DOCSLIB.ORG

Wumb. 38300 3169

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Wumb. 38300 3169 Wumb. 38300 3169 TO Of TUESDAY, the 2,$th of MAY, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, 26 MAY, 1948 THE CARRIER BORNE AIRCRAFT without being attacked . by aircraft . is ATTACK ON KIRKENES AND PETSAMO. encouraging. The following Despatch was submitted to the 5. I concur in the remarks of the Rear Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, I2th September, 1941, by Admiral Sir John in paragraph 53 of his report. The lack of time C, Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in- for training and preparation was mainly Chief, Home Fleet. responsible for such small errors in execution as took place. I concur also in paragraph 54. Home Fleet. It was not possible for the force to provide its I2th September, 1941. own reconnaissance without sacrificing the vital Forwarded. The material results of this factor of surprise. I consider it essential that operation were small and the losses heavy. steps should be taken to remedy the present This had been expected. The heaviest losses complete lack of air reconnaissance in Northern occurred in the squadrons from the and Northwestern Norway. VICTORIOUS and there is no doubt that 6. With reference to paragraph 52 of the some of the survivors felt that an attack on report of the Rear Admiral Commanding, First such poor targets against heavy opposition was Cruiser Squadron, the importance of the not justified and their morale was rather shaken Command being in the carrier in purely air until they appreciated the political necessity operations is appreciated; but, although the. for the operation. question did not arise on this occasion, it is 2. Attacks by low performance aircraft in considered preferable in the case of surface broad daylight where fighter opposition is attack .that the Senior Officer, should be in a present can only hope to achieve results com- ship of the supporting force. mensurate with their losses if complete surprise is obtained. On this occasion the force was 7. The gallantry of the aircraft crews, who extremely fortunate in the weather conditions knew before leaving that their chance of sur- which allowed it to make the long approach prise had gone and that they were certain to to the flying-off position without being seen; face heavy odds, is beyond praise. The but the good fortune did not last quite long conduct of the operation by the Rear Admiral enough, and they were reported by an enemy Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, the aircraft just before the Striking Force left. handling of ships by their Commanding Officers in most difficult conditions, the keenness and 3. It would perhaps have been better to time efficiency of all officers and men, especially of the attack to take place during the night,, even the deck handling parties' in the carriers, are in this region of perpetual summer daylight, in much to be commended. I trust that the the hope that the enemy reconnaissance and encouragement to the morale of our Allies was defences would then'be less alert. This would proportionately great. also have avoided an approach directly into the sun. (Signed) JACK C. TOVEY, 4. The lack of enterprise on the part of the Admiral, enemy which enabled the force to withdraw Commander-in-Chief. 58157 A 3170 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 MAY, 1948 H.M:S. DEVONSHIRE. to operate an A/S patrol. I regarded this as f rather a blessing as it reduced the possibility i$th August, 1941. of our being sighted by enemy aircraft. Operation " E.F." was carried out with the object of making attacks by carrier-borne 2$th July. aircraft on German shipping in the waters adjacent to Kirkenes (Norway) and Petsamo 8. At 0258 ACHATES; which was starboard (Finland). ' ship of the screen, struck a mine. ANTHONY immediately went to" her assistance, and Forces Taking Part. ACHATES reported that she was badly, ' DEVONSHIRE INGLEFIELD damaged forward -but that her engines wouldf (Flag of Rear Admiral (Captain (D), 3rd still work. The Squadron at the same tim/e Commanding, First Destroyer Flotilla). was turned away, and soon after, as it becamie Cruiser Squadron). INTREPID thicker, it was obvious that with an uncerts SUFFOLK ICARUS position Seidisfiord could not be made in safetj; ESCAPADE I accprdingly- turned to the southward lool FURIOUS ECLIPSE for clear weather, -and after - crossing the VICTORIOUS ECHO hundred fathom line turned to the westward at 0730. R.F.A. BLACK ACTIVE RANGER* ANTHONY 9. The coast was sighted at 0833 but the ANTELOPE . exact position could not be ascertained as it ACHATES was shrouded in shifting fog and only the mountain 'tops were occasionally visible. The 2. ADVENTURE' was placed under the Force was.