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2016 The Statesmanship of Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel

Anderson, Timothy

Anderson, T. (2016). The Statesmanship of Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28389 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3317 doctoral thesis

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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Statesmanship of Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel

by

Timothy Douglas Anderson

A THESIS

SUMBITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 2016

© Timothy Douglas Anderson 2016

ii

ABSTRACT

How might we better understand the Canadian regime? This inquiry provides a review of a moment in Canadian political history and its statesmen that stands as an example of the practice that shaped

Canadian nationhood. Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel were the only “Fathers of

Confederation” to meet in pitched battle. Their conflicts between 1869 and 1885 shaped two separate and core elements of the Canadian regime: English-French and East-West tensions.

Through a lens of statesmanship, this inquiry analyzes the thoughts and actions of these two men.

Macdonald, eastern and English, may be understood as a transactional statesman. In brief, this means he practiced a politics of negotiation, compromise, and dedication to classical liberal principles. Riel, western and French, can be read as a transformational statesman. This is a politics of profound idealism, of discomfort with this world, and of an identification of oneself with one’s cause. The inquiry examines these Fathers, their interactions, and the outcomes of their clash of statesmanship. It shows that their statesmanship represents a fresh way for us to might understand the English-French and East-West dynamics in Canada. Further, it demonstrates that ideas and statesmanship are critical to understanding the Canadian regime.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is a long list of people to thank for this dissertation. First, I am grateful for the guidance, advice, and lessons of my supervisor, Dr. Tom Flanagan. You have taught me to be a better writer and to be far more open minded. I am also thankful for Dr. Anthony Sayers, whose advice on this project and my academic career were immensely helpful. I want to thank Drs. Rainer Knopff and

David Stewart for their willingness to serve on my supervisory committee and for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this dissertation.

To Judi Powell, the Graduate Coordinator for Political Science at the University of Calgary, thank you for your assistance, friendship, and cheerfulness. It helped me to navigate a busy and daunting eight years through my Master’s and Doctorate. I am also indebted to Ms. Ella Wensel and Ms. Bonnie Walter, whose administrative help I could not have done without.

I also want to thank Drs. Michael Zekulin and Dave Snow for their friendship, wisdom, and advice during my time working on this inquiry. To Mark Harding, my office mate, I am deeply appreciative of your friendship, insight, warnings, and all around good humour throughout my academic career at Calgary. You helped to make the experience of earning a PhD grand.

To be sure, I owe a great deal to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Douglas and Jo-Anne Anderson, my brother, Nicholas, and grandmothers Geraldine and Phyllis for their love and support. I also want to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for their generous financial assistance with their Doctoral Fellowship as well as a Master’s SSHRC during my previous degree.

Finally, I want to especially thank my uncle Richard, with whom I have lived throughout my time in Calgary. My debt to you is unpayable. This is for you.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ……………………………………………………………………. ii

Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………… iii

Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………. iv

Epigraph ……………………………………………………………………. vi

Introduction .…………………………………………………………………… 1

Chapter 1: Statesmanship …………………………………………………… 8

1.1. The History and Present of Statesmanship …………………… 8

1.2. A Review of Social Science Research on Leadership …………… 19

1.3. Re-conceiving Statesmanship: Transactional and Transformational . 38

Chapter 2: Sir John A. Macdonald ……………………………………………. 51

2.1. Macdonald as a Political Thinker ……………………………. 52

2.2. Pre-Confederation ……………………………………………. 69

2.3. Confederation ……………………………………………………. 78

2.4. The Pacific Scandal and Political Relationships ……………………. 90

2.5. Macdonald and Statesmanship ……………………………………. 100

Chapter 3: Louis Riel, Part One ……………………………………………. 114

3.1. On the Verge of Uprising …………………………………………… 116

3.2. In the Provisional Government …………………………………… 135

3.3. After the Resistance …………………………………………… 149

3.4. Early Riel and Statesmanship …………………………………... 157

Chapter 4: Louis Riel, Part Two …………………………………………… 175 v

4.1. Riel Prior to the Rebellion ……………………………………. 175

4.2. The North-West Rebellion ……………………………………. 190

4.3. Later Riel and Statesmanship ……………………………………. 212

Chapter 5: Riel’s Madness? ……………………………………………………. 220

5.1. Views of Riel’s Madness ……………………………………………. 220

5.2. Religiosity and the Myth of Mental Illness ……………………. 226

5.3. Riel, Psychology, and Statesmanship ……………………………. 237

Chapter 6: Statesmanship in Collision ……………………………………. 241

6.1. Statesmanship during the Red River Resistance ……………………. 241

6.2. Interaction Before and During the North-West Rebellion ……. 254

6.3. Macdonald and Riel: The Clash Over Hanging ……………………. 265

6.4. Statesmanship between Macdonald and Riel ……………………. 273

Chapter 7: The Canadian Regime and Statesmanship ……………………. 285

7.1. English-French Tensions …………………………………….. 285

7.2. East-West Tensions ……………………………………………. 299

7.3. The Regime and the Ideals of Statesmanship ……………………. 316

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….. 319

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….. 323

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EPIGRAPH

“There were giants in the earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown.”

— Genesis 6:4 1

INTRODUCTION

How did Canada become the Canada we recognize today? One can answer that question in several ways and each answer is valid in its own right. One could say that Canada became a country on 1

July 1867 with Confederation. But, why is that date more important than the one where the Fathers agreed to the British North America Act, or the day Queen Victoria gave Royal Assent to the bill?

I doubt there is much of a difference. One can claim that we became a country in April 1917 with

Canadian victory at Vimy Ridge. While this might be the first time that Canada asserted itself in the world, to take this argument seriously is to diminish the importance of the Fathers of

Confederation and early Canadian statesmen. A few Canadians suggest that Canada came into its own with the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982.1 This allegedly freed the country from requiring Westminster to pass amendments that Canadians wanted to make to the BNA Act.

Although the appeal of this perspective is obvious, for it to be true means that prior to 1982, the

Canadian state was supine and incapable of expressing sovereignty, which would be wrong.

When one questions against this problem of Canada’s origin, it becomes clear that it is incredibly difficult to answer. In one sense, this is because a country forms much the way a child does, through processes of gestation, education, inculcation, and maturation. I can say confidently when I was born, but it becomes a trickier situation to find out when I became who “I” am.

Knowing the date I was conceived or first went to school teaches me little about the nature or identity of my character. Instead, it takes reflection, analysis, and genuine introspection in order to generate an answer. And furthermore, the question has to change, albeit slightly. It is better to

1 Randy Boswell, “1867 Competes with 1812, 1608 and 1982 as ‘Founding’ Dates in Canadian History.” Post Media, 24 June 2013. Available at: < http://www.canada.com/life/1867+competes+with+1812+1608+1982+ founding+dates+canadian+history/8572618/story.html >. Accessed 1 July 2016. The report shows that seven percent of Canadians identified 1982 most strongly with the Canadian founding. 2 ask how does a subject begin to become what it is, rather than when did it become what it is.

Identity is always subject to modification.

More than two thousand years ago, Aristotle wrote about how one’s character emerges. He believed that character comes from habit; nature did not fit us for any one condition, but we are naturally fitted to acquire various ones and thus become who we are through habit.2 Thus, “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, [and] brave by doing brave actions.”3 Furthermore, Aristotle thought that this was true of political communities too, since he claimed that good legislators make good citizens, or they can pass on cowardice and fear if they are poor governors.4 It is important for citizens to learn how to perform the right sorts of actions because they are capable of being either good or bad depending on their instruction. 5

Connectedly, we can say that we become who we are through a gradual process of learning and experiencing that begins with doing the right thing.

In modern philosophy, John Locke’s epistemology expanded on the old master’s thought.

He wrote that we are born as a blank sheet of paper upon which experience will inscribe the contents.6 He denied that we come pre-packaged with inclinations towards justice, freedom, or religion; he wrote that someone who never saw a just act would not know justice and would not find himself inclined to do justice.7 Concomitantly, his theory of government rests on the idea that human experience in the state of nature drove us into political community.8 Locke’s idea about the right of rebellion also stands on the basis that people determine that their experience of the current

2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Second edition (Indianapolis, IN & Cambridge, UK: Hackett, 1981), book II, §§1-3, 1103a15-26. 3 Ibid., book II, §4, 1103b1-2. 4 Ibid., book II, §5-7, 1103b3-22. 5 Ibid., book II, §8, 1103b23-26. 6 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 7 Ibid. 8 Idem, Second Treatise on Government, in Two Treatise of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapter VIII. 3 government is so awful that they are required to throw out that body and form a new government. 9

In short, for Locke a person and a body politic become who they ultimately are through the occurrence of events and observations rather than being born with innate ideas or modes of life or political organization.

When, throughout this inquiry, I consider what helps to shape the Canadian “self,” it is in the way Aristotle and Locke wrote about the subject that I intend. The country has become what it is through continuous conflict and tension. There is no one moment that made the Canadian regime. It is the result of various moments and according to various tensions that over time “make”

Canada what it is. Armed with this grasp of how identities are formed and the self is created, we can return to our original subject, the Canadian regime. Since Canada has been independent for nearly one hundred and fifty years, any quest to determine the nature of that identity requires us to review something from history—likely from the very beginning. I add that Canada intuitively seems to be a fit subject for this definition because many of its political controversies past and present centre around relations between English and French, and East and West. Anyone familiar with the Canadian case knows that these tensions help to define the Canadian experience.

Canadian political history seems quieter than that of other Western polities. The explorers who made first contact with the Natives, such as Jacques Cartier and John Cabot, lack the cachet and global fame of Christopher Columbus and James Cook. The rebellions in the 1830s were mild compared to those that began at the Bastille or Fort Sumter. Confederation was the result of negotiation by leading politicians, partially at the prodding of Imperial Britain, for British North

America to administer itself. This process seems meek in contrast to the American War for

Independence or Oliver Cromwell’s Glorious Revolution. Furthermore, Britain produced

9 Ibid., chapter XIX. 4 canonized moral and political philosophers such John Locke and David Hume. Similarly, France produced world-famous tacticians and statesmen such as Napoleon and Charles de Gaulle. The

United States gave us defenders of democracy and freedom such as Thomas Jefferson and

Abraham Lincoln. Although Canada has provided to the world diplomats such as Lester Pearson,10 it has yet to produce a Lincoln or Napoleon.

This notwithstanding, I believe there is one period of time in Canadian history that can rival any in a Western polity. It has the elements of leadership, action, philosophy, religion, realpolitik, controversy, and historical significance. This moment saw two of Canada’s founders who represent two abiding dualities in Canadian politics, linguistic and geographic. It is the only period where two Fathers of Confederation actually engaged in a pitched battle, each inspired with different visions for political life. Because of the winner’s successes, the power and importance of the federal government was instantiated. Their clash provides students of politics an opportunity to better understand English-French relations and East-West relations in Canada. It also demonstrates the importance of ideas and statesmanship to the Canadian regime. We can understand the Canadian regime better through a careful review of this moment and these men.

The period in question is defined by the conflict between Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis

Riel. The evidence marshaled below will show that a careful review of their statesmanship teaches us two things about the Canadian regime. First, that their clash represents a vivid and high-stakes example of two of the important dualities that animate Canadian politics: English-French and East-

West tensions. Second, that the interplay between these Fathers of Confederation shows that

Canada can be understood, at least in part, through the lens of statesmanship and the ideas that attend to it. This fact is underappreciated in Canadian scholarship.

10 See Andrew Cohen, Lester B. Pearson (Toronto, ON: Penguin, 2008). 5

I propose that Macdonald and Riel are justifiable subjects for inquiry; my project will show they stand as the champions of two major strands in the Canadian tapestry: French and English, and East and West. I intend to study these subjects through the scholarly tradition of statesmanship theory. I believe it is a helpful approach for making sense of important political leaders. Beginning with Plato and stretching into the contemporary works of Harry Jaffa and Harvey Mansfield, statesmen are said to arise as great leaders who use their wisdom, political thought, and practical skills at a pivotal juncture in a country’s history. The literature on statesmen shows that they are great leaders who act according to a vision of human nature, psychology, and approach to idealism in politics. Moreover, these statesmen attend to the founding or preservation of the regime.

It is plausible to assert that Canada is a polity whose identity may be better understood through the statesmanship of Macdonald and Riel. I also think it is reasonable to ask whether they were statesmen who helped to found or preserve our regime. Canadian scholars argue that the

Fathers of Confederation, such as Macdonald, promoted the principles of good government, British political liberty, the respect for linguistic difference, and the practical necessity of federalism.11

But, in both 1869 and 1885, the Canadian polity was challenged by Métis revolts at Red River and in the North West under the leadership of Riel, who also became a Father of Confederation. At times, he posited different political ideas than those discussed at the Confederation debates; he drew on traditional French and Catholic thought in contrast to many Canadian Founders such as

Macdonald, who endorsed liberal ideas.12 In 1885, the Canadian state, under the leadership of

Macdonald, put down the uprising and tried its leader for treason. As a result, Riel was hanged and his influence faded, whereas Macdonald is often acknowledged as the primary Father of Canadian

11 Janet Ajzenstat et al, Canada’s Founding Debates (Toronto, ON: Stoddart, 1999); Janet Ajzenstat, The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (Kingston, ON & Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2007). 12 Thomas Flanagan. “Political Theory of the Red River Resistance: The Declaration of December 8, 1869.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, volume 11, number 1 (March 1978): pp. 153-164. 6

Confederation. If statesmen use ideas and attend to the formation or reformation of a regime, it seems reasonable that Macdonald and Riel may have engaged in statesmanship as described above, albeit they may be different types of statesmen.

A word about the term “regime.” I follow Mansfield’s definition: “the rule of the whole of any society by a part of that society, which by its rules, gives that society its particular character.”13

A regime is not born, rather it comes about by choice—or human accident—and is made to cohere by both force and legislation.14 In brief, a regime exists when, through force and ideas, the polity is ruled in a specific way that imparts to it a certain form. It is why “these men live in this way.”15

In the United States, the people and the states rule freely, and this yields a liberal democracy. In

Robespierre’s France, radical élites ruled, and this resulted in state terror and human misery.

I begin my inquiry with a literature review of statesmanship and the social science scholarship on leadership. This enables me to borrow and renovate the concept of statesmanship in a way that brings together insights from various important texts. In short, it is one that distinguishes between transactional and transformational statesmen. Next, I work through primary and secondary source materials on Macdonald and in order to argue that he can be understood as a transactional statesman. Then, I engage in the same process for Riel and argue he can be interpreted as a transformational statesman, and someone who ought not to be dismissed as insane.

Following this, I consider the clash of statesmanship between Macdonald and Riel and demonstrate how these statesmen interacted. Finally, I suggest that these moments are important to understanding the Canadian regime in two ways. First, by providing students of Canadian politics a dramatic and vivid depiction of two champions of two dualities that animate Canada. Further,

13 Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago, IL & London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 236. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 7 the Macdonald-Riel clash shows that ideas and statesmanship are a key element of the Canadian regime.

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CHAPTER 1

STATESMANSHIP

An examination of Macdonald and Riel’s statesmanship must begin with some thought on what is meant by statesmanship. It is a tricky word, and one is unlikely to find an iron-clad definition. It is a term with clear connotations and intuitive value, but to provide a clear definition for this inquiry, we must review some literature. In this chapter, I work through philosophical approaches to statesmanship, which provide a broad description of the term that depicts statesmen as special leaders who help to found, re-found, or preserve a regime. However, because this literature might preclude certain people who commonsensically ought to be considered statesmen, I extend my literature review to include several classic social science texts on leadership in order to expand the definition. Despite many differences among the philosophical and social science writers, there are critical cross-connections and similarities. These similarities are well captured in the distinction between more prudent “transactional” and more radical “transformational” statesmen. This distinction, drawn from writers such as J.M. Burns, will be used to review Macdonald and Riel.

1.1. Philosophical Approaches to Statesmanship

The term “statesman” has currency in contemporary politics. It is common to encounter laypeople referring to a foreign diplomat or well-regarded president as a statesman. People possess a general intuition about the words “statesman” and “politician.” We think that a politician seeks only electoral advantage, and would perhaps stretch truth if necessary. The statesman is something else.

He possesses a knack for leadership and thoughtfulness that the politician fakes. An etymological study will ground our intuition in facts. 9

While this is a linguistic distinction we make today, the words “statesman” and “politician” existed as one in early political thought. Plato’s dialogue, the Statesman, in the original Greek is entitled Politikos, the root of which gives “politician” in English. From the title, we note that perhaps the distinction between the politician and the statesman might not be as obvious we thought; it might be an idiosyncratic distinction in English.

As we dig deeper, we find reason to combat this scepticism. The Statesman is the second of three dialogues, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philosopher—the last of which was never written.16 In the first dialogue, Plato sketched out a sophist as one who knowingly manipulates.

The sophist is seen as a master of dispute; he makes his living by teaching others to dispute the visible things in heaven and earth.17 Any time somebody makes a claim about the universal nature of something, we see the sophists as “tremendous arguifiers (sic).”18 Even though they lack universal knowledge, as such a thing is impossible, the sophists get others to believe in them through their exploitation of “conjectural or apparent knowledge.”19 The sophists are manipulative people who convince others they know more than they do, and they teach others to dispute any comment about the essence of eternal things.

In contradistinction, in the second dialogue the statesman manages the people as artfully as a shepherd, and possesses the knowledge of “practical aspects of human care.”20 Throughout the dialogue, the Stranger tries to impress upon his interlocutors the idea of the statesman as a guardian of an earthly flock he needs to lead. The key point is that there appears to be between the

16 Mary Louise Gill, “Method and Metaphysics in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edited by Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2009). Available at: < http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/plato- sophstate/ >. Accessed 31 May 2013. 17 Plato, Sophist, in The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (New York, NY: Macmillian, 1892), p. 359 [232] 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 360 [233] 20 Cf. Plato, Statesman, in The Dialogues of Plato. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (New York, NY: Macmillian Company, 1892), p. 475 [276]; Gill, “Method and Metaphysics,” §7.1 10 skilled actor—the statesman—and the less noble one—the sophist— a distinction that resembles our intuitive divide between the statesman and politician. The Stranger reinforces this point when he says of the dangerous politician that he is the “chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.”21 Plato’s study of political leadership distinguishes between the statesman and the politician in a similar manner as our intuitions directed us.

What of the word “statesman”? The Oxford English Dictionary notes that it originated from the French term “homme d’état,” meaning a man of state.22 The definition refers to one who takes charge of the affairs of state and is “a skilled, experienced, and respected politician.”23 Moreover, the word can be used as an appositive, and as such it can modify the meaning of other professions, such as “statesman-priest.”24 The OED also notes that the first use of the word is in Thomas

Nashe’s Pierce Pennilesse, where we find this line: “some thing to be counted rare Politicians and statesmen, by being solitary.”25 We can cull from this a couple key points. First, that a statesman is a man of the state, somebody who serves an important role in it. Inasmuch as a statesman is an

“experienced politician,” we can conclude that our intuition about the statesman being something over and above the politician is correct; the quotation from Nashe shows a separation of the two ideas. Further, the idea that “statesman” can be an appositive means that it possesses the quality of addition; one can be, theoretically, a statesman-politician. These investigations indicate that on the face of it, there is reason to uphold the common sense distinction between the statesman and the politician.

21 Plato, Statesman, p. 493 [291] 22 “Statesman,” in Oxford English Dictionary. Available at: < http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca /view/Entry/189271#eid20908134 >. Accessed 31 May 2013. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Quoted at ibid. 11

Of course, an understanding of statesmanship must go beyond the OED definition and

Plato’s classical reflections. Since the second half of the twentieth century, several writers on statesmanship trace their intellectual roots back to Leo Strauss. In particular, the works of Harvey

Mansfield, Gerald Wegemer, Ralph Rossum, Harry Jaffa, and Herbert Storing demonstrate a genuine engagement with the subject. What we find is that the key point is not so much between statesman and politician, but that statesmen are special types of leaders. We will review some of the core aspects of their thinking below.

Mansfield defines statesmanship as the good that a political actor can do under the present circumstances. 26 In other words, statesmanship is a prudent statecraft. The statesman has the special capacity to determine whether the complaints from the people regarding a particular issue simply represent our human tendency to bemoan our condition, or whether they are founded on a substantive claim that requires fixing.27 Sometimes the people clamour for something because they lack access to something fundamental to human flourishing, whereas other times people complain out of narrow self-interest. This ability to distinguish, Mansfield writes, is the “statesman’s presumption.” Furthermore, the process of statesmanship requires a man to be able to see further into the future than the average citizen—the statesman is blessed with foresight.28

Statesmen cannot be just anybody. Any effort to understand statesmanship requires us to consider those who are the “best example” of leaders.29 In order to understand what statesmen do, we must “know the limit of human capacity, that is, what a great man would do.”30 Statesmen, then, are leaders that we could consider to be great people, according to Mansfield. Further, he

26 Harvey Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government: A Study of Burke and Bolingbroke (Chicago, IL & London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 17. 27 Ibid., p. 23, 20-40. 28 Ibid., pp. 226-227, 243. 29 Ibid., p. 17. 30 Ibid. 12 writes that the “study of statesmanship is therefore chiefly the study of great men, and reliance on statesmanship is a reliance on the performance and example of great statesmen.”31 If we want to inquire into the concept of statesmanship, we are required to consider “great men”; a regime that treasures statesmanship looks to the deeds and lessons of its statesmen for guidance.

“Great men” are critical visionaries. They can see the world clearly without the “aid of appearances.”32 They differ from regular, honest politicians because those leaders are impressed by good fortune and slavishly fear threats against their own personal fortune.33 Great statesmen can rise above their own personal circumstances. Furthermore, the great have the capacity to know that just because something worked previously does not mean that it will again; sometimes the status quo is limiting, and new, bold steps need to be taken.34 Nevertheless, they must be modest, and must appreciate that in normal times, it is preferable for average leaders to govern rather than themselves.35 Despite their gifts, statesmen understand that their exceptional talents are only required at exceptional times. In short, statesmanship is the study of great men who possess extraordinary vision and who exercise prudential leadership at critical moments.

Another expositor of statesmanship was Gerald Wegemer. In his interpretations of Thomas

More’s philosophy, he developed a definition of the concept. He wrote that statesmen possess

“both the science and the art of ruling.”36 By that, Wegemer meant leaders who understood the political theory, history, and law required to rule well, but also had the practical wisdom of how

31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 243. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Gerald B. Wegemer, Thomas More on Statesmanship (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 2. 13 people actually govern, how people need to be spoken to, and how government actually works.37

In brief, a statesman must have a command over the theory and practice of ruling.

Additionally, the statesman is one “versed in the principles and art of government, especially one who shows unusual wisdom in treating or directing public affairs.”38 The statesman is uncommonly wise in practicing his craft. In order “to implement, interpret, and improve a nation’s laws, the wise statesman must have a thorough knowledge of his nations laws, traditions, and literature as well as a thorough knowledge of human nature.”39 Statesmanship requires one to be steeped in an appreciation of the specific regime as well as how human beings act in general.

As with Mansfield, the statesman is leader with extraordinary gifts in terms of vision, wisdom, and capacity to act politically.

A further review of statesmanship literature demonstrates that statesmen emerge at particular moments in the life of a regime. Rossum and Gary McDowell contend that real statesmen are those who use wisdom, rhetoric, and prudence in political life.40 Thinkers such as Publius appreciated the special genius of the American people, and arranged both a philosophic defence of a federal American polity and a constitution to instantiate those ideas. 41 In particular, the

Federalists founded a commercial republic, which enabled people to pursue their natural self- interest without destroying civil society. They tied local businesses to the central treasury, and this created a bond between merchants and the Union, for if the latter were to dissolve, so would their

37 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 38 Ibid., p. 19. 39 Ibid., p. 212. 40 Ralph Rossum and Gary McDowell, “Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution,” in The American Founding: Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution. Edited by Ralph Rossum and Gary McDowell (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981), p. 6. 41 Alexander Hamilton et al., “Federalist 39,” in The Federalist Papers with the Letters of Brutus. Edited by Terence Ball (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 14 investments.42 The process of instituting this new kind of republic, Rossum noted, was intended to reduce the political chaos that attends states where every man simply seeks his own wealth.43

The American founders had “engaged in the most fundamental of political acts—the founding of a nation.”44 They wanted to create a constitution that would apply just as much to future generations as their own; they constructed a federal republic to pass the tests of time. 45 In order to succeed, these statesmen had to “plumb the depths of human nature, to take account of both its virtues and its vices”; a constitution that violated or mischaracterized human nature had no chance for success.46 The founders built a sound constitution, and then those like Publius had to sell it with their Federalist Papers, which they did. This all goes to underscore what Rossum saw as the key ideas that set the statesman apart: his use of wisdom and rhetoric.47

Storing takes a slightly different approach to statesmanship. He says we cannot understand the founding of the constitution, for example, the same way we might read political treatises on good government.48 Instead, we need to look at those who were involved in these momentous political occasions and study their character; in 1787, the founders were composed of exceptionally talented, patriotic, and unusually young people.49 Some statesmen even realize that later students of these historical junctures will look to them in order to make sense of things, and this perhaps explains why James Madison made such an effort to note what was said and debated at the federal

42 Ralph Rossum, “Statesmanship and the Future of the American Commercial Republic,” in The American Founding: Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution. Edited by Ralph Rossum and Gary McDowell (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981). 43 Ibid. 44 Rossum & McDowell, “Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution” p. 10. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., pp. 10-11 47 Ibid., p. 11. 48 Herbert J Storing, “The Federal Convention of 1787,” in The American Founding: Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution. Edited by Ralph Rossum and Gary McDowell (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981), p. 14. 49 Ibid. 15 convention.50 He wanted to leave behind what he believed was an accurate representation of these statesmen at work.

There is no doubt in Storing’s mind that the federal convention was an exercise in statesmanship. He criticized the idea that all governments come together through accident and force because 1787 was a case where “the whole people, through their representatives, deliberately constitut[ed] themselves into a political community.”51 Furthermore, it was a moment of political compromise, but not in the sense that the constitution was merely an array of compromises added together.52 Instead, the founders engaged in compromise with larger principles in mind that guided them; the debate went beyond the provincial interests of each delegate to include the intrinsic worth of union itself and the “broad principles of free government.”53 While the founders had to deal with the material and social realities of their time, this did not prevent them from finding a way to subject to law the new “political community” in America. 54 In brief, Storing saw statesmanship as something that could be best understood by studying the individuals who participated in it, and in his case of the 1787 convention, the statesmen were exceptional compromisers who founded a new liberal society.

Jaffa contended that the statesman needs to try and avoid a particular vision of human nature. Statesmanship requires a rejection of Behaviorist and Marxist conceptions of human nature and freedom. 55 Our nature ought to be understood as profoundly free—I am endowed by my creator or by nature with particular inalienable rights.56 The aforementioned camps contend that

50 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 51 Ibid., p. 13. 52 Ibid., p. 14. 53 Ibid., p. 15. 54 Ibid. 55 Harry Jaffa, “Introduction: On the Necessity of a Scholarship of the Politics of Freedom,” in his Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Winston Spencer Churchill (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), pp. 3-4, passim. 56 Cf. ibid., p. 3. 16 human nature is malleable and materialistic; if I change the means of my existence or the phenomena that stimulate me, I become a different person.57 Jaffa notes that this last position indicates that those who are in positions of authority hold themselves to be intrinsically better than their subjects.58 This destroys the capacity for human beings to be equal in their rights, and to be perceived as all equally flawed too. Good statesmen—such as Lincoln or Winston Churchill— understood that human life is imperfect, and that only through the processes of reflection, dedication, courage, and the humility to believe they are not divine can leaders help build a better, albeit imperfect, world for everyone.59

To that end, in Jaffa’s Crisis of the House Divided, he interpreted Lincoln’s arguments during his debates with Stephen Douglas. In an especially moving passage, Jaffa noted that Lincoln possessed a theory of political justice, composed of equal parts equality and consent.60 Lincoln wanted blacks in America to become full and equal citizens, but he was uncomfortable forcing equality upon a people unprepared for it.61 He feared that a leader who disregarded the people’s consent in the pursuit of justice would be the imposition of oligarchy, and that would defeat the principle of equality.62 Lincoln’s statesmanship on the eve of civil war “consisted in finding that common denominator in existing circumstances which was the highest degree of equality for which the general consent could be obtained.”63 This mirrors Mansfield’s initial definition of statesmanship being the practice of doing the most good possible given the situation.

57 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 58 Ibid., p. 8. 59 Ibid., p. 9. 60 Idem, Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (Chicago, IL & London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 377. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 17

Jaffa also holds up Churchill as a genuine example of statesmanship. Churchill once asked rhetorically whether “the march of events [is] ordered and guided by eminent men, or do our leaders merely fall into their places at the heads of the moving columns?”64 The answer to him was obvious; one’s wisdom, virtue, and deeds matter in political life, they are not insignificant. 65

Churchill looked around during the 1920s and 1930s and saw that the world he believed in, a world that depended on free human agency, was being marginalized in favour of a world shaped by mere

“tides and tendencies.”66 As Coriolanus did with Rome, he rejected this modern form of politics and set himself to “banish” it.67

The fuel that propelled Churchill’s statesmanship was ambition “harnessed” by anger.68 He turned his righteous anger against the Tories when their politics were too narrow, he raged against socialism for its inherent meanness in the pursuit of an ideal society, and he fought the National

Socialists and the Bolsheviks who represented tyranny and “inhuman cruelty.”69

One could say Churchill was ambitious to see a politics of prudence and freedom prevail over these other ways of life. In fact, he rejected any idea of utopian living, according to Jaffa. He wrote of a world where everyone lived the “good life” marked by citizens who lived as long as they want, had a heightened sense of pleasure and empathy, could travel into outer space, and could even predict the future with accuracy.70 Churchill saw all of these scientific advancements as ultimately empty, since these new humans were no more equipped to answer the simplest and basic questions of life—“why are we here? What is the purpose of life? Whither are we going?”71

64 Idem, “Can There Be Another Winston Churchill?” in his Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Winston Spencer Churchill (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), p. 25. 65 Ibid., p. 26. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., p. 28. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 71 Ibid., p. 29. 18

Even though our physical bodies may be pleased, a utopian world cannot bring comfort to the human soul.72 Jaffa saw this as the most revealing passage in all of Churchill’s writings, and that makes complete sense.73 Confronted with a Nazi ideology where the conquest of the Führer and the Führerprinzip were supposed to bring forward a joyous thousand year Reich, Churchill would clearly deny the possibility of one man’s will and vision being capable of solving all of Germany’s problems, particularly through mass killings and naked military aggression. Moreover, it makes sense that Churchill stood up against the USSR, whose founding mission was the collective ownership of the modes and means of production and the smashing of the imperial state in the name of “bread, freedom, and peace” for all. In a Marxian utopia where people could follow

Marx’s dream of being an unalienated worker by day and a social critic in the evening, no one would be an inch closer to answering the ultimate questions of human life.

The works of Rossum, Storing, and Jaffa do two things. First, they give further evidence to the idea that statesmanship is a practice of extraordinary leadership, grounded in wisdom, prudence, and political skill. Second, that we see statesmanship arise at moments when a regime is founded (Publius and the American Framers), re-founded (Lincoln), or preserved (Churchill).

If one were to summarize a definition of statesmanship from the literature, it would be the practice of using wisdom, rhetoric, and political savvy in the service of the good of the people at critical junctures in the regime’s life. Furthermore, the statesman holds important the principles of liberty, equality, and justice, but at the same time, he knows when he needs to employ force when the welfare of his citizens or his regime require it. He realizes that his actions are consequential, so he needs to act as an example to those who can learn from him. We see this point particularly in Jaffa’s reflections on Churchill and Lincoln in that both refused to accept National Socialism or

72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 19 slavery as normal, justifiable ways of life. Instead, their unwavering belief in human freedom and equality that they learned through studying history and philosophy compelled them to wage war against these belligerents because their existence was intolerable to a species created for freedom and equality.

An issue arises here in that the definition inferred from the literature, understood to have liberal-democratic roots, is limiting. It seems that to be a statesman, one cannot be too radical. This seems absurd, since surely religious leaders like Brigham Young, nationalists like Bismarck, or socialist revolutionaries such as Lenin were also statesmen. Here I want to highlight a weakness in the literature. The term “statesman” actually needs to apply to illiberal leaders too. Instead of concluding that Rossum, Mansfield, and Jaffa have defined statesmanship, I want to say they have partially uncovered what it is.

As a consequence, what I want to do here is reconceptualise statesmanship theory by expanding the pool of intellectual resources. By reading through social science research on leadership from analytical, sociological, psychological, and institutional perspectives, I find that it is more fruitful to bisect the concept of statesmanship.74

1.2. Social Science Approaches to Leadership

The key texts in statesmanship theory do not fully explicate the relationship between leaders and the regimes. They sketch a form of statesmanship that requires an appreciation of liberal democracy in order to be considered as such. In this section, I review some of the important works

74 Throughout this inquiry, the use of the word “statesman” or “statesmanship” is meant to be an inclusive term. A statesman can of course be either a man or woman—it is by no means the exclusive province of men. I use this terminology for two reasons. First, the relevant literature uses that term, and I do not wish to revise their language. Second, the primary subjects of this inquiry are both male—they are statesmen in the same way two male conveners of meetings are “chairmen.” 20 in social science literature on leadership. I determine that there are general traits in the literature that enable us to modify statesmanship theory. These ideas are the distinction between types of leaders, the psychic mindset of those leaders, and their approach to idealism. In the end, I propose that we should re-envision statesmanship by dividing it into two types: the transactional and the transformative.

Since the start of the twentieth century, the social sciences are rich with scholarship on the ideas of leaders and leadership. In 1907, William James distinguished between the “tender- minded” and the “tough-minded” thinker. 75 Those with tender minds are dogmatic, religious, monistic, idealistic, and optimistic.76 Conversely, the tough-minded are pluralistic, materialistic, sceptical, and empirical.77 James argued that these real categories and their interactions help to explain the intellectual atmosphere of many generations; the tender- and tough-minded hold one another in low esteem, and this friction is philosophically productive.78 The tough think of the tender as “sentimental” and “softheads,” whereas the tender see the tough as “unrefined, callous and brutal.”79 When these sorts of individuals interact, there are moments filled with disdain and acrimony, mingled with amusement from the tough-minded and fear from the tender.80

Around the same time, Moisey Ostrogorski emerged as a scholar of democratic politics in the United Kingdom and the United States. In his studies of the UK, Ostrogorski wrote that its politics centred on maximizing self-interest since the 1700s, and it developed in conjunction with the daily experience that the British people had with booming industrialization.81 In other words,

75 William James, “The Present Dilemma in Philosophy,” in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 9. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Moisey Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, volume I. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 19-20. 21 as people realized they lived in an economy that incentivized self-interest, their political interests took that character. In practical terms, this meant that the people wanted to protect freedoms of trade and commerce from their leaders; this is part and parcel of the “English nature.”82

This sketch of the English character influenced the way Ostrogorski described the relationship between the people and their leaders in the UK. He argued that no matter how absolute political leadership might appear, it is restrained in practice because a leader cannot prevent the people from voicing their opinions. 83 Leaders are forced, because of the British public’s preferences for personal freedom and economic success, to allow modifications of their policies from below. 84 Nevertheless, one must not confuse modification with indentured service.

Ostrogorski wrote that people are willing to look up to leaders as superiors and provide them with considerable room to act, but the people want their leaders to feel out the political terrain and gauge a reasonable pace of action in accordance with popular sentiments.85

This means that leaders are agents. Ostrogorski claimed that public opinion, to which a leader is tethered, tends to fluctuate and therefore one must carefully review each situation to figure out which course of action will encourage the most sympathy and support from the people. 86 More than that, British leaders also depend upon the people’s votes in order to remain in positions of authority. One must learn to balance issues of genuine public interest with the institutional pressures for re-election; leaders must use their own intuitions to root out an issue that resonates with the public that can be transformed into a successful election cry.87 Using their “fertile brains” and their capacities for “master strokes,” leaders need to grab the people’s support and attention,

82Cf. Ibid., p. 21. 83 Ibid., pp. 240-241. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., p. 241. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., pp. 241-242. 22 and at times, this requires public agitation and propaganda.88 Insofar as political parties manned by leaders are “fighting machines,” they are designed to “hit hard” enough to make a din that the public will hear and support.89

Robert Michels followed Ostrogorski in his review of party structure and its leadership.

Although he is most famous for his argument that fundamental political change is impossible because of the oligarchic nature of institutions,90 he had some interesting reflections on leadership.

In his view, leaders are a special breed of people; whereas ninety-nine percent of the population tend to oppose anything new, leaders gravitate toward fresh ideas and identify the relationship between prosperity and the state that most people miss.91

At the heart of Michels’s analysis is the weakness of people and the special strengths of leadership. He wrote that the mass wants someone to direct their affairs and has a cultish need for heroes.92 The mass is “organically” deficient; it flounders and dissolves into chaotic disorder in times of political consequence when no leadership is present.93 The neediness of the people means that their leaders need to work very hard, and only those with fit enough constitutions can endure and not die prematurely.94 In return, leaders expect the people to show their gratitude. This can be expressed through things as tangible as re-election and as subtle as the tone of reverence in someone’s voice when he mentions the leader’s name.95 One could say that leaders feed security and confidence to the people and want to be thanked for the meal, since it is hard to prepare.

88 Ibid., p. 242. 89 Ibid. 90 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1962) p. 365. 91 Ibid., p. 85. 92 Ibid., p. 88. 93 Ibid., p. 90. 94 Ibid., p. 90-91. 95 Ibid., p. 92-93. 23

Michels distinguished between two types of leaders, namely demagogues and strong leaders. The demagogue preys on the mass’s weakness by debasing himself to the crowd and feasts on their basest impulses for personal gain.96 Whereas the people are weak and desperate to worship a hero, the demagogue seems to flatter them by giving them a false sense of worth, instead of trying to lift them from their lower station.

In contrast, the strong leader tries to raise up the people. He proceeds full of the knowledge that he will receive public criticism; he does it because he knows what he is doing is right and that he will prevail in the end.97 One can say the strong leader is called to be different and brave for the people’s sake. Michels wrote that any leader conscious of his power must wrangle with vanity, belief in self-greatness, and the desire to dominate—these are psychological facts.98 We can infer that Michels thought any of those qualities can be harnessed for good or evil, and that depending on how a leader engages with these psychological facts, we can determine whether he is a demagogue or strong leader.

Flowing from Michels, it is plain that we must review some psychological and sociological research on leadership. Vilfredo Pareto posited his theory of the ruling class: the idea that society can be broken down into the rulers and the ruled.99 In other words, an entrenched élite leads society.

In modern civilizations, Pareto provided three rules for social organization: (1) society is split into classes, (2) society is governed by a ruling élite, and (3) membership in that élite can change, but the basic structure always holds.100

96 Ibid., p. 173. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 206. 99 Warren J. Samuels, Pareto on Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012), p. 91. 100 Ibid., p. 92. 24

Further, Pareto distinguished between two strata in society, the élite and the non-élite.101

Since we are interested in leadership, our attention turns to the first stratum. Within the élite, there is a fissure between those who govern and those who currently do not.102 Therefore, there is always a struggle for power, and this leads to a greater circulation of people within the élite because those out of power are trying to recruit new agents that the people will support in their quest to remove the current powerbrokers from authority. 103 In Pareto’s view, the very exercise of power is manipulation, and he believed that the ruling class will do whatever it can to preserve its powerful position.104 That means that rulers will buy off new members of the élite to keep them from upsetting the basic dynamics, or it means they will use fraud or deception if necessary. 105

Governing, thus, requires both the use of force and guile in modern society.

In contrast to Pareto, Karl Mannheim encouraged us to think more positively about the mindset of political leaders and intellectuals who want to make change. The basic distinction he made was between the “utopian” and the “ideologue.” A utopian mindset persists when its possessor finds that his own state of mind is wholly incongruous with his current reality.106 Utopian leaders possess a vision that transcends the real world and they hope to shatter the present world in order to make their own visions a reality. 107 Furthermore, Mannheim argued that the term

“utopian” often gets thrown around as a pejorative; frequently, those whose time has passed label a set of ideas that threatens their power as utopian.108

101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., p. 94, 96. 105 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 106 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction Into the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York, NY & London, UK: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936) p. 192. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid., p. 203. 25

In contrast to the utopian, the ideological mindset may have transcendent goals, but it operates within the bounds of the present social order.109 The ideological leader then does not seek to remake the world; instead, he wants to rearrange things in such a way that he can better his life and the lives of others. According to Mannheim, ideologies emerge as new ideas adapted to present circumstances.110 Taken together, the point is that novel and change-centred politics can take two different forms: utopian and ideological. Advocates of the former are uncomfortable in this world and need to remake everything to be satisfied. Advocates of the latter also prioritize newness and change, but they can accomplish their goals through the system.

Scholarship that circles around mindset and leadership also finds expression in the work of

Carl Jung. He wrote that people cannot take up phony personalities, and that if they try, the result is that they end up convulsed in phobias and bad moods.111 We can extrapolate from this that leaders are born, not made, and that if someone ill fitted for leadership tries to take up the mantle, they will end up psychologically damaged.

Furthermore, Jung believed that the craziest dramas get worked out in the hearts of great people because they try desperately to hide away from the world the emotional stresses that they suffer under a veneer of seriousness.112 This suggests a couple key points. First, that baked into the concept of leadership for Jung is the notion that leaders need to promote a sense of calm and peace; frenetic characteristics belong elsewhere. Second, there are such things as “great men,” those who rise above the mass and deserve the respect of others. Third, the great need to have a strong psyche

109 Ibid., pp. 192-193. 110 Ibid., p. 203. 111 C.J. Jung, Psychological Reflections: A New Anthology of His Writings. Edited by Jolande Jabobi and R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 237. 112 Ibid., p. 241. 26 since the strains of leadership gnaw at a person constantly; those too weak to withstand this psychological onslaught will fall to pieces.

Jung also claimed that human foresight cannot prescribe everything in our lives, and that those who try to anticipate all contingencies wind up bitter and unsuccessful.113 This is because the greatest and most critical problems in life are ultimately insoluble—serious problems never leave mankind, and if it seems as if they have, then something has gone terribly wrong.114 It is only through the constant working out of our problems that mankind can avoid “stultification” and becoming petrified.115 In short, there is no perfect solution to human life, and leaders that try to sell perfection are lost souls who will succeed in nothing but making other people lose their way too. This is likely why Jung wrote that exceptional people are rare and that they can be either wonderful or monsters.116 The good ones are those who continue to struggle with psychological stresses and calmly encourage us to think deeply about our own problems so that we can begin to wrestle with them. 117 The bad ones get lost in their own ego or error and try to provide ultimate responses to questions that cannot be answered fully.

The philosopher Bertrand Russell tried to make sense of the same sorts of puzzles that Jung did, albeit with less dependence on psychological factors. His observations led him to argue that we cannot be static, and that we are happiest when we can enjoy different pleasures, experiment with change, and hope for various things.118 Lord Russell condemned the idealists who drew their inspiration from Hegel in that these thinkers and leaders believed that they had constructed a

113 Ibid., p. 304. 114 Ibid., p. 304-305. 115 Ibid., p. 305. 116 Ibid., p. 307. 117 Cf. ibid. 118 Bertrand Russell, “Philosophy and Politics,” in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. Edited by Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn (London, UK: Routledge, 1999), p. 458. 27 system that explained the whole world. 119 He wrote that this resulted in autocracy based on dogma.120 Instead, Russell preferred a politics that stems from empiricism, which he followed himself in his attempt to break down sentences into assertions and the words in those assertions into atoms that had a one-to-one correspondence with something real in order to develop an interpretation of language that was free of ambiguity.

Russell thought that empiricism could justify liberal democracy because only the empiricist will concede that he or she could be wrong.121 Such a person does not claim that something is true, but instead states that based on the current evidence, it is likely that it is the case.122 Individuals who emerge from this mindset are like Locke in that they are reluctant rebels who try to ground political authority on consent rather than rational truth.123 In contrast, fanatics fail because they often seek out the impossible or attempt something so unscientific that it cannot find an appropriate grounding.124 Moreover, fanatics tend to be abrasive and irritate the very people they need to coerce in order for them to attain and keep political power; they happen to be unpleasant people.125 If the human race is to be successful, Russell stated that we need more empiricism and liberalism because they do not require the types of murders and cruelties that animate the fanatical.126

J.L. Talmon expressed similar concerns about fanaticism and empiricism when he distinguished between liberal and totalitarian democrats. Leaders who espouse liberal democracy see politics in terms of “trial and error”; the ingenuity and spontaneous actions of individ uals animate political life in unpredictable ways.127 They also believe that some personal or “collective

119 Ibid., pp. 459 et seq. 120 Ibid., p. 462. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid., p. 463. 123 Ibid., p. 464. 124 Ibid., p. 466. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid., pp. 466-467. 127 J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, UK: Secker & Warburg, 1952), p. 1. 28 endeavour[s]” belong outside the realm of politics altogether. 128 In contrast, the totalitarian assumes there is “a sole and exclusive truth in politics.” 129 Talmon believed this totalitarian democrat resorts to “political Messianism” because that individual leader promotes a “preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme” that all will strive to achieve if shown the truth.130 Moreover, the totalitarian suffers psychological instability and mental stress. Talmon claimed that the beliefs that the world needs complete saving from corruption and that one unified theory of politics will save mankind were representative of an unbalanced mind.

Furthermore, Talmon placed liberal democrats on the side of empiricism and totalitarians with rationalism. Rationalists hold a “doctrinaire spirit” and gravitate towards “abstraction” irrespective of historical evidence that might otherwise cause one to reject a particular theory. 131

In contrast, empiricists base their knowledge on observation and raw sense data, and care about

“the historic groups” to which individuals belong when thinking broadly about politics—in this,

“empiricism is the ally of freedom.”132

Contemporarily, Thomas Sowell writes on the concept of visions. He argues that it is impossible to translate the world around us completely unaided; it is too complex for any mind to grasp entirely.133 Visions are the different perspectives that people use to form their opinions and thoughts on various issues; they are necessary but also dangerous, because it is easy to mistake them for reality.134 Our visions are “pre-analytic,” that is, they are senses or intuitions we have about how the world operates before we schematize things. 135 For Sowell, visions are the

128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid., p. 2. 131 Cf. ibid., p. 4. 132 Ibid. 133 Thomas Sowell, Conflict of Visions (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), p. 3. 134 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 135 Ibid., p. 4. 29 foundations upon which we build theories, and those theories must withstand the barrage of facts and logic.136 Genuine visions are more than just dreams, prophecies, or moral imperatives; they are supposed to be hunches about causation.137

In particular, Sowell is fascinated by two different visions of human nature. He presents

Adam Smith as an advocate for the constrained position in a passage where Smith described our natural reaction to a disaster on the other side of the world.138 Smith thought that an unaffected man would sympathize with the misfortunes of the victims, but after a short period would return to his business as usual; if this man were to lose his smallest toe he would pass an entire night restless, but the death of thousands in China would not disturb him enough to stay awake.139 Those with a constrained view do not lament man’s selfishness; instead they accept it as given.140 They believe that people need to be induced to help others in such a way that they also satisfy their own self-interest.141 These arguments were made in Smith’s Wealth of Nations and in Publius’ Tenth

Federalist.

The unconstrained visionary leader believes that people are capable of forming genuine intentions to help others; this act of virtue is the road to human happiness.142 Humanity is selfish because we live in economic and social conditions that encourage that behaviour—it is possible to tap into our innate human potential so that we might feel more strongly for the concerns of others rather than ourselves.143 Sowell argues that the unconstrained dismiss inducements that rely on

136 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 137 Ibid., p. 6. 138 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 139 Ibid., p. 12. 140 Ibid., p. 13. 141 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 142 Ibid., p. 15. 143 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 30 self-interest because those are short-term measures that fail to enable people to cultivate the sense of duty and moral virtue necessary to live well.

Sowell summarizes this distinction as between those who encourage trade-offs to promote social harmony and those who propose solutions to our troubles.144 The constrained possess a

“tragic vision” and see human capacity as limited, freedom as the evasion of others’ control, justice as a process governed by rules, knowledge as coming from real observation, and believe that political change should be incremental.145 Their vision is tragic in the dramatic sense—there are qualities of human nature that will inevitably cause one to succeed or fail. 146 In contrast, the unconstrained hold an “anointed” view and believe human potential is vast, freedom is the ability to achieve goals, justice is an equal result for all, knowledge stems from select intellectuals, and political decisions ought to be categorical.147 The first camp is prudential and grounded, whereas the second hates prudence because it is a practice that prevents people from discovering their

“generous and magnanimous” nature.148 Seeming to agree with Sowell, Michael Barkun writes that millenarian thinkers approach the world with an “all-encompassing set of ideas” that will perfect the world, and they believe these ideas have entrusted to a select group of people only. 149

In brief, those who see human nature as constrained come closer to Sowell’s initial theory of “vision” than the unconstrained. The latter are not interested in constructing political or social theories based on facts and logic; rather, they do not require external confirmation of their beliefs, since they already seem to “know.” Further, they have allowed their intuitions about mankind to stand in for reality; this is the danger of the visioning process, and echoes the fears Jaffa has about

144 Ibid., p. 18. 145 Idem, Visions of the Anointed (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1995), p. 105. 146 Ibid., p. 104. 147 Ibid., p. 105. 148 Idem, Conflict of Visions, p. 18. 149 Michael Barkun, Millenarianism and Violence (New York, NY: Frank Cass & co. 1995), p. 7. 31 those who treat human nature as changeable. Perhaps rather than saying that visions cannot be imperatives and dreams, we should say that prudent visions admit theories that can be tested against evidence and logic, whereas imprudent visions yield theories resting on intellectual hunches that eschew external examination.

Unlike many of the other scholars and thinkers, Glenn Paige proposed to study leadership more scientifically. His definition of leadership is that it is the behaviour of people in political authority and their interactions with others.150 Even if this definition is bland, it provides us with a neutral idea of what we mean when we say someone is a leader. And leadership is an important concept for Paige; a person’s life is greatly affected if he is governed by a dictator or if a revolutionary vanguard attains power.151 Because leaders matter, Paige entreats social scientists to study leadership in a way that neither sees leaders as mystical nor views them as so mundane that they can be easily forgotten.152

He argues that the task of political science is to describe, explain, predict, and evaluate the political behaviour of humans, and then ensure that we pass on that knowledge to nurture creative people.153 In other words, political scientists are charged with studying the political behaviours of people and use that research to advise others with it; since leadership centres on political behaviour and since political scientists are supposed to study political behaviour, we can say that specifically that political science’s chief focus is leadership.

Paige carefully works out different elements that compose leaders and leadership. He says that personality plays a significant role in leadership.154 Specifically, he hypothesizes six forms of

150 Glenn D. Paige, Scientific Study of Political Leadership (New York, NY & London, UK: Free Press, 1977), p. 1. 151 Ibid., p. 2. 152 Ibid., p. 3. 153 Ibid., p. 7. 154 Ibid., pp. 106-107. 32 personalities for leaders. Some draw their strength from their attempts to compensate for failures in childhood. Others will continue to reuse the techniques that led to their first political successes; they seem stuck on repeating themselves because it worked once before in the past. Still others want to lead out of a psychological need for power and achievement. Further, some leaders have unresolved oedipal problems that engendered in them a revolutionary personality. Certain leaders’ personalities come out of sex differentiation, while others still come out of their birth order.

Another core aspect of leadership is setting. 155 Leadership takes place within an environment, and it is conditioned by the sort of environment in which it exists.156 A leader in a small democratic area hones skills such as interaction with his constituents on a personal level because that is what is necessary to be a good local leader. A general called upon in a state of martial law to put down an insurrection cultivates the skills of command, the strategic use of violence, and organization because that is what the circumstances of his leadership require.

Specifically, Paige gives six different types of settings for leaders. They can be natural, physical, manmade, economic, social, or cultural.157 As a further example, it is easy to surmise that a leader who governs during stable economic times learns how to cut taxes and spend public money in ways that garner the support of the people. In contrast, a leader at the helm during a significant economic depression develops the capacity to create policies that counter deflation or pumps liquidity into the system to prevent a total collapse.

Any review of social science literature on leadership necessitates a discussion of Max

Weber’s classic “Politics as a Vocation.”158 He argued that the state is the “monopoly of the

155 A thoroughgoing breakdown of all of Paige’s conditions for leadership (personality, role, task, values, and setting) falls outside of the scope of this project, but I have selected to focus on personality and setting here because they particularly mesh well with the other literature I have reviewed in this section. 156 Ibid., p. 125. 157 Ibid. 158 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 77-128. 33 legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” and “a relation of men dominating men.”159 Therefore, it needs leaders who will justify its existence to the masses. Weber provided three forms of “authority” or what we might call types of leaders who can provide such a justification. The first is “the authority of the ‘eternal yesterday,’ i.e., of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform.”160 These leaders draw their authority from the people’s respect for tradition. He gave the patriarch and the

“patrimonial prince of yore” as examples.161

Weber wrote that the second form of authority came from one’s “extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.”162 These leaders draw authority from their forceful personality, natural charisma, and oratorical skills. Weber was fascinated with this form of leadership. The people are devoted and obedient to these leaders simply “because they believe in him.”163 If genuine, a charismatic leader “lives for his cause” and he develops a following of believers “oriented to his person and to its qualities.”164 Examples consist of “the elected war lord” and “the great demagogue.”165

Lastly, Weber examined authority that stems from the law. Sometimes leaders command the people because they have “the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules.”166 The leader validates the decisions of the state through his actions as a functionary of good laws. Public servants and those who profess to be public servants

159 Ibid., p. 78. Emphasis removed. 160 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 161 Ibid., p. 79. 162 Ibid. Emphasis removed. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. Emphasis removed. 34 fit within this category.167 In all three cases, leaders find ways to instill hope and fear into the public in order to cajole them into obedience—what will scare or inspire them will depend on the circumstance.168

The last piece of social science research I want to review, in some ways, might be the most important contribution to the subject: James MacGregor Burns’s Leadership.169 His inquiry divides leadership into two categories. Transactional leaders “approach with an eye to exchanging one thing for another,” such as votes for jobs.170 This type of trading underpins most of the interactions between political leaders and prospective constituents or followers.171 In contrast, a transforming leader “recognizes and exploits an existing need or demand” from followers and hopes to “satisfy higher needs, and engages the full person of the follower.”172 In order to unpack these ideas further,

I emphasize a couple distinctions that Burns makes regarding transactional and transformative leadership that I believe contribute the most to this inquiry.

In regard to opinion-directed leaders, Burns wrote of transactional leadership as a condition where followers and the leader exchange “gratifications in a political marketplace.” 173 The participants are bargain-seekers trying to “maximize” their “political and psychic profits.” 174

Further, the bargainers are attempting to attain short-term tangible, quantifiable ends—they are not grasping for principles like freedom or justice.175 Practically, this process requires a leader who

167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1978). 170 Ibid., p. 4. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid., p. 258. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 35 promises, gestures, or makes public pronouncements to the people that result in their political support, which gets rewarded with particular legislation or policy.176

Burns also conceived of presidential power, as in the U.S., as an account of transactional leadership. The president’s advantages of prestige and authority give him or her an upper hand in negotiations, but the outcomes of any given dispute are uncertain.177 The presidential powers of persuasion are best understood as an instance of “give-and-take”; this renders his threat of a veto, or his party influences, or his capacity to make “prestigious appointments” as bargaining chips. 178

This also means that a transactional leader such as the president needs to have a personal skill set suited for the position. One must have a genuine will to power to avoid being run over, one must be able to both wield and seek out as much power as possible to ensure one negotiates from a position of strength, and one must be capable of hoarding power so it is available at future negotiations.179 Additionally, a transactional president must be able to make sound choices, by which Burns meant choices that “win concessions from rivals and at the same time bolster the

President’s power posture and resources.”180 Transactional leaders, in other words, must be fitted to maximize the use of power and make prudent decisions that further satisfy their own self-interest

(and that of their followers) without it being obvious.

However, Burns was adamant that this theory is more than a “technique” of governing; there is an ethical component that makes it more than a Machiavellian process devoid of values. 181

In the American context, he argues that if we strip away all the rhetoric, “generalities” and “empty bombast,” we find two guiding purposes for transactional presidents: the pursuit of liberty and

176 Ibid. 177 Ibid., p. 388. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid., pp. 388-389. 181 Ibid., p. 389. 36 equality.182 Transactional executives are not ideologues, but they have purposes and values. 183

Thus, the currency of their transaction is usually practical, although designed for some purpose that is not value-neutral. Moreover, the values that they negotiate and fight for can change depending upon the actual political circumstances of the time. Lincoln began as a “whiggish conservative” in the 1850s who became the “Great Emancipator” ten years later in the face of what slavery and its defenders were doing to the Union.184 Further, he had to suspend his beliefs in

“Jeffersonian libertarianism” by suspending constitutional liberties during the Civil War for the sake of preserving a Union devoted to the principles of human liberty.185 Lincoln came across as a transactional executive who defended values such as freedom and equality without pursuing an ideological path by allowing circumstances to dictate the type of actions required.

On the other side, Burns discussed transforming leaders. To reiterate, the transforming leader tries to reach out to his followers and modify both them and the world around them; as the name implies, this leader intends to make significant change with elevated purposes. One form of this leadership is the intellectual transformer, who is driven by a “conscious purpose” to apply his ideas on his current environment.186 This leader believes he sees further than the average man and agitates to modernize his surroundings. In addition, these leaders are animated particularly by conflict, since they are caught in the tension between “the pure and the applied, the negative and the affirmative, the analytical and the prophetic” among others.187 As a consequence, Burns wrote that often the pressures associated with the tensions of intellectual leadership leads to emotional breakdowns as the stress is too heavy for many.188

182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid., p. 390. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., p. 142. 187 Ibid., p. 143. 188 Ibid., pp. 142-143. 37

Furthermore, his picture of the intellectual transformer denied the idea of the withdrawn intellectual—they are “hommes engagés”.189 These leaders need “disciples to sustain them, patrons to subsidize them, lovers to cherish them, adversaries to exchange hate with, and above all, ways of communicating their ideas to intellectual circles and beyond.”190 We can take from this that transforming leaders appear to be needy people; unable to summon their own individual will to power, they rely on others to flatter them, to reassure them, and to be a sounding board for their ideas. The solitary philosopher-king that we might idealize from Plato’s Republic is nothing like

Burns’s intellectual transforming leader.

Burns also wrote that these leaders can be dangerous. Working from Tocqueville’s insights, he sees that “men of letters” who take the lead in politics tend towards abstract broadness, a

“contempt for hard facts,” and a desire to reshape political institutions on new and “original lines.”191 Historically, this resulted in disaster; while these ideas and tendencies might make great books, they led directly to “catastrophic” practical consequences.192 According to Tocqueville, “for what is a merit in the writer may well be a vice in the statesman….”193 These leaders succeed in transforming the world around them, but not in the way they intended.

Another type of transforming leader is the revolutionary. These two ideas of revolution and transformation fit together logically inasmuch as “revolution is a complete and pervasive transformation of an entire social system.”194 In short, transformation is the practical manifestation of revolution. Such a leader must commit himself wholly to the cause and be willing to sacrifice his freedom, his comfort, and even his life if needed.195 Further, the leader must attend to the

189 Ibid., p. 145. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid., p. 149. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid., p. 202. 195 Ibid. 38

“wants and aspirations of the populace” in the hopes of encouraging their mobilization to action. 196

The transformative revolutionary also needs radical conflict—he needs friends and enemies,

“saints and devils,” to orient his project and inspire others.197 Last, this leader needs a clear sense of mission and a “transcending purpose.”198 The revolutionary extends the basic transforming leadership principles of reaching out and satisfying the demands of the people; the path to satisfaction comes through a complete reordering of the world. It needs, at least in part, a new government, economy, system of laws, and new leadership.199

Burns was trying to get students of political science to see that the idea of “leadership” is multifaceted and complex. He bisected the concept: the transforming and transactional models.

For example, opinion gathering and executive leadership both show, in different ways, that transactional leaders negotiate with the people in order for everyone to maximize their interests.

On the other side, intellectual, revolutionary, and reform leaders show that transforming leadership is about reaching out to the people and satisfying enduring interests and hopes of an enduring sort and practicing them.

1.3. Re-conceiving Statesmanship: Transactional and Transformational

Having laid out several core pieces in the literature on leadership, I think there are some important cross connections between the writers. Specifically, we notice that each of the scholars is, in varying degrees, distinguishing between two types of leaders. In general, we see leaders divided according to their views of human nature, their psychological makeup, and their preferences

196 Ibid. 197 Cf. ibid. 198 Ibid., p. 203. 199 Ibid., p. 202. 39 towards practicality or idealism. We will take these in turn, as they provide a rich language and toolkit to use in reshaping the way we think about statesmanship.

Essentially, all the writers above differentiate between two types of leaders. James talked about the tender- and tough-minded. Michels juxtaposed the demagogic leader and the strong leader. Pareto pointed to the “ins” and the “outs” of the élite powerbrokers. Jung reflected on the good leaders and the monstrous. Russell praised politicians moved by empiricism and he condemned the idealists. Mannheim differentiated between political leaders desirous for utopias and ideologies. Talmon clearly distinguished between liberal democrats and totalitarian democrats.

Sowell discusses leaders that differ in terms of constrained and unconstrained visions. Weber described leaders whose power derives purely from their charisma and those who need tradition or the law to assert authority. And of course, Burns’s entire inquiry rests on the division between transactional and transforming leaders. To be sure, there is a tendency to divide leaders into two camps throughout the literature.

When we look closer, we notice that there are common bonds between the different types of leaders. The writers have not divided leadership into camps that have no relation with one another. Although they are not identical, a leader tends to fall in one group or another based on human nature, psychology, and degree of idealism.

Regarding the first point, we see Michels grounding his division between demagogues and sound leaders on the question of human nature. Sound leaders are sceptical of praising man, but instead, take stances that might clash with the people’s narrow interests because they know they are right and can endure the criticism. In contrast, the demagogue flatters the people and deceives them into believing their human nature has directed them towards acceptable public policy. The 40 distinction turns on the strong leader understanding human nature to be imperfect and not giving into it, whereas the demagogue either does not or will not grant the flawed nature of man.

Mannheim’s theory also implicitly points to human nature as a pivotal aspect of the utopian-ideological split. He seemed to prefer the ideologue who wants to reshape the present world around him rather than making everything new. Conversely, he provided a more critical tone in discussing the utopian whose political dreams are incompatible with the world in which he finds himself. Let us say that the ideological leader appreciates and works with human nature as it is, whereas the utopian is compelled to perfect and modify that nature in order to succeed. When

Mannheim wrote that the utopian world is incommensurate with the current environment, the logic of that argument compels one to see human nature as one of those elements.

Jung’s evaluation of leaders considers human nature in a serious way. He denied the idea that anyone had perfect foresight, and that those who believed they could fashion a world where everything is predictable were doomed to fail. He also wrote that not everyone was fit for leadership but that some people try to lead even though they are not leaders. Because this causes the would-be leaders real psychological harm, it suggests that human beings are often flawed.

Leaders whose nature it is to lead and who accept their imperfection belong in one camp, whereas those who believe otherwise belong in another.

Russell takes us down a similar path. He viewed human nature as dynamic; leaders who avoided all-encompassing systems and left latitude for people to experience happiness and fulfillment in their own way are to be preferred. He contrasted this with idealists who believed that mankind could have a final nature worked out through a philosophical system; those leaders were destined to create despotism because of their autocratic philosophy. Leaders that understood the 41 messy and free qualities of human nature are one sort of leader, whereas those who thought they could remove the natural unpredictability of mankind were another.

Talmon focussed directly on the role of human nature in his distinction between liberal and totalitarian democrats. The former embrace trial-and-error and the fallible nature of men. They put politics into perspective: mankind is imperfect; there is no point in devoting all one’s energies to political schemes because their participants make it impossible to achieve a “harmonious” polity.

Totalitarian democrats reject all this, and believe that human nature can be remade based on its inherent goodness.

