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1 2 3 Political Geography xx (2007) 1e21 4 www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo 5 6 7 8 Money and votes: A New Zealand example 9 10 Ron Johnston a,*, Charles Pattie b 11 12 a School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1SS, UK 13 b Department of Geography, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK 14 15 16 17 Abstract PROOF 18 19 The role of money in elections is attracting considerable contemporary attention, because of the poten- 20 tial for corruption of electoral and political systems. In part, this concern is based on a belief that money 21 matters in those elections, that how much parties and candidates spend on their campaigns can influence 22 how many votes they win. Tests of this belief suggest that this is indeed so, especially in the case of chal- 23 lengers’ spending. The New Zealand electoral system offers an excellent arena in which to test these ideas further, because its adoption of MMP allows examination not only of the impact of spending on changing 24 patterns of party support over time but also of patterns of switching between parties in the two components 25 of each election. Analyses of the 2005 general election there provide substantial support for the argument 26 that money matters, especially for the country’s smaller political parties. 27 Ó 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 28 29 Keywords: Elections; New Zealand; Campaign spending; Split tickets 30 31 32 33 34 The role of money in elections is a topic of considerable contemporary interest in a range of 35 countries, because of concerns about potential corruption of the political process by vested in- 1 36 terest groups. These concerns have increased in recent years as a result of a number of trends. 37 38 * Corresponding author. 39 E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Johnston), c.pattie@sheffield.ac.uk (C. Pattie). 40 1 In the UK, for example, claims in mid-2006 that major donors to the Labour party had been offered peerages (seats 41 in the House of Lords, which is part of the legislature) in return for their support (in many cases, through loans that did 42 not have to be reported to the Electoral Commission because of a loophole in the relevant legislation) stimulated a public 43 inquiry into political funding, only 10 years after an earlier report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life which led to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 and the establishment of the independent Elec- 44 toral Commission (see Ewing,UNCORRECTED 2007). 45 46 0962-6298/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 47 doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.07.002

Please cite this article in press as: Johnston, R., Pattie, C., Money and votes: A New Zealand example, Political Ge- ography (2007), doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.07.002 ARTICLE IN PRESS JPGQ1109_proof 6 August 2007 2/21

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48 Political parties are no longer mass organizations with large memberships prepared not only to 49 subscribe to the parties’ funds but also to work for them, especially in mobilisation activities 50 during election campaigns. To replace the lost members, parties have to find alternative sources 51 of income and adopt other forms of campaigning, with the latter increasingly expensive because 52 of the costs of professional staffs and media advertising. To raise the needed money, many 53 parties have turned to wealthy donors, who are prepared to make large contributions e though 54 often with an expected quid pro quo in terms of access to politicians and potential influence 55 over policies. 56 The potential for wealthy donors (both individual and corporate) to gain influence over the 57 political process has generated considerable interest in the regulation of party finance. Some 58 countries have had regulations in place for a considerable time e as with the UK’s Corrupt 59 and Illegal Practices Act 1883 e but for a variety of reasons these are proving no longer suf- 60 ficient to deal with the contemporary situation. Those promoting reform have thus explored 61 a range of means for regulating party funding so as to remove any appearance of corruption 62 (a term used in the landmark US Supreme Court judgement regarding the regulation of federal 63 political funding in the 1976 case of Buckley v Valeo). As a result, extensive regulatory regimes 64 are now in place in some countries (as with the UK’s Political Parties,PROOF Elections and Referen- 65 dums Act 2002 and the USA’s Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002) and some have also 66 introduced state funding for political parties (as in Canada: see the overview in Ewing, 2007). 67 Three types of regulation have been introduced: 68 69 1. Disclosure, whereby parties and candidates are required to disclose, usually to an indepen- 70 dent electoral commission, both their sources of income (above a certain threshold) and 71 their expenditure; 72 2. Regulation, whereby how much individuals and corporate bodies can donate to a party or 73 candidate (or to a third-party interest group) in a given period is restricted to a maximum 74 sum, and/or with party and candidate expenditure similarly capped; and 75 3. Public funding, whereby the state provides funds for political parties and candidates, sub- 76 ject to conditions and constraints. 77 78 Although not a sequence that has been followed in all cases, the second has usually been 79 introduced because disclosure merely illuminates the problem of an ‘appearance of corruption’, 80 by indicating a party or candidate’s degree of indebtedness to specified donors. Regulation is 81 intended to constrain such potential influence and also, by limiting how much parties and/or 82 candidates can spend, remove the need for large donations and the equivalent of an ‘arms 83 race’ in the growth of expenditure as parties perceive the need to outspend opponents in the 84 quest for electoral victory. Such regulation has often proved difficult to implement, however. 85 Further, by limiting parties’ and candidates’ ability to appeal to donors for funds, regulation 86 has constrained political activity perceived as necessary to democratic operations e parties 87 and candidates need to get their messages to potential voters. (In some cases, such information 88 dissemination is covered by constitutional protections of the freedom of speech and expres- 89 sion.) Hence public subsidy has been introduced in some countries, ensuring that bona fide con- 90 tenders for power have sufficient funding for their electoral purposes and removing any 91 potential for them to becomeUNCORRECTED dependent on (and thus open to influence from) interest groups. 92 (For an example of this sequence in Que´bec, see Massicotte, 2006.) 93 There are many issues relating to regulation regimes and public funding, and how these 94 might be established and made operational in a way that benefits democracy (as illustrated

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95 in a recent collection: Ewing & Issacharoff, 2006). Only one is considered here e is money 96 effective in elections? The underlying assumption in much of the debate is that it is e that 97 the more money that candidates and parties spend on their election campaigns, the better their 98 performance. (For an early review of this literature, see Johnston, 1987; for a recent evaluation 99 of spending on constituency campaigns in England, see Johnston & Pattie, 2007.) Such evi- 100 dence sustains the arguments of those who want campaign spending regulated: expenditure 101 caps will limit an individual’s ability to influence an election outcome through donations to 102 parties and/or candidates. This alone may not be sufficient reason to limit and/or cap donations, 103 of course, since individuals may seek to buy influence, by providing funds for other party ac- 104 tivities than electioneering. Against it are counter-arguments that any regulation and the provi- 105 sion of state funding e which in almost all cases is conditional on candidates and/or parties 106 limiting their reliance on other founding sources e is an unwarranted intrusion into the dem- 107 ocratic process.2 Some of the most recent US cases in this area e such as McConnell v FEC 108 (2003) e have been concerned with balancing these two arguments: is a limitation of the 109 free speech right justified in the larger public good because it removes the potential for corrup- 110 tion of the electoral and political system? 111 There is a large literature on the impact of campaign expenditurePROOF on election outcomes, with 112 mixed findings (see, for example, Jacobson, 2006). In general, although with a number of ex- 113 ceptions (some reflecting different methodological strategies for testing hypotheses that money 114 matters), this research has shown that spending by challengers has more of an impact than 115 spending by incumbents. (Such findings are largely derived from studies of countries with 116 first-past-the-post electoral systems as deployed in UK and US elections.) The New Zealand 117 case provides a particularly valuable opportunity to extend this body of work, because its elec- 118 toral system and regulated party funding regime allow two sets of analyses of the impact of 119 campaign spending to be undertaken. Does money matter as an influence on election results 120 there, in what Ewing and Issacharoff (2006) present as the only exemplar of ‘light touch 121 regulation’?3 122 123 124 New Zealand’s electoral system 125 126 Following two referendums in 1992 and 1993, New Zealand changed its electoral system 127 from first-past-the-post to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, first deployed in Ger- 128 many in the 1950s and adopted recently in a number of countries (Wattenberg & Shugart, 129 2001). Each elector has two votes: for a party list and for an electorate candidate. Regarding 130 the party list, electors vote for their preferred party in a national poll; in the electorate (or con- 131 stituency) portion, they vote for a local representative. The electorate votes are counted as in 132 a first-past-the-post contest; the winner in each is the candidate with most votes. The party 133 list votes are used to determine the overall composition of the House of Representatives on 134 the basis of proportional representation: any party which either obtains 5% or more of the 135 list votes or wins at least one electorate contest (irrespective of its list vote percentage) is en- 136 titled to a number of MPs proportional to its list percentage. Thus, if a party’s list vote total 137 138 2 In the USA, candidates canUNCORRECTED opt out from accepting federal funds for their election campaigns, and thus from some of 139 the regulations on what they raise personally and from whom. 140 3 For earlier studies of the impact of spending at New Zealand elections, see Johnston and Perry (1984) and Johnston 141 and Pattie (1999, 2002, 2003).