-turned to the northward and later orders of the Rear Admiral 'Commanding, First to the north-eastward on soundings. A Cruiser Squadron, so that she might make her destroyer was sent inshore at 0951 to try to passage to North Russia under cover of the identify the land, and about noo .an aircraft forces taking' part--in Operation "E.F." .was flown off. At about 1130 ANTHONY and ACHATES were sighted. The tow had Narrative. just parted, and they were then about 40 22nd July. miles from Seidisfiord. 3. Force " Q.", consisting of ECLIPSE, 16. It had been my original intention to send ECHO, and BLACK RANGER, left Scapa at VICTORIOUS and SUFFOLK into Reydar- oooi on 22nd July and- proceeded to Seidis- fiord,* but I decided that it was unwise to nordf, where the destroyers fuelled from leave them to make this difficult entrance under R.F.A. WAR SUDRA, and the Force then the prevailing conditions. At 1400 the Force proceeded to the. rendezvous at Position " X " was off Seidisfiord. .The coast was still com- (70 degs. 28 mins. N., 08 degs. 09 mins. E.). pletely shrouded in fog, and INTREPID was sent in and'told to proceed with great caution 2yd July. and endeavour to 'find the entrance, of which 4. ADVENTURE left Scapa' at 0030 on she was given the approximate bearing. At 23rd July and arrived at Seidisfiord before 1415 Glettinganes Light was sighted and it was Force '.' P ". possible to fix our position. The Force then proceeded into Seidisfiord," DEVONSHIRE 5. Force "P", consisting of DEVONSHIRE, and FURIOUS anchoring above the minefield, SUFFOLK, FURIOUS, VICTORIOUS, and VICTORIOUS and SUFFOLK joining INTREPID, ESCAPADE. ANTHONY, . ADVENTURE near the entrance to the fiord. ACHATES, ACTIVE and ANTELOPE, sailed from Scapa at 2300 on Wednesday, 23rd July, ii. An A/S patrol was carried out by and proceeded at .20 knots to Seidisfiord. destroyers in the mouth of the fiord.. On A/SJ air escort was provided by the Com- anchoring I was told by the Examination mander-in-Chief, Rosyth.' Officer, Lieut. R. P. B. Veal, R.N.R., that a U-boat had been operating in the neighbour- 24th July. ' . ^ ' hood during the preceding two or three days. 6. At 0856 on the 24th DEVONSHIRE I was surprised that I had no information of detected an aircraft approaching. A fighter this from the' Admiral Commanding, Iceland, patrol was flown off from FURIOUS but it but I supposed he thought it was a false quickly became obvious that DEVONSHIRE report. .My investigations, however, did not at had detected .the A/S patrol. The incident all convince me that it was false and I ordered was of value in that it brought out various VICTORIOUS, SUFFOLK and ADVEN- small points of co-operation between R.D.F. TURE to move further up the fiord where they ships** and the two aircraft carriers. One had to anchor in forty fathoms. In the fiord Fulmar landed on when. FUR'IOUS was stern were two A/S trawlers, WAST WATER and to wind and crashed.. • •" . SEALYHAM. I ordered these to carry put an A/S patrol off the entrance. 7. The whole of this day was very overcast. In the afternoon visibility decreased and varied .12. I had arrived at Seidisfiord eleven hours from one mile to five and it was not possible late on .my programme and I decided that it would be better to hold over the whole opera- Admiralty footnotes :— tion for twenty-four hours and.thus retain its * An Admiralty-oil tanker. f Seidisfiord—on the east coast of Iceland. original timing. This had been arranged so .as J A/S—Anti '.Submarine. ** R.D.F. ships—those ships fitted with radar Admiralty footnote :— equipment. * Reydarfiord—about 25 miles south of Seidisfiord SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 MAY, 1948 317? to pass the track of the Zenit Flight* at a time 19. On • arrival in the vicinity of Position when it was least likely to be operating. " X " a search was commenced. While so ADVENTURE'S departure was accordingly doing the sun appeared and sights were delayed to conform with the new programme. obtained, and the search was re-arranged. The This also gave me time to oil SUFFOLK in Squadron.was spread to cover a front of about addition to DEVONSHIRE, FURIOUS and 40 miles, with aircraft patrolling on the wings the four destroyers, INTREPID, ESCAPADE, and ahead. At 1515 Force " Q " was sighted ANTELOPE and ACTIVE. some twenty miles ahead. With Force " Q " 13. At midnight ACHATES, in tow of was Captain (D), 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, in ANTHONY, arrived in harbour and berthed INGLEFIELD and ICARUS, who had been Alongside DEVONSHIRE. Before sailing .next sent to replace ACHATES and ANTHONY. dVy all possible assistance was given to her, 20. Oiling then took place as follows. arrangements were made for the accommoda- DEVONSHIRE gave 60 tons each to ECHO.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • British Back Egypt; Is Menace*
    r*>^ f iRmir^Btnr Eofttbqi SnaOk WEIJWB8DAT, JUIfB i r r i W N Average Dally Circulation Tba Study group at the North Mr. and Mra. Victor A. Sohiffar sona able uv walk w ill join tha luo a ttoiitt which latar la tha day Far the Mouth eC May. l » a Methodlot W. S. C. S. wlU moot for o f ldS3 Tidland Tum plka and amaU march. Children and ddar par­ s iRMIb - to a OTO 9t lea About Town ita final aeaslon before the summer daughter, Judith Leah, have re­ South Church sons will be provided for by oars. cream and a . M rs. A . VITAMIN FRESH VEGETABLES vacation, tomorrow afternoon at 3 turned to town after a vlalt of aev- Gihoon and M ia s : Bonn ars In 7,386 Td Hold Oentaota The regular meetlnr of the o’clock at the home of Mrs.. Leon­ eral weeks In WUkes-Barrs, Pa,.. charge of tba cup M aBte aC Bw A n « i ru M 4H1 or eo«ie 1® Pfnehorst for your Yitanin ard Burt of Henry street. Family^Picnic Tluo^^ut the aftenoon games Army and Navy club will be held for ckUdren and adults wlU ba At 3:80 o’clock overyono win ..■nwoiK^qwi V aM teU ^ AagMiTM:"* ®o®" Summer Oampbell OOuncU K. of C." haa enjoy a haokst supper whlcB will In the clubbouae tonlfht at 8 Contests of all kinds with Manehmter^A CUy of VilUige Charm i aatiTe, Just in. Beets and CauIUlower^ at lower o’clock. Offleera and toachera of the named a committee to conduct a conclude the aftmaoca’s festlvi.
    [Show full text]
  • Thinking Beyond Dead Germans by Capt Zachary Schwartz
    IDEAS & ISSUES (STRATEGY & POLICY) Thinking Beyond Dead Germans Bias and our warped orientation on the Russian adversary by Capt Zachary Schwartz ecent articles in the Marine Corps Gazette have shed re- >Capt Schwartz is the Weapons Company Commander, 3/7 Mar. He is also a regu- newed light on the influence lar contributor to and co-founder of the Connecting File, an online newsletter for of German Military history, infantry company commanders. Rparticularly the German military of World War II, on the Marine Corps and the Maneuver Warfare Movement. mistakes made by the authors, omit- pragmatically propped up and pro- This influence is undeniable and has ted information that would have been moted the narrative of the nobility and been critical to the development of our embarrassing and placed the blame strength of German arms against the warfighting doctrine; however, a series for fiascos on third parties.”2 You can Communist threat.5 American military of biases are inherent in our embrace of probably go to your unit library right leaders began to accept and study the the German military experience. These now and find well-worn editions of Gen often-slanted accounts of SS and Heer biases deeply effect our understanding Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Leader, Gen officers. This uncomfortable acceptance of World War II Germany’s most hated Friedrich von Mellenthin Panzer Battles, of Nazi commanders continues to this adversary: Russia. To fully understand and the achingly titled Lost Victories day. In 2019, the Department of De- and execute maneuver warfare, we must by Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein.