Sowell distinguishes between leaders who possess tragic and anointed visions, at least in part, on the basis of their understanding of human nature. Tragic leaders know that mankind is corrupted, so ideal institutions or governments cannot be hewn from them. In contrast, those with anointed vision think that under the right circumstances, human beings can maximize their

“magnanimous” and “generous” nature to accomplish something wonderful and just. The way a leader sees our nature helps to decide what type of vision he possesses.

Of course, Weber’s piece makes a clear distinction between types of leaders. One group employ a nation’s history or its laws to justify their authority over the people. In contrast, other leaders depend on their “gifts of grace” and natural charisma to inspire the people to support them simply out of belief.

Burns makes the distinction between transactional and transforming leaders based on many things, but human nature appears to be key. At the heart of the transactional model is the idea that leaders bargain and negotiate with the people because that is the best one can do. People are driven by self-interest, and so there is no point in trying to inspire people to sacrifice their comfort or economic welfare in the name of “justice” or “peace.” The best a leader can do is try to live up to 42 certain political values through the processes of give-and-take, based on the realities of his or her time. Transforming leaders, on the other hand, seem to think mankind is capable of much more.

Whether they are reformers or revolutionaries, these leaders seem to be calling people to rise above their current lot in life through sacrifice to create a more just or fair world. It is as if human beings were fitted for higher purposes, and the transforming leaders are there to help people both to see and to attain them. A leader either accepts humanity as a bundle of self-interests or sees the species destined for something greater.

In brief, we can see that these writers use human nature in a similar way in terms of dividing types of leaders. On the one hand, we have leaders who accept a permanently flawed human nature and pursue a politics according to those permanent flaws. On the other, we see leaders who either believe in remaking human nature or who believe that it is fundamentally good; a significantly better world is therefore possible to build. One can say they flatly reject Kant’s famous statement that “from such crooked wood as man is made of, nothing perfectly straight can be built.”200

Leaders also appear to be divided on the basis of psychology. Ostrogorski wrote that leaders use “master strokes” and have sharp brains to construct an election platform or issue that will pique the people’s interest. They understand the people’s interests and stay in power because they understand the people crave leadership and strive to satisfy them sufficiently. One could extrapolate from this that successful leaders understand both the psychology of the mass and possess a superior mind that enables them to organize winning campaigns. The logical corollary is that failed leaders have a poor grasp of human psychology and do not have the “fertile brain” needed to convince the people to support them.

200 Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan View. Translated by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), sixth thesis. 43

James’s typology of leaders is principally psychological, which of course makes sense in that he was one of the founding scholars in that discipline. Leaders are either tough-minded in the way they see science, politics, and people through a materialist and skeptical lens, or they are tender-minded in their embrace of mysticism, dogma, and religious ideas. One notices that the way a leader’s mind is wired determines the sort of leader that he becomes.

Michels, in part, distinguishes successful and unsuccessful leaders from a psychological perspective. Because leadership is demanding work, only those with a strong enough psyche to deal with the pressures and tensions can hope to survive. The weak psychological leader dies early from stress and illness brought on by the pressures of the job. Furthermore, successful relations between the leader and the mass turn heavily on psychological factors. One gets the sense from

Michels that a good leader realizes the innate weakness of the mass, the special genius of his or her own self, and understands how to take those facts and entrench his power. Michels believed that sound leaders knew how to compensate and balance natural psychological facts like vanity and the lust for power without dissolving into tyranny. It is manifest then that poor leaders do not fully grasp the key psychic distinctions between themselves and the mass, or fall prey to the vices of ego and power.

Jung also treated the psychology of leaders very carefully. Great people are beset by internal dramas that require a strong psyche to conquer so that the people do not see his conflict and may admire him. They too avoid egoism and have trained themselves how to handle the inherent tensions that accompany the possession of power efficiently. Weak leaders are lost souls who let their own pyschodramas play out in public and try to avoid the eternal struggle between people and the pressures of the outside world by constructing what they believe to be ultimate 44 answers to things. It is safe to say that weak leaders are those who descend into madness or believe too much in their own abilities to resolve all the world’s problems.

Talmon wrote that liberal democrats take a more relaxed stance to politics; they admit that there is life outside of the political, and as such, do not incur the same amount of mental stress from it. In contrast, the totalitarian does not admit a nonpolitical sphere, and thus is psychologically plagued with pressures that often crack him. The totalitarian is given to self-pity and significant mental breakdowns, whereas the liberal tends to keep a more even keel.

For Paige, some of the important factors that animate leadership are personality and psychological development. Leaders differ because of their experiences in youth, their relationship to their mothers, their birth order and its corresponding resentments, or one’s innate desire for power. In other words, we can divide leaders in terms of their psychological development and the traits with which these forms of that development manifest themselves.

In general, these writers provide for us another explanation for why to distinguish between types of leaders. Those who have a strong psyche that can help them exploit their positions of power and immunize themselves from emotional stress belong in one camp, whereas those who succumb to egoism and become psychologically damaged from the pressures of leadership belong in a different camp. It is worth noting that this division falls closely along the same line as it did for human nature. More will be said on this later.

A third division that the literature makes between leaders centres on their embrace of idealism or practical politics. For James, the tough-minded are empirical, pragmatic, and skeptics by nature, whereas the tender were dogmatists and given to idealism. Ostrogorski’s successful leaders never neglected to realize that their power stems from their positive relationship with the people. Conversely, we can infer that those who fixed their attention solely to the things above 45 failed to remain or grasp political power. For Pareto, any successful ruling class needs to co-opt new people or use propaganda in order to keep its power. It is easy to see that a naïve leader who believed he could break the hegemony of rule through his dedication to the principles of justice would be crushed or compromised by the practical élites. For Mannheim, the utopians are those whose objectives are completely founded on ideals of a perfect world, whereas ideologues want to use the materials at hand to reform their environment. According to Lord Russell, politicians either followed the principles of empirical research and the belief that they could be wrong, or they are armed with a total system that admits no objections because of its philosophic perfection. Further,

Sowell’s distinction between those who saw life as constrained and unconstrained hinged on whether one was willing to accept the practical limitations of human life or whether the purpose of politics was to transcend them. Furthermore, Burns shows that transactional leaders are those who engage in the practical arts of negotiation and bartering, whereas the transforming leaders can fall prey to radical idealism, revolutionary fervour, or reformation that overreaches what is possible. In each of these cases, leaders are either practical or idealistic.

Weber’s charismatic leaders are really not of this world. They possess special gifts of grace that enable them to enrapture people and convince them to follow. These leaders are so devoted to their prophecies and their plans that they integrate themselves with their cause. A charismatic leader is unlikely to be distracted from his mission by friends, family, or other interruptions that life provides. In contrast, leaders who depend on tradition or legality to exercise authority cannot rely on pure idealism. They must shape their policies and garner support for them based on an interpretation of tradition or law that have a chance at success. These leaders cannot win support by claiming “I say unto you” to do something; they have to be somewhat practical. 46

What this literature provides is not just that leaders fall into separate camps, but that there are two well-defined camps that everyone is hinting at in their own way. The first are leaders who see that human nature is flawed. They appreciate, as a consequence, that politics cannot be perfect, and instead they focus their efforts on how to do the best they can, given the circumstances. This means that they have a flexible psychology that enables them to tackle the stresses and puzzles innate to leadership as well as they can. They are realists, and do what they can to maximize their own interest and those of the people. At the same time, they are not nihilists; they are guided by basic principles of freedom or justice, but they do not obey any particular value slavishly. The circumstances of time and environment help to make them who they are.

The second camp of leaders is not at home in this world. They reject the notion that mankind is nothing but a bundle of interests and greed. They either think that human nature is rational and generous, or they believe it could be that way under the right conditions. They tend to struggle psychologically, in part because they bear a heavy weight; they see themselves as charged with making a better society. They lack the flexibility to live comfortably with contradiction and compromise that might water down their ideals, and as a consequence, their psyche can be damaged. Their vision is fixed above; they want to cut through the tediousness of institutions, conventions, and traditions in the name of something bigger and better. Sometimes these leaders will try to renovate their current environment to meet those objectives, but other times they will only be satisfied if everything is made new.

At this point, I think that we can borrow from the literature this notion of two different camps of people in terms of statesmanship. To be sure, statesmen are leaders and great persons like the ones discussed above—they differ in terms of their role. A “leader” is a vague term. Whom does a leader lead? Where do they lead? A statesman is a special type of leader—someone, as the 47 earlier literature showed, who attends to the birth or preservation of a regime. The delegates at the

1787 convention were statesmen as they helped to create a constitution that set into motion the

American polity. Abraham Lincoln was a statesman who re-founded the Union against Southern rebels. Winston Churchill was a statesman in saving the United Kingdom, the last free democracy in Europe, from the encroachments of National Socialism. He also helped to preserve Western democracy from the evils of Marxist-Leninism in his efforts against Soviet expansion. In each case, no one would deny that the American founders, Lincoln, or Churchill were leaders. What makes them statesmen is that they exercised a special and particular type of leadership at times when regimes were being created or preserved.

The literature’s differentiation between types of leaders helps us solve our original problem with statesmanship theory, namely that one had to be a liberal in order to count. It is clear that the leaders of the first group connect with the scholarship on statesmanship. These leaders reject radical idealism, they have a skeptical view of human nature, and they use practical wisdom and rhetoric in the exercise of politics. These are the core points emphasized by Rossum, Mansfield,

Storing, and Jaffa that made someone a statesman. They say statesmen were great people who paid attention to the genuine concerns of the people, were prudent, denied a perfectible human nature, and compromised without losing sight of key values. As expressed above, this closely mirrors the portrait of one group of leaders in that literature.

I want to call statesmen who share these characteristics “transactional” statesmen, borrowing Burns’s terminology. I do this for two reasons. First, I think the word conveys the form of politics being practiced—it captures the concept of trade, negotiation, and discussion innate to this form of statesmanship. Second, the term lacks the loaded connotations that terms used by other writers have. For example, Talmon’s distinction of liberal and totalitarian implies the former is 48 better than the latter; who would want to see themselves as totalitarian? And moreover, if this inquiry divided Macdonald and Riel along liberal and totalitarian lines, this might suggest that the analysis of Riel’s statesmanship was initially biased by negative attitude towards him.

Statesmen who do not fall into the liberal framework find a home in the second category.

Robespierre, Brigham Young, or Lenin who sought to create a new regime based on the principles of pure reason, history and culture, religion, or dialectical materialism can be seen as statesmen too. Unlike the transactional statesmen, these are great people who dream of something bigger or more radical than their current context. They believe that human potential can be harnessed for something greater than self-interest, and that there are genuine maxims worth living and dying for.

These are statesmen who either want to construct a new régime or wish to preserve the prevailing one by breathing into it new life through principles of reform.

For these statesmen, I want to use the term “transformational,” again borrowing from

Burns, although I remove the gerund from “transforming” to give both forms of statesmanship the same suffix. As with transactional, I believe the word “transformational” gets at what these statesmen are trying to do, either transforming the world around them into something new, or transforming the institutions and government they have to make them more responsive to the needs of the people. Moreover, the term “transformational” has a certain neutrality to it that I think is crucial for this inquiry. As we saw, these leaders tend to have weaker psyches and the scholars seem to be more critical of their form of leadership than the other. By using the word transformational, this enables my inquiry to avoid the charge that everything was stacked against statesmen of this branch from the start. There are many people who would prefer to think of themselves as transformative leaders, but would bristle at the sorts of terms used in the literature, such as messianic, totalitarian, or tender-minded. By using the words “transactional” and 49

“transformational,” I hope to imply that both are legitimate forms of statesmanship, and that my evaluation of Macdonald and Riel rests on the case evidence and the literature on statesmanship and leadership.

I am not the first to use the terms “transformational” and “transactional” within Canadian politics or leadership studies. In 2005, Cristine de Clercy distinguished between two types of leaders. Those who “highly value the occupancy of public office,” “averse to risk,” and sympathetic to traditional political approaches are transactional.201 This leader tries to reduce their

“followers’ uncertainty in exchange for support.”202 The example of this leader she provides is former Saskatchewan premier Roy Romanow. Against transactionalism, another form of leader is willing to risk political office for certain decisions.203 This leader is more “risk acceptant” and strives for “new policies.”204 Here the example is former Alberta premier Ralph Klein.

In a very broad sense, what de Clercy writes matches with the distinctions I am making.

Surely transformational statesmen are willing to take great risks in trying to fashion a new order.

Similarly, transactional statesmen lean on the traditional forms of authority and practice a greater deal of prudence than their counterparts. However, de Clercy’s typologies do not seem wholly appropriate for the “great men” who practice statesmanship. While Romanow and Klein are fine politicians, they are not on par with people such as Churchill or Lenin. They were provincial premiers who may have left legacies, but are not statesmen who attend to the founding or preservation of a regime.

201 Cristine de Clercy, “Leadership and Uncertainty in Fiscal Restructuring: Ralph Klein and Roy Romanow.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 38:1 (March 2005): 182. 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 50

Furthermore, while transactional statesmen are prudent, it would be folly to contend they are as risk averse as de Clercy’s leader. One must have the courage to execute a master stroke, following Ostrogorski’s argument. One must be daring enough to try and reshape the world when required, following Mannheim’s view the ideological. Lincoln was willing to suspend constitutional liberties during the Civil War for the sake of keeping the country together. In contrast, while a transformational leader might want new policy, that concept is still too narrow for the approach of the transformational statesman as I provide it. These statesmen want to make to change the nature of the regime because they are not home within the current one. Klein may have been a bold premier, but he did not reshape Alberta in any way approximating regime change.

While de Clercy’s distinctions perhaps make sense in trying to understand leadership in times of politics-as-usual, I contend the way I have sketched out transactional and transformational statesmanship are conceptually different and apply in different circumstances.

It is important to highlight that both forms of statesmanship can be practiced well or practiced poorly. A transactional statesman can succeed or err in trying to interpret the true interests of the people or concluding political deals to overcome issues. A transformational statesman can successfully or unsuccessfully implement his bold vision of politics and try to reshape his world. Engaging in one form does not necessarily spell victory or doom for a statesman.

Instead, what matters is how good of a statesman they are.

Armed with a modified and expanded concept of statesmanship, I now proceed to analyzing the primary and secondary source materials on Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel.

I will use this statesmanship theory as a lens to review these leaders. The inquiry will determine whether the idea of statesmanship applies in each case, and if so, in what form. 51

CHAPTER 2

SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD

The nineteenth century was a moment of genuine statesmanship. At its beginning—9 November

1799 actually—Napoleon Bonaparte executed the 18 Brumaire coup d’état that installed him as

France’s de facto head of state. In the subsequent decade, Bonaparte initiated a new form of civil law to govern the people of France, led the nation to military victories, and moved the country out of the darkest periods of the Revolution. In the middle of the century, Otto von Bismarck successfully united the German states through oratory, diplomacy, political grace, war, foresight, and determination. At the same time, Abraham Lincoln held together a fractured Union in

America. Despite secession, Lincoln’s ability to select the right generals, willingness to use the extraordinary war powers granted him by the Constitution, and devotion to the cause of human freedom yielded a victory over the rebels. Concurrently, Giuseppe Garibaldi directed the Italian people as both a military and political leader for the sake of a united Italy. In the United Kingdom,

Prime Minister William Gladstone used his gifts of public speaking and popularity to push through the Reform Act and modernize and liberalize the UK. The nineteenth century was an age of statesmanship.

In such an age, I want to determine whether Canada has its own statesmen to study and from whom to learn. In the previous chapter, I presented two versions of statesmanship, each premised on different views on human nature, psychology, and practical politics. The problem- statement I intend to resolve in this chapter is whether Sir John A. Macdonald was a statesman, and if so, what form of statesman was he? As Canada’s first prime minister, a Father of

Confederation who attended all three Confederation conferences—Charlottetown, Quebec, and 52

London—the first leader and founder of the Conservative party, and as an acknowledged founder of Canada, there is little doubt he is a subject fit for such inquiry.

In this chapter I investigate several moments in Macdonald’s political life through an analysis of primary and secondary source material on the subject. Some of those moments are pivotal triumphs in Sir John’s career, others are failures, while others are smaller moments that demonstrate his political skills.205 I begin by a general review of Macdonald’s political ideas. Then,

I review pre-Confederation Macdonald with the Brown defeat and the Double Shuffle. Third, I examine his political machinations at the Confederation conferences as well as his legislative speeches in favour of the Constitution they yielded. Further, I consider where Sir John faltered with the Pacific Scandal. Finally, I inquire into his relationship with Joseph Howe. Through such a review, I hope to present, based on the case evidence, an answer to whether and what kind of statesman Sir John A. was.

2.1. Macdonald as a Political Thinker

In the introduction of Canada’s Founding Debates, the editors comment that, as a rule, the Fathers of Confederation have been interpreted as lawyerly pragmatists rather than genuine political thinkers.206 The conventional view holds that the Fathers “had no strong commitment to political values [and] no interest in political ideas.207 Instead, the Fathers sought to protect their self-interest and political power in striking the Confederation deal. These men were not the American

Founders—Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, and Madison sought to found a new country on a foundation of political philosophy and genuine principles.

205 It should be noted that I have avoided discussing political interactions with Louis Riel, as those will animate the sixth chapter of this inquiry. 206 Ajzenstat et al., eds., Founding Debates, p. 1. 207 Ibid. 53

We certainly see the pragmatist opinion of the Fathers borne out in looking at scholarsh ip on Macdonald. Gwyn comments that Macdonald preferred to be a man of deeds instead of words.208 He writes that Macdonald did not have “intellectual epiphanies,” and favoured action over theoretical contemplation.209 In part, Gwyn sees this stemming from Sir John’s Scottish heritage, since Scots tend to reject “intellectualizing and attitudinalizing (sic)” in favour of getting the job done, with a marginal respect for ideas.210 Furthermore, he builds from other scholars such as Peter Waite, whose research concluded that Macdonald seemed to have “no political ideas at all.”211 On Gwyn’s account, Sir John was a politician focused on results, not questions of what was right or just.

Waite did interpret Macdonald in this manner. He described Macdonald as a polite,

“genuine,” and engaged leader; he would often respond to letters from Canadians with notes he wrote himself and had a knack for remembering people’s names and facts about them.212 However, he stated that Macdonald was aware that these character traits were ones that made him popular and appreciated “that popularity was power.”213 In defining what Sir John was as a person, Waite asserted that he was a lawyer, a land speculator, an administrator, and a politician—in so doing he encouraged the reader to see Macdonald as professional and a man of business.214

When it came to ideas, Waite wrote that Macdonald abjured “abstract notions of what government ought to be,” in favour of more “motions in parliament.”215 Further, Sir John is understood as one who disliked “narrow-minded” politics as well as “closed political and

208 Richard Gwyn, Sir John A: The Man Who Made Us (Toronto, ON: Random House, 2008), p. 275. 209 Ibid., p. 277. 210 Ibid., p. 295. I am inclined to think that Scottish philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and the whole Scottish Enlightenment call into question the truth of this claim. 211 Ibid. 212 Peter Waite, Macdonald: His Life and World (Toronto, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975), pp. 8-11. 213 Ibid., p. 10. 214 Ibid., pp. 16-19. 215 Ibid., p. 22. 54 philosophical systems.” 216 Instead, politics ought to be an open game, free of “strident convictions” and resentment.217 Sir John would pick up theoretical arguments in order to use them strategically; he used them “detachedly, like a chess player making a deliberate move to forestall, or to provoke, a response.”218

When it came to new and exciting ideas, Macdonald consistently held those at a distance because he was attentive to the difficulties that these ideas would have in “practical application.”219

Sir John balked at “gusts of popular enthusiasm,” since society is difficult to change and human nature is fixed towards self-interest—often, hasty change originated from new ideas “might only change the appearances of things, not the reality [, a]nd Macdonald was after realities.”220 In short, we see that Waite’s portrait of Macdonald is of a practical man who resisted political ideas except when they could be deployed for his cause.

This is especially clear in how Waite understood Macdonald’s position on Confederation.

Although Macdonald was the chief architect of Confederation, Waite noted that Sir John did not pursue it as a “real reformer” or a “prophet.”221 To be such a thing, one must be willing to “fight long battles against things as they are, against the dead weight and inertia that institutions and human beings can summon up,” and Macdonald did not possess that sort of drive.222 Instead, Sir

John thought that laws “should be improved, and changes made to correct palpable abuses; injustices ought not to be done.”223 In such a pursuit however, “Macdonald could never fight for something that looked visionary [and h]is energies refused to be summoned for anything his mind

216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Ibid., p. 23. 220 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 221 Ibid, p. 60. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid. 55 told him was ephemeral.”224 Consequentially, Macdonald fought for Confederation because he believed it was a necessary solution to the travails of government in the Canadas,225 not because he believed it was morally pure or was a step on the unending ladder of human progress.

In sum, Waite’s portrait of Macdonald does resemble the comments made by Gwyn and others vis-à-vis Macdonald not being a true political thinker. He preferred action, political maneuvering, and cultivating strong relationships with the people to dispassionate philosophical reflection. When he did take to new ideas, it was only inasmuch as they were necessary steps that resolved imminent practical problems. However, I reject the notion that all this indicates Sir John did not take ideas seriously—what it shows is that he was not given to being a political philosopher.

This does not mean that he did not engage with ideas or trivialized them, rather it means that he did not dwell wholly within the realm of ideas. To be sure, the comment that Macdonald distrusted new ideas because they did not account for the forces of inertia suggests a political thinker quite attuned to pragmatic and liberal theories of politics. Furthermore, his belief in an unchanging human nature means that he had a conception of what human beings are like and what motivates them. As Waite wrote, Macdonald despised “closed philosophical systems,” but of course many systems are open to claims of fallibility and freedom of choice, such as classical liberal and pragmatic traditions.

Rod Preece’s analysis of Macdonald’s thought leads us to consider just this. He writes that

Sir John A. practiced a type of “political wisdom” that demonstrated his knowledge of right and wrong.226 Preece states that Macdonald lived when idealism, Marxism, and utilitarianism affected

224 Ibid., pp. 60-62. 225 Ibid., p. 62. This is especially true for Upper Canadians who were agitating for greater representation in the legislature that would correspond with their larger percentage of the population. 226 Rod Preece, “The Political Wisdom of Sir John A Macdonald.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, volume 17, issue 4 (September 1984): p.459 56 the intellectual landscape, and thus it would not be reasonable to claim, as Waite and others did, that Macdonald had no theoretical criteria for selecting courses of action.227 Specifically, Preece points to empiricism and anti-abstractionism to understand Sir John.228 He upbraids scholars who mistakenly suggest that someone needs to have a unique theory of politics in order to be considered a political thinker; not everyone is a Sieyès or a Lenin.229 Although Macdonald disliked intellectual abstraction, Preece claims that the same may be said for Aristotle and Cicero who each believed that allowing abstract ideas to govern a political society was dangerous—nevertheless, we would err in not calling these figures “men of ideas.”230

Preece also responds to the charge implied by Waite when he insisted that Macdonald was inconsistent with his political ideas—he would take up any idea he needed if it could advance him politically. As Preece shows, intellectual variation cannot disqualify someone as a genuine thinker.231 He presents Adam Smith as an example. Smith was a staunch defender of the “invisible hand” that directs free markets, but he also sympathized with government protection for new industries and government control of sectors where competition was hard to create. 232 Human beings are imperfect and susceptible to contradiction at times, even brilliant thinkers like Smith; just because one can find intellectual inconsistencies in one’s ideas does not mean that person is a charlatan.233 Put another way, even the smartest people have only a limited grasp of what is a complex reality.

227 Ibid., pp. 459-460. 228 Ibid., p. 460 et seq. 229 Ibid., pp. 460-461. 230 Ibid., p. 462. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid., pp. 462-463. 233 Cf. with Gwyn’s mistaken claim about Scots and their antipathy for intellectualizing. There is a clear difference between dogmatic political thought and one open to fallibility, verification, and the give and take of daily life. 57

In his Constitutional Odyssey, Peter Russell makes an interesting claim about political thought and Confederation. He writes that, in opposition to the American Founders, the “Fathers of Confederation were not particularly given to political philosophy.”234 And if the Fathers did care about political theory at all, their champion would have been Edmund Burke instead of the chief influence on the American founding, John Locke. 235 Burke was an Irish thinker who is remembered for his distrust of radicalism in politics and for his prudential and pragmatic approach.

Famously, he wrote against radical change in his Reflections on the French Revolution; he chastised the French revolutionaries for their hasty destruction of France’s traditions and anticipated the horrors that would be contained in the Reign of Terror.236

Russell also considers what he calls the “basic constitutional assumptions of the

Fathers.”237 He contends that they resemble Burkean principles rather than Lockean.238 Taking

Russell’s points together, if we wish to think that political theory mattered to the Fathers and to early Canadian politics, we should anticipate the influence of Burke and not Locke. I wish to test this theory.

Equipped with the idea that Sir John may in fact have had a taste for political ideas and that we should expect Burke’s influence and not Locke’s, we must inquire into the truth of the matter.

What we find as we examine Macdonald more closely is an intimate relationship with both classical liberalism and pragmatic thinking in a manner that follows Burke. We will take each in turn. During the initial crisis at Red River, Macdonald worried about the anarchy that might arise if the Canadian delegation arrived and proclaimed their authority over the territory before the

234 Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? Second edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 11. 235 Ibid. 236 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, in Edmund Burke: Collected Writings (New York, NY: P.F. Collier & Son Corp., 1969), pp. 143-380. 237 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, p. 12. 238 Ibid. 58

Canadian state had rightful possession of the land.239 Afraid that the inhabitants were inclined to work with the United States, Macdonald wrote to Governor MacDougall that

No matter how the anarchy is produced, it is quite open to the law of ex necessitate for the protection of life and property, and such a government has certain sovereign rights by jus gentium which might be very convenient for the United States, but exceedingly inconvenient for you.240

Macdonald thought that if the Canadian government caused anarchy by imposing on the Red River colony a technically illegal authority, the residents of Red River would then possess the right to claim their own lawful government with which the United States could directly negotiate.

This claim is actually consistent with John Locke’s argument about the rights of people to create a government. He wrote that when men are in a state of nature that they can strike a government to preserve their lives, liberties, and property.241 Moreover, Locke argued that this government, empowered by the majority through their tacit or explicit consent, may “act and conclude” as it deems necessary.242 For example, if the people at Red River struck the provisional government in a moment of political chaos, they would possess the right to deal with the United

States if they so desired. As with Locke, Macdonald believed that people without a government have the right to create one to preserve their lives and property; he even uses the same words.

Further, Macdonald claimed, like Locke, that the new government would have the right to act independently. This passage demonstrates Sir John operating out of a classical liberal framework rather than just being a politician trying to get things done.

239 Donald Creighton, The Old Chieftain, in his John A Macdonald: The Young Politician, The Old Chieftain (Toronto, ON, Buffalo, NY, London, UK: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 51. 240 Quoted in ibid. 241 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, in Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), bk. VII, sect. 95, p. 331. 242 Ibid. 59

Liberal political thought also courses through Macdonald’s speech on the Canadian Senate.

He stated that the body’s purpose is not to produce gridlock with the Commons, but also not to

“register the decrees” of the lower chamber either.243 Rather it must be independent and be willing to consider legislation from “the popular house” without standing in intentional opposition to the

“wishes of the people.”244 The Senate must determine the reasonable will of the people, and it must not stand in its way as the British House of Lords had done in the past, since this resulted in significant political turmoil.245 For Sir John, the Senate ought to exist to deliberate on Commons legislation in order to determine whether it is fitted to become law in correspondence to the will of the people; Macdonald saw it as a check on radicalism.

Moreover, Canadian senators shall not be like British peers who gain their position through heredity; senators shall be like members of the Commons, “men of the people and from the people.”246 Senators shall “spring from the people” in sharing sentiments and experiences common to all, and they will fraternize with people when they go back home at the end of senatorial sessions.247 And yet, senators are not to receive their mandate from the people, since this would cause there to be two elected chambers that could both claim equal authority to expressing the popular will and result in impasses.248 Even though the senator belongs to the people, his mission will not be from the people, rather, he stands as a complementary official to ensure that the people’s

243 Ajzenstat et al. eds., Founding Debates, p. 80. Throughout this inquiry, I depend upon various collections of the Confederation Debates rather than the original physical copies of the debates as I was unable to acquire them. However, the edited collections I use are thorough and trustworthy compendiums of primary source material to use in my review of Macdonald. 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 246 Ibid., p. 81. 247 Ibid., p. 82. 248 Ibid. 60 work is accomplished while representing a region of the country rather than particular constituents who elected them to the office.249

In short, Macdonald posited a complicated theory of senators. They belong to a necessary chamber that serves to double-check and correct legislation from the House of Commons to verify that it matches the will of the people. Senators can do such things because they come from the people and go home from time to time to live amongst them when the Senate is not in session.

Senators are neither a rubberstamp nor parliamentarians empowered with equal moral authority; they are citizens, bereft of nobility, who coolly deciphers the people’s will through their connection with the people without becoming subsumed in notions of expressing that will themselves.

Macdonald’s theory intimately reflects that of Publius’s Federalist Papers. They wrote of senators that they ought to be American citizens who are experienced enough to win the trust of the people.250 Because the Senate requires a “stability of character,” its members must have enough life experience with complicated political issues in order to preserve that chamber’s stability. 251

Senators ought not to be elected by the people at large, but rather appointed by the various state legislatures to ensure that they will be the sorts of people that will represent the state appropriately rather than as individuals imbued with particularistic missions from a segment of the population. 252

Indeed, Publius proposed that the Senate serves to stabilize immediate public opinion. 253

They thought public instability must be avoided in a democracy because its effect “is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising and the moneyed few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people.”254 If an upper chamber fails in its duty to protect

249 Ibid. 250 Alexander Hamilton et al., “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist with Letters from “Brutus”. Edited by Terence Ball (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 300. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid., p. 304. 254 Ibid. 61 the people from rabid public opinion, the only people who will prosper will be the avaricious and the affluent. Senators, then, must make certain of the people’s will rather than giving into the interest of some at a particular moment when it comes to legislation. A senator must ask whether the bill proposed will be to the benefit of the American people or if it is an instance of the wealthy heaping a “harvest reared not by themselves but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens.”255 The Senate, through its veteran membership and responsibility to double-check the will of the people, will prevent the connected and the rich from profiteering off the average citizen.

The American Senate may balance the People’s Chamber, but it is not an identical body that mirrors the House. Publius wrote that the House ought to have exclusive power to originate money bills or impeach executive officers.256 Further, the Senate will not overrule the execution of a truly held public will. They cite the British House of Lords as an example, saying that “assembly of opulent nobles” could not use their immense powers to prevent the House of Commons from carrying the day when the latter branch had seized on the popular will.257 Like the Lords, US senators would be duty-bound and appointed politicians whom Publius thought would be incapable of thwarting reasonable actions of the House.258

The similarities with Macdonald are clear. As with Publius, he derided the aristocratic

House of Lords, he proposed senators as a moderating political presence, he believed that the

Senate will not tend towards deadlock with the House, and he argued that it is responsible to determine the people’s will through a second chamber of government rather than bending to the whims of radical democracy. Macdonald appears prima facie to have been influenced by the

255 Ibid. 256 Idem, “Federalist 66,” p. 324. 257 Idem, “Federalist 63,” p. 311. 258 Ibid., pp. 310-311. 62 political thought of the American Federalists. Now, it is possible that Sir John developed his ideas without close reliance on the Federalists. However, the fact that at the Quebec Conference Sir John carried with him annotated books by Hamilton and Madison on how to make constitutions indicates he had a knowledge of their writings and enough respect for them to use them as reference in his own constitution-making.259

The above speech on the Senate, the editors of the Founding Debates note, is also a direct allusion to more of Locke’s theory. They focus on Macdonald’s idea that senators from the people return home to interact with their countrymen.260 Regarding this, Locke stated

If the Legislative, or any part of it be made up of Representatives chosen for that time by the People, which afterwards return into the ordinary state of Subjects, and have no share in the Legislature but upon new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people….261

Ajzenstat interprets Locke to mean that liberal societies lack permanent politicians, so whenever they arrive home, they will have to live among the people according to the same laws that the people do.262 It is unlikely that legislators will choose to make laws that would be uncomfortable to live under. 263 In that Canadian senators are “representatives of the people,” Macdonald’s argument contains a residue of Locke. From this, we see further a classical liberal spark in his political thinking; political ideas do seem to matter for him.

While this evidence lends to the conclusion that Macdonald should be seen as a classical liberal, I am not convinced that this is the only way to interpret his political thought. Although these liberal ideas mattered to Sir John, I wonder if there is not some relevance to the popular idea that he, like many of the other Fathers, was a pragmatist. To be sure, Gwyn, Waite, and other

259 See below section on the Quebec Conference. 260 Ajzenstat et al., eds., Founding Debates, p. 82. 261 Locke, Second Treatise, Chapter. XIII, sect. 154 262 Ajzenstat et al., eds., Founding Debates, p. 82. 263 Cf. ibid. 63 scholars who analyzed Sir John saw different virtues in his thinking that do not match up with classical liberal theory. In particular, it was Russell who argued that Burke’s thought was formative on the Fathers and the 1867 Constitution, so we should expect to find some commonalities between the chief father of Confederation and Burke’s pragmatic prudence.

During the legislative debates on Confederation, Macdonald discussed the type of political union that the new country ought to adopt: a legislative union where there is one parliament for the whole polity, or a federal union of different provinces. The fact of a country being a unitary state or a federation is important. It affects how many levels of government a citizen has to deal with, how the enumerated powers of the state are going to be divided, and the degree to which regionalism will play in the country. In other words, the form and nature of a country’s political infrastructure depends on whether it is unitary or federal.

This reality mattered a great deal to the Fathers, and especially to Macdonald. He understood that in Confederation the country had to get the balance right between power for the central government and respect for diverse regions in British North America. Although he would have preferred in a perfect world to have a legislative union—a unitary state with one central government—he only wanted it as far as it was “practicable.”264 He felt that this form would, ideally, give the country a most “vigorous” and the “strongest system of government.”265 However, he then said immediately “on looking at the subject” of the British colonies in North America after the Confederation conferences, “such a system was very impracticable.”266 French Canadians would not assent to legislative union because of their different language, nationality, religion, and

264 Quoted in ibid., p. 279. 265 Ibid.; P.B. Waite, ed., The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada, 1865 (Montreal, PQ & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2009), p. 20. 266 Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, p. 279; Waite, Confederation Debates, p. 20. 64 legal institutions; they desired to preserve these differences. 267 Furthermore, people of the

Maritime colonies, even though they shared a common tongue and “system of law” with Upper

Canadians, also sought to preserve their regional individuality and identities as separate political units.268 Therefore, the only options available were to insist on legislative union and abandon the entire project, or to accept a system of federal union for the colonies.269 Macdonald would then argue for the latter.

Since federal union was the only viable option, Macdonald wanted one where reserve powers rested in the hands of the central government rather than the provinces. The reason for this was not intellectual preference or abstraction, but because he observed what happened in the

United States when the states retained non-enumerated powers. 270 America contained multiple sovereigns and had to deal directly with “states’ rights”; consequently, much of the cause of the

US Civil War can be explained, according to Sir John, by these facts.271 Referring to the Tenth

Amendment of the American Constitution, Sir John told the delegates at the Quebec Conference that the “primary error at the formation of their constitution was that each state reserved to itself all sovereign rights, save the small portion delegated.”272 According to Macdonald, “we must reverse this process.”273 By granting the residual powers to the central government, Canada could avoid “that great source of weakness which has been the cause of the disruption of the United

States” and avoid “all conflict of jurisdiction and authority” if the powers were arranged in the way he proposed. 274 While issues that directly pertain to local concerns would belong to the

267 Ajzenstat et al, Founding Debates., p. 279; Waite, Confederation Debates, pp. 20-21. 268 Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, pp. 279-280; Waite, Confederation Debates, p. 21. 269 Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, p. 280.; Waite, Confederation Debates, p. 21. 270 Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, pp. 283-284. 271 Ibid., p. 282. 272 Quoted at G.P. Browne, ed., Documents on the Confederation of British North America (Montreal, PQ & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2009), p. 94. 273 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 274 Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, p. 283. 65 provinces, matters of “general character, not specially and exclusively reserved for the local governments” would belong to Ottawa.275

Macdonald made it clear that he wanted to use America’s experience with constitutional debates to Canada’s advantage.276 He had tremendous respect for the American constitution. He called it “one of the most skilful works which human intelligence ever created; it is one of the most perfect organizations that ever governed a free people.”277 Despite its advances for liberty and near perfection, Sir John did not want a pure replication in Canada; circumstances and experience furnished for Canada a lesson on how to avoid its central conflict, namely, the sovereignty of the states.

The points Macdonald made here are not born from Lockean or other liberal principles. He did not argue that federalism is preferable because of its natural tendency towards liberty, although there are several classical liberal arguments in its favour. Hume favoured a large federal state that had both regional governments and a central one. 278 He further posited that a large federal democracy would have so many voices and opinions in public office that it would not be possible for “prejudice” and small-mindedness to govern political affairs—compromises would be unavoidable.279 Sir John did not make a case like this; neither did he cite Montesquieu, who argued the converse, that in order for a democracy to flourish, it needed to operate within a small territory and with a population who shared homogeneous characteristics.280 Democracy across an “extended republic” is not possible, 281 and therefore, one can see federalism as an effort to break up

275 Ibid. 276 Ibid., p. 281. 277 Ibid. 278 David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.” Available online: < http://www.constitutio n.org/ dh/perfcomw.htm >. Accessed 15 September 2014. 279 Ibid, loc. cit. 280 See Baron de Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws. Edited by David Carrithers (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), Bk VIII, ch 16, p. 176 et seq. 281 Cf. ibid. 66

Confederation into small polities based on regional and ethnic origin—Quebec being the prime example—for the sake of instituting a genuine democratic polity. Neither does Macdonald recommend replicating Publius’s constitution, even though he has high praise for it, because he thinks experience teaches how to smooth over problems unanticipated in the political theory. When it comes to federalism, classical liberal thought provides us with various ways to consider its relationship with freedom and help us to choose the right way to order our society. In Macdonald’s case, he advocated for federal union because of its practicability first and foremost—if there were additional theoretical blessings that accompanied federalism, those were bonuses.

I want to consider whether the idea that other scholars suggested, namely, pragmatism, can help us to understand Macdonald’s approach to an important concept like federalism. However, unlike what these earlier academics thought, I propose to consider pragmatism not as the political practice of expediency but rather in its philosophic dimension as expressed by Burke. This first requires some unpacking.

A famous example of Burke’s prudence and pragmatism comes from his “Speech to the

Electors of Bristol.”282 He stated that the people’s representative cannot be a mere conduit for their beliefs. To be sure, a representative must weigh the will of his constituents, treat them with “high respect,” and be willing to sacrifice his happiness for theirs. 283 However, the opinion of his constituents cannot reign supreme; sometimes the people can err. Instead, a representative owes the people “his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, [and] his enlightened conscience.”284 A representative owes the people his judgment, and he betrays the people if he “sacrifices it to” their

282 Edmund Burke, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol,” in Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts. Edited by Steven M. Cahn (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 618-619. 283 Ibid., pp. 618-619. 284 Ibid., p. 619. 67 opinion.285 This is because parliament exists as a “deliberate assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.”286 And this process requires great care and agility from parliamentarians since “the machine of a free constitution is no simple thing, but as intricate and as delicate as it is valuable.” In short, Burke contended that an elected representative cannot rigidly follow the opinions of the people who elected them. Instead, a representative must be free to use his judgment in parliament to negotiate with other representatives in order to succeed in the tricky practice of creating good laws for a free people.

Another place where Burke set out his prudent political theory was in the Reflections.

Against the radicals who overthrew King Louis XVI in the name of liberty in the abstract, Burke wrote that “I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty.”287 In other words, Burke preferred a form of freedom that was dignified, principled, and restrained rather than untethered and abstract. The revolutionaries found their liberty in the desecration of French society’s hierarchy and tradition.

For Burke, all ideas purely in the abstract need to be met with skepticism. He claimed that

“Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect.”288 We understand the goodness and the appropriateness of a principle as we see it in action. To that end, Burke wrote that “Is it because liberty in the abstract may be classed amongst the blessings of mankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a mad-man, who has escaped from the protecting restraint and wholesome darkness of his cell…?”289 In short, just because we count liberty as crucial to the good life does not mean that

285 Ibid. 286 Ibid. Emphasis removed. 287 Idem, Reflections, p. 147. 288 Ibid., p. 148. 289 Ibid. 68 every exercise of it is worth rejoicing over. Burke thought that when “the spirit of liberty” is in action, all one can see initially is “a strong principle at work” but it is not until later on when “the first effervescence is a little subsided” that one can squarely judge any such action.290 We can say that here Burke exhorted that one must be practical and pragmatic when trying to understand events—they are to be judged based on whether they yield positive effects into the world.

Burke connected a respect for liberty that was grounded in prudence. He wrote that the

“effect of liberty to individuals is that they may do what they please: we ought to see what it will please them to do before we risk congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints.

Prudence would dictate this in the case of separate, insulated private men.”291 People are free when they can follow their own devices, but it ought to be praised and respected only when we can reasonably foresee that that freedom will be reasonably practiced. On Burke’s understanding, we would only praise the liberty of citizens to eat whatever they want if we could be certain that they would not resort to eating one another.

Returning to Macdonald, we can see Burkean pragmatism and prudence at work. First, he claims that maybe in a perfect world legislative union is best, but he only wants it if it can be practiced. And, because experience shows him that it cannot, he gives up on that notion in favour of a federal union that is plausible. Following Burke, the pragmatist is going to take up and pursue opinions whose consequences apply positively in practice. Macdonald knows that if Canada did become a legislative union, this would cause significant tension within the population. The differences in nationality, religion, and legal traditions among Lower Canada, Upper Canada, and the Maritimes would make legislative union an unworkable tangle, fraught with strain. So, while

Macdonald thought that in principle a legislative union might be best, the circumstances of the

290 Ibid. 291 Ibid., p. 149. 69 situation, as Burke might say, made that principle imprudent. As Waite noted about Sir John, he was interested in realities and practical applications, not ephemeral debates or pursuing radical ideas.

Instead, because a federal union did seem practicable, he shifted the discussion towards what form of federation Canada should adopt, namely one where the reserve powers rest with the states or one where those powers belong to the central government. Macdonald points to the arrangement of powers in the United States, not because he feels it was philosophically mistaken, but because the practice of depositing reserve powers in the subunits led to civil war. Macdonald expressed affection for the American experiment, but was conscious of its flaws. Like Macdonald,

Burke was sympathetic to the American revolutionaries and Framers because he saw in them a

“fierce” desire for “liberty according to English ideas, and on English principles.”292 This is in contrast to the abstract love of liberty he criticized later in France. However, Burke did seem to think that the Americans were a bit too anxious about governmental tyranny. To that end, he wrote that “they anticipate the evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance; and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze.”293 Instead of combatting tyranny when it actually exists,294 the Americans were obsessively careful about preventing it at every turn. To that end, the Constitution limits the powers of the president, prevents him from taking royal titles, checks and balances political power amongst three branches of government, and gives all unenumerated powers to the states.

On the question of reserve powers, one can see Sir John’s position being akin to Burke’s general thinking. Once the first “effervescence” of the American experience of empowering the

292 Idem, “Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies.” The Founders Constitution, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, doc. 2. Available online: < http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s2.html >. Accessed 1 July 2016, paras. 1-2. 293 Ibid., para. 6. 294 Ibid. 70 states through the Tenth Amendment had settled, observation showed that this was a poor arrangement of political power. To avoid a similar civil war amongst the Canadian provinces,

Macdonald proposed and successfully ensured that the general government would retain reserve powers. The language and the thought process he demonstrated resemble a Burkean cast of mind.

In sum, the scholars who contend that Macdonald was a pragmatist rather than a political thinker are partially right. What they did not seem to appreciate adequately was that some theorists, such as Burke, provide the grounds for prudence and pragmatism as an intellectual tradition. In this,

Peter Russell is partly correct as well—Burkean thought affected the Canadian founding, but

Locke and American theory played an important role too, especially vis-à-vis Macdonald.

In sum, despite the traditional argument that Fathers of Confederation such as Sir John did not take political ideas seriously, the evidence shows otherwise. There are strong links between

Macdonald’s thoughts on the Senate that demonstrate someone who embraced classical liberal ideas along the lines of John Locke and Publius. Further, we can assert that Burkean pragmatism played an important role in Macdonald’s willingness to compromise over legislative versus federal union and this argument about the location of reserve powers.

2.2. Pre-Confederation

In 1856, Macdonald served in a Conservative government under the premiership of Allan MacNab, an elder statesman but not one that Macdonald judged could lead Canada into the tumult of the following decade. MacNab seemed to subscribe to what John A. called “old-fogey Toryism”;295 he was hardheaded, unwilling to engage in political compromise, and an “embodiment” of the family

295 Joseph Pope, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald (Toronto, ON: Musson Book Company, 1894) p. 160. 71 compact in Upper Canada. 296 Although Pope denied that Macdonald did anything to hasten

MacNab’s departure, he wrote that John A. was not “insensible” to the clamour of Reformers in the cobbled-together cabinet who wanted Sir Allan gone and Macdonald to supplant him. 297

Members of the government such as Messrs. Ross and Smith made it clear to MacNab that it was time for him to be replaced as the leader, but Macdonald did not jump to push Sir Allan out. 298

In fact, when opposition member A.A. Dorion heard the rumour of MacNab’s potential demise, he put the question in the legislature to Macdonald regarding its truth. Here, Macdonald could have been evasive or given a canned response, but he elected not to do that. He stated

That the Attorney General West [himself] is not the leader of the party in the House, and that such leadership has never been accepted. But I will state more clearly for the information of the honourable member what has occurred, in order that there may be no misunderstanding on the subject, or with regard to my position in the House. On one occasion three gentlemen came to me, stating that they came from what is called the Liberal-Conservative party; and they said that they had heard certain rumours of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, of a change of the members of the Cabinet, but that they did not wish to inquire into the probability of a change. They did not say that they wanted a change, nor did they even hint at its propriety; but what they wanted to state to me was, that if there were any change, if there were any reconstruction of the cabinet, under any exigencies whatever, they had confidence in me, and would support any transaction I would advise. My answer was that there was no authority for the rumour, and that there was no prospect of a change; that I was much obliged to them for the expression of their confidence, but that I had a leader, and as long as he would lead I would follow.299

Sir John did four interesting things in this portion of the speech. First, he related to the House that although there were members of his government that had approached him regarding possible changes, he was careful to state that these men had good intentions and did not seem to trying to oust MacNab whatsoever from his post. They were merely inquirers into the conditions on the ground, and suggesting that if Macdonald needed it, they would support him. By mentioning aloud

296 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 297 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 298 Ibid., p. 162 299 Quoted in ibid., pp. 162-163. 72 that members of the government had come to see him and had discussed his role in the party,

Macdonald was not ducking the question; his response showed that he thought this encounter was wholly innocent. This painted to the legislature, and more importantly to members of his party, that there was not a cabal of traitors lurking within.

Second, Macdonald showed loyalty to his leader. Nothing precluded him from saying that he was not going to discuss intra-party politics in the House, particularly if he did have a covetous eye on the premier’s chair and did not want to tip the balance towards MacNab. Instead, he vowed before the House and on the record that Sir Allan was his leader and that he would continue to serve under him. He let the House know that although members of the party were positively disposed towards him, Sir John would be standing with MacNab for as long as he decided to stay.

In the same way as with the three party members, Macdonald used this speech to defend and support his leader.

Third, Sir John was able to take the discussion of palace intrigue out of the realm of rumours and whispers. As Pope noted, opposition parties vigilantly look for any unrest within the cabinet.300 By making it known what he had heard and what his own position on MacNab’s premiership was, Macdonald made it difficult for the Rouges and Grits to convince people that there was revolt happening on the government’s front bench. In short, Macdonald’s speech acted as a type of damage control.

Fourth, Macdonald used rhetorical skill in this speech. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Sir John would in fact become prime minister and that MacNab would resign shortly hereafter. Macdonald’s oratory gave implicit credence to the idea of Macdonald being the next leader. In denying any element of truth in the rumour of the coup against MacNab, John A.

300 Ibid., p. 162. 73 nevertheless enabled members of his party to picture him as a possible replacement. By defending the three government members and by supporting MacNab, Macdonald proved to the members present that he was the sort of leader one could trust to stand up for them and act ethically. It was said that Julius Caesar had Mark Antony offer him the laurel crown in front of the people just so that he could refuse it, and in so doing, gauge the feelings that the people had at the idea of him becoming their king. In this response to the House, Macdonald openly denied his current leadership aspirations, but in so doing, made it possible for others to envision him as their leader in the near term.

The element of guile becomes a little clearer when one looks at Gwyn’s work. It is to be expected that Alexander Pope would put the best possible face on Macdonald’s sentiments towards replacing MacNab, since he was Sir John’s secretary and likely good friend. Pope wrote that the idea that Macdonald “sought, as has been alleged, to hasten his own promotion by intriguing against his leader, I entirely deny.”301 Gywn writes however that Macdonald sought to reach the

“political ladder’s last, short rung,” and that to avoid being seen as a regicide, he “needed to dispatch MacNab while leaving no impression of his own footprints on his departing leader’s back.” 302 In other words, Sir John had a hand in hastening MacNab’s departure from the premiership. Gwyn argues that Macdonald’s “solution” to remove MacNab cleanly was to get the

Reform ministers to gang up against MacNab and precipitate their resignations, while Macdonald would pledge solidarity with the remaining Conservative ministers—this conflict resulted in Sir

Allan’s departure from the premiership without Macdonald appearing to have been the chief

301 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 302 Gwyn, The Man Who Made Us, p. 161. 74 architect.303 While E.P Taché became the nominal premier, no one doubted that Sir John was the

“recognized leader” of the new government.304

After these events, Gwyn quotes Macdonald who, writing in a letter, stated “I might, as you know, have been Premier, & insisted on Taché’s claims lest it be said that in putting MacNab out I was exalting myself.”305 Although Gwyn thinks Macdonald clearly engaged in a cloak-and- dagger effort to remove MacNab while preventing his image from being blackened, the section quoted earlier suggests that Macdonald may have been trying to do more than just take over the leadership. I think a consistent reading of the evidence is that Macdonald was trying to save the government from family-compact era politics, save the Liberal-Conservative government, protect the reputation of Sir Allan, and advance his own political interests at the same time. To be sure,

Macdonald’s ambitions were not pure, but that does not mean that the entire event was an orchestration for his own empowerment. If it had been, I see no reason why Sir John would not have kept relatively quiet in the face of Dorion’s question, since in so doing he would not have been openly encouraging a leadership change and could have continued the façade he was building behind the three Reform ministers.

Shortly after this affair, an important practical issue confronted the government that

Macdonald now directed. Well into the 1850s, Canada did not have a fixed capital. This was the result of tension between English Canadians who wanted the seat of government in an English city such as Toronto, and Francophones who preferred Quebec City. Because of this, those two cities took turns acting as the province’s capital. With few historical exceptions, 306 this was an

303 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 304 Ibid., p. 162. 305 Ibid. 306 Examples are South Africa with capitals at Pretoria, Cape Town, and Johannesburg, or the European Union with capitals at Brussels and Strasbourg. 75 unworkable scenario—one town needed to be selected as the national capital and physical infrastructure such as parliament buildings could not be constructed until one was chosen. A similar experience took place in Australia; Canberra was chosen as capital instead of Melbourne or Sydney, as those two colonial capitals were rivalrous as Quebec City and Toronto were.

Macdonald decided that he needed to find a way to select a capital without drawing the ire of either French or English colleagues. At the same time, Macdonald was fast friends with the new governor general Edmund Head because of the proximity of their homes in Toronto and their mutual love of literature.307 Together, Macdonald and Head devised a plan to get Queen Victoria to select Ottawa as the national capital. Head felt Ottawa was “least objectionable” and there is a rumour that his wife drew a sketch for the Queen of the view from Parliament Hill to prove how lovely a spot it was.308 On Macdonald’s advice,309 Head wrote to the Colonial Office that in “8 to

10 months,” it would be received positively if Her Majesty were to give her choice of Ottawa as the seat of government, and the Queen obliged. 310 This plan of having Queen Victoria select

Ottawa as the capital was politically cunning because, although it would certainly upset Canadians who preferred the seat to be in Lower Canada, nobody in public life would dare state anything that could be seen as disrespectful to the monarch.

However, this shrewd political maneuver did not unfold as perfectly as Macdonald had hoped. Shortly after the Queen’s choice had been announced, the opposition agitated against it.

They passed a resolution in the House “that a humble address be presented to Her Most Gracious

Majesty the Queen to reconsider the selection she has been advised to make of a future capital of

307 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p.174 308 Ibid. 309 Cynthia Smith & Jack McLeod, eds., Sir John A: An Anecdotal Life of John A. Macdonald (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 17. 310 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, pp. 174-175. 76

Canada” and that was amended to say that “in the opinion of this House the city of Ottawa ought not to be the permanent seat of Government of this province.”311 Excitedly, George Brown called for a vote of adjournment against the government, which basically served as a non-confidence motion; it was defeated in large part by bleu members who wanted to show their continued loyalty to Macdonald’s government despite their support for the opposition’s letter to the Queen.312 The loss of this vote made Brown look “foolish,”313 and gave Macdonald the assurance that his French members still supported his government—this point is essential to make sense of what transpired next.

Hours after the vote, Macdonald and his ministers decided that the resolution that was carried amounted to an “insult” to Queen Victoria, and that as her servants, they felt obliged to resign in the face of such.314 The governor general invited Brown as leader of the opposition to try and form a government, but warned him that, since an election had taken place just seven months earlier, a defeat of his government would not automatically result in the granting of dissolution and a new election.315 Brown accepted.

In those days, if a member of the legislature had been appointed to the cabinet, it was expected that he would resign his seat and run in a by-election, since the terms of his representation of the people had changed. When Brown’s new government came into power, many of his newly appointed ministers had resigned to stand for re-election. Without enough numbers, the Brown government could not prevent the Liberal-Conservatives from adding an amendment to a motion that stated that the House had no confidence in the government.316 The reasons given for the defeat

311 Pope, Memoirs, pp. 196-197. 312 Ibid., p. 197; Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 175. 313 Pope, Memoirs, p. 196. 314 Ibid., pp. 197-198; Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 175. 315 Ibid., p. 176. 316 Pope, Memoirs, pp. 201-202. 77 were that members were unhappy with Brown’s choice of cabinet ministers, that the government had no clear policy agenda, and that the interests of Upper Canadians had given way to those in

Lower Canada.317 In his ambition to grab the premiership, George Brown had been willing to appoint more Roman Catholics to the ministry than John A. ever had—and it was said of him that he was “a slave to the priesthood”—and had appointed ministers who were renowned for their opposition to representation by population, even though it was a core principle for Brown and

Upper Canadian Grits.318 Brown, in the hopes of grabbing real political power, was willing give way on so many of his principles that he lost the possible support of enough members in the

Legislature to sustain his government.

Brown had taken a risk, both in accepting government that might not last, and in the face of the threat from Head that he might not grant a request for dissolution so soon after an election.

Having lost the Legislature’s confidence, two days after taking office, Brown advised the Governor

General to dissolve parliament for an election he could likely win.319 Head declined the request,

Brown resigned, and Head decided to invite Cartier to try and re-form a conservative government with Macdonald leading the Upper Canadian contingent; it was clear that Brown had used bad political judgement.320

Naturally, one would think that once Macdonald struck a government and his appointed ministers resigned, he too would lose the House’s confidence and the government would again fall. However, Macdonald found in the Independence of Parliament Act that if a minister resigned his post and then took up another within thirty days, he would not have to give up his seat in

317 Ibid., p. 202. 318 Ibid., p. 203. 319 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 175. 320 Ibid.; Pope, Memoirs, p. 211. 78 parliament to do it.321 Consequently, Macdonald and Cartier got all the previous ministers sworn into new posts, since their resignations were not a month old.322 The next day, everyone in cabinet was moved back to their previous post before their resignations, and resumed as if the Brown

Administration had never happened.323

Although Sir John did not intend for his political move to get Ottawa named as the national capital to have any drawbacks, once it did, he found a way to use it to his political advantage. He knew that George Brown was excitable and ambitious for power, and Gwyn intimates that

Macdonald encouraged his ministers to resign the government with him in favour of Brown as a plan “to lure Brown into a trap and there to crush him.”324 To be sure, Macdonald did “close the gate over Brown’s prone body” once he was in the trap, found a way to humiliate his political rival, and won for himself a “reputation for political knavery.”325 In other words, once Sir John realized that his political opponents were unwilling to accept his and Head’s choice of the national capital, he decided to engage in a dramatic series of events that would destabilize, embarrass, and chasten the opposition while asserting himself and his party in Canadian politics.

2.3. Confederation

The 1860s were a decade when everything changed in Canada. The Civil War in the United States led to the mobilization of a large American army. For many in Canada and in Imperial Britain, there was a real fear that once the Union had prevailed, it would turn its sights on Canada. To be

321 Ibid., p. 212. 322 Ibid., pp. 212-213. 323 Ibid. 324 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 175. 325 Ibid., pp. 175, 177. 79 sure, in both 1776 and 1812, the United States had unsuccessfully tried to annex British North

America; but now stronger physically than ever before, it may have been time for a third attempt.

Concomitantly, the British colonies were weak. Despite the success of responsible government and democratic institutions in the previous decades, there was still a strong dependence on the United Kingdom in both the politics and the economy of the colonies.

Moreover, the colonies were separated from one other geographically (Newfoundland, Prince

Edward Island, British Columbia), ethnically (Red River, Lower Canada), and economically

(Upper Canada, Nova Scotia). Other than their shared connection to the mother country, the colonies were divided and alienated from one another.

In September of 1864, delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick travelled to Prince

Edward Island to attend a conference regarding Maritime Union. The three colonies were small compared to the Canadas, and felt particularly vulnerable from American influence after the Civil

War; united, they might stand a chance against these threats. This conference, however, was no great secret, and Macdonald petitioned to Britain to be allowed to come to Charlottetown with a

Canadian delegation and discuss a continental confederacy. This was granted, and throughout three separate meetings, Macdonald helped to fashion Confederation by July 1867.

This history is well known and documented by historians. Of interest to me here is to review the things Macdonald said and did in the run-up to Confederation that could assist in determining his bona fides as a statesman. Under investigation here are his actions at

Charlottetown, his thoughts and actions at Quebec City, and his speeches in the Canadian legislature over Confederation. 80

The task at Charlottetown was relatively clear: convince the Maritime delegates seriously to consider federating themselves with Upper and Lower Canada.326 In attempting to make this pitch, Creighton noted that Macdonald stood out to the delegates gathered for more than just his ideas. Whereas the other men assembled wore beards, sideburns, and black suits, Sir John went clean-shaven and donned pearl gray trousers. 327 Uniquely presented, Macdonald then gave a speech at the conference that highlighted British history and constitutional practice, the precedents for a confederation within the empire, and the Southern Confederacy as an example of what happens when a polity of a similar population base fails at putting its constitution together correctly.328 Then, having laid out the start of his case for Confederation, Macdonald invited the delegates to a lavish luncheon on his ship.329 It was said to have included large amounts of beef, ham, lobster, salmon, seasonal vegetables, and copious amounts of champagne.330 This unusually dressed man who was a stranger to most of the delegates did not just ply the ears and minds of the delegates with convincing words about Confederation, but their stomachs and appetites as well.

Phenix intimates that it was in the entertaining aspect of the conference that Macdonald was an especial success.331 She writes that Sir John “schmoozed the Maritimers by hosting balls and cocktail parties, punctuated with political talk.”332 In other words, Macdonald succeeded at

Charlottetown by being a gracious and generous party host who flavored his soirées with just enough politics to advance his objective. Gwyn comments that the champagne had been brought

326 Although technically the division was “Canada East” and “Canada West,” the older terms seemed to predominate in public discourse, and therefore, I will continue to use “Upper” and “Lower” in this inquiry. 327 Donald Creighton, The Young Politician, in his John A Macdonald: The Young Politician, The Old Chieftain (Toronto, ON, Buffalo, NY, London, UK: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 365. 328 Ibid., pp. 365-6. 329 Ibid. The ship, named the Queen Victoria, was where Macdonald and many other Canadian delegates stayed while at Charlottetown because many of the hotel rooms were previously occupied on account of the circus being on Prince Edward Island for the first time in a long while. 330 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 304. 331 Phenix, Private Demons, p. 166. 332 Ibid. 81 to the conference “cagily,” denoting a political motive behind having it.333 This became a habit at the Conference, in that on the days where different Canadians spoke about various elements of confederation—Macdonald on the principles of the project, Galt on finances, Brown on the judiciary and division of powers—there was a celebratory meal to follow. Brown wrote that at one of the Canadian luncheons “the ice became completely broken, [and] the tongues of the delegates wagged merrily.”334 By the end of the conference, the delegates, steeped in the gaiety of the event and the wisdom of federating, “were unanimous in regarding Federation of all the Provinces to be highly desirable—if the terms of union could be made satisfactory.”335 Macdonald and his partners had convinced the Maritime representatives that instead of maritime union, their best way forward was federation, and they agreed to reconvene at Quebec City to formalize the details of such an arrangement.

Before that meeting would take place, Macdonald travelled to both Nova Scotia and New

Brunswick to help make the public case for Confederation. At Halifax, Macdonald delivered a speech where he praised the American Constitution but noted that its principal failure lies in its inherent weakness of having the states as sovereigns.336 The Canadian federation could sidestep this weakness, according to Macdonald “if we can agree upon forming a strong central government—a great central legislature—a constitution for a union which will have all the rights of sovereignty except those that are given to the local governments.”337 In short, the Canadian constitution would invert what is enumerated in the Tenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, namely that the general government would retain the residual powers instead of the

333 Gwyn, Man Who Made Us, p. 304. 334 Quoted in ibid. 335 Ibid., p. 305. Emphasis removed. 336 Creighton, The Young Politician, pp. 368-9. 337 Quoted in Gwyn, The Man Who Made Us, p. 307. 82 provinces. This is not some grand renovation in federalist thinking; rather, it was drawing on the practical experience of what happened in America when the states held the residual powers and trying to avoid the calamity of civil war.

Before ending that speech, Macdonald invited those listening to support the federation he proposed. He envisioned Canada as “a great British monarchy, in connection with the British empire, and under the British Queen.”338 Confederation would not mean what independence did in the U.S.; neither a new sovereign nor new political culture would be necessary. People in Canada would be loyal subjects of the Queen and members of the British empire just as they had been beforehand. But in order for this to become a reality, Sir John insisted that action happen immediately. He said that “[e]verything, gentlemen, is to be gained by union, and everything is to be lost by disunion. Everybody admits that the union must take place some time. I say now is the time. If we allow so favourable an opportunity to pass, it may never come again.”339 The people of

British North America had to federate or risk being devoured separately by exterior forces.

But it was at the Quebec Conference and the subsequent legislative debates that

Macdonald’s politics are clearest and strongest. In October 1864, the delegates reconvened at

Quebec City to concretize the positive developments towards union that began at Charlottetown.