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142 Table 1 143 Results of New Zealand’s 2002 and 2005 general elections 144 2002 2005 P P 145 L% ES LS S L% ES LS S 146 ACT 7.14 0 9 9 1.51 1 1 2 147 Green 7.00 0 9 9 5.30 0 6 6 148 Anderton 1.70 1 1 2 1.16 1 0 1 149 Labour 41.26 45 7 52 41.10 31 19 50 e 150 Maori 0 0 0 2.12 4 0 4 National 20.93 21 6 27 39.10 31 17 48 151 NZ First 10.38 1 12 13 5.72 0 7 7 152 United 6.69 1 7 8 2.67 1 2 3 153 Total 69 51 120 69 52 121 154 P Key: L%, percentage of the list votes; ES, electorate seats won; LS, list seats won; S, total number of seats won. 155 156 157 entitles it to 10 MPs and it has six candidates who have won electorate seats, it is allocated 158 another four places (to individuals on its ordered list of candidates)PROOF to ensure proportionality. 159 A party may win more electorates than its list percentage entitles it to, in which case extra seats 160 are provided in the House (the so-called u¨berhangmandate). This happened after New Zea- 161 land’s 2005 election, resulting in a House of Representatives of 121 MPs rather than the usual 162 120 (comprising 69 elected from the constituency contests and a further 51 according to the 163 outcome of the list contest). e 164 Table 1 gives the results of the 2002 and 2005 New Zealand general elections. Two parties 165 Labour and National, which dominated the country’s politics under first-past-the-post from the e 166 1930s until MMP was introduced won nearly all of the electorate seats, with a number of 167 smaller parties (according to their percentage of the list votes) obtaining almost all of their 168 MPs via the list. The main exception to this was the Jim Anderton Progressive Alliance (called e 169 Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition in 2002), which won one electorate seat at each contest e 170 Wigram, held by its leader and only a very small percentage of the list votes (despite fielding 171 candidates in most constituencies). 172 One other apparent anomaly in Table 1 is the Maori Party, which won four electorate seats. 173 Since 1867 New Zealand’s House of Representatives has had a number of seats reserved for e 174 Maori electors only those registered on the Maori electoral roll (who thus claim Maori 175 descent-ethnicity) can vote in these constituencies (see Atkinson, 2003); they traditionally elec- 176 ted Labour Party MPs throughout the 20th century. There are now seven such seats. In 2002, 177 Labour won all seven; in 2005, the newly-created Maori Party won four, and Labour the other 178 three. The Maori Party was entitled to no further seats, however, because of its poor showing e e 179 overall in the list contest. (It also fielded 35 candidates in the ‘general roll’ non-Maori 4 180 constituencies. ) e 181 Because of major differences between the ‘general roll’ and ‘Maori roll’ electorates notably 182 the absence of candidates in the latter from most of the parties that contest the ‘general roll’ 183 184 4 185 The Maori party won 48,263 votes (2.12% of the total) of the list votes nationally, which made it the sixth largest overall. It won 75,076 votesUNCORRECTED in the electorate contests (3.36% of the total, the fourth largest total). Of it 48,263 party list 186 votes, 37,238 (77%) were cast in the seven Maori electorates; similarly, 84% of its electorate votes were cast in those 187 seven constituencies and it failed to get more than 819 votes in any of the ‘general roll’ constituencies that it contested. 188 (On average, 34,000 valid votes were cast in each general roll constituency.)

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189 Table 2 190 Percentage of the votes won by the seven main parties at New Zealand’s 2002 and 2005 general elections in the ‘general 191 roll’ electorates 192 2002 2005 193 E% L% E% L% 194 ACT 3.75 7.48 2.09 1.60 195 Green 5.54 6.79 4.26 5.42 196 Anderton 1.87 1.72 1.71 1.21 197 Labour 43.63 40.56 40.18 40.25 National 31.86 21.88 42.86 41.29 198 NZ First 4.20 10.12 3.71 5.70 199 United 4.75 4.67 3.01 2.81 200 E%, percentage of the electorate votes; L%, percentage of the list votes. Q1 201 202 e 203 electorates this paper analyses only the 62 ‘general roll’ constituencies (which were unchanged 204 between 2002 and 2005; redistricting takes place in New Zealand after each quinquennial cen- 205 sus). In 2002, Labour had a substantial lead over National in both contests (Table 2). Three of e PROOF 206 the smaller parties ACT New Zealand (Association of Consumers and Taxpayers, a party es- 207 tablished by Roger Douglas and others in 1993: Douglas was Minister of Finance in the 1984 and 208 1987 Labour governments, and responsible for the country’s major economic restructuring gen- 209 erally known as ‘Rogernomics’; ACT is committed to free-market neo-liberalism); New Zealand 210 First (a populist party established in 1993 by Winston Peters, a former National Party Cabinet e e 211 Minister who occupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outside the Cabinet in the post- e 212 2005 Labour-led government); and, to a lesser extent, the Green Party won much larger shares 213 of the party list than of the electorate votes. This was not the case with the other two: Jim Ander- 214 ton’s Progressive Alliance gained most of its support in his Wigram electorate (Anderton is a for- 215 mer left-wing Labour MP) and United Future New Zealand has comparable list and electorate e e 216 support. (Its leader Peter Dunne holds an electorate seat: United was formed in 2002 as e e e 217 the merger of two parties, one United centrist and the other Future NZ, formerly Christian e 218 Democrats conservative.) 219 In 2005, Labour’s share of the votes was little changed in either contest but National 220 achieved virtual parity following a major increase in its vote share, with all of the other parties 221 except Anderton’s losing support between 2002 and 2005, accordingly. Twelve other parties 222 were on the list ballot, but apart from the Maori Party none gained more than 0.62% of the votes 223 cast across all 62 constituencies. In addition, 182 candidates from parties (including some 224 standing in the list contest) not in the list in Table 2 contested electorate seats, including 35 225 for the Maori Party in ‘general roll’ constituencies. New Zealand First’s leader lost his elector- 226 ate seat, however, whereas ACT’s new leader unexpectedly won in his constituency. 227 228 Campaign expenditure in New Zealand 229 230 New Zealand’s party funding legislation is at the second of the three stages identiﬁed 231 above e both donations and expenditure are regulated (as outlined in Geddis, 2006). For the 232 current research, the mainUNCORRECTED element of this system is the campaign expenditure limit for each 233 candidate in an electorate contest of NZ$20,000 (ca. US$12,300 and UK£6600), a relatively 234 small sum. Electorate candidates are required to make a return of their campaign expenditure, 235 under six headings. According to the 2005 returns for the 62 ‘general roll’ constituencies, the