    [Show full text]
  • IF WE LOSE the ARCTIC Finland’S Arctic Thinking from the 1980S to Present Day
    IF WE LOSE THE ARCTIC Finland's Arctic thinking from the 1980s to present day ARKTINEN KESKUS Lapin yliopisto Markku Heikkilä ARCTIC CENTRE University of Lapland ARKTINEN KESKUS Lapin yliopisto ARCTIC CENTRE University of Lapland IF WE LOSE THE ARCTIC Finland's Arctic thinking from the 1980s to present day ARKTINEN KESKUS Lapin yliopisto Markku Heikkilä ARCTIC CENTRE University of Lapland Rovaniemi, 2019 ARKTINEN KESKUS Lapin yliopisto ARCTIC CENTRE University of Lapland Text © Markku Heikkilä Publisher The Arctic Centre, University of Lapland Layout Annika Hanhivaara English translation Jenny Hakala Printed in Popa, Rovaniemi 2019 ISBN 978-952-337-133-0 (Pb. English) ISBN 978-952-337-134-7 (pdf English) CONTENTS Prologue 4 PARTI I Arctic Visions 1998. The origins and background of Arctic cooperation 6 ”Strategic Reserve” for the Future of Europe 7 The Hopes and Realities of the Barents Region 13 Finland Brings the Northern Dimension to the European Union 22 From the Mediterranean Sea to the Baltic Sea and towards the North 27 Gorbachev's Speech Launches Arctic Cooperation 31 Canada Is Searching for Itself and the Arctic Council Is Born 36 Negotiations without Success 43 A Moral Obligation for Humanity 47 The Northern Indigenous Peoples Step Forth 52 Southern Pollution Hits North 60 Researchers Want to Influence Politics 63 From Military Security to Comprehensive Security 67 The Only Arctic Environmental Organisation 73 The Northern Parliaments Want In 76 Towards Transatlantic Economic Cooperation 80 PART II The Leading Arctic Actor.
    [Show full text]
  • 'EF': Churchill's Costly Gesture
    PQ-17 Bonus Scenario XI. Operation ‘EF’: Churchill’s Costly Gesture Type: Air Strike Date: August I 1941 - AM Day 3 Environment: AM Turns - Day, PM Turns - Day Convoy Routes: N/A Ice Conditions: IW - Heavy Drift? IE - Solid Pack? Air Sectors: Allied - Iceland 1; IIW - Clear? IIE - Light Drift? III - Clear? Axis - North Sea 1, Trondheim 2, Barents 1 IV & V - Clear Forces: Allied Axis Patrol White: 1x CA (Shropshire) in Rekjavik Stavanger: 3x He111H-5 [I/KG26], Seiðisfjördur: 2x CV (Furious w./ 1x Fulmar [800 Sqn], 2x Ju88A-4 [4./KG30] 1x Sea Hurricane [880 Sqn], 1x Albacore Trondheim: 1x Sub (GE); 1x Ju87B [Ergs/LG1] [817 Sqn], 2x Swordfish [812 Sqn]; Tromsø: 1x He115C [1./KüFlGr 406] Victorious w./ 2x Fulmar [809 Sqn], Banak: 2x Ju88A-4 [II/KG30] 3x Albacore [2x 827 Sqn, 1x 828 Sqn]), Kirkenes: 1x CM (Bremse), 5x DD (Type 34-36 [1 Inop]), 4x 2x CA (Devonshire, Suffolk), MV; 2x Bf109E/F [14./JG77], 2x Bf110D/F [1.(Z)/ 5x DD (A-I class); JG77], 2x Ju88A-4 [II/KG30] 2x DD (A-I class), 1x AO (Black Ranger); Within 2 hexes of Murmansk: 1x Sub (GE), 1x Dummy 1x CM (Adventure), 1x DD (A-I class); 1x DD (A-I class), 1x ES, 1x AO (Oligarch) Scapa Flow: 1x BB (King George V); 2x CL (Aurora, Nigeria), 2x DD (J-R class); 1x Sub (BR) Sumburgh: 1x Catalina [413 Sqn] Hex 0717: 4x Subs (SU) Murmansk: DD (Type 7); 2x I-153 [147 IAP], 2x I-16 [145 IAP], 1x SBbis [72 SAP] CPs: Gruppe Nord 0 Severnyy Flot 1 Dummies: Maximum - 5 Allied, 2 Axis Reinforcements: Allied Axis 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction 1 the Royal Navy and the Home Fleet: Men, Material
    Notes Introduction 1. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1995 revised paper back ed.), p. 306. 2. For a modern account informed by Italian language sources, see J. Greene and A. Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (Rochester, Kent: Chatham Publishing, 1998), pp. 63–81. 3. L. Kennedy, The Death of the Tirpitz (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 56 uses the term ‘much worry’; ‘bogeyman’ is from P. Kemp, Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters (London: Arms Armour Press, 1993), p. 191; Rear Admiral W. H. Langenberg, USNR, in ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz: A Strategic Warship?’, Naval War College Review, 34 (4), p. 82, uses the term ‘concern’. See also T. Gallagher, The X-Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), chapter 2. 