Macdonald possessed “directing control” of the conference; he put his decades of parliamentary and legal training into practice there.340 Although the delegates appreciated the purpose of the meeting and the utility of union, only Sir John had an “architectonic view of the entire structure.” 341

Macdonald did not come unprepared to the conference; Gwyn notes that with him were two annotated books written by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton—co-authors of the Federalist

338 Quoted in ibid., p. 308. 339 Quoted in ibid. 340 Creighton, Young Politician, p. 372. 341 Ibid., p. 373. 83

Papers—on how the American constitutional convention transpired and how to write a constitution, respectively.342

Early in the conference a major crisis arose over how many votes each provincial delegation would have on resolutions—the smaller provinces believed that each should have one, but the Canadian delegates naturally balked at this suggestion because that would allow the small provinces to gang up and defeat the Canadians at any time.343 This disagreement threatened to unravel the meeting before it began. Macdonald stepped into the breach and negotiated a settlement that enabled Canada to have two votes, owing to the distinctiveness of Upper and Lower Canada; this settlement was agreed to and reduced the tension.344

A second dilemma struck the Fathers regarding the composition of the Senate. Several delegates, especially those from Prince Edward Island, wanted equal representation for every province in the Upper House. Many of the Canadian delegates, including Macdonald, did not want to construct a Senate on the American model for fear that too much power in the provinces would weaken the union as it had in the United States. After several days of debate on the subject, Sir

John proposed the idea that the Senate would be divided into three co-equal regions—Ontario,

Quebec, and the Maritimes—each with the same number of senators. 345 To sweeten the deal,

Macdonald agreed not to count Newfoundland’s potential senators in the reckoning, meaning that the four Atlantic provinces would have more seats than either Quebec or Ontario.346 Despite the unhappiness of the Prince Edward Island delegates, the compromise was accepted by both New

342 Gwyn, The Man Who Made Us, 322 343 Creighton, Young Politician, p. 373. 344 Ibid. 345 Ibid., p. 376 et seq. 346 Ibid., pp. 376-377. 84

Brunswick and Nova Scotia. By the end of the conference, there was agreement among Canada,

New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia regarding union.

Sir John was the chief engineer of the Quebec Conference. Of the seventy-two resolutions passed that formed the framework of the British North America Act, Macdonald wrote fifty of them.347 He said that “[n]ot one man of the Conference (except Galt on finance) had the slightest idea of Constitution making,” and that going it alone, “[w]hatever good or ill in the constitution is mine.”348 In essence, Macdonald was an exceptional character who had the knowledge to construct a constitution, and that document is his progeny. Furthermore, Gwyn depicted Macdonald at

Quebec City as “the gathering’s orchestra conductor, cheerleader, bookkeeper … entertainer, and diplomat.”349 Sir John guided the convention in every way one could, and guided it in the direction that he sought.

Macdonald’s fight for Confederation expanded beyond the constitutional conferences; in the

Canadian legislature he debated and defended the various principles of the union to both skeptical and sympathetic representatives. Even though he had convinced the delegates of the idea of union, resolutions to this effect needed to be passed in the legislatures of the provinces. For Macdonald’s part, he needed to persuade fellow Canadians to support the plan hatched at Quebec City. His arguments against complete independence from the United Kingdom and against putting

Confederation to a national vote represent fascinating ideas that will help us to diagnose

Macdonald as a statesman further below in this inquiry.

347 Ged Martin, John A. Macdonald: Canada’s First Prime Minister (Toronto, ON: Dundurn, 2013), p. 87. 348 Ibid. 349 Creighton, Young Politician, p. 311. 85

In February 1865, Macdonald spoke against the idea of a fully independent Canada. He noted that at the Quebec Conference, the delegates were “unanimous” in their desire to remain loyal to the Crown.350 Sir John commented that there would be risk in retaining ties with Britain inasmuch as there might be subsequent hostilities between the UK and the US that might result in war within Canada, but that he and the other Fathers were willing “to run all the hazards of war, if war must come, rather than lose the connection between the mother country and these colonies.”351

Although an independent Canada might negotiate a neutrality agreement during a conflict between

America and Britain, maintaining allegiance with the UK was worth the risk for Macdonald.

The reason behind this is that Sir John A. believed that England would reciprocate the

Canadian “desire for a permanent alliance.”352 More to the point, he saw remaining a loyal member of the British Empire as a “quid pro quo”; we would benefit and Britain would benefit from such an arrangement. He envisioned England seeing Canada as a “friendly nation” instead of a “merely dependent colony,” because as a subordinate power, Canada would be a nation that could help

England “meet the whole world at arms” during possible global conflicts;353 of course England would remain a military guarantor of Canadian independence against any American expansionist intentions. Sir John believed since Australia would soon become a similar subordinate country along with others, that England would have a full inventory of loyal partners who would help the mother country at times of need. 354 Conversely, Canada would benefit from this relationship because we would continue to “enjoy, under her protection, the privileges of constitutional liberty according to the British system.”355 In short, as long as Canada remained allied with Great Britain,

350 Quoted in Ajzenstat et al., eds., Founding Debates, p. 204. 351 Ibid. 352 Ibid., p. 205. 353 Ibid. 354 Ibid. 355 Ibid., p. 206. 86

Canada would be able to continue in practice the freedoms and rights that are a part of the English constitutional model. In particular, that means that minorities would have the guarantees of protection from majority faction.356

This is an unusual argument and Macdonald took time to unpack it. He stated that the truest test to a free constitution is its capacity to protect minorities.357 In any country the rights of the majority are easily secured, yet “it is only in countries like England, enjoying constitutional liberty, and safe from tyranny of a single despot or of an unbridled democracy, that the rights of minorities are regarded.”358 What Macdonald meant was that it is not difficult for a majority to protect its rights; they outnumber everyone else. Minorities, however, cannot fall back on the idea of “safety in numbers”—they must seek out legal and institutional protection.359 England stands apart from most nations, since it is neither governed by a tyrant nor does mob-rule democracy carry the day.

One man cannot oppress or suppress a minority; neither can the majority vote the rights and protections of a minority away in an election. Instead, the system of constitutional liberty practiced in Britain where the crown holds sovereign power, but the business of governing falls to a bicameral legislature of both lords and commoners, prevents minorities from marginalization. The people have their say in the Commons, but need the approval of the Lords in order to pass bills, while the sovereign has legal control over appointing head the government or dissolving parliament even with responsible government.

Macdonald then continued:

So long, too, as we form a portion of the British Empire, we shall have the example of her free institutions, of the high standard of the character of her statesmen and

356 Ibid. 357 Ibid. 358 Ibid. 359 Although Macdonald was not directly referencing Publius, inasmuch as he had read its authors’ work, it is reasonable to assume that he was obliquely referencing Publius’s argument in “Federalist 10” about faction and republican politics. 87

public men, of the purity of her legislation, and the upright administration of our laws. In this younger country, one great advantage of our connection with Great Britain will be that, under her auspices, inspired by her example, a portion of her empire, our public men will be actuated by principles similar to those which actuate the statesmen at home. These, although not material, physical benefits, for which you can make an arithmetical calculation, are of such overwhelming advantage to our future interests and standing as a nation that to obtain them is well worthy of any sacrifices we may be called upon to make, and the people of this country are ready to make them.360

Sir John’s opinion here was that if Canada remained within the British Empire, it would learn from

England’s shining example how to inculcate constitutional liberty. England sets such a fine example that statesmen here would watch and mimic statesmen there because of how well that system operates. And although Canada’s contribution to England is one of a more material nature—as discussed above—Britain provides Canada both with a splendid paradigm of constitutional practice and a military alliance against potential threats to Canadian sovereignty.

This ensures Canada makes out quite well in the exchange. One can argue that Macdonald’s defense of Canada rejecting complete independence with Britain stems not from an abstract idea of independence but rather with the practical benefits that come from a liberal constitutional order and standing as a nation.

A second point that Macdonald ardently defended in the legislative chamber was against putting Confederation to a nation-wide vote. In March 1865 he pushed back against M.C. Cameron who wanted just such a vote; Macdonald asked rhetorically how “a vote like that could be taken in a country whose constitution is modeled on the constitution of England?” and with “what contrivance known to our constitution could we take such a vote?”361 None existed, and if the legislature wanted to do something like that, they would be “subverting the principles of the British

360 Quoted in Ajzenstat et al., Founding Debates, p. 206. 361 Ibid., p. 458. 88

Constitution.”362 To be sure, the Canadian Legislature could pass a bill stating the people needed to positively or negatively express themselves on Confederation, but such a bill would change the

Constitution itself; Macdonald sarcastically stated that he would like to meet the man who would

“sanction” a measure of that sort who supposedly represents the Queen.363 Instead, Macdonald encouraged the members to appreciate that they were “representatives of the people, and not mere delegates”; if they passed a law requiring a public vote, they would rob from themselves “the character of representatives.”364

This concept of members of the House actually representing the people is a long-held

British tradition and one that Macdonald made great use of here. He maintained that one who might directly poll the people on questions of this magnitude imitates “the means by which a despot, an absolute monarch, may get that popular confirmation and approval which he desires for the laws necessary to support a continuation of his usurpation. It may be the means that a despot, at the point of a bayonet, may ask the people to vote yea or nay on the measure he proposes.”365 In brief, because a despot represents his own interests but not the people’s, he will need to, at times, ask the people to affirm his decisions to keep relative peace in the land. He can use physical force to bully the people into giving him a fallacious approval that he may use as a shield against people who would claim that he acted against the volition of the people.366

362 Ibid. 363 Ibid., pp. 458-9. 364 Ibid., p. 459. 365 Ibid. 366 An obvious example of this is Louis Bonaparte’s plebiscite in 1851. Louis had become president in 1848 with the support of nearly three-fourths of French voters, but was term-limited from running again. He staged a coup d’état in December 1851 and asserted himself as the permanent head of the Second French Republic—he would later name himself Emperor Napoleon III. To demonstrate that he had popular support, he held a referendum to gauge support for the coup. People were threatened to be named if they voted against the coup, and they took those threats seriously, as Bonaparte had already arrested thousands who protested the coup in Paris. He “won” over eighty percent of the vote, but the plebiscite was neither free or fair. 89

Free countries do not need to consult the people on issues such as these according to Sir

John.367 In such places, the representatives of the citizenry are those who cast the votes; they do not do so as “a cover for tyranny, but as a measure which accords with the calm and deliberate judgements of the people, as expressed through their representatives.”368 In constitutional states such as Canada or Britain, the people are represented by individuals whom they have chosen in fair elections, and when these representatives make a decision, it is as if the people themselves have voted. This is a point noted by the editors of the Debates in their commentary on Macdonald’s speech.369 They go on to note that another premise in Macdonald’s argument is that parliaments contain high degrees of impartiality because of the open nature of debate there, and therefore, they are better forums to make important political decisions than in the public square. 370 Sir John believed “in his conscience that” the House “represents truly and faithfully the people of Canada,” and that if this is the case, then they are empowered by the Constitution Act to “pass laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of the country.”371 Consequentially, if the House passed a bill in favour of Confederation, then the representatives had the “right to go before the foot of the throne and declare that we believe it to be for the peace, welfare, and government of the people of

Canada to form of these provinces one empire, presenting an unbroken and undaunted front to every foe.”372

This is precisely what Sir John and the representatives of the provinces did. Having secured supportive votes in Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, the Imperial parliament passed the

British North America Act. This act, which resulted in Macdonald being named Canada’s first

367 Ajzenstat et al, eds. Founding Debates, p. 459. 368 Ibid. 369 Ibid., p. 459n 370 Ibid. 371 Ibid., pp. 462-463. 372 Ibid., p. 463. 90 prime minister, was Macdonald’s achievement. He was the one with the political skill to get the

Canadians into the Charlottetown Conference. He was the leader and architect of the Quebec

Conference and the resolutions that resulted from it. He was the man who fought vociferously for the principles of the constitution, for a maintained alliance with Britain, and against a national plebiscite. On the important issues, Sir John A. had his way, and on 1 July 1867, no one could have felt a greater sense of accomplishment than he did.

2.4. The Pacific Scandal and Political Relationships

It is important in this inquiry to consider moments in Macdonald’s political career beyond merely those that cover him in glory. One such major moment was what has come to be known as the

Pacific Scandal; this incident was received so poorly by the opposition and the general public that

Sir John was forced to resign as prime minister. Furthermore, I want to consider a smaller moment in Macdonald’s political career—politics are not just about grand moments of constitution-making.

Specifically, I consider his relationship with Joseph Howe, a Liberal and skeptic of Confederation from Nova Scotia.

By the 1870s, Confederation had been extended beyond the original provinces to include

Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia. In particular, part of the deal that brought

British Columbia into Canada required the government to build a railroad to connect that distant province to the rest of the country. For this railway, Waite noted that it “was going to take all the talent and capital available in Canada, and a good deal more from outside of Canada.”373

Before the project could begin in earnest, Macdonald had to fight the federal election of

1872, one that promised to be close. Sir John, throughout his career, did not shy away from

373 Waite, Macdonald, p. 100. 91 patronage and was public about his willingness to engage in it.374 At this time, Macdonald had agreed to a joint venture from Montrealer Sir Hugh Allan’s Canadian Pacific company and

Torontonian David Macpherson’s Interoceanic company to build the new railway.375 However, by

July 1872 Macpherson suspected that Allan was a “front for American interests,” the likes of which were supposed to be excluded from the project.376 Although Allan had dealt with Americans in the past, he was supposed to give those interests up for this joint project.377 The consortium plan was failing,378 and “Allan moved quickly to gain complete control of the company that would build the transcontinental railway”; Allan had also successfully gained the support of many Bleu MPs and turned Cartier into a spokesman for his cause.379

In the midst of this election, the Conservatives needed money, and Allan was poised to help them if he received assurances from the government. Allan wrote to Sir John that if the government appointed members to the consortium’s board who would be sympathetic to Allan’s presidency, we would be grateful;380 that gratitude would of course be expressed in cash terms.

The bargain that Macpherson and Allan had struck in July 1872 was that both men would appoint the same number of members to the board while the government would choose the rest; there would be no favoritism in advance for who the president would be, but that decision would come from the board itself.381 In other words, Allan dealt in bad faith in an attempt to make an end-run around Macpherson by having the government stack the board of directors with people sympathetic to him.

374 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 209. 375 Ibid., p. 211. 376 Ibid. 377 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 131. 378 Ibid., p. 134. 379 Gwyn, p. 211. 380 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 381 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 137. 92

Macdonald responded that the government would use its influence to help Allan gain the presidency but any other matters about the railway would be postponed until after the election.382

Cartier delivered this message to Allan, but the “robber baron” pushed for greater assurances such as a pledge that if Macpherson’s company dropped out of the deal, the charter would be written in such a way that Allan’s company would win the sole contract to build the railroad.383 In essence, this meant that Allan would receive “a charter that he could interpret as he wished,” and this of course went beyond the narrow guarantees that Macdonald gave.384 Specifically, this would enable

Allan to “accommodate his American partners” inasmuch as he would have incredible latitude to interpret the charter as he deemed fit.385 Nevertheless, Cartier accepted those terms and relayed the news to Sir John A, who was in “disbelief” that Cartier had given Allan “everything.”386

In the heat of the election, Macdonald was forced into a Hobson’s choice: he could reject

Allan’s offer and leave the party bereft of funds or accept the deal and enter into a secret deal to give the entire project over to the robber baron.387 Sir John decided to neither deny nor accept the request; however he simply restated to Allan that the acceptable proposal from the government would be his presidency, and that would be the “basis of the agreement.”388 Allan was agreeable and cut Sir John a cheque for $10,000; much more money followed after this into the Conservative coffers.389 In fact, by the end of the election, Allan had given Macdonald over $45,000; Cartier and

Langevin took together nearly $117,000.390 When Macdonald found out just how much money had

382 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 212. 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 Ibid. 386 Ibid. 387 Ibid., p. 213. 388 Quoted in ibid; Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 138. 389 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 213. 390 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 141. Waite contradicts this slightly, claiming the number to be around $162,000. 93 been doled out to these top Tory leaders, Creighton reported that “Macdonald felt a cold chill of uneasiness.”391

As mentioned earlier, patronage was not an uncommon practice for Macdonald. Gwyn notes that in principle Allan’s company was a perfectly reasonable choice to undertake the building of the transcontinental railway because of his vast wealth and experience, and because he too was a Conservative, the party would have sought out donations from him during the election no matter what.392 However, Macdonald’s decision to make the deal with Allan was “indefensible” on two fronts: that the amount of money the Tories received—$350,000393—was so large that it would mean many candidates “would breach electoral laws,” and Macdonald was at the time also the

Minister of Justice whose job it was to maintain those laws.394 While taking patronage money was not an outrageous practice in nineteenth-century politics, Macdonald and Cartier took cash from a man whose intentions, they knew, extended beyond being president of the railway consortium, to help secure their party an electoral victory.395 There ought to be no doubt that it was “unrestrainedly sleazy.”396

During the election, Macdonald’s penchant for drinking reappeared, and in a moment of insobriety, he personally wired Sir Allan’s lawyer on 26 August. The text of that telegram was:

Macdonald to Abbott, St. Anne de Bellevue, from Toronto. August 26, 1872. Immediate private. I must have another ten thousand. Will be the last time of calling. Do not fail me. Answer today.397

With the sort of politicking that Macdonald was engaged in, not leaving behind clear evidence of one’s direct involvement is critical. From a public relations perspective, a politician must be able

391 Ibid. 392 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 214. 393 Waite, Macdonald, p. 101. 394 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 214 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid. 397 Waite, Macdonald, p. 103. 94 to deny his involvement in underhanded practices. When he sent this message personally, Sir John

“cocked and fired” a smoking gun. 398 Its effect would be made plain in the months after the election.

Macdonald and the Conservatives won the tightly contested election, but it was not as if

Allan’s contributions swept them to a big victory; in Quebec where much of the cash was spent, the Tories won a bare majority and Cartier lost his seat in a riding not known for its Rouge sympathies. 399 Further, Sir John was unable to keep together the consortium of Allan and

Macpherson.400 In September 1872, Macpherson publically aired his opinion that the railway would be tainted with American influence, a challenge that Allan refuted.401 Macdonald had not been asking Allan whether in fact he remained aligned with American interests, but decided to finally inquire into it after the comments by Macpherson.402 By this time, members of Macdonald’s cabinet began to ascertain the nature of the scheme that had been entered into. In particular, Joseph

Howe resigned from cabinet because he “could not defend the scheme,” as did Peter Mitchell—

Sir John became like a “deer caught in the headlights.”403 Furthermore, on 31 December, Sir John met unexpectedly with George McMullen, proprietor of the Chicago Post, an American partner of

Sir Allan who enlightened Macdonald about the former’s duplicity.404 He told Macdonald that

Allan lied to his American investors by claiming they were allowed to continue as “silent partners,” and that Allan had not broken off his ties to the Americans as he had promised to Sir John.405

Macdonald had agreed to work with a man who was wholly dishonest to everyone involved.

398 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 213. 399 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 142. 400 Ibid., pp. 143-144. Macpherson is quoted as stating that Allan’s gambit was “an audacious, insolent, unpatriotic, and gigantic swindle—the greatest ever attempted in this Dominion.” 401 Gwyn, Nation Maker, pp. 215-216. 402 Ibid., p. 216. 403 Ibid., pp. 216-217. 404 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 147. 405 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 217. 95

According to Creighton, the grandness of the Pacific project had the effect of exaggerating all of

Allan’s character flaws; he changed from an “inhibited Scottish merchant into a Roman emperor, free of restraint and drunk on power.”406 McMullen demanded that Macdonald either restore the full deal with Allan they had discussed or rescind the deal to make him president, neither of which

Sir John would accede to doing.407 When McMullen threatened to take public the accusations against the Conservatives, Macdonald asked for time to talk to Allan and his attorney, J.J. Abbott, about the subject.408

In the subsequent months, the American partners revisited and contacted Macdonald, letting him know that Allan came to them with the idea of working together; they were under the impression that the Canadian government was behind Allan’s discussions with them. 409 Sir John refused to admit he had done anything wrong and that they were certainly in their rights to take

Allan to court in that he had been deceptive.410 They threatened to “petition” parliament publicly for a redress of their grievances, which would have been incredibly damaging to Macdonald. 411 Sir

John was able to convince Allan’s lawyer to pay off the Americans so that the issue would remain secret, and Abbott and McMullen agreed to terms of $37,500—twenty thousand was given to

McMullen right away, the remainder to be delivered after Allan had destroyed the evidence tha t

McMullen had of his conversations that he showed to Macdonald.412

Nevertheless, early in the 1873 parliamentary session, Liberal MP Lucius Huntington made a speech in the chamber accusing Allan of being “secretly financed by Americans,” that the government was aware of this fact, and that Allan had donated large quantities of cash to the Tory

406 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 148. 407 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 222. 408 Ibid. 409 Ibid., pp. 222-223; Martin, Canada’s First Prime Minister, p. 135. 410 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 150. 411 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 223; Waite, Macdonald, p. 102. 412 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 223. 96 party’s election campaign in return for the contract.413 Although this was all true, Huntington at the time had no evidence to prove this case; when a vote was called on this subject, Macdonald carried the day, but there was enough public pressure from the nature of the allegations for John

A. to propose a committee of the House to examine the accusations.414 On 8 April, he struck just such a committee.415 However, the committee did not get to work quickly as the major witnesses they wanted to question—Allan and Abbott—were in England at the time and would be unavailable until July.416

Then, on 4 July, McMullen gave the Toronto Globe and the Montreal Herald access to the letters and correspondence that he had with Allan; the letters exposed the party’s dealings with

Allan and Allan’s with American businessmen.417 Because of this, there was no way for Macdonald to escape the public ire that came from his involvement with the scandal. The Globe concluded that Sir John was “hopelessly involved in an infamous and corrupt conspiracy.”418 As Martin explains, the issue for Macdonald was that the issue was easily understandable by the general public: he and his Tories were “Charter-sellers”—politicians willing to sell off the Pacific railroad for political contributions.419 In response, Macdonald convinced Allan to write an affidavit that explained himself and that gave the sense that he was the principal villain of the piece; this seemed to have a relatively calming effect and Sir John was comfortable enough to go on his summer vacation.420

413 Ibid., p. 225; Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 153; Smith & McLeod, eds., Sir John A, pp. 113-114. 414 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 226. 415 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 154; Smith & McLeod, eds., Sir John A, pp. 114-115. 416 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 232. 417 Ibid., p. 233. 418 Quoted at ibid. 419 Martin, Canada’s First Prime Minister, p. 136. 420 Gwyn, Nation Maker, pp. 234-235. 97

But the crisis did not go away. Weeks later, the Globe, the Herald, and the Quebec City

L’Événement had new evidence of the scandal.421 The papers reported, with further support from

McMullen, more sordid details of Allan’s scheme but also the release of the 26 August telegram where Macdonald asked for ten thousand dollars. 422 While Macdonald did not give up immediately, the resultant attacks against him from the press, the opposition, and within the

Conservative party became too much. In a final fury, he delivered to the House during in the early hours of 4 November his last public defense. According to Waite, this was the “speech of his life and, in a sense, for his life.”423 Sir John stated,

I have fought the battle of Confederation, the battle of Union, the battle of the Dominion of Canada. I throw myself upon this House; I throw myself upon this country; I throw myself upon posterity, and I believe that I know, that not withstanding the many failings in my life, I shall have the voice of this country, and this House rallying around me … I can see past the decision of this House either for or against me, but … there does not exist in Canada a man who has given more of his time, more of his heart, more of his wealth, or more of his intellect and power such as it may be, for the good of this Dominion of Canada.424

Macdonald could not deny his deep involvement with Allan and the Pacific mess, but he wanted to state one more time that his love for the country and its political system was second to none. He had given his adult life to it, and he hoped that meant something to the members present and the people more generally. Nevertheless, there was simply not enough support in parliament for

Macdonald to stay, and therefore the next day he resigned as prime minister, as did his government, and the Liberals took over. In the next general election of January 1874, the Liberals won a massive majority, fuelled no doubt by a public desire to make the Conservatives pay for their involvement with the Pacific Scandal.

421 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 163. 422 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 236. 423 Waite, Macdonald, p. 104. 424 Ibid., p. 106; Gwyn, Nation Maker, pp. 252-253. 98

Of course this was not the end of Macdonald’s political career, as he would return to government as prime minister in 1878. Instead of retreating into a well-earned retirement,

Macdonald served as the Conservative leader during the Liberal interregnum until his party was swept into power on the strength of economic issues. Sir John remained active in Canadian politics as prime minister until he died in office on 6 June 1891. Although the Pacific Scandal marred

Macdonald’s reputation, he did not allow it to ruin him psychologically and he resolved to return to lead the country he had given so much to already. As we will see, this cast of mind fits within a typology of statesmanship.

The last aspect of Macdonald’s politics I want to study is the interactions and relationship he had with Joseph Howe because I think that will show how Sir John dealt with people from a different cultural and political background than himself. Although his relationships with Cartier and Brown are each interesting because of differences in language or ideology, Howe represents a much starker difference with Macdonald. Howe was from Nova Scotia, a reformer, a journalist, and vehemently opposed to Confederation. Sir John of course was a Scot from Upper Canada, a

Tory, a lawyer, and the architect of Confederation. The way that Macdonald dealt with Howe and then convinced him to join his cabinet is a story that is worth some reflection.

In the first federal election, Nova Scotians sent to Ottawa seventeen of their eighteen MPs from the Anti-Confederate party.425 There had been no provincial election in Nova Scotia fought on the issue of Confederation, and most public opinion, clearly, was in the negative on the project.426 Early in his prime ministry, Macdonald was forced to deal with Howe, the “tallest head” of the anti-confederates, since he believed Howe could drive Nova Scotia out of the new country

425 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 4. 426 Ibid., p. 3. 99 if he were not brought on side.427 In fact Howe planned to visit London and propose Nova Scotia’s removal from Confederation because she did not consent to join. However, as a man whose first loyalty was to England, he had confessed to Macdonald previously that he would “blow up Nova

Scotia into the air” if it meant saving the mother country, and he had also stated that there was a real chance that if Nova Scotia was granted release from Canada, she might be compelled to join the United States.428 Realizing Howe was so loyal to England that he would never have enough fortitude to push for full secession and risk becoming an American, Macdonald was optimistic that he could find a solution to his problem.429 He did not want to bully or threaten Nova Scotians to reject Howe’s anti-confederate position; instead, he was convinced that with a little persuasion and patience, the province would give up its stance towards secession,430 which of course it did.

By 1869, Nova Scotians became warmer to Confederation and had begun to “walk themselves back” towards Canada, especially after Lord Granville—the colonial secretary—told

Howe that his hope for Nova Scotia’s release was unattainable. 431 Nevertheless, Sir John still wanted to bring Howe into the project to quell the secession issue. At this point, Howe was rather poor and had loans out that he was unable to repay; Macdonald realized that he could leverage his well-worn practice of patronage here to accomplish his goal.432 Macdonald had been making a concerted effort to flatter and win Howe over by writing letters that he was poised to be a hero for his province and could negotiate better terms for the province than what had initially been agreed to in 1867.433 In need of money and out of a sense of duty that Macdonald inculcated in Howe, he and Macdonald’s minister of finance agreed to a plan where the federal government would absorb

427 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 50. 428 Ibid. 429 Ibid. 430 Ibid., p. 52. 431 Ibid., p. 60. 432 Ibid. 433 Ibid., p. 62. 100 the province’s entire debt and increase its annual subsidy.434 With this done, Howe agreed to resign his seat as an anti-confederate and run in a by-election as a Conservative to sit in Macdonald’s cabinet, a by-election he won by a narrow margin.435 In the subsequent years, Nova Scotian anti- confederates softened their secessionist views, and most of the MPs became Tories.436

In brief, the relationship between Macdonald and Howe tells us a great deal about

Macdonald as a politician. In dealing with a sizable caucus of anti-confederates in parliament,

Macdonald saw that Howe was their leader and respected the threat he posed to Confederation. At the same time, Macdonald knew not to push too hard to convince Howe to change his mind, since he was aware that Howe’s affection for England would prevent him from fighting for Nova Scotian independence as much as he might have. Instead, Sir John waited until Howe had been rebuffed by London and in need of financial help before he seriously broached the subject of bringing Howe into the fold. Through patronage and careful strategy, Macdonald was able to give Howe a basket of goodies for Nova Scotia in terms of the debt and subsidy, while also providing for Howe a lucrative seat in cabinet. Macdonald used skill, patience, and keen observation to convince an ardent anti-confederate to sit in his federal cabinet!

2.5. Macdonald and Statesmanship

The preceding sections sketched out Sir John A. Macdonald’s political thought, his political skill before Confederation, his role at Charlottetown and Quebec City, his defense of certain principles in the legislative debates, his struggles with the Pacific Scandal, and the nature of his relationships with Howe. Here, I want to analyze these instances to see whether Macdonald fits a model of

434 Ibid., pp. 62-63; Creighton, Old Chieftain, pp. 30-31 et seq. 435 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 63. 436 Ibid., p. 64. 101 statesmanship as worked out in Chapter 1, based on his approach to human nature, psychology, and idealism in politics.

The argument I am going to present here is that Macdonald clearly fits within the framework of the “transactional” statesman. If we look at Sir John’s use of liberalism, we see that he believed that the people of Red River had the right to form a provisional government if the

Canadian government’s early assertion of authority created chaos. As mentioned, this argument followed Locke’s famous theory in the Second Treatise that in the name of preservation of life, liberty, and property, people are free to form or re-form a government to suit those ends. This connects with the approach to human nature taken by Mannheim’s ideological leader who prefers to reshape the world around him rather than construct something new and utopian. John A. was not claiming that Red River had the sovereign right to declare itself an independent polity without reference to the sovereignty of the Queen, but rather, the inhabitants were entitled to construct a new government that protected their rights as Englishmen that were under threat if there was a power vacuum. Macdonald’s thoughts here also compare with Lord Russell’s notion of a good leader who thinks that politics is about people trying to maximize their happiness in their own way instead of forcing citizens to follow autocratic philosophies of the just. Inasmuch as the people of

Red River were pursuing happiness in preserving their lives, freedoms, and homes with a provisional government, Macdonald’s liberal stance matches with Russell’s view. These approaches to human nature of Mannheim and Russell fit within the transactional statesmanship model; here we see an initial connection between it and Sir John.

A second element of Macdonald’s liberalism focused on his thoughts on the Senate. The chamber was to be an intermediary between the people’s House and the law. Its members would be “of the people,” but they would not be directly elected “by” the people, so they were as beholden 102 to follow the particular wishes of their constituents as an MP might be. Instead, they are so unencumbered as to deliberate over bills from the House and determine whether they match the will of the people properly expressed. Further, senators would refrain from using their privileged positions to make laws that the people dislike inasmuch as senators will have to go home after legislative sessions and live under those same laws; no man would make a law he himself would hate living under. These opinions connect with Talmon’s idea that liberal democrats deny the perfectibility of mankind and will instead opt for the best they can do under the circumstances.

Believing that there is a need for a Senate to check radical democracy in the House is tantamount to accepting the idea that humans are flawed creatures that at times make bad decisions. If Sir John thought that the people could be perfected, then in lieu of a Senate we can imagine that he would have proposed a project of edification that would prevent citizens from making prejudicial, selfish, or ill-conceived laws in the future. Instead, by arguing to entrench a Senate into the Constitution, he admitted that people are going to go on making errors in judgment, from time to time, for the foreseeable future; the upper chamber would be a lasting bulwark against this. Since Talmon’s theories of the liberal democrat and human nature underpin an understanding of transactional statesmanship, Macdonald can be positively compared to that typology.

John A’s Burkean prudence also lends itself to an interpretation from the perspective of statesmanship. He argued that although legislative union was theoretically the strongest and cheapest form of union, he rejected it for Canada because of its impracticability. Because of the provinces’ various cleavages, only a federal union with a division of authority would work. To that end, the form of federal union that would work best would be one where the local governments attended to issues they were best equipped to administer because of their proximity to their citizens, whereas the general government would handle issues of a clearly national character. Furthermore, 103 any power not enumerated would belong to the general government. Macdonald’s argument for that was not a philosophical defense but rather that recent experience with the alternative was a direct cause of the American Civil War. Sir John defended a federal union with residual powers in the hands of the general government for practical and experiential reasons. As noted earlier, this meshes with Burke’s theory of supporting ideas based on the circumstances, effects, and likelihood of success. This reflects Sowell’s argument about leaders and their preferences for idealistic or practical politics. For Sowell, the practical leader has a constrained view of things; he thinks that knowledge comes from observation, and political change must be gradual and based on rules.

Macdonald’s argument for federal union is a constrained approach to politics. In the midst of forming a new political constitution, it was available to the Fathers to found any sort of polity that they wanted—while it would have been fractious, the Fathers had the right to make Canada a legislative union if they so desired. Instead, Macdonald proposed federalism because it matched the conditions on the ground at the time. He used his practical knowledge of the Canadian provinces as a reason why the Fathers should not push for a unitary state, irrespective of whether it may be cheaper or better theoretically. In arguing for federalism as he did, Macdonald showed himself to be a constrained actor; this is an element of the transactional statesmanship model.

Even the scholars who doubted Macdonald’s embrace of political ideas provide a portrait of Sir John that can fit within a model of statesmanship. Waite describes Macdonald as someone who loved politics, had a skill for knowing names, but was skeptical of new political concepts. He feared them because he doubted their practical applicability and they would do nothing to change human nature as it is, which is selfish and self-interested. This resembles Russell’s notion that sound leaders abjure all-encompassing ideas and avoid becoming fanatical about politics. It also matches Talmon’s claim that the liberal democratic leader rejects the notion that there is only one 104 exclusive political truth that must be followed if one is to have a good society. The fact that

Macdonald held many ideas at a distance is actually an important anti-abstractionist connection one can make between him and transactional statesmanship.

When we turn to review Macdonald’s actions in the period before Confederation, we see that he used political rhetoric, guile, loyalty, and tact in replacing MacNab as leader, getting

Ottawa named the national capital, and pulling off the “double shuffle.” Let us take each one in turn. Macdonald wanted to take over from MacNab at some point, but he used his speech in the legislature to deny that he was actively undermining his leader, to defend those ministers who might have had such intentions, and to put into the minds of those listening that he would actually be a capable replacement in the future. In part, this connects with how Ostrogorski’s saw leadership and psychology. Successful leaders, he claimed, employed “master strokes” that convince people to support his cause by appealing to their interests and their innate need for leadership.

Macdonald’s speech was masterful in that he was able to advance multiple motives at once—and successful inasmuch as he became the de facto leader in short order. He appealed to the interests of those in his own party by shielding them from public exposure of their designs on a coup, and he appealed to MacNab’s interest by expressing loyalty and support. It was also a moment of

Burkean prudence. His actions were tailored to the circumstances by being cautious enough to protect his allies from the criticism that would have proceeded from an obvious coup attempt.

More importantly, he recognized that the stubborn conservatism of MacNab was the impetus for the desire for change, and his speech appealed to party members who were casting about in the hopes of finding a better, stronger leader. One could say Macdonald was satisfying their psychological need for leadership. This approach to psychology by Sir John compares to the transactional stance towards the psychological. 105

Macdonald’s machinations around Ottawa being named as the new capital are another interesting example. In a moment where Canadians were deeply divided over whether the capital ought to be at Toronto or Quebec City, Macdonald and the Governor General—with whom he was friends—devised a scheme to ask the Queen to select the capital while informing the Imperial officers that they would be happy if Ottawa was Victoria’s choice. In so doing, Macdonald was able to remove from those who would oppose Ottawa’s designation much of their ammunition, since they would not want to risk being seen as disloyal to the Queen in expressing an undue amount of displeasure. In one sense, this move was a victory for Sir John because Ottawa did become the capital city. In another, he faced a tremendous challenge to his government that he had not initially anticipated. Macdonald’s political opponents were able to move a motion that was critical of the decision, and in response, the government felt it had to resign since the Sovereign had been insulted in the House.

I suspect that we can compare this example with both Burns’s approach to leaders and practical politics, and Michels’s position on human nature and leadership. Burns wrote that transactional leaders tend to prefer bargaining in politics rather than grasping for idealistic principles. A transactional leader has the internal strength not to be pushed around by his opponents, but is flexible enough to persuade and “give and take” in order to gain some concessions. We can place Macdonald in this model in that he was aware that a compromise was necessary between supporters of Toronto and Quebec City; choosing one of those two cities obviously would result in anger from a sizable segment of the population. He did not give into the advocates of either side, and instead helped to select a city in between both on the border of Upper and Lower Canada. Of course it might have been easier to give in and pick one of the two popular candidates and ride out the anger of the losing side, but Macdonald decided to give both sides 106 something that they wanted—the city they did not want as the capital did not become it. In the end, he got a concession from both sides inasmuch as Ottawa did become the capital. Burns’s transactional concept of practical political leadership bears heavily on the statesmanship theory of the same name.

Another interpretation of Macdonald’s actions here might be through Michels’s approach to leadership and human nature. Michels argues that strong leaders are unafraid of making tough decisions that will earn them public criticism. Despite the backlash, the leader makes his decision because he knows that he is right and that he will eventually prevail. In contrast, the weak leader becomes the demagogue who gives to the mass whatever they want without any regard to whether this is good public policy. To be sure, one can argue that Macdonald helped choose Ottawa over

Toronto and Quebec City because he believed it was the right thing to do—a decision that would not give a total victory or defeat to either side. While there was strong criticism, his city of choice remained the national capital.

That his government received much more disapproval from the opposition than he anticipated and that this led to its resignation for a short period needs to be taken seriously. One way to interpret this slight misstep would be along Talmon’s theory of the liberal democrat. This leader believes that people are fallible, but that their psychological constitution is strong enough not to descend into emotional distress when they are challenged. If we accept from the earlier argument that Macdonald believed that mankind was fallible, then that suggests that he would have thought himself equally fallible from time to time. Moreover, when his government faced the prospect of resigning over the “insulting” motion about the Queen’s decision, he decided to spring into action rather than sulk. 107

That response was his “double shuffle.” When Macdonald’s government resigned, he opened the door for the Brown-Dorion administration, which was a mess of internal contradictions.

This foreseeable debacle coupled with the fact that the new government would be weakened in terms of numbers once the newly appointed ministers resigned to run in by-elections meant that it was easily defeated in the Legislature on a confidence vote. Furthermore, because an election had been held just months prior, the Governor General denied Brown’s request for dissolution, as was always going to be likely. He allowed the Cartier-Macdonald administration to try its hand at governing, and to avoid the same defeat as Brown. Sir John found a loophole in the rules that allowed the ministers to avoid by-elections by being appointed to new portfolios other than those they held previously. Of course, the very next day they were all returned to their original positions and the government continued on. This piece of political guile reflects Pareto’s thoughts on leadership as well as Jung’s approach to leaders and psychology.

Pareto argued that naïve leaders believe they can break the ruling class’s grip on power; however, they end up being crushed by experienced élites. Brown thought he could sort out his differences with the French members of his new government on representation by population and his own prejudices against Catholics once he attained power. At this he failed. Instead, an experienced hand like Macdonald used his knowledge of the system and his opponent to crush the political spirits of Brown. Although the two men both fought for Confederation together, the

“double shuffle” was the last time Brown ever led a government. This similarity of Macdonald with Pareto’s notion of political élites and practical success is a further contribution to the idea of

Sir John as a transactional statesman.

Furthermore, Jung argued that all leaders have dramas in their lives, and that only those with strong psyches persevere. They realize that they cannot solve all the world’s problems, and 108 instead steel themselves to handle the stresses and strains that attend the practice of political power.

Macdonald did not let the setback of his resignation weaken him; instead, he conjured up a plan that would allow his party to remain in power after re-taking office. Instead of losing himself in egoism by believing he had been humiliated when his plan to select Ottawa hit a snag, he redoubled his efforts to prevail. Jung’s theory of psychology and leaders is a contributing element of transactional statesmanship, and Macdonald’s connection to it furthers the case that he fits within that typology.

Turning to the Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences, Macdonald’s actions there lend themselves to comparison with elements of transactional statesmanship. At Charlottetown,

Macdonald convinced the Imperial powers to allow a Canadian delegation to meet with the

Maritimers at the conference and he used both speeches and lavish luncheons to garner their support. On the first point, Macdonald’s actions correspond with Pareto’s idea that successful political élites tend to co-opt future leaders into the ranks in order to preserve their current status.

One can interpret Sir John trying to get his delegation included at Charlottetown as an opportunity to co-opt the Maritime leaders and provinces into his plan for Confederation since it would need to expand beyond Upper and Lower Canada if it had any chance to succeed. On the second point, one might think that the fact that Sir John brought with him copious amounts of champagne and threw extravagant parties was his belief that people are partial to these luxuries and that by providing them for the Maritimers, he could endear them to him and his cause. Of course, that is precisely what happened.

At Quebec City, Macdonald was like an orchestra conductor. He organized the conference, he resolved potentially devastating deadlocks, and he wrote fifty of the seventy-two resolutions that informed the BNA Act. In this moment, the case can be made that Sir John represents James’s 109 theory of “mindedness.” James wrote, as we saw in Chapter 1, that some thinkers and leaders are tough-minded, which means they tend towards skepticism, empiricism, and pragmatic action.

When Macdonald faced the crises surrounding the number of votes each province should have or how to arrange representation in the Senate, he employed pragmatic thinking to negotiate compromises. In this, we could see echoes of Burns’s theory of the transactional leader and his willingness to bargain. Furthermore, Macdonald did not let the importance or scope of the Quebec

Conference overwhelm him as a “tender-minded” leader might who is consumed by idealism and dogma. Instead, Macdonald came to the conference prepared with copies of Madison and

Hamilton’s writings on constitution-making and used their experience as a guide to writing the resolutions and managing the meeting. In that Macdonald was pragmatic and empirical at the

Quebec Conference, he meshes with James’s theory of mindedness that itself contributes to our idea of transactional statesmanship.

Next, let us review Macdonald’s arguments as they are presented the Legislative debates collections. He argued against the idea of complete independence from the United Kingdom. In his opinion, by retaining Queen Victoria as our monarch and remaining within the empire, Canada and Britain would enter into an important exchange. Britain would receive an allied nation who would help her out during times of war. In return, Canadian statesmen would have British leaders as their role models, and in practicing the British form of government, would receive all the blessings that attend to English constitutional liberty. This follows Weber’s concept of traditional authority, where a leader convinces people to follow him because he can convince them of the importance of the tradition or the dangers that would stem from abandoning them.

This also matches with Sowell’s concept of practical politics and the constrained vision of the world. Macdonald did not see the Confederation project as an opportunity to build a country 110 founded on abstract principles of complete independence and pure democracy. Instead, he took the moderate position that life in Canada under British rule has been good, and that Canada as a new nation is better off retaining the institutions and sovereign under whom life was so good. While alternatives were available, Macdonald feared the unrestrained consequences of majority rule or a strong presidential system would threaten the freedom of minorities. Inasmuch as the British model gave genuine protections for minority rights, he was inclined to keep it. When Macdonald fought against complete political independence, he took up a constrained view of practical politics in line with Sowell’s definition.

Sir John also inveighed against the idea that Confederation ought to be put to the people at large for a vote. He contended that representative democracies with open parliaments are wonderful vehicles for free debate and limited bias. Consequentially, the representatives of the people, after free and full debate, are able to vote in the assembly in the name of the people; this represents the people’s interests better than a nation-wide plebiscite which is open to corruption, demagoguery, and deception. His argument reflects Michels’s view of human nature. He believed that the “mass” tend towards chaos and disorder when leadership is weak or non-existent. It is the role of strong leaders, on his account, to ensure that public order is maintained. When Macdonald advised against a plebiscite, this resembles the notion that the people are too easily whipped up and unstable to make decisions that most properly belong to their elected leaders. Furthermore, this compares with Burns’s theory of negotiation and trade-offs. I would make the comparison insofar as in a parliamentary setting, leaders can openly debate, discuss, and make deals over big political issues. However, if such issues are given to the people, the subtle arts of negotiation and compromise get overrun by the “yes” or “no” question. Macdonald would not allow himself to be bullied into throwing the project to a referendum. Perhaps he feared that such a referendum would 111 fail in the Maritimes, but one can interpret Macdonald’s argument as him standing tall in defense that a vote in the Legislature was a true representation of the popular will. In other words,

Macdonald’s belief in the need for bargaining and his political strength to stand firm for what he believed to be the case reflect Burns’s thought that transactional leaders passionately strive for

“give and take” within political decision-making.

The Pacific Scandal stands as the thorniest issue when considering Macdonald and statesmanship. Macdonald allowed himself to be duped by Sir Hugh Allan about his American contacts, he sought out the robber baron’s cash to fund his party’s political campaign, and he personally exposed his involvement in the cash-for-charter incident by writing a telegram that requested $10,000 from Allan’s attorney. He was not able to deflect opposition or media attacks when the news of this scandal became public and he was forced to resign. Although he would return to the prime minister’s chair four years later, the event forever blackened Macdonald’s reputation. In some ways, it would be hard to say that the Scandal was an act of statesmansh ip, since it was fuelled by an empirical need for cash and a willingness to ignore Allan’s duplicitous relationships and actions. Of course, for a particular model of statesmanship to apply to Macdonald does not mean that every event in his political life needs to fit within that framework—it is the sign of a typology that is too malleable which can absorb any and all elements of someone’s career within it.

Notwithstanding this, I think that how Macdonald reacted to the aftermath of the scandal can further inform us of his statesmanship bona fides; in particular, his capacity to bounce back from the scandal and return eventually to power. As scholars note, Macdonald tended towards binge drinking; he could have easily fallen into retirement and alcoholism as a result of his humiliation. This resembles Talmon’s comment that liberal democratic leaders differ from 112 totalitarian in that the latter are susceptible to mental stress and self-pity. It also connects to

Michels’s idea that many leaders die early from political stress, and that strong leaders survive and triumph over the strains of life. On these scores, Macdonald does bear resemblance to the transactional statesman.

Finally, I want to analyze Macdonald’s relationship with Joseph Howe in light of statesmanship. Sir John was able to convince a strident anti-confederate, a man with whom he shared little in common, to abandon that stance and take up a seat in his federal cabinet through a prudent use of patronage and political deal making for the sake of keeping a province in

Confederation. This might be the strongest example yet of Burns’s idea of the transactional leader and his proclivity for bargaining politics. Macdonald did not refuse to negotiate with Howe because he believed the latter fought for some immoral cause, but rather, was willing to give him enough concessions to get him to give up on Nova Scotia leaving Confederation. Macdonald was strong enough to practice patience and not give in to the natural inclination to immediately buy off the anti-confederates or to threaten the province with punitive consequences if they continued to demand independence. Instead, he used foreknowledge of Howe’s love of England and a confidence that the secession movement had only a slim chance to succeed to wait until the right time when he would have the upper hand in negotiations. This fits intimately with how Burns describes transactional politics.

Taken together, a clear portrait emerges about Macdonald and statesmanship. There is clear evidence to suggest that his use of liberal ideas, his Burkean prudence, his politics before and during Confederation, his relationship with Joseph Howe, and his response to the Pacific Scandal all fit within the model of transactional statesmanship. In particular, several elements of the transactional approach to human nature, psychology, and idealism in politics all appear in the 113 analysis. The case evidence in this chapter lends itself to the conclusion that in fact we would be right to diagnose Macdonald as a transactional statesman.

114

CHAPTER 3

LOUIS RIEL, PART ONE

A reasonable way to think about the “Fathers of Confederation” might be to include only those who attended the Confederation conferences. Canada came into existence because of the labours of those men who proposed, debated, and ratified a series of principles and resolutions that made up the British North America Act, Canada’s first constitution.437 Furthermore, the idea of heralding certain politicians as “Fathers” relates to the American practice of calling the men who declared the independence of the United States and who framed their constitution the “Founding Fathers.”

However, I am inclined to think that the Canadian definition needs to be slightly broader.

When I say slightly, I mean to include pivotal leaders who helped to form an aspect of the

Canadian polity who lived in close proximity to Confederation. For example, I do not take seriously the claim that Joey Smallwood, the first premier of Newfoundland, ought to be seen as the last Father because of his influential role in encouraging the island to join Confederation in

1949. That, to me, smacks of a desire for recognition rather than an accurate depiction of the man.

Canada was a thriving country by 1949. By that point, Canada had gained its political freedom from Westminster, had helped to win two world wars, had played a central role in international peace talks, and was rapidly developing into an economic power. This is not to say that

Newfoundland’s inclusion has not been positive, but to say that Smallwood’s efforts to bring it into Confederation was akin to the work of Macdonald, Cartier, Brown, or McGee would be overinflating his contribution.

437 The BNA Act, although modified from its original form, is still the central part of the current Canadian constitution, styled The Constitution Act, 1867. 115

What then are the grounds for considering somebody to be a “Father?” If the term is to be significant, there ought to be a set of criteria as to who do and do not count.438 For this, I rely on

Canada’s Founding Debates as my guide. In that text, the editors set forth an implicit set of rules for organizing those whom we should call the Fathers, and those rules are clearly broader than just those politicians who spoke in the legislatures of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. I say this because they include in the collection the comments of leaders from Prince Edward Island,

Newfoundland, British Columbia, and Red River. These colonies did not enter Confederation in

1867, and in the case of the latter two, did not have any delegates at the Charlottetown or Quebec

Conferences. This point is critical. The inference I draw from the inclusion of British Columbia and Red River is that those leaders, although apart from the formal negotiations, took up in their own debates the same questions of liberty, identity, and responsible government as the canonical

Fathers did. Further, they did so in a time period that was close to the legislative debates of 1864.

Finally, these debates at Victoria and Red River resulted in those colonies opting into

Confederation. In short, one can refer to political leaders in places like Red River as Fathers of

Confederation because of the issues they debated, the time in which they were debated, and the ultimate decision of their legislative bodies.

Of interest to me in this inquiry is one of the Fathers at Red River: Louis Riel. This enigmatic man is interesting for several reasons. First, under his leadership, the people at Red

River formed a provisional government in response to Canada’s acquisition of the territory from the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). Second, his actions as president of that government resulted in Manitoba entering Confederation. Third, he is the only Father of Confederation to confront

438 It may be held that calling people “Fathers of Confederation” has no practical worth and underplays the importance of other actors both before and after the 1860s and 1870s. This notion lies outside the scope of this inquiry. I will only say I think there is utility in the term. It sets apart the statesmen whose actions and ideas did shape the country; without these men, Canada would not exist as it does today. 116 another—Macdonald—in a pitched battle during the North-West Rebellion. Fourth, he was the only Father to be hanged for treason. I suspect that a careful analysis of him as a leader will be fruitful in the discussion of Canadian statesmanship.

The problem-statement of this chapter will be to investigate Riel’s political thoughts and actions through the lens of statesmanship. In this chapter, I review such things up to 8 December

1875, since the literature designates this moment as a crucial turning point in Riel’s life. On that date, Riel had a religious revelation that decisively shaped his politics and his worldview, and his life after that period are the subject of Chapter 4. For this section I am interested in Riel’s role in the Red River Resistance of 1869-1870 and the fallout from this period.

I begin by examining Riel in the immediate lead up to the Resistance through his speeches, personal correspondence, and secondary research that describe his actions. Next, I review Riel in the midst of the Resistance until the Canadian government drove him from Red River in August of 1870. Subsequently, I consider Riel in the period between the end of the Resistance and his revelation. Then, I sketch out whether and how Riel’s thought and action fit into the statesmanship framework set out in Chapter 1. Briefly put, Riel emerges as a statesman of the mostly, but not wholly, transformational variety.

3.1. On the Verge of Uprising

Riel’s actions at Red River during 1869-1870 were not the first instances of civil and political unrest in the territory. The existence of a settler democracy in the colony has been recently worked out by Darren O’Toole, whose work I believe sets a clear context for Riel’s politics during the

Resistance. The original Charter given to the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) over Rupert’s Land gave the company the right to monopolize trade among British subjects there, and between British 117 subjects and Indians; trade amongst the Indian tribes was not included. 439 This economic arrangement resulted in conflict with the Métis 440 since they were regarded by the Crown as subjects, but considered themselves independent like the Indians.441 In practical terms, the Métis found themselves with an overabundance of goods that they could not sell to American markets since the HBC had exclusive control over the trade of British subjects.442 This situation put into motion what O’Toole considers as the first “outbreak” of the Métis in the territory, and one that ought to be understood in republican terms (which I will consider later in the work).443 In sum, the political acts before and during the Red River Resistance ought to be seen as outcomes of republican rhetoric and political theory.

O’Toole notes that in 1834 the Métis organized to demand justice for the mistreatment of one of their own by an HBC clerk. The Métis demanded that the offending party be dealt with according to their “law of retaliation,” and when that was refused them, they threatened violence that a Catholic clergyman successfully pacified. 444 In subsequent years, the HBC governing council appeared to the Métis, according to historian Alexander Ross, as unrepresentative of their interests and did not echo the voice of the people.445 By 1845, the people petitioned and agitated against the HBC when fur trading with the United States was tamped down and the Recorder had imprisoned disobedient Métis traders.446

439 Darren O’Toole, The Red River Resistance of 1867-1870: The Machiavellian Moment of the Métis of Manitoba. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2010: pp. 91-92. 440 There are multiple orthographies of the word “Métis.” Sometimes it is capitalized, sometimes it has an accent over the “e,” and sometimes it does not. For this inquiry, I have chosen to spell the word with the accent and with an uppercase “M.” I do this because it does seem to be the most standard form of orthography, and the capitalization denotes the Métis as a people, the same way one would write the French or the English. 441 O’Toole, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 92. 442 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 443 Ibid., pp. 99-100, passim. 444 Ibid., pp. 100 et seq. 445 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 446 Ibid., p. 105. 118

To that end, the people organized to formally set forth their position. The Métis asserted that they had lost faith in the HBC government, that the public safety of the land was endangered by their current government, as was the peace.447 In their words: “As British subjects, we ardently desire to be governed according to the principles of this constitution which shall make happy the whole of subjects of our august Sovereign.”448 Specifically, O’Toole notes that the constitution being referenced is one that demanded an elected legislature.449 However, the Métis did not gain representation until after the 1849 Sayers trial. The eponymous defendant was arrested along with other traders for exchanging with Amerindians. Enraged by the arrests and by the continued barriers to trade, the Métis surrounded the courthouse with guns.450 Furthermore, during the trial, one settler presented the court with a document that listed the grievances of the Métis as a delegate of the “people.”451 Their demands were for free trade, Métis inclusion on the governing council, and for Recorder Adam Thom to be replaced with someone who spoke both French and English. 452

These pressures seemed to influence the court inasmuch as Sayers was convicted but not punished, whereas no other convictions were assessed. The Métis took this result as a victory, and this outcome represented the end of the HBC monopoly and birthed self-government in the territory.453

In the end, the Red River territory that Riel helped to shepherd through the Resistance was not an apolitical collection of hunters and settlers; it was a territory that had experienced elements of democracy and had grappled with questions of self-representation that a skilled statesman could further develop. W.L. Morton best articulated this political context:

447 Ibid. 448 Ibid., p. 106, my translation. In French: “comme sujets britanniques, nous désirons ardemment être gouvernés d’après les principes de cette constitution qui rend heureux tous les nombreux sujets de notre auguste Souveraine.” 449 Ibid. Whether this word “constitution” is meant in the technical sense of citizens constituting themselves politically as a people, or in a legal sense is unclear. 450 Ibid., pp. 107-109. 451 Ibid., p. 109. 452 Ibid., pp. 107-109. 453 Ibid., p. 109. 119

By 1869 Red River had had a government, courts, churches, and schools for nearly fifty years. It had become a civilized society, largely of mixed white and Indian blood, it is true, but civilized by every test except that of self-government; and that test in no forced sense of the word it could also meet.454

The territory that Riel would lead in resistance against the Canadian government in 1869-1870 possessed everything except self-government. It was a society without politics of its own, but ready to be transformed from a pioneer community that was ruled by a company to a polity ruled by the people who resided on the land. Riel, one might say, approached Red River like a farmer would an acorn sitting on his coffee table. Its end is to grow into an oak tree, and inside the acorn already is everything necessary to become such a tree, but it needs to be taken outside where it belongs and planted in the earth. Riel, in other words, was to plant that acorn during the 1869-1870

Resistance.

By 1869, the HBC intended to transfer Red River to the Canadian government on 1

December.455 Throughout the process, no one consulted with the people at Red River; although thousands lived there, it appeared that neither Canada nor Great Britain considered the Métis there important enough to engage. Even more distressing for the settlers was the fact that once Canada became the government, it would encourage immigration to Red River. 456 This threatened to irrevocably change the plantation’s culture away from the customs and traditions of the Métis way of life.457

At this moment, we encounter Riel. He was educated at Montreal until 1865, and arrived at Red River a couple years later. Morton noted that he was “by talent and training no common

454 Quoted in Hartwell Bowsfield, ed., Louis Riel: Rebel of the Western Frontier or Victim of Politics and Prejudice? (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Publishing, 1969), p. 3. 455 J.M. Bumsted, Red River Rebellion (Winnipeg, MB: Watson & Dwyer Ltd., 1996), p. 44. 456 Ibid., p. 58. 457 Ibid. 120 youngster, but a handsome, eloquent, and impetuous personage.”458 He had studied to become a priest, but did not succeed in completing his courses in part because his mentors saw in him “some instability of character.”459 By the time he returned to his homeland of Red River, he was

“educated, poor, and a failure, another young man for whom there was no place in Red River.”460

Now aged twenty-five, he was determined to make something of himself, and that would be through defending the rights of his people.461

Being from Red River, Riel both understood the risk immigration posed and bristled at the fact the settlers were not consulted over the change in government. In October 1869, Riel riled a group of Métis at a church regarding these subjects.462 He argued that if the people accepted the soon-to-be Lieutenant Governor the Canadians sent, they would sign away their political rights. 463

Riel claimed that the people should use force against this intrusion—he imagined dipping a handkerchief in the blood of the first man to fall and using it as the flag of the territory.464 He claimed that resistance to Canada needed to begin somewhere, and the people at the church embraced his words; quickly, it was known throughout the colony that the Métis hoped to “drive back” William MacDougall, the would-be governor.465 Riel translated his anger over the neglect of the people at Red River into a speech, and that oratory successfully helped convinced the people to turn against the Canadians.

In November, Riel, who became a source of authority, directed the Métis to engage in “an aggressive and orchestrated series of actions designed to prevent Canada from taking control of

458 W.L. Morton, Manitoba: A History. Second edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 122. 459 Ibid. 460 Ibid. 461 Ibid. 462 Bumsted, Red River Rebellion, p. 57. 463 Ibid. 464 Ibid; Idem, Louis Riel v. Canada: The Making of a Rebel (Winnipeg, MB: Great Plains, 2001), p. 28. 465 Idem, Red River Rebellion, p. 57. 121 the Red River Settlement.”466 Two of those important actions were the taking of Fort Garry and escorting MacDougall out the settlement as he waited to assume its governorship. On 2 November, a group of Métis led by Riel entered Fort Garry. Riel met with William Cowan, HBC’s second-in- command at the fort, and told Cowan that the Métis gathered there would be commandeering the fort.467 Although Cowan directed Riel and his followers to leave immediately, Riel would not oblige; since the HBC had only fifteen men and there were a hundred Métis prepared to take the fort by force, the HBC allowed the capture of the place.468

At the same time, Riel and National Committee directed a group of Métis to confront

MacDougall at Pembina where he was staying.469 The group informed MacDougall that on behalf of the people, he and his supporters were to quit the Red River territory the very next morning. 470

True to their word, the following day, a group of armed men arrived and escorted MacDougall across the border.471 In both the taking of Fort Garry and in escorting the governor out of Red

River, the literature shows that Riel was not just a good orator but could effectively convince people to follow his directives.

It was not that Riel hated Canada; he wanted Red River to join Confederation so long as the colonists could help set the terms.472 Riel advanced the political situation by proposing to the people the idea of a provisional government.473 He believed that it would serve two purposes: it would protect the rights of the people at Red River and it could garner the respect of the Canadian

466 Ibid., p. 65. 467 Ibid. 468 Ibid.; George Stanley, Louis Riel (Toronto, ON & Montreal, PQ: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1985), p. 67. 469 Thomas Flanagan, Louis “David” Riel: Prophet of the New World. Revised edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 31. 470 Bumsted, Red River Rebellion, p. 68. 471 Ibid., p. 70. 472 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 473 Ibid., p. 83. 122 government.474 The HBC, as the nominal authority, was too weak—they lacked the strength to even prevent the taking of Fort Garry.475 Through a provisional government, the people could protect themselves while acquiring the support of the Queen, who in turn, could direct the

Canadians to actually negotiate with the settlers.476 This idea elicited support from the people, and after internal discussion, they formed the Provisional Government on 30 November.477

This summary of actions and events paint Riel very clearly. He was a passionate and genuine believer in the cause at Red River. He does not appear as an opportunist, but rather as a fellow Métis who was upset that the government of the colony was changing from HBC to Canada and that his people had no say in the matter. One gets the sense from reading about Riel in this period that he felt as if neither the new nor the old government of Red River thought that the settlers were valuable enough to consult on the matter.

In particular, an important aspect of Riel was that he believed in violence as a positive and necessary instrument. Consider, according to Bumsted, the idea that the colonists could use a handkerchief dipped in blood as the territory’s flag.478 This suggests that Riel thought that violence was an important aspect of the new government’s identity inasmuch as a flag is supposed to symbolize the identity of the people or country to which it belongs. It is customary for a nation to fly a flag that represents something about themselves that they wish to project to outsiders; the use of a blood-soaked pennant implies that Riel wanted to express to onlookers that this new government was both unafraid to use force and that violence was an intrinsic part of the new regime, at least at its founding.

474 Ibid. 475 Ibid., p. 84. 476 Ibid. 477 Ibid., pp. 86-91. 478 In both of his texts on Riel and Red River, Bumsted makes mention of this claim. It was allegedly said by Riel on 24 October 1869 at to the cathedral congregation after Sunday mass. 123

If one looks at the taking of Fort Garry, Riel appeared again to prefer violence, or at least the threat of it, which is frightening enough.479 Cowan and HBC had about fifteen men inside the fort, whereas there were over a hundred Métis. With that significant manpower advantage, Riel could have tried to negotiate a peaceful settlement, but instead, he pressed his advantage and forced the HBC employees out. Riel was not looking for ways to solve the impasse at Fort Garry peaceably. It was as if the settlers at Red River were satisfied with getting their own way through the threat of violence. The same case can be made with the threat of force against MacDougall, compelling him to return behind the borders of the settlement to prevent him from asserting the legitimate authority vested in him by the Queen. The Provisional Government was no so much founded on democracy or diplomacy, as on violence. Maybe the bloodstained pennant was a fitting emblem after all.

As with most revolutionary political acts, the colonists at Red River set down the basic principles that fuelled their actions in a document. Theirs was the “Declaration of the People of Rupert’s

Land and the North West,” of 8 December 1869.480 While Riel was noted as the secretary of the

Provisional Government in this document, evidence suggests that he was its intellectual leader;

John Bruce, as president of the government, was just a signatory.481 This document demonstrates

479 Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts. Edited by Steven M. Cahn (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), Part 1, Ch. 13, p. 320 “For WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known…” 480 Although the “Declaration” was produced in both French and English, they are not mere carbon copies of one another. There contains essential political theory in the French version which is absent in the English. This, accompanied with the fact that the French Declaration was written in Riel’s native tongue, is the reason that I make a point of working from the French text. Further, I work from the “comprehensive first draft” of the Declaration which provides the most detailed and fruitful account of the Declaration rather than a later abridged version. 481 Ibid., p. 99. There is dispute regarding how much of the Declaration Riel wrote. Flanagan notes that Riel’s hand might not have been the predominant force behind the document and that Georges Dugas played a crucial role in drawing up the document. For my own part, I submit that inasmuch as Riel was the secretary of the Government and signed the Declaration, it is fair to conclude that Riel assented to the ideas therein. His signature on the Declaration implies that he supports these claims—they were his ideas even if he was not the primary author. Consider this in regard to the American Declaration of Independence. Although Jefferson was the primary architect, I see no reason to 124 that Riel482 thought deeply about politics and the origins of government. It also shows his appreciation for the role that leadership has in foundational moments.