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236 Table 3 237 Total expenditure by candidates at the 2005 New Zealand general election in the ‘general roll’ constituencies, by spend- 238 ing categories (NZ$) 239 Min Max Mean Total %Total 240 Newspaper 0 13,134 1040 587,499 26 241 Radio and TV 0 7522 302 170,495 8 242 Internet 0 4046 21 11,677 1 Billboards, etc. 0 15,771 1939 1,095,948 49 243 Postage 0 9367 368 207,800 9 244 Other 0 11,874 313 177,263 8 245 Total 0 19,652 3984 2,250,684 100 246 247 248 total spent by all candidates was NZ$2,251,000 (Table 3), which is only 20% of the potential 249 maximum spending for 565 candidates e among whom 121 made a nil return.5 Of the six 250 categories e newspaper advertising; radio and television advertising; internet advertising; bill- 251 boards, notices, posters, pamphlets, handbills and cards; postage; and other advertising e the 252 largest percentage went on billboards, etc. Each attracted considerablePROOF expenditure by at least 253 one candidate, but the means show very little spending on the Internet overall and relatively 254 little on radio and TV (which is expensive) and on postage. 255 Turning to the seven largest parties e five of which won seats in the ‘general roll’ constit- 256 uencies in 2005 (Table 1) e Table 4 shows that National and Labour far outspent the other 257 five on average with, in particular, the Green Party and Jim Anderton’s Progressive Alliance 258 spending very little. Indeed, Anderton’s party reported no expenditure in well over half of the 259 electorates in which it fielded a candidate, with United, Green and NZ First also recording 10 260 or more constituencies where there was no expenditure promoting their candidates. (This 261 implies that those individuals were, in effect, ‘paper candidates’, relying only on their party’s 262 general expenditure for the list vote, which is also regulated e to a maximum of NZ$1 263 million e but not limited by where it can be spent, as long as it does not promote any indi- 264 vidual candidate.6) All parties except the Greens spent a substantial amount in at least one 265 constituency, however, although comparison of means and standard deviations shows that 266 apart from Labour and National, the distributions were probably very skewed: indeed, apart 267 from the party leader only two other Anderton candidates spent more than NZ$1000 on their 268 campaign. 269 One would expect candidates to spend more campaigning for votes in those constituencies 270 where they had the greatest opportunity of making a substantial impact e if not winning the 271 seat e by building up their local credibility. This was the case in general e the better the can- 272 didate’s 2002 performance for ACT, Greens, National, and New Zealand First the more that was 273 spent on the 2005 campaign: but the relationships, although significant, were weak with no R2 274 value above 0.33. Candidates spent more on vote-seeking where their party had relatively 275 strong support foundations, but did the amount spent (holding constant what their competitors 276 also spent) influence the outcome? 277 278 279 5 A ‘nil return’ indicatesUNCORRECTED zero expenditure and is different from no return being made. 280 6 By fielding an electorate candidate, even if nothing is spent promoting that candidature, a party can gain extra ex- 281 posure for its list vote campaign: for example, declared candidates are invited to attend public meetings at which they 282 can advance their party’s as well as (perhaps more than) their own interests.

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283 Table 4 284 Spending by the candidates of the seven main parties on their campaigns at the 2005 general election: summary 285 statistics (NZ$) 286 Party Min Max Mean SD N 287 ACT 0 17,236 3637 4241 56 (5) 288 Green 0 6650 815 1272 51 (12) 289 Anderton 0 15,356 436 2158 51 (33) Labour 2747 18,778 10,711 4329 62 (0) 290 National 1644 19,652 12,410 5172 62 (0) 291 NZ First 0 17,124 3684 4651 40 (10) 292 United 0 19,652 5068 5951 62 (19) 293 Key: Min, minimum; Max, maximum; Mean, mean; SD, standard deviation; N, number of candidates (number making 294 a nil return in brackets). 295 296 The research questions 297 298 No causal links between spending and electoral performance can be identiﬁed using the data 299 available here, but e as in many other studies e circumstantial evidencePROOF can be provided by 300 relating spending patterns to election outcomes in the aggregate. According to Geddis (2006: 301 20), ‘The limited amount of . spending in New Zealand is also attributable to the fact that 302 candidate advertising does not really have an impact on the election outcome’; in this paper, 303 we put that assertion to an empirical test. 304 305 Continuity and change 306 307 Most studies of the impact of campaign expenditure have assumed e on the basis of empir- 308 ical evidence e that there is substantial continuity in the geography of support for a party across 309 two (and sometimes more) elections. The models tested here build in this continuity and then 310 ask whether spending has an impact at the margins. Such models can be represented as a regres- 311 sion equation: 312

313 Vikt ¼ a þ Vikt1 þ Sikt Sjkt ð1Þ 314 315 where Vikt is the percentage of the votes won by party i in constituency k at election t; Vikt1 is 316 the percentage of the votes won by party i in constituency k at election t; Vikt1 is the percentage 317 of the votes won by party i in constituency k at election t1; and Sikt and Sjkt are spending by 318 candidates of parties i and j in constituency k at election t (measured in 1000s of NZ$). 319 The expectation is that the better a party’s candidate performed at one election in a sequence 320 the better he/she will perform at the next. In addition, the more that party’s candidate spends on 321 the campaign at election t the better her/his performance then, relative to performance at the 322 preceding election (t1), but the more that party j’s candidate spends, the poorer is i’s perfor- 7 323 mance. In other words, does relative spending by candidates promoting their own cause mod- 324 ify the overall pattern of party support? 325 326 7 Some studies also take intoUNCORRECTED account whether a party’s candidate was the incumbent MP (on which see Johnston & 327 Pattie, 2006; Levitt, 1994). This was not relevant to the current study, however: in 2005, 33 of Labour’s 38 incumbent 328 electorate MPs stood for re-election, as did 20 of National’s 23, along with all three other incumbents (one each for 329 ACT, Anderton and New Zealand First).

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330 Straight- and split-ticket voting 331 332 As well as model (1), the New Zealand election system allows another model to be tested. 333 Under MMP, each party’s list vote tally is crucial in determining the number of seats it is al- 334 located in the House of Representatives. Thus, all voters who want to see a party’s representa- 335 tion maximised there should vote for it in the list contest: this choice should represent their 336 ‘sincere vote’, indicating the party that they prefer above all others.8 Their electorate vote 337 need not replicate that sincere vote, however, without harming their preferred party’s chances 338 of representation in the legislature, for a number of reasons.9 Voters may think that their pre- 339 ferred party’s candidate has little chance of victory in their constituency (assuming that one is 340 fielded) and so are prepared to vote for another candidate, who has an apparently better chance 341 of being the constituency’s representative, and who is acceptable to them: they are prepared to 342 switch their votes, or split their ticket, accordingly. Alternatively, they may be attracted to an- 343 other candidate, simply because they assess her/him as a better potential local representative 344 irrespective of party: voting for that candidate/party will not reduce their preferred party’s num- 345 ber of MPs, however, since this is determined by the list vote. 346 The New Zealand electorate is generally well aware of MMP’sPROOF potential for split-ticket vot- 347 ing e and has become increasingly so since the system was first used in 1996. A 2005 sample 348 survey found that 60% knew that their party vote was most important in determining the com- 349 position of the House of Representatives, and only 6% thought that their electorate vote was.10 350 (Most of the remainder e 29% e thought they were equally important.) But if they are to split 351 their ticket e vote for a different party in the electorate contest from that supported in the party 352 list e how will they obtain the information on which to make that choice? One source is the 353 candidates’ campaigns. The more that they spend in the constituency (as an indicator of their 354 campaigning intensity), the more visible they are through their leaflets, posters and billboards, 355 and other publicity material, and so the more likely they are to convince potential ‘floating 356 voters’ (those prepared to vote for a candidate for a party other than their ‘sincere’ choice as 357 shown in the list contest) to shift to them. 358 How substantial are such shifts? Elections New Zealand has published the full matrix for 359 every constituency,11 and Table 5 summarises the pattern for the ‘general roll’ constituencies, 360 covering only the seven largest parties being analysed here. The percentage voting a ‘straight 361 ticket’ e remaining loyal to their preferred list party in the electorate contest (and shown on the 362 main diagonal of the matrix) e varies from just 23% for ACT to 85% for National. Overall, 363 72% voted a straight ticket, so more than one-in-four selected a candidate to vote for in their 364 365 366 8 There are two, relatively unlikely, scenarios in which this may not be the case. The first involves the u¨berhangman- 367 date: if voters estimate e and this is very unlikely e that their party will win more electorate seats than its list total 368 would entitle it too, then it may be in their interests to vote for their second choice party in the list contest without harming their party’s overall representation. It would require a very sophisticated electorate and superb forecasting 369 of the outcome to make this feasible. The other e more plausible e is voters may do this even if there is no chance 370 of an u¨berhangmandate favouring their party, if they expect it to do so well in the electorate contests that it will 371 gain no further MPs from its candidates for the list contest. 372 9 There can be exceptions to this, because of the two thresholds applied when allocating seats e either 5% of the list 373 votes or one constituency victory. A party can focus on the second of those criteria, as ACT did at the 1996 and 1999 elections and Anderton’s partyUNCORRECTED now appears to do: it then garners additional seats commensurate with its list vote share 374 (which in Anderton’s case has been zero at each of the last two contests). 375 10 The survey results are available at http://www.elections.org.nz/mmp-understanding-pre05.html. 376 11 At http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/splitvote_index.html.

