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Inglismaa-Soome Sõda 1941 Tartu Ülikool Filosoofiateaduskond Ajaloo ja arheoloogia instituut Ago Raudsepp Inglismaa-Soome sõda 1941 Magistritöö Juhendaja professor Eero Medijainen Tartu 2013 SISUKORD SISSEJUHATUS ................................................................................................................ 4 Demokraatlikust rahust ................................................................................................... 6 Historiograafiast .............................................................................................................. 9 Allikatest ....................................................................................................................... 19 Eesmärgist ..................................................................................................................... 20 1. POMMITAMINE ..................................................................................................... 22 1.1. Maiski manööver ja Kaitsekomitee otsus ........................................................... 22 1.2. Operatsioon „E.F.“ ............................................................................................. 28 1.3. Žest ja selle tulemused ....................................................................................... 38 2. SUHETE KATKESTAMINE ................................................................................... 43 2.1. Esimene nädal ja ebaselgus. ................................................................................ 43 2.2. Saksamaa kaas-sõdija.......................................................................................... 51 2.3. Nõukogude Liidu liitlane. ................................................................................... 60 2.4. Sini-valge raamat ja lord Newtoni kõne. ............................................................ 70 3. SÕJAKUULUTUS ................................................................................................... 82 3.1. Stalini rahualgatus ............................................................................................... 82 3.2. Churchilli sõjaähvardus ..................................................................................... 90 3.3. Dominioonide arvamus ...................................................................................... 95 3.4. Stalini-Churchilli tüli........................................................................................ 103 3.5. Kui ta ikka veel soovib seda ............................................................................. 112 3.6 Epiloog Kremlis .............................................................................................. 120 KOKKUVÕTE ............................................................................................................... 122 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 133 KIRJANDUS .................................................................................................................. 144 Kasutatud arhiiviallikad .............................................................................................. 144 Kasutatud muud allikad .............................................................................................. 144 Kasutatud kirjandus .................................................................................................... 145 LISAD ............................................................................................................................. 149 Lisa 1: Lahinguüksuse „P“ teekond väljalennu punkti „M“ ja tagasi. ....................... 149 2 Lisa 2: Väljavõte operatsiooni „E. F.“ kaardilt – väljalennu punkt „M“. ................... 151 Lisa 3: Foto pildistatud umbes 7 km enne sihtmärgini jõudmist. ............................... 152 Lisa 4: Kaart „Furious’i“ eskadrillide lähenemis- ja lahkumiskursiga. ...................... 153 Lisa 5: Kaart pommitajate lähenemistrajektooriga Petsamole. .................................. 154 Lisa 6: Kaart torpeedode allaheitmise positsioonidest. .............................................. 155 Lisa 7: Foto torpeedo- ja pommitabamustest Petsamos. ............................................ 156 Lisa 8: Briti välisministeeriumi väljavõtted Risto Ryti 26. juuni raadiokõnest. ......... 157 Lisa 9: Churchilli Soome-teemaline sõnum Edenile 05.07.1941. ............................. 161 Lisa 10: Churchilli Soome-teemaline sõnum Edenile 10.07.1941. ........................... 162 Lisa 11: Churchilli Soome-teemaline sõnum Edenile 16.07.1941. ........................... 163 Lisa 12: Väljavõtted Lord Newtoni kõnest Lordide kojas 22.07.1941. ...................... 164 Lisa 13: Soome memorandum Briti valitsusele 28.07.1941. ...................................... 