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Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942

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Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942 Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942 In April 1941 after being promoted to the position of General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival noted that “In going to Malaya, there is the double danger of being left in an inactive command if war did not break out in the East, or finding myself involved in a sticky business with inadequate forces which are usually to be found in the distant parts of our Empire”. So how did Percival come to this position and to preside over the “worst disaster” and “greatest capitulation” in British military history. Percival had chosen a life outside the military until the start of WW1 in July 1914. At the age of 26, he enlisted in the Officer Training Corps on the first day of the war and graduated five weeks later with the rank of second-lieutenant. By November, he had risen to the rank of captain before being despatched to the Western Front in France with his unit. In the battle of the Somme, in September 1916, Percival led an assault beyond the ruins of the village of Thiepval where he was badly wounded. For his gallantry Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival under fire, he was awarded the Military Cross. In March 1918, now a temporary lieutenant-colonel, Percival led a counter-attack which saved a French artillery unit from capture. For this, he was awarded the Croix de Guerre and Distinguished Service Order (DSO). After the war, Percival entered full-time service with the army with the rank of captain. In 1919, he fought in the Russian Civil War when, once again, he distinguished himself again earning a bar for his DSO. In the following year, he went to Ireland to serve in the struggle against the Irish Republican Army, first as a company commander and then as an intelligence officer. As an intelligence officer, he proved himself in counter-guerrilla techniques and intelligence gathering. However, his time was marred by accusations of brutality towards prisoners. Percival was referred to as “easily the most vicious anti-Irish of all serving British officers”. Something that Percival denied. But Percival was subjected to two failed assassination attempts and was moved back to England in 1923, to attend the British army’s Staff College at Camberley. Here he was identified for accelerated promotion by his instructors. Percival then spent four years serving in West Africa. In 1930, Percival returned to England and spent a year studying at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich and then Recreation of the last Command Conference on the 15th became an instructor at the Staff College in 1931. It was said February 1942, at the Battlebox (Percival standing centre) of him “he has an outstanding ability, wide military knowledge, good judgement and is a very quick and accurate Page 1 of 4 Copyright: 2020 Historic War Tours Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942 worker” but added “he has not altogether an impressive presence and one may therefore fail, at first meeting him, to appreciate his sterling worth”. In 1936, Percival was promoted to colonel and was appointed the General Staff Officer to Major-General William Dobbie who was the GOC Malaya. It was during this time that Percival carried out a tactical assessment of the vulnerability of Singapore. In this, he identified the possibility that Japanese forces would land on the east coast of Thailand and Malaya to capture aerodromes and thereby achieve air superiority. His analysis was supplied to the War Office in London but was largely ignored. In March 1938, having been promoted to brigadier, he returned to England. By 1940, Percival was now a major-general and Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the War Office in London. However, after Dunkirk, he requested a transfer to an active command. In April 1941, with a promotion to lieutenant-general, Percival was appointed GOC Malaya. On his arrival in Singapore, he discovered that the airstrips on the Malay Peninsula had not been placed in defensible positions, there was not a single tank as all 350 had been sent to Russia and the troops, particularly the Indians, were poorly trained. Furthermore, most equipment was either in short supply, obsolete or both (London British surrender party marches up to the Ford Motor Factory considered that the war in North Africa was a higher (Percival on right) priority for new equipment than Singapore). Percival intensified the training of the soldiers and attempted to construct defensive positions in the north of Malaya. But local British interest stepped in not wanting troops near their plantations or property. He devised a plan (Operation Matador) to seize a potential Japanese troop staging area in Thailand. However, this too was cancelled by Percival’s superior, Air Chief Marshall Brooke-Popham citing that it was the government’s policy to refrain from any acts that may be viewed as provocation. Percival’s relationship with his two senior generals was problematic. Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, the commander of the 3rd Indian Corps, had been senior to Percival prior to Percival’s appointment as GOC Malaya. Heath felt that he should have been appointed to the GOC position. With the ill-feeling between the two, Percival lost confidence in Heath but did not sack him. And then there was Major-General Gordon Bennett, the commander of the Australian 8th Division. Bennett was full of confidence in his Australian troops and his own ability. But as a veteran of WW1, Bennett had a low opinion of the British military hierarchy. Also, frustrating for Percival, Bennett had considerable freedom in that he had the option to discuss orders from Percival, with the Australian government, if he disagreed with them. The relationship between Heath and Bennett was not a harmonious one either. The Japanese invaded Malaya on the 8th December 1941 in a manner almost as predicted by Percival some four years earlier. The British strategy was always a defensive one. By this time, General Archibald Wavell had been Page 2 of 4 Copyright: 2020 Historic War Tours Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942 appointed to take over from Brooke-Popham, Percival’s superior. Immediately, Wavell found that he was not happy with Percival’s performance claiming “he has the knowledge but not the personality to carry through a tough fight”. After the allied troops had been withdrawn to Singapore, Wavell and Percival clashed over the likely invasion point by the Japanese. Wavell was convinced that it would come from the north-west, whereas Percival insisted it would come from the north-east. Wavell gave in to Percival stating that there were sufficient troops on Singapore should the invasion come from either direction. On the 8th February 1942, the Japanese invaded from the north-west. But Percival insisted it was only a diversion and held back from sending in reinforcements. It Yamashita (arms folded) discusses the allied surrender with Percival (second from left at front) wasn’t until nearly two days later when it was obvious that there would be no invasion from the north-east that the forces held in reserve, were added to the defence of Singapore. But it was too late. The Japanese had a strong hold on Singapore. By the 14th February, the Japanese were approaching the city limits of Singapore. They had captured the ammunition stores and the water supply. On the morning of the 15th, Percival held his final command conference in the Battlebox at Fort Canning. It was clear that the island would soon fall. He was informed that both water and ammunition would run out by the following day. Percival agreed to surrender and late that afternoon, under a white flag, he and his surrender party marched up the hill to the Ford Motor Factory at Bukit Timah, to meet with Japanese Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commander of the Japanese forces. Although the Japanese themselves were running short of ammunition, Yamashita bluffed Percival into surrendering unconditionally. Over 100,000 allied soldiers including about 14,000 Australians became prisoners of war of the Japanese. After the surrender, Percival was held in Changi Prison and in August 1942, was sent to Manchuria where he stayed until the end of the war. US General Douglas MacArthur invited Percival to attend the Japanese surrender ceremony on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Percival also attended the Japanese surrender ceremony in the Philippines where he met Yamashita one last time. Whether shunned or not by the British, Percival did not attend the British-led Japanese surrender ceremony in Singapore. Percival returned to England in September 1946 and later US General Douglas MacArthur hands Lieutenant-General Percival that year, retired from the army. He found himself one of the pens used at the Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri ridiculed for his leadership in Malaya but was respected Page 3 of 4 Copyright: 2020 Historic War Tours Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival General Officer Commanding, Malaya 1941-1942 for his time spent as a prisoner of war. He became life president of the Far East Prisoners of War Association pushing for compensation for his fellow captives. In 1957, he led protests against the film “The Bridge on the River Kwai” obtaining an on-screen statement that the movie was a work of fiction. Unusual for a British lieutenant-general, Percival was not knighted for his service to king and country. Percival died in January 1966, at the age of 78. During WW1 and the years shortly after, as a leader, Percival was courageous and tenacious in the face of the enemy.
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