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377 Table 5 378 The split-ticket voting matrix for ‘general roll’ constituencies at the 2005 New Zealand general election e percentage of 379 list voters supporting that party’s candidate in the electorate contest 380 List vote Electorate vote 381 ACT G AND LAB NAT NZF UTD 382 ACT 23 1 1 8 60 1 2 383 Green 1 26 2 58 8 1 1 384 Anderton 1 3 27 49 12 3 3 385 Labour 1 5 2 79 6 2 1 National 3 1 1 4 85 2 3 386 NZ First 2 2 2 19 34 33 3 387 United 1 1 1 15 40 2 35 388 Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand First; UTD, 389 United. 390 391 home constituency who was representing a party other than their sincere choice. In some cases, 392 this was because their preferred party did not field a candidate in their electorate but Labour, 393 National and United had candidates in all 62, ACT fielded 56, thePROOF Greens and Anderton’s party 394 both fielded 51, and NZ First had 40 candidates seeking election through the electorate man- 395 date. Thus many supporters of the five smaller parties must have decided to vote for another 396 party’s candidate despite their own preferred choice in the list contest fielding one: United 397 had a candidate in every constituency, for example, but only just over one-third of those 398 who voted for the party in the list also chose that candidate. 399 The pattern of split-ticket voting in Table 5 is generally consistent with the policy positions 400 of the various parties. Those who voted either ACT, New Zealand First or United in the list but 401 not the electorate contest were much more likely to give their latter vote to a National than to 402 a Labour party candidate, for example; those whose party list vote went to either the Greens or 403 Anderton’s party were much more likely to favour Labour than National with their electorate 404 vote.12 But was that pattern consistent across all electorates? Table 6 indicates considerable var- 405 iability, looking only at the constituencies in which the relevant party fielded a candidate in the 406 electorate contest. With straight-ticket voting, for example, the percentage of ACT’s list sup- 407 porters who voted for that party’s electorate candidate ranged from 4 to 80; the variation 408 was from 13 to 88 for Anderton, and from 12 to 97 for United e and even from 32 to 92 409 for Labour and from 38 to 96 for National. For split tickets, in many cases the percentage 410 switching from one party in the list to another in the electorate contest was (virtually) zero, 411 even where there was a candidate available, but for most cells in the matrix, the maximum per- 412 centage was fairly substantial, particularly within the party blocks identified above. Among the 413 ‘left-leaning’ parties, for example, as many as 85% of Green list supporters switched to Labour 414 in an electorate contest, as did 80% of Anderton’s supporters, compared to only 29% of ACT 415 list voters, 42% of those whose sincere vote was for United, and 50% of those whose list vote 416 went to New Zealand First. 417 Supporters of one party at the list contest should, according to the argument above, remain 418 loyal to that party’s candidate in the electorate contest if they perceive that he/she has a chance 419 of victory there and/or campaigns hard for them to make that decision; they should be less 420 UNCORRECTED 421 422 12 Both of those parties were prepared to support the Labour government in the previous Parliament, and Anderton 423 held a cabinet post.

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424 Table 6 425 Summary statistics for the split-ticket voting matrices across all ‘general roll’ constituencies where the relevant party e 426 fielded a candidate in the electorate contest percentage of list voters supporting that party’s candidate in the electorate contest 427 428 List vote Electorate vote 429 ACT G AND LAB NAT NZF UTD 430 ACT Min 4 0 0 2 16 0 0 431 Mean 22 5 19 10 88 20 40 432 Max 80 2 1 29 61 2 2 433 Green Min 0 20 0 15 1 0 0 434 Mean 1 30 2 57 9 2 1 Max 10 55 53 85 36 29 22 435 436 Anderton Min 0 0 13 7 1 0 0 437 Mean 1 4 26 51 13 5 3 Max 17 15 88 80 38 28 34 438 439 Labour Min 0 2 0 32 1 0 0 Mean 7 6 2 79 6 3 1 440 Max 10 28 57 92PROOF 27 40 34 441 442 National Min 0 0 0 0 38 1 0 Mean 3 1 1 5 84 3 3 443 Max 59 4 22 20 96 26 52 444 NZ First Min 0 0 0 1 5 23 0 445 Mean 2 3 3 22 35 43 3 446 Max 37 9 38 50 68 93 49 447 United Min 0 0 0 1 1 0 12 448 Mean 1 1 2 16 41 2 33 449 Max 26 6 39 42 73 22 97 450 N (56) (51) (41) (62) (62) (38) (62) 451 Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand First; UTD, 452 United. 453 454 455 likely to if the other candidates campaign for their support. That suggests the following model, 456 in which the first factor is indexed by the party’s candidate’s performance at the previous elec- 457 tion in the constituency, and campaign intensity is measured by party spending: 458 459 Fiikt ¼ a þ Vikt 1 þ Sikt Sjkt ð2Þ 460 461 where Fiikt is the percentage of those who voted for party i in the list contest who also voted for 462 party i’s candidate in the electorate contest, in constituency k at election t; Vikt1 is the percent- 463 age of the electorate votes won by the candidate of party i in constituency k at election t1; and 464 Sikt and Sjkt are spending by the candidates of parties i and j, respectively, in constituency k at 465 election t (measured in 1000s of NZ$). 466 For split-ticket voting, flows from party i to party j should be greater, the greater party j’s 467 chances of victory inUNCORRECTED the electorate e as indexed by its performance there at the previous 468 election e and smaller, the greater party i’s chances e indexed by party i’s vote share at the 469 previous election. In addition, the more that party i’s candidate spends on the electorate cam- 470 paign, the smaller the expected flow, and the more that j’s candidate spends, the larger. Finally,