The Declaration begins:

Il est admis en principe de morale que la puissance publique est inviolable de droit comme aussi il est reconnu qu’un peuple qui n’a pas de gouvernement est libre d’adopter une forme de gouvernement plutôt qu’une autre; d’accepter ou refuser celle qui lui est proposée: C’est d’après ces deux principes que la peuple de la Terre de Rupert et du Nord-Ouest se contenait de gémir en silence, et de tolérer l’espèce d’asservissement dans lequel l’avait [sic; avaient] placé les circonstances particulières qui avaient entouré son berceau.483

[All men admit as a moral principle that public authority is an inviolable law just as it is also recognized that a people that does not have a government is free to adopt one form of government instead of another; and they may accept or reject which ever has been proposed: It is in following these two principles that the people of Rupert’s Land and the North-West have contained their moans in silence, and have tolerated the bondage created by the particular circumstances of their infancy that surround their homeland.]484

According to Riel, public authority is essential for society, and if the people in a given society find that oversight is lacking, they are free to construct a new one. If that power has abandoned the people, they are equally within their rights to reject the imposition of a new government if it is not to their liking. In this context, since the HBC was relinquishing their authority over the territory, the people of the region had the right to reject Canada’s assumption of authority. Riel also noted that the people of the region did in fact respect legitimate authority when it persisted—the

Provisional Government was not a fig leaf for a quest for independence.

Furthermore, Riel wrote that the HBC were not benevolent governors; they did not expressly address the economic or social needs of the people, but nonetheless the inhabitants

argue that each of the signatories held fast to its principles. Their explicit consent to the Declaration means that one can state that it is as if it is the work of John Hancock insofar as he readily signed it. 482 Cf. Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 32. 483 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Déclaration de Habitants de la Terre de Rupert et du Nord-Ouest,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-021. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 35-36. 484 My translation. Cf. text 1-051 in the Collected Writings, p. 42. 125 obeyed that government loyally.485 However, when the company planned to abandon the people in 1869 “contre le droit des gens,” the people of the territory were free to consider their own proper form of government.486 Riel sought to portray the inhabitants as patient subjects who had become recently liberated to erect a government rather than people desirous to remove the HBC and who were using the transfer of power as an excuse to actuate this desire.

This initial section of the Declaration, unsurprisingly, imitates the American “Declaration of Independence.” It began:

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.487

For Jefferson, a people may build a new form of government if there are sound reasons for them to overthrow the current regime. Furthermore, it is the natural right of the people to do so. That right cannot be exercised in secret; rather, if the people intend to modify their government, they are obliged to declare and defend publically their rationale.

Connections between Riel’s and Jefferson’s declarations are clear. As with Jefferson, Riel wrote that the people of the territories found their current condition of government unacceptable.

Additionally, Riel asserted the natural right of the people to form a new government. Further, like

Jefferson, Riel posited the reasons and justification for this action in a public, written document.

Consequentially, one might infer that at the heart of the Provisional Government were the principles of liberal democratic politics.

485 Stanley, gen. ed. 1-021, p. 36. 486 Ibid. 487 “Declaration of Independence of the United States,” in Ideals and Ideologies: A Reader. Terence Ball et al. eds. Ninth edition (Toronto, ON: Pearson, 2014), p. 86. 126

Closer analysis of the 8 December Declaration suggests that this initial inference is incomplete. Thomas Flanagan shows that the political theory that animated this Declaration was anything but liberal. He highlights the following passage from the Declaration:

Or comme il est un autre principe admis par tous les publicistes (parmi lesquels nous pouvons citer Berclay [sic] et Duvoisin) qu’un peuple devient libre, et peut désormais se gouverner comme il le juge à propos lorsque la pussiance à laquelle il était soumis l’abandonne ou l’assujettit contre son gré, à une puissance étrangère, et que de plus, elle ne transfere aucun droit à la puissance à laquelle elle le soumet.488

[As such there is another principle expressed by all the writers (among which we cite Barclay and Du Voisin) that a people becomes free, and can govern themselves as they choose when the power under which they used to submit abandons them, or subjects them against their will to a foreign power, and moreover, it does not transfer any right to the power to which they submit.]489

Here one notices an explicit reference to William Barclay and Jean-Baptiste Du Voisin. According to Riel, these men wrote that if a people found themselves without a government, the people were permitted to form a new one that would oppose the imposition of force from an alien power. This reference to Barclay and Du Voisin, according to Flanagan, meant that the Declaration does not rest on “high whiggery” as the American Declaration does.490

Barclay published De Regno et Regali Potestate in 1600, and was a subject of J.W. Allen’s seminal work on medieval thought. According to Allen, Barclay followed counter-renaissance theorists in his support for an absolute monarchy.491 Barclay believed that “authority to command” derives from God, and that it is impossible for humans to derive power on their own.492 Elections, then, become an empty game where the people decide to deposit authority in one person for a time,

488 Quoted in Flanagan, “Political Theory at the Red River,” p. 156. 489 My translation. 490 Flanagan, “Political Theory,” p. 158. 491 J.W. Allen, Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London, UK: Methuen & Co, 1961), pp. 386-387. 492 Ibid., p. 387. 127 even though they possess neither the capacity nor the right to do so. 493 Barclay held that sovereignty was crucial to the preservation of society, and that it needed to be indivisible; divided sovereign power in the form of any limitations to the exercise of power by the king would lead directly to unacceptable legal anarchy.494 Therefore, since social stability depends upon undivided sovereignty, it follows for Barclay that the king must have undivided obedience from his subjects.495 Even if a king is cruel or oppressive, his subjects have no justification in rebelling against his authority.496 Should they resist, they would rend sovereign power such that civil war would result, and, they would be trying to wrest from the king his God-given power.

However, Barclay did sanction public resistance against a “tyrant.” For him, a tyrant is a king who abdicates and leaves a power vacuum, gives his kingdom away to another king, or wantonly tries to destroy his kingdom.497 Under “tyranny,” people may, under the law of nature, rebel against their king in the hopes of restoring society such that God can once again install His sovereign power in their midst.498 In sum, Barclay argued in favour of the divine right of kings— no matter how tyrannical, deviant, or immoral the king may be, one cannot take away the throne from the one to whom God gave it.499 A king derives his authority from God; rebellion against the king is tantamount to rebellion against God. However, according to Barclay, a king ceases to be a king if he wages war against his own people or if he attempts to transfer his kingdom to another

493 Ibid. 494 Ibid., pp. 387-388. 495 Ibid., p. 388. 496 Ibid. 497 Ibid. As Allen noted throughout this section, Barclay’s thinking was unclear. Why “tyranny” or the right of resistance exists under only the most extreme circumstances is an open question. I am persuaded to think this comes from Allen’s contention that Barclay was not much of a thinker to begin with. He was more of a compiler and lacked originality. 498 Ibid., pp. 388-389. 499 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 128 monarch.500 If either of these violations takes place, the people would be justified in making insurrection or helping to institute a new government if one is absent.

Riel’s use of Barclay meant, for him, that the people of Red River had a right to construct a provisional government because he believed that the HBC’s surrender of authority created a power vacuum. When Riel noted that, following Barclay, people have a right to replace government he did not mean that they may overthrow their current governors on the basis of natural right. Government does not derive from the consent of the governed; it comes from God. Even though, as he stated, the HBC were governors that did not respect the needs of the people, the people remained loyal because they had no right to overthrow them. It was only once the HBC opted to cede their control to the Canadian state that a provisional government became a defensible option.

Barclay’s theory contradicts liberal political thought. In fact, this is exactly what Locke fought against when he wrote his less-read First Treatise, attacking Robert Filmer.501 Locke argued that at the heart of the “divine right of kings” theory is the notion

that Men are not naturally free. This is the Foundation on which his absolute Monarchy stands, and from which it erects it self (sic) to an height, that its Power is above every Power, Caput inter nubila, so high above all Earthly and Human things, that Thought can scarcely reach it; that Promises and Oaths, which tye the infinite Deity, cannot confine it.502

Filmer, like Barclay,503 believed that humans are not free beings; therefore, the form of their government is not up to them to decide. Rather, they are tethered to their government by the will

500 Flanagan, “Political Theory,” p. 163. 501 John Locke, First Treatise on Government, in Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 502 Ibid., chapter II, p. 144. Emphasis removed 503 The connection between Filmer and Barclay arises from the literature. Filmer cited Barclay in his Patriarchia, and Locke made note of this. See Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), p. 221, n147. 129 of God. Monarchy reflects divine majesty, and the height of its power is commensurate with God’s inestimable power.

According to Locke, this theory only allowed the people to form a new government under special circumstances:

But if this Foundation fails, all his Fabric falls with it, and Governments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the consent of Men … making use of their reason to unite together into society. To prove this grand Position of his, he tells us [that] Men are born in subjection to their Parents, and therefore cannot be free. And this Authority of Parents, he calls Royal Authority.504

Clearly, Filmer and Barclay held the same position that the only time that we may reorganize political life is when there exists no power at all. Because people are born under the natural servitude of parental authority, they must be obedient and only invoke the practice of reason vis-

à-vis the structure of their government if it vanishes. Referring back to Chapter 2 of this inquiry, one sees that according to liberals, such as Locke, just government derives from popular consent.

Liberal theorists claim, against writers such as Barclay or Filmer, that government was neither a natural nor divine entity. Instead, it is an artifice and the people are its artificer. They are entitled by nature to create, reform, and dissolve government according to their own reason and self- interest. To underscore Flanagan’s point, the fact that Riel referenced Barclay in the Declaration and that his explanation for why the people at Red River were instituting a provisional government suggests an adherence to conservative and reactionary political theory rather than liberalism.

The other theorist cited by Riel was Du Voisin. He wrote in the early nineteenth century against the excesses and flaws of the French Revolution. One is naturally inclined to compare Du

Voisin with Burke. However, whereas Burke criticized the revolutionaries for engaging in the wrong type of revolution, Du Voisin denied the idea of revolution entirely. He followed Barclay

504 Locke, First Treatise, chapter II, p. 144. Emphasis removed. 130 in defending the sacrosanct nature of the monarchy; if people have an unjust king, then they ought to follow the Christian practice of long-suffering and await their reward in the next life.505 No matter how deplorable the king is, the result of rebellion would be even worse for society. 506

Whereas Barclay focussed his attention on the religious foundation of one’s government, Du

Voisin highlighted its practical role in preserving order. He advocated that the people fight against the French Republic because by their regicide, the Jacobins made war against the people; this is one of Barclay’s instances when popular resistance is just.507

Specifically, Du Voisin wrote of insurrection that:

Je dis … que, dans le cas même d’une oppression réelle et manifeste, le droit de résistance active de la part de particuliers est inadmissibles. L’état social n’admet pas un droit dont l’usage entraînerait infalliblement la ruine de la société. Or, il est évident que la société ne saurait subsister avec le droit laissé à tout citoyen de résister par la voie de l’insurrection, à l’oppression même réelle et manifeste. Sous la Constitution la plus favorable à la liberté, sous le Gouvernement le plus humain et le plus éclairé, il est impossible qu’il ne commette pas quelques injustices, car le prince et les magistrats sont des hommes: vitia erunt, donec homines.508

[I say… that even in cases where oppression is real and manifest, the active right of resistance on the part of the people is not granted. The social state does not admit to the people an unalienable right, the use of which would result in the ruin of society. Clearly, society cannot exist if every citizen has the right to resist against real and evident oppression. Even under the freest constitution, and under the most open and most humane government, it is impossible that there will not exist a few injustices since the prince and the magistrates are men after all: vitia erunt, donec homines.]509

Du Voisin claimed that even if the people suffer genuine oppression, the right to rebel against these governors is denied. Society cannot contain within itself a right that would result in its

505 Flanagan, “Political Theory,” p. 163. 506 Ibid. 507 Ibid. 508 J.B. Du Voisin, Défense de l’Ordre Social, Contre les Principes de la Révolution Française (Paris, FR: Sociéte Catholique Des Bons Livres, 1829), p. 122. Emphasis removed. 509 My translation. 131 demolition,510 and it is obvious to Du Voisin that no society can endure that admits a right to insurrection. Chaos and anarchy are the results of revolution, and therefore it must be avoided. He then noted, pessimistically, that injustice and oppression are going to be present in the best possible society, since people are irredeemable sinners. The implication of this is that if I find myself living in a repressive regime, I have no right to try and change this because there exists no earthly society free of oppression. I simply have to endure.

This sort of long-suffering advocated by Du Voisin clashes with principles of liberal governance. In fact, Du Voisin explicitly mentioned he was opposed to Locke and Rousseau in his belief in the inviolability of sovereign power. 511 Locke wrote in Chapter XIX of the Second

Treatise that men have the right to dissolve a government that they believe is not properly protecting their rights to life, liberty, and property.512 Du Voisin, like Barclay before him, claimed that the original social pact that formed one’s government is by its nature a “perpétuel et irrévocable” pillar against anarchy and public disorder.513 There is an incompatibility between the rights of people in liberal and reactionary conceptions of political right.

Now, Riel’s thoughts in the Declaration appear far more in line with Du Voisin than with the “whiggish” theory of Jefferson. If this is so, then one can essentially dismiss the appearances of liberalism in the Declaration as camouflage for its author’s true motives. Flanagan writes that although Riel and Dugas likely had little “first-hand” experience with Barclay, the ideas of the

Declaration trace back to Du Voisin, and he drew from Barclay.514

510 This idea does not belong exclusively to medieval Catholic theorists. Carl Schmitt posited a similar argument about the inherent flaws within parliamentary democracy, especially as he saw it in Weimar Germany. See Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Edited by Ellen Kennedy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 511 Du Voisin, L’Ordre Social, pp. 137 et seq. 512 Locke, Second Treatise, chapter XIX, pp. 406 et seq. 513 Du Voisin, Défense de l’Ordre Social, p. 140. 514 Flanagan, “Political Theory,” p. 162. 132

It would be one thing if Riel, in passing, cited Barclay and Du Voisin, but to point to a tight connection between their work based on that mention would be stretching the utility of the reference too thin. However, the Declaration goes further than a mere citation. As Flanagan notes, there are three passages from the Declaration that appear as if they were lifted directly from Du

Voisin. I will present below each passage from the Declaration and then the corresponding section of Du Voisin:

DECLARATION: qu’un peuple devient libre, et peut désormais se gouverner comme il le juge à propos.

DU VOISIN: le peuple, devenu libre à son égard, peut se gouverner désormais comme il le juge à propos.

DECLARATION: lorsque la puissance à laquelle il était soumis l’abandonne ou l’assujettit contre son gré…

DU VOISIN: En assujettit, contre son gré, un peuple…

DECLARATION: elle ne transfere aucun droit à la puissance à laquelle elle le soumet.

DU VOISIN: il ne confere aucun droit à celui auquel il le soumet.515

The connection between the Declaration and Du Voisin is clear. In parts, the draft leans directly on the work of the French reactionary, who himself depended on divine right theorists. Despite initial appearances, one cannot treat Riel’s 8 December Declaration as a piece of pragmatic liberal theory; it was an effort in classically conservative, French royalist thought.

This matters because it means we need to interpret the Resistance and Riel within that context. It would be wrong to say that Riel helped to spearhead the Resistance because the people of Red River simply deserved recognition or because their modes of life appeared under threat.

While this may have been important, the founding Declaration of the new Provisional Government

515 Ibid. 133 suggested that the Resistance took place because God’s appointed authority had abandoned the settlers, and they were empowered, by natural law, to reconstitute their government in a way that would be conducive to God reasserting His sovereignty.

This analysis of the Declaration also supports Stanley’s assertion that there was a natural conservatism to Métis such as Riel.516 He wrote that while the Métis were logical, at times they became extreme and avoided subtleties.517 To be sure, the ideological character of the Declaration was conservative. Further, the theorists cited within the document were logical but their work required extreme conditions in order for the people to resist against oppression. Furthermore, it would be generous to refer to the thought of Barclay and Du Voisin as lacking in as much nuance as it might. The ideas that all political power stems directly from God, that all sovereignty is indivisible, that any resistance to oppression is tantamount to anarchy, and that rebellion is only justified during a power vacuum, is relatively blunt and unsophisticated.

Moreover, it does not appreciate the subtleties in the Bible itself surrounding the issue of power and the relationship amongst it, men, and God. To be sure, Saint Paul noted in Romans 13 that people are to obey their government and that “Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. ”518 In response to a question about whether his followers should give tribute to Rome, Christ did not counsel rebellion, but rather instructed those gathered around to “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.”519 It seems as if some scriptural evidence lands squarely with Barclay and Du Voisin.

516 Stanley, Riel, p. 9. 517 Ibid., p. 14. 518 Romans 13:2. All references to the Bible in this inquiry come from the King James Version. I do this for consistency and because this translation of the Bible has long been the standard in English and the most read. 519 Matthew 22: 21. 134

Not all Catholic thinkers take this stance. In fact, Saint Thomas Aquinas, the central authority on intellectual and philosophic matters for Catholics, provided a different perspective. In

Book II of his Summa Theologica, he wrote that men must obey secular rulers inasmuch as this obedience tends towards justice—if the ruler is either a usurper or demands his subjects do unjust things, his subjects need not submit to his authority. 520 Furthermore, Aquinas argued in On

Kingship that the end of man’s government is to provide expedient rule that protected the common weal and common good.521 In particular, he wrote

Now it happens in certain things which are ordained toward an end that one may proceed in a right way and also in a wrong way. So, too, in the government of a multitude there is a distinction between right and wrong. A thing is rightly directed when it is led toward a befitting end, wrongly when it is led toward an unbefitting end. Now the end which befits a multitude of free men is different from that which befits a multitude of slaves, for the free man is one who exists for his own sake, while the slave, as such, exists for the sake of another. If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler toward the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims, not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership.522

Aquinas’s larger argument can now be grasped. Men should obey their rulers if they are just. To be just, a ruler must govern for the sake of the common good. If people are ruled by an unjust governor, they do not have to obey him. Unjust rulers are those who govern for their own private good rather than the goodness of all.

Aquinas, as the authority on philosophy for Catholic thinkers, provided a challenge to thinkers such as Du Voisin and Barclay. Humans, made free and equal by God, do not have to suffer tyrants. Now, Du Voisin and Barclay say that tyrants ought to be thwarted, but their definition was narrower than Aquinas. They believed that one is a tyrant if one either usurps power

520 Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Dino Bigongiari (New York, NY: Hafner Press, 1974), p. 172. 521 Ibid., pp. 176-177. 522 Ibid., p. 177. 135 or sells off his authority to another; cruelty, selfishness, and callousness do not rise to the level of tyranny for them. Against that, Aquinas asserted that any government that pursues the interests of the rulers rather than of the multitude is tyrannical and does not have to be obeyed. To be a faithful

Christian, then, does not require the masochism of suffering that the later thinkers posited—unless one held that Aquinas was unfaithful, which would violate Catholic dogma, and thus transform those who doubt Aquinas into the truly unfaithful. In brief, just because Riel was a practicing

Catholic did not mean he was compelled by faith to treat the notion of obedience in as strict a way as he did.

3.2. In the Provisional Government

By December 1869, Riel had become president of the Provisional Government and it had taken hold in the territory. Reflecting on this, George Stanley writes that “Riel’s star was ascendant,” and that “he had become in six months the head of the colony’s only effective government.”523

Stanley noted that, although successful in appearance, Riel failed to create a broad enough foundation for this “gimcrack government” inasmuch as the whole structure rested on the support of a people who tended to think in only black and white terms.524 Nevertheless, Riel charged forward with the government into the new year in the hope of convincing the Canadians to negotiate proper terms for Red River’s entry into Confederation.525

Now, most of the previous examples demonstrate Riel’s effectiveness as a political leader.

I want to focus on another instance of Riel’s actions that demonstrate his passion. Before

Christmas, Riel realized that the Provisional Government needed money. On 22 December, he and

523 Stanley, Riel, p. 77. 524 Ibid., pp. 14, 77. 525 Ibid., p. 77. 136 another man requested from Governor Mactavish a loan of ten thousand pounds.526 Even though

Mactavish denied their request, Riel and the other man did not turn away. They entered the HBC office and physically went through the pockets of the accountant working there, looking for the key to the company safe.527 Then, having found it, they threatened and intimidated the accountant so that he would open the safe; they then made off with an unknown amount of cash.528 To be sure, this was a thuggish act and reveals a dictatorial streak in Riel. At the same time, it shows that Riel was so determined to see the Government succeed that he would go so far as to accost an innocent employee of the HBC and steal a needed sum of money. It also showed the man who came with

Riel that he was serious and enthusiastic about the Government, and these sorts of things do spread by word of mouth.

Of all Riel’s actions during the period of the Government, none likely had more lasting effect than his treatment of Thomas Scott. Scott was a Canadian who fought with Major Charles

Boulton against the authority of the Provisional Government and was arrested for his actions. 529

Bumsted describes him as a boisterous and opinionated Orangeman who held Métis people in contempt.530 Similarly, Stanley calls Scott a pugnacious man who, while living at Winnipeg, drank and quarrelled.531 On 9 January 1870, Scott escaped from prison and unsuccessfully tried to

“rouse” the people of Portage la Prairie to fight against the government; subsequently, he was re- arrested in February.532 While in prison, Scott set out to torment his captors by shouting racist epithets and “threatening [the jailors] on every possible occasion.”533 On 28 February, Scott

526 Bumsted, Red River Rebellion, p. 105. 527 Ibid., p. 106. 528 Ibid. 529 Ibid. 530 Ibid., p. 163. 531 Stanley, Riel, p. 111. 532 Ibid., p. 112. 533 Ibid. 137 engaged in a fight with one of the jailors, and this nearly led to his death.534 Upon hearing this news, Riel visited the prison guards who had become “surly and resentful” towards Scott.535

Moreover, Riel met with Scott. He hoped to convince the man to be more congenial “lest his continual provocation lead to bloodshed.” 536 However, Scott was graceless in response.

According to Stanley, Scott “had nothing but contempt for all mixed-bloods and to his sense of racial superiority he added the narrow bigotry of an Ulster Orangeman. The yelling and cursing began all over again, and Scott was, in consequence, put in irons.”537 Riel was confronted with a vicious prisoner who actively sought to resist the Government. If we recall Stanley’s earlier point that Riel’s entire government rested upon the support of an uncompromising people, it is plausible that Riel agreed to have Scott court-martialled and executed because it would please the people that Scott had angered.538 If the Government and Riel’s leadership depended upon the good will of the people of Red River, and if the Métis hated Scott, then Riel’s decision might appear to make political sense.

However, several authors, including Stanley, suggest the true reason behind executing

Scott was political symbolism. Bumsted argues that Riel believed that killing Scott would represent a defense of honour and firmness, something the Canadian government would see, understand, and respect.539 Stanley believed that Riel was insecure, and used Scott as a means to attain the esteem of the Canadians.540 Flanagan writes that Riel, through the execution, hoped to demonstrate the sovereignty of the Red River colony, and this would compel the Canadians to

534 Ibid. 535 Ibid. 536 Ibid. 537 Ibid. 538 Ibid., p. 111. 539 Cf. Bumsted, Red River Rebellion, p. 159. 540 Stanley, Riel, p. 114. 138 agree to negotiation.541 He further argues that the trial and death of Scott was rather repugnant: the court-martial took place in a language Scott did not understand, Scott had no access to a legal defence, the offense itself that Scott had committed was unclear, and the Government by this point was well-enough situated that it did not need to kill in order to cement its power.542 Furthermore, the literature shows that the execution of Scott was a terrible mistake—its spectre would chase

Riel from Canada and dog him the rest of his life.543

One could argue that the killing of Thomas Scott represented a moment of passionate political leadership. Riel was responding viscerally to a man who insulted and belittled him and his people. Moreover, Riel allowed Scott to die because it would placate a portion of the population he depended on for the maintenance of the Government. However, the execution infuriated English

Canada. Siggins writes it was a “typical reaction of Orange Ontario to any event they knew almost nothing about.”544 Also, it forced Riel to flee from Red River at the end of the Resistance because his life was in jeopardy. It remained as a grievance against him—in the mid-1870s, he could not take his seat in parliament at Ottawa because he feared being arrested by English forces for the execution, and some assert that Scott’s death was a motivating factor in Riel’s own execution in

1885.545 All things considered, Scott’s execution was not a moment of sound leadership for Riel.

During the Resistance, Riel demonstrated political thought too, especially regarding the idea of loyalty. Stanley wrote that Riel, throughout the period, “had no intention of committing an act of rebellion against the crown.”546 Right from October 1869, Riel declared that the Métis were

541 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 33. 542 Ibid., p. 34. 543 Cf. Stanley, Riel, pp. 116-117. Riel and Scott became “political symbols, political slogans around which men rallied and for which they argued and fought…” 544 Maggie Siggins, Riel: A Life of Revolution (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins Publishers, Ltd., 1994), p. 164. 545 See Bumsted, Louis Riel v Canada, p. 166. 546 Stanley, Louis Riel, p. 65. 139 the “loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of England.”547 When Riel repelled MacDougall from Red River, his intention was not to keep him out permanently; he would happily admit the man as Lieutenant-Governor once the people were prepared to receive him.548 Riel believed that if MacDougall arrived and “settled in,” it would be impossible to get rid of him; he would possess papers signed by the Queen that stated he represented her authority.549 If, after this, the people set up a provisional government to protect their rights, they would be rebelling against the crown, and

Riel did not want that.550

Moreover, on 10 December, after the settlers declared and confirmed the legitimacy of their Provisional Government, Riel spoke to a group assembled at Fort Garry.551 He stated that he

“hoped” those present would remain loyal to the monarch, and that their loyalty to the Provisional

Government would expire when the Canadians respected their rights “as freeborn subjects of

Queen Victoria.”552 While the people of Red River would serve a new and temporary government in the present, its purpose was to preserve their rights as loyal subjects of the monarch. It would be illogical for Riel to make these assertions if he hoped that the Red River colony would declare its independence as a sovereign state.

This reflects the pre-modern thought that Flanagan worked out. Riel believed wrongly the

HBC had surrendered Red River to Canada without the consent of the people. The people no longer possessed a legitimate government. They would not be rebelling against a king; rather, they had been abandoned, and were allowed to fill that vacuum at their discretion. Moreover, since the people of Red River had been “made free against their will,” they had a duty to resist those who

547 Ibid. 548 Ibid. 549 Bumsted, Red River Rebellion, p. 77. 550 Ibid. 551 Ibid., p. 103. 552 Ibid. 140 would create this statelessness, just as Frenchmen had a duty to protest the Republic because of what the Jacobins had done to their state. Following this train of thought, it becomes plausible for

Riel to hold the position that he could institute the Provisional Government in opposition to Canada but remain loyal to the Queen. His Government remedied the power vacuum created at Red River, and this would enable them to repossess their rights as subjects by bringing them back into communion with the Crown.

Riel’s thoughts on loyalty went beyond the fidelity of the settlers towards the Queen. In the “Proclamation aux Peuples du Nord-Ouest” that was published in April 1870, just as the

Provisional Government had squarely asserted its authority in the colony, Riel demanded the loyalty of the people in the territory to the Provisional Government. He wrote:

Aujourd’hui même le gouvernement fait grâce à tous ceux que des différences politiques n’avaient entraînés que pour un temps; l’amnistie sera donnée généreusement à tous ceux qui se soumettront, qui mettront de côté ou qui feront connaître des rassemblements dangereux.553

[To-day the government pardons all those whom political differences led astray only for a time. Amnesty will be generously accorded to all those who will submit to the Government, who will discountenance or inform against dangerous gatherings.]554

Then, further in the document, Riel noted that he

Placé par la main de Dieu avec le suffrage de mes concitoyens au premier rang dans le Gouvernement de mon pays, je suis heureux de dire que la paix existe aujourd’hui au milieu de nous. Le Gouvernement prendra toutes mesures pour qu’elle ne soit pas troublée. Tandis qu’à l’intérieur tout revient dans l’ordre, au dehors le Canada invite le peuple de la Rivière-Rouge à un arrangement amical. Il nous offre la garantie de nos droits avec une place égale aux autres Provinces dans la Confédération. Identifiée avec le Gouvernement Provisoire, notre volonté nationale, appuyée sur la justice, sera réspectée.555

553 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Proclamation aux Peuples du Nord-Ouest,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-054. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 80. 554 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Proclamation to the People of the North-West,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-055. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 82. 555 Idem, 1-054, p. 81. 141

[Elevated by the Grace of Providence and the suffrages of my fellow-citizens to the highest position in the government of my country, I proclaim that peace reigns in our midst this day. The Government will take every precaution to prevent this peace from being disturbed. While internally all is thus returning to order, externally also, matters are looking favorable (sic). Canada invites the Red River people to an amicable arrangement. She offers to guarantee us our rights and give us a place in the Confederation equal to that of any other Province. Identified with the Provisional Government, our national will, based upon justice, shall be respected.]556

Riel then concludes the piece by writing:

le gouvernement traitera avec toutes les sévérités de la loi tous ceux qui oseraient encore compromettre la sûreté publique. Il sera prompt à sévir contre le désordre des partis, et contre celui des individus. Mais nous espérons plutôt que les mesures extrêmes seront inconnues, et que les leçons de passé nous guiderons dans l’avenir.557

[the Government will treat with all the severity of law those who will dare again to compromise the public security. It is ready to act against the disorder of parties as well as against that of individuals. But let us hope rather that extreme measures will be unknown, and that the lessons of the past will guide us in the future.]558

The ideas contained in this proclamation set forth Riel’s beliefs in the Government’s utility, his role within it, and how it would administer justice. We will take each cited passage in turn.

First, Riel claimed that the Government would pardon anyone whose disagreements with the body led them to oppose it, and that amnesty would be given to anybody who would submit to the Government’s authority. Essentially, the Government would accept with mercy anyone willing to surrender unconditionally to its authority. In the English version, Riel said that those who opposed the Provisional Government had been “led astray,” just like sheep away from their shepherd.

556 Idem, 1-055, p. 83. 557 Idem, 1-054, pp. 81-82. 558 Idem, 1-055, p. 83. 142

This quasi-religious metaphor is given force in the next portion where Riel stated that God

Himself, through the support of his compatriots, placed Riel at the head of the government.

Furthermore, this heavenly act has resulted in peace, which the Government would not allow to be disturbed. The reactionary thought of Barclay and Du Voisin was clearly on display. As with

Barclay, Riel thought that earthly authority finds its genesis in God. Following these thinkers, Riel thought that the peace that resulted from the Government’s authority was paramount, and no dissension that could disturb this peace would be allowable. In his opinion, Riel did not come to power through democratic politics. Rather, the people’s support was a manifestation of Riel’s chosen nature from God. The idea of loyalty to the Government is evident.

The next two paragraphs pivot from thoughts on loyalty from the people to what the

Government was owed from the Canadian state. Now that peace had been restored, and because the Government represented the public will of Red River, the territory should be admitted into

Confederation as an equal province.559 If we reflect on what this seems to mean, we notice that

Riel had an unorthodox view about Confederation and its member provinces. Ontario, Quebec,

Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick entered through peaceful negotiation in conferences, legislative debate, provincial elections, and official legislative votes. In contrast, Riel thought that Red River could skip most of these steps because the Government clearly expressed the public will already.

Whereas in the other provinces the discovery of the public will took years of open debate and democratic politics, Red River knew the popular will through Riel’s unilateral declaration of authority, the providential nature of his leadership, and his physical ability to restore order—even though that disorder originated with the resistance of the settlers themselves. The process of deliberation at Red River to join Confederation took less than a year, whereas the British North

559 Cf. Ajzenstat et al, eds., Founding Debates, p. 415. Riel stated “We have shown ourselves to the world to be capable of discussing, creditably, matters of the utmost political consequence.” 143

America Act was the result of many years of hard work from many leaders. In other words, Riel did not seem to think there was something crucial about the manner in which the other provinces came into Confederation. That the Red River province was bonded in blood compared to others set upon foundations of liberty and representation seemed of little import.

The last portion underlines the continual role that political violence was to play at Red

River. Riel stated that the Government would use force to subdue anyone who continued to dare threaten its power. Moreover, it would do so with severity. There was an amnesty for anyone who had previously challenged the Provisional Government, but from this point forward, the body, as a manifestation of the people’s will (and God’s), would severely clamp down on any future dissent.

The assumption that underlay this portion was that there were likely still insurrectionists about, and thus the Government was entitled to put them down with force, even as it negotiated the terms of Confederation.

While violence was a magic wand for Riel, it was not his principal political value. In the letter “Aux Habitants du Nord et Nord-Ouest” that his government also released in April 1870, one notes some important ideas that guided Riel’s political leadership. In this explanatory letter to the people, Riel’s government stressed that the government had sprung up to preserve the English rights of the people, to maintain stability in the face of anarchy, and to negotiate Red River’s entry into Canada. In short, the government was not only a manifestation of God’s will, neither was it merely a power trip for its leaders. It existed to serve the practical political concerns of the people.

In the letter, the Government noted that

Vous savez comment on a arrêté et reconduit à la frontière un Gouverneur que le Canada—cette autre Colonie Anglaise,—ignorant nos aspirations et notre existence comme peuple, oubliant le droit des gens et nos droits de sujets anglais, voulait nous imposer, sans nous consulter et sans même nous avertir. 144

Vous savez aussi que, ayant été abandonnés par notre propre Gouvernement qui avait vendu ses titres sur ce pays, nous vîmes la nécessité de nous rassembler en Conseil et de reconnaître l’autorité d’un Gouvernement Provisoire….560

[You know how we stopped and conducted back to the frontier, a Governor, whom Canada—an English colony like ourselves—ignoring our aspirations and our existence as a people, forgetting the rights of nations and our rights as British subjects, —sought to impose upon us without consulting or even notifying us. You also know that, having been abandoned by our Government, which had sold its title to this country, we saw the necessity of meeting in Council and recognizing the authority of a Provisional Government….]561

And furthermore,

Non seulement le Gouvernement Provisoire a réussi à ramener l’ordre et à pacifier le pays, mais il a entrepris des négociations très avantageuses auprès du Gouvernement Canadien, et de la Compagnie de la Baie-d’Hudson; vous serez tenus au courant des résultats de ces négociations.562

[Not only has the Provisional Government succeeded in restoring order and pacifying the country, but it has inaugurated very advantageous negotiations with the Canadian Government and with the Hudson’s Bay Company. You will be duly informed of the results of these negotiations.]563

Here one should leave aside for a moment our earlier discovery of the pre-modern political ideas that underpinned the Government. This address was to people who would have had neither the knowledge of thinkers such as Barclay or Du Voisin, nor much interest in political philosophy.

This was an address to the people at large, and while ideas play an important role, it does not require a careful theoretical analysis to unearth their plain meaning.

For Riel’s government, Red River was not in rebellion, nor was its intention to construct a new republic. It was an English plantation, and the actions taken were to repel a fellow English colony from violating the rights due to all Englishmen, namely, rights of representation.

560 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Aux Inhabitants du Nord et du Nord-Ouest,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-051. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 74. 561 George Stanley, gen. ed., “To the Inhabitants of the North and the North-West,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-052. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 77. 562 Idem, 1-051, p. 74. 563 Idem, 1-052, p. 77. 145

MacDougall was not driven away because the Government denied its allegiance to the Crown, but rather, to preserve the settlers’ ability to demand their English rights without putting themselves into a state of rebellion. The Government reminded the people that the HBC had abandoned the people, and in order to preserve political stability, they needed to fill the void. In fact, the

Government had done this, and now, it would fulfill the adjective of its name—Provisional—by paving the way for Red River to enter into Confederation. To that end, the people had a right to know about the nature of those negotiations, and the Government would reveal to the people its contents when practicable.

The ideas behind the thinking of Riel’s government are simple: our rights had been threatened, and we stepped forward to fight for them while we were being ignored. Now that public order was restored, the Government would turn to another English colony, Canada, to cement the preservation of their rights going forward. In brief, the principles of consent, self-government, and free access to political rights animated the Government’s arguments. Even though its methods were at times bloody and its deeper political theory was tethered to a reactionary conservatism, the practical wisdom and political leadership contained in this letter would have been obvious to its audience. The Government was there for them when no one else was.

This tension between Riel as a religious, violent leader and Riel as a steadfast advocate for the rights of his people comes into its clearest expression in the Métis Bill of Rights.564 In truth, there were at least four editions of the “Bill of Rights,” but of interest to us here is the second one, as I shall show below. The Convention of the Forty composed the second edition in February 1870 as a set of demands with which to negotiate with the Canadian government.565 This body was a

564 “1870 Métis Bill of Rights, Adopted February 3, 1870.” Available online: < http://www.canadahistory.com/ sections/documents/thewest/metisbillrights.htm >. Accessed 2 February 2015. 565 See Morton, Manitoba: A History, p. 134 146 mix of French and English representatives and formed the bill democratically; although Riel was highly influential in the committee, he was unable to win support from the members to get the

North-West to enter Confederation as a province.566

Now this Bill of Rights contained several liberal-democratic provisions. It stated that there would be no taxation on the people without their legislative approval. It ensured that the new province contain a legislative structure akin to the other provinces. It demanded that Red River receive representation in both the House of Commons and the Senate. It ensured the franchise with the exception of “uncivilized and unsettled Indians” within the territory. Further, for the North-

West territory, it sought guarantees from Canada that its inhabitants could overrule a veto by its governor by a two-thirds vote and that it would receive a sum of $25,000 per annum for schools and infrastructure.567 These points can easily be interpreted as an effort by Riel and the government to protect their people by ensuring provincial status, voting rights, and representation for those in the new province, and guarantees for those in the North-West. These appear as practical measures intended to guarantee the English rights of those in the territory.

Other provisions in the Bill focussed on aspects of political identity. For example, the Bill would ensure that both French and English would be spoken in the legislature, and that the

Supreme Court would be staffed with judges who spoke both languages. It also encouraged the

Canadian government to make treaties with the various Indian bands of the territory. 568 A charitable interpretation of these provisions would be that this did not differ from the sorts of linguistic and cultural protections granted to Quebec at Confederation. Part-and-parcel of

Canadian federalism may be the protection of cultural minorities that constitute a majority in a

566 Ibid. 567 “Bill of Rights,” see points 2, 6, 7, 9, 16, 19. 568 Ibid., see points 13, 14, 15. 147 specific region. Therefore, in making these requests, Riel and the delegates sought to defend their people and way of life as any good leader would.

But this was not the Bill of Rights taken to Ottawa. On 11 February, Riel named N.J.

Ritchot, John Black, and Alfred Scott as delegates of the Provisional Government, and provided them a new Bill of Rights that his government drew up to replace that of the Convention.569 It stated that the territory ought to become a province and it demanded an amnesty for those involved in the Resistance. 570 In one bold act, Riel “undid” some of the democratic decisions of the

Convention and “most unethically repudiated a major decision of the Convention.”571 This might have been because Riel was devoted to the idea that Canada treat the region as an equal partner; the text quoted earlier from April 1870 demonstrate Riel praising the government for getting the

Canadian Government to negotiate with the territory on these sorts of terms. However, Flanagan suggests that an important motivation for demanding provincial status was land control. Should

Ottawa accept Riel’s demands for provincial status, a small number of people in Red River would have “full control over the public lands of this gigantic area.”572 In the new Bill of Rights that came from Riel, the delegates were to push Ottawa for “full control over all public lands of the province, and the right to annul all acts or arrangements made or entered into with reference to the public lands of Rupert’s Land and the North-West….”573 From this view, the Provisional Government changed the second Bill of Rights to include provincial status in order for the settlers in the territory to acquire complete control over a large and valuable swatch of land. I find myself in sympathy with this interpretation of Riel’s motivation.

569 Thomas Flanagan, Metis Lands in Manitoba (Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, 1991), p. 30. 570 Ibid.; Morton, Manitoba: A History, p. 140. 571 Ibid. 572 Flanagan, Metis Lands, pp. 30-31 573 Quoted in ibid., p. 30. 148

Even if one were to excuse his push for provincial status as an instance of patriotic zeal, the point about amnesty still looms. In Riel’s letter to U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant in October

1870, written shortly after being driven from Red River, he provided the full text of the demand:

“That none of the members of the Provisional Government … be in any way held liable or responsible with regard to the movement, or any of the actions, which have led to the present negotiations.”574 There could be no ambiguity about what this meant: Riel would not be held accountable for anything he did during the Red River Resistance.

This is further confirmed by Riel in 1874 when he wrote in Le Nouveau Monde in an effort, four years later, to still earn his pardon. He claimed again that the amnesty was a “sine qua non” of the negotiations, and that it had been guaranteed to the delegates at Ottawa.575 For Riel, the negotiations had two important parts: the negotiation of Manitoba as a province within

Confederation and the “final settlement of all past difficulties by the immediately pending proclamation of a general amnesty which had been guaranteed to our delegation….”576 Since the

Canadian Government reneged on the offer of amnesty, Riel declared that “Canadian

Confederation for Manitoba and the North West is therefore a fraud.”577 In brief, Red River entering into Confederation hinged on men such as Riel being pardoned for their crimes during the Resistance.

Now the delegates left for Ottawa after the death of Thomas Scott, which still angered

English Canadians. A granting of amnesty by Canada would have meant that Riel could not be punished for his role in the man’s murder. Furthermore, he would escape justice for robbing the

574 George Stanley, gen. ed., “‘Memorial to the people of Rupert’s Land and North-West’ to Ulysses S. Grant,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-076. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 114. 575 Louis Riel, “Canadian Perfidy,” in Louis Riel: Rebel of the Western Frontier or Victim of Politics and Prejudice? Edited by Hartwell Bowsfield (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Publishing, 1969), p. 100. 576 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 577 Ibid., p. 102. 149

HBC offices, and for other untoward acts of violence and intimidation that he may have committed.

Furthermore, the inclusion of amnesty in the Bill meant that Riel was saying that a guarantee of his safety was just as important as the rights of Englishmen that his people would resume in

Confederation. Riel’s desire to escape justice for his crimes became tied to the mission of the

Provisional Government. It could no longer be said that the effort to bring Red River into

Confederation was solely about providing stability to the region and the resumption of the people of their rights as English subjects. Instead, it was—at least in part—an effort by Riel and others to avoid prosecution for the things they did when in power.

This is not mere speculation on my part. In Riel’s letter to Grant and his 1874 article in Le

Nouveau Monde, he described the negotiations with the Canadian government. According to him, unless Canada gave into the demand for amnesty, no deal could have been struck. In other words,

Manitoba’s entry into Confederation hinged on Riel and other leaders being given unconditional immunity for anything they did during the few months in the Provisional Government. The rights of the Métis mattered but were clearly not more important to Riel than his personal safety. Riel’s self-interest and ego were equally as important, if not more so.578

However, while the Canadian government accepted the majority of the delegates’ demands, they did not grant a general amnesty.579 Macdonald and Cartier tried to prevent the territory from receiving provincial status right away, but when the delegates steadfastly demanded that they become a province in Confederation, the Canadians conceded the point.580 On 15 July 1870 a square parcel of land around the Red River territory became the province of Manitoba, and entered into Canadian Confederation.

578 See Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 36. 579 Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada, p. 133; Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 30. In the latter, Flanagan notes that Cartier denied the amnesty, but gave a verbal assurance that no one would face prosecution. 580 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 133. 150

3.3. After the Resistance

Manitoba’s entry into Confederation did not mean that Riel was safe to remain in the territory.

Macdonald had raised a military force to enter into Red River and put down any further insurrection against Canadian authority. In August 1870, under the threat of capture and death by

General Wolseley’s forces, Riel was forced to flee from Red River into exile.581 In late 1871, operating as Riel’s proxy, Bishop Taché worked out a deal with Sir John whereby the Canadian government would pay Riel $1,000 to remain out of Canada.582 Later, in absentia, Riel hoped to win a seat in the House of Commons from Provencher, but in that same election Macdonald’s closest ally, Sir George-Etienne Cartier, lost his seat in Quebec.583 Riel opted to withdraw in favour of Cartier with the belief that this action would result in an amnesty for the execution of Scott.584

Cartier won the seat, but died shortly thereafter; there was not time enough for Cartier to petition for Riel’s pardon, and the deed went unrewarded.585 This would be the last time that Riel would put his faith in Canadian government.586

Riel’s account of the aftermath of the Provisional Government was given in his letter to

Grant. In it, Riel constructed a fictional account of the historical events. He claimed that the

Canadian representatives accepted “unconditionally” the point about personal amnesty.587 This was not the case. He then stated that the Canadians broke their promise about immunity when they sent the Wolseley expedition588 when the case evidence suggests that Sir John had planned this

581 Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada, pp. 151 et seq. 582 Ibid. pp. 180-181. 583 Ibid., pp. 182-183 584 Ibid., p. 183. Bumsted shows that although Riel might have hoped for an amnesty, Macdonald had no intention of pardoning anyone involved in Thomas Scott’s death. One can gather this hopefulness from the tone of the congratulatory notes to Cartier assembled in the Collected Writings, texts 1-148 to 1-151, pp. 224-227. 585 Stanley, Louis Riel, pp. 186-187. 586 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 39. 587 Stanley, gen. ed., “Grant,” p. 114. 588 Ibid. 151 attack for reasons other than private revenge. He claimed that “not a single pledge given by the

English and Canadian Governments to our people … has been kept or performed, but on the contrary, each and every one as set forth in this memorial, has been ruthlessly and revengefully violated and trampled upon.”589 To the contrary, the Canadian government had in fact agreed and implemented most of the Rights agreed to during the formal negotiations regarding Manitoba —its entry into Confederation, its guarantee of a legislature, its people’s right to the franchise, and its representation in the federal parliament contradict Riel’s statement. Then, quite shamefully, Riel, acting “upon the highest principles of civil and religious liberty,” asked for the support of the

United States against Manitoba’s “coerced” entry into Canada “in the name of justice.”590

Grant elected not to interfere, but that did not end Riel’s complaining. Writing to Alexander

Morris in March 1873, Riel against puts his case regarding the amnesty:

Cette condition, nos Délégués la posèrent comme sine [qua] non. Sir John et Sir George l’acceptèrent. Ma[is] [nos] délégués demandèrent des guaranties. Les de[ux] [ministres] répondirent que cette condition était guar[antie] [avec] une grande force par le fait même qu’[une] [entente] amicale avait lieu entre le Canada e[t] le [Nord’]ouest. Les délégués répliquèrent qu’ils avaient […] besoin là-dessus de données irrécusables pour [la] [satis]faction de ceux dont itls défendaient les intérets (sic). Sir John et Sir George n’hésitèrent pas à dire que sur cette question, ils étaient en mesure de rassurer la déléguation. On procéda à la composition du Bill de Manitoba.591

[Concerning this condition, our delegates held it as a sine qua non. Sir John and Sir George accepted it. But, our delegates demanded assurances. The two ministers responded that this condition was surely guaranteed by means of the friendly entente that had taken place between Canada and the North-West. The delegates responded that they needed this in writing in order to satisfy those whose interests they defended. Sir John and Sir George did not hesitate that on this question they could assure the delegates. They then proceeded to compose the Manitoba Act.]592

589 Ibid., pp. 116-117. 590 Ibid., p. 117. 591 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Lettre à Alexander Morris,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-157. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 235. This text is a draft of a polished version of Riel’s letter (1-158). I chose this version because as the first draft, I believe it expresses Riel’s initial and closest thoughts on the issue. Cf. 1-158. 592 My translation. 152

As with the letter to Grant, Riel was convinced—in his mind—that the negotiations over Manitoba were only possible once the amnesty had been accepted. Further, he believed that Macdonald and

Cartier had given the delegates that guarantee. One also gets the distinct sense that Riel saw the lack of immunity as more than a dishonest political trick played by the Canadians: it was treason against his people. Despite the fact that at no point was the amnesty granted in formal writing to the delegates of Red River, Riel was convinced there was a deal and that in breaking it, Canada had harmed the people of the territory.

I think one can interpret Riel’s falsifications in this letter in two ways. The first may be an over-exaggeration for effect or a genuine misunderstanding of the relationship between Canada and Manitoba in terms of the Métis Bill of Rights. The second is that Riel was so enraged that he did not receive the amnesty that he confused this slight for the total violation of the rights of his people. This second interpretation is more in line with the evidence. Riel thought that negotiation was only possible if the amnesty was granted, as if no other political guarantees could matter. He also believed he was divinely ordained to lead the Provisional Government at Red River. In short,

Riel’s profile shows a man often unable to disentangle his own interests from those of his people.593

So, when the Canadian government did not give him the pardon he wanted, he viewed the entire contract between Ottawa and Red River as a coercive lie. One can see Riel viewing himself as a martyr; unlike most martyrs, he was that cause rather than sacrificing himself for a cause above himself. As Flanagan notes, Riel saw the lack of pardon as a double-cross by his enemies, since he believed his own motives were upright and for the sake of his people.594

593 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 36. 594 Cf. ibid. 153

During the winter of 1872-73, Riel’s sister became sick, and it seemed that she would die.

However, through what Riel saw as the power of prayer, his sister recovered from her chest ailment, which the local bishop recorded as a genuine miracle. 595 Then, in 1873, with the

Provencher seat open, Riel ran and won, while Canadians who attained a warrant for his arrest over the Scott affair dogged him.596 Stressed, exhausted, and “toying” with the idea of taking up his seat in Parliament, Riel travelled to Quebec.597 While there, Riel met with Bishop Bourget at the Hôtel-Dieu at Montreal.598 He begged that the Bishop heal him of all of his stresses and strains;

Bourget blessed Riel, and the latter was convinced that the former had miraculously restored him from his “prostration” and “complete exhaustion.”599 In fact, it was Bourget who convinced Riel that he had “mission in life,” and his ideas would have a tremendous effect on Riel’s character— but we will deal with this idea in a later chapter.600

When one looks at Riel’s poetry during this period, it is evident that he was stressed, tired, and grappling with the tension between faith and his political past. The following is a useful example, written sometime between 1871 and 1873, years after the Resistance:

Si je suis infiniment bon Si je suis Dieu, celui que j’ai fait du limon De la terre et que j’ai fait avec la boue, Qui de mon bon plaisir, impudemment se joue, A-t-il quelque raison de gouverner pour moi De définir ma loi D’abattre mes ministres Que je choisis pour l’expliquer. L’homme insensé veut m’indiquer Le sens de mes décrets ou bien il les rejette Il croit à la vérité

595 Ibid., p. 40. 596 Ibid., p. 43. 597 Cf. Ibid. 598 Ibid., p. 44. 599 Ibid. 600 Stanley, Riel, p. 216; In Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 61, the author writes that Bourget was Riel’s “patron and protector.” 154

De la souveraineté Mais ne veut pas de moi pour maître. L’homme ne peut me jouer, il s’exerce à me soumettre. Le laisser s’emporter selon tous ses désirs, Quel plan viendra-t-il mettre A la place du mien Et si je consentais un jour à me soumettre Que ferait-il? Quel but chercherait-il alors? Une tour de Babel? Sur quels fermes ressorts Poserait-il son pied pour dire à la nature agis, je te commande. et quand son âme pure Voudrait s’échapper de son corps Où la conduirait-il? Et de sa triste dépouille En tombant aujourd’hui, de main par sa vertu Ressusciterait-elle? Où son être abattu Peut-il se retrouver? Sur la terre qu’il souille Quelle ordre constituerait-il? Pour remplacer ma Providence? L’homme deviendrait Dieu, l’homme avec sa démence. Ses pauvres; ses richards; ses guerriers, ses malades Avec ses affligés.601

[If I am infinitely good, If I am God, the one whom I have made from The dust of the Earth, have made from mud, Who impudently mocks my good will Does he have any reasons to govern in my place, To define my law, to overthrow my ministers? The foolish man wants to tell me The meaning of my every decree Otherwise he rejects them. Whom I have chosen to interpret it, He believes in sovereignty.

But he does not want Me as master. Man cannot play me, he will submit or suffer disaster.

Let him take then as his desires A plan to replace my rules entire. And what would he do if one day I gave in, What would he do if nothing were a sin? Would he make a new Babel? And on what firm ground Would he stand to tell nature to obey his every sound? But when his pure soul escapes his body, where would it go?

601 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Si je suis infiniment bon…,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 4-047. Edited by Glen Campbell (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 99. 155

And his sad remains, could his virtuous hand make them grow Or rise from the dead? Can he recover his defeated self? On the land he defiles, can he make laws himself? He would replace my providence and gladness? This man becomes like God, this man of madness. These poor men, these fools, these men who fought, These patients, sick with the diseases they wrought.]602

This poem was written from the perspective of God. The first half is shot-through with uncertainly and questioning: the idea that if He is infinitely good and if He is in fact God. The speaker laments over those who appear to be powerful beings on Earth—perhaps political leaders. They believe in truth and in sovereignty, but they do not want Him to be their master. In fact, they would dare tell

Him the meaning of His laws. Even though He fashioned the world from the beginning with rough materials, people seem indifferent towards this infinitely good creator.

Then, the poem’s tone takes a decisive shift. The speaker says that mankind cannot play him; they are created to submit to Him. They can do whatever they want, but if He chose to intervene, their works would be as ruinous as it was for those who built Babel. Next, He asks rhetorically what these people shall do with their souls once they have died. He says that they might try to replace His providence but they cannot. They might think themselves to be God, but it is the consequence of a mental sickness on their part. This section of the poem depicts a defiant and confident God; a God certain of his omnipotence if uncertain of his infinite goodness.

I think this illustrates Riel’s thoughts and emotions in this period after the Resistance.

Moved by divine providence, he was the creator—in part—of a Provisional Government that sought to redress the evils of anarchy and a lack of recognition and respect from fellow English colonies. However, he finds himself driven out of that territory immediately after his government

602 My translation. 156 was able to secure the people a legal place within Canada. One can see Riel wondering why he has been abandoned if he was the father of that land and if his objectives were pure. Although he and the government drafted a Bill of Rights and demanded amnesty, and Sir John and Sir Georges seemed willing to accept the government’s demands as legal, they did not follow through with their obedience. They went back on their word.603

The second section of the poem, then, previsions Riel’s response to his current circumstance. Fusing himself with God poetically, he believed that he was graced with the power to secure the full rights of the Métis. His earlier letters suggested that he felt that the Canadian government had lied to his delegates and that every pledge to his people had been violated.

However, if he were to exert his full force, he could decimate what Manitoba had become. Ottawa might think they can get along without dealing with Riel, but they are fooling themselves.

Eventually a day of reckoning would come, and Riel would show everyone how wrong their thinking was.

One finds some initial corroboration for this second point when, inspired by Bourget and armed with a mission to liberate the Métis of the Canadian prairies, Riel visited Washington,

DC.604 While there, he hoped to win the support of influential American politicians. He secured a meeting with President Grant, who again showed little interest in Riel’s plans.605 So, by this point,

Riel had to flee from his homeland, saw his sister miraculously healed from a serious illness, had

603 Poetry can be tricky to interpret. Formal poetry written to be published singly or in an anthology can be interpreted in various ways. For example, T.S. Eliot—an influential twentieth-century literary critic—wrote in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” that a “poet’s mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite form a new compound are present together” (p. 2323). In other words, poems are the robotic output of a poet who is a machine to make poetry. The poems that I review in this inquiry were not written by Riel for formal acceptance and recognition. As such, I interpret these poems as if they are outlets that provide insight into what Riel was thinking when he composed them. In that they are poems, one must allow for some literary flourish and exaggeration, but nonetheless, I contend they are useful texts in an effort to grasp the nature of Riel’s thoughts. 604 Stanley, Riel, p. 217. 605 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 54. 157 become inculcated in religious and persuasive advice from Bourget, and failed to secure support for his mission in the Canadian West.

Now Riel’s religious transformation began. While still at Washington, on 8 December

1875, he had a “mystical illumination,” in which he communed with God, who told Riel he was

His “prophet of the new world.”606 Shortly thereafter, atop a mountain, Riel saw the spirit of

God.607 The Lord said to him: “you have a mission to accomplish for the benefit of humanity.”608

Riel took his appointment seriously—as one would, considering the source—and from then on, he declared himself to be a king, a prophet, and the infallible pontiff of the new world.609 In the next chapter, I take up the effects of Riel’s religious prophecy that began in earnest after this revelation. What matters at this point is that he was willing to accept, as he had at Red River, the idea that God had a special role for him to play. He was not simply fighting for the political rights of his people; he was a man with holier intentions.

3.4. Early Riel and Statesmanship

The preceding three sections provided an interpretation of Riel’s political ideas and leadership before, during, and after the Red River Resistance. In this portion of the inquiry, I examine whether these moments lend themselves to our ideas of statesmanship. As with the review of Macdonald, the three areas of interest are Riel’s approach to human nature, psychology, and idealism in politics. Unlike Macdonald though, the Riel of this era more closely reflected “transformational” statesmanship rather than “transactional”—even though traces of the latter are discernible.

606 Ibid., p. 56. 607 Ibid., p. 57. 608 Ibid. 609 Ibid., p. 82. 158

We begin with Riel’s treatment of human nature. Riel’s interaction with Thomas Scott showed him as a leader who believed in the perfectibility of men. He was aware that Scott was an

Orangeman, terribly bigoted, violent, and contemptuous towards the Métis. Nevertheless, Riel, as a leader of the Provisional Government that Scott sought to sabotage, thought that he could visit

Scott and try to change his character from unpleasant to “congenial.” Of course, this was ineffective. Riel confirms Burns’s thought that certain leaders want to make people capable of more than they can be. These transforming leaders, for Burns, think they are strong enough to lift up people from their current circumstances for the sake of the higher purposes for which they are called. While transactional statesmen simply take people as they are, Riel took was unwilling to accept that Scott was irredeemably lost to those baser qualities.

Further, his approach to Scott reflects Mannheim’s theory of leadership. For Mannheim, the utopian leader cannot accept people who are contributing to the idea that the world around the leader is incommensurate with his vision; he must remake people in order to effectuate the change he wants. To be sure, Scott’s violence and intolerance was a threat to the stable and peaceful image the Provisional Government needed to project if it was to be taken seriously by Canadian officials in regard to negotiating terms for entry into Confederation. Someone who believed human nature was improvable would be unlikely to visit the jail cell of Scott since there would be little hope of convincing him to give up the prejudices that animated him so fiercely. In visiting him and hoping to reason with him, Riel stands as a figure attempting to modify someone’s nature whose actions endangered the Government’s image. He seemed sure that rational argument would change Scott’s mind, even though there was much evidence to show that was a lost cause. It suggests wistfulness about human nature in the manner described by Mannheim and Burns that we have designated as belonging to transformational statesmanship. 159

Additionally, Riel’s general view of his people provides an example of his approach to human nature. In the 8 December Declaration, one finds the Métis as docile, loyal people whose current political actions only stemmed from being abandoned. The logic of Riel’s argument depends on its readers believing that if the HBC had not relinquished its authority, the people at

Red River would still be faithful subjects of their rule. The same need for humility and faith from the Métis comes across when Riel wrote his Proclamation to the People. There, he claimed that the credit for his coming into leadership belonged to both divine aid and the support of his compatriots. Their cause was not one of arrogance or heresy, rather, one taken up only because their government deserted them. This was of course in line with what devout theorists such as Du

Voisin and Barclay posited. To take this position has to mean that the Métis had to be earnest and loyal enough people to receive God’s guidance. Further still, his interpretation of the negotiat ions at Ottawa over the Manitoba Act portrayed the delegates of Red River as honest brokers who fought passionately for the demands of their people. In other words, they were hard-working and kept faith with their constituents. This was set in juxtaposition to Macdonald and Cartier, who are painted as men willing to lie and deceive in order to gain political control of the territory. Riel thought and said—directly and indirectly—he was defending a people who were humble, passive, and loyal by nature. There is a profound sense of goodness in his characterization of the Métis.

One can compare this view with Sowell. For him, leaders with an anointed vision convince themselves that, under the right circumstances, their people can maximize their magnanimous and generous nature for a moral cause. These leaders, as we argued in Chapter 1, are transformational statesmen. In Riel’s assertion about the patient endurance, religious blessedness, and loyalty of his people, he indicated that his people were generous and fair. In his “Letter to the Inhabitants of the

North-West,” he wrote that the Provisional Government was willing to negotiate business terms 160 with HBC, the company which had ignored and violated the rights of his people. In his interpretation of the Ottawa negotiations, his vision was of a Métis people who were magnanimous enough to deal on even terms with a country in Canada who had been willing to ignore their rights as fellow British subjects. And, it was Riel’s leadership over them that helped the Métis be this good type of people. Further, they were even agreeable to accept their authority over the territory if certain conditions could be met. His vision of the Métis depends in part on a belief in their natural goodness, humbleness, and charitableness that Riel would help them maximize. This matches

Sowell’s concept of anointed vision.

However, while aspects of Riel’s thinking on human nature situate him in the transformational camp, he does not fit the description perfectly. Transformational statesmen, following Michels, believe in human perfection. Following Lord Russell, these leaders seek out a final human nature, one conducive to perpetual happiness and equality. Talmon suggested that totalitarian leaders want to refashion the human condition according to the maxims of its own inherent goodness. Early Riel cannot be said to be as totalistic in his approach to human nature as a transformational statesman might be. While he does idealize a vision of the Métis, the purpose of his Provisional Government was not to create a new Garden of Eden. To the contrary, its goal was to defend the English rights of his people, namely rights of representation, of linguistic protection, physical protection, and access to important political institutions. These rights refer to a politics where people disagree about the ends of life and the best way to live. These sorts of debates are rendered unneeded when human nature tends towards perfection. Furthermore, Riel’s government was always supposed to be transitory, a body that emerged to fill the power vacuum left by HBC and that would labour on behalf of the people of North-West to protect their rights as subjects of the Crown; in this case, that meant entering into serious negotiations with Canada. The 161

Red River Resistance was not an effort in reprogramming or reeducating the settlers of the area, rather, it was about dealing with the practical problems that appear when a people finds themselves on the precipice of a state of nature. To a degree, some of Riel’s statesmanship was transactional in this period.

Next, I want to review early Riel vis-à-vis his political and personal psychology. Riel’s emotionality in the aftermath of the Resistance is telling. He was mentally exhausted, beset with significant stress, and open to religious mysticism while composing dark and brooding poetry.

Within the poem “Si je suis infiniment bon,” we saw that Riel sought to escape the world around him by envisioning himself as God and the people who he once led as if they were his artifices over which he had control. Further yet, this section of Riel’s life concluded with his receptiveness to the idea that God gave him a holy charge.

Immediately, one can see the applicability of Jung’s work. He argued that all leaders face emotional turmoil, and unfortunately some leaders are not strong enough to rise above these issues; instead, they become consumed by them. Riel, in asking for spiritual blessing, in picturing himself as God, and by believing that He had spoken to him certainly appears as a leader embroiled in mental stress and psychodrama. Moreover, Michels contended that leaders—the likes of which I call transformational—at times crumble under the pressure of politics. Finally, James provided a typology of tender-minded leaders who were prone to religiosity, mysticism, and dogma—these leaders fit within the concept of transformational statesmanship. While I would not state that Riel’s mental condition was unraveling in the period after the Resistance, the case evidence shows that he certainly wrestled with psychological strain and waded further into religiosity at that time. If anything, it contributed towards a psychological disposition in Riel towards religious doctrine, 162 considering the ideas that underpinned the Declaration and his belief that God had a hand in him leading the Provisional Government.

Another aspect of psychology I want to consider is early Riel’s tendency towards a belief in the purity of his motives and victimology. At the onset of the Resistance, Riel encouraged the people to use physical violence to repel Canadian authority and said that the blood of the first fallen man would be splattered on a handkerchief and serve as their flag. However, those who opposed the Resistance, the Proclamation stated, were to be forgiven for their mistake if they were to stop now; they had been “led astray.” Those who would persist in their opposition, however, would be crushed. This is emblematic of someone who believed his motivation was just; those who disagreed had been deceived would receive mercy, but those who did not recant clearly intended to do harm to the stability and peace of Red River.

One sees this trend even more powerfully in Riel’s letters and complaints about the practical outcome of the Manitoba negotiations. Riel was convinced he was supposed to have immunity for all his actions taken during the Resistance because Macdonald and Cartier had promised such a thing. Riel said that the negotiations were organized in such a way that the only way that the loyal delegates of Red River would have entertained any discussions was if the genera l amnesty was accepted. The fact that Canada gave no such amnesty and that Riel had to flee from the territory meant that he had been wronged. The letters contain no regret for his decision to slay

Scott in cold blood without a trial. The letters do not demonstrate contrition for using intimidation and thuggish behaviour when forcing the HBC out of Fort Garry or robbing their coffers. Riel had done some awful things during the Resistance for which he needed the amnesty. But instead of trying to make the case for the necessity of his actions in conjunction with an apology for the cruel and indecent things he did, Riel turned inward. As far as he was concerned, he and his people were 163 victims of a deceptive Canadian government that broke every oath sworn and promise made. Now, one can state that Cartier may have gone back on his word to provide an amnesty, but it would be erroneous to say that Manitoba was the consequence of lying and backstabbing at every turn. This is the disposition of a martyr, of someone desirous to play the victim without accepting any responsibility himself.

In this respect, Riel matches Talmon’s insight about leaders who seek after grand political transformation. He noted that these people tend towards victimhood and self-pity. Those who see politics as merely one part of life do not succumb to emotional episodes where they believe that any rejection of what they want is tantamount to a rejection and hatred of them. Those who have a more totalizing view of politics, and therefore believe that theirs is a special mission, fall prey to seeing their opponents as mortal enemies, and any movement against them as treacherous and villainous. Riel’s position vis-à-vis the amnesty clearly depicts a man who believed in the purity of what he and the settlers were doing at Red River, and saw the denial of the amnesty as an assault against him and his people.

The third area of statesmanship I wish to work through revolves around idealism in politics.

Transformational statesmen are idealistic, whereas transactional statesmen take the messiness of politics as a given. The first area worth considering is the political thought at the core of the 8

December Declaration. Despite its appearances, the ideas that animate it were not the liberal ones of freedom, equality, and representation. Rather, Riel proposed a theory of government where sovereignty is both indivisible and finds its origins in God. Consequentially, people have no right to rebel against government because they find it either unsatisfactory or antithetical to their freedom, but only when it produces a power vacuum through abdication or selling the territory. 164

The liberal notion of government based on the consent of the governed means that human beings will have to use their reason and negotiate amongst themselves how best to preserve their freedom and their property. While their right to do so emanates from nature and the Creator, there is no perfect way to construct a government; there may be moments when people choose to remove their consent and dissolve the government that they made.

Riel’s approach does not leave this sort of latitude for discussion and debate. He envisioned that the form of government itself that one finds oneself under comes finds its origins in God, and like God, rebellion against it is unacceptable. Instead, subjects are to be loyal and endure the government, regardless of how it treats them. Only under extreme circumstances, when one’s government has morphed into a tyrant, or if they have left the people without a governme nt are the subjects allowed to make a new government. Government, then, is not the work of reason and neither is the decision to form or reform it. For Riel, government is the work of divine authority, and any reformation of government comes when those in power have absconded. Riel’s vision of government was an idealized, religious entity—one quite far away from the hurly burly of debate and political negotiation that undergird liberal democracies.

This concept of government meshes with transformational statesmanship in two ways.

First, it highlights James’s argument about the tender-minded. These are people who give into dogma and mysticism rather than try to understand the world from empirical evidence and practical experience. By using Barclay and Du Voisin as he did, Riel proposed a theory of government that depended on religious origins of the state and an understanding of the people under government as obedient and submissive to its power just as they are supposed to act towards the Almighty.

Second, Riel connects to Ostrogorski’s point that contrary to strong leaders, those who fit within the transformational camp fail to recognize that political power stems from a leader’s ability to 165 retain a positive relationship with the people; those that lose sight of this find their grip on power tenuous. Inasmuch as Riel thought that the origins of political power are mystical and cited theorists who argued that a leader can essentially be as abusive as he wants towards his people so long as he does not fit the narrow idea of “tyrant,” he premised his thoughts on government on unstable ground.

However, Riel’s indirect use of Barclay and direct use of Du Voisin also highlights a degree of transactional statesmanship. Following Weber’s model, Riel’s use of Catholic thought on the religious and legal rights of rebellion resemble a resort to both traditional and legal forms of authority. The Métis were not justified to follow Riel during the Resistance merely because of his charisma. Instead, the Provisional Government was just because when the HBC abandoned Red

River, they left a void where both common law and Catholic political theory permitted Riel’s solution to emerge. Again, while Riel’s psychological disposition during the Resistance often fits within the transformational statesmanship typology, sometimes he can be understood through the transactional lens.

Riel’s treatment of Scott also portrays a high level of idealism in his politics. Whereas transactional statesmen do not allow politics to cloud the entirety of life, transformational statesmen are usually unable to disassociate the two; everything becomes political. His decision to kill Scott was in part a message to the Canadian government to show just how strong the

Provisional Government was. It was, for Riel, a symbol that would garner Ottawa’s respect. He treated a human life the way a chess player sacrifices a pawn in trying to set up his attack. Scott was important only inasmuch as Riel could use him for a political purpose.

In this, Riel connects to insights from Talmon and Jaffa. Talmon said that the authoritarian democrat is convulsed in politics, and that there is no life for him away from them. Riel’s callous 166 use of Scott as a symbol certainly appears like that. Further, Jaffa claimed that the sorts of statesmen that I call transformational do not see all humans are equal and free beings. Instead, they approach some people as if they were test subjects to be used in an experiment, and therefore regard themselves as intrinsically better. Anybody who slaughters a man because that person’s death will be good for his political movement does not see their victim as equal to himself. Instead, he sees himself as someone important enough to decide whether the other man dies, and that his own aspirations matter more than the life of that victim. Transactional statesman use bold but measured political violence for the sake of their cause. Transformational statesmen tend to use physical force to excess. Such was Riel’s statesmanship at Red River with when it came to the treatment of Scott, as well as his notions about the blood-soaked pennant and theft of the HBC.610

At every stage of Riel’s politics that we reviewed in this Chapter, there is an appreciation for violence and a willingness to use it for the sake of gain. It would be fair to surmise that Riel idealized force as a political tool.

Riel’s protestations against the Canadian government vis-à-vis the amnesty are also useful in considering his proximity to idealism in politics. It appears that Riel was too trusting of a verbal promise from career politicians. His letters stress the idea that he saw that promise as a pact between Canada and the people of Red River; when it was broken, so too was their agreement.

One way to interpret this is that Riel was not in touch with reality. Throughout English Canada, people were clamouring for justice against Riel; the political pressures on the government from a vote-rich segment of the Canadian electorate would be impossible to ignore. Given that the

Canadian government yielded on almost every one of the points in the Bill of Rights, Riel did not anticipate that Ottawa would draw any hard lines against the demands of Red River.

610 See Stanley, Riel, pp. 94-95. Stanley showed Riel as a political bully and dictator in this period. 167

Further, Riel seemed incredulous that someone like Cartier who was a career politician and lawyer would ever break his word. Or, if he did, he did not seem to grasp that at times it is necessary and even good to break one’s word. When the government gave the delegates verbal assurances— assurances they could not follow through with—this opened up the discussions that resulted in most of the demands of Red River being met, and the creation of Manitoba. The end of pacifying the resistance in the North-West was worth the lie. It allowed the negotiations to happen without infuriating the English Canadians that they would have by fulfilling the commitment. Riel seemed unprepared for the Canadian government to be Machiavellian; he assumed the cause of the settlers was so obviously good that the Canadians would recognize it and accept all their demands.

In this, Riel fits in with the statesmanship literature in two ways. First, Pareto noted that the order of things is strong in the realm of political power, and that élites will do any number of things to retain their positions. The logical corollary would be that leaders grounded in reality and pragmatic politics would appreciate this and attempt to work within the system, whereas idealistic leaders will deny the permanence of these power structures and will not resign themselves to operate within them. Riel’s naiveté—or “contempt for hard facts” to use a term of Burns—towards the Canadians represents this sort of idealistic political thinking. Instead of considering the difficulties that attended to the politicians in Ottawa, Riel seemed to possess a trust in the

Canadians to simply “do the right thing.” Politicians are just as apt to doing what is expedient or effectual than what some consider “just.”

Second, Riel connects to Russell’s notion that pragmatic leaders approach disputes with a belief in their own fallibility, while others are more idealist and have not thought about whether they might be wrong. Riel was convinced that the Provisional Government had providential backing; it had effectively brought harmony to the territory; and had drawn up a list of reasonable 168 demands from the Canadians. His lack of remorse or explanation over the crimes he committed shows that he probably did not think he had done anything worth regretting. Yes, an amnesty was needed for legal protection, but he did not need absolution, since he acted for the sake of a greater good. This sort of single-mindedness was anticipated in the Proclamation where Riel’s government distinguished between those who now supported the government and those recalcitrant few who did not. The idea that some had been “led astray” meant that he believed his cause was the just one, and any opposition was misguided. There is a difference between believing in the rightness of one’s cause and being unwilling to admit that there is a chance that one might be wrong about some aspect of that cause. Certain leaders are capable of that sort of nimbleness, while other leaders are too idealistic. Riel appears in the second camp.

Yet, Riel’s actions before 1875 cannot be totally called “transformative.” Riel had the foresight to appreciate the people’s complaints about the transition of government were substantive; they were not even being consulted on the matter. In this he demonstrated the

“statesman’s presumption” in the way Mansfield described it. Moreover, he used force boldly for the people’s sake by driving MacDougall out of the territory. The objective was to prevent

MacDougall from asserting his authority as granted by the Queen, and thus, keeping the people of

Red River from being in rebellion against the Crown. If the goal was the restoration of their rights as English subjects, Riel could not allow the people to show disloyalty to the very Crown whose rights they sought. This reflects Michels’s bold, directive leadership that helps to make up the model of transactional statesmanship. Furthermore, Riel was in fact able to produce relative stability in the colony, encouraged greater public participation in the Council of Forty, and his delegates were able to secure a place for his people in Confederation with the Manitoba Act. This somewhat cynical portrait appears much like the transactional president sketched out by Burns 169 where one tries to earn concessions from the other side while bolstering political power. It also resembles Ostrogorski’s idea that practical leaders are able to execute political “master strokes” that inspire the people around them to support the mission. Riel was able to get support behind the

Provisional Government and the quest to bring his people into Confederation; his efforts were successful enough to convince the Canadians to grant provincial status to the Red River colony.

Riel, as a political leader, was able to summon up aspects of transactional statesmanship during the Resistance.

Another element of Riel as a transactional statesman comes from pushing Red River into obtaining provincial status. To be sure, many living in the region doubted whether there were enough resources and people to sustain a province.611 Despite these limitations, Riel insisted that provincial status was necessary, since it would provide a stronger government that could preserve the rights of the residents and control public lands.612 English representatives in the Provisional

Government were initially successful in preventing Red River from demanding that it become a province, but Riel believed in the necessity of the cause and did not surrender his position. He shouted at the Convention that his view needed to win since it was the will of the Métis people; regardless of how the vote on the issue worked out, the territory had to become a province.613 He exclaimed that when he said that this matter needed to be carried, he meant that “it will be carried[, i]f not by you here, then by the Métis people alone. Do not forget that the Métis provisional government is already in place, and if this convention does not act to protect our rights, then my government will do it regardless.”614 In the end, Riel was persuasive enough in that the Red River delegates did demand provincial status, and moreover, they won that concession. Despite the fears

611 Dan Asfar and Tim Chodan, Louis Riel (Edmonton, AB: Folklore Publishing, 2003), p. 72. 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid., p. 74. 614 Ibid. 170 of some, Riel had what Mansfield calls the foresight of the statesman—he could see past the petty complaints of the people. He knew what needed to be done, and was willing to engage in bold statecraft to make it a reality. These are marks of transactional statesmanship, not because he succeeded, but because the thought processes and actions fit that model.

It is here that I wish to return to O’Toole’s point about republicanism at Red River. As the focus of this inquiry is on Riel, I will limit my discussion of his argument to direct references to my subject. Now in general O’Toole posits that there was present in Red River a republican discourse and rhetoric before and during the Resistance. He claims that Riel took up the “classical republican metaphor of the master/slave relation” in regard to executive power and arbitra ry tyranny.615 He feared Governor McDougall as the “master or King” of the Métis, and that the people would exercise their rights during the Resistance to avoid such tyranny.616 Further, O’Toole notes that Riel “evoked the autonomy/heteronomy dichotomy” of republican thought when he pleaded with the people of Red River not to wait and fight for their rights once an alien force already had taken control of the territory.617 Furthermore, other writings of Riel show that he felt the people would have to decide between being slaves or free, and he held to “unmistakably” republican ideals when he claimed that self-government was an unalienable right and a sacred principle.618

To be sure, the quotations that O’Toole uses are accurate; I would agree that Riel did say these things. As a consequence, this point might challenge my interpretation of Riel being an admixture of transactional and transformational statesmanship. If it was true that Riel approached the crisis of power that provoked the Resistance in classically republican ways, and if his

615 O’Toole, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 179. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid. 618 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 171 understanding of the event was as theoretical and principled as O’Toole claims, then Riel was mostly transformational during this period. He would be mainly a transformational statesman because of his adherence to idealism in politics, and a psychological disposition to see the conflict as an ultimate “us versus them” clash that would result in the Métis becoming slaves or remaining free.

I find O’Toole’s argument unconvincing. Riel’s “use” of the republican dialectics of master/slave and autonomy/heteronomy is exaggerated. Certainly, Riel appeared to understand the conflict between the Canadian takeover of the territory as an oppressive force and wanted his people to have some say over their governance. However, at the heart of Riel’s arguments during the Resistance was the proposition that the settlers remain loyal and pledged to the British Crown.

Now the master/slave dialectic, given its most famous formulation by G.W.F. Hegel,619 centres on the idea that the slave only wants recognition and humanity, whereas the master can provide neither and remain a real master. A master is more miserable than the slave because he can never be truly human inasmuch as he cannot recognize his own humanity, but rather is dependent on other consciousnesses. 620 Furthermore, the purpose of the dialectic is for this relationship to be overcome, so that the conflict gives way to the slaves discovering who they are by themselves.621

Riel’s thoughts on McDougall simply do not reflect this dialectic in my view. Riel had said they would in fact accept the Governor once their rights as Englishmen were respected. Their uprising was not premised on a long-standing feud between their governors (HBC) and themselves, but rather, only that the HBC forgot about them when negotiating the sale of the land to Canada.

A master needs the slave in order to be who he is, Canada’s actions were not those of antagonism

619 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), Section B, Chapter IV-A, pp. 111-119. 620 Ibid., p. 116. 621 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 172 against the Métis people, but rather, of omission and indifference. The master in the dialectic ceases to be without his slave, but McDougall was arriving to “enslave” the people in this metaphor; he was not yet a master, which makes the dialectic a faulty one to use. Furthermore,

Riel’s application of Catholic political theory suggested that he was uninterested in a political relationship of mutual recognition between those in and out of power; he and his people would have peacefully endured the rule of the HBC for as long as it lasted. Nowhere in those texts can one see burgeoning master/slave dialectics; rather, one sees a theory of politics where those who are governed are morally responsible to obey as long as those with authority do not abandon them or cede it to some alien power. Riel did not want the Métis to overcome the master/slave relationship; he was happy with such a relationship both with the HBC and the Canadian

Government—in the latter case, after a few concessions had been won. On Riel’s account of things, the Métis still know themselves through their obedience, whether it be to the HBC or the British

Crown.

Second, the republican distinction of autonomy and heteronomy also does not work in trying to understand Riel. In republican thought, autonomy means that the power to act, the laws that are made, and the will to be followed finds its origins interiorly. Conversely, heteronomy means that such influences come from the outside. To be sure, republican theory, such as in

Rousseau’s Social Contract,622 favours autonomy. Let the following citation stand for many:

Now the Sovereign, since it is entirely of the individuals who make it up, has not and cannot have any interests contrary to theirs; consequently the Sovereign power has no need of a guarantor toward the subjects, because it is impossible for the body to want to harm all of its members, and we shall see later that it cannot harm any one of them in particular. The Sovereign, by the mere fact that it is, is always everything it ought to be.623

622 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Edited by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp. 39-152. 623 Ibid., book I, chapter 7, p. 52. 173

Rousseau’s sovereign is an ideal power constructed by the person, who acts politically according to everyone’s will. Its interests originate within the people themselves, no outside or heteronomous force compels the sovereign to act.

If it is the case, as it surely is, that republican principles emphasize autonomy, then Riel’s thinking was not truly republican. The impetus for his call to action in the Resistance was heteronomy—the HBC giving their authority over Red River to the Canadian Government. The desire of the Métis people for self-government did not originate in their frustrations of not having this, but from their anger of being abandoned by a legitimate power. Moreover, Riel followed

Barclay and du Voisin in believing people had no right to rebel against their governors unless they engaged in a curious form of tyranny. Riel held with them a heteronomous stance towards rebellion; the political thought he espoused made it clear that the impetus ought to come from an outside force, not within the people.

O’Toole’s work is to be admired as an honest attempt to make sense of the Métis at Red

River within a philosophical tradition. However, his arguments about Riel’s “republicanism” do not pass muster based on the case evidence. Therefore, my inquiry can avoid the conclusion that would arise from O’Toole’s work if he were correct. Instead of republicanism, I contend that Riel should be read as a predominantly transformational statesman during the 1869-1870 period. While it may be plausible that republicanism influenced certain settlers at Red River between 1830 and

1870, such was not the case for Riel.

What is one to make of early Riel? His actions and thoughts before, during, and after the

Red River Resistance indicate he was an important leader. Specifically, we can interpret Riel during this period as someone who fits broadly within the typology of transformational statesmanship. However, he does not belong there nearly as squarely as Macdonald did as a 174 transactional statesman. Elements of Riel’s leadership during this time period suggest that rather than an idealistic man who seemed out of place in the world, he was able to marshal his wit, persuasiveness, passion, and political skill to defend his people and bring them into Confederation.

The designation at the beginning of this chapter, “a Father of Confederation,” seems well- deserved. He was, to a great extent, a transformational statesman during this period, with elements of transactional statesmanship mixed in. In the next chapter, I review the ideas and the actions of

Louis Riel in the last ten years of his life and determine whether and to what degree the form of his statesmanship changed.

175

CHAPTER 4

LOUIS RIEL, PART TWO

Few people experience something so dislocating that it changes their identity. When it happens, it is frequently religious. Obvious examples are Saul of Tarsus, Augustine, and Joseph Smith.

Whether one believes that these men truly had a religious experience, all evidence suggests they believe that they had one. When one has such a revelation, it alters one’s life; nothing will ever be the same again.

Louis Riel had this experience. As this is not an inquiry in theology proper, I am uninterested in arguing whether Riel communed with God or whether he wanted to experience

God so badly he made himself believe that he had. I want to review how Riel, after his transformation, thought and acted in political life. The new Paul saw his mission to preach the good news throughout the world. Augustine became a bishop and took up his pen to defend

Christianity. Joseph Smith founded a new denomination on his discoveries of a new gospel. Riel, like them, pursued a heavenly mission too. His charge was the salvation of the Métis of the North-

West. In this chapter, I investigate Riel in the period before and during the 1885 Rebellion. Then,

I consider whether and how Riel ought to be considered a statesman. The evidence will show that we can interpret Riel squarely as a transformational statesman, unmixed with the transactional elements discovered in Chapter 2.

4.1. Riel Prior to the Rebellion

In December 1875, Riel travelled to Washington, DC. In part, he made the trip in the hopes of meeting President Grant directly, to whom he wrote the letter that I cited in Chapter 3. But Grant 176 had no interest in Riel’s mission to salvage the Canadian West.624 On 8 December, Riel ascended a hill near Washington where he reported seeing the spirit of God.625 The Lord told him that “you have a mission to accomplish for the benefit of humanity,” and given the source, he took the appointment seriously.626 From then on, Riel styled himself as a king, a prophet, and infallible pontiff of the new world.627

In the brief period before Riel’s religious inspiration, he spent time with Bishop Bourget at Montreal. While there, he was exposed to a radical intellectual tradition: Ultramontanism. His exposure to these ideas—ideas that had support in Quebec—helps to explain why Riel may have taken to his divine charge. Most of us, if we were met by a vision of God, would question whether we were dreaming. But Riel was open to the experience, and in part, I think that came from his dealings with Ultramontane thought inasmuch as he gave up the vestiges of liberalism and royalism of his former life.

Ultramontanism came from France, and was associated with the struggle between the King and Pope for control over the Catholic Church.628As the word suggests, the Ultras looked beyond

France to Rome for their guidance.629 In Quebec, the Ultras ardently supported papal supremacy over the Catholic Church, while they were fierce French-Canadian nationalists at the same time. 630

They bristled against the Canadian state because it was overrun with English Protestants; by fighting English Canada, Ultras hoped to prevent the secularization of Quebec.631

624 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 54. 625 Ibid., p. 57. 626 Ibid. 627 Ibid., p. 82. 628 Ibid., p. 45. 629 Ibid. 630 Ibid. 631 Ibid. 177

Just as their predecessors did, the Ultras looked beyond their own country to Rome for how to organize the Church, and by extension, society. They saw the Roman Catholic Church as an

“international army” under the direction of the pontiff, and they believed in papal infallibility as a cure for modern social ills.632 At that time, Pius IX wrote in his encyclical that it was impossible for the Church to reconcile itself with liberalism or modernity; the Ultras inveighed against all forms of “liberalism” in their society.633 At the same time, they rebuffed the modern separation of church and state because they feared it would end in the state’s dominance—in Quebec that meant the Church would no longer control education, hospitals, and marriage.634 If this were so, it would mean that Rome would have less influence on Quebec society, and this was the opposite of what the Ultras wanted.

Furthermore, and more importantly, Ultramontanism was a philosophy of history; French

Canadians understood themselves as a chosen people whom God charged with a mission.635 The

Ultras saw themselves as distinct from the French, the Americans, and the English; theirs was a quest of self-identity and they found it through identification with the papacy.636 This notion found its formulation in L.F. LaFlèche, who wrote in 1866 that human history unfolded according to

God’s providence, whereby every nation has its own purpose.637 For French Canadians, this meant that they were to convert the indigenous peoples to Catholicism and extend the faith throughout the land in the hope of creating a Catholic nationality.638 This process, LaFlèche believed, began

632 Ibid. 633 Ibid., p. 46. 634 Ibid. 635 Ibid. p. 47. 636 Nathan R. Coller, “The Death of National Symbols: Roman Catholicism in Quebec,” in Ethnicity, Nationality, and Religious Experience, edited by Peter C. Phan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), pp. 294-295. 637 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 47. 638 Ibid. 178 with Jacques Cartier in 1535; going forward, they had a duty to preserve their Catholic heritage against English agitators.639

This was the intellectual climate Riel entered into at Montreal. French Canadians looked upon the Pope as their guide for social and religious matters. Also, his infallible dictum that liberalism and Catholicism were irreconcilable drove the people to reject everything modern. For

Ultras, the idea of separating church and state in Quebec would result in the unacceptable weakening of Rome’s capacity to guide French Canada. Finally, Quebeckers had a mission to preserve and expand the faith in North America against all intrusions. To be an Ultra was to be anti-liberal, ardently Catholic, intensely nationalistic, and to take a deontological approach to the faith.640 In practice, Charles Lindsey noted that the Ultra movement owed its forward momentum to Bourget more than any other person in Quebec.641

Riel found himself under the influence of Bourget while at Montreal and he wrote to

Bourget several letters outlining his mystical experiences. Moreover, while on this visit, the Ultras offered Riel both material and spiritual support as he sought to recover from the events of the

Resistance.642 Taken together, this suggests that Riel was both exposed to Ultramontanism and that he had direct connections to its key figures. And, as Flanagan writes, Ultra thought was to function as a foundation for Riel’s future project.643

The literature shows how this form of philosophy dominated Riel’s political thinking in this period. Bumsted provides one such example in his exposition of the ideas in Riel’s

639 Ibid. 640 Charles Lindsey, “The Ultramontane Movement in Canada,” in The North American Review, vol. 125, no. 259 (November-December 1877): p. 559. According to Lindsey, the terms “Catholic Liberal” and “Liberal Catholic” were seen by the Ultras with “horror.” 641 Ibid., p. 557. 642 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 46 643 Ibid., p. 47. 179

Massinahican. In it, Riel sets out his mission of providing for the Métis a new Catholic church; an

“église, catholique, apostolique et vitale des Montagnes Lumineuses.”644 He describes the Métis as God’s chosen people; in his mythology, he believed that the Métis originated from Hebrews who left Egypt from during the time of Exodus.645 Moreover, in the institution of a new church,

Riel wanted to preserve the universalist “essence” of Catholicism, even if things needed to change slightly for the North American context.646 The presence of Ultra philosophy is obvious: he saw the Métis as a chosen people, and his new church would help preserve catholicity in North

America, just as the French Canadians were also a chosen people and had been charged with retaining Catholicism in Quebec.

Moreover, the way Flanagan describes Riel’s mission further demonstrates the impact of

Ultra thought. He writes that central to Riel was “his belief in Providence.”647 This means that everyone has a mission in life that comes from a divine plan.648 Riel was convinced of this, and

Flanagan points to its origins in Bishop Bourget’s statement that the Holy Ghost consecrated Riel for a special task.649 One can see the result of Ultra thought in Riel’s “fantastic” signature: “Louis

‘David’ Riel, Prophet, Priest, Infallible Pontiff.” 650 As David set the Israelites free from the

Philistines, and as Cartier set the indigenous free from their heathenism, Riel would liberate the

Métis from Canada. Moreover, his signature suggests that he believed God called him to be a king, which tethers him to the concepts of monarchy and religion, the currency of Ultra thought.

Additionally, he called himself an infallible pontiff; this was how Ultras in Quebec saw the Bishop

644 Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada, p. 249. 645 Ibid. 646 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 647 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 82. 648 Ibid. 649 Ibid. It is worth noting that feeling a call to a special task is not unique to Ultramontanism or Riel in Christianity. However, what makes Riel’s situation really special was his belief that he had a real-life encounter with God who actually told him what to do. 650 Ibid. 180 of Rome. Both in the origin of his mission and the words in his signature, Riel showed the influence of Ultra thought.651

This development is significant. Earlier, his political thought was a mix of liberalism and

Catholicism that defended the sacrosanct nature of the monarchy. Even if, as I showed, Riel’s earlier thought was not purely liberal or republican, there were clearly traces of democratic and

English thought at work during that phase. Now, he embraced a political philosophy that rejected any form of liberal thought; his movement towards Ultra thinking meant that, like them, he wanted to give up his desire for English rights, loyalty to the Crown, and any traces of popular consent regarding political matters as Ultras did. It is my assertion that after visiting Montreal in the 1870s,

Riel’s political thinking became decisively Ultra, and this animated the actions he took going forward.

Now, after Riel had his visions at Washington, he became so obsessed with his charge that he was committed to an asylum in Longue-Pointe, Quebec.652 There, he precipitated conflict and remained devoted to his religious calling, which the administrators took as mental insanity. 653

Eventually, Riel learned to suppress his prophetic declarations, and although he was released from asylum, he never stopped believing in his mission.654 He later poured his thoughts into a book, the

Massinahican, which Bumsted compares to Joseph Smith’s Book of Mormon.655 He was convinced that as God’s prophet, his mission was to establish a new church for the Métis. Together, they would “bring about the spiritual renewal of the modern world.”656

651 See ibid., p. 79. Riel “exaggerated the doctrines of the Quebec Ultramontes…” 652 Ibid., p. 63. 653 Ibid., pp. 67-70. 654 Ibid., p. 77. 655 Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada, p. 249. 656 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 79. 181

While still in Longue-Pointe, Riel wrote a letter to Bishop Bourget that highlighted elements of his charge from God.657 While much of the letter rambles, it clearly demonstrates that spirituality had come to dominate political calculations in Riel’s thinking. He wrote that:

Moyennant la grâce de Dieu, je me tiens pour toujours dans la voie qui m'a été tracée; c'est-à-dire je ne me réserve rien de ce qui m'appartient, de ce qui me touche. Je souhaite ardemment servir Dieu et procurer sa gloire le plus possible. Je travaille sans cesse à l'honneur de la religion, au salut des âmes, au bien de la société. Enfin je me sanctifie moi-même en désirant ardemment la sanctification des autres.658

[Through God’s grace, I will forever follow the path laid out for me; by this, I mean that I will reserve nothing that belongs to me, which touches me. I ardently hope to serve God and procure His glory as much as possible. I work endlessly for the honour of religion, for the salvation of souls, and for the good of society. Finally, I sanctify myself in ardently desiring the sanctification of others.]659

This passage illuminates the influence of Ultra thought. Riel no longer hoped merely to defend the rights of his people or give them some say over their government; his interests had all become religious. Like the Ultras, he was devoted to the welfare of the Catholic Church. Further, like the

Ultras, the concept of the “salvation of souls” suggests that non-believers need to be saved by the chosen French Canadians, and that those who are faithful need protection from potential threats.

Finally, like an Ultra, his interest in the state, or society, seems inseparably linked to religion. In this passage, the idea of the “good of society” seems to be what comes from endless work “for the honour of religion” and “the salvation of souls.” Briefly put, I interpret Riel here saying that a good society is the product of honouring religion and trying to save the souls of one’s fellows; it has an unmistakable religious cast.

657 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Lettre à Ignace Bourget,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-010. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 34-42. 658 Ibid., p. 35. 659 My translation. 182

Later in the letter, Riel expressed to Bourget what he heard the spirit of God tell him. He wrote that

Monseigneur, le Saint Esprit m’a dit: puisque ton Seigneur du Mont Royal te voue à la bénédiction des hommes, travaille à la conversion de tous, selon la généralitié remarquables de ses paroles. Edifie le petit nombre des bons. Edifie l'énorme quantité de ceux qui hésitent entre le monde et Dieu. Edifie parout: multiple-toi pour délivrer ceux qui sont déjà en la possession de Satan dès avant leur mort. Comme ton Seigneur du Mont Royal t'a béni, au nom du Dieu, Je suis avec toi... Faisons miséricorde et justice. Donnons la liberté à ceux qui languissent dans les chaînes et remettrons sur le chemin de la patrie ceux qui en sont éloignés.660

[Monseigneur, the Holy Ghost said to me: because your Lord of Mount Royal dedicates you to the benediction of men, work for the conversion of all, according to the remarkable generality of his words. Teach the small number of the good. Teach the huge number of those who are torn between the world and God. Teach everywhere: multiply yourself to deliver those who are already in Satan’s possession before their deaths. As your Lord of Mount Royal has blessed you, in the name of God, I am with you … Let us bring forth mercy and justice. Let us liberate those who languish in chains, and let us set those who are lost back on the path to the homeland.]661

Riel claimed that the Holy Ghost spoke to him, and encouraged him to teach the ways of God to the righteous and the wicked. God empowered Riel to save those in sin and darkness, and with

God, he will help to free people from damnation. As with the earlier passage, the influence of Ultra principles is clear. Riel’s focus in political terms is to save those who are caught “between the world and God”; in other words, the separation of God from the world makes those who live in the world separated from God. Riel’s job is to teach his people the way forward, and help those, with God’s strength, who need spiritual nourishment. Furthermore, the communing with God is not just about Riel and the Almighty. There are frequent messages to Bourget, which I interpret as aspects of Catholicity that weigh heavily on Riel’s interpretation of what he had been charged to do. In other words the Catholic faith is the avenue through which Riel’s mission takes flight; the

660 Stanley, gen. ed., text 2-010, p. 37. 661 My translation. 183 blessing of Bourget played an important role in inaugurating Riel on his new path. If Ultras in

Quebec believed in the preservation of Catholicity in North America, then Riel’s explicit mentioning of Bourget suggests an important role for Catholicism in his mission.

Throughout his time in Longue-Pointe, Riel wrote several letters to Bourget. These letters were replete with what God had told him. Sometimes it was that he needed to immolate himself and give up his will to a superior power,662 other times that God told him that he was well-pleased with his progress,663 or that he would only be healthy once he surrendered everything for his mission.664 Throughout the various letters, a reader cannot help but notice how excitable Riel was during their writing, how focused he was on religious revelation, and how important Bourget was to Riel as someone to whom he could communicate his God-given task of saving the Métis through the spread of a new type of Catholicism.

By 1877, Riel’s thoughts had turned towards the political and practical shape of his mission. That shape was unmistakably Ultra. In a letter written to a cousin in May of that year, having have left Longue-Pointe for Beauport, Riel composed the following:

La nation canadienne-française a reçu de Dieu la belle mission de continuer les grands travaux de la France de ce côté de la mer. Et quoique cette nation canadienne-française paraisse petite dans l'Amérique du Nord, la Providence lui fournira les moyens de faire son grand ouvrage. Parce que les canadiens français aiment le Bon Dieu. Mais une fois que la nation canadienne-française aura accompli sa tâche et qu'elle se sentira prise des infirmités de la vieillesse, il faudra que sa mission passe en d'autres mains. Et moi je voudrais qu'avec le secours de Dieu, nous travaillons à faire du peuple métis canadien-français un peuple assez grand pour mériter de recueillir alors l'héritage du Bas Canada...665

662 Idem, “Lettre à Ignace Bourget,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-014. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p 56. 663 Idem, “Lettre à Ignace Bourget,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-015. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 57. 664 Idem, “Lettre à Ignace Bourget,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-017. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 61. 665 Idem, “Lettre à Paul Proulx,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-039. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 119-120. 184

[The French Canadian nation has received from God the beautiful mission of continuing the important work of France on this side of the ocean. And although this French Canadian nation might seem small in North America, Providence will furnish the ways forward. Because it is the French Canadians who love the Good Lord. But, once the French Canadian nation has accomplished its task, it will feel the pains of pains of old age, and it will come to be that its mission will pass into a new set of hands. And I hope that with God’s support, we will work to make of the French Canadian Métis a people great enough to merit the inheritance of Lower Canada’s heritage.]666

This passage shows us the influence of Ultra thought on Riel in his years following the Resistance and his religious illumination. His reference to French Canadians continuing the work of France in North America shows he took up the Quebec Ultra principle of following the French model of looking beyond their own state in order to do God’s work. In writing that Providence will assist the French Canadians, Riel referred to LaFlèche’s idea that French Canadians were charged by

God with a mission; if a people have a purpose given to them from God, then it is reasonable to think God will assist them in accomplishing it. Finally, Riel pivoted from the Quebec Ultra position to where he saw his role, namely the spread of Catholicism and French Ultra principles in the

North-West with the Métis people. Just as the Lower Canadians worked to preserve the faith in

Quebec, it seemed that Riel saw his mission as a continuation of that practice into Métis lands.

Riel learned to conceal the outward manifestations of his religious inspiration, and was released from the asylum. We will review this stage of his life in Chapter 5. Eventually, he left

Quebec for the United States, and after spending time in New York State, he travelled to Montana in 1879.667 During this period, Riel conjured a plan to organize the Métis and Indians in the North-

West to rise up against the Canadian government. During the winter of 1879-1880, Riel met with

Indian leaders attempting to forge an alliance amongst them, for sake of protecting “the lands that

666 My translation. 667 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, pp. 231-232. 185 belonged to them” in the North-West.668 According to Chief Crowfoot, who had been privy to the discussions, the plan was to instigate a “general uprising and capture the North-West, and hold it for the Indian race and the Métis.”669 The Indian tribes would seek to detain RCMP Commissioner

Macleod, and declare a provisional government; this would follow a pattern similar to the Red

River Resistance.670 Riel was convinced that the North-West was the rightful land of his people, and that they should rule it.671 This radical course of action however was met with “suspicion,” as

Chief Big Bear commented to Riel that the people ought to fight the Queen with her own laws rather than with guns as Riel wished to do.672

One might conclude that this plan reflected Riel’s hope to empower the Indians of the

North-West to self-government, but an interview with Wandering Spirit, a fellow Indian agitator, conducted in 1885 casts a different light on the subject. According to him, Riel had gathered the leaders of various Indian bands, offered them alcohol, and claimed that he wanted to make war on

Canada.673 Riel was upset that the Canadian government had treated him poorly and intended to ask them for money—if Ottawa would not oblige, Riel “would spill blood, plenty of Canadian blood.”674 Instead of following Lincoln’s model of appealing to the better angels of people, Riel tried to buy their support with alcohol, and sought restitution for the denial of amnesty by the

Canadian government; more on this later in the inquiry. This uprising he dreamed of was not an earnest attempt to encourage self-government; it was a personal crusade to be made whole. And if he was not compensated, Riel was happy enough to kill Canadians as a result.

668 Ibid., pp. 232-233. 669 Quoted in ibid., p. 233. 670 Ibid. 671 Ibid. 672 Ibid. 673 Ibid. 674 Ibid. 186

Ultimately, Riel’s plan did not succeed. In May 1880 he announced his intention to take up American citizenship and “renounce his allegiance to Queen Victoria.”675 In March 1883, that citizenship became official. He spent the years from 1880 to 1884 in Montana with his attention towards improving the lives of Métis there, and politicking within the Republican Party.676 During these years, Bumsted notes that Riel “gave no outward evidence of instability (mental or otherwise), religious mania, or even discontent.”677 Consider the following letter written to the

U.S. Consul J. W. Taylor in June 1883. Riel wrote him regarding a trip he took to Manitoba that year:

I have the honor to inform you of my presence in Manitoba and that I have become [an] american (sic) citizen in good faith, honestly, only to better my personal condition and standing in the world; and not to create any difficulty. The object of my visit is simply one of business concerning land belonging to my wife and to other parties who having emigrated from this country to Montana and having left some real Estate in this province, have authorized me to come and dispose of it by sale. My visit gives me, Mr Consul, a precious opportunity: I have the happiness to see once more my very dear mother, my brothers and sisters; my friends amongst whom you occupy, no second place.678

The Riel of this letter does not express any signs of spiritual transformation. He decided to become

American in order to live a better life. His visit to Manitoba focussed solely on a banal sale of land and seeing relatives. The Riel of the Bourget letters understood himself to be God’s messenger to guide his Métis people into a new life. In this letter, Riel appeared to have given up on that. He was happy to just be an American rather than dedicate himself to recovering the souls of his people.

Further, his travel back into the Canadian West had nothing to do with pursuing his assignment from God. He was a traveller, pleased enough by his new private life.

675 Ibid., p. 234. 676 Ibid., p. 235 et seq. 677 Ibid., p. 238. 678 George Stanley, gen. ed. “Letter to J.W. Taylor,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-111. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 290. 187

Even some of Riel’s poetry during this period appeared to be lighter. Consider a few stanzas from a poem he wrote in Helena, Montana in 1882:

I can sing in my poetry Right and wealth. I can advertize Your trade. I can sing the country And every great enterprise.

My poems can show the big trains Run by the Northern Pacific Over Hills and through rowling plains: I can celebrate their trafic (sic).

My pen can invite emigrants To come and buy along the line Acres of those beautiful grants Where a land is worth a rich mine.

I can speak also of politics And turn around a big fellow Unvail (sic) his well cover’d tactics Whenever they become too low.

But politics are hot a ground Where roots of passions grow deep One has to be well back’d up, sound To walk there and get away cheap.

And all you who stand in office O civil employers, I thank You well: your general police Keeps every one to a rank.679

It is significantly sunnier compared to many of Riel’s earlier poems. He celebrated trains and enterprise, a clear shift away from his religious brooding. His discussion of politics in the last three stanzas looked different from what one might expect. Politics were not an existential struggle for self-mastery. He did not see government as a conspirator against him. Instead, the American

679 Idem, “I Can Sing in My Poetry,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 4-106. Edited by Glen Campbell (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 279-280, vv. 1-12, 21-28, 36-40. 188 government and its employees are depicted in a calmer, democratic tone. Finally, this poem is unserious. Riel was enjoying his life to such a degree that he did not weigh every word of the poem to express something profound. Instead, it was simply what flowed through his mind as he wrote it. This is not the poetry of a man consumed with his mission from God to liberate his people from bondage like a new Moses.

Riel tried to convince the outside world that he was no longer moved by his mission, but in private, it still gnawed at him. In a letter to Bourget in February 1884, he reminded Bourget of his comment that God had given Riel a mission.680 Riel also restated that he believed in its truth.681

He asked Bourget if he could make Riel understand what he seemed not to grasp about having a mission from God that he must complete.682 Here, Riel was struggling with what he must be doing wrong, as nearly ten years had passed since he was charged by the Lord to save His people, and yet, little had changed. Since God’s wisdom accompanied Bourget, he hoped the bishop could give him some guidance.683 He then signed the letter “L.D.R.,” a reappearance of the mystical “David” as his middle name.684 Without question, although living a quieter life in America, he had not forgotten about his charge.

Riel’s notebook of prayers and meditations between May and June 1884 leaves no doubt that he still had religious visions. His comments of 2 June are of special interest:

L’esprit de Dieu s’est répandu dans mon cerveau, dès le commencement de mon sommeil. Je me suis réveillé en disant. Qui est-ce qui m’a fait du bien? Je suis sauvé à présent… L’esprit de Dieu nous impressionne quand il le veut; et comme il le veut, au degré qu’il lui plaît. Son influence vitale s’exerce aisément sur nous....685

680 Idem, “Lettre à Ignance Bourget,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-129. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 322. 681 Ibid. 682 Ibid., pp. 322-333. 683 Ibid., p. 323. 684 Ibid. 685 Idem, “Carnet de méditations et de prières,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 2-151. Edited by Gilles Martel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 355-356 189

[The spirit of God spread itself in my brain, since the beginning of my slumber. I woke up saying: Who is it that made me well? I am saved at present… The spirit of God shapes us when he wants, and as he wants, the degree to which he wants. His vital influence is exercised on us with ease….]686

This reveals that Riel still believed that God communicated with him. The Holy Ghost had entered into his mind in his sleep. I interpret this to be his time away from actively pursuing his mission.

He had awoken from this sleep knowing that he had been saved. He stated that God initiates any visions he had. Riel had no control over how He related to him. Although these are prayers and reflections that Riel wrote for himself—they are unpolished and not quite clear— they show that he had not abandoned his religious inspiration altogether.

The years between 1875 and 1884 are interesting when studying Riel because of the degree of transformation he underwent, and how much or little these experiences changed him. In one sense, the Washington DC vision inspired him to believe he was God’s prophet, to free his people in the New World. He was so taken by this that he had to be institutionalized. While at Longue -

Pointe, he wrote several letters to Bourget describing the things he believed that the Holy Ghost had spoken to him. However, once he learned to control the manifestations of his mission, and ventured into the United States, we see a Riel who resembled his pre-transformation self. He tried to band together various Indian leaders to strike against the Canadian government in the North-

West and form a provisional government, as he had done at Red River. His innermost motivation for this came from his frustration at Ottawa for the denial of the amnesty and the general deception he received at their hands. This Riel resembles the one I noted in the preceding chapter, bemoaning his dealings with the Canadian government. Finally, between 1880 and 1884, Riel seemed to have become a different person once again. He was content to become an American citizen, forgoing

686 My translation. 190 his loyalty to the Queen. He was happy to help the Métis of Montana, forgoing his religious charge to free his people in the North-West from the Canadian government. He was pleased enough to be a private citizen. Although his writings demonstrate that Riel still believed he was God’s prophet, he lived a quieter life in America.

4.2. The North-West Rebellion

By 1884, the people of the North-West were frustrated with the Canadian state. In 1885 the Métis of the South Saskatchewan River decided to rise in rebellion. They declared for themselves a provisional government and rejected the authority of the Crown. Furthermore, they took up arms against agents of the state. After a short-lived Métis victory at Duck Lake, the Canadian government was able to make use of the Canadian Pacific Railway to send sufficient troops to the

North-West. After their defeat at the Battle of Batoche, the insurrectionists surrendered. Riel, as a leader of the rebellion, was tried at Regina for treason. I will not try to work out the historical details of the insurrection. Instead, I will investigate Riel’s thoughts and actions throughout this important moment.

Flanagan highlights three factors that one might look to in trying to determine the causes of the rebellion of 1885: land, scrip, and “aboriginal rights.” Expressing his displeasure, Gabriel

Dumont, leader of the Métis of the Saskatchewan Valley, criticized the federal government’s land policy. He was convinced the Canadian state had seized the North-West through broken promises—something was needed to make the government take the people seriously.687 The issue over land in the North-West arose from the fact that Métis who settled along the Saskatchewan

River followed a similar pattern as along the Assiniboine and Red Rivers, where the plots fronted

687 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 238. 191 on the river.688 The Canadian government wanted to plot out the land in a rectangular format that at times put it at odds with the Métis.689 However, Flanagan shows, this conflict between the

Department of the Interior and the Métis was due largely to “mistakes in judgment” by the government and “unrealistic expectations” from the Métis.690 To be sure, certain Métis thought that the way the land was being parcelled up did not match what they wanted. George Denison put the blame at the Department of the Interior because they were used to being obeyed, and did not anticipate the claims that would come from those who had already comfortably settled the land.691

Nevertheless, the fact was that Ottawa was willing to grant river lots to people through special applications, even if that process was somewhat complicated.692 While there was disagreement about land, this was not a sufficient cause of the rebellion.

Secondly, there was an issue of scrip. In 1870, the Canadian government had granted to the “half-breeds” in Manitoba a land deal that entitled them to land because of their ancestral claims. By 1873, other mixed-blood persons who lived in Rupert’s Land, but not in Manitoba, began petitioning for a similar settlement; they believed they were just as aboriginal as those in

Manitoba.693 When Macdonald returned to power as minister of the Interior, as well as prime minister, after 1878, he sought to negotiate with the people in the North-West in a way that would satisfy them without following the same land granting plan as had taken place in Manitoba, which had been anything but a success.694 He feared that duplicitous “sharks” would buy up the scrip from those in the North-West; however, by January 1885, likely as a result of pressures coming

688 Thomas Flanagan: Riel and Rebellion: 1885 Reconsidered. Second edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 21. 689 Ibid. 690 Ibid. 691 George Denison, “Complaints Ignored,” in Louis Riel: Rebel of the Western Frontier or Victim of Politics and Prejudice? Edited by Hartwell Bowsfield (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark, 1969), p. 115. 692 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, p. 21. 693 Ibid., p. 76. 694 Ibid., pp. 76-79. 192 from Riel, his government relented and set up a commission to settle the dispute by giving out scrip in a similar pattern as in Manitoba.695 Flanagan argues that this commission was not an empty promise to the people of the North-West—Ottawa took great concern for public opinion there and would have embarrassed themselves if the commission had set to work enumerating thousands of claims only to produce no settlements.696 As with the river lots, while there was tension between the North-West and the Canadian government, neither of these elements was enough to fuel a rebellion.

Instead, the real origins of the Rebellion come from Riel and an idea of aboriginal rights claims.697 Much of this position appears to come from Riel’s thoughts on the aftermath of the

Manitoba Act of 1870. That document, in Riel’s estimation, was a treaty between two nations and had two components: the text that dealt with Manitoba and the rest of Rupert’s Land, and the amnesty promised to those at Red River.698 In other words, Canada had the right to annex the

Rupert’s Land as long as the “treaty” was not violated. For Riel, it had been violated through denial of amnesty and the Canadian government had no right under “le droit des gens” to rule over the

North-West.699 The way that Canada could make the people of Rupert’s Land whole would be through significant compensation for the aboriginal rights that were extinguished in the takeover of the territory, otherwise the people had the right to secede from Canada.700

Displeased with Ottawa, the Métis contacted Riel in 1884 for assistance in Montana. It was clear to many that the best chance they had at receiving their demands from the federal government would come from the help of Riel. After all, he had already challenged the Canadian state and won

695 Ibid., p. 78. 696 Ibid., p. 79. 697 Ibid., p. 81. 698 Ibid., p. 93. 699 Cf. Ibid. 700 Ibid., p. 97. 193 for his people significant concessions. If it had worked in 1870, it might again in 1884. The Métis community sent a delegation to Riel in Montana that arrived in June. Riel was predisposed to this invitation in part because of letters he had received in the preceding months from various people who stroked his ego by writing things such as “[y]ou have no idea how great your influence is…” and that he was needed because “[n]one of us feels capable of undertaking so great a protestation against a despotic authority.”701 Riel agreed to help the delegates, and days later, left for the North-

West.

Of interest here are not the historical details of the Rebellion, but Riel’s part in it. Riel arrived in the District of Saskatchewan, and during the fall of 1884, and he got to work composing a list of demands for the people of the North-West in a similar manner to his 1869 Bill of Rights.

In this petition of 16 December 1884, a series of grievances were outlined such as that the settlers of the North-West needed food, that they were not treated equally compared to those in Manitoba, that customs were being unfairly applied, and that the fairest way to address the various issues of the North-West would be self-government.702 Furthermore, Riel’s petition included a request for delegates to come to Ottawa, as they had from Red River, with a bill of rights to negotiate the entrance of the territory into Confederation as a province.703

However, as Flanagan notes, this list was simply a draft, and work on other declarations continued into February 1885.704 Riel did not think his work was finished. He was convinced it had just begun. I want to investigate two explanations for this: first, the idea that Riel had returned to the North-West for financial gain, and second, that Riel saw the North-West as the place to

701 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 239. 702 George Stanley, gen. ed. “To His Excellency the Governor General, of canada, in Council,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-026. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 41-45. 703 Ibid., p. 45. 704 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, p. 97. 194 execute his religious mission. Both of these help to frame why and how Riel thought and acted during the Rebellion.

Even though the Canadian government seemed willing to meet many of the demands of

North-West residents, each concession was met by Riel and the people as an insult, or a further spur towards the Rebellion.705 Why was this the case, and why did Riel remain in Saskatchewan to pursue a rebellion when the work he was called there to do was essentially done? One explanation for Riel’s decision to remain in the North-West has to do with his interest in financial compensation. One must not forget that Riel still bore a grudge towards the Canadian government for denying him the amnesty he sought after the Red River Resistance, as well as forcing him into exile afterwards. While in Saskatchewan helping the people of the North-West, Riel met with a federal representative, D.H. MacDowall. He requested various sums of money from the Canadian government—between $35,000 and $100,000—and in return for it, he would leave the North-West and attempt to resolve any disquiet among the people before it turned into an insurrection. 706

Bumsted quotes from MacDowell in his four-hour interview with Riel before submitting his report in 1885 to the prime minister:

“My name is Riel and I want material,” he told MacDowall. “I suppose,” reported the councillor somewhat testily, that this “was a pun.” “He then proceeded to state,” MacDowall continued, “that if the government would consider his personal claims against them and pay him a certain amount in settlement of these claims, he would arrange to make his illiterate and unreasoning followers well satisfied with almost any settlement of their claims for land grants that the government might be willing to make, and also, that he would leave the north-west never to return.” In many respects, this report was a turning point in the 1885 Rebellion. According to MacDowall, “Riel made it distinctly understood that ‘self’ was his main object, and he was willing to make the claims of his followers totally subservient to his own interests.”707

705 See ibid., p. 81. 706 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, pp. 254-255. For his part, Bumsted claims that Riel’s requests were reasonable since he had not been compensated for governing Manitoba before General Wolseley arrived, he had not received his land grant, and he had been prevented from working by the Canadian government. 707 Ibid., p. 255. 195

What Riel told MacDowall, if we believe this, was that the claims and grievances of the Métis in the North-West were secondary. If the government would pay him, he would convince those who trusted in him to accept any deal the government wanted. He was in it for himself. Furthermore, his comment that he would leave the North-West after this deal suggested that he was not in the area to fulfil God’s command. He came because others asked him to be there, and was willing to turn that into his financial advantage. Macdonald was quoted as saying Riel arrived to “extract money from the public purse,”708 and if one is to believe MacDowall’s account, that is what Riel sought to do. His appearance in the North-West was a shakedown.

Bumsted is not the only scholar to make note of Riel’s selfishness during this period.

Creighton quoted extensively the same comments from MacDowell. Riel wanted $100,000 but he would take $35,000 as Sir John had promised him many years previously.709 However, he also included a comment from MacDowell that in his opinion, a cheque for between $3,000 and $5,000 would likely be enough to “cart the whole Riel family across the border.”710 This revelation, according to Creighton, was shattering for Sir John and it removed any good will he had for Riel— it was a “malevolent sham.”711 Macdonald concluded that the conflict brewing in the North-West was less about the legitimate grievances of the people and more about the “enigmatic personality” of this “self-admitted blackmailer.”712 We are apt to see Macdonald’s side of things here. To be sure, Macdonald was concerned for the people of the North-West. He wanted to redress their claims but hoped to do so in a way that prevented them from being manipulated. He even set up a commission to deal with claims in the territory to assuage their concerns. Despite Sir John’s best

708 Ibid. 709 Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 414. 710 Ibid. 711 Ibid. 712 Ibid. 196 intentions, Riel’s comments implied that none of that mattered. Pay him, and the problems would disappear.

Flanagan too looked into the idea of Riel trying to extort money from the Canadian government in the North-West. He cites Riel when he wrote to the delegates who visited him in

Montana that a prime reason he would go to Saskatchewan was so that he could finally acquire the money and land he was owed.713 He also notes a comment from Riel to MacDowell that if his financial interests were satisfied by the government, he would make sure that the potential rebels in the North-West were equally satisfied.714 Throughout January 1885, Riel was fixated on getting money from Ottawa. He visited St. Albert twice to see if any progress had been made on his demands in addition to sending surrogates there too.715 In February 1885, Macdonald answered

Riel’s request by denying it. Even though Riel never received this, Flanagan writes it was “anti- climactic” because Riel had already figured out that Ottawa was never going to pay him. 716

Spurned by the government, Riel dug in and pursued the agenda of Rebellion with great intensity and fervour, as I am about to discuss. However, Flanagan comments that this incident around the money is important; Riel was prepared to betray those who put their faith in him to get a good deal for their people, and it shows us that “it would be historically wrong to interpret his role in the insurrection as arising solely, or even chiefly, from disinterested idealism.”717

Beyond personal gain, Riel also saw the North-West as a place to accomplish his religious charge from God. By March 1885, with no hope of receiving any money, Riel seemed to be more public with religious zeal again. He encouraged leaders of the North-West to strike another

713 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, pp. 118-119. 714 Ibid., p. 124. 715 Ibid., p. 127. 716 Ibid., p. 129. 717 Ibid., pp. 130. 197 provisional government against the authority of the Canadians as he had at Red River, except this time, Riel gave it a distinctively religious character.718 Riel called it the “Exovedate,” which was a portmanteau of the Latin words ex and ovile; together, they meant “picked from the flock.”719

Clearly, this has a Christian meaning, inasmuch as Christ is often referred to as the “Good

Shepherd,” and his followers as members of the “flock.”720 He encouraged the members of the

Exovedate to name him their official prophet, which they did unanimously in March 1885. The following is the resolution that was passed to this effect:

That the French-Canadian Métis Exovedate recognize Louis ‘David’ Riel as a prophet in the service of Jesus Christ the son of God and the only redeemer of the world; as a prophet at the feet of Mary Immaculate under the powerful and most favourable protection of the Virgin Mother of Christ; as a prophet under the visible and most comforting protection of St. Joseph, the chosen patron of the metis (sic), the patron of the universal church; as a prophet humbly imitating in many ways St John the Baptist, glorious patron of the French-Canadians and the French-Canadian metis.721

As far as the new government—and it was a government—was concerned, Riel was their prophet, and spoke for Jesus Christ to them during their deliberations.

Riel’s prophesying was pronounced throughout the Rebellion. He revealed a prophecy in

March 1885 that “Rome” had fallen, and that a new church was necessary for the North-West.722

In the place of Roman Catholicism would be a new “Catholic, Apostolic, and Vital Church” that centred around Bourget as the new pontiff, and it would take as a holy text the letters Riel wrote to Bourget while at Longue-Pointe that expressed his interactions with the Holy Ghost.723 Because the clergy found Riel’s declarations grossly unorthodox, they balked at the insurrection and denied

718 Idem, Prophet of the New World, p. 154. 719 Ibid. 720 John 10: 11, “I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep.” 721 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 155. 722 Ibid., p. 158. 723 Ibid. 198 the Eucharist to its members; consequently, Riel had his own chapel constructed, and conducted religious services there.724 His prophesies led him to declare that Saturday should replace Sunday as the Lord’s Day, and he convinced the Exovedate to make this the law.725 While members of the government were concerned about pushing for their land claims and right to self-government, Riel was invested in building a new religion with his prophesies.

Later in the spring of 1885, Riel focussed his attention on new Eucharistic rituals surrounding the consecration of bread and milk, convinced the Exovedate to accept his denial of the trinity, the transitory nature of hell, and that Mary was simply the “mother of the Son of God” rather than the “Mother of God.”726 Furthermore, he put a motion to the Exovedate to change the names of the week from the current pagan ones to ones that were more Christian; for example,

Monday was to become “Christ Aurore.”727 During the Battle of Duck Lake, Riel sat amidst the chaos of the fight between his people and the North West Mounted Police “exposed to gun fire.”728

Throughout the battle, he raised a crucifix above his head and prayed.729 The clear implication was the Riel, at that moment, believed that God had chosen him as His prophet, and he had nothing to fear. Furthermore, the fact that the rebels won this battle buoyed Riel into believing that God favoured his side.730 He was so convinced of the holiness of their cause that when he met with a wounded Métis after the battle, Riel’s focus during their conversation was exclusively on the new church he would build for his people, rather than on the physical sacrifice that warrior made on the battlefield.731

724 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 725 Ibid., p. 159. 726 Ibid., p. 160-161. On this point, the distinction that Riel was trying to make seems inconsequential. 727 Ibid., p. 161. 728 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 260. 729 Ibid. 730 Stanley, Riel, p. 319. 731 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 260. 199

Riel’s turn towards religiosity is of interest here because while it explains his thoughts during the latter stages of the Rebellion, it also shows us the political damage it caused both him and his people. Predictably, Riel’s spiritual obsessions put him and his followers at odds with

Church officials. Catholic officials excommunicated him for his heretical beliefs, and Riel’s response was to hector these men rather than try and work with them.732 He believed he was like

Moses, someone appointed by God to reorganize the faith, and that meant abandoning Rome as the seat of spiritual authority. Riel’s religious visions had a negative effect on the Rebellion because his radical prophesies turned possible allies aside. He had created a schism, which made it impossible for the rebels to create a broad coalition of Indian and Métis groups in the North-

West to stand together to fight against the Canadian government. Instead, he hoped to create a world in his “heterodox” image that scared and aggravated the very people from whom he needed support.733 He saw himself like a new King David—a humble servant chosen by God to fight against a gigantic foe and prevail to save his people.734

This idea of Riel being like David is evident in his comments on 6 May, days before the larger and stronger Canadian forces were to crush the Rebellion. He saw that moment as “the time

God has marked in the order of things to come” and that he saw all the “signs that are supposed to accompany it, just as we are told in the scriptures.”735 Further, just before the battle when the men heard the fire of a Canadian cannon, Riel claimed that it was God’s thunder, and that his holy lightning was about to strike the Canadian enemy.736 In other words, faced with a gargantuan challenge, Riel maintained that he would, like David,737 smite the overwhelming enemy with the

732 Ibid., p. 254; Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, pp. 140, 158-160. 733 Stanley, Riel, p. 300. 734 See Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 83. 735 Quoted in ibid, p. 157. 736 Ibid. 737 Cf. Bumsted, Riel vs. Canada, p. 254. 200 help of God. During the fighting, Riel spent his time praying the rosary and asking God to bring forth his miracle.738

The other reason Riel’s prophecy harmed the movement was that it shifted attention of the

Exovedate away from the business of governing. During the Red River Resistance, Riel and his government spent considerable amounts of time trying to shape their public image to demonstrate strength both to Canada and to those unsympathetic to the Provisional Government. Furthermore, they held long and serious debates over various Bills of Rights that contained practical political arguments for the formation of a new province where the settlers could protect their lands, govern themselves, and maintain their religious and cultural practices. In contrast, Riel was having the

Exovedate spend important time deliberating on the nature of the trinity, the role of Rome in the salvation of souls in the North-West, or what day the Lord’s Day should be. The rebel government should have been trying to win a war, but Riel weighed them down with his prophecies. While

Flanagan notes that many of the Métis did not oppose Riel’s revelations, all of these matters could have been disposed of after the insurrection.

But I think an underexplored consequence of Riel’s religiosity during the Rebellion was that it took his strategic focus away from his actual God-given talent, namely politics. He proved during the Resistance to be a skilled orator and political organizer. He composed a thoughtful

Declaration for the people. He helped to construct Bills of Rights for the people. He convinced his fellow Métis of the virtues of a provisional government, and then he helped to lead it. His political strategies were the primary reason why Manitoba entered Confederation.739 His focus on prophecy turned him into what Machiavelli called an “unarmed prophet.”740 These people “come to grief”

738 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 157. 739 Ibid., p. 36. “Politics was [Riel’s] natural métier, for it allowed him to exercise his great oratorical and persuasive gifts.” 740 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince. Translated by George Bull (London, UK: Penguin, 2003), p. 21. 201 because they lack the political and military strength to transform their visions into practical effects in which people might believe. 741 Riel could have become an “armed prophet,” the type that

Machiavelli said tend to conquer,742 but his blindness towards military strategy and fresh political ideas, and complete faith in religious salvation turned him in the opposite direction.

In practical terms, we can see Riel’s lack of political strategy during the Rebellion in comparison with Gabriel Dumont. Pierre Berton described Dumont as a sound and strong man. He had been his people’s chief since the age of twenty-five and “much beloved by all who knew him.”743 Although given to gambling—it was said he could play cards for three straight days without taking a meal break—Dumont was a generous man; Berton records he would kill large numbers of buffalo and give the meat to those who could not hunt or who had no access to the game.744 When trouble arose, the people would look to Dumont.745 In 1884, Dumont knew that although his people needed help, he was not the right instrument, and looked to Riel.746 Dumont was a “man of action, a prairie general who would shortly become the tactician of the Métis empire against the onrush of civilization.”747 One pictures Dumont as a Métis Odysseus or Jason.

But Dumont was not the leader of this Rebellion. Riel called the shots. On 18 March 1885, the Métis cut the telegraph line between Prince Albert and Batoche while also acquiring weapons.748 Dumont told Riel he should send envoys to other Indian tribes for more support, but

Riel overruled him because he thought, “Ottawa would now yield to the threat of insurrection.”749

741 Ibid. 742 Ibid. 743 Pierre Berton, The Last Spike: The Great Railway 1881-1885 (Toronto, ON: Anchor Canada, 2001), p. 340. 744 Ibid., pp. 340-341. 745 Ibid., p. 341. 746 Ibid. 747 Ibid. 748 Ibid., p. 346. 749 Ibid., pp. 346-347. 202

Even though no shots had been fired and communications were cut, Riel erroneously believed

Canada would give in to the Métis demands. We are right to think this made little sense.

At Duck Lake, Dumont secured the victory over the Canadian forces. The “Prince of the

Prairies” antagonized Crozier and his outnumbered force.750 When the policemen, their volunteer allies, and their cannon arrived at Duck Lake for the battle, Dumont saw their approach and organized the Métis to encircle the force.751 After the shot was fired that instigated the fighting, it was Dumont and his men who repelled the Canadians; as mentioned earlier, Riel rode through the gunfire holding a cross aloft.752

After their victory, Riel denied Dumont’s request to press their “temporary advantage” and use “guerrilla warfare” against the Canadian forces.753 Commentators such as George Woodcock contended that guerrilla warfare may have worked; had the Métis taken Prince Albert and encouraged other Indians to ally with them, Ottawa might have preferred negotiation to “protracted war.”754 Riel overruled Dumont in the hopes that the Canadian forces would meet the Métis in small enough groups for his people to fight off.755 Riel seemed unaware that the new railway made it possible for Macdonald to send a large Canadian contingent to Saskatchewan to put down the

Rebellion authoritatively if the Métis chose pitched battles over guerrilla tactics. Instead, Riel’s religious prophecy led his people into formal battles such as at Batoche where any advantage

Dumont gained at Duck Lake was destroyed when the Métis were crushed.756 In short, when Riel became a prophet, he lost the keen sense for politics that he demonstrated during the Resistance; he did not understand the changes in tactics required from 1870 to 1885. This is why Flanagan

750 Ibid., p. 347. 751 Ibid., pp. 347-348. 752 Ibid., p. 348. 753 Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 154. 754 Ibid. 755 Ibid. 756 Cf. ibid., p. 157. 203 says of Riel during the Rebellion that he “was more prophet and miracle worker than political leader.”757 Unfortunately for Riel, those miracles did not extend to winning the Rebellion.

While we have reviewed the secondary literature on what Riel did during the Rebellion in terms of asking for money and religious prophecy, I want to turn to what he thought and wrote during that period. In order to make sense of this, it is worth reiterating Riel’s intellectual positions, because they are not readily clear. He was convinced that the Canadian government ceded its general authority to govern the North-West by violating the “treaty” of the Manitoba Act. They could only justify its control with further financial compensation to the Indians in the region. He wanted desperately to receive money from the Canadian state he believed he was owed from the results of the Resistance. He also threatened to use violence against the Canadians if his request was not granted. He helped to write an unpolished bill of rights in December 1884, then after realizing he would not be getting any money from Ottawa, turned completely towards his spiritual mission to save the Métis people of the North-West through the creation of a new Catholic church—a new form of Ultramontanism. He helped to organize and then served as a prophet for the Exovedate, where he revealed to the membership the various revelations given to him by the

Holy Ghost. Furthermore, through the course of the Rebellion, he pursued his religious visions.

This alienated possible allies because of its heretical fanaticism. He also used stale political tactics in the hopes of earning for Saskatchewan provincial status. Eventually, the Canadian forces defeated his uprising, and he was arrested for treason. He helped to lead a movement rebelled against the British Crown, used armed violence against the Canadian state, tried to extort that government for money, and saw his role in the ordeal as being one of prophet and religious counsellor.

757 Ibid. 204

This is in part clear from Riel’s letter to Métis allies on 24 March 1885, a week before he was officially named the Exovedate’s prophet and two days before the Battle of Duck Lake. He said to them “since you are willing to help us, may God Bless you, in all that is to be done for our common salvation,” and that “Justice Commands to take up arms. And if you see the Police passing by, stop it, and take away their arms.”758 He ends his letter with the command “Fear not” and signs it as “Louis ‘David’ Riel. Exoveed.”759 In brief, Riel wrote to these friends that their spiritual salvation was at stake in fighting the Canadian police who would try to bring their insurrection to heel. What is more, God’s justice requires both the threat of violence against the government forces, and the disarming of those who might oppose the rebellion. In this letter, the core of the insurrection does not focus on the preservation of rights, but rather on following a violent course of action ordained by God for the salvation of their souls.

More of Riel’s political thinking was displayed in his letter to the Métis at Fort Pitt, written just one day before the Battle of Duck Lake. He wrote that

Le Bon Dieu a toujours en soins des métis. Il a les nourris pendant longtemps dans le désert. C’est la Providence qui avait enrichi de bison nos prairies. Et l’abondance dans laquelle nos nos pères ont vécu était une abondance aussi merveilleuse que la manne céleste. mais (sic) nous n’avions pas assez reconnaissance envers Dieu notre Bon Père, c’est pour cela que nous nous sommes laissés tomber entre les mains d’un gouvernement qui ne s’intéressait à nous que pour nous piller. Ah! si nous avions compris ce que Dieu faisait pour nous avant la confédération, nous nous serions mis en peine de la voir arriver.760

[The Good Lord has always taken care of the Métis. He fed us for a long time while in the desert. It is Providence that enriched our prairies with bison. And the abundance that our fathers lived with was an abundance as marvellous as manna from heaven. But we were not grateful enough towards God our Good Lord, and it is for this that we have fallen into the hands of a government that is only interested

758 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Letter to ‘Dear Relatives’,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-040. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 67. Emphasis removed. 759 Ibid. Despite the signature, Riel was not an actual member of the Exovedate. 760 Idem, “Lettre aux Métis Anglais et Français de la Rivière Bataille du Fort Pitt et des Environs,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-042. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 68-69. 205

in pillaging us. Ah, if only we understood what God was doing for us before Confederation, we would have taken the trouble to see it arrive.]761

This passage is fascinating because it demonstrates Riel’s attitudes towards the Métis. He was convinced that God had a special affection for them, and that He had cared for the people in the days when the buffalo were plenty. This passage also demonstrates Riel’s opinion of the Canadian government. He described them as a government interested only in robbing the land, not one interested in protecting them or improving their lives. The government also has only acquired power because the Métis had forgotten their devotion to God. That Canada controls their land is a consequence of their lack of faith. In other words, the Canadian government was almost like a form of punishment, something wicked that the Métis needed to fight against.

Riel continued in the letter thus:

Mais quinze ans de souffrance, d'appauvrissements, de persécution sourde, et fort maligne nous ont ouvert les yeux. Et le vue du gouffre de démoralisation, dans le quel la Puissance nous fait descendre de plus en plus avant tous les jours, nous a, tous à coup, par la grâce, de Dieu, comme frappés d'épouvante. Et le plus effrayés de l'enfer où la Police montée et son gouvernement cherchent à nous conduire ouvertement, que de leur armes à feu qui, après tout, ne peuvent tuer nos corps, nos consciences alarmées nous ont fait entendre une voix qui nous a dit: La justice ordonne de prendre des armes.762

[But fifteen years of suffering, of poverty, of heedless persecution and strong malignancy has opened our eyes. And seeing the abyss of demoralization into which Canada is driving us has suddenly, by the grace of God, struck us with terror. And more frightened of this hell, where the Mounted Police and their Government look to lead us, than of their firearms which after all can only kill our bodies, our alarmed consciences have made us listen to a voice that said to us: Justice ordains that you take up arms.]763

Riel’s point in this passage was to suggest that the years between the Manitoba Act and the present were miserable for the Métis; this intimates once again Riel’s conviction that the “treaty” was a

761 My translation. 762 Ibid. Emphasis removed. 763 My translation. That the sentence seems confusing and unclear comes from the confused comments of Riel on this matter. I intend that my translation brings out the fullest meaning of the comment. 206 sham for the people of the North-West. He then used florid language that connoted hellfire and despair when describing what the world looked like for the Métis in the territory. It was contrary to God’s love for the people. Most importantly, he provided a spiritual argument that they need to realise that the guns of the RCMP could only hurt their bodies and that a voice tells them to take up arms against the Canadian government. In brief, this passage laid out an extreme version of the sufferings of the North-West Métis and encouraged them to take up arms against the RCMP without fear, since with holy protection they were safe from spiritual injury. Of course, many Métis were in fact slain at Duck Lake.

On 1 May, days before the Battle of Batoche, Riel wrote a letter to the Indians in Battle

River. This letter is important because it demonstrates a strong degree of religiosity in Riel’s thinking at the time. He said:

Nous vous invitons à fixer votre attention sur l’accomplissement de la volonté de Dieu. Vous serez sûrs de Lui être agréables premièrement, si vous mettez toute votre confiance en Jésus-Christ; secondement, si vous observez avec fidélité les dix commandements, troisièmement, si vous priez sans cesse comme le recommande l’Evangile. Voilà la Religion. Pratiquez-la, pratiquons-la tous ensembles. C’est le moyen d’obtenir, dans nos bonnes entreprises, le succès, les victoires, les triomphes de la vérité, de la justice et de la droiture.764

[We invite you to fix your attention to accomplishing God’s will. You are sure to please him firstly, if you put all your confidence in Jesus Christ; secondly if you truly follow the ten commandments; thirdly if you pray nonstop as is recommended in the gospel. There you have Religion. Practice it, let us all practice it together. It is the way to obtain, in our good undertakings, success, victory, triumphs of truth, of justice, and of righteousness.]765

This letter was written just before imminent destruction at Batoche, and yet Riel did not appear to be concerned whatsoever with military tactics. His method for defeating the oncoming enemy was

764 Idem, “Lettre ‘Aux Métis et à Nos Parents Indiens des Environs du Fort Pitt et de la Rivière Bataille,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-052. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 84. 765 My translation. 207 through faith, obedience to biblical laws, and prayer. Riel’s tone throughout this passage was

Pauline, and the people at Battle River might as well have been his Thessalonians. Riel was telling his readers that the path to salvation lies in faith. The Rebellion was about to confront its decisive moment, but Riel’s focus appears to be heavenward. He was a man on a spiritual mission to give the Métis of the North-West a true religion to follow. He would save his people’s souls, and one gets the sense that God will save them by giving them the victories they desire because of their faith.

Furthermore, the thinking expressed in Riel’s letter to Canadian Major Crozier after the defeat of the RCMP at Duck Lake is also worth closer examination.

A Calamity has fallen upon the country yesterday. You are responsible for it before God and men. Your men cannot claim that their intentions were peaceful, since they were bringing canons. And they fired many shots first. God has been pleased to grant us the victory: and as our movement is to save our rights, our victory is good: and we offer it to the Almighty.766

Although brief, this portion of the letter contains important aspects. First, the idea that the RCMP was responsible for the battle in its entirety shows how consumed in his own sense of religious certainty Riel was. It had been the North-West that rose up against the Canadians, the North-West who declared a provisional government, and it was the North-West that armed itself for battle. The

Police had come to put down insurrection, and yet he blamed them for arriving armed. It is unclear how he thought they should arrive. The idea that the Police bore all the responsibility indicates that he was convinced in his own vision that the Métis were beset by evil forces from whom they needed deliverance. Of course the religiosity came to the fore with his comment that God gave the

766 Idem, “Letter to L.N.F. Crozier,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-046. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 74-75. 208

Métis the victory at Duck Lake, and because it was a battle over rights, they were on the “right” side, so to speak.

While he may have believed that God favoured his people that day, the comment about rights was disingenuous. As was established, the Canadian government was already engaged in a process to enumerate claimants in the North-West in order to provide people with scrip, and they were accommodating Métis who wanted river lots. It is unlikely that Ottawa could have dealt with the North-West people in terms of a Bill of Rights as they had at Red River because, first, the bill

Riel was tasked with writing was still just a draft, and second, he had eliminated any good will between his cause and Ottawa in his attempt to blackmail the government. In this instance, Riel comes across as deluded.

Another piece of Riel’s thinking I want to examine from this period is his letter to Major

General Middleton, the commanding officer of the Canadian milita at the Battle of Batoche, during that battle. He wrote:

The Providence of God knows that our intentions and our motives are honest. You fight not against warriors as we are. We are no enemies of the government. You fight against petitioners. For our crime is to have petitioned the government and to have been refused the object of our petition. And as the Providence of God takes care of every thing, she has allowed us to meet on the Field….767

The context of this letter is very important. At Batoche, the Métis were outnumbered, and their chance of defeating the Canadians was next to nought. Despite this, Riel saw fit to write to

Middleton that God was aware of the goodness of the Métis’ intentions, and that they were not warriors, but petitioners. This demonstrates once again Riel’s obsession with religious prophecy to such a degree that he appears ungrounded. He is so certain that God has blessed his people, that his side were the forces of good. However, the comment that the Métis were merely petitioners

767 Idem, “Letter to Frederick Middleton,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-055. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), p. 87. 209 was fiction. It was not through petitions that his people slew RCMP officers and won a victory at

Duck Lake. It was through force, even though he thought God had won at Duck Lake. Riel appears so enraptured by his belief that he was leading God’s chosen that he was blind to the fact that their crime was not petitioning the Canadian state, but rather making a violent rebellion against it.

Lastly, I want to parse one of Riel’s poems written during the Rebellion—its exact date is uncertain, but Glen Campbell suggests it was composed between November 1884 and February

1885, while Riel was transitioning towards his holy project in the North-West.768 Riel wrote

Secourez-moi, Mon Dieu! Délivrez-moi, sous peu,

Accordez-moi la grace De ne pas les choquer Faites que je leur trace Le chemin, sans le provoquer.

Soutenez-moi qu’ils prennent Mes bons avis, au sérieux Et que tous mes discours obtiennent Grâce, autorité, devant eux.

Faites que mes amis m’écoutent Et qu’ils embrassent mes desseins; Que mes ennemis me redoutent! Que je rompe tous leurs essaims.

Seigneur Jésus! Je vous prie. Ouvrez-moi votre Sacré-Cœur!

Sainte-Vierge, auguste Marie Priez pour moi le christ Vainqueur.769

[Save me, my God! Deliver me with celerity,

Give me grace And without shocking them

768 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Secourez-moi, Mon Dieu!,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 4-129 (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 394-395. 769 Ibid., p. 394. 210

Have me draw for them the path Without provoking them.

Sustain me that they will take My good advice seriously And let all my words obtain Grace and authority before them.

Make it so my friends listen to me And that they embrace my designs; Let my enemies fear me That I may break their stranglehold on us.

Lord Jesus, I pray to You Open to me your Sacred Heart

Holy Virgin, august Mary Pray for me to Christ the Conqueror.]770

Riel asked God to quickly save him, and bless him to show the people the way forward in the

Rebellion. He requested that God give his words authority, and asked that the people listen to him as a messenger of God’s will. Furthermore, with Jesus’ help, he prayed that his enemies would be afraid of him, and that he might lead his people against them to victory. He invoked Christ and the

Virgin Mary to impart to him their grace and power to vanquish the enemy. As in his other writings, this poem demonstrates that Riel was convinced that God would empower him to save his people.

This poem reflects the revelation given to Riel at Washington—that he would serve as God’s prophet to save the Métis.

To sum up this section, one can say that the primary and secondary literature both confirm a specific portrait of the man’s actions and thoughts. He was motivated by both self-centeredness and religious fervour. He believed he was fighting for the salvation of his people, and was convinced that God was on their side. Instead of the careful strategy and political theory he exercised at Red River, Riel spent his time in 1885 obsessed with creating a new church in the

770 My translation. 211

North-West with himself at its centre. His time and attention went towards his religious prophecies, which alienated the cause from many potential allies, and left the insurrection ill-prepared for the eventual defeat they suffered at Batoche. One might put it best by claiming that this period for Riel was an admixture of selfishness, radical idealism, religious zeal, and delusion.

A point remains, however, that will likely leave the reader confused. Were Riel’s efforts in the Rebellion primarily because of his personal animosity towards the Canadian state, especially after being denied his indemnity? To hold that position would be to claim that the religious elements of Riel’s thinking and acting were wholly fraudulent. I do not take that position.

Conversely, would we best understand Riel as a religious prophet (or insane person) and extremist during this period? To take that stance would mean to gloss over the attempted blackmail, which

I am also disinclined to do. It may seem we are at an impasse. However, a helpful way to make sense of these two elements of Rebellion-era Riel comes from Eric Hoffer’s comments about those whom he calls the “inordinately selfish.” He wrote:

The inordinately selfish are particularly susceptible to frustration. The more selfish a person, the more poignant his disappointments. It is the inordinately selfish, therefore, who are likely to be the most persuasive champions of selflessness. The fiercest fanatics are often selfish people who were forced, by innate shortcomings or external circumstances, to lose faith in their own selves. They separate the excellent instrument of their selfishness from their ineffectual selves and attach it to the service of some holy cause. And though it be a faith of love and humility they adopt, they can be neither loving nor humble.771

The argument fits Riel during the Rebellion. His selfishness was manifest in his belief the

Manitoba Act had been violated because he had not received an amnesty. His self-love drove him to come to Saskatchewan to pursue it. When that failed, his selfishness was transfigured into his

“holy cause.” His faith was of love and charity, but he was not actually capable of it. His religion

771 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York, NY: Perennial Classics, 2002), p. 48. 212 placed himself at the centre, and depicted him haranguing the Canadian forces. In brief, one can thread together the competing motivations for the Rebellion by seeing Riel as typical of the inordinately selfish fanatic who used his prophecy as a way to follow his self-interest.

4.3. Later Riel and Statesmanship

Having discussed Riel’s thoughts and actions before and during the 1885 Rebellion, I want to consider whether one can make sense of these moments through the lens of statesmanship. Unlike earlier Riel who demonstrated a mixture of the transactional and transformational typologies, later

Riel appears to be decisively of the latter character. I will consider his approach to human nature and idealism in politics in this section.

In terms of human nature, transformational statesmen, following Michels, tend towards praising their fellows and telling them what they wish to be told, despite the realities of the situation. They have a strong belief in the goodness of their fellows, and suspect that whatever challenges they meet, they will be able to rise to that challenge. One can see Riel’s comments just before Batoche in line with this. He believed that the Métis were chosen by God, and therefore, conceived of them as good enough to merit God’s grace. He told them just before a battle they had no chance to win that God favoured their enterprise and gave them false hope that a miracle would save them from defeat. In this, he exemplified Michels’s ideas.

Further, it demonstrates that transformational statesmanship can be, at times, unsuccessful.

Lenin was able to construct an enduring polity on the basis of ideas no more utopian than Riel’s.

The difference was that Lenin did not trust that socialism would unfold effortlessly in the USSR.

He was willing to revise economic plans with the pseudo-capitalist New Economic Plan instead of sticking to strict Marxist economics. He chose to fight the Menshevik rebels and royalist 213 sympathizers instead of allowing those vestiges of regression and revisionism to wither away along with the state. As a consequence, Lenin left behind a governable state. Riel’s certain belief in providential salvation led him to mistakenly ignore Dumont’s sound political advice to negotiate with important Indian tribes in the North-West. Riel would not have abandoned his mission if he had modified his strategies in those ways; one could imagine him interpreting them as moments to put God’s prophecy into practice as he had done in created the Exovedate or writing a bill of rights.

Unlike Lenin, Riel did not leave behind a polity. He appears as a transformational statesman who was not as skilled at statecraft as he might have been.

Furthermore, Jung’s notion about leaders whom we would call transformational centred on those who believed it was possible for some to have perfect foresight. In other words, it is the belief that within humanity, some are gifted with a higher power and thus superior to their fellows.

This is apparent in Riel’s signature when he calls himself “infallible” and a prophet of God. His vision compelled him to think he was not like other Métis, rather, that God can and does choose some people to be His elect. Furthermore, his poem from November 1884-February 1885 indicates that he believed special powers could be granted to him. He wanted God to change the minds of the Métis by clothing him in holy power. This is indicative of transformational statesmanship especially in this sense of inequality. In Chapter 1, we saw Jaffa warning that when we see human nature as graduated between the blessed and the ordinary, it becomes possible to treat the non- elect as inferior and suitable subjects for experimentation. This stance towards inequality makes liberal democracy impossible, which is the preferred mode of the transactional statesman, since it is premised on the notion that all are equal and each have an equal right to contribute to their polity.

Riel’s view of an unequal human nature indicates disinclination towards the principle that binds liberal democracy. 214

Moreover, I argued that Sowell’s typology of those with anointed visions of human nature belongs in the transformational camp. Sowell states that these leaders deny the imperfectability of humans and their ideas, and that under the right circumstances, they can be brought together to accomplish wonderful things. In Riel’s letter to Bourget (2-010), he claimed that God called him, and that he intended to execute God’s glory here on Earth. Riel and his mission, according to him, was one of those exceptional moments. It was an instant where God ordained a special leader in order to bring forth His will. Throughout many of Riel’s writings, there is an evident sense that he could harness God’s power to convince the Métis to follow him in his mission. Riel’s approach to human nature during these ten years, particularly his perception of inequality, indicates that his leadership closely matched a key tenet of transformational statesmanship.

Additionally, Riel’s rapprochement with Ultramontanism suggests a transformational view of human nature. For Ultras, to be liberal or non-Catholic was to live in a horrible, and almost irreligious way. As a consequence, those following Ultra thought had to see themselves as better than those who rejected the teachings of the Church and obedience to its leadership.772 The Ultras in Quebec had a particular view of French Canadians as the chosen preservers of Catholicity in

North America against the English Protestants. This entails a view of humanity as profoundly unequal with the French executing God’s plan and the English standing as obstacles to it. And if it was the case that one side worked on behalf of God and the other did not, then those in the Lord’s service occupied a higher rank. If we accept the argument that Riel encountered and embraced elements of Ultramontanism, then we can state that his perception of human nature contains the sort of inequality that animates transformational statesmanship.

772 See Flanagan, Prophet of the New World, p. 102. “Liberalism became synonymous with evil itself.” 215

Another hallmark of transformational statesmanship is the relationship between idealism and politics. Lord Russell noted that these leaders believe that politics are an absolute, and they cannot admit the possibility that any of their dearly held principles are wrong. In other words, transformational statesmen take an extreme position towards idealism in politics. For Mannheim, the utopians represent these statesmen, those whose political goals are unattainable in this world, and feel frustrated about the fact that they cannot make their objectives real. Talmon too described the totalitarian democrat as the man who is unable to divorce his private life from politics.

Everything for him is political, and any denial of his principles is tantamount to a personal attack.

Finally, according to Burns, the transformative leader eschews the practices of negotiation and compromise. Instead, he focuses men’s attention towards radical ideas and revolutionary beliefs in the name of political change.

The evidence cited about Riel proves these characteristics many times over. Consider

Riel’s position as the official prophet of the Exovedate. Someone who provides to a political body on a frequent basis visions that the Holy Ghost has told him is unlikely to admit that he might be wrong. God is omniscient and all-powerful after all. Further, being given the prophetic vision that he would lead the people against the enemies regardless of odds does not leave much room for

Riel to consider that maybe the cannon fire he was hearing was not indicative of God’s forthcoming vengeance, but rather of a stronger and larger army coming to put down the Rebellion. Riel did not believe that they would defeat the enemy with the practical materiel of war, but instead through prayer and obedience to the Ten Commandments. The right way forward had been prescribed for his people, and that path was faith.

One might also draw this about Riel’s certainty of his correctness from his seeming persistence to make rebellion against the Canadian state right from 1880 when the various tribes 216 rejected his plans. Despite the short period where he seemed to content to live in quiet, Riel remained fixated on the idea that, clearly through God, he needed to lead the Métis against the

Canadian state. It was an idea he never gave up, and that type of persistence is symptomatic of a transformational statesman.

Moreover, Riel, like other transformational statesmen, had trouble during this period at dissociating himself from the cause. His initial premise that the North-West could rebel against the Canadian state assumed that the deal for Manitoba had been violated when Ottawa did not grant his amnesty. Next, he was encouraged to visit Saskatchewan to help the people in part because he wanted to address his own indemnity. Then, once his leadership during the Rebellion took its religious turn, it was Riel who was the oracle receiving prophesy. It was Riel at the centre of the new church he was building. It was Riel who was proclaiming how God had favoured him and his cause to save the people. At every turn, Riel associated himself with the cause.

In this period of Riel’s life, Weber’s conception of charismatic leadership matches most closely. His integration of himself with the cause in the North West is precisely what Weber said these leaders do. The other Exoveeds did not followed Riel’s prophecies for traditional or legal reasons, but rather, because they believed he was God’s messenger; Weber wrote that the charismatic leader is special just because people follow him because they believe in him. And surely Riel’s public displays of piety and prophecy drew their authority from his charisma and the perceived grace of God. Weber’s charismatic leader helps to inform the transformational statesmanship typology.

Riel also demonstrated the transformational view of idealism in his various letters to

Bourget. Those letters show that Riel was convinced that God has instructed him to follow a new path, and deliver the souls of his people. He asked for God to teach him how to illuminate the way 217 forward. The practical lessons of negotiation and political horse-trading provide no insight into

Riel’s vision. As a utopian, he will liberate the captives and rescue people from Satan’s clutches.

A man bent on these sorts of objectives was clearly concerned with a new order of politics and a supernatural approach thereto. Additionally, in the letter written to his cousin and in his inculcation to Ultra theory, Riel showed his utopian idealism. The Ultras rejected any form of liberalism and modernity, and in their place, took up a belief in the Pope’s infallibility and the need for the Roman

Catholic Church to provide the content of political life. Inasmuch as the liberal and modern approach depends upon the presumption of fallibility, the plurality of interests and values in life, and freedom of conscience and religion, the Ultra sympathies of Riel underscore a transformational standpoint of staunch political idealism.

Furthermore, an important corollary of idealism and politics in the statesmanship literature is the fact that transformational leaders are apt to use violence because what matters to them is their end goal. The lives that get discarded en route are of lesser importance. In much of the primary literature cited, especially those in May 1885, we see Riel during the Rebellion encouraging his followers to take up arms against the Canadian state. In his poem from the Rebellion, he envisioned himself as someone who would vanquish the Canadians. I interpret this passage to mean that he saw the use of force necessary to accomplish this task as perfectly acceptable, especially since he was asking Christ for the strength to do it.

His letters to Crozier and Middleton reflect instances of violence. In the first case, he justified the Métis use of violence at Duck Lake as an emanation of God’s support. They won the battle because God knew their intentions were pure. In other words, the violence at Duck Lake was defensible because it was in the pursuit of good intent and Godliness. Those slain NWMP officers’ lives were not as consequential. Further, the notion that the Canadians shot first several 218 times as he claimed was specious. It is recorded that a Canadian shot one bullet first, and that was as a Métis tried to grab his gun.773 One could argue that Riel is exaggerating in that letter to Crozier to further defend the Métis use of force.

In the Middleton letter, Riel wrote bafflingly that his people were not warriors, but just petitioners for their rights. In other words, it would be fine to kill Canadians because that violence was really just an expression of the complaints his people had vis-à-vis their rights. The benefits would outweigh the drawbacks. Furthermore, God wanted this violence because He wanted them to attain their rights; one can say this since Riel thought they would meet on the battle field because of His providence. Again, the use of killing and violence was perfectly acceptable because it was in the name of God. Those who stood on the other side would be merely feeling the practical effects of His wrath. Riel’s stance towards political violence as acceptable for the sake of an idealistic cause land him within a transformational state of mind.

In addition to idealism in politics, and one’s vision of human nature, the third aspect of statesmanship focuses on psychology. I will postpone that discussion until the end of next chapter, since it is not fully answerable until the question of Riel’s sanity has been fleshed out. However, what this chapter showed was that during the years of 1875-1885, the political actions and thoughts of Riel resemble in part those of the transformational statesman. His approaches to religious prophecy, idealism, self-centeredness, political violence, and rebellion can all be fairly interpreted as examples of transformational statesmanship. Before the Rebellion, Riel underwent a religious experience that resulted in a brief institutionalization before—empowered with spiritual conviction—he sought unsuccessfully to organize a war against Canada in the North-West. Unlike other spiritual conversions, Riel’s contained an aspect of selfishness inasmuch as he was willing

773 See text 3-046, n2. 219 to live for years in the United States without pursuing his mission, and took up the invitation to come to Saskatchewan because it was an opportunity for him to profit. Once this moment passed, he regressed into his prophetic persona until his obsession with it contributed to the ultimate defeat of the North-West Rebellion. Although an analysis of Riel’s mental health is necessary before I can claim definitively that he fits within a particular typology of statesmanship, this chapter points us towards interpreting Riel as a transformational statesman during this period.

220

CHAPTER 5

RIEL’S MADNESS?

In Chapter 1, I noted that one of the three components of statesmanship was the relationship between psychology and politics. Looking at Riel after 1875, the question of his psychology is very important. If I conclude that Riel was a madman, there is no statesmanship to talk about.

Riel’s actions and ideas at that time would not have resulted from deliberate acts of choice, but instead from insanity. Although some scholars argue that Riel was mad during this stage, I argue in this chapter that we need not accept that. There is historical and psychological argument that lends a different perspective. This is not a piece of psychology, and I am not a diagnostician.

However, what I can provide are logical reasons to doubt the idea of Riel being mentally ill. One could interpret Riel’s psychology during the post-1875 period as transformational statesmanship if the evidence allows for it.

5.1. Views of Riel’s Madness

Many have written about Riel’s sanity. The topic has interested writers and scholars because if

Riel was insane, his execution for treason would be unjustified. Legally, the McNaghten Rule stated that if a man cannot understand why he was to be executed, it would be cruel and improper to impose the sentence. I, however, care about this issue for a different reason. If Riel was mentally ill, then an analysis of his statesmanship during this period would be of dubious worth. It would be like trying to evaluate the logic that Caligula used when he appointed his horse to the Senate.

Many contemporary as well as subsequent writers have viewed Riel as insane. For example, the alienist Dr. F. X. Valade examined Riel in 1885 before his execution for treason. 221

Famously, Valade concluded that Riel “is not an accountable being, that he is unable to distinguish between wrong and right on political and religious subjects, which I consider well-marked typical forms of insanity under which he undoubtedly suffers….”774 Taken together with the fact that Riel spent time in mental asylums, the case for insanity grows stronger. While at Longue-Pointe one evening, the asylum archives stated that he “insane, smashed up his cell, broke his iron cot and used it to break the ventilators and the sashes; it was truly destroyed; three robust and strong men could hardly master the poor lunatic.”775

Even before his mystical vision near Washington in 1875, there are reports of Riel’s madness. John Lee, his uncle by marriage, claimed that after Riel’s father’s death in 1864, he saw in Riel “signs of mental disturbances ... I saw his profound grief affected his mind which was manifested by exaggerations of an eccentric religion….”776 Furthermore, Lee claimed that while

Riel was studying law under Rodolphe LaFlamme at Montreal in 1865, Riel suffered from

“hallucinations” whereby he claimed to be a Jew named David Mordecai who had switched places with the “true” Riel who had drowned in the Mississippi River.777 Unlike an alienist such as

Valade, Lee was using a commonsense framework to report his observations.

Few scholars have argued more strongly than later psychiatrist C.K. Clarke that Riel was mentally ill. He stated that Riel precipitated the Rebellion, and in so doing he revealed himself as one “whose mental disease was fanned to white heat.”778 Clarke claimed that the majority of the

American Medico-Psychological Association was “united” in the position that Riel was insane.779

774 Quoted in Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, pp. 160-161. 775 Quoted in Olive Knox, “The Question of Louis Riel’s Insanity,” in Louis Riel: Selected Readings. Edited by Hartwell Bowsfield (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Pitman, 1988), p. 182. 776 Quoted at ibid., p. 183. 777 Ibid. 778 C.K. Clarke, “A Critical Study of the Case of Louis Riel,” in Louis Riel: Selected Readings. Edited by Hartwell Bowsfield (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Pitman, 1988), p. 199. 779 Ibid. 222

Riel’s constant praying showed the “marked evidences of an unbalanced mind,” and when the

Rebellion began, “Riel was so insane that, as a leader, he was of little or no account.”780 At the trial, Riel’s prosecution brought forth dubious medical testimony; Dr. Wallace, who testified against Riel, had only spent a half-hour with the accused and found him sane. 781 Clarke was convinced that Riel was deluded, and thus when Riel rejected his counsel’s advice to plead insanity, this was consistent with his insanity; throughout his life he dismissed the notion that he was mentally ill.782 His sickness explains the happiness Riel felt when the jury concluded he was sane and responsible for his treason.783

For Clarke, politics prevented Riel from being properly diagnosed. He wrote

When one considers the mass of testimony pointing to Riel’s mental defect, the undoubted history of insanity from boyhood, with the recurring paroxysms of intense excitement, he wonders that there could have been the slightest discussion regarding it. As a matter of fact it became simply a battle between race, religion, and politics, in which the sanity or insanity of the unfortunate was discussed as something apart from the real issue at stake.784

At every turn, Riel was mentally ill. He was delusional, paranoid, and religiously extreme; his was a case of “evolutional dementia.”785 Clarke contended that this condition was frequent on the

“lonely prairies of the North-West,” and other such cases resembled Riel’s closely. 786 He speculated that if Riel had stayed away from political excitement in Montana, he would never have been heard from again, since the quiet of Longue Pointe may have caused “a favourable remission,” even though he would never be cured.787 Clarke described Riel after the battle at Duck

780 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 781 Ibid., p. 201. 782 Ibid., p. 204. Clarke quoted Daniel Clark who observed Riel when the subject said, for example, that his “persecutors” put him into Longue-Pointe. 783 Ibid. 784 Ibid. 785 Ibid., p. 205. 786 Ibid. 787 Ibid. 223

Lake as a “maniacal paranoiac beyond the reach of human control, useless as a leader, and a menace to the lives of his friends and foes alike.”788 He rejected the idea that Riel was faking his insanity since “his mission was no trumped-up affair to him, and his consistency was the consistency of the insane enthusiast.”789 Without a doubt, Clarke concluded that Riel was insane in 1885, and in fact, had been displaying symptoms of mental illness years before that.

Daniel Clark, another psychiatrist, took a similar approach. He claimed that Riel’s letters to Archbishop Taché, written even before the Red River Resistance, demonstrated that bizarre ideas “were taking possession of his mind” in writing about his religious aspirations.790 Taché, because of these letters, was convinced that Riel should not become a priest because “his mind had become so erratic and full of delusions….”791

Clark wrote that he had examined many of Riel’s letters and diary entries from when he was in the asylum. The tenor of those writings would be natural to understand for someone accustomed to the thoughts of the “conceited insane.”792 His scepticism centred on Riel’s religious visions of the Holy Ghost and of other divine revelations; the tone of Clark’s comments was dismissive and sarcastic.793 He noted that if Riel’s writings were compiled, the book would be large and “the veriest trash as a whole.”794

Then, finally, Clark makes his medical pronouncement on Riel:

The particular disease of the prisoner was the mania of ambition, called by eminent authors “Megalomania.” The symptoms of the disease are sometimes found in ordinary maniacs. These maniacs are sometimes very clever in arguing from a false idea, and are very excitable when opposed because they hold the false idea strongly and are perfectly sane on all other questions. Pride occupies a place in the symptoms

788 Ibid., p. 206. 789 Ibid. 790 Daniel Clark, “The Pyscho-Medical Journey of Louis Riel.” American Journal of Insanity, volume 44 (July 1887): p. 33. 791 Ibid., p. 34. 792 Ibid., p. 38. 793 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 794 Ibid., p. 39. 224

of the disease, the victims are very egoistic and forget their best friends. The difficulty is to make them believe they will have no success in their schemes. Very rarely are they cured, though there may be intermissions.795

Riel was sick with megalomania, a disease that caused the maniac to hold fast to false ideas, to concentrate on himself against the advice of friends, and to be beyond cure. To bolster this finding,

Clark cited from Métis who knew Riel. They said that he was “insane during the rebellion,” that

Riel “was not quite sane,” and that he did not speak “like a sane man.”796 He noted that it is obvious to specialists such as him that Riel was insane because Riel had “that peculiar appearance, which is hard to be described, of a man who is honest and sincere in his insane convictions and statements.”797 In other words, based on Clark’s experience, Riel just looked the part. We are to trust him on this.

Beyond alienists, relatives, and later psychiatrists, best-selling historians tried to synthesize secondary literature but did not make use of primary sources. They depict a man who professed a fantastical religion and a personal relationship with God, who had spent time in a mental asylum.

Pierre Berton wrote of Riel in 1884, “his already mercurial psyche had been subjected to such stresses that he had gone insane at times, bellowing aloud that he was a prophet, suffering hallucinations, and sometimes running naked down the corridors of the institutions of which he was confined.”798 Similarly, Conrad Black writes of Riel during this time that he “was now suffering from intermittent dementia and had a delusionally messianic view of his own religious experience.”799 Furthermore, Black says, “Riel was of doubtful sanity and probity. He was chiefly preoccupied with a messianic mission he generally believed he possessed.”800 Both Berton and

795 Ibid., p. 40. 796 Ibid., p. 42. 797 Ibid., p. 45. 798 Berton, The Last Spike, p. 341. 799 Conrad Black, Rise to Greatness: The History of Canada from the Vikings to Present (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 2014), p. 368. 800 Ibid., p. 371. 225

Black make explicit their view that Riel was insane. We can say that the view of some alienists, relatives of Riel, later psychiatrists, and popular historians was that Riel was mad.

In contrast, others hold that Riel was not insane. Amateur historian Olive Knox’s archival research uncovered two affidavits produced by J.A. Chapleau—a lawyer and a member of Sir

John’s government during the time of Riel’s trial—from Drs. Perreault and Brunelle. These physicians observed Riel during his time in the mental asylums and concluded he was faking insanity. Perreault claimed that “I perceived with him insanity was simulated. The exaggeration of his acts was such and so much beyond what we generally remark in subjects with real insanity….”801 When Perreault challenged Riel directly about his actions, “he confessed to me in effect he was shamming insanity. And the evidence that I was right in my surmise and that his confession was really sincere, is that on all occasions … he always talked in a manner absolutely lucid and sane upon all and every subject with which he has entertained me.”802 Perreault signed

Riel’s commitment papers because he feared Riel was in danger after the fall out of the Red River

Resistance; he would be safer in the institution.803 In short, Perreault’s first-hand observations led him to doubt Riel’s insanity. Riel confessed he was faking, and then afterwards, conversed with the doctor in a totally sane manner. Perreault only agreed to keep him institutionalized because he felt Riel would be safe there from attack.

Dr. Brunelle observed Riel at the Beauport asylum and concluded that Riel was “perfectly lucid in his mind and sane in his intellect, and spoke absolutely well on all subjects when he was not observed.”804 Brunelle continued that “in my presence, said Louis Riel had been simulating insanity in such a manner as to leave no doubt in my mind as to the character of his pretended

801 Knox, “Riel’s Insanity,” p. 193. 802 Ibid., pp. 193-194. 803 Ibid., p. 194. 804 Ibid. 226 insanity … Louis also told me the secret of his insanity.”805 As before, Riel was found to be sane and he confessed to both that he was simulating his insanity.

Furthermore, Knox works through passages from Dr. Michael Lavell, an alienist sent to

Regina by Sir John to determine Riel’s sanity in 1885. Lavell’s comments show no sign of diagnosing Riel as insane; instead, as Knox wrote, the doctor showed admiration and sympathy for Riel.806 According to Lavell’s notes, Riel relayed that he had acted so strangely, such as when he raised the crucifix over his head at Duck Lake, because the Métis people were superstitious, and it was in this manner that he could retain his control.807 In other words, Riel was sane and calculating during the Rebellion. He was conning the Métis of the North-West with exaggerated religiosity, just as he had exaggerated his actions while institutionalized.

Knox concluded that Riel was a devout man with unorthodox beliefs, but not insane. While his notebooks in 1885 are filled with “incoherent” writings and prayers, she rightly asked whether any of us would be coherent if faced with imminent hanging.808 In his last letter to his mother and wife, Riel showed that he honestly believed he had been given a divine mission.809 Those letters were not the final words of a madman. Riel and his cause were not insane; Riel was sincere when he was hanged at Regina. Such would be the conclusion of Chapleau, Perreault, and Brunelle along with Knox. What we find in the literature are two perspectives. One that Riel was insane, the other that he was not.

805 Ibid. 806 Ibid., p. 195. 807 Ibid. 808 Ibid., p. 196. 809 Ibid. 227

5.2. Religiosity and the Myth of Mental Illness

To be sure, there is a healthy debate surrounding whether Riel was actually insane. But, before I can see whether Riel’s psychology is a fit subject for statesmanship analysis, I wish to argue which of these two positions I find to be most persuasive. Although, as I wrote, I cannot definitively declare Riel sane or insane, I am inclined towards the position that Riel was not insane. This argument rests on two points: the contemporary approach towards religion, and Thomas Szasz’s reflections on mental illness. My choice to review Riel’s psychology in terms of statesmanship is not simply plausible; it is reasonable.

In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche wrote that Western man moved from valuing strength and beauty in Ancient Greece towards prioritizing humility and meekness in

Christianity.810 He contended that man’s spirit could no longer be suppressed by Judeo-Christian

“slave morality,” and that mankind, if it was to be virtuous, had to throw off Christian principles.

In many ways, Nietzsche’s cry of secular progressivism succeeded in influencing Western democratic politics and society over the past 150 years. Specifically in Canada, we have seen an explosion of divorce rates, sexual liberation, abolition of capital punishment, gay marriage, and a decline in attendance at weekly religious services. All of which denote a clear and sharp reduction in the power religiosity has in our society. Although our money still mentions God, 811 God’s supremacy is recognized in the preamble of the Charter of Rights, and nominally religious days such as Christmas and Good Friday are national holidays, the importance of religion in Canadian society has ebbed since Confederation.

810 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Edited and translated by Walter Kauffman (New York, NY: Modern Library, 2000), pp. 437-600. 811 Although the Latin word for God, Dei, has been reduced to “D.” 228

The result of this ebbing means that people who profess religious conviction are seen as different. This is not necessarily because secular progressives are intolerant of religious people, but because to be religious means to prefer eternal truths to inclusivity and substantive equality, the cornerstones of secular progressivism.812 Allan Bloom saw this dynamic between people who believe in absolute truths and relative truths. For secular progressives, the “relativity of truth” is a

“moral postulate” and necessary to a free society.813 He wrote that we live in an era where claiming to be absolutist is akin to saying one believes in witches; being outside of the current intellectual climate, an absolutist meets indignation.814 Progressives believe in relativism because it leads to openness, and openness is a virtue.815 Bloom put their attitude this way:

Openness—and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of various claims of truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings—is the great insight of our times. The true believer is the real danger. The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and be really right; rather, it is not to think you are right at all.816

For the progressive, there are so many points of view that no one can know for sure which is correct. One must to be open to all comers. When people think they have absolute truth, the result of this “mad” belief is oppression and violence. Everyone is better off denying the notion of being right in the first place. One must not be open just to learning past mistakes and then finding the right path forward, instead one must be totally open.

812 This is not to exclude the “social gospel” perspective, which is both progressive and religious. I am limiting my discussion here to secular progressives rather than those open to religious inspiration. In fact, I suspect there might be an interesting line of inquiry that examines whether “openness” in the way Allan Bloom means it and I will refer to in this chapter can fit within the social gospel tradition, but that falls outside the scope of my analysis here. 813 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 25. 814 Ibid. 815 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 816 Ibid., p. 26. 229

Bloom pushed against this sort of openness by discussing the role absolute truths had for classical liberals. At the heart of a liberal democracy lay the view that everyone accepts the natural rights of mankind, whereby all are equal.817 Natural rights are various principles such as the rights to exercise freedom, own property, have a family, and live without the threat of death. For the religious—which the vast majority of classical liberals were—this means that natural rights have their origins in God, since they believe He is the author of all things. The push for openness however has effaced natural rights from our vocabulary.818 In its place is a sense of openness where any person, of any belief, of any lifestyle ought to feel as if he belongs—only he who is closed to something or other does not.819

Bloom distinguished between two types of openness. One is the “openness of indifference” that tells us we can be whatever we want and scorns those who have the audacity to assume they possess any eternal knowledge.820 The other is the openness to knowledge and truth. History is full of thinkers and societies striving for truth, and this kind of openness encourages us to reflect on previous attempts to discover what will make us happy.821 Openness can be positive when it means being open to learning what the best way to live might be. It is negative when it means being open to everything, full stop. A religious person can definitely participate in the first form of openness through Bible study, personal reflection, and openness to personal revelation. However, in being religious, one denies the second form of openness because a person of faith holds certain truths that rule out other possibilities. One who believes “not that which goeth into the mouth defiles the

817 Ibid., p. 27. 818 Ibid. 819 Ibid. 820 Ibid., p. 41. 821 Ibid. 230 man,”822 will be closed to the view that the state ought to ban sugary drinks or tobacco because they are harmful.

Bloom’s observations about progressivism help to explain why some would see Riel as insane. Progressives are skeptical of religiousness because a man of faith is a man not open to various forms of living. He believes he knows eternal truths, and will not compromise—that sort of inflexibility is allegedly at the root of history’s violent struggles. Although society tolerates people who express their faith personally and quietly, it is the tendency of our age to excoriate anyone who professes his faith loudly, and certainly those who think they have communicated in some capacity with God. The “New Atheist” authors have made careers out of criticizing and maligning publicly religious people.823 Society is influenced by the idea that people who are really religious are somehow “different” or just “not normal.” A facile conclusion would be that these religious peoples might be a bit crazy.824

If deeply religious people are seen as such, those who claim to have heard God’s voice or spoken with Him are definitely seen as insane. Consider this hypothetical. Suppose a man named

John were to walk up to us and say he had just spoken to the Lord, and He wants us to do something. Our natural reaction would be to think that John is either a liar or a madman. Now, if

Bloom is right that modern openness requires the belief that all truths are relative, then that removes the possibility of John being a liar. There is no lying when there is no actual truth to lie about. We would probably think that John is crazy. After all, the Lord does not speak to me, and

822 Matthew 15:11. 823 For an example, see Christopher Hitchens, The Missionary Position: Mother Theresa in Theory and Practice (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 2012). 824 Cf. Thomas Flanagan, “Louis Riel Insanity and Prophecy,” in Louis Riel: Selected Readings. Edited by Hartwell Bowsfield (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Pitman, 1988), p. 209. “Madness is a sort of residual category used to describe individuals who depart from the social consensus about what is reasonable.” 231 he most likely does not speak to you either. Why should I do what John says just because he says it came from God? Where is my choice in the matter?

Although this reaction is perfectly reasonable, it clashes with how we already live. In

Canada, when the Supreme Court provides a decision, we readily obey it, even though they are not the only people in the country with an intimate knowledge of the Constitution. We tend to take it on faith that these persons, all of whom have been appointed and vetted, stand in a special relationship to the law. Thus, when they rule, we follow. Despite the notwithstanding clause of the

Charter of Rights and Freedoms, legislatures regularly refuse to contradict the Court, even in circumstances when popular opinion is against the judiciary.

In Canada, over eighty-three percent of people identify as religious and over seventy-five percent as Christian.825 Because of this, our immediate thought that John must be crazy for thinking he spoke to God makes even less sense. People of religious, and particularly Judaeo-Christian, conviction believe there is a God, that God spoke to prophets throughout the millennia, and that

He interacted directly with people in the long-ago past. Adam heard God walking through the

Garden of Eden. Moses heard the voice of God in the burning bush. God sent an angel to save

Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego from Nebuchadnezzar’s furnace. God replied to Job when he dared to question Him. St. Paul saw and spoke to Christ on the road to Damascus. People of religious faith are willing to believe, and do believe, that God interceded with some people in the past, but that it could never happen today. We are comfortable with Paul or John of Patmos seeing

God’s revelation, but unnerved if somebody today makes a similar claim. To be sure, our mental asylums contain many people who believe they have spoken to God. We likely feel more

825 Statistics Canada, “Population by religion, by province and territory (2001 Census).” Available at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo30a-eng.htm. Accessed 2 July 2015. 232 comfortable with them being kept away from the general public. But in doing this, we are inconsistent, or arbitrary, with what we believe.

Instead of believing Riel was mad because he thought God told him to be his prophet, we could interpret him as a man of profound religiosity. In other words, someone who was open to knowledge of the truth and became convinced through his experiences that he knew that truth. 826

I think the contemporary attitude of discrediting religiosity in the way Nietzsche would love, and

Bloom feared, harms society. If our origin as a liberal democracy is the respect for natural rights and the equality of people, then perhaps religion can play a constructive role. Either way, the relating of religiosity and absolutism with madness and insanity need not be accepted.

Many of the arguments that Clarke and Clark presented were premised on the fact that

Riel’s religious visions were signs of megalomania in believing God gave him a task. The defensiveness he showed against anyone who questioned his mission was interpreted as pride, which is supposedly an element of megalomania. His enthusiasm for his mission was chalked up to insane enthusiasm. And, he simply had the countenance of someone with a mental disease. In other words, God—if He exists—does not talk to people. Believing He does is crazy. Believing

He talked to you is a particularly self-centred form of insanity. Defensiveness about this is more insanity. Just having that look in your eyes constitutes insanity according to the official knowers.

Here we hear echoes of the secular fear of “absolutism” and a lack of openness towards various points of view. One does not get the sense from the writers who maintained Riel was insane of any sympathy towards the idea of someone being divinely inspired. Instead of examining affidavits that were available to all these critics wherein doctors who observed Riel found him to be sane and to be faking insanity, the conviction that anyone who claims to be a religious prophet must be

826 See Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 284.This compares with how Knox and Flanagan approach the question of religion and Riel’s insanity. 233 called insane was too strong to lead these writers to a more factual conclusion.827 This attitude towards religiosity is the first reason I find those who find Riel to be sane more persuasive; it prejudices one against genuine religious experiences to such a degree that one might overlook compelling information, which seems to have happened in this case.

The second reason I am inclined that Riel was not insane emerges from the “myth of mental illness.” In an article on Riel’s sanity, Flanagan cites Thomas Szasz as an influence on his interpretation of Riel and mental illness. As with Knox, Flanagan doubts that Riel was mad; he calls pronouncements of Riel’s insanity to be “a serious distortion.”828 Before I work through

Flanagan’s arguments, we need to familiarize ourselves with Szasz’s ideas, albeit briefly.

Szasz, a professional psychiatrist, began with a simple but radical argument: mental illness is a myth. Szasz saw illness in the pre-nineteenth century sense: bodily sickness that showed itself in physical change to one’s body structure.829 In the 1800s however, psychiatrists found that their research was not receiving the same respect and attention that medical doctors did. Men such as

Jean-Martin Charcot and Sigmund Freud convinced the scientific community that there were diseases of the mind just as much as of the body, even if the mind is not a body part.830 Freud began to call his subject “patients” in an attempt to mirror medical practices that were esteemed in their time.831 Instead of asking, “Is this person sick?” Freud tried to determine “In what way is this person sick?” 832 His analyses, on Szasz’s reading, were filled with “metalanguages” and equivocations designed to make it look as if he was treating genuine illnesses.833 Psychiatrists

827 Cf. Flanagan, “Insanity and Prophecy,” p. 224 828 Ibid., p. 208. 829 Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2010), p. 11. 830 Ibid., pp. 17-31, 70-79. 831 Ibid., p. 72. 832 Ibid. 833 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 234 carved out a distinction between structural and functional illnesses. A structural illness is a physical problem, whereas a functional illness meant there was a behavioural problem. Physicians discovered the former; the latter had to be invented.834

Szasz showed that even Freud had to have known he was not treating actual sickness. In moments when he was not trying to impress his medical critics, Freud’s notes suggest he knew that his job was to give “discourses on the troubles and unhappiness of human beings or persons, as moralists and writers do.” 835 Even if someone was faking his illness—Szasz calls this

“malingering”—this was seen as an illness as well, since his actions are out of step with what psychiatrists and the public think are acceptable behaviour. 836 Szasz compared this whole movement in psychiatry to a person and a photograph of that person. A physical disease is the person, whereas the photograph is mental illness. They surely resemble one another, and are both

“real,” but they are not the same thing, and should not be treated that way.837

Instead, Szasz argued that mental illness is a metaphor rather than a phenomenon.838 We consider people to be “sick” because they behave in ways we find abnormal, just as we say someone suffers from kidney disease because his kidneys act abnormally. But someone’s personal behaviour is not a thing that can be sick in the same way. We say that someone’s behaviour is sickening, but that does not make it sick. Minds are “sick” in the same way that economies are

“sick”; the expression is metaphorical.839 The accepted version of mental illness is troublesome because of what it does to its victims. They are treated with medications they do not require and institutionalized, often against their will, because it is supposed that their sickness makes them

834 Ibid., p. 12. 835 Ibid., p. 73. 836 Ibid., pp. 236 et seq. 837 Ibid., p. 47. 838 Ibid., p. 267. 839 Ibid. 235 unable to know better.840 So often, a finding of mental illness is “stigmatizing” and robs people of their freedom and dignity.841 Furthermore, the use of insanity pleas in criminal law will “corrupt the law and victimize the subject on whose behalf they are ostensibly employed.”842 Szasz wanted to replace the concept of the victim or sufferer of mental illness who cannot be blamed or held responsible for his actions. In its place, he proposed a game theoretical idea of conduct where what we call “mental illness” is a man not following the rules of the game within our society.843 A

“mentally ill” person, on Szasz’s view, simply holds different values than those of the professionals who observe him; a hysteric struggles with the clash of equality and cooperativeness against “inequality and domination-submission” in his game.844

Szasz wrote that modern psychiatrists deny the freedom and autonomy of people to behave in various ways. They “prefer to operate with the tacit assumption that whatever their own values are, their patients and colleagues share them—or should share them!”845 A disagreement about values is not made explicit within the profession out of fear that it would destabilize “cohesion” amongst psychiatric experts and threaten the “prestige and the power of the psychiatric profession.” 846 Put differently, diagnoses of mental illness come from an unwillingness of psychiatrists to see human behaviour in a rule-following manner where one might value any number of things in their “game”; instead, they proceed in order to protect the image of their profession.

840 Ibid., p. 268. “There is no medical, moral, or legal justification for involuntary psychiatric interventions. They are crimes against humanity.” 841 Ibid., p. 267. 842 Ibid., p. 268. 843 Ibid., pp. 199-212. “Mental illnesses thus differ fundamentally from bodily diseases, and resemble, rather, certain moves or tactics in playing games,” p. 201. 844 Ibid., p. 214. 845 Ibid., p. 215. 846 Ibid. 236

And it is at this point that Flanagan’s analysis of Riel and “mental illness” demonstrates why I find the case against Riel’s insanity more persuasive. Flanagan reviews Riel’s time in asylums in the years 1876-1877 and finds that his “chief, and indeed his only important ‘symptom’ was disobedience.”847 In this vein, Riel clashed with attendants at Longue-Pointe because they insisted on calling him Louis R. David instead of Louis David Riel.848 He was barred from the chapel after he destroyed items in the sanctuary that he found unclean and unfit for worship.849 He was encouraged to give up his prophesying for obedience in line with Roman Catholic faith, and was seen as sane the fewer visions that he expressed.850 As a result, he went on a hunger strike and only broke that once he believed God wanted him to consume consecrated bread and wine.851 He would tear his clothing and present himself nude both because it “symbolized the innocence of man which could be restored by his new revelation” and because the asylum was on a tight budget—rending his clothes was Riel rebelling against his captors.852 Riel was considered insane because he refused to obey the rules of a place he where he never consented to be in the first place.

Flanagan rejects the psychiatric community’s determination of Riel as insane. Instead, he chooses to study this question from Riel’s point of view; Riel was a prophet who incurred the status of a madman because he refused to allow others to “control his thought and speech.”853 Riel was being punished for heresy, which was in effect simply “free speech.”854 As a consequence,

Flanagan writes that the issue of Riel’s insanity ought to be omitted when we consider the North-

West Rebellion; instead, we need to consider how the Canadian government had treated the Métis

847 Flanagan, “Insanity and Prophecy,” p. 221. 848 Ibid., p. 218. 849 Ibid., p. 219. 850 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 851 Ibid., p. 219. 852 Ibid., pp. 219-220. 853 Ibid., p. 224. 854 Ibid. 237 and Riel’s actions as their leader. 855 On the first score, Flanagan contends the Canadian government is responsible for its “many mistakes in policy,” and on the second, Riel is culpable for instigating a rebellion against the Canadian Crown that “marked the submergence, not the emergence” of the Métis people.856

Szasz’s reflections make Flanagan’s arguments about Riel’s sanity clear. Riel at Longue -

Pointe refused to play by the “rules of the game,” and instead behaved according to a different set of rules. The Catholic attendants and chaplains acted as if their values ought to be those that Riel accepted, and sanity only appeared when Riel submitted. To them, Riel’s “illness” was not functional, but rather structural; he had “sick” behaviour, rather than a sick body. In brief, Flana gan takes up Szasz’s contention that mental illness is metaphorical, that treating people as ill merely for unorthodox behaviour is an affront to liberty, and that instead, people should responsible for their behaviour. The evidence of Riel’s institutionalization Flanagan presents supports seeing his insanity the way Szasz saw the subject. For my part, I find the “myth of mental illness” thesis persuasive, and all the more so when considered with Riel.

As I stated, I am not a psychologist. What my reflections on secularity and Szasz’s work do suggest is that there is a strong case that Riel was not mentally ill. The proceeding analysis of

Riel’s statesmanship in terms of his psychological approach to politics does not rest on the remote possibility that he was sane. There are historical, logical, and sociological reasons to maintain that

Riel was sane enough to be considered as a statesman. Whether he was using insanity as a strategic resource cannot be stated with certain sureness, although the evidence insinuates that it is true in part. This should not disqualify him from statesmanship, since faking madness because he refused

855 Ibid. 856 Ibid. 238 to play the “rules of the game” is akin to something a transactional statesman might do located in a world he does not fit into. Let us consider his statesmanship vis-à-vis his psychology more fully.

5.3. Riel, Psychology, and Statesmanship

In our typology of statesmen, the psychology of leaders helps to determine what sort of statesman they are. Ostrogorski divided leaders who make political masterstrokes from those whose radicalism lead to risky strategic calls. The latter are what I call transformational. In 1885, Dumont, a strong and perceptive man, advised that, after acquiring weapons and cutting the communication cable between Prince Albert and Batoche, the Métis should try to solicit support from Indian tribes.

Riel rejected that advice because he thought that, somehow, the Canadians would fear what the

Métis had done and seek to negotiate with them. That did not happen, and his people could have desperately used the extra help. Then, after Duck Lake, Dumont argued for the use of what we now call “guerilla” tactics against Canadian forces to compel Ottawa to negotiate. Students of history know that the Boers in the Orange Free State, the North Vietnamese, and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan all used guerilla warfare effectively against large invading armies. Instead, Riel went against Dumont. He forced the Métis into a pitched battle against the Canadians at Batoche by wagering the Canadians would never collect a big enough force to defeat the Métis. Even

Dumont, an inveterate gambler, did not think this was a good risk. They were, of course, crushed.

Riel was convinced that God defended the Métis and directed his mission, so in his mind, there was no need for protracted fighting. Would that reflect the power and glory of God? These gambles ended the Rebellion and proved that Riel’s focus on divine providence led him to make unsuccessful strategic decisions. Although transformational statesmen can succeed, as Brigham

Young did, Riel did not. Perhaps, it was because he was not as good at it as he might have been. 239

Michels contributed to our typology by claiming that leaders with weak psyches bend while under immense stress, and as a consequence, they struggle to get people to support their cause. To be sure, when we reviewed Riel’s private writings and poems in and before 1885, Riel’s mind was often brooding and sad. In his public comments, he was violent, radical, and convinced that God’s providence would sustain his people. His erratic and unconventional religious claims—starting a new Church in the New World because God commanded it of him, for example—alienated potential Catholic allies from the North-West Rebellion. Furthermore, in his religious zealotry, he was unable to convince the Indian tribes to join a Rebellion against Canada in 1880, and unwilling to seek their support in March 1885. Michels’s arguments help to form the transformational model of statesmanship, and again, we can see Riel’s place therein.

Jung discussed leaders who pursued egoistic projects and believed they were tasked with providing ultimate answers. To be sure, Riel’s egoism was on display after 1875. Reconsider the moment after Duck Lake when Riel was meeting with injured soldiers. His attention was focused on telling the injured about the new church he was going to create in the North-West. Here we have men who were wounded, and yet Riel’s focus was squarely on himself. If we review his signature, Riel was convinced that he was a prophet, a priest, and infallible pontiff. Regardless of whether God gave him this charge, there is still something egoistic about telling people God spoke to me and told me I am now the following things. I do not believe that egoism is simply a negative word; I understand it to be a strong focus on the self.

The point about believing in giving ultimate answers also fits Riel. In his 1 May 1885 letter to the Indians at Battle Creek, he noted that the struggle was about “accomplishing” the will of

God. Furthermore, he told his readers about practicing his religion: “It is the way to obtain, in our good enterprises, success, victory, triumphs of truth, of justice, and of righteousness.” In his letter 240 to Crozier, Riel claimed that the battle was about securing a victory of their rights as desired by

God. Here we have Riel convinced that his faith and his rebellion represented a path of salvation for his people. It is not about scrip, or land, or dignity. Riel’s focus is on the ultimate salvation of his people as ordained by God. That is how he saw the North-West Rebellion; his psychology matches that of a transformational statesman. This determination connects with my conclusions in

Chapter 4: Riel was transformational in his views of human nature and idealism in politics.

241

CHAPTER 6

CANADIAN STATESMANSHIP IN COLLISON

Until now, we have reviewed statesmanship, Sir John’s relationship to it, as well as Riel’s. Here,

I want to consider how these statesmen interacted with one another. This chapter will show that

Macdonald and Riel practiced statesmanship in relation to one another. Put simply, an analysis of their interactions will demonstrate that we should interpret them as a clash of statesmanship. By looking at their statesmanship in action, we will begin to understand why events transpired as they did and why considering a leader’s statesmanship is integral to understanding the Canadian regime.

In particular, I examine their contact and negotiations during the Red River Resistance. Next, I review their interaction after the Resistance and through the North-West Rebellion. Finally, I consider the aftermath of the Rebellion with Riel’s execution for treason. In each instance, I show how both Macdonald and Riel practiced their particular forms of statesmanship. The importance of this will be discussed at length in Chapter 7.

6.1. Statesmanship during the Red River Resistance

In the autumn of 1869, William MacDougall, as the Lieutenant Governor-designate for Red River, was warned not to establish Canadian control of the colony. The Dominion Government feared that the natives would reject the establishment of Canadian rule at that moment. Regardless,

MacDougall entered into Red River and declared, on behalf of the Queen, his authority. As noted earlier in the inquiry, a group of Métis directed by Riel drove MacDougall out of the territory. Just as a match cannot be lighted until it is struck, so the Red River Resistance did not begin, in earnest, until MacDougall’s action. 242

When he heard this news, Sir John was unhappy. MacDougall had disobeyed the wishes of the Government and had claimed a royal authority that he did not yet possess.857 Macdonald’s response to the burgeoning uprising was conciliatory. His cabinet appointed two respected French

Canadian emissaries to Red River on a “mission of peace and conciliation.”858 The government did not make the commissioners plenipotentiary. Instead, they “were authorized merely to use their influence to persuade” the residents to be peaceful.859 In brief, Macdonald hoped that the power of persuasion would suffice. This hope was mistaken. Riel and his followers did not intend to settle — they feared “economic and racial absorption by an unfamiliar, aggressive civilization.”860

Further, Macdonald appointed a third commissioner, Donald A. Smith, Montreal

Commissioner of the HBC. As with the French appointees, Smith was to be peaceful. He was to explain to the Métis what the Government intended for the territory, and to report back why

MacDougall’s entry had been rebuffed.861 Colonel Garnet Wolseley—the man who would lead

Canadian forces into Red River in 1870—volunteered to accompany Smith. Macdonald declined because he thought that sending the Quartermaster-General would send unintentional warlike signals.862 Smith, with an “olive branch,” would inquire into the causes of strife, assuage public concerns and facilitate the transfer of power from HBC to the Canadian government.863

In these initial stages, Riel took a different attitude than Sir John. He incited the people of

Red River against potential Canadian rule. As Riel saw it, Canadian authority would result in the end of the Métis way of life through immigration and disrespect of their linguistic and religious

857 George Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions. Introduced by Thomas Flanagan (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 76 et seq. 858 Ibid., p. 88. 859 Ibid. 860 Ibid. 861 Ibid., p. 89; Sarah Katherine Gibson and Arthur Milnes, eds., Canada Transformed: The Speeches of Sir John A. Macdonald, A Bicentennial Celebration (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 2014), pp. 217-218. 862 Stanley, Birth of Western Canada, p. 89. 863 Ibid. 243 identity. Unlike the prime minister, Riel was willing to use violence against the Canadians if he had to; his men were armed when they drove MacDougall out of Red River. This is because, unlike

Ottawa, Riel did not see Canadian authority in Red River as a mere exchange of HBC governance for the Dominion’s. As we saw earlier, Riel thought this was an existential crisis. The objective was not peace, but security and dignity.

Riel, however, was mistaken. The Canadian government did not want to efface Métis society. In actuality, the transfer stemmed from something benign. The HBC had received authority from the United Kingdom in the 17th century since it was the most practicable way to provide governance and trade in the territory. By 1869, the new Dominion Government in British

North America was clearly a more effectual and competent government than that of a company.

The HBC could not provide the organizational or physical powers that Canada could.864 It only made sense that authority would be transferred by the Crown to the new government. Yes, the residents in Red River felt disrespected by the fact that nobody bothered to consult their opinions on the matter, but this demonstrates indifference rather than nefariousness from Ottawa. If Canada intended to disassemble the Métis way of life, then Riel’s concerns would have been justified.

However, if it was simply a question of competence, then the people of Red River could hope to inform Ottawa of their concerns and win various concessions. And this was eminently possible without violence. In the end, Ottawa’s willingness to bargain with Red River won for the Métis several important concessions. This underscores the fact that there was no intention to conquer and transform the lives of the settlers without regard to their views, albeit Riel’s threat of force did move things along.

