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China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information Www Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-74595-6 — China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information Index Page numbers in italics denote figures and tables. Abramoff, Jack, 191 China vs. United States, 44 access money, 14, 20, 24–25, 37, 49, 51, 120, wealthy countries, 50 181, 182, 190–93 “Alleviate the Burden of Grassroots analogous to drugs, 12 Cadres Year,” 177 from businessperson’s point of view, 12 American crony capitalism, 181 China vs. India’s, 41, 42,43 America’s and China’s Gilded Ages, China vs. Russia’s, 39 parallels between, 211 China vs. United States’,44–45, 45 access money, 190–93 combating, 209 comparative-historical data, 184–86 concept of, 204 corruption trends, 186–88 definition, 10 modifying earlier, 189–90 fertile soil for, 203 Progressive Era, 186–88 illegal forms of, 10, 11 anti-corruption campaign, 1, 6, 19, 21, 65, institutionalized and legal, 191–92 69, 119 measurement in UCI, 29 backlash of, 176–77 side effects for economy, 13 city-level Party secretaries, 153 steroids of capitalism, 12–13 falls of national and local officials, 173, wealthier countries, 46, 48 174 access money, indirect harm of, 146–48, 151 impact on China’s growth, 174–77 distorting allocation of resources, 147–48 officials disciplined in, 153, 156, 209 inequality within society and firms, 147 patronage and, 154 real estate, 146–47 straightening bureaucratic norms, 157 administration costs, 222 “tigers” and “flies” purged in, 76–77, administrative reform, transitional 156–57 strategies of, 115. See also transitional tool for tightening political control, administrative institutions 175–76, 202, 209 agency collection, 101 wide-ranging and penetrative, 157 and tax revenue impact on anti-corruption exhibition, 155 compensation, 102–7 arbitraries, 56 vs. tax revenue on, long-term effects of, Asian financial crisis of, 1997, 61 106, 107 vs. tax revenue on, short-term effects of, bank loans, 13 105–7 Bell, Daniel, 197 agency-level corruption, 109 Belt and Road Initiative, 203 aggregate corruption scores Benedict, Ruth, 210 249 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-74595-6 — China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information INDEX bottom-up initiatives, 210 independent and dependent variables, Bo Xilai, 1, 21, 30, 119–20, 125 223 connections to Xu, 142–43 institutional arrangement, 95 family during Cultural Revolution, 125 long-term effects of agency collections vs. grave violations of party discipline, tax revenue on, 106, 107 134–36, 154 low rates of, 92–93 milestones in career path, 125–26, 126 promotion incentives, 95 political stand-off with leadership, 121 “shared expectations” about structure of, second-generation aristocrat, 125 96 strategies for growth promotion, short-term effects of agency collections 148–49 vs. tax revenue on, 105–7 stripped of his position, 134 standard regressions of, 102–5 Bo Xilai, Chinese media coverage of, 122 topped with allowances and perks, 93–94 accomplishments, 121 total compensation, 223 prior to being investigated for bureaucratic extortion, media mentions of, corruption, 123 81 top 10 words describing, 121–23, 122 Bo Xilai, Chongqing under, 127–33 campaign finance restrictions, 191 “celebrate red and smash black” campaign-style policy implementation, 162 campaign, 132 capability traps, 113 economic downturn of, 132–33 capacity-building measures, 16–17, 183, 209 economic growth of, 127, 128 capital flight, 175 government revenue and FDI, 127 capitalism infrastructure projects in, 128–29 access money as steroids of, 12–13 investment in, 131 corruption and, see corruption as land of laptops, 129 rise of, 211 rising debt-to-GDP ratio of, 131, 132 capitulation wages, 88 social welfare initiatives, 130 CCP, see Chinese Communist Party urban residential income, 127 centrally appointed officials, fall of, 173 Bo Yibo, 125 Central Party Secretariat, 177 BRI, see Belt and Road Initiative Chen Chuanping, 165 bribery, 8, 16, 21, 72 Chengdu, 91 decline of, 190 Cheng Li, 133 definition, 219–21 Chen Liangyu, 75, 111 and embezzlement by rank of officials, China 75,76 2012 CPI ranking of, 2 and embezzlement trend by monetary as gigantic outlier, 2–5, 4 size, 73–74, 74 nineteenth-century America and, large-sum cases, 77 comparison of, 18–19 by low- vs. high-rank cases, 220 single-party autocracy, 19 rise in, 73, 73, 74 UCI and CPI rank comparison, 34 by small vs. large cases, 220 and United States at equivalent levels of British corruption, 191 income, 185 budgets by spending categories, 222 China’s Crony Capitalism (book), 119 bureaucratic compensation, 86, 92 China’s economic expansion, 2, 21 capitulation wages, 88, 93 China’s economy, 83 dual-track, 115, 209 boomed after, 