165 Lisa 14: Briti valitsuse kommünikee Soome memorandumist 29.07.1941. .............. 166 Lisa 15: Briti valitsuse vastus Soome memorandumile 31.07.1941. .......................... 167 Lisa 16: W. N. Ewer’i artikkel „Daily Heraldi’is“ 30.07.1941. ................................ 168 Lisa 17: Soome vastus Briti valitsuse vastusele 02.08.1941. ..................................... 168 Lisa 18: Edeni kiri Riigidepartemangule seoses survega Soomele 06.09.1941. ........ 169 Lisa 19: Briti hoiatus Soomele, edastatud Norra saatkonna kaudu 22.09.1941. ........ 169 Lisa 20: Lõuna-Aafrika Liidu arvamus sõjakuulutusest 29.10.1941. ......................... 170 Lisa 21: Väljavõte Churchilli kirjast Stalinile 04.11.1941. ....................................... 171 Lisa 22: Väljavõte „The Times“ artiklist 03.11.1941. ............................................... 171 Lisa 23: Väljavõte Churchilli vastusest Crippsile 28.10.1941. .................................. 173 Lisa 24: Churchilli kiri Mannerheimile 28.11.1941. ................................................. 173 Lisa 25: Briti valitsuse noot Soomele 28.11.1941. .................................................... 174 Lisa 26: Briti valitsuse noot Ungarile ja Rumeeniale 28.11.1941. ........................... 175 Lisa 27: Soome valitsuse vastus Briti noodile 05.12.1941. ....................................... 175 Lisa 28: Briti sõjakuulutus Soomele, Ungarile ja Rumeeniale 06.12.1941. .............. 176 Lisa 29: Sõjakabineti vastus Edeni telegrammidele Moskvast 19.12.1941. .............. 177 Lihtlitsents lõputöö reprodutseerimiseks ja lõputöö üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks ................................................................................................................... 179 3 SISSEJUHATUS Mõni kuu enne 60 aasta möödumist II maailmasõja lõppemisest Euroopas, 1. märtsil 2005 pidas Soome president Tarja Halonen Prantsusmaal riigivisiidil olles kõne Pariisis asuvas Prantsuse Rahvusvaheliste Suhete Instituudis (IFRI). Halonen ütles, et Soome lähenemine Euroopa integratsioonile tuleneb paljuski 60 aasta tagustest kogemustest. President meenutas, et pärast Euroopa mõjusfäärideks jagamist Nõukogude Liidu ja Saksamaa vahel, tuli Soomel võidelda Punaarmee vastu, et säilitada oma iseseisvus. Me pidime tegema seda üksi, ilma märkimisväärse välise abita. Viis aastat hiljem, suvel 1944 õnnestus meil jälle peatada Punaarmee katsed Soomet vallutada [...] Meie jaoks tähendas maailmasõda eraldi sõda Nõukogude Liidu vastu ja me ei pidanud jääma tänu võlgu teistele.1 Kaks päeva hiljem avaldas Venemaa välisministeerium oma kodulehel teate pealkirjaga: Venemaa välisministeeriumi informatsiooni ja ajakirjanduse osakonna kommentaarid seoses meedias ilmunud küsimustega, mis puudutavad Soome presidendi T. Haloneni poolt Teise maailmasõja olemuse tõlgendamist.2 Keegi küsija, kelle nime ei pidanud Venemaa välisministeerium vajalikuks märkida, viitas Haloneni kõnele ja palus välisministeeriumil seda kommenteerida – sest Euroopa ajalooga kursis olevate inimeste jaoks olevat selline lähenemine pehmelt öeldes üllatav. Samuti ilma nimeta vastuses öeldi, et niisugune ajalootõlgendus on tõepoolest Soomes levimas eriti viimase kümne aasta jooksul, kuid et vaevalt on põhjust viia üle terve maailma ajalooõpikutesse sisse korrektiive kustutamaks mälestust sellest, et Teise maailmasõja aastatel kuulus Soome hitlerliku Saksamaa liitlaste hulka, sõdis tema poolel, ja seega kannab ka oma osa vastutusest selle sõja eest. Kommentaaris soovitati lugeda 1947. aasta Pariisi rahulepingu preambulat selleks, et veenduda, mis on ajalooline tõde, mainitud leping olevat 1 Helsingin Sanomat. International Edition. 7.03.2005. http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1101978754422; http://www.hs.fi/english/print/1101978754542 loetud 26.04.2013. 2 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/EC2527949C2E95BDC3256FB9005F21FD?OpenDocument loetud 26.04.2013. 4 muuhulgas garanteerinud sõjajärgses Soomes inimõiguste ja vabaduste taastamise, mis pani aluse demokraatlikule ühiskonnale. Venemaa välisministeeriumi anonüümsel kommentaatoril on õigus vähemalt ühes asjas: 10. veebruaril 1947 kirjutati tõepoolest Pariisis alla rahuleping ühelt poolt Soome ja teiselt poolt Nõukogude Liidu, Ukraina NSV, Valgevene NSV, Ühendkuningriigi, Kanada, Austraalia, Uus-Meremaa, Lõuna-Aafrika Liidu, India ja Tšehhoslovakkia vahel. Samal päeval sõlmiti sarnased lepingud ka Itaalia, Rumeenia, Bulgaaria ja Ungariga.3 Käesoleva töö autor uuris mainitud rahulepingule vahetult eelnevaid ja järgnevaid sündmusi 2011. aastal kaitstud bakalaureusetöös.4 Praeguses töös huvitab autorit eelkõige see, mismoodi sattus Soome sõtta Inglismaaga. Küsimust, kas üldse
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