864 See Stanley, Birth of Western Canada, pp. 19-43. 244

By the spring of 1870, Macdonald encountered a different set of challenges from Red

River. Initially, he had entertained the idea of using military force against Métis resistance, but opted against it. There are several reasons for this. First, the terrain made it impossible for an expeditionary force to arrive at Red River until the spring.865 Second, the Imperial government indicated to Sir John that they would assist only if the Dominion Government had negotiated and respected the rights of the inhabitants; the Imperial disposition was to have the colonies “attain nationhood” by providing their own self-defence rather than begging help from London.866 Third,

I contend that Macdonald had no interest in provoking a fight and abandoning negotiation.867 His would be a moderate approach, neither too pacifist nor too bellicose.

By 1870, the news of Scott’s murder by Riel had incensed people in Ontario, and they demanded retribution. On 6 April 1870, Macdonald updated the House of Commons on the

Government’s approach to Red River. He assured that “the Government [was] fully aware of, and appreciate[d] the gravity of the position, and have been so through the whole of [the] winter.”868

Further, he notified the House that Ottawa and London were “acting in accord and unison … and with the one object in view, that of retaining that country as a portion of Her Majesty’s Dominions, and of restoring law and order therein.”869 Although the Government had devised further plans to put down the trouble in Red River, Macdonald would not provide any detail, as that would be

“improper”; Canadians could rest assured that the United Kingdom had approved their intended conduct, and that it would be “carried out to a successful completion at no distant day.”870

865 Ibid., p. 127. 866 Ibid., p. 128-130. 867 Pace Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 59. 868 Gibson & Milnes, eds., Canada Transformed, p. 218. 869 Ibid. 870 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 245

To be sure, Macdonald intimated that his government was about to use force against the uprising. His comment that revealing his plans would be “improper” indicates someone hoping to conceal his strategy from enemy sympathizers. However, in the same address, he assured the

French members that the Government was still intent on negotiation. Macdonald praised the delegates sent from Red River to negotiate with his government. They were “elected by the people” and emerged from “a respectable body of men as a whole.”871 Sir John said that the delegates “will be heard” and that the representatives “will receive every consideration.”872 Macdonald would respond to the crisis at Red River through use of both force and political dialogue.

The government put out a call for volunteers to fill an expedition to Red River in both

Ontario and Quebec. While there was no difficulty in acquiring volunteers from Upper Canada, the French were sympathetic to the Métis, and Quebec had trouble filling its troop.873 Sir John was in a tight spot. He was negotiating with Métis representatives over what would become the

Manitoba Act, and yet could not disband an expeditionary mission to Red River, since this would appear as surrender to French pleas. Macdonald’s solution was one of proportionality. The expedition would go ahead, but its commander, Wolseley, was instructed to see and express the mission as one of peace. In this, Macdonald would placate the English Canadians who burned

“white hot” against Riel’s Provisional Government, but it would also ensure that the negotiations with Red River would not be jeopardized.

On that last point, Macdonald informed the House on 2 May 1870 about the negotiations with the Métis delegates that Riel’s provisional government had sent to Ottawa. Canada would welcome a new province into Confederation. His remarks about what would be the Manitoba Act,

871 Ibid., p. 220. 872 Ibid. 873 Cf. Stanley, Birth of Western Canada, p. 132. 246

1870 show that Sir John had genuine interest in the project. While Creighton thought that Sir John accepted this resolution out of political expediency,874 a careful look proves there is more to it than that.

First, Macdonald highlighted the choice of its name, Manitoba, as a reflection of the Ojibwa word that means “the speaking God.”875 The delegates were interested in a “euphonic”876 name, and he was happy to grant one that worked for all parties. Although the territory was called

Assiniboia, they agreed not to use that name in order to avoid confusion with the Assiniboine

River.877 Clarity, locality, and euphony mattered to Sir John. Second, Macdonald was enthusiastic to show that he and the delegates easily compromised on the boundaries of Manitoba. He retained

Ottawa’s control over the vast territory of the North-West, while providing for the settlers 11,000 square miles.878 Third, Macdonald proved that Ottawa had soundly negotiated with the delegates to not implement a new Constitution in the province, but that a Lieutenant Governor and Executive

Council would be appointed, and no firm decisions were yet made on various questions of right. 879

It would be left to the people, over the course of legislative sessions, to provide that content. This shows that Sir John believed he had not surrendered to the pressure applied by Riel’s government.

Manitoba would not be a polity that was distinct from its fellow provinces, but he left it open to time and negotiation whether any especial fixed constitution ought to be settled.880

More importantly, Macdonald also set out how political power would be organized. It would differ from Riel’s Provisional Government, where a unicameral legislature was swayed by

874 Creighton, The Old Chieftain, pp. 62-64. Creighton actually contradicts Sir John’s comments about the delegates being democratic representatives. It is likely he did not see this speech. 875 Gibson & Milnes, eds., p. 224. 876 Ibid. 877 Ibid., pp. 223-224. 878 Ibid., pp. 224-225. 879 Ibid., pp. 225 et seq. 880 Ibid., p. 226. 247 forceful executive leadership. In Manitoba, the legislature would have two chambers: one was appointed by the Crown, and the other constituted of elected representatives. Sir John underscored the liberalism of this plan. When a member laughed at the idea of there being two chambers,

Macdonald chided him that “being a true liberal, he will not object to the people having a voice in the settlement of their own Constitution.”881 There would be an upper chamber, but it would not be “very formidable.” 882 Manitoba would resemble Canada in having a strong house that represents the people, and a weaker one populated with elites. If we recall Macdonald’s thoughts on the Senate in Chapter Two of this inquiry, we notice that he brought his political theory of divided government to bear in Manitoba.

Riel’s relationship with Macdonald’s Government in the later stages of the Resistance was not marked with the same proportionality, even if it was not radical. On 9 March 1870, Riel addressed the representatives of the territories to inform them of his political hopes. I shall quote from the address at some length:

One result of our labors is that the people generally now have, for the first time in the history of this land, a voice in the direction of public affairs. They have here a full representation. Herein, we may congratulate ourselves that our work has been a good one; and indeed, it may almost be said to be the only result we have arrived at as of yet … Let us, then, see to it that the public are no more allowed to rush together, on one side or the other, in such a manner as they have gathered of late. Let us be friends—and let our friendship be hearty and sincere (cheers). On many occasions, since last fall, I have heard professions of friendship in this Chamber, and I must say I was sorry to hear those professions, for I knew they were—as they afterwards proved to be, insincere. There was too much of fear and estrangement to allow of that friendship to be hearty … We are here as the public authority. We are here to act in that capacity … Well, then, let us act—that is our motto (cheers). Let us not confine ourselves to thinking or speaking. We must act. Let us act inside this Chamber as well as outside. The work is urgent,—is one of the utmost consequence to ourselves and our people … There are, I know, some differences between the residents of different localities—and perhaps the easiest way to dispose of them would be that each side should concede something. A spirit of concession,

881 Ibid., p. 228. 882 Ibid. 248

I think ought to be manifested on both sides; and if it is, we will be cordial and united.883

This captures the inchoate vision Riel had for his government. The assembly was the first populated by the people’s representatives and that spoke for their views. This is true, but Riel transforms this body into “full representation.” This differs from the classic idea of representation that Macdonald used. Macdonald, following Burke, thought that the people’s representatives spoke for their interests but also used their God-given talents and reason to deliberate on what laws the people would like. Macdonald did not see his government as Canada; it represented the interests of Canada in only one sense. The Senate, the Governor-General, the Imperial administrators, and

Queen Victoria all represented the Canadian people. Various bodies, with various powers, in various places, made up the representation of Canada. Riel contended that the small collection of elected settlers assembled was the full representation of the people.

This is at odds with his earlier thoughts. Riel claimed that the people of the Red River sought to stay under the British Crown. This means that Riel thought the Crown represented his people in some way. If he was convinced the Crown was a foreign power, then political independence from that foreignness would be the goal. Why? In the 8 December Declaration, Riel followed Barclay and Du Voisin in arguing that people must rebel against a government that was imposed upon them by a foreign force. Riel and the Métis rebelled because the HBC had ceded their governmental power to another entity. But, in all cases, Riel contended that the residents wanted the guarantee of their English rights as subjects of the Crown, and feared they would be lost in the transition to a new government. The role of the Crown at Red River was to represent the rights the settlers had as English subjects. So, when Riel claimed that this new assembly fully

883 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Address before the Legislature of Rupert’s Land.” In The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-039. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 60-61. 249 represented the people, he posited not only a different vision from that of Sir John, but also one that seemed to conflict with his own earlier assertions.

Riel also thought his government could end societal conflict in the territory. The “rushing” between various sides can be stopped through a politics of friendship. Riel suffered fake friendliness from various people in the past months, but now the Provisional Government, which represented the people, provided the opportunity to make lasting friendships. All that was needed was concession and compromise. One will never know the content of these negotiations from this speech. His entreaties to friendship and unity were hollow. There was no reason to believe that

“fear and estrangement” caused the lack of comity. Riel praised the lofty notion of friendship, but the nature of this friendship or the practical measures of securing it were left unstated. I make of this that Riel used this portion of the address as rhetoric. He praised a concept to which no one would object, friendship. Anyone who disagreed with the direction Riel’s government was taking put himself in an unfriendly relationship with that government. Macdonald provided detail on the nature of the Red River Constitution, its precise boundaries, its system of government, and the importance of its name when he addressed his assembly as its leader. Riel chose obliqueness.

The last important point Riel made was about action. The government must not debate or theorize, instead, it needed to get down to work. This sounds good, but the only way an assembly can act is through legislation; this is the by-product of debate and discussion in governments without tyranny. Riel seemed to accept this by claiming that action was necessary within the assembly. What else could that action be except debate and talking together? To be sure, governmental action goes beyond discussion. Laws need enforcing and borders need guarding.

But action within the assembly is not physical action. The work “for the people” that Riel desired would have to include things he considered as inactivity. 250

There are two ways of interpreting this confusion. First, I could claim that Riel, as with the question of friendship, was merely using sophistry to encourage the Provisional Government to respond to his ideas rather than devise other ones. This is plausible, but I think Riel’s confusion stems from his inattention to the interplay between action and contemplation. This relationship has its roots in ancient political theory. In the Ethics,884 Aristotle wrote that we find happiness in consistently doing virtuous things. I am not happy when I do one or two good acts; instead, I must be a man who regularly does things that good people do. For Aristotle, the highest form of happiness comes through living a contemplative life. This is because the best goods are the ones that cannot perish and are easily accessible. In order to be a generous man, I need to have both ample amounts of money and ample opportunities to give that money away. Much depends on forces external to me in order to be generous. The contemplative man needs only reason and a little time to reflect on virtuous subjects. Neither of these necessities has the practical restraints that philanthropy does—I can choose to think whenever I wish, and when I make that decision, I am doing it temporally. But, one must not mistake contemplation for inaction. Thinking, deliberating, writing, and philosophizing are activities. The generous man acts with money, which is an external good, but the contemplative man exercises time and reason as goods of the soul. Despite what one may commonly think, action is not all about physical movement.

I see no reason in Riel’s speech to think that he understood this point. He grasped the idea that assemblies act, but he rebuked the means by which they act. The confusion the reader gets from Riel’s argument has its roots in Riel’s misunderstanding of what “action” means. He was disinclined to define friendship and misused action, even though he believed they were both useful.

While they are, he did not marshal their definitions to assist him. I see Macdonald approaching

884 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, books I and X. 251 action similarly to Aristotle. The government acted to resolve the crisis at Red River through negotiation and diplomacy, but were preparing for physical action too. The “talking” between the delegates and Ottawa was no ruse; it was an active attempt to solve a question of political representation.

Riel further interacted with Macdonald and his government through a strategic declaration on 14 May 1870. In it he wrote:

Le présent état d’excitation contre nous en certaines parties du Canada nous fournit une belle occasion de montrer la différence de leurs principes et de nôtres. … Les hommes du Haut-Canada, avec lesquels nous avons évité toutes sortes de mêlés durant les derniers mois, ont cherché à nous diviser à nous surexciter les uns contre les autres, à nous amener dans l’horrible collision d’une guerre civile! … Lorsque nous savions qu’ils se hâteraient de faire contre nous le mal qu’ils soulèvent aujourd’hui dans le Haut-Canada, en se parjurant. Et parce que l’un de ceux qui par obstination continueraient à troubler la paix publique qu’eux seuls ont compromise au milieu de nous et que nous faisons tant d’efforts pour maintenir dans le Nord- ouest nous a forcé à faire de faire de lui un exemple que d’autres pussent apprendre, ils veulent nous déclarer la guerre; pendant que Sir John A. Macdonald, le Premier est obligé de dire en justice que le Canada n’a pas de juridiction dans ce pays. Non! Ces gens-là n’ont pas travaillé et ne travaillent pas dans l’intérêt de l’Angleterre! Ils ne s’occupent de la Confédération qu’autant qu’ils la croient nécessaire à la réussite de leurs plans dont l’object est trop personnel et trop exclusif pour être juste! Ces personnes par un grand manque d’honnêteté et de loyauté ont ambitionné sur nous une supériorité tout à fait condamnable, parce que pour l’obtenir, ces faux sujets Anglais n’ont voulu et ne veulent respecter les droits de personne dans une colonie Anglaise. Ils se sont flattés du coupable espoir de pouvoir associer les projets égoïstes avec ceux de la politique Impériale pour l’Amérique Britannique du Nord. C’est une chose qu’ils ont oubliée: La politique d’un gouvernement ayant à s’occuper des intérêts généraux de la société, sans distinction de langage, d’origine, sans distinction de croyance est toujours incompatible avec les vues étroites de l’intérêt individuel... Ils auraient dû le savoir: le seul moyen d’assurer l’existence et l’extension de la Confédération est de placer sur un pied égal et libéral les Provinces de l’Amérique Britannique du Nord.885

[The present state of excitement between us and certain parts of Canada furnishes us with a proper occasion to show the difference between their principles and ours … The men of Upper Canada, with whom we have avoided all sorts of conflict during these past months, have found ways to divide us and excite us against one another, to bring us into the horrible collision of a civil war! … When we knew

885 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Protestation Des Peuples Du Nord-Ouest,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 1-060. Edited by Raymond Huel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 89-91. 252

they would hasten to do the bad things against us that they raise in Upper Canada today, they perjured themselves. And, because one of those obstinate men continued to disturb the public peace that only they have compromised among us and that we are trying so hard to maintain in the North West, has forced us to make an example out of him so that others might learn, they want to declare war on us; during which time Sir John A Macdonald, the prime minister, is obliged to justly say that Canada does not have jurisdiction in this country. No! These people have not worked and are not working in the interests of England! They occupy themselves with Confederation only as far as they believe is necessary to achieve their plans of which the goal is too personal and exclusive to be just! These very dishonest and disloyal people held over us a condemnable superiority, because to obtain it, these false English subjects have not wanted and do not want to respect the rights of a person in an English colony. They flatter themselves with a guilty hope of power by associating their egoistic projects with the Imperial policies for British North America. But they have forgotten one thing: the policy of a government to deal with the general interests of society, without distinction of language, origin, without distinction of belief is always incompatible with narrow individual views… They should have known: the only way to assure the existence and extension of Confederation is to place the provinces of British North America on equal and liberal footing.]886

Riel expressed for people their displeasure with the negotiations and their treatment by Ottawa during the Resistance. He stated that there were differences of principle between Canada and Red

River. While he did not enumerate them, it is clear he thought that the Provisional Government was an honest, loyal, and selfless advocate of the people. In contrast, he blackened the Canadian

Government as disloyal, dishonest, egoistic, and condescending. Riel’s government was open and genuine, whereas Ottawa was deceptive and cunning. To Riel, the settlers were victims of

Canadian malice.

Of particular interest for this inquiry is Riel’s direct reference to Macdonald. He thought that Sir John, as prime minister, had a moral duty to see Red River as outside of Canadian authority.

Riel then bemoaned that Macdonald shirked that obligation, and in so doing, acted against English interests. The meaning of that expression is not entirely clear, but that is Riel’s doing. I contend that by “the interests of England,” he meant the capacity for the people at Red River to remain

886 My translation. 253 loyal subjects of the Queen. Instead, Macdonald used Confederation as a stalking horse for his own narrow interests, namely the extension of Canadian power over a people that were seen as inferior. If only they remembered, Riel opined, that Confederation had to be based on equality of its constituent parts, and then it could expand justly.

This passage demonstrates Riel’s transformational view of reality. This is, of course, a discomfort with this world and its practical politics. In their place, the transformational leader hopes to bring about a whole new world where the realpolitik of political life has been excised. To be sure, Riel promoted ideas such as equality, fair negotiations, and the pursuit of peace that fall squarely within liberal democratic politics. However, he simply misunderstood Ottawa’s intentions. In Chapter 2, I reviewed Macdonald’s note to MacDougall that confirmed he thought the settlers did have a right to construct their own provisional government if a power vacuum developed. Further, by May 1870, Macdonald had accepted the delegates from Red River and personally negotiated with them over their concerns for the territory. Both publically and in private writings, Sir John demonstrated an interest in meeting the demands of Riel’s people without the use of force. Furthermore, Riel had to know that Macdonald would be in contact with the Imperial offices in London regarding the Resistance and that his government’s actions were in accord with

English interests. Riel’s expression of the people’s protests was a series of misplaced complaints, which had they been true, would have been commensurate with justice. But we cannot accept that they were.

What rankled Riel by this time, at least in part, goes back to the amnesty discussed in

Chapter 3. As I described, Riel commissioned the delegates going to Ottawa to obtain an amnesty for the leaders of the Provisional Government for their time in power. The evidence showed that

Cartier appeared to promise it, but that the government never followed through. Surely, it was 254 dishonest to renege on the concession. In this context, one can make sense of why Riel accused

Macdonald’s government of being dishonest. But it must be restated that the lack of good faith was between Sir John and Riel, not between the Canadian government and the Métis of Red River.

The people got a province in Confederation, complete with an elected assembly, Senate and House of Commons representation, and the right to help shape their Constitution. These were at the heart of Riel’s demands in the 8 December Declaration. In fact, examining that document, one fails to see a single mention of amnesty or its theoretical need. The amnesty was needed only because Riel had committed a cold-blooded murder and hoped to escape justice. It was a post facto requirement, and one not rooted in either the conservative philosophy he espoused, or in the liberal thought

Macdonald embraced. Its relative unimportance to Riel can be seen in his own comment upon fleeing Fort Garry that “No matter what happens now, the rights of the métis are assured by the

Manitoba Act; that is what I wanted—My mission is finished.”887 However, one gets the sense from the Protest that Riel would scrap the entire Manitoba Act because it was short of an amnesty for himself; he was owed that, he thought. Macdonald and Riel clashed during the Resistance, and as I will demonstrate later, these clashes ought to understood in terms of competing forms of statesmanship.

6.2. Interaction Before and During the North-West Rebellion

Between August 1870 and late 1884, Macdonald and Riel had limited contact. In part this was because Riel had quit Canada for the United States. Further, between 1874 and 1878, Macdonald’s

Tories were reduced to opposition after an electoral defeat. Nevertheless, one can see aspects of

887 Stanley, Louis Riel, p. 156. 255 contact between these men in their private writings. In particular, I want to review one of Riel’s poems dedicated to Sir John, and Macdonald’s comments about Riel in that period.

In 1879, Riel was squarely out of the crosshairs of the Canadian government. But Riel was still angry and irritated with Macdonald. After all, the man had been promised an amnesty from the Canadian state in recognition of the work he did bringing Red River into Confederation. At this time, Riel composed a poem directed towards Macdonald. I quote parts of it at length:

Sir John A. Macdonald gouverne avec orgueil Les provinces de la Puissance Et sa mauvaise foi veut prolonger mon deuil Afin que son pays l’applaudisse et l’encense.

Au lieu de la paix qu’il me doit Au lieu de respecter d’une manière exacte Notre Pacte Et mon droit, Depuis bientôt dix ans, Sir John me fait la guerre. Un homme sans parole est un homme vulgaire. Fort ou faible d’esprit, moi, je le montre au doigt.

Il a voulu jetter (sic) sans la sombre disgrâce Le prélat de St Boniface, En se voyant mal pris, il a feint la candeur.

Il s’est montré gentil pour plaire à sa grandeur. Il commissionna le Pontife Alexandre D’appaiser les métis justement soulevés: Et de ne pas manquer de leur laisser entendre Qu’ils avaient, après tout, bien fait de se défendre Puisque les MacDougall et les Schultz dépravés Etaient dûment désapprouvés De nous avoir causé toutes sorts d’alarmes En prenant contre nous les armes Sans l’autorité, De Sa Majesté.

Eh! comme de raison, il voulait faire croire Au gouvernement Provisoire Qu’Ottawa renonçait à la duplicité; Et rejettait (sic) le mal qu’il avait médité 256

Contre nous; et saurait prendre une politique A notre égard, conforme à la saine critique Sir John eut du bonheur; car l’envoyé sacré Agit et parla comme il avait espéré.

Qui peut dire autrement? L’évêque a bien fait l’œuvre Pour convaincre, il jura la parole d’honneur. Mais au lieu d’accomplir, Sir John fit la couleuvre Le traître, il a fait honte au noble ambassadeur.

Il a laissé hurler sa province enragée. Il ne l’a pas guidée, il n’a su que flatter. Et John, dans ses erreurs, l’a même encouragée. Cet homme n’a jamais rien fait pour racheter La parole d’honneur qui se trouve engagée.

Il a trompé l’évêque: et puis l’a démenti A mots couverts, avec assez de politesse Pour cacher sa scélératesse; Et contenter ses gens sans nuire à son parti.

Il a beau revêtir des façons imposantes: Il a beau se fier sur son habileté; Il rendra compte un jour au Seigneur irrité De ses injustices criantes.

…

Sir John se trouve encore une fois au pinacle Quoiqu’il soit très habile et leste à se jucher, On peut presque s’attendre à le voir trébucher Bientôt. Et ce sera peut-être au moindre obstacle.

…

Je ne souhaite pas, Sir John, que votre mort Soit pleine de tourments. Mais ce que je désire C’est que vous connaissiez et souffriez le remord: Parce que vous m’avez mangé, comme un vampire.888

[Sir John A. Macdonald governs with pride The provinces of the Dominion

888 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Sir John A. Macdonald gouverne avec orgueil,” in The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 4-094. Edited by Glen Campbell (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 234-6, 238, 239. 257

And his bad faith seeks to prolong my mourning So that his country applauds it and praises it.

Instead of the peace he owes me Instead of properly respecting Our pact And my right For nearly ten years, Sir John has made war on me A man who breaks his promise is a common man Strong or weak in spirit, I point it out.

He wanted to throw down in somber disgrace The prelate of St. Boniface And thinking he was caught out, he faked candour.

He pretended to be gracious to please his Eminence. He commissioned Alexander the pontiff To appease the Métis who were in just revolt And did not fail to let them hear That they had, after all, done well to defend themselves Since the depraved MacDougall and Schultz Were duly disapproved Us to have caused all sorts of alarms In taking up arms against us Without the authority Of Her Majesty

Ah! As a result, he [Taché] wanted the Provisional Government To believe That Ottawa renounced duplicity and They rejected the evil planned for us. His policy towards us seemed reasonable. Sir John was happy because the holy envoy Acted and spoke as he had hoped.

Who could say otherwise? The bishop carried out the task of Convincing us, he swore his word of honour. But instead of fulfilling his word, Sir John became A treacherous snake and brought shame on our noble ambassador.

He made his province [Ontario] howl with rage. He gave not leadership, but flattery. And John, in his errors, encouraged it. The man did nothing to redeem his word of honour.

He tricked the bishop, and then he lied there 258

With covert words with enough politesse to Hide his villainy; and satisfy his people without Harming his party.

He may have nice, imposing ways, He may be proud of his skills, He will have to account one day to an Angry Lord for his glaring injustices.

…

Sir John is once again at the pinnacle, Though he is clever and nimble, you can almost Expect him to stumble. And it will be Perhaps at the slightest obstacle.

…

I do not hope, Sir John, that your death Will be full of torments. But what I want Is that you understand and suffer remorse: Because you’ve devoured me like a vampire.]889

This poem is about Macdonald’s refusal to grant Riel the amnesty, and Riel’s anguish over the travails he suffered in having to flee Red River without any reward or security. Ten years had passed since this affront to his dignity, but Riel had not let it go. Time had not healed his wounds.

He gave a menacing portrait of Macdonald. Sir John was prideful, unfaithful, bellicose, disingenuous, underhanded, fake, arrogant, and a sinner.

Now, this is a poem, and one can tolerate exaggeration as a poetic device. However, the incessant depiction of Macdonald in this way has serious implications. First, Riel was convinced that Macdonald’s government’s refusal of the amnesty was a personal slight. Second, that

Macdonald humiliated Bishop Taché who went to meet with Cartier, and thus dishonoured God.

Third, that Macdonald had no intention of dealing fairly with the Provisional Government; he was just a politician looking to dupe and dispossess the naïve settlers. Fourth, Riel, now in the prophetic

889 My translation. 259 stage in his life, tried to prevision a future conflict. Macdonald had returned to power, and some small obstacle to him would cause his demise. Further, Sir John needed to feel remorse and answer to God for his injustices. By injuring Riel, Macdonald had insulted the Lord.

Knowing the future, we can offer some speculations about what Riel meant here. The forthcoming conflict would be the North-West Rebellion. The people of the North-West would be the small obstacle, since Riel thought Macdonald did not see the Métis and Indians of the West as serious adversaries. The way in which God would force John A. to see his errors would be through

His prophet Riel. As an agent of the Lord’s will—an accurate depiction of Riel’s self- understanding during the Rebellion—Riel would enlighten Macdonald to his sins. What further supports this thesis is Riel’s description of Macdonald as a vampire. A vampire is a supernatural entity that comes back from the dead and feasts upon the living. Macdonald was “dead” to justice and heavenly ideas, and was feeding on Riel’s blood.

Macdonald’s interaction with Riel was nowhere near as poetic or self-pitying. This suggests that Sir John really did not think about Riel that often. He was far too busy with the constant demands of government to spend much time writing about or reflecting on the irascible fellow. In 1871, Macdonald was thinking about Riel in the context of the upcoming election. He feared that if Riel remained in Manitoba, this would enflame racial tensions between French and

English Canadians.890 The leader of the opposition, Edward Blake, was inciting Ontarians against

Riel in the hopes of persuading these voters to support the Liberals.891 The government wanted

Riel out of Canada through a lengthy voluntary exile; Macdonald met with Riel’s erstwhile patron

Archbishop Taché to discuss inducements to that end. 892 Taché was hurt that the government

890 Stanley, Louis Riel, p. 178. 891 Ibid. 892 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 260 rescinded their promise to him during the negotiations in the spring of 1870, namely a full amnesty for Riel; he came to Ottawa to discuss the matter.893 Out of “political considerations” rather than

“simple justice,” Macdonald was willing to cut a deal for Riel.894 Sir John frankly stated that the amnesty was politically impossible for him to grant; no government in his situation could do it.895

National unity was at stake. Issues of preserving Confederation mattered a good deal more than the “inconveniences suffered by Louis Riel or the embarrassments experienced by the archbishop.”896

Macdonald opted to pay Riel to leave Canada. He gave Taché a bank draft for $1,000 which was to be disbursed in twelve installments in order to avoid being noticed.897 Sir John and Sir

George both told Taché that the Government needed Riel gone for partisan political reasons—Riel remaining in Manitoba and participating in federal politics could only help the Liberals.898 Taché returned to Riel equipped with the money and the demand that Riel go into exile. While it was a

“bitter pill for Riel to swallow” because he wanted the long-promised amnesty, “he was not unwilling to comply with the government’s request.”899 In less equivocal terms, Riel accepted the bribe. That $1000, topped up with another £600 from Donald Smith, travelled with the president of the Red River out of Manitoba.

Another interaction between Macdonald and Riel, albeit brief, came in 1873. Riel had won a by-election for the House of Commons in absentia and came to Ottawa to sign the members’ roll. Macdonald had been informed by the Clerk of the House that Riel had arrived in person to

893 Ibid., p. 179; Idem, Birth of Western Canada, p. 148. Macdonald had promised to Taché an amnesty, but it centred on “consumption of any stores or goods belonging to the Hudson’s Bay Company by the insurgents.” 894 Idem, Louis Riel, p.179. 895 Ibid.; Idem, Birth of Western Canada, p. 145. Had there been no bloodshed, it would have been politically feasible to grant an amnesty. Scott’s murder changed that. 896 Idem, Louis Riel, p. 179. 897 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 898 Ibid., p. 180. 899 Ibid., p. 181. 261 sign in as a member.900 Sir John’s reaction to the news was “to be astonished.”901 Although a short interaction, one can imagine Macdonald’s shock. He and Riel had an agreement that Riel would leave Canada and avoid federal politics in return for a cash payment. Riel took the money and went back on his word.

To discuss the clash between Macdonald and Riel during the Rebellion, we are compelled to express it in broader terms. Macdonald’s reactions towards Riel and his Rebellion and Riel’s thoughts and actions towards Macdonald and his government, I think, are reasonable ways to conceptualize their clash. Macdonald and Riel understood the motivations for North-West

Rebellion differently. For Riel, the rebellion was an opportunity for him to satisfy his divine mission of delivering his people. As indicated in Chapter 4, he transformed into a prophet who ignored sound military advice. Although religiosity coloured the Red River Resistance in terms of its political theory, it was not the spiritual struggle that 1885 was.

Macdonald believed that the Rebellion was about money, in particular, that Riel’s involvement in the insurrection was about money. Sir John thought that Riel hoped to be bought to leave Saskatchewan.902 He had good reason to think this. In 1870, Riel accepted a bribe to leave

Red River, so he was likely willing to be purchased again. As provided earlier, Riel would happily take a $35,000 down payment from the Canadian state to leave the North-West and ensure the

Métis agreed to Canadian negotiation. Macdonald could not trust Riel. The last time the two made such an arrangement, Riel broke his word when he came to Ottawa to sign the members’ roll. Sir

John provided to the House on 6 July 1885, just after the Rebellion, Riel’s modus operandi. He said: “Riel, from the beginning, when he went into the country until he left, went there for the

900 Smith and McLeod, eds., An Anecdotal Life, p. 103. 901 Ibid. 902 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, p. 252. 262 purpose of making money. He came there for the most sordid purposes possible, and he told all kinds of lies.”903 Macdonald did not view Riel as a genuine advocate of his people. He did not see

Riel as primarily a religious advisor for the Métis of the North-West. Riel had not returned for the sake of the quick and the dead; he was back for a quick buck.

This difference between the two helps to explain their approaches towards one another.

Macdonald was not going to settle with Riel. Canada’s standing as a nation that could garner respect was at stake in the North-West. Riel precipitated a conflict that was “inconsiderately commenced, wickedly commenced, criminally commenced” according to Macdonald. 904 His government needed to “put that down speedily and gallantly” and as a result of their success, the

“credit of Canada has risen because Canada has shown, as a vindicator of herself, that she is worthy of being a nation.”905 Macdonald would not beg the United Kingdom for help. He would not try to purchase an immediate peace. Canada’s standing as a country was at stake, and in an exceptional moment like that, a swift and efficient military campaign was warranted. We can say Macdonald had a double view of the Rebellion. Riel’s inciting of it centred on money and it was a defining moment for the country. Macdonald and Riel had differing arguments about the origins of the fight, but as Richard Gwyn notes, in one respect they both had similar hopes for their clash. Sir

John would use the Rebellion to “create a nation”; Riel wanted to “save a nation.”906

During this time, the prime minister held all the western portfolios in cabinet, but despite his intellect, he “knew far less about the West than he thought he did.”907 When Sir John heard in

903 Gibson & Milnes, eds., Canada Transformed, p. 340. As I show in this chapter, simply claiming that Riel was lying about altruistic purposes in the North-West is not entirely true. As I show, he was at times deceptive, but at others, he acted as a genuine defender of his people. As with most people, Riel’s thoughts contain something of a contradiction here. 904 Ibid., p. 345. 905 Ibid. 906 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 413. 907 Ibid., pp. 398-399. 263

August 1884 that Riel had returned from the United States, he did not fear that he would start any trouble.908 He was focussed on other affairs of state and had no idea that Riel had become convulsed in prophecy or that he was involving himself in politics in the North-West.909 However, once Macdonald appreciated the burgeoning crisis from the various reports he received, he was convinced that he had to persuade the Indians of the North-West not to ally with Riel.910 On their own, the Métis were meagre enough for the Canadian state to defeat, but, if Riel could enlist the

25,000 Plains Indians in his cause, Canada would require Imperial assistance to quash an uprising.911 Macdonald knew that a country cannot call itself sovereign if it cannot put down skirmishes in its own territory.

We see an example of Macdonald and Riel’s political interaction with the Blackfoot. Well before 1885, Riel had worked to unite Indians with the Métis to help “drive the white man from the North-West.”912 Although the Cree and Sioux were sympathetic, Crowfoot, the chief of the

Blackfoot, was not.913 Crowfoot would have been an excellent ally for Riel. He was an experienced warrior and led an important tribe. On several occasions, Riel tried to coax him into an alliance, but Crowfoot was uninterested in his plan to “capture the North-West and hold it for the Indian race and the Métis.”914 Macdonald also appreciated the importance of the Blackfoot. He wanted to make sure they did not support Riel’s rebellion if things initially looked positive for the rebels. In

March 1885, Sir John wired Father Albert Lacombe, an envoy he trusted, to visit Crowfoot to ensure that the Blackfoot would remain out of the war; he increased the rations for the Blackfoot

908 Ibid., p. 400. 909 Ibid., p. 401. 910 Ibid., pp. 414-415. 911 Ibid., p. 414. 912 Ibid., p. 447. 913 Ibid., pp. 447-448. 914 Ibid., p. 448. 264 as well as other Cree bands in the North-West as further inducement.915 Consequently, the Indian tribes never supported the Rebellion.916 Riel hoped to convince Crowfoot that his support would lead to a new North-West where Indians and Métis were the established authority of the territory.

He failed. Macdonald only wanted to persuade Crowfoot and other Indians to remain quiet, and encouraged that behaviour with additional material support.

Another obvious place of conflict between Riel and Macdonald comes from strategic planning. Even in the days before Duck Lake, Macdonald was preparing a military response for

Riel’s rebellion. He sent General Middleton to lead an expeditionary force by rail to the North-

West and informed the Winnipeg Militia to get ready for battle against the insurrectionists.917 Sir

John provided Middleton with exact orders regarding how the armed forces should act. He wrote that the “first thing to be done is to localize the insurrection so as to prevent the flame from spreading westwards.”918 Further, Macdonald was happy to negotiate with William Van Horne over the CPR. His government would rescue the CPR from its indebtedness and award Van Horne complete control over the railway—a serious concession from the government—if the CPR would transport Canadians to the prairies to extinguish the rebellion.919 Van Horne agreed, and in nine days, he transported 3,300 Canadians to Qu’Appelle. These troops provided the decisive blow to the rebels and ended the war.

In contrast, Riel’s strategic planning was scant. As we examined in Chapter Four, he rebuffed Dumont’s pleas to try and enlist various Indians into the Rebellion. Further, he rejected the Prince of the Prairies’ strategy of guerilla warfare against the Canadians; Riel wanted a

915 Ibid., p. 445; Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 418. 916 Gwyn notes that beyond Macdonald’s influence, the Indians opted not to support the Riel Rebellion because of their loyalty to the agreements they signed with the Queen and the Canadian government. Joining the Rebellion would be a violation of their peace treaties. See Nation Maker, p. 449. 917 Ibid., p. 449 918 Ibid., p. 451. 919 Ibid., pp. 451-452. 265 traditional pitched battle where God’s favour of the Métis would be obvious. Even after Riel finally agreed that the rebels should “take the fight to the enemy,” he prevented Dumont and 130 Métis from a night-time attack on Middleton’s forces in South Branch because they did not arrive in time. The reason was that Riel insisted on reciting the rosary each time the men had to stop.920

Dumont was the soundest strategic mind in the contest, and to his credit, the rebels won every battle of the campaign except Batoche. Even there, Dumont’s strategy of moving his troops around to disguise their numbers and their use of trenches prolonged the battle.921 But Riel left Dumont with a force no larger than one third of Middleton’s. He had prevented him from using various tactics and manoeuvres and delayed his use of others. Without allies and without allowing his field general to strategize freely, Riel’s tactics led to the rebellion’s defeat by Macdonald’s forces. As during and after the Resistance, Macdonald and Riel clashed as statesmen during the North-West

Rebellion.

6.3. Macdonald & Riel: The Clash Over Hanging

The chief connection Macdonald and Riel had during this period was over whether the sentence of hanging should be carried through. In nineteenth century British common law, there existed the

McNaghten Rule. This rule states “the defense must clearly prove that the defendant was suffering from such a defect of reason from disease of the mind that he did not understand” what he had done was wrong.922 If Macdonald believed that Riel was unfit to face the noose, the Crown,

920 Ibid., p. 454 921 Ibid., p. 455. 922 Ellsworth Lapham Fersch, ed., Thinking About the Insanity Defense: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions with Case Examples (New York, NY: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), pp. 28-29. The test is also referred to as the “M’Naghten test.” Because the scholars I cite in this inquiry opt for “McNaghten,” that is the orthography used. 266 through the Governor General-in-Council, would commute the sentence and send Riel to an asylum.

Interestingly, both Riel and Macdonald wanted to find him sane. For his part, Riel insisted throughout his trial that his lawyers should not use an insanity defence. Riel thought he was God’s prophet rather than a madman. To concede insanity would be to invalidate both his religious experiences and his visions. Riel was adamant during his trial that he was sane and “responsible for his behaviour.”923

Macdonald wanted Riel to be sane for political reasons. Since 1869, he had caused Sir John nothing but grief. With Riel’s conviction for treason, the end of the president of the Red River was in sight. Even though the Rebellion was quashed, Macdonald was beset by English members of his caucus and voters who bayed for Riel’s blood. Concurrently, French members and voters wanted leniency for a pitiable character with whom they sympathized. Sir John thought that once

Riel was dead, the fervour over him would eventually die out too. Surely, new political stories would capture the attention of the Canadian people. But, in order to see Riel hang, Macdonald needed to show he was of sufficiently sound mind.

We can consider part of Macdonald’s position on Riel’s treachery as he described it in a private letter to the Governor General on 28 August 1885.924 Macdonald differentiated between

“treasons and treasons,” meaning that some treasons are technically rebellions but are mostly riots without international political significance.925 He wrote that the “offences of Riel were riot and murder of such an extensive nature as to make them technically amount to treason.”926 However,

923 Bumsted, Riel v. Canada, pp. 291-292. 924 Joseph Pope, ed., Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 354- 356. 925 Ibid., p. 354. 926 Ibid., p. 355. 267

Macdonald noted that this treason was of the lesser variety. 927 Nevertheless, the passions in

English Canada are such that if Riel’s execution were not carried through, it would result in

“greatly affecting the friendly relations between English and French” and have “serious and far- reaching consequences of a disastrous character.”928 While some in French Canada sympathized with Riel, Macdonald told the Governor General that Riel’s actions in the North-West and the

“abandonment of the faith of his fathers” would “prevent any anticipated sentiment in his favour.”929 In short, although Riel was not the greatest traitor possible, what he had done in the

North-West was in fact treason. Further, English Canadians sought his execution so fiercely that failure to see it through risked racial war in Canada. And, Macdonald believed that the French were not nearly as emotionally invested in Riel as their English fellows were. One can read this letter as Macdonald explaining to the Governor General why legally and politically it made sense to ensure Riel’s death sentence be carried out.

Sir John also had every reason to believe that if Riel escaped execution, he would re-enter

Canadian politics. In July 1885, Riel wrote Macdonald a letter. 930 Much of its contents are confusing and unfocussed. Of particular import to Macdonald though would have been this:

Mon intérêt n’est pas seulement de me disculper. Je désire me réhabiliter. Si par le soutien de Dieu et la faveur des bonnes gens, il m’est permis de viser aux avantages d’une vraie réhabilitation et d’une indemnité équitable, ce serait pour rentrer dans la politique Manitobaine. Il m’en coûte d’abandonner ma patrie ma mère, mes frères, mes sœurs, mes parents, mes amis. De plus j’ai à cœur de continuer mon œuvre. J’apprécie le grand talent des hommes qui ont gouverné et qui gouvernent, encore à l’heure qu’il est, le Manitoba. Mais il me semble qu’ils ne comprennent pas sa fondation. C’est pour cela que cette province n’est pas à l’aise et que la Confédération s’en sent. Le Manitoba profite mais il me fait penser à ces personnes qui engraissent sans avoir de santé. Il ne lui

927 Ibid. 928 Ibid. 929 Ibid. 930 George Stanley, gen. ed., “Lettre à John A. Macdonald.” In The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, text 3-073. Edited by Thomas Flanagan (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1985), pp. 129-131. 268

serait peut-être pas inutile que j’arrivasse un jour à son ministère. Et il me serait particulièrement avantageux, à moi, d’y arriver, pour continuer avec notre gouvernement ce qui a été commencé, il y a quinze ans, par l’acte du Manitoba.931

[My interest is not only to exonerate myself. I desire to rehabilitate myself. If by God’s will and the favour of good men, I am able go after the advantages of a real rehabilitation and an equitable indemnity, it would mean getting into Manitoban politics. It cost me to abandon my homeland, my mother, my brothers, my sisters, my parents, my friends. And moreover I have the heart to continue my work. I respect the great talent of the men who governed and who govern, up to this day, Manitoba. But it seems to me that they do not understand its foundation. This is why this province is not at ease and Confederation feels it. Manitoba profits but it makes me think of these people who fatten without being healthy. It will not perhaps be useless that I enter its ministry. And it would be particularly advantageous for me to continue with our government which originated fifteen years ago in the Manitoba Act.]932

If Riel was acquitted, he hoped to rehabilitate himself as a key player in Manitoba politics. Sir

John had no reason to think that if Riel avoided execution that he would retire from public life peacefully. Riel was never going to be Cincinnatus. Instead, he wanted to go back to Manitoba and be a minister in its government. Politically, this man tormented Macdonald. That had not changed from 1869 and it was never going to. If Macdonald was to be finally free of Riel, the man would have to hang. It would be disingenuous to say that Sir John was impartial; he certainly preferred the full weight of justice to fall on Riel.

I compare this in political philosophy to Socrates’ argument in the Apology. In the dock and facing death for his alleged crimes against Athens, Socrates entertained the ideas of stopping his dialectical enquiries or going into exile. He categorically objected to either possibility.933 He claimed it was his duty to persist in asking questions and philosophizing. He, like Riel, heard the

931 Ibid., p. 129-130. 932 My translation. 933 Plato, Apology, in Four Texts on Socrates. Translated by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 37d-38b, pp. 91-92. 269 voice of a God who told him that it was his task to constantly enquire into truth and knowledge. 934

He was uninterested in avoiding death for the sake of being peaceful because his mission was what gave his life meaning. Even at the end of the dialogue, once he was convicted and sentenced to die, Socrates clung to his belief in that duty. He said to the jury “now it is the time to go away, I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to a better thing is unclear to everyone except to the god.”935 Sir John, in this instance, stands akin to Meletus, the chief prosecutor of Socrates.

Although Meletus had nefarious intentions that I doubt Macdonald shared, both wished to see their accused face death in the name of their understanding of justice and the preservation of the polity.

Macdonald’s solution was to send doctors to Regina to examine Riel. In particular, he chose Drs. Michael Lavell and F.X. Valade. Lavell was English and a constituent of Macdonald’s.

Sir John trusted him, as warden of the Kingston Penitentiary and a professor of obstetrics at

Queen’s University, to render a strong decision.936 Valade was French; it would not have been possible for Macdonald to send only an English doctor without it appearing as a whitewash to the

Quebec members of his caucus. Both were to visit Riel in his cell and discover whether he was responsible enough to hang.937 Macdonald gave both physicians these instructions, but he gave

Lavell additional information. Since Lavell had greater experience with insanity, he should be forceful in his determination and work to ensure that Valade showed him deference. 938 The implication of this is that Macdonald was doing whatever he could to procure a determination of

“sane” if it were feasible.

934 Ibid., 31d, p. 83. 935 Ibid., 42a, p. 97. 936 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, p. 158. 937 Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 436. 938 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, p. 158. 270

Both doctors examined Riel, but they came to slightly different conclusions. Lavell’s conclusion was: “I am of the opinion that Riel, although holding foolish and peculiar visions as to religion and general government, is an accountable being and knows right from wrong.”939 The

Englishman had no doubt that Riel’s mental state was sound enough to hang. Valade, however, wrote that “I have come to the conclusion that that he is not an accountable being, that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong on political and religious subjects which I consider well marked typical forms of a kind of insanity he suffers, but on other points I believe him to be quite sensible and can distinguish right from wrong.”940 The French doctor thought Riel sane in some respects and insane in others and this makes his findings different from Lavell.

Although both doctors intended to write up full reports on their examinations, Macdonald opted to work quickly. He composed a memo for cabinet that included a rendition of what the doctors said and the letter of instruction he sent to both doctors.941 The cabinet decided on 12

November that Riel’s sentence should be carried out; they decided that, despite different verbiage between Lavell and Valade, both doctors came to the same basic determination.942 On the morning of 16 November 1885, while reciting the Lord’s Prayer, Riel was hanged.

Of interest for us is how to interpret Macdonald’s actions in this affair. It is important to state that Sir John did not convict Riel of treason. He also did not impose a death sentence on him.

Both these decisions were taken in a legal process—the very process Riel had denied Thomas Scott at Red River. What matters is a sound understanding of why Macdonald acted as he did vis-à-vis the medical determination of Riel’s mental accountability. For my part, I find that Sir John was not a wholly honest broker here, but will stop short of accusing him of sinister intentions.

939 Quoted in ibid., p. 160. 940 Quoted in ibid., pp. 160-161. 941 Ibid., p. 161. 942 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 271

The literature is divided on interpreting Macdonald’s treatment of Riel. Flanagan writes that the doctors came to opposite conclusions on the integral point—whether Riel was accountable enough to hang.943 He argues that Macdonald did not fully inform the cabinet with all possible evidence—he omitted the additional instructions he gave to Lavell, he did not wait for detailed reports from the physicians, and he did not give them a report from Dr. Augustus Jukes, a surgeon in the area, who also examined Riel at Regina.944 Further, in March 1886 when Macdonald was compelled to reveal to the House the details of the reports to justify the cabinet’s decision, the documents laid on the table “were not an accurate transcript.”945 Lavell’s comments were released unedited, but Valade’s had been modified to say that Riel “suffers under hallucinations on political and religious subjects.”946 Gone was the comment about Riel being unaccountable over these matters. Flanagan calls this a “crude forgery.”947

Creighton took a decidedly more defensive position. He underscored that the important point Macdonald made to the doctors was to determine “not as to whether Riel is subject to illusions or delusions but whether he is so bereft of reason as not to know right from wrong and as not to be an accountable being.”948 Creighton noted that although Valade made the comment about

Riel’s unaccountability on “political and religious subjects,” the evidence in its totality did not meet the “supreme necessity” needed to stop the hanging.949 The only real dilemma Sir John faced at that cabinet meeting was whether his French ministers would back his decision that the court’s decision needed to stand—and they did.950 Furthermore, Creighton praised Macdonald’s decision

943 Ibid, p. 161. 944 Ibid. 945 Ibid., p. 163. 946 Ibid. 947 Ibid., p. 164. 948 Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 436. 949 Ibid., p. 437. 950 Ibid. 272 to release information about the doctor’s reports to Parliament. He wrote that in “a twentieth- century treason case, such private and highly confidential communications would almost certainly be withheld from publication; but Macdonald’s government, which dispensed information with a swiftness and a completeness rarely known in modern democracies,” decided to be open.951

Creighton also characterized the modification of Valade’s report as “not an unfair exercise.”952 This was because the government also removed comments from Lavell’s report about

Riel’s vanity and ego that would have unfairly biased readers against Riel.953 In changing the wording of Valade’s report, Macdonald’s government “blurred” but did not eliminate his comments about Riel’s unusual approach to religion and politics.954 The government intended to provide the brief “gist” of the doctors’ opinions and did so with “unprovocative language.”955

Whereas Flanagan writes that Macdonald forged the reports, Creighton felt that Sir John had simply condensed the reports fairly.

Both scholars do agree that it was just for Riel to hang. Creighton had said that

Macdonald’s decision to not seek clemency had everything to do with the strenuous proof required under the McNaghten Rule. Flanagan argued that Valade’s determination of unaccountability was poorly founded. Valade based his view on “monomania” that was invented by French thinkers. 956

This condition is “insanity focussed on one area of perception or action, in some cases accompanied by extensive lucid periods.”957 This is, of course, precisely how Valade understood

Riel as expressed in his report. Whereas Lavell based his argument on the “dominant legal view

951 Ibid., p. 447. 952 Ibid. 953 Ibid. 954 Ibid., p. 448. 955 Ibid. 956 Flanagan, 1885 Reconsidered, p. 166. 957 Ibid. 273 of insanity in contemporary British law,” Valade founded his on foreign, French theories.958 Thus,

Flanagan writes that it would have been inconceivable for the Canadian cabinet to overlook British legal interpretations in favour of a French one.959 Riel was a religiously obsessed prophet, but it could not be denied that he was perfectly accountable over “the affairs of life,” and did not meet the McNaghten Rule exemption.960 Yes, the government acted in “bad faith” with “less than admirable” methods, but the decision was legally defensible.961

6.4. Statesmanship Between Macdonald and Riel

Having reviewed various interactions between Macdonald and Riel, I want to consider the form of statesmanship they employed against one another. The evidence is consistent with the determinations in our previous chapters; Macdonald appears transactional, whereas Riel was transformational. However, I note that Sir John, at times, does fall outside the confines of transactional statesmanship. He does not take up a transformational statesmanship; rather, he simply acted too rashly.

Macdonald’s actions during the Red River Resistance resembled transactional statesmanship. Mansfield’s view is that these statesmen do the best they can in present circumstances. This leader cannot change the world to satisfy everyone, but will make things as palatable as possible. Sir John sent Donald Smith to Red River for just this reason. There was no stopping Canada assuming control over the territory. The idea that the settlers could govern themselves without Canadian interference was impracticable. Instead, Macdonald took the initiative to inform the people that the government did not mean to harm them, and in fact, was

958 Ibid., p. 167. 959 Ibid. 960 Ibid. 961 Ibid., pp. 167-168. 274 taking their opinions seriously. The decision to keep Wolsley behind indicated a fear that such a move would indicate that Macdonald had violent intentions. Further, following Mansfield’s idea of the “statesman’s presumption,” Sir John appreciated that the concerns of the people of Red

River were sincere. He sent a commissioner to assure the people that their lives and economy were not going to be wrecked by Canadian assumption of power.

Second, Macdonald was transactional in his balance of French and English emotions over

Riel after the execution of Scott. Rossum wrote that statesmen need to employ wisdom and prudence in their decision making. They must understand the flaws of human nature, and tailor politics accordingly. From Ostrogorski we see that these statesmen need to understand public opinion and employ it with a “master stroke.” Michels informed this typology with idea of the strong-willed leader who does not give into public needs, but instead shows courage and strategy to resolve crises. Macdonald knew that English Canadians fumed because one of “their own” had been slain by Riel. He also knew that French Canadians raged because they identified with Riel— a French outsider fighting against English domination. Sir John, then, tried to satisfy both sides of the conflict by negotiating and attempting to placate the Métis demands on the one hand, while organizing militias to fight in Red River on the other. Macdonald understood public opinion in both French and English Canada, and endeavoured to satisfy both without giving into their demands. This proportionality is a transactional hallmark.

He also used the Resistance as an opportunity to install Canadian principles at Red River.

This shows the role of vision present in transactional statesmanship. Sowell’s concept of tragic vision fits. This is the idea that justice comes from the rule of law, freedom comes from a lack of impediment, and human agency has limits. By overwhelming Red River and instituting the

Manitoba Act, Macdonald was not laying down a new theory of justice. Rather, it was the 275 installation of British common law, constitutional liberty, and a liberal-democratic system of government. This stands as an application of the legal authority of leadership that Weber described.

Further, Jaffa wrote that statesmen of this type harness their ambition through just anger.

Macdonald was angry that Riel had slain Scott and angry that Canada would be diminished in the eyes of others if they allowed a small cadre of settlers to bully them. His ambition to extend the

Canadian state from Atlantic to Pacific was thus channeled through a righteous anger at Red River to bring it into Confederation.

Macdonald’s vision also emerged in his speech to Parliament about the Manitoba Act. He chose “Manitoba” out of linguistic and practical respect. He negotiated the territory of the province to only be 11,000 square miles. He ensured that there would be Crown government, but also a legislative chamber for the people’s representatives. In all these things, Sir John presents himself as a political leader with a restrained view of what politics can do. Lord Russell commented that these leaders use empiricism and avoid striving for “rational truth.” Sowell’s tragic leader thinks the scope of politics is limited. Burns’s theory of transactional leaders presents people who hope to satisfy the real needs and demands of the people through trading and negotiating with others. In all these things, it is evident that Macdonald’s approach towards Riel’s commissioners vis-à-vis

Manitoban policy was transactional.

In contrast, Riel represented a transformational leader in his interplay with Sir John in this period. He saw Canada’s control of Red River as an existential crisis. The Métis way of life would be obliterated if Macdonald’s government seized control. The objective, then, was dignity for his people. This sort of abstraction resembles a transformational tendency. Talmon wrote that these leaders are doctrinaire in their approach to politics. Burns understood transfomational leaders as those who fought for abstract principles and a “conscious purpose.” James’s typology of the 276 tender-minded highlighted the predisposition towards abstraction. Riel wanted to save his people from attack. He hoped to preserve their dignity and their identity. These are not tangible goals.

This does not mean they are not real, but are not the sorts of things one can touch and see. Dignity, for example, has no obvious material characteristics. The same goes for a “way of life.” One has to organize in, and out, various activities that constitute that complex idea. Further, Riel indicated that his government wanted to induce friendship amongst the people, without any discussion of what friendship even meant in this context. He wanted “action” from his government, but his attempt at defining action was convoluted and unclear. His tendency towards seeing the Red River

Resistance as a struggle on an abstracted basis points us towards transformational statesmanship.

We can interpret Riel’s interpretation of “action,” “friendship,” and the like as an element of transformational statesmanship too. Mannheim’s utopianism was marked by those who were so alienated from this world that they ignored it completely in order to build a better tomorrow. What

Riel intended by genuine friendship or real action might have been clear to him as he thought about a new Red River governed by the Métis only. But to those who do not possess so vivid a vision, his comments confuse. He did not inform and lead the people in coherent and relatable ways.

Instead, Riel turned inwards to new definitions and principles only clear to someone who had glimpsed their truest meaning.

Another way Riel demonstrated this statesmanship comes through an identification of the cause with oneself. Talmon warns of leaders who see any criticism of their ideas as an affront to them personally. There is no life outside of politics for these leaders, and they see their existence as part of the struggle. Riel’s condemnations of Macdonald’s double-dealing centre around the amnesty. Because the Canadian state lied to Riel and his commissioners about the amnesty, Sir

John and the government were complete hucksters and the Manitoba Act was a sham. He also 277 confused the Provisional Government that he led with the full representation of the people—a blending of the people’s cause with himself again. What the people wanted was what Riel’s government wanted.

Sure, Macdonald wronged Riel by deceiving him about the amnesty. But the sum total of his negotiations with Riel’s commissioners resulted in the people of Red River receiving a great deal of political independence. Macdonald was interested in making political concessions to achieve a reasonable outcome. Riel’s objectives were grander and less strategic. He wanted to retain the dignity of his people, and wanted the amnesty which was his by right. The Provisional

Government would have foundered and his people would have been overrun if not for what he did.

Thus, his amnesty was part-and-parcel of securing Red River’s peaceful entry into Canada. This obsession with abstraction and a melding of the cause with himself are patent aspects of transformational statesmanship.

Further, Riel’s depictions of Macdonald and the government expand this argument. He called Macdonald dishonest, unjust, and condescending. A mark of transformational statesman is a tendency to see their political disputes in absolute terms. Sowell, Talmon, and Russell all indicate a typology of leaders who deny empirical ideas of human self-interest, trial and error, and limited agency in favour of a politics based on salvation, categorical decisions, and fixed solutions.

Macdonald, according to Riel’s various writings cited above, was seen as an enemy. He was denying Manitobans their true rights. His scheming violated English principles of law. The interest displayed by him and his government was wicked. In contrast, Riel’s people sought to be on equal footing with other British North Americans. They wanted public peace. They entreated for the complete respect of their rights as subjects of the queen. They wanted genuine friendship. Instead 278 of approaching the Canadians as potential partners or political adversaries, Riel was determined to interpret Macdonald as an enemy of good people

The statesmanship Macdonald portrayed before and during the North-West Rebellion in his conflicts with Riel was transactional. First, Macdonald was willing to pay Riel to leave Canada after the Resistance. He commented that it was about political expediency, not in the name of justice. The preservation of peace within Confederation meant that if he had to cut Riel a cheque, he would. Later, after Riel demonstrated that he could not be trusted by signing into the members’ roll, Macdonald refused Riel a second payoff to leave the North-West. He came to think that the entire Rebellion was, at its core, all about money.

This is congruent with transactional statesmanship in several respects. First, following

Burns, transactional statesmen see politics as a series of tradeoffs for short-term gain. Instead of standing on principle, they will cut deals. Mansfield says these statesmen do the present good they can do given the circumstances. Rossum, Jaffa, and Sowell all wrote that these statesmen understand the self-interestedness of human nature. Sir John’s decision to pay Riel the $1,000 sprang from a willingness to give away public money for national security. The best he could do for Canada was to give Riel a small sum in order to quell racial unrest. Macdonald also understood that money is an excellent instrument to accomplish his goal, since most people desire money and

Riel was poor.

However, when Sir John denied his later request in the North-West, he took up a different element of transactional statesmanship. Burns wrote that transactional leaders have principles, but they pursue them in non-doctrinaire ways. Lincoln, he noted, believed in liberty and equality under the law, but was willing to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War to preserve the Union.

Insofar as the Union, whose constitutional documents contain fundamental liberty and equality for 279 all men, was preserved, he defended principles, even if that meant compromising them in a small way to protect them in a fuller sense. Michels indicated certain leaders have the fortitude to say

“no” to the neediness of the people when it is the right thing to do. And, there is Sowell’s

“constrained vision” of human nature, which these leaders share. This is the view that people are primarily out for themselves, and that their selfishness is not the residue of the economic or political system of the day. Sir John fits this model here. He believed in protecting the people’s money. He was willing to forfeit a small portion of it to Riel so that the country was safe. A $1,000 payoff was cheaper in the long run than the cost that the significant fight Riel’s presence would precipitate. But then Macdonald realized that Riel refused to uphold his end of the bargain. When he demanded more money, Sir John saw that a bribe was not going to resolve a national problem.

And he understood that Riel suffered from the human flaw of avarice. Riel said explicitly that he wanted money and that he would ensure the Rebellion was quieted if he got it. Riel, in his nature, was a man who wanted money. Sir John, discovering this through empirical observation, knew well enough not to give in. His words remind us of Mansfield’s comments about statesmen making do: “The insurrection is a bad business, but we must face it as best we may.”962

Riel related to Macdonald in the spirit of transformational statesmanship. In his poem, he continued to obsess over the amnesty that Sir John denied him. He characterized Macdonald in

“evil” terms. This time, however, he confronted Macdonald with specifically religious thinking.

He wrote that John A. would have to answer for to a vengeful God for his crimes, and that through

God’s grace, Riel hoped that Macdonald would feel the pain of remorse. During the lead up to the

Rebellion, Macdonald thought little about Riel except in a few short instances that surrounded money. Riel, in contrast, at this point subsumed in his religious prophecy, was anticipating that

962 Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 418. This comment was written by Macdonald to Lt-Gov. Dewdney. 280

God would lead him against Macdonald in a holy cause. The evil done to God’s messenger and to those he appointed to negotiate with Macdonald would be avenged. This focus on abstraction and good and evil once again match transformational statesmanship. Further, it demonstrates Talmon’s comment about these types of leaders. People in this typology believe there is a sole truth in politics. To be sure, inasmuch as Riel is convinced that Macdonald’s offenses against him are a crime against God’s will, there is no room for negotiating what God’s perspective would be.

Their negotiations with the Indian tribes also help to illustrate their statesmanship. Riel implored Crowfoot to have the Blackfoot unite with his Métis to drive the white man out of the

North-West so that they could govern it. Despite multiple attempts, Riel could not convince him or several other Indian tribes to violate their peace treaties and rebel against the Crown.

Conversely, Macdonald sent an envoy to visit the Blackfoot to encourage their inactivity and he increased their rations. The difference in statesmanship is clear. Riel proposed to Crowfoot a strategy that resembles the utopian thinking of Mannheim. These utopians fundamentally want a different world, and are willing to smash the current state of things to accomplish it. Riel appealed to an abstract form of government that the Crowfoot could help to build. In contrast, Macdonald understood the self-interestedness of human nature in giving extra rations. Moreover, he proposed to the Blackfoot a far simpler and easily understandable course of action: stand pat. The Blackfoot, as with other Indian tribes, clearly preferred Sir John’s material and practical offers to Riel’s bolder and more radical promises. It was a triumph of transactional statesmanship over transformative.

Further, their clash in terms of military strategy shows a divergence in statesmanship. Sir

John was already preparing war before the Rebellion began in earnest. He gave Van Horne control over the CPR if he would transport Sir John’s troops to Qu’Appelle. He directly ordered Middleton to contain the spread of insurrection to the areas already in rebellion. He sent a large contingent of 281 men to the West to ensure they outnumbered Riel’s forces. In contrast, Riel prevented Dumont from engaging in guerilla tactics. He consumed much of the Exovedate’s time with his spiritual revelations. He unintentionally sabotaged Dumont’s plan to attack Middleton’s forces at night by slowing down their campaign when he recited the rosary. He also sought a pitched battle that his undermanned force could not win because he was certain of God’s providential support.

Macdonald’s approach towards Riel’s forces was empirical, pliable in terms of principle, and prudent. This embodies the transactional statesmanship approach. In contrast, Riel ignored empirical realities, such as the fact his men stood no chance in a pitched battle. He refused to sacrifice his larger principles for strategic victory, such as employing guerilla tactics or suspending his recitation of the rosary to make haste. He was positively convinced that God would defeat

Macdonald’s forces, and that nothing else mattered. Unquestionably, this corresponds to the literature on transformational statesmanship in terms of abstraction, viewing politics in stark moral terms, the fusing of the self (as God’s prophet) with the cause, and a preference for utopian thinking.

Macdonald’s statesmanship in the decision to let Riel hang was transactional. His decision to send both English and French doctors to Regina demonstrates the transactional quality of balance. His willingness to show clemency for Riel if he were found unaccountable reflects the notion of empiricism, practical politics, and political wisdom that Russell, Jung, and Rossum recommend.

One can interpret his decision to act speedily upon receipt of the doctors’ initial report as a form of bold statecraft where the leader has a special vision of what needs to be done and must use his force of will to act in a way that some of the mass may not appreciate. This is, of course, a blend of what Mansfield and Michels think about sound statesmanship. His decision to allow Riel to 282 hang after all could equally be a moment where he sought to keep the country from perpetual racial fights by ensuring that one of its strongest causes, Riel, was no longer alive. He believed in the dignity of life, but had to be adroit and malleable enough in his principles to preserve the larger goal.