4. Langenberg, ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz’, p. 82. 1 The Royal Navy and the Home Fleet: Men, Material, Strategy 1919–39 1. This process is described in detail by P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 205–37. However, the conventional view of naval policy ca 1900–14 has recently come under critical review; see, for example, J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy (London: Routledge, 1993), N. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press, 1999). Certainly, it was a cost-saving measure. But whether Britain employed a Dreadnought fleet or ‘flotilla defence’, it became clear between 1906 and 1912 that most of the Fleet would be needed in Home Waters if war with Germany erupted.
    [Show full text]
  • Inglismaa-Soome Sõda 1941
    Tartu Ülikool Filosoofiateaduskond Ajaloo ja arheoloogia instituut Ago Raudsepp Inglismaa-Soome sõda 1941 Magistritöö Juhendaja professor Eero Medijainen Tartu 2013 SISUKORD SISSEJUHATUS ................................................................................................................ 4 Demokraatlikust rahust ................................................................................................... 6 Historiograafiast .............................................................................................................. 9 Allikatest ....................................................................................................................... 19 Eesmärgist ..................................................................................................................... 20 1. POMMITAMINE ..................................................................................................... 22 1.1. Maiski manööver ja Kaitsekomitee otsus ........................................................... 22 1.2. Operatsioon „E.F.“ ............................................................................................. 28 1.3. Žest ja selle tulemused ....................................................................................... 38 2. SUHETE KATKESTAMINE ................................................................................... 43 2.1. Esimene nädal ja ebaselgus. ................................................................................ 43 2.2. Saksamaa kaas-sõdija.........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Pops 4 QUARK DEFINITIV¥
    39 Chapter 4 Regional and Circumpolar Levels and Trends in Abiotic and Biotic Media ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– This section reviews new information on the levels and giving the concentration of OC in the total weight of tis- spatial trends of POPs in Arctic abiotic and biotic media sue analyzed; on a lipid weight basis, giving the concen- available since 1996. Some earlier data which were omit- tration in the lipids in that particular tissue; or as a body ted from the previous assessment are also included. Most burden, giving the contaminant concentration in the interpretations in this chapter, including comparisons and whole organism. OC levels in abiotic samples and some conclusions about spatial trends, were made by scientists biotic samples, most often plants, are expressed on a dry in charge of projects described (most are listed as con- weight basis. The following abbreviations are used tributing authors) and by the four editors. In some cases throughout the text to distinguish lipid weight concen- interpretation was not possible due to limited sample trations (that is ‘ng/g lw’), from results reported on a wet numbers. The new data are primarily entered as summary weight (‘ww’) or dry weight (‘dw’) basis. All lipid weight data in the Annex Tables, and interpretations were kept concentrations are calculated from the wet weight con- to a minimum. It should also be noted that sample sizes centrations unless otherwise indicated. Concentrations for results given in the Annex Tables vary greatly. Readers of OCs in air samples expressed as pg/m3 are presented should be aware of the risk of spurious conclusions for gas phase and particle phase separately or are drawn from small data sets.
