China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information Www

Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-74595-6 — China's Gilded Age Yuen Yuen Ang Index More Information

Index

Page numbers in italics denote ﬁgures and tables.

Abramoff, Jack, 191 China vs. United States, 44 access money, 14, 20, 24–25, 37, 49, 51, 120, wealthy countries, 50 181, 182, 190–93 “Alleviate the Burden of Grassroots analogous to drugs, 12 Cadres Year,” 177 from businessperson’s point of view, 12 American crony capitalism, 181 China vs. India’s, 41, 42,43 America’s and China’s Gilded Ages, China vs. Russia’s, 39 parallels between, 211 China vs. United States’,44–45, 45 access money, 190–93 combating, 209 comparative-historical data, 184–86 concept of, 204 corruption trends, 186–88 definition, 10 modifying earlier, 189–90 fertile soil for, 203 Progressive Era, 186–88 illegal forms of, 10, 11 anti-corruption campaign, 1, 6, 19, 21, 65, institutionalized and legal, 191–92 69, 119 measurement in UCI, 29 backlash of, 176–77 side effects for economy, 13 city-level Party secretaries, 153 steroids of capitalism, 12–13 falls of national and local officials, 173, wealthier countries, 46, 48 174 access money, indirect harm of, 146–48, 151 impact on China’s growth, 174–77 distorting allocation of resources, 147–48 officials disciplined in, 153, 156, 209 inequality within society and firms, 147 patronage and, 154 real estate, 146–47 straightening bureaucratic norms, 157 administration costs, 222 “tigers” and “flies” purged in, 76–77, administrative reform, transitional 156–57 strategies of, 115. See also transitional tool for tightening political control, administrative institutions 175–76, 202, 209 agency collection, 101 wide-ranging and penetrative, 157 and tax revenue impact on anti-corruption exhibition, 155 compensation, 102–7 arbitraries, 56 vs. tax revenue on, long-term effects of, Asian financial crisis of, 1997, 61 106, 107 vs. tax revenue on, short-term effects of, bank loans, 13 105–7 Bell, Daniel, 197 agency-level corruption, 109 Belt and Road Initiative, 203 aggregate corruption scores Benedict, Ruth, 210

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bottom-up initiatives, 210 independent and dependent variables, Bo Xilai, 1, 21, 30, 119–20, 125 223 connections to Xu, 142–43 institutional arrangement, 95 family during Cultural Revolution, 125 long-term effects of agency collections vs. grave violations of party discipline, tax revenue on, 106, 107 134–36, 154 low rates of, 92–93 milestones in career path, 125–26, 126 promotion incentives, 95 political stand-off with leadership, 121 “shared expectations” about structure of, second-generation aristocrat, 125 96 strategies for growth promotion, short-term effects of agency collections 148–49 vs. tax revenue on, 105–7 stripped of his position, 134 standard regressions of, 102–5 Bo Xilai, Chinese media coverage of, 122 topped with allowances and perks, 93–94 accomplishments, 121 total compensation, 223 prior to being investigated for bureaucratic extortion, media mentions of, corruption, 123 81 top 10 words describing, 121–23, 122 Bo Xilai, Chongqing under, 127–33 campaign finance restrictions, 191 “celebrate red and smash black” campaign-style policy implementation, 162 campaign, 132 capability traps, 113 economic downturn of, 132–33 capacity-building measures, 16–17, 183, 209 economic growth of, 127, 128 capital flight, 175 government revenue and FDI, 127 capitalism infrastructure projects in, 128–29 access money as steroids of, 12–13 investment in, 131 corruption and, see corruption as land of laