must adhere to the rights of the Palestinians which include full return of all of the Palestinians to all of the Palestinian land.3 The recognition of Israel by the PLO and its cooperation on security issues with Israel during the period of the agreements, even for a short time, have caused ongoing tension with Ḥamās. According to Ḥamās, in order for the PLO to return and become a leading factor in the Palestinian society, it must retract its recognition of Israel, stop its security coordination with Israel, and re-adopt the armed struggle approach while redefining the supreme aim—the liberation of all of Palestine (Levy and Madzini 2011). Using Ḥamās’ Covenant and its summary of Ḥamās history, Ḥamās’ refusal to recognise Israel can be seen as a natural progression of its ideology based upon its radical view against the Jews.4 2.2 Antisemitism The slogan that Shaykh Yāsīn coined during the first intifāḍa—Khaybar, Khaybar Ya Yehud, jaysh Muḥammad Sawf Ya’ud (“Khaybar, Khaybar, Oh Jews, the army of Muḥammad will return,” quoted in ʿAzzām 1989: 41)—gives an indication of how anti-Jewish attitudes neatly segue with Ḥamās’ religio- nationalistic agenda. A theological right to land is embedded in Ḥamās ide- ology, for example, Ḥamās prisoner, Fahmi ‘Aid Ramadhan al-Mashaira, who called himself Abu ʿUbayda al-Muqaddasi,5 wrote the following explanation of the first verses of Sura 17, according to Ḥamās commentators: 3 A public statement by Ḥamās from a Palestinian information site affiliated with the move- ment, 28 November 2010. At www.palestine-info.info. 4 It is no surprise that Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Quṭb’s book, Marakatuna maa al- Yahud or Our Struggle Against the Jews, became a best seller among members of Ḥamās. 5 Fahmi ‘Aid Ramadhan al-Mashaira, from Jabel Mukaber, Jerusalem, was arrested together with his brother Ramadan in July 2002. The two planned and carried out a terrorist attack at the Pat Junction in Jerusalem where 19 people were murdered. In addition, according to the indictment where they were found guilty, the two also planned on blowing up a cruise ship in the Gulf of Eilat. The brothers are currently serving out life sentences in an Israeli jail. During Shaul Bartal - 9789004435544 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 09:08:25AM via free access 382 Bartal The Jews corrupted the land, the first time in Medina and al-Hijaz before and after the messenger and his fellows arrived. They succeeded with the grace of God to remove this corruption. The second time of their [the Jews] corruption is here in our land, in Palestine. As this is clarified by modern commentators … ‘You will surely cause corruption on the Earth twice’ [Qurʾān 17:4]. Abu ʿUbayda al-Muqaddasi 2012: 3 The second corruption mentioned is Israel’s existence. In Ḥamās’ Covenant, the Jews are the presented as a hidden source of evil on earth, continuing a long history of antisemitic themes (Bartal and Rubinstein-Shemer 2018; Patterson 2015: 101–103). In Article 7 of the Hamas Covenant (1988) the war with the Jews, like Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Quṭb said, is eternal (Coughlin 2015: 123–125; Quṭb 1954: 37–38). In Ḥamās’ first proclamation in the intifāḍa, the following words were said: Hey! the al-Murabitun (the defenders) on Palestine, the pure and the loved land. Hey! All ye residents, men and women. Hey! Children of ours. Here are the Jews, the brothers of monkeys, the murderers of the proph- ets, the bloodsuckers, the war agitators—murdering you, depriving you of your life after they have stolen the Motherland and your home. Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream: Therefore, they proclaimed in their faces, ‘Allāhu akbar, Allāhu akbar’ [‘Allāh is great’] from their army, ‘Allāhu akbar’ from their planes and from their weapons. Take into account that when you are fighting with them to ask one of two favors: The martyr’s death or victory over them and their rout. Mishal and Aharoni 1989: 199 According to a short film which appears in the Ḥamās educational curriculum from 2007, for Ḥamās the first intifāḍa lasted up until the year 2000, while the second intifāḍa began in September 2000 and continues up until today. The period of the agreements, from September 1993 until July 2000, is considered, in the eyes of the movement, a cynical but successful attempt by Israel to divide Palestinian society and to cause a fitna—a war between brothers.
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