Macdonald’s struggles after Riel’s hanging did not stem from moving away from transactional leadership. Instead, I contend he just miscalculated within this more general approach. First, Sir John completely misread public opinion in Quebec and poorly anticipated how people there would react. He was convinced that once Riel hanged, the people would turn their attention to other political issues; he did not expect it to fester.963 He thought that once Quebeckers discovered Riel’s strange religious beliefs that this Catholic society would cease to see him as a martyr. Of this, Creighton wrote:

[Macdonald] could not really believe that the devotion of Quebec could be won by a man who had abjured his religion, renounced his citizenship, and shown himself perfectly prepared to abandon his followers for money. He could not really believe that the death of a single métis could seriously damage the work of unity through diversity which he and Cartier had carried out twenty years ago. Yet with what frightening swiftness this dreadful commotion had arisen in Quebec!964

Sir John believed that the Canadian people would understand that Riel hanged for the sake of justice. This was not a vicious attempt to murder an insane man, but the imposition of a legal sentence on a disreputable character. In this rare instance, Macdonald got it wrong. The people of

Quebec were infuriated at Sir John’s government, and in future elections, the Conservatives struggled there. 965 Yes, the Tories held Quebec until after Sir John’s death, but his actions contributed to the eventual collapse of Conservative support in Lower Canada. French Canadians did not turn away from Riel because of his religiosity, instead, they identified with a French person

963 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 471. 964 Creighton, The Old Chieftain, p. 438. 965 See Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 480. 283 who waged a battle for independence against an English-dominated government. Although members of Macdonald’s cabinet could justify Riel’s hanging as an instance of justice, such an abstract argument did not weave itself into the collective Quebec mind.

Here we see Macdonald trying to use transactional statesmanship. The statesman is supposed to understand the minds of the people and brings moderation and wisdom to bear. He uses boldness in the right measure and at the right time for the sake of satisfying the actual needs of the people. He shies away from large principles for the sake of short-term successes whenever it is reasonable and feasible. Macdonald’s decision to hang Riel was an effort to do all of this; to tried to anticipate the people’s reaction. He just misunderstood the people, and hoped that they would see the justice in hanging the man. They were unprepared to do that. I do not say that

Macdonald did the wrong thing in letting Riel hang; he simply failed to convince French Canadians to support his decision.966 In hanging Riel, Sir John did not believe he was changing the world.

Instead, he was allowing justice to prevail and suspecting that the Canadian government could move past the Rebellions in order to get on with the task of ordinary governing.

The other element of Sir John’s actions in this period centres on his modification of the report to parliament. In one sense one could side with Creighton that he edited the doctors’ reports in a balanced way by both removing prejudicial language from Lavell’s comments and changing the wording of Valade’s. But there is something altogether too quick and convenient about that. It makes a false equivalence between deleting a negative phrase about Riel and deleting a phrase that bore directly on the purpose of Valade’s examination. In Macdonald’s own words, the point of the examination was to determine if Riel was accountable. The line where Valade wrote that Riel was

966 Rather unartfully, Macdonald said at one point that he would see Riel hanged “though every dog in Quebec should bark in his favour.” See Paul Romney, Getting It Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and Imperilled Confederation (Toronto, ON, Buffalo, NY, London, UK: University of Toronto Press, 1999), p. 135. 284 not accountable was the one that Macdonald “blurred.” Even though Valade’s determination was based on pseudo-science that went against British approaches to law, what he said should have been tabled. Sir John’s modifications were transactional but done in error. I see the re-writing of the reports as Macdonald trying to conclude a deal with his French colleagues to endorse the decision to let Riel hang. This effort in transactional statesmanship simply did not work as he intended. Transformational statesmanship can be effective and transactional statesmanship can be ineffective.

In this chapter, I reviewed various moments of interaction between Riel and Macdonald. They clashed during the Red River Resistance. They dealt with one another both before and during the

North-West Rebellion. Finally, Macdonald related with Riel over the question of whether he ought to hang. The evidence suggests that in general, we can understand Riel’s actions towards

Macdonald as emblematic of transformational statesmanship. Conversely, we ought to view

Macdonald’s as commensurate with transactional statesmanship. This further confirms our conclusions from the previous chapters where I reviewed the nature of leadership of each separately. In the following chapter, I discuss what the importance of Riel and Macdonald having different statesmanship models means both for the concept of statesmanship and for Canadian nationhood more generally.

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CHAPTER 7

THE CANADIAN REGIME AND STATESMANSHIP

We can state that both Macdonald and Riel were statesmen. We can also claim to know what type of statesmanship they practiced. What remains is perhaps the most important question in this inquiry: why does any of this matter? If this were purely an historical study, it might be well enough to conclude now. However, the purpose of this inquiry was to determine whether

Macdonald and Riel, as early Canadian statesmen who confronted one another, can teach us anything about Canada. I contend that Canadian conflicts between English and French and East and West can be further understood through this clash of statesmanship. I also argue that the collision between Macdonald and Riel demonstrate that ideas and statesmanship matter to the

Canadian regime. While there is no grand narrative that explains the Canadian identity and the country contains other important tensions besides the ones described, those wishing to understand the Canadian regime will profit from considering the stories of Macdonald and Riel.

7.1. English-French Tensions

The first duality of Canadian nationhood I want to investigate is English-French relations. Nobody who studies Canadian politics, even cursorily, denies that the English-French dynamic matters.

Earlier in this inquiry, I referred to Sir John’s interest in insuring that Confederation embraced and included French Canadians into his scheme for a new country. Throughout the legislative debates at Confederation, several representatives stressed the obvious importance that linguistic politics and rights would have. From well before Confederation up to present day, the tension between

English and French has been integral to understanding Canada. Macdonald and Riel stand as two 286 clear representatives of this tension and their conflict had some potential aftereffects for that duality. Statesmanship shaped the contours of this decisive Canadian relationship. I think that the evidence and reasonable thought illustrates that the clash of Macdonald and Riel’s statesmanship was an important example of English-French relations in Canada—one where two statesmen-

Fathers met in pitched battle. Below, I review some classic literature on English-French Canadian relations to provide context for how Macdonald and Riel’s statesmanship provides us with further useful evidence to understand the regime’s key duality.

Prior to Confederation there was little reason to believe English and French Canadian culture could coexist harmoniously. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:

The French Canadians, who have faithfully preserved the traditions of their pristine manners, are already embarrassed for room upon their small territory; and this little community, which has so recently begun to exist, will shortly be a prey to the calamities incident to old nations. In Canada, the most enlightened, patriotic, and humane inhabitants make extraordinary efforts to render the people dissatisfied with those simple enjoyments which still content it. There, the seductions of wealth are vaunted with as much zeal as the charms of an honest but limited income in the Old World, and more exertions are made to excite the passions of the citizens there than to calm them elsewhere. If we listen to their eulogies, we shall hear that nothing is more praiseworthy than to exchange the pure and homely pleasures which even the poor man tastes in his own country for the dull delights of prosperity under a foreign sky….967

In 1831, Tocqueville gave voice to a fear that gripped altogether too many French Canadians.

Inevitably, the “French” values and mode of life will become impractical and undesirable for the people. The money and luxury that attended the surrender of old world values were too enticing.

Further, these temptations were on offer constantly from “enlightened” and “patriotic” people— read, English—in the hopes that their fellow denizens gave up their French traditions.

967 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, chapter XVII. Available online: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0042. Accessed 10 February 2016. 287

Shortly after Tocqueville, Lord Durham famously pronounced in his Report that the French should assimilate with the English in British North America.968 He described French Canadians who wanted to rebuff British influence as people with “an anxiety to preserve ancient and barbarous laws.”969 To remedy the uprisings and rebellions of Upper and Lower Canada, Durham set forth the following:

A plan by which it is proposed to ensure the tranquil government of Lower Canada, must include in itself the means of putting an end to the agitation of national disputes in the legislature, by settling, at once and for ever, the national character of the Province. I entertain no doubts as to the national character which must be given to Lower Canada; it must be that of the British Empire; that of the majority of the population of British America; of that great race which must, in the lapse of no long period of time, be predominant over the whole North American Continent. Without effecting the change so rapidly or so roughly as to shock the feelings and trample on the welfa[r]e of the existing generation, it must henceforth be the first and steady purpose of the British Government to establish an English population, with English laws and language, in this Province, and to trust its government to none but a decidedly English legislature.970

Durham was an Englishman who had been sent by the British to get a sense of the 1837 Rebellions and to report back on possible solutions. Agitation and dispute arose, surely, from racial tension between the French and English subjects. London should assimilate the French through the use of

British political institutions and British immigration. This patient, but decisive, process would quell future disruption.

Durham’s justification echoed Tocqueville. The French possessed a culture that they inherited from their ancestors, and therefore must be treated with a good deal of respect.971

However, the French found themselves surrounded by people of greater civilization, industry, and energy.972 While they are content with what they have, they are unable to force their way of life

968 G.M. Craig, ed., Lord Durham’s Report: An Abridgement (Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1982). 969 Ibid., p. 131. 970 Ibid., p. 146. 971 Ibid. 972 Ibid. 288 on the majority.973 Furthermore, by doing away with the French traditions, they will become happier people and free of frustrations of watching their compatriots thrive politically and economically in a way that they do not.974 Both Tocqueville and Durham thought that in British

North America, there was no hope for cohabitation between the French and English. The English were more populous. Their culture tended more towards the acquisition of wealth. Their way of life was electric and energetic. The existence of two races that have a long history of feuding sparked conflict between them in the new world. In short, English culture and politics would and should predictably overtake French traditions in Lower Canada.

The element of linguistic difference played a role at Confederation too, but it was a rare instance when this tension was overcome, albeit briefly. Creighton, for example, set out that what preoccupied the Fathers was constructing good government and ensuring economic success.975

The notion that language and culture were crucial elements of the legislative debates or the

Confederation Conferences is mythology.976 The Quebec Conference in 1864 did not consist of the French Canadian delegates sitting together in opposition to their English fellows—delegates were arranged by colony.977 The reason that at the Conferences the Canadian delegation received two votes had nothing to do with its cultural duality but that Canada would be two provinces in

Confederation.978 Inasmuch as the Fathers concerned themselves with language, it was expressed in Section 133 of the BNA. This ensured that English and French could be spoken in the federal parliament and courts as well as the Quebec legislature and courts. This was the extent of the

973 Ibid. 974 This general thesis and a thorough analysis of Tocqueville and Durham is spelled out in detail in Janet Ajzenstat, The Political Thought of Lord Durham (Kingston, ON & Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1988). 975 Donald Creighton, “The Myth of Biculturalism,” in his Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected Essays (Toronto, ON: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 256-257. 976 Ibid. 977 Ibid., pp. 260-261. 978 Ibid. Of course what Creighton does not fully appreciate is that language and culture would be seminal reasons as to why Canada would be two provinces. 289 discussion over English and French concerns at Confederation.979 We can interpret Creighton’s argument by saying Confederation was a rare moment when Canadian politicians got over the horns of the linguistic dilemma.

In 1906, André Siegfried emphasized the importance of the English-French tension. He took a dim view of French attitudes of the English. He wrote of the French that to “say simply that they do not like [the English], even that in their inmost hearts they detest them, would not be inaccurate….”980 In particular, Siegfried noted that French Canadian disdain for the English centred on English Canadians, not Great Britons.981 The French saw themselves as a conquered people, but the conquerors were not the “distant and invisible” British.982 Instead, they saw the

English Canadian as he “who lives on their spot and profits in his insolent way by the victory of his ancestors.”983 As far as Siegfried could tell, the rivalry between French and English was “one of the chief currents in Canadian political life,” and that current ran between English and French

Canada.984

He wrote further that this tension is not usually expressed violently. A traveller to

Canada—like himself—would find “French and English together, seated round the same tables, even consorting together in clubs and drawing-rooms.”985In fact, this coexistence inspired political leaders such as Sir Wilfred Laurier to declare the “old enmities have ceased to exist” between the races.986 To that end, Siegfried said it would be “a mistake to be carried away by this kind of

979 Ibid., p. 262. 980 André Siegfried, The Race Question in Canada. Edited by Frank H. Underhill (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 1966), p. 85. 981 Ibid. 982 Ibid. 983 Ibid. 984 Ibid. 985 Ibid., p. 86. 986 Ibid. 290 deliberate fiction.”987 Instead, what the traveller sees is the “fiction of an entente cordiale” between the races that effective statesmen create for the sake of preventing violence.988

The French, said Siegfried, have a false “outward seeming and a true inwardness.”989 On the outside, the French make speeches and pursue policies that suggest they want open cooperation; inside, they still harbour animosity and resentment.990 Towards Great Britain, the

French feel some loyalty and duty because it is in their self-interest.991 The French are loyal to

Great Britain in this sense, but they appreciate that in fact they are subjects, in the words of Henri

Bourassa, “of a power which for centuries has been the foe of our land of origin. … [Their] loyalty to England can only be, and should only be, a matter of reason.”992

In contrast, Siegfried noted that English Canadians do not share the same tension between sentiment and self-interest.993 He thought that their patriotism is “made up in large measure of haughty belief in British superiority, asserted sometimes offensively, at the expense of the impliedly inferior French.”994 This feeling encourages the English to regard themselves “the sole masters of Canada” by “right of conquest.”995 And it causes them indignity to see the conquered

French trying to further their way of life instead of accepting and assimilating into theirs.996 This is why in Canadian politics the English stand up to incursions of French social life: because they fear the dishonour of being “surpassed by adversaries whom they judge backward and inferior.”997

987 Ibid., p. 87. 988 Ibid. 989 Ibid. 990 Ibid. 991 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 992 Ibid., p. 88. 993 Ibid., p. 95. 994 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 995 Ibid., p. 96. 996 Ibid. 997 Ibid. 291

If this is the state of affairs between English and French Canadians, then as long as both races are predominant in Canada, their relationship will be meaningful and strained.

About half a century after Siegfried, Senator Eugene Forsey gave his classic interpretation of the English-French dimension. 998 To this end, he cited Horace’s comment that “naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.” 999 No matter how much one might want to avoid or overcome English-French relations, they are a part of Canada. Although the Fathers sought one people and nationhood at Confederation, French Canadians have reserved their excitement for the project.1000 He chalked this up to “touchiness” from the French; he meant it in a neutral sense.1001

Forsey asked the reader to place himself in the place of French Canadians. Imagine I find myself to be a linguistic minority on my continent and in my country. My mother tongue can only be spoken in the parliament and courts of the federal capital and my home province. The lands my ancestors founded and civilized were conquered by that foreign majority. Immigrants to the country do not learn my language in the vast majority of cases. My dreams for the West to reflect my linguistic culture and heritage were dashed by that majority. This is Forsey’s view of French

Canadian opinion, and it explains their indifference towards the Fathers’ one-nation vision.1002

Forsey’s solution is to strike up a “genuine Canadian Anglo-French partnership.”1003 That begins with English Canadians accepting that their French brothers are lukewarm towards

Canadian nationhood and try to resolve that.1004 This partnership requires everyone to appreciate that the country has both an English and French tradition, and that what Canada is is the reality of

998 Eugene Forsey, “Canada: Two Nations or One?” in Freedom and Order: Collected Essays (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1974), pp. 247-269. 999 Ibid., p. 252. “You can drive nature out with a pitchfork, but it will come running back.” 1000 Ibid., p. 254. 1001 Ibid., p. 257. 1002 Ibid. 1003 Ibid., p. 262. 1004 Ibid. 292 this duality. Canada is “rooted in her past, both French and British, and from that past she draws her nourishment.”1005 In this, he cited W.L. Morton that there are not two Canadian histories, but one.1006 Furthermore, each group needs to learn to “respect each other” by learning about one another’s history and trying to learn each other’s language.1007 Anglo-Canadians need to accept that Quebec, as the “citadel of French Canada,” is no ordinary province and merits special treatment; in response, Quebec has no right to veto projects the rest of Canada wants from which

Quebec can be exempted.1008 These steps are necessary if Canada wants to complete the work of the Fathers who built a country with a vision of unity where everyone can feel “at home” in

Canada.1009

The renowned Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor made similar arguments not long after Forsey. For him, Canada possesses a unique and unfortunate trait amongst the nations of the world: the sharing of great national events pull us apart instead of bringing us together.1010

In particular, Taylor briefly mentions the Riel Rebellion as a moment of national disunity between

Anglo- and French Canadians.1011 The fractious fact of our past means for Taylor that the only hope Canada has of unity is in building a “projective future.”1012 To that end, Canada must become a bicultural society where everyone learns from one another in a way that actually enriches the

1005 Ibid., p. 263. 1006 Quoted at ibid. 1007 Ibid., pp. 263-264. 1008 Ibid., p. 265. 1009 Ibid., pp. 268-269. Although the soundness of Forsey’s arguments here fall outside the scope of my inquiry, I think it is worth noting that they are confusing. For example, why “respect” and “accepting” the roles of French and English are different things remain unclear. Moreover, the senator’s theory of Canadian nationhood vis -à-vis English and French resembles Trinitarian logic with only two poles. Canada is both French and English, but neither French or English. Except, unlike with St. Athanasius, the English and French do not participate in the same eternality that allows him to argue there is one God and one person, but three aspects of God. A term Forsey uses to describe those who argue that the Fathers intended to have a decentralized federation, “jiggery pokery,” applie s to his solution to Canadian partnership. 1010 Charles Taylor, “A Canadian Future,” in Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism. Edited by Guy Laforest (Kingston, ON & Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1993), p. 25. 1011 Ibid. 1012 Ibid., p. 27. 293 way we live.1013 Further, Canada needs to transmogrify the good will other countries feel towards it by making itself into an honest broker and respected operator in international politics.1014 Unless there is movement in this direction, the different approaches that French and English Canadians take towards “Canada” will perpetuate discord. For the French, the “nation française” has more potency than Canadian nationhood; this incites English Canadians who see national unity as tenuous and any group’s preference to something smaller than Canada as treasonous.1015 In fact,

Taylor writes that “any demonstration that la nation canadienne-française is the fundamental gut- loyalty of French Canadians fills English Canadians with dread.”1016 This is why a Canadian future has to be a project, both in terms of building biculturalism and in making Canada into a respected peacemaker in foreign affairs.

In the twenty-first century, Richard Gwyn tries to articulate the tension between English and French Canadians that stemmed from Riel’s execution—an avenue of thought that I will make use of further. Riel’s death was a “slap in the face” for Quebeckers. 1017 Fifty thousand upset

Francophones assembled at Montreal a week after Riel’s death to burn Sir John in effigy and listen to speeches from equally angry compatriots. Laurier spoke that day, regrettably claiming that had he been in the North-West, he would have picked up a gun to fight the Queen’s forces.1018 More importantly, it empowered the radical, Catholic, and nationalist Honoré Mercier to stoke up anti-

English and anti-Conservative sentiment. He said Riel was their “brother” who had been slain because of “fanaticism” from Macdonald and his friends.1019 Inspired by an attitude expressed in

1013 Ibid. As with Forsey, what this means in practical terms in unknowable. 1014 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 1015 Ibid., p. 31. 1016 Ibid., pp. 31-32. Emphasis removed. 1017 Gwyn, Nation Maker, p. 482. 1018 Ibid. 1019 Ibid. 294

La Presse that Quebec Conservatives were tantamount to traitors, he proposed a new political party to take out Macdonald’s allies and protect Quebec’s interests.1020

After tempers in Quebec had cooled, English Canadians in Ontario reignited things. The

Evening News said that “Ontario pays about three-fifths of Canada’s taxes … [while] Quebec … has been extravagant, corrupt and venal.”1021 The Mail claimed that “Ontario would smash

Confederation into its original fragments” rather than allow Quebeckers to direct the country; if the French pushed their luck too far “the Conquest will have to be fought all over again.”1022 Gwyn claims that these feelings combined together contributed to Mercier becoming the first non-

Conservative premier of Quebec.1023 The Riel decision resulted in Sir John winning less support in Quebec in 1887 and 1891 than he had before. It resulted in the election of a nationalist

Francophone premier of Quebec in 1887. It created the conditions for angry English Canadians to antagonize the French. Further, Riel’s death “confirmed to French Canadians the cardinal character of Canada as refashioned by Confederation—that within it the French would always be the minority and the English not merely the majority, but an ever more dominant one.”1024 Although

Gwyn thinks that Francophones would have eventually realized this core division in Canadian politics, he claims that Riel’s death “marks the dividing line between Canada’s past … and its future, with Quebec ever more self-contained and detached from the rest of the country.”1025 To understand Canada is to know at least in part, that its English and French citizens live in tension, especially since Riel.

1020 Ibid., pp. 482-483. 1021 Quoted at ibid., p. 483. 1022 Quoted at ibid. 1023 Ibid., pp. 483-484. 1024 Ibid., p. 484. 1025 Ibid. 295

In terms of practical and more contemporary politics, Lucien Bouchard’s theory of Quebec separation during the 1995 Referendum represents another instance of English-French tension. As leader of the Bloc Quebecois and a spokesman of the “Oui” campaign, Bouchard had to provide justifications for why it was okay for Quebeckers to separate. Famously, he referred to a “Oui” vote as “waving a magic wand that would transform Quebec.”1026 With that vote, Quebeckers would win everything they wanted through independence, while retaining everything that they liked about Canadian citizenship. 1027 Quebec would be independent, but it could retain the

Canadian dollar and its citizens might even receive dual citizenship.1028 Separation—or so-called

“sovereignty association”—would mean that Quebec received only the benefits and none of the drawbacks of independence. In this, one can say that Bouchard’s theory denied Siegfried’s observation that French Canadians’ reckoning that maintaining their allegiance to English

Canadian political institutions was more beneficial then throwing them off. No longer would

Quebeckers need to trade off political and financial security for self-determination and positive liberty.

The result of that form of thinking was immediately contradicted by Canadian government forces. Prime Minister Chrétien declared that for Quebeckers a yes vote was a “one-way ticket to separation” the cost of which would be their “passport and all the other advantages that go with it.”1029 Further, he ridiculed Bouchard’s wand comment by asserting that there “is no magic and people have to pay their bills at the end of the month.”1030 Chrétien said if Bouchard’s side win the referendum that his mandate “would be to unmake the omelette and put the eggs back in their

1026 “Shaking Canada,” The Economist. 21 October 1995, p. 75. 1027 Ibid. 1028 Ibid. 1029 “Prime Minister Urges Quebec to Stay,” Lewiston Sun Journal. 19 October 1995, 10B. 1030 Ibid. 296 shells. I tell you it takes one big wand to do that.”1031 Bouchard contended that separation would cost Quebeckers nothing and win them everything. Chrétien swore that Canada was not going to give into these fantastical demands. A vote to separate meant precisely that. Quebec would be out of Confederation and ought to have no expectation of any previously enjoyed benefits. As the

Economist noted in October 1995, “[i]n the real world, Canada’s nine English-speaking provinces would not fall over backwards, or speedily, to get back into bed again with a Quebec that had just chosen divorce.”1032

Without question, Canadian political science is full of literature on English-French relations. What the pieces I have selected demonstrate is something both evident and unexpressed.

What is obvious, beginning with Tocqueville, is that the interaction between these races is touchy, with the French in an inferior position to the English. If there was any doubt that the Anglo-French issue was crucial to understanding Canadian nationhood, it can be silenced. And what this inquiry adds to the literature is that the clash of statesmanship between Macdonald and Riel also helps to inform our understanding of Canadian politics.

Both Tocqueville and Durham hoped that both races to construct political institutions that would calm and eliminate racial tension. The Fathers, in their efforts, debated and sought to create one nation out of various regional components; they were engaged in trying to make that hope real.

Macdonald, a transactional statesman, argued for British institutions to inculcate prudence, and constitutional liberty. A Father and transformational statesman, Riel, wanted to carve out special status for people based on identity, religion, and origin in order that they may follow their own unique missions on Earth. What we see is that Macdonald’s approach fits within the tableau of

1031 Ibid. 1032 “Shaking Canada,” p. 75. 297 how English Canadians often approach politics, and that Riel’s reflect how many French

Canadians have felt.

Both Forsey and Taylor think that Canada’s linguistic issues needed to be overcome through mutual respect and forward-looking political leadership. They grasped the seriousness of the division—there would be two referendums on Quebec separation after their writings, with the second one being a near-run thing—but not the nature of the division. But what often divides

English and French Canadians is their vision of politics, and that gap can be very wide, which the evidence in this inquiry further substantiates. Sir John’s successes at Confederation and in 1885 meant that the principles that animated his statesmanship would become entrenched as core

Canadian political virtues. Amongst them, of course, would be empiricism, pragmatism, classical liberalism, and united strength in the face of national danger.

Those who sympathize with Riel treasure the principles that vivified his statesmanship.

Those would be, in short, political optimism, absolutist thinking, rebelliousness, community identification, and a blending of the cause with oneself. Riel had French blood, and French

Canadians empathized with him and seemed to have internalized the hallmarks of his statesmanship. In the various pieces of literature above that describe the English-French dynamic, we see that Riel’s ideas resemble those pursued by French Canadians. For the rest of the country, including its political institutions outside Quebec, which were English, the ideas that Sir John defended and practiced in the “clash of statesmanship” were reified in Anglo-Canada. In French

Canada, the same sorts of principles that Riel held find greater receptivity.

Had Riel succeeded in the North-West, even partially as he had in 1870, it is possible that the English-French relationship would look different. For one thing, the prairies might have a greater French and Catholic component. Further, the Métis and Native tribes would have had 298 considerably more control over the lands and resources. Quebeckers and other francophone

Canadians may not see themselves isolated in one province the way Forsey described it. In truth,

French culture and society might have been extended throughout the continent. In the United

States, the election of Abraham Lincoln unnerved the slave-owning states because he was going to ensure that new states that entered the Union were free. The southern states feared that their economic and social lives, would have, in time, been replaced through constitutional means when there were enough states to outlaw slavery. Had Stephen Douglas won the 1860 election, those states could have believed that the principle of popular sovereignty—where every new state would decide for itself whether to allow slavery—would dull the abolitionist threat. While eventually slavery would have been outlawed, the tensions between the North and South were intensified by

Lincoln’s election. In this sense, Riel’s success could have eased the anxieties of many French

Canadians that Quebec needs to be an armed citadel against English incursion in their ways of life.

While I do not simply wish to equate the Southern Confederacy with French Canadians, the logic of concern about the persistence of their different way of life seems remarkably similar. These speculative comments suggest a further reason for why looking at the Macdonald-Riel relationship is important—because the stakes were so high in the conflict, it had the potential to re-shape the regime entirely.

The tension between English and French is an important element of the Canadian regime.

The country is the sort of country that it is because of this dynamic. This inquiry looks at an underappreciated but fundamental instance of this in reviewing the statesmanship of Macdonald and Riel. It fits well within various other scholarly writings about the subject and provides students of Canadian politics with a richer understanding of the tension. Sir John and Riel stand as champions of competing linguistic groups, and their conflict centred on the nature of the Canadian 299 regime itself. No attempt to understand the English-French duality could be complete without considering their clash.

7.2. East-West Tensions

Although an obsession over English-French relations dominated Canadian politics for much of the twentieth century, the East-West dynamic is just as important to understanding the Canadian

“self.”1033 As with the last section, I review key pieces of literature to help contextualize the tension. And, as with Anglo-French interactions, I contend that Macdonald’s and Riel’s statesmanship ought to be considered as an important instance of the peculiar form of regional conflict found in Canada. In fact, it is amongst the first.

The Founding Debates record the concerns of legislators in both British Columbia and Red

River about joining into Confederation. In British Columbia, T.L. Wood stated that it would be difficult to imagine that colonies such as theirs could ever feel the same loyalty towards Canada as towards England. He said in regard to Canada that there “is no natural love and original feeling of loyalty. The feeling of loyalty towards England is a feeling blind, instinctive, strong, born with us and impossible to be shaken off; and I believe it is impossible to transfer a feeling of loyalty and fealty at will….”1034 Although British Columbians are naturally loyal to England, it would be tough to manufacture such sentiment towards Confederation. In other words, western loyalty towards their eastern cousins was a difficult proposition.

1033 By the “West,” what I have in mind is British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba—what is often referred to as Western Canada. When I describe the “East,” I mean the seats of power along the St Lawrence River, namely Ontario and Quebec. The Maritime provinces and Newfoundland, while surely east of Quebec, do not figure into this geographic debate of East-West, if for no other reason than the paucity of political power they possess. Perhaps one might better put the distinction as “West-Central” Canada relations. That, however, would neither match the language of the literature or the general way that Canadians think about geographic power dynamics. 1034 Quoted in Ajzenstat et al, eds., Founding Debates, pp. 215-216. 300

Wood claimed that Confederation with the Canadas and other British American colonies would be better described as “incorporation” of the people.1035 It would be “Incorporation with a country to which we are bound by no natural tie of affection or duty, and remote in geographical position, and opposed to us in material interests. Incorporation with all the humiliation of dependence, and to my mind the certainty of reaction, agitation, and discontent.”1036 This part of western North America was so dissimilar and so unconnected with the colonies in Confederation that such union would be unpleasant and even oppressive. Wood believed that Confederation would extinguish the colony and make it subservient “to the will of a majority of the House of

Commons at Ottawa, and the administration of its affairs by the political adherents of Canadian statesmen.”1037

Red River was equally concerned about eastern power. Riel feared that having a Canadian governor in the region predisposed towards Canadians rather than the settlers would necessitate the creation of a local force to preserve their interests.1038 He believed that the leaders at Red River needed to have a “special regard to the interests of the people of this country” by ensuring they do not become “swamped” with English, Irish, and Canadian “outsiders.”1039 Those people “do not appreciate the circumstances in which we live.”1040 Riel’s point was that the region had to be guarded about eastern Canadian influence; otherwise, their way of life could be inalterably changed.

As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4 of this inquiry, the Red River Resistance and North-West

Rebellions were made from the concerns of Westerners. The Resistance was precipitated because

1035 Ibid., p. 216. 1036 Ibid. 1037 Ibid. 1038 Ibid., p. 247. 1039 Ibid., p. 249. 1040 Ibid. 301 the Canadian government gave little regard to the opinion of the people of Red River when it was decided that Ottawa would take over its administration from the HBC. The people had not been consulted whatsoever about a change in their government. This sparked Riel’s interest in the

Provisional Government, and its justifications came from royalist and Catholic political theory that resembled the political thinking in the federal government in no way. The 1885 Rebellion was fuelled by the misguided belief that its inhabitants had been mistreated by the Dominion government and they ought to claim their rights through rebellion. As with 1870, the thinking of the 1885 Rebellion did not stem from Locke’s nineteenth chapter of the Second Treatise, but from the radical and millenarian statesmanship of Riel.

Although future conflicts between Western and Eastern Canada lacked the violence, the mythology, and the interests of the Riel Rebellions, the contrast remained just as sharp. In particular, Flanagan notes that one important way to understand western Canadian politics is through their political parties, as the West has a knack for developing new ones.1041 This process of special political organization began with Riel and stretched through the end of the twentieth century. Flanagan highlights the Farmers’ Parties, Social Credit, and the CCF as three examples.1042 It is to these three political parties that I now turn in order to better interpret the habits of the East-West relationship.

In the middle of the twentieth century, C.B. Macpherson published his classic, albeit flawed, text Democracy in Alberta on an important period in Western Canadian politics. 1043

According to him, the two major political parties by that point, the United Farmers of Alberta

1041 Tom Flanagan, “From Riel to Reform: Understanding Western Canada.” Fourth Annual Seagram Lecture. McGill University, Montreal, PQ, 26 October 1999: p. 1. 1042 Ibid., p. 5. 1043 C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 302

(UFA) and the Social Credit Party, were rebels against eastern “oligarchic” forces.1044 Neither movement resembled the prairie populism of its American counterparts; these western Canadian parties would practice a different theory of government, delegate democracy.1045 This political theory differed from the traditional British theory of representative government. The UFA treated their annual delegate conventions as the “supreme law-making” power in the province; this was incommensurate with the party system and cabinet government model practiced at Ottawa.1046

Macpherson noted that we should expect to see a different theory of party politics in the

West; provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewan did not join Confederation as much as they were created at the time they entered in 1905.1047 Furthermore, the West’s utility to Canada was that it could serve eastern capital; the West’s embrace of unorthodox economic, social, and political theories vis-à-vis Eastern Canada were natural developments. Interestingly, Macpherson does not discuss the impact of either the 1870 or 1885 Rebellions in the development of Western political attitudes towards the East. Instead, his analytical approach of Marxism did not allow him to focus on factors that did not have a clear economic component.

For our purposes, he laid out the political theory of Henry Wise Wood, the leader of the

UFA. In particular, Wood proposed “group government” where the autocratic tendencies of political parties would be blunted by having political representation consist of “organized occupational groups each nominating and instructing its delegates to the legislature.”1048 For example, farmers in Alberta would select delegates to Edmonton who would represent their interests rather than a member of the Liberal Party. Wood saw modern political parties in a dim

1044 Ibid., p. 3. 1045 Ibid., p. 4. 1046 Ibid. 1047 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 1048 Ibid., p. 40. 303 light. He believed they were inherently unstable because their members were divided on many important political issues.1049 This harms the people because:

Patriotism is prostituted to the service of the most selfish interest and design. Few questions are seriously discussed on their merits. Truth is frequently not sought after, but systematically concealed in a mass of confusion. All of this is made possible because the individual unit of citizenship is so low that the masses of the people have no citizenship strength. They have been like sands of the desert, blown back and forth by the changing winds of false propaganda. The unit of citizenship strength must be raised to an infinitely higher degree. This can never be done through the political party system.1050

The interests of the people cannot be expressed in political parties. They are rife with corruption and self-interestedness. In order to overcome these vices, a system of representation that transcends the traditional party system is necessary. As Macpherson noted, Wood’s theory can be boiled down to the expression that “[p]arty becomes hypocrisy.”1051

Wood and the UFA had a transformative approach to politics. Political organization was, for them, a way of “changing the social order” of things rather than the horse-trading of traditional brokerage partisanship.1052 In his words, Wood hoped for “the overthrow of class domination by the masses” by marshaling democratic forces against traditional ones.1053 He contended that the old party system—namely, the one practiced in Ottawa—had never been able to mobilize democratic interests together and there was no hope of such a thing developing on its own.1054 The party system prevented “real social progress” because it perpetuated a “primary and irreconcilable division between social elements,” such as centralism and democracy.1055 The critics of Wood’s

1049 Ibid., p. 41. 1050 Quoted at ibid, p. 42. 1051 Ibid. 1052 Ibid. 1053 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 1054 Ibid., p. 43. 1055 Ibid. 304 theory were panned as “reactionary forces of partyism.” 1056 In short, there were no honest criticisms that could be made.

The UFA’s solution was to replace parties with occupational groups that would select people to represent their economic and social interests in government. For Wood, these groups were a “natural and inevitable power grouping,” whose representation could disrupt the ownership of power by the “exploiters” within the party system. 1057 In the West, this theory of group government would speak to “existing occupational organization” and expressed “the most stable and permanent interests distinguishing and uniting individuals.” 1058 Each group would be internally democratic, it would lack “machine control,” and it would move the people towards “the establishment of a new social order.”1059 Once every group worked to rebut the dominance of the autocrats, it would remove injustice and selfishness in politics because each group pursuing its interest would prevent domination by anybody.1060 Wood thought that when democratic politics

“will have been built into one co-operative unit in the interests of human welfare, there will be nothing left to exploit but the gifts of nature. But, by that time, humanity will have developed sufficient intelligence regarding human welfare to understand that by co-operating with nature her gifts will be multiplied.”1061 The introduction of group government would yield a peaceful and cooperative human nature, distinct from the current one.1062

It would be wrong to treat the West as a monolith during this time period. Leslie Pal notes that Alberta contains political “exceptionalism” because of a “nonpartisan tradition” in its

1056 Ibid. 1057 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 1058 Ibid., p. 45. 1059 Ibid. 1060 Ibid., p. 47. 1061 Ibid. 1062 Another important text regarding Western Canada is J.M. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1954). Here, he made the point that the prairies were governed in a similar way that Rome governed its provinces, namely from the centre. 305 parties.1063 The nonpartisan stance “rejects superficial divisions of the electorate into classes or groups, and politics built on their competition.”1064 Instead, to be nonpartisan in Alberta is to attempt to govern for the whole people, and satisfy everyone’s “fundamental needs.”1065 For example, Pal includes the UFA—as seen above, what underpins Wood’s theory of government was a strong opposition to the traditional party structure because of its corrosive public effects.

This nonpartisan approach was not shared ubiquitously throughout the west at that time.

By 1921, a new political party emerged to challenge both the Liberals and Conservatives at Ottawa: the Progressive Party. Its composition was “the rank and file of the members of the organized farmers in Ontario, Alberta [and] Manitoba.”1066 The “agrarian leaders” throughout Canada had found that they were “unable to control” the two major parties at Ottawa, and so this new one would better serve their constituents’ interests.1067 The UFA belonged in part to this new party.

The leader of the Progressives was Thomas Crerar, a Manitoban. He took the position that as its leader “his duty lies to the whole people of Canada”;1068 this makes sense, as his party did not represent just one province, or even the west exclusively. For Morton, Crerar “conceived the new party as a national and composite one, the parliamentary members of which would be national representatives and not delegates of a class.”1069 Unsurprisingly, this angered Wood and those who favoured his theory of group government that depended upon representatives of various classes and vocations to function.1070 Consequentially, there arose a division within the Progressives: the

1063 Leslie A. Pal, “The Political Executive and Political Leadership in Alberta,” in Government and Politics in Alberta. Edited by Allan Tupper and Roger Gibbins (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 1992), p. 23. 1064 Ibid. 1065 Ibid. 1066 W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada. Revised edition (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 106. 1067 Ibid. 1068 Ibid., p. 107. 1069 Ibid. 1070 Cf. ibid. 306

Manitoban faction who thought about their political responsibilities nationally, and the Albertan section who wanted “each economic interest to be represented by an occupational delegation in legislatures, freed of the conventions of the party system.”1071 The west was not unified in its particular antagonisms towards the east, as the spilt in the Progressives show. However, Crerar was unable to keep the party together enough to retain his leadership following the 1921 election.

Much of the political interaction between west and east would not follow his broader perspective.1072

Further antagonism between the East and West comes from the federal Parliament’s use of its powers of disallowance and reservation. Section 56 of the Constitution Act, 1867 allows the federal cabinet to annul a law made by a provincial legislature if they deem it fit. Section 57 allows the cabinet, through the Governor-General, to command the Lieutenant Governor of a province to reserve his assent to a bill until it can be reviewed by the Queen or her representative. In both cases, the Constitution empowers the federal government to strike down or prevent provincial legislatures from passing bills. When the power has been used, Forsey noted that it centred on a province passing laws that were wholly outside its authority, partially outside its authority and in conflict with a federal law, or outside its authority and discriminatory.1073

Forsey rightly noted that Sir John believed that these powers were important for the federal government. The BNA Act gave the Dominion government the reserve powers in part as a contrast to how the American Constitution’s Tenth Amendment gave those powers to the states. It is a common belief that the American model of handing unenumerated powers to the states had

1071 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 1072 Crerar was not an enemy of eastern Canadian politics. He joined the Liberal party in 1929, and served in Mackenzie King’s cabinet for many years. In 1945, he accepted an appointment to the Canadian Senate. Crerar was not antagonistic towards eastern Canada, rather, he chose to work and serve in federal politics with the eastern -centric Liberal party for many years. 1073 Eugene Forsey, “Canada and Alberta: The Revival of Dominion Authority Over the Provinces,” in Freedom and Order: Collected Essays (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1974), pp. 179-180. 307 precipitated the Civil War. To be sure, John C. Calhoun, an American vice-president and strong advocate for states’ rights, argued that the United States of America were a “system of governments, compounded of the separate governments of the several States composing the

Union….”1074 Macdonald and the Fathers had, as we have seen, a different vision, whereby Canada was a united dominion with various provinces whose sovereignty rested in the crown and whose reserve powers belonged to the Dominion. As Sir John said in 1868, it was the prerogative of

Ottawa to decide whether a province’s law was unconstitutional, clashed with national interest, or was “objectionable” in some way.

These powers were used 106 times in Canada. Strikingly, seventy-five per cent of these usages were against western provinces.1075 Furthermore, the Liberal Party used these powers more frequently than the Conservatives, especially when Laurier and Mackenzie King were Prime

Minister.1076 King seemed especially dedicated to the utility of these powers. He wrote to the

Lieutenant Governor of Prince Edward Island in 1924 that reservation was given to the Crown’s representatives as Dominion officers in order to protect the federal government’s interests. 1077

Disallowance and reservation exist to preserve the federal government’s power. They were used disproportionately against western provinces and by a political party whose central support came from Eastern Canada, not the West.1078

In 1937, the King government’s use of these powers against Alberta illustrate the West-

East conflict clearly. Premier Aberhart’s government had passed three bills. The first two

1074 John C. Calhoun, “A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States,” in A Disquisition of Government and Selections from the Discourse. Edited by C. Gordon Post (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs -Merrill, 1953), p. 85. 1075 See Forsey, “Canada and Alberta,” p. 179. 1076 Ibid., p. 182. 1077 Ibid., p. 185. 1078 Famously, this came to the fore in the three bills passed by Aberhart’s Social Credit government in Alberta in 1937. King’s Liberal government struck down these bills on limiting press freedom and modifying monetary policy. 308 empowered the province to wrest away control of the credit system from the banks, while the other restricted the freedom of the press and their ability to protect sources. On 11 August 1937, King telegraphed Aberhart to warn him that the government was considering using disallowance on the banking bills, but they would hold off if he agreed to submit the bills to the Supreme Court before bringing them into force.1079 These bills sought to force the banks to allow the people of Alberta

“the full enjoyment of property and civil rights.”1080 In a complicated method, the government would be able to compel banks to provide credit in a way the state had never done before. Aberhart, the religiously inspired leader who saw himself on a mission, balked at King’s warning and disallowance was used on 17 August.1081

The Press Bill, The Accurate News and Information Act, met its end in the autumn of 1937.

In it, the Aberhart government required every “proprietor, editor, publisher, or manager of a newspaper” to publish the statements of the chairman of the Credit Board on his command. 1082

Those statements would also be privileged “for all purposes of libel.”1083 Further, the chairman could request from every newspaper that within twenty-four hours that they provide the names of their sources.1084 Should they refuse, the government could prohibit the publishing of that paper and fine the people involved $500.1085 The Lieutenant Governor reserved assent this time, and the bills were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July of 1938. Once again, eastern politicians and élites had intervened in western affairs.

The West’s anxiety towards Eastern domination took socialistic forms as well. During the

1930s, a new political party sprung up in the West called the Co-operative Commonwealth

1079 Forsey, “Canada and Alberta,” p. 186. 1080 Ibid. 1081 Ibid. 1082 Ibid., p. 190 1083 Ibid. 1084 Ibid. 1085 Ibid., p. 191 309

Federation (CCF). A socialist and social-democratic party, it garnered support from farmers, professional socialists, and organized labour. In 1933, its Regina Manifesto1086 set out the party’s beliefs about Eastern capital and its economic system. In the preamble, the CCF declared itself in favour of a system of exchange that supplied “human needs, not the making of profits.”1087 They sought to “replace the present capitalist system” that brought misery and inequality “by a social order from which domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated….”1088

The CCF thought that power had concentrated in the hands of a few élites. Capitalism caused waste, instability, and needless poverty “in an age of plenty.”1089 Although the new social order would not reduce individual rights—as socialist regimes had done throughout Europe—it would reorder the economic system to ensure that all people could enjoy leisure and prosperity.1090

Specifically, the CCF called for a planned economy, the socialization of credit, the public ownership of utilities, subsidies to agrarian workers, the elimination of protectionist trade policy, co-operative industries, a national labour code, socialized healthcare, and progressive income tax.1091 In practical terms, the CCF would remake the Dominion and provincial governments that the Fathers set up in favour of contemporary and radical socialist policies. Money and its attendant power harmed Westerners, and through democratic means, the CCF would reform the polity.

Furthermore, the Manifesto defined freedom as the rights of workers to assemble in the face of

“Fascist tendencies.”1092 In brief, what the CCF meant by “freedom” was the freedom of union members to meet. Moreover, “freedom” meant that economic migrants ought not to be deported;

1086 “The Regina Manifesto 1933,” Socialist History Project. Available online: < http://www.socialisthistory.ca/ Docs/CCF/ReginaManifesto.htm >. Accessed 29 February 2016. 1087 Ibid., preamble, para. 1. For the CCF, human needs and profits were somehow not the same thing. 1088 Ibid., preamble, para. 2. 1089 Ibid. 1090 Ibid., preamble, para. 3. 1091 Ibid., passim. 1092 Ibid., section 12, para. 2. 310 this was “inhuman.”1093 The purpose of this, of course, was to ensure that persons positively disposed towards organized labour stayed in the country.

The Manifesto also highlighted a need for social justice that was apparently lacking. They proposed to amend the British common law system in favour of “a commission composed of psychiatrists, psychologists, socially minded jurists and social workers to deal with all matters pertaining to crime and punishment and the general administration of the law.”1094 A new social order required a new legal framework. The judges and barristers with the appropriate training to adjudicate disputes needed to be jettisoned for academicians and well-meaning men. This would

“humanize the law and bring it into harmony with the needs of the people.”1095 That the previous law was somehow not human or what that means was not discussed. Moreover, this general scheme of the CCF was not an aspirational set of goals. According to the framers: “No CCF Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Cooperative

Commonwealth.”1096 There were no compromises to be made. Either the CCF would, through governmental means, implement their entire platform, or there would be persistent agitation.

Usually, in party politics, parties barter various planks in order to accomplish something positive for its supporters. In this case, the CCF was uninterested in transactional politics. Its members had a clear vision that could not be implemented piecemeal if the dream of a new social order was to be won.

It would be in error to claim that the CCF was just a western phenomenon. In 1934, the

CCF ran candidates in the Ontario’s provincial election, and by 1943 it was the Official Opposition

1093 Ibid. 1094 Ibid., section 13, para. 1. 1095 Ibid. 1096 Ibid., section 15, para. 5. 311 with thirty-four seats.1097 However, at the founding conference in Calgary in 1932, there were no

Ontarians present.1098 So although the CCF would organize in Ontario, and would have both

Ontarian MLAs and MPs, J.T. Morley writes that “the CCF was the creation of labour, socialist, and farm groups in the four western provinces.”1099If one considers that only CCF government was in Saskatchewan, its founding was in Calgary, and its manifesto written in Regina, it is fair to interpret the CCF as a western movement, just not wholly so.

Although the Red River Resistance, the UFA, the use of reservation, and the CCF are historical phenomena, western agitation towards Eastern Canada persists. In his The New Canada,

Reform Party leader Preston Manning wrote that western political innovation, such as the populism that his party espoused, is “energized” by Western alienation.1100 By alienation, Manning meant something other than the traditional Marxian concept of people becoming alienated from their handiwork and their fellow humans because of the division of labour. Alienation was a “conviction shared by generations of western Canadians that their region and interests have not achieved equality with the constitutional and economic interests of Quebec and Ontario, and that systematic change is necessary to achieve such equality.”1101 Western Canadians felt much as T.L. Wood feared—the geographic and political differences between West and East left westerners in an unenviable position.

For Manning, the first genuine expression of western frustration came during the Red River

Resistance. He writes that Riel’s interest in resources was its lasting influence on western attitudes towards Eastern Canada since the “ownership and control of land (resources) was a central feature

1097 J.T. Morley, Secular Socialists: The CCF/NDP in Ontario, A Biography (Kingston, ON & Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), p. 3. 1098 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 1099 Ibid., p. 39. 1100 Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto, ON: Macmillan, 1992), p. 118. 1101 Ibid. 312 of Riel’s list of rights, and has been a basic concern of all the western populist movements ever since.”1102 Beginning with Red River, he traces out the highlights of western alienation through the Autonomy movement in the North-West Territories in the 1870s, the Progressive movement of the 1920s, biculturalism of the 1960s, and Trudeau’s National Energy Program of the 1970s.1103

The basic thesis that Manning proposes is that in a country of regions, Western and Eastern Canada stand in opposition throughout much of Canadian history, and the impetus for this conflict emerges from how Eastern Canada neglected the perspectives of Westerners in their supposedly national projects.

Contemporarily, Nelson Wiseman notices that there is a peculiar relationship between

Western Canada and the East. Ottawa’s institution of bilingualism, multiculturalism, gun regulation, trade tariffs, and natural resources regulation helped to fuel western alienation.1104 He further highlights the immigration to the West of Eastern Europeans in large numbers that resulted in the population of Western Canadian cities having a different demography than Toronto or

Montreal.1105 In particular, he points to Winnipeg having a concentration of Ukrainians and Jews who were “enthralled” by the Russian Revolution in 1917 in a way Ottawa was not.1106 Something else Wiseman notes, albeit briefly, is the effect that the Riel Rebellions had on the region. He called them “formative events” that “determined that the region would have an English and white, rather than a bilingual and native, cast.”1107 As I will show below, the “English and white” versus

“bilingual and native” dichotomy is the wrong lens to interpret the outcome of Riel’s uprisings.

1102 Ibid. 1103 Ibid., pp. 118-121. 1104 Nelson Wiseman, In Search of Canadian Political Culture (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2007), p. 211. 1105 Cf. ibid, pp. 214-215. 1106 Ibid., p. 215. 1107 Ibid. Wiseman also tries to divide up the West according to the “mid-” and “far-west.” To be sure there are important differences amongst the western provinces, but it is common in Canadian political discourse to consider the “West” as one unit. To that end, the Senate apportions its seats to the West region, which includes the four provinces west of Ontario. 313

However, Wiseman does underscore that these events shape western thinking, even though, like

Macpherson, Wiseman prefers to analyse political culture from an economic and sociological perspective.

As with the Anglo-French dynamic, much scholarly and popular ink has been spilled on

West-East relations in Canada. My inquiry argues that an examination of Macdonald and Riel is an important but relatively untold part of this story. Both Manning and Wiseman notice, for different reasons, that Riel’s uprisings played a formative role in Western attitudes towards

Canada. Both of their arguments need refinement. Manning overstates the centrality of natural resources for Riel during the Resistance. Wiseman overstates the importance of French and

Aboriginal identity for Riel. While both resources and identity mattered for Riel, as I showed in

Chapter 3, one does better to consider the political theory that motivated the Resistance. It had much to do with the royalist and Catholic idea that a polity can only reconstruct their government if their sovereign has abandoned them. Further, neither Manning nor Wiseman treated 1885 as the seismic political event that it was. This religious and western rebellion ought to have informed both writers, but especially Manning, who Flanagan comments was like Riel in that their

“participation in politics [were] fundamentally guided by a religious vision of the world and a personal sense of mission based on that vision.”1108 There is much more to understood about the clash of statesmanship than these texts indicate.

Prior to and during Confederation, the colonies knew that in any contentious relationship between Ottawa and a region, the Dominion would have the whip hand. The powers of disallowance and reservation stood as instruments of that dominance, although they would not be the only ones. The fears of western legislators about joining Confederation were realized in the

1108 Tom Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning (Toronto, ON: Stoddart, 1995), p. 2. 314

Dominion’s disproportionate use of these constitutional powers against them. In short, before the collision of statesmanship, the constitutional infrastructure and public sentiment of Western

Canadians anticipated conflict between West and East. And, I contend that this inquiry provides us with a new way to think about the nature of western agitation against the East after 1885, namely, along the lines that animated the Macdonald-Riel clash.

Wood’s theory of group government with the UFA reflects transformative thinking. The idea that brokerage party system was corrupted and that a new theory of representation was needed corresponds to the notion of somebody uncomfortable with their world. The strategy of the UFA, it was hoped, would change human nature by blunting self-interest. Politics had become a battle amongst elites who did not care for the true concerns of the people. In its place, the UFA would institute a new social order, free of domination and exploitation. Wood’s language denotes a conflict between good and evil, which is central to transformative politics. Moreover, group government would erase the traditional distinction between the public and private sphere. Thinkers such as Aristotle and Jefferson thought that farmers should participate in government because they would legislate for short periods in order to return to their farms and lives. In contrast, Wood hoped to fuse agriculturalism and political representation together. No longer would someone be a farmer and an occasional politician; the people’s representatives would be farmer-legislators. The utopian hopes of changing the political system, the social order, and weakening the public-private distinction suggest what fuelled the West’s attitude towards East was the residue of transformational politics. The UFA had a mission to change the social order. And although

Crerar’s Manitoban faction of the Progressives demonstrates that not every western movement had such a transformational view, the UFA did govern Alberta for fourteen years, not an insignificant period of time. 315

William Aberhart’s clash with Mackenzie King’s government can be analysed as transformational too. The two bills about credit were efforts to reconfigure the traditional relationship between capital and the people. The Press Bill suggests that Aberhart believed that the province’s leaders knew best what was in the people’s interest. Instead of allowing Albertans to consume and judge critical newspaper articles about the government, Aberhart tried to silence criticisms. It was as if an attack against the government’s policy was akin to an attack against the people and their representatives. Further, his flat refusal to soften the legislation or subject it to judicial review reflects the transformational tendency to reject compromise in political life.

Aberhart was on a mission too, simply put.

The CCF was clearly transformational. As stated, they sought to remake the Canadian polity. Everything from its economic system to its legal system required significant reform. For too long, the moneyed and powerful interests in the East had rendered life for Western farmers and socialists unbearable. Only a new social order would do. Mannheim’s concept of utopia fits perfectly for the CCF. Its members felt dislocated in the world that the Eastern Canadian Fathers and politicians had made. Their trade policy, their monetary policy, and their legal framework clashed with the interests of leftist and populist Westerners. In order to be at home in the word, only a transformation of the entire regime would suffice. Saviours, after all, do not compromise when they try to save their people from ruination. And there can be no doubt that the drafters of the Regina Manifesto, from their grandiose language, saw themselves as the rescuer of a marginalized people.

For their parts, both Manning and Wiseman highlight the attitude of Western Canadians towards the East, but neither captures it correctly. I contend that the reason Ottawa was able to use disallowance, implement tariffs, biculturalism, and the NEP against the expressed wish of western 316 provinces was because of the triumph of transactional statesmanship. Transactional leaders are willing to make bold decisions despite deep public criticism, as Michels thought. They pursue a broad vision for the whole of the country and dismiss the pleas of people who they believe oppose that vision because of the self-interested nature of men, as Mansfield contended. They act in a

“tough-minded” way against the anxieties of those they consider too tender, as James wrote. This is not to say that the transactional approach was always correct—the NEP, for example, was a disastrous economic policy. Nevertheless, the antagonism between West and East was informed by the defeat of transformational statesmanship by transactional.

To be sure, I am not claiming one can draw a straight line between 1885 and the policies of the UFA, Aberhart, and the CCF. It was not as if Wood or Aberhart had read and internalized

Riel’s writings. But, what I do contend is that Riel’s failed pursuit of transformational politics in the West provides a fresh way to interpret the nature of the East-West duality in Canada. And considering that the clash of statesmanship met its apotheosis in the West and prevented a completely different realignment of the political geography of the West, an attempt to grapple with this dynamic in Canadian politics that takes into consideration transformational statesmanship is apt to benefit from it.

7.3. The Regime and the Ideals of Statesmanship

This study of Macdonald and Riel has one further and integral significance: ideas are an important aspect of the regime and Canada does have a political history of great leaders. The review of Sir

John showed that his successful efforts to build the Dominion of Canada vis-à-vis the Senate, federalism, the location of the reserve powers, and the place of the monarchy amongst others were derived from the liberal-democratic ideals that animate the transactional statesman. His use of both 317 prudence and principle towards Riel’s provisional government in 1869, his rebellion of 1885, and the hanging can be interpreted as the thoughts of someone versed in Locke, Publius, and Burke.

Although some scholars want to downplay or deny the role of political ideas for Sir John, this inquiry helps to set the record straight on that score.

Macdonald also shows the underappreciated role that statesmanship plays in the Canadian regime. In this inquiry, I tried to establish that Macdonald’s political master strokes in the pre-

Confederation period—such as the “double shuffle” and at the Confederation Conferences—might be read as transactional statesmanship. These instances of political leadership come from a particular approach to human nature, political idealism, and from a certain psychology. The same may be said of Sir John’s decisions in 1869 and 1885 versus Riel. Treating one as a legitimate skirmish over government and the other as high treason can be taken as instances of transactional statesmanship as well, as I have tried to show. To be sure, certain moments such as the Pacific

Scandal or anticipating the aftermath of Riel’s hanging represent poor decision-making, but any political leader is human. Even Lincoln was prepared to agree to a constitutional amendment that protected slavery from abolition if it could have prevented the Civil War. But my inquiry helps to show that because of Macdonald, Canadians can contend that their country has in its history a tradition of ideas and statesmanship.

My review of Riel adds to this. His interpretation of HBC’s decision to abandon the people of Red River, his arguments in favour of the Provisional Government, and various actions his government took in 1869-1870 reflect the ideas of both transformational and transactional statesmanship, although more so the former. Those are ideas about the perfectibility of people, the need for radicalism in politics, and a total focus of one’s mind on the political dispute. His several letters and poems after 1875 are full of ideas that correspond to transformational 318 statesmanship. Further, the justifications and rationales for his policies during the North-West

Rebellion ought to be read as transformational ideas. Too many scholars have written off Riel’s mind as mentally ill—my inquiry contends that his mind was moved by particular political ideas.

Riel’s use of force and general political actions at Red River and in the North-West were also instances of statesmanship. For example, preventing the would-be Lieutenant Governor of

Red River from proclaiming the Queen’s authority was an act of transactional statesmanship from

Riel that allowed his people to legitimately contend they only sought the rights of English subjects.

Conversely, his choice to meet the Canadian military in open battle at Batoche and his inflexible reliance on divine providence to win the North-West Rebellion were the acts of a transformational statesman as I have described it. Riel helps to show that at two critical moments of early Canadian history—a resistance that led to Manitoba’s entry into Confederation and an insurrection that threatened to delegitimize Canada’s standing as a nation—we find an engaging and enigmatic statesman.

In this chapter, I tried to answer why one should care about the clash of statesmanship between Macdonald and Riel. My answer can be divided into two general sections. First, they and their interactions stand as an important instance of the English-French and East-West tensions that help to animate the Canadian regime. As it fits within the literature and adds to it an significant illustration where two clear champions of these tensions met in a fierce conflict, students of the

Canadian regime will receive a richer understanding of these tensions by considering Macdonald,

Riel, and their collision of statesmanship. Second, this inquiry suggests that the Canadian regime stands in part on sophisticated political ideas and has a history of genuine statesmen. While we might think that that sort of political theory or exciting leadership belongs more properly to the

United States or France, Canada too can claim to stand in part on ideas and statesmanship. 319

CONCLUSION

In this inquiry, I sought to better understand the Canadian regime. I contend that aspects such as the English-French and West-East dynamics are fundamental to understanding it. I wanted to explain how, at least in part, these dynamics operate and appear the way that they do. To that end,

I chose to examine a moment in Canadian history full of violence, philosophy, strategy, realpolitik, and intrigue, namely, the conflict between Sir John A. Macdonald and Louis Riel. This was an interesting, valid, and underappreciated area of study, since it stands as the only instance where two Fathers of Confederation faced one another in combat. It is written in Genesis 6:4, “there were giants in the earth in those days.” This inquiry examined two giants of Canadian politics. To do this, I wanted to interpret things through the classical approach of statesmanship.

As I surveyed the statesmanship literature, it became apparent that something important was missing. The thinkers and scholars on this subject only really treated statesmanship from the liberal-democratic position. And while no one can dispute that liberal democracy plays an integral role in the statesmanship of some, this cannot be the entire story. To claim that Bismarck or

Brigham Young were not statesmen because they did not practice high Whig political theory narrows the term too much. Consequently, the first contribution this inquiry makes is to work out what I saw as a duality in statesmanship. Drawing from seminal texts in statesmanship and leadership, I determined that those leaders who saw politics as a negotiation, who did not approach things from a utopian vantage point, who exercised their vision from a democratic impulse, who resisted including themselves in their cause, and who believed in human fallibility were transactional statesmen. In contrast, leaders who saw politics as an opportunity to change the world, who had utopian predilections, who elevated themselves above the common man, who 320 mixed their purpose and themselves together, and believed in improving human nature were transformational statesmen.

Next, I reviewed the thinking and political actions of Sir John A. Macdonald. What my inquiry contributes in this chapter is a new way to take stock of the chief Father of Confederation.

I attempt to make sense of the conflict in the literature between those who thought Sir John embraced political theory and those who denied it through a discussion of pragmatism-cum-theory.

I also provide an analysis of his speeches, letters, and actions that suggest with relative strength that Sir John can be interpreted as a transactional statesman.

In the third and fourth chapters of the inquiry, I performed the same type of analysis on

Louis Riel. In Riel’s political life before 1875, I demonstrate someone whose use of political violence, confessional political theory, and vision for his people’s rights as Englishmen made him a transformational statesman, but only moderately so. After 1875, the evidence I reviewed left no doubt that his religiosity, his thinking, his paranoia, and his admixture of self and mission made him a transformational statesman. Thus far, in the literature written on Riel, no one has treated him in this way.

In Chapter 5, I provided a study of Riel’s sanity. The contribution that this section makes to Canadian politics is that offers an academic way to interpret Riel’s religious transformation that does not require we consign it to madness. Too often, writers, scholars, popular historians, and alienists dismissed Riel as a madman. My reflections on, and use of, Thomas Szasz’s writings provide space for an alternative explanation. This inquiry prevents future writers, I should hope, from merely dismissing Riel’s life after 1875 as something that cannot be treated in a careful and systematic way as I did with statesmanship. 321

In the penultimate chapter, I reviewed Macdonald and Riel’s interactions. My study provides to the literature a way of understanding their exchanges during 1870, between the rebellions, and in 1885 as instances of two competing forms of statesmanship. Put plainly, I contend that this was a story of transactional statesmanship prevailing over transformational. I do not believe this was inevitable, neither do I think that one form of statesmanship is inherently

“better” than another. However, in the Canadian context, my inquiry shows that at Batoche, this was transactional statesmanship winning and transformational statesmanship losing.

In reflection, I find that of the three determining factors that help us to identify the form of one’s statesmanship, that there should be some rank ordering. In other words, I think one can say that some aspects are more important than others when trying to evaluate a statesman’s character.

The more one demonstrates the marks of the more powerful aspects of one type of statesmanship or another, the better one can apply the typologies I worked out in this inquiry with confidence.

I rank one’s view of human nature as most important. I do that because I think whether one sees people are fundamentally equal, flawed, and free will significantly determine one’s leadership approach. If I believe that perfection is impossible from anybody, I am highly unlikely to pursue utopian political projects. Since human beings are the building blocks of politics, how one understands their nature will have the strongest impact. In a close second, I would place the role of idealism. In short, whether one accepts a public-private divide in politics goes a long way to shaping the types of political solutions one will craft. If I am convinced that some things, such as family or religion, belong outside of the frontiers of political life, I will avoid endeavours of an all-encompassing nature. The belief there is, as Talmon put it, a “sole and exclusive truth” in politics, requires leadership oriented around bringing all things in line with that truth.

Consequentially, I rank the psychological approach to politics in third. This is because although 322 the nature, strength, and orientation of a leader’s psyche matters a great deal, it cannot outweigh the interpretative power of human nature or idealism in politics.

Chapter 7 has been an attempt to make sense of this fact. In brief, the Canadian regime can be better understood by appreciating that the clash of statesmanship between Macdonald and Riel.

My research suggests that they stand as champions of various poles of important dualities in

Canada, linguistic and geographical. By reviewing their clash of statesmanship in full, I provide both a new way to think about the English-French and East-West tensions and provide further evidence into the literature about the nature and history of these tensions. I also claim in this chapter that the review of Macdonald, Riel, and their statesmanship assists students of the

Canadian regime to see that ideas and statesmanship play a role in Canadian nationhood. This fact is not always acknowledged.

Ultimately, this inquiry suggests one last question: should we rejoice or despair at the fact that transactional statesmanship prevailed in 1885? As I mentioned earlier, I do not believe that one form is naturally superior to the other. But, in the case of Canada, I would respond on the rejoicing side. The country we have become—our “self” if you will—is due in part because of transactional statesmanship. I count it as positive that Canadian society has a clear public and private divide. Further, I think brokerage politics, negotiation, federalism, and an attachment to

British political institutions have successfully defended our natural rights to freedom of speech, religion, mobility, and property. The Canadian regime is imperfect, but I am suspicious of the politics of perfection. The hope of remedying these imperfections radically, as transformative statesmen would do, might endanger the entire regime in unanticipated ways. However, I must leave open the possibility that at the right moment, the right transformational statesman might just lead the country into a greater place than I can envision today. 323

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