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471 the flow should be less in those constituencies where party i is fielding a candidate at election t. 472 This gives a regression model with the form: 473 474 Fijkt ¼ a Vikt1 þ Vjkt1 Sikt þ Sjkt Cikt ð3Þ 475 where Fijkt is the percentage of those who voted for party i in the list contest in constituency k 476 who voted for party j there in the electorate contest; V and V are the percentage of the 477 ikt1 jkt1 electorate contest votes won by parties i and j, respectively, in constituency k at election t1; 478 S and S are spending by the candidates of parties i and j, respectively, in constituency k at 479 ikt jkt election t (measured in N 1000s of NZ$); and Cikt is a dummy variable, coded 1 if party i fielded 480 a candidate in constituency k at election t, and 0 otherwise. 481 482 Spatial autocorrelation 483 484 An issue in many studies of spatial variations is autocorrelation, both in the original depen- 485 dent variable and in the residuals from any model fitted. Where there is significant autocorre- 486 lation, this suggests either or both of an under-specified model and spatial processes that 487 overlap the data units, with implications for the standard errors andPROOF hence the evaluated levels 488 of significance for the relevant independent variables in the fitted models. An under-specified 489 model is always possible: whether there are spatial processes overlapping the data units de- 490 pends on the particular case. 491 For the current study, there is some potential spatial autocorrelation because the individual 492 constituencies are not entirely independent, so that spending in one could affect voting patterns 493 in adjacent constituencies. In general, this is unlikely to be very substantial, however, because 494 most of the expenditure in each constituency is undertaken to promote a particular candidate e 495 although that candidate’s party affiliation is almost certain to be displayed on any electoral ma- 496 terial. Each constituency should thus be largely independent of its neighbours: different candi- 497 dates are being promoted within each party. There is the possibility that some spending in one 498 constituency could have an impact on voters in an adjacent district, however, where that spend- 499 ing is on items such as billboards and smaller posters which are generally visible, so that seeing 500 posters for a party’s candidate in one constituency (or posters promoting a party in the list con- 501 tests: Roberts, 2003) could have an impact of voters from neighbouring constituencies who en- 502 counter them e perhaps as they pass through the area. This is only likely to be slight, in that 503 a great deal of candidate spending on electoral materials goes on leaflets distributed to the vot- 504 er’s home rather than on posters.13 505 Given the potential of some spillover effects involving adjacent constituencies, it would 506 seem desirable to test for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. This was not undertaken 507 here using conventional methods, however, for two major reasons. First, New Zealand’s constit- 508 uencies can be divided into two clear types: those located in the urban areas, where there is 509 likely to be a great deal of cross-border voter movement and exposure to publicity for two 510 or more candidates for the same parties. The second cover the rural areas e including the small 511 towns e where constituencies are very large in area and cross-border movement is likely to be 512 very much less than in the large cities. It seems desirable to separate the two types out. Further, 513 the urban constituencies are in five major clusters (i.e., separate urban areas with two or more 514 UNCORRECTED 515 516 13 On constituency electioneering in New Zealand, see Cousins and McLeay (1997), Denemark (1998, 2003), Pearse 517 (2000), and Roberts (2003).

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518 constituencies: Auckland, 17 constituencies; Hamilton, 2; Wellington-Hutt, 4; Christchurch, 5; 519 and Dunedin, 2). Secondly, in many of the models fitted here e especially those for the smaller 520 parties for which we expected spending would have a greater impact e a substantial number of 521 the constituencies are omitted because no candidate was fielded in the constituency in either or 522 both of 2002 and 2005, which made for both computational and interpretation difficulties, es- 523 pecially for fitting local measures of autocorrelation, which would have been the relevant ap- 524 proach given the clear urbanerural divide. Thus the approach taken here was to fit the relevant 525 models [Eqs. (1)e(3) above] and then, as a final step, introduce dummy variables representing 526 the constituencies in the five main urban areas where spillover effects might occur, and would 527 be identified by positive regression coefficients. 528 529 The results: I e continuity and change 530 531 Model (1) was tested for each party in all of the constituencies where it fielded a candidate at 532 both the 2002 and 2005 general elections, giving the results shown in Table 7A. (In this and all 533 of the other tables, to save space, if there are no significant regression coefficients for any of the 534 urban areas, they are omitted.) The regressions, as throughout the paper,PROOF were fitted in stepwise 535 mode, because of the potential problems with small Ns if all of the variables were incorporated 536 contemporaneously. Only significant coefficients at the 0.05 level or better are shown, 537 therefore. 538 The goodness-of-fit coefficients (R2) indicate considerable success for the model: the small- 539 est shows that 68% of the variation in a party’s performance in 2005 could be accounted for and 540 the average is 87%; such high values are not unexpected, given that the party’s performance at 541 the previous general election 3 years earlier is included as an independent variable. For each of 542 the seven parties, the variable indexing its chances of victory e its performance in the constit- 543 uency at the preceding election e is not surprisingly significant, and with a positive sign: each 544 party performed better in a constituency, the better its performance there last time. (The large 545 positive constant value for National, and the regression coefficient of 1.00 for its 2002 perfor- 546 mance indicates the party’s ‘comeback’ from its poorest ever general election performance in 547 2002.) 548 Did campaigning also have an impact; could candidates change the pattern of votes over a 3- 549 year period by the intensity of their search for support in the constituency, as indexed by their 550 local campaign spending? The significant positive coefficient for spending by all five of the 551 smaller parties e ACT, Green, Anderton, New Zealand First, and United e indicates that in- 552 deed, as hypothesised, greater spending was linked to a better performance, relative to the 553 parties’ achievements in 2002. Thus for every additional NZ$1000 spent, the Anderton party 554 retained a further 2.15 percentage points of its list contest support, for example, and the differ- 555 ence between it spending nothing on the local campaign and the maximum was some 40 per- 556 centage points extra in straight-ticket voting: the comparable figures for ACT, Green and New 557 Zealand First were 5.8, 8.6 and 7.4 percentage points, respectively. 558 There was no significant link between spending and performance for either Labour or Na- 559 tional, however. These are by far the country’s largest two parties which, as Tables 1 and 2 560 show, have continued to dominate electorally since MMP was introduced, especially in the con- 561 stituency contests (whereUNCORRECTED between them they won all but three of the seats in 2005, and came 562 second in all 62). They are highly visible because of their complete dominance of the country’s 563 governments for some 70 years, and their MPs get substantial local coverage through the media 564 in their home electorates. Spending does little to promote their candidates’ cause locally,

+ MODEL R. Johnston, C. Pattie / Political Geography xx (2007) 1e21 13 Q2 565 566 567 0.17 (0.07) 0.56 (0.68) 0.35 (0.09) e e 568 569 570 571 572 573 0.53 (3.05) 1.46 (0.63) 0.15 (0.07) ee ee ee ee e ee ee 574 e 575 576 577 578 579 United. 0.53 (0.19) 0.43 (0.18) 580 ee e 581 PROOF 582 583 584 585 5.14 (1.63) ** ** *** * 0.48 (0.15) eee e eee e 586 ** ** 587 588 589 590 591 2.15 (0.24) e e e e eeee e eeee e e e 592 eeee e

593 : standard errors in parentheses

594 (1) 595 596 0.50 (0.13) 1.99 (0.75) 597 1.28 (0.61) 2.08 (0.58) 1.17 (0.50) * 1.48 (0.27) * * * * * * * 0.58 (0.21) * * eeee 598 eeeee e 599 600 601 602 3.57 (0.77) 0.26 (0.73) 0.87 (0.51) 5.08 (3.43) 14.83 (4.61) 0.05 (0.02) * 0.32 (0.14) 0.11 (0.04) * 603 0.68 0.91 0.980.45 0.88 0.82 0.55 0.84 0.96 0.49 0.43 52 48 4851 62 62 47 21 59 20 58 ACT G AND LAB NAT NZF UTD e e e e e ee e eeeee e e eeeee e e eee e e e 604 eee e e 605 606 607 608 UNCORRECTED 609 610 ACT ACT 2 2 R (A) All constituencies whereConstant the party had candidates in 2002 and 2005 Christchurch Labour National NZ First United United 0.53 (0.21) Anderton Labour National NZ First Green Own vote % 2002Spending 2005 by 1.37 (0.19) 0.56 (0.04) 0.34Dunedin (0.10)R 0.81 (0.05) 0.89 (0.08) 0.26 (0.08) 0.76 (0.02) Table 7 Continuity and change: results of the regressions ﬁtting model Spending 2005 by Green Anderton (B) Excluding constituencies withConstant high leverage Own vote % 2002 0.14 (0.07) 1.50 (0.54) * *Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, 0.16 Anderton; (0.07) LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, 1.10 New (0.28) Zealand First; UTD, * * * * 5.09 (3.51) 1.52 (0.74) N N 611 Auckland Wellington-Hutt Christchurch

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612 therefore, unlike the situation for the smaller parties where visibility and awareness of their can- 613 didates’ credentials is apparently much more dependent on the intensity of their campaigns. 614 Whereas spending by the five smaller parties had a positive impact on their own candidates’ 615 performance, however, it had no negative impact on their opponents’ performance. By spending 616 more, candidates could win over support but not have a significant impact on their competitors’ 617 fortunes. 618 One problem encountered when fitting these models for four of the parties was heterosce- 619 dasticity. Each of ACT, Anderton, New Zealand First and United had one constituency where 620 the party’s 2002 performance far exceeded its achievement in all of the others where it con- 621 tested the electorate vote. In all four cases, this was the constituency contested by the party’s 622 leader, who got 22, 36, 53 and 58%, respectively, of the votes cast in their home electorates in 623 2002, compared to means of 3.7, 1.9, 4.2 and 4.7.14 These were also the constituencies where 624 those parties spent most on the 2005 campaign: ACT spent NZ$17,240 in the constituency 625 where its candidate performed best in 2002, against an average of NZ$3300 in all seats where 626 it fielded a candidate; Anderton’s party’s average expenditure was only NZ$436, but 627 NZ$15,360 in the seat its leader contested: for New Zealand First, the comparable figures 628 were NZ$3672 and NZ$17,120, and for United they were NZ$1616PROOF and NZ$13,600, respec- 629 tively. To remove the leverage of that single point, therefore, those four regressions were re- 630 run without the relevant constituency, giving the results in Table 7B. Although these now 631 have much smaller R2 values, the coefficients for the party’s own spending in 2005 are both 632 significant and positive in each case: the more that candidates for each of the four spent, in con- 633 stituencies where they had little chance of victory, the better their performance in 2005 relative 634 to 2002. 635 Were there any spillover effects? Two main patterns stand out. First, the Green Party tended 636 to perform better in 2005 than in 2002, irrespective of how much it spent, in three of the urban 637 areas e Wellington-Hutt, Christchurch and Dunedin e than elsewhere, suggesting that it was 638 better able to mobilise support there than in the rural areas (but also than in Auckland, the coun- 639 try’s major city). Secondly, Anderton’s party performed better in Christchurch than in any other 640 city. Anderton has always represented a Christchurch constituency since he was first elected to 641 Parliament in 1984 and his popularity in his current Wigram constituency is clearly reflected in 642 his vote-winning elsewhere in that city e which may be a ‘friends-and-neighbours’ effect rather 643 than a direct spillover from the impact of his campaign spending and other activities in Wi- 644 gram: his party is better known in neighbouring constituencies because of his high profile, 645 and his party’s candidates benefit accordingly. 646 647 The results II e straight- and split-ticket voting 648 649 Results of testing model (1) are consistent with the findings of similar studies in other coun- 650 tries, modified to take account of New Zealand’s multi-party system. Parties challenging in 651 seats held by others get an electoral benefit from their campaign spending; those which hold 652 virtually all of the constituency seats do not. But where do those votes come from? Model 653 (2) suggests that parties should retain the loyalty of their sincere voters e those who supported 654 them in the party list contest in an electorate e the better their candidate’s chances of victory in 655 UNCORRECTED 656 657 14 Such a positive skew does not characterise the Green party, which had a near-normal distribution of support in 2002, 658 with only two small outliers e including one contested by one of its joint leaders.

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659 the electorate contest and the more that they spent on the campaign there (as found by Karp, 660 Vowles, Banducci, & Donovan, 2002, in their study of New Zealand’s first MMP election in 661 1996). Similarly, model (3) argues that they are likely to win more support in the electorate 662 contest from voters who supported other parties in the list contest where their chances of suc- 663 cess are greater and they campaign more intensively (i.e., spend more). 664 665 Straight-ticket voting 666 667 Results of the regressions fitting model (2) are in Table 8. The average R2 value is 0.63 and 668 only one is below 0.5. In all but one case, the coefficient for the party’s performance in 2002 is 669 significant and positive. With the exception of the Green Party, the better the party’s perfor- 670 mance in 2002 e and thus its chances of victory in the constituency 3 years later e the larger 671 the percentage of its ‘sincere’ voters in the 2005 party list contest who remained loyal to its 672 candidate in the electorate vote. People were more likely to stick with their preferred party’s 673 candidate e vote a straight ticket e where he/she had a strong foundation of local support. 674 In six cases e the exception was Anderton’s Progressive Party e each party’s campaign 675 spending was also significantly and positively related to its performancePROOF in 2005, holding its 676 2002 performance constant. The more intensively those parties campaigned in a constituency, 677 the better their candidates were able to retain the loyalty of their sincere supporters there: with 678 the Greens, every additional NZ$1000 spent saw it retain a further 3.06% of its list voters, so 679 that the average difference between spending the maximum and nothing was some 60 680 percentage points. 681 In a number of cases, this ability to retain support through campaign efforts was countered 682 by their opponents’ spending, however: National spending, for example, reduced the ability of 683 ACT and United (both parties on the right of the political spectrum) to sustain the loyalty of 684 their list voters, and United’s expenditure cut into both Labour’s and National’s loyalist percent- 685 ages. In many of the cases with significant coefficients, this role of spending as a limit to an- 686 other party’s ability to retain support operated within the ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ party 687 blocs: ACT and United spending impacted on the performance of National candidates, for 688 689 Table 8 690 The pattern of straight-ticket voting: tests of model (2) 691 ACT G AND LAB NAT NZF UTD 692 693 Constant 22.69 (4.67) 37.13 (5.20) 0.87 (0.51) 63.08 (5.37) 70.73 (6.40) 40.82 (5.39) 39.32 (5.25) 2002% 1.18 (0.42) e 0.34 (0.10) 0.50 (0.08) 0.50 (0.11) 0.82 (0.19) 0.95 (0.20) 694 Spending 1.03 (0.35) eee 1.03 (0.32) ee 695 by ACT 696 Green e 3.06 (0.95) e 2.23 (0.82) eee 697 Anderton ee 2.15 (0.24) 2.72 (0.53) eee eeeeeee 698 Labour National 0.92 (0.27) eee 0.50 (0.22) e 0.84 (0.30) 699 NZ First 0.57 (0.27) eee e 0.96 (0.30) e 700 United eee2.12 (0.44) 1.51 (0.51) e 1.38 (0.60) 701 Christchurch ee 1.17 (0.50) eeee 702 R2 0.59UNCORRECTED 0.31 0.97 0.72 0.53 0.71 0.59 703 N 56 51 48 62 62 40 62 704 Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand First; UTD, 705 United.