    [Show full text]
  • FAA Noise Hearing
    /J-- J_/- _./ •_--_'O_ACLln_¥ copy.. i l • t_ 550/9-73-002 PRo_' PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE CRITERIA FOR NOISE JULY 27, 1973 U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Washington, D. C. 20460 550/9-73-002 PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE CRITERIA FOR NOISE JULY 27, 1973 Jr _* _. PREPARED BY : THE U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF NOISE ABATEMENT AND CONTROL 11_[! document hel b_on epprovod for oenerol availability, It does not conltltule a itandord, ipecificotion, or roflt;l_ztlon. =, _ lids by the 8U_tende._t of D_i_ta, U.8. Ogverar_at l_zlnLh31lOGee, WMldal_n t D O 20t_t. Pr[_ IL_ FOREWORD Tile Noise Control Act of 1972 requires that the Administrator of The Enviromnental Protection Agency (EPA) develop and publish criteriawith respect to noise. These criteria are to "reflect tile scientific kno'_ledge most useful in indicating tile kind and extent of all identi- fiableeffects of noise on the public health and welfarewhich may be expected from differing quantities and qualities of noise." This document meets that re(luirement. The terms "criteria and standards" are generallyused interchangeably in the scientific communities concerned with noise and its control. However, in accordance with the intent of the U,S.Congress, criteria for environmental pollutants are to reflect an honest appraisal of availableknowledge relating to health and welfare effects of pollutants, (in this case, noise), The criteria are descriptions of cause and eft'eet relationships. Standards and regulations must take into account not only the health and welfareconsiderations described in the criteria, but also,as called for in the NoiseControl Act of 1972, technology, and cost of control.
    [Show full text]
  • The Barents Sea, the White Sea, the Kara Sea)
    Chronology of the Key Historical Events on the Western Seas of the Russian Arctic (the Barents Sea, the White Sea, the Kara Sea) Ninth century 870–890 The travel of Otar, a Viking from the Norwegian province of Hologaland (now Helgeland), who discovered the way to the White Sea. The story of this journey was recorded from his own words by the English King, Alfred the Great. 9th–10th century The beginning of the Russian advance to the north and northeast and their appearance on the shores of the White Sea and the Barents Sea. Tenth century 920 The Viking Eirik Bloodaxe sailed in the mouth of the Northern Dvina (it was called “Vina” in the sagas). 965 The son of Eirik Bloodaxe, the Viking Harald Grey Cloak made a trip to the mouth of the Northern Dvina. Eleventh century 11th century The people of Novgorod, coming out of the White Sea, won Biarmia, the country located on the Pechora River and the Northern Dvina. 1026 The mouth of the Northern Dvina was visited by the Viking Torer Dog, who first engaged in peaceful trade but ended up plundering the temple of Iomala (supposedly located on the site of the current Kholmogory). Twelfth century 12th century (first The mention in the annals of the Terskiy Shore (the White Sea Throat), among Novgorod’s half) possessions. 1110 or 1130 The archbishop of Novgorod, John, founded a monastery of the Archangel Michael (at the mouth of the Northern Dvina), at which there was a settlement, an early precursor of the port and the city of Arkhangelsk.
    [Show full text]