UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Electoral Reform and the Correct Vote: The Case of New Zealand by Evan Wilson A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CALGARY, ALBERTA JANUARY, 2009 © Evan Michael Wilson 2009 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49731-9 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-49731-9 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. •*• Canada Abstract In 1996, New Zealand switched from a single member plurality (SMP) electoral system to a mixed member proportional (MMP) system. This thesis examines the impact of electoral reform on voter correctness using data from New Zealand Election Study (NZES) surveys conducted in 1990,1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. It is hypothesized that New Zealanders would have voted correctly more often in the latter three elections than during the first two, due to evidence showing that proportional systems, like MMP, contribute to system predictability and clarification of the signals sent out by political parties. Aggregate levels of the dependant variable, vote correctness, were compared during this time period using contingency tables. Simple least-squares regression provided an individual-level analysis while applying several statistical controls, including birth cohort, political interest, media exposure, household income, education, and major party support. The study revealed no difference in aggregate vote correctness under each system. However, voters supporting major parties voted correctly more consistently under MMP than under SMP, suggesting that electoral reform does affect voter behaviour. ii Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the generous guidance and assistance of my supervisor, Dr. Brenda O'Neill. Without her help, patience, and confidence, it is unlikely that I would have brought this paper to a successful conclusion. Much gratitude is extended to Dr. O'Neill for everything she has done since I enrolled in the program. Additional thanks to the faculty of the University of Calgary's Department of Political Science for offering further support and advice on the project. Thanks are also extended to Dr. Jack Vowles, from the University of Exeter, and Matthew Gibbons of the Comparative Manifesto Project for the assistance that they provided in tracking down the historical New Zealand election platforms necessary to perform this analysis. And, of course, thanks to all of my fellow graduate students who were all generous with both advice and a bit of fun during more stressful times: Andrew Banfield, David Coletto, Will Grieves, Stephen Hobbs, Candice Powley, Dave Snow, Jared Wesley, and Michael Zekulin (to name a few). Thanks also to Dr. Garry Jones for the editing assistance and advice (and also to the rest of his family, Barbara, Sean, Owen, and Heather for taking me in!). Finally, many thanks to Judy Powell, Bonnie Walter, and Ella Wensel for the untold number of favours they have offered pretty much since I applied for entrance to the University of Calgary. iii Dedication I would like to dedicate this work to my family: Ron, Elspeth, Jonathan, and Jamie Wilson. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Dedication iv Table of Contents v List of Tables vii List of Figures viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 The Method 7 The Findings 10 Organization and Overview 11 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 13 Electoral Systems 15 The Effect of Electoral Systems 21 Election Outcomes 22 Competition 23 Voter Behaviour 28 Electoral Reform and Electoral Engineering 31 Political Knowledge 33 Cue-taking and Heuristic Theories 36 Electoral Systems, Knowledge, and Cue-Taking 40 Hypotheses 41 CHAPTER 3: ELECTIONS IN NEW ZEALAND, 1990-2002 47 Overview 47 The 1990 General Election 49 The MMP Referenda 50 The 1993 General Election 51 The 1996 General Election 52 The 1999 General Election 54 The 2002 General Election 55 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 58 Data Sources 59 Operationalization 61 Cohorts 71 Political Interest 73 Media Consumption 74 Contact by Political Parties 75 Political Knowledge 76 Major Party Support 79 v CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 81 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 107 REFERENCES 131 APPENDIX A: Data Sources 142 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 4.1- Cohort Sizes in New Zealand Elections, 1990 - 2002 72 Table 4.2 - Stated Levels of Political Interest in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 73 Table 4.3-Media Consumption in New Zealand, 1990-2002 75 Table 4.4-Contact by Parties in New Zealand, 1990-2002 76 Table 4.5 - Income Distribution in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 78 Table 4.6 - University Degree Attainment in New Zealand, 1990-2002 79 Table 4.7 - Major Party Support on Electorate Votes in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 80 Table 4.8 -Major Party Support on Party Votes in New Zealand, 1990-2002 .... 80 Table 5.1 -Correct Votes in New Zealand by Cohort, 1990-2002 81 Table 5.2 - Determinants of Correct Party Votes in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 89 Table 5.3 - Determinants of Correct Electorate Votes in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 90 Table 6.1 - Voter Turnout (Official) in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 116 Table 6.2 - Vote Correctness in New Zealand, 1996, by Previous Participation ... 118 Table 6.3 -Turnout in New Zealand by Previous Voting Experience, 1990 - 1996 120 Table 6.4 - Determinants of Correct Electorate Votes in New Zealand (including number of priorities), 1990-2002 123 Table 6.5 - Determinants of Correct Party Votes in New Zealand (including number of priorities), 1990-2002 124 Table 6.6 - Number of Votes Correct in New Zealand, Based Upon Number of Priorities, 1990-2002 125 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4.1: Decision Tree for Single Priority Voters 65 Figure 6.1: Voter Turnout and Correct Voting Rates in New Zealand, 1990 - 2002 117 viii 1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION Elections are essential to democracies because they provide the means for citizens to choose their governments and hold them to account. Consequently, electoral rules introduce powerful incentives and disincentives on electoral behaviour. Because they determine the outcomes of democratic competition, these rules influence the behaviour of all political actors - including voters, candidates, and political parties. Research reveals that electoral rules are correlated with a range of political behaviours, influencing participation and turnout, voter satisfaction, and the structure of party systems. These findings have influenced the argument that electoral systems can reliably influence political behaviour; single member plurality (SMP) systems will result in certain behavioural trends while proportional representation (PR) systems will result in others. These observations have driven discussions of "electoral engineering," where reformers advocate for rule changes that will shape incentives, direct political behaviour, and, perhaps most importantly, enhance democratic legitimacy (Norris 2004; Cox 1996; Diamond and Morlino 2004). While there is evidence that electoral reform has affected election outcomes (Lijphart 1994), there is little to support the claim that it results in the long-term behavioural changes promised by electoral engineers. This is important because electoral reforms are often proposed in order to improve the quality of democracy in a given country (Diamond and Morlino 2004). We must acknowledge, however, that there is a 2 possibility that reforms could potentially degrade the quality of democracy. Because the argument that reform will "improve" democracy is often predicated on its power to induce the desired behavioural changes, governments must understand real-world effects of rule change rather than relying upon the promise of the theoretical. The dearth of research involving the long-term effects of electoral reform makes it difficult to