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706 example, but not Labour’s; spending by both Green and Anderton cut into Labour’s loyalist 707 proportions, but not National’s. 708 There was virtually no evidence of spillover effects, with only one of the dummy coefficients 709 statistically significant e for Anderton’s party. Again, this was for Christchurch, stressing the 710 party’s general strength there. None of the other parties apparently benefited in some constit- 711 uencies from strong performances in neighbouring districts. 712 713 Split-ticket voting 714 715 Turning to model (3), Table 9 reports regressions of split-ticket voting where the ‘recipient’ 716 or ‘destination’ party (that voted for in the electorate but not the list contest) was either Labour 717 or National, the two which dominate the competition in virtually all 62 constituencies. There is 718 a good fit in virtually every case, with only three R2 values below 0.5 and averages of 0.59 for 719 Labour and 0.50 for National. 720 Only one of the independent variables has a consistent pattern of significant, positive, coef- 721 ficients across all 12 regressions, however: the relevant ‘destination’ party’s performance in the 722 constituency in 2002. The stronger each ‘destination’ party’s electoralPROOF base as indexed by its 723 previous performance, the better its candidate’s ability to attract support from each of the six 724 725 Table 9 726 The pattern of split-ticket voting: tests of model (3) for flows to Labour and National 727 ACT G AND NAT NZF UTD 728 Flows to Labour 729 Constant 7.41 (2.90) 38.77 (5.47) 22.85 (5.13) 0.63 (2.98) 4.43 (2.88) 6.18 (3.12) 730 Own 2002% ee e0.10 (0.04) ee Labour’s 0.36 (0.04) 0.70 (0.09) 0.77 (0.08) 0.23 (0.03) 0.54 (0.05) 0.53 (0.06) 731 2002% 732 Own candidate e 21.45 (3.53) 9.59 (3.03) e 10.32 (1.36) e 733 Own spending ee eee e 734 Labour’s ee eee e 735 spending Dunedin ee e 5.20 (2.09) 9.91 (3.66) e 736 2 737 R 0.66 0.59 0.72 0.72 0.82 0.65 738 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 739 ACT G AND LAB NZF UTD 740 Flows to National 741 Constant 43.21 (6.66) 0.38 (3.84) 0.94 (4.59) 6.30 (5.31) 19.81 (4.53) 12.01 (6.19) 742 Own 2002% 0.98 (0.37) ee0.16 (0.06) e 0.53 (0.22) 743 National’s 0.83 (0.13) 0.36 (0.07) 0.40 (0.09) 0.21 (0.08) 0.71 (0.08) 0.92 (0.13) 744 2002% eee e 745 Own candidate 9.43 (4.19) 9.11 (2.00) Own spending 0.83 (0.41) eee0.63 (0.27) e 746 National’s 0.63 (0.28) e eee 0.67 (0.27) 747 spending 748 Auckland ee 5.13 (2.47) ee e 749 R2 0.69UNCORRECTED 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.76 0.67 750 N 62 62 62 62 62 62 751 Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand First; UTD, 752 United.

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753 other parties’ 2005 list voters. For National, in four cases, the stronger four of those parties 754 were in 2002, the smaller the ‘leakage’ in 2005, but this applies in only one case for flows 755 to Labour. Not surprisingly, in general where one of the smaller parties fielded a candidate 756 in the electorate contest the flow to one or both of the major parties was significantly smaller 757 (United fielded a candidate in all 62 seats). 758 Regarding the impact of spending, National’s expenditure on its local campaign was signif- 759 icantly related to its ability to attract support from ACT and United list voters but no others: for 760 Labour, spending was insignificant in every case. Similarly, the amount spent by the ‘origin’ 761 parties in the relevant splits (those supported in the list but not the electorate contest) had little 762 impact in less than half of the cases: for flows to Labour, the more that the Green, Anderton and 763 New Zealand First candidates spent the smaller the proportion of their list voters who switched 764 to a Labour candidate as was the case of ACT and New Zealand First switchers to National. La- 765 bour and National vary in their electoral strength across the constituencies and this is the 766 predominant influence on their ability to attract electorate votes from the smaller parties’ list 767 supporters: neither their own nor their opponents’ spending has any marked impact on this. 768 Where spending has an impact, however, it works within the lefteright ‘ideological’ blocks: 769 the more that National candidates spent the more votes they won fromPROOF the list supporters of other 770 ‘right-wing’ parties (ACT and United); and the more that Green and Anderton’s candidates spent 771 the fewer who switched to Labour. There was only one significant coefficient for an urban area e 772 fewer Anderton party supporters switched to National in Auckland than elsewhere. 773 What of flows away from Labour and National? The regression results in Table 10 again show 774 relatively good fits, with the exception of flows to United from Labour. The strength of the ‘des- 775 tination’ party is a key variable (i.e., its candidate’s performance in the constituency in 2002), 776 with a significant, positive coefficient in all but one case: the better the performance at the pre- 777 vious election, the more a candidate was able to attract party list voters away from either Labour 778 or National. In Labour’s case, this occurred whatever its performance in 2002 for three of the 779 parties (the exceptions occurred with flows to the other ‘left-of-centre’ parties e to the Greens 780 and to Anderton e where the better Labour’s 2002 performance the smaller the outflow in 2005: 781 Labour held on the left-leaning voters in constituencies where it was strongest). For National, the 782 better its candidate’s performance in 2002 the smaller the movement away to three parties e the 783 Greens, New Zealand First, and United. Labour was the defending party of government in 2002 784 whereas National was the main challenger and seeking to improve on its poor 2002 performance 785 e it lost most list support in constituencies where it was relatively weak. 786 For flows from Labour to all five of the ‘minority’ parties, and for two of the five cases for 787 National (both of them within the right-wing ‘ideological’ block), the amount spent by the des- 788 tination (i.e., smaller) party had a significant and positive impact on the volume of ticket- 789 splitting. The more that each of the five parties spent on its constituency campaign, the more 790 Labour list voters their candidates won over, a situation that also applied to the ability of 791 New Zealand First and United to attract support away from National. Spending by the two large 792 parties did not stem this flow, however: only in the case of flows from National to ACT and 793 United was there a significant, negative coefficient (again, within the ‘right-wing’ bloc). Five 794 of the 25 dummy regression coefficients for the cities were significant: again, this included pos- 795 itive coefficients in both cases for flows to Anderton in Christchurch, indicative of his personal 796 vote-winning capacityUNCORRECTED there. 797 Finally, Table 11 looks at flows among the five smaller parties, indicating mixed results with 798 regard to the impact of the major variables of concern here e spending. Although most of the 799 regressions have a reasonable goodness-of-fit, with an average R2 of 0.48, the amount spent by

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800 Table 10 801 The pattern of split-ticket voting: tests of model (3) for ﬂows from Labour and National 802 To ACT G AND NZF UTD 803 Flows from Labour 804 Constant 0.44 (0.28) 3.85 (1.21) 0.38 (1.12) 0.38 (1.12) 0.83 (0.36) 805 Labour 2002% e 0.08 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) ee e 806 Other’s 2002% 0.75 (0.07) 0.15 (0.07) 0.17 (0.05) 0.10 (0.04) Labour spending eeeee 807 Other’s spending 0.09 (0.02) 0.67 (0.25) 0.81 (0.29) 0.27 (0.06) 0.08 (0.03) 808 Auckland eee1.27 (0.58) e 809 Christchurch ee 1.18 (0.35) ee 810 R2 0.30 0.85 0.42 0.74 0.23 811 N 53 51 38 39 61 812 813 Flows from National Constant 2.39 (0.72) 0.62 (0.30) 0.27 (0.08) 4.71 (1.50) 3.64 (0.62) 814 National 2002% e 0.02 (0.01) e 0.11 (0.03) 0.05 (0.01) 815 Other’s 2002% 0.16 (0.18) 0.12 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.13 (0.06) 0.23 (0.07) 816 National spending 0.07 (0.03) eeePROOF0.09 (0.03) 817 Other’s spending eee 0.18 (0.07) 0.12 (0.06) e eee 818 Auckland 0.56 (0.18) Christchurch ee 0.58 (0.07) ee 819 Dunedin ee 0.25 (0.09) ee