1993, 61 and financial outcomes, systematic links driven by private sector, 67 between, 86 Western media portrayal of, 67 fringe benefit and allowances, see fringe China vs. India’s corruption compensation CPI scores, 40 higher “efficiency” wages, 88 petty bribery, 41–42 250 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-74595-6 — China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information INDEX political regimes and, 40, 43 forces driving present pattern of, 52–53 speed money and access money, 41, 42, during “growing out of the plan,” 54–57 43, 50 intensification of, 69–70 structure of, 40 involving larger sums over time, 70 UCI scores, 41 during Maoist era, 54 China vs. Russia’s corruption post-1993 reforms, 61–62 access money, 39 regime collapse risk with, 200–2 anecdotal comparisons, 38 sources of, 67–68 grand theft, 39 structure of, 24–25, 52 reasons for difference in, 37–38 studies on, 5 speed money, 39, 40 temporal patterns, 82, 83 structure of, 40 Chinese corruption and economic growth, UCI scores, 38–40, 39 paradox of, 5–7, 51 China vs. United States’ corruption access money, 14, 182 access money, 44–45, 45 capacity-building reforms, 16–17, aggregate corruption scores, 44 183 UCI scores, 44 challenging belief of, 151 Chinese bureaucracy, 89 data to shed light on, 19–20 attracting and serving investors, 91 explanation for, 17–18 bureaucratic compensation, see penalizing speed money payments, 17 bureaucratic compensation profit-sharing arrangements, 14–16, focus on monetary incentives, 114 182–83 layers of, 76, 89 regional competition, 17, 183 99 percent of public employees, 90–91 Chinese Criminal Law (CCL), corruption predatory states vs., 21 definition of, 68–69 profit-sharing mechanism, see profit- Chinese crony capitalism, 148–51 sharing mechanism competition, 150 street-level bureaucrats, see Chinese cronyism, 149–50 street-level bureaucrats economic development and social Chinese Communist Party, 202 welfare, 148–49 anti-corruption campaigns, 6 provision of preferential policies, 150–51 concentration of power, 199 system of elite profit-sharing, 149 discipline inspection committees, see Chinese highways, construction of, 62 discipline inspection committees Chinese infrastructure expansion list of eight regulations, 157, 159 government debts financing, 62–63 new roles post-1993 reforms, 61 land-related proceeds financing, 62 Organization Department, 198 shadow financing, 64 political scandal, 1 train station, 62 Chinese corruption, 5, 53, 180 Chinese leadership, 19 access money, see access money Chinese officials, varieties of, 225, 226, autocracy and capitalism shaping, 228 199–200 competent and not corrupt, 227–28 Bo Xilai’s arrest, 1 incompetent and corrupt, 225–26 CCL definition, 68–69 incompetent and not corrupt, 226–27 Chinese infrastructure expansion and, see Chinese paradox, see Chinese corruption Chinese infrastructure expansion and economic growth, paradox of competing characterizations of, 47 Chinese Party-state apparatus cyclical pattern, 69 civil servants, 90 decline in, 52 non-civil service public employees, 90 Deng Xiaoping and, see Deng Xiaoping political elites, 89–90 economically destructive corruption and, ranks of officials in, 76 49 Chinese political elites, see political elites 251 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-74595-6 — China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information INDEX Chinese political system grand theft, see grand theft bureaucracy, see Chinese bureaucracy impact on economic growth, 1–2, 206–7, Confucian-style meritocracy, 197–98 215–16 patronage, 198–99 inequality caused by, 207–8 Chinese street-level bureaucrats involving elites vs. non-elites, 8–9 common knowledge among, 118 involving two-way exchanges, 8 curbing extractive behavior, 96–97 measurement, 205–6, see also corruption income source of, 96 indices Chongqing, 127 petty theft, see petty theft city Party secretaries, 197 poverty and, correlation between, 1 performance measures, 163–64 problems with national classification in, roles of, 163 49 city Party secretaries, anti-corruption speed money, see speed money campaign outcome for, 163 structure of, 50 event history analysis, see event history systematic qualitative comparisons, analysis 47–49 geographic patterns of fall, 167–68, 168 unbundling, 24 hazard rate of fall, 166, 166–67 wealthy economies, 14 high turnover rate, 167 corruption categories, 9 individual characteristics, 168–69 and countries, 28–29 inverted V-shape pattern of political fall, unbundled into sub-categories, 28, 208 166 corruption indices patronage effects and, 164–65 CPI, see Corruption Perception Index variables for studying, 163, 165–66, measuring effectiveness of, 24 229 perception-based survey, 24 Civil Service Law, 60 problems with,
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