820 2 821 R 0.42 0.70 0.69 0.42 0.60 N 55 51 50 39 61 822 823 Key to parties: ACT, ACT; G, Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand First; UTD, United. 824 825 826 the ‘origin’ party in the split-ticket flow was statistically significant in only one of the 20 cases; 827 more campaign expenditure by these parties’ candidates could not stem any outflow. Spending 828 by the ‘destination’ party was significant in eight cases. In comparison, the ‘destination’ party’s 829 2002 performance in the constituency was significant in 16 of the 20 cases. As in the other tests, 830 the main influence on a party’s ability to attract support from those who voted for others in the 831 list contest was its prior electoral strength: votes flowed to candidates in constituencies where 832 their parties were already relatively strong, and in some cases this attractiveness was amplified 833 by the amount of campaigning those candidates undertook (as indexed by the amount spent). 834 835 Conclusions 836 837 Money matters in some aspects of New Zealand election constituency campaigns, therefore. 838 Although the regulations restrict electorate candidates to only a relatively small amount of 839 spending to promote their cause (the NZ$20,000 limit has remained the same since MMP 840 was introduced in 1996), the amount that some spend had a significant impact on both the num- 841 ber of votes that they won in 2005 in a constituency, compared to their performance there in 842 2002, and the pattern of straight- and split-ticket voting. 843 The major beneficiariesUNCORRECTED of spending at the 2005 election were the smaller parties, which not 844 only won just three of the constituency seats but on average polled poorly in the vast majority of 845 electorates. Compared to their performance at the previous contest in 2002, the more that the 846 candidates of these five parties spent on their 2005 campaigns, the better their performance

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847 848 2.65 (0.42) 2.42 (0.81) 849 0.99 (0.24) 850 851 852 853 854 2.71 (0.37) 0.13 (0.04)1.26 (0.56) 0.11 (0.04) 3.44 (0.61) 1.62 (0.70) 0.12 (0.05) 0.11 (0.04) 855 856 857 858 859 2.29 (0.34) 2.48 (0.37) e 860 861 862 863 PROOF 864 1.84 (0.31) 0.19 (0.22) 2.89 (0.46) 1.96 (0.66) 1.39 (0.28) 865 0.62 (0.22) New Zealand First Green eeee 866 eeee 867 868 869 870 0.37 (0.17) 3.74 (0.69) 0.29 (0.07) 0.14 (0.04) 1.87 (0.61) 1.66 (0.80) e eeeee e 871 eee 872 873 874 875 5.42 (1.10) 876 0.36 (0.12) 877 878 879 880 for ﬂows among the ﬁve smaller parties 0.43 (0.07)1.63 (0.69) 0.19 (0.07) 0.234 (0.14) 0.23 (0.07) 0.27 (0.04) 0.30 (0.03) 0.24 (0.11) 0.87 (0.35) 1.52 (0.34) 0.65 (0.24) 0.40 (0.11) 0.27 (0.12) 881 2.80 (0.32) 0.30 (0.07) (3) ee 882 eee eeee 883 884 885 886 0.48 0.66 0.390.23 0.31 0.69 0.47 0.640.15 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.35 0.37 0.73 0.18 0.60 0.65 0.70 (0.29) 0.08 (0.03) 51 41 3746 60 51 54 3952 50 61 51 39 55 49 60 50 39 50 61 eeee eeee e eeee eeee eeee eee ee e eeee eeee e eeee eee eee eeee ee e 887 eee 888 889 890 UNCORRECTED 891 892 2 2 2 FromOther’s 2002% Anderton FromToConstantOwn 2002% Other’s 2002% United Own spending Other’s spending ACT 0.52 0.13 (0.20) (0.05) 0.11Key 0.16 (0.22) to (0.03) parties: ACT, ACT; G, G Green; AND, Anderton; LAB, Labour; NAT, National; NZF, New Zealand 0.49 First; 0.22 (0.18) UTD, (0.08) United. 2.15 (1.47) AND NZF N ToConstantOwn 2002% ACT 1.65 (0.30)N 2.35 (0.59) G 6.76 (1.02)Own candidate 4.18 (0.83) NZF 2.01 (0.33)N UTD 2.34 (0.36) 3.06 ACT (0.35) 3.08 (0.49) G AND UTD Table 11 The pattern of split-ticket voting: tests of model FromToConstantOwn 2002% ACT G 0.82 (0.21) 0.39 (0.13) AND 2.17 (0.55) 1.97 (0.69) NZF UTD ACT AND NZF UTD Own candidate Christchurch Other’s spending Own spending Wellington-Hutt Own candidate Other’s 2002% 0.17 (0.03) R Christchurch R Own spending Other’s spending 893 Wellington-Hutt R

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894 then: greater spending helped them increase their vote share, relative to their party’s average 895 performance 3 years previously. Furthermore, the more that they spent in general the better 896 able they were to retain the support of their list voters in the parallel electorate contests: greater 897 spending resulted in larger straight-ticket voting percentages for the smaller parties. And the 898 amount that they spent enabled them to win over voters who supported other parties e mainly 899 those within either the left- or the right-wing party blocks e at the list contest: greater spending 900 stimulated greater volumes of relevant split-ticket voting. 901 The case for regulating campaign spending by political parties and their candidates is that 902 expenditure caps not only prevent large donors potentially influencing their chosen parties’ elec- 903 toral manifestos and political agendas if elected into power but also increase their prospects of 904 gaining power: spending limits create a relatively ‘level playing field’ across all parties. In New 905 Zealand, the low spending limits for candidates in the MMP electorate contests clearly do this, 906 by making it possible for the smaller parties’ candidates to campaign as intensively as those rep- 907 resenting the two larger parties (Labour and National), without having to raise large sums. This 908 clearly acts as a substantial constraint on those two larger parties whose candidates are generally 909 able to outspend their opponents and in many places to obtain sufficient money to come close to 910 the expenditure maximum. But, unlike the situation for the smallerPROOF parties’ candidates, the 911 amount that Labour and National candidates spent had little impact on their performance. 912 Where the smaller parties were able to raise relatively large sums to promote their candi- 913 dates’ cause they can apparently employ these effectively through more intensive campaigns 914 that win them additional votes e many of them loyalists who supported the party in the list 915 contest but others who supported parties with relatively similar ideological positions are pre- 916 pared to vote a split-ticket. Regulation in this case, it seems, assists those with access to rela- 917 tively few resources by allowing their candidates (most of whom have little or no experience on 918 the national political stage, compared to their major party opponents, many of whom are incum- 919 bent MPs) to compete for support against those representing the two larger parties. 920 Whether money does matter in electoral contests is, to some commentators, not as important 921 as the belief that it does: if people believe that money can ‘buy’ votes through effective cam- 922 paigns, then parties and candidates will act accordingly, as will those prepared to back them. 923 Cases for regulation are then based on this belief. For some commentators, however, the lack 924 of convincing evidence that money matters weakens the case for regulation e because in the 925 end donors will stop giving if their contributions have no impact and thus impositions on dem- 926 ocratic freedoms need not be considered. Money does matter, however, as the results presented 927 here have shown. Where there are geographies of spending there are also parallel geographies of 928 election outcomes which, it might be argued, is good for electoral competition because it aids the 929 cause of candidates of smaller parties who otherwise might have little impact on the contest. 930 931 Uncited reference 932 933 Geddis, 2004 934 935 936 Acknowledgements 937 UNCORRECTED 938 We are grateful to Jack Vowles of the University of Auckland and Helena Catt of the New 939 Zealand Electoral Commission for pointing us towards the data sets used here, and to them and 940 Nigel Roberts for further information about campaigning in New Zealand.

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Please cite this article in press as: Johnston, R., Pattie, C., Money and votes: A New Zealand example, Political Ge- ography (2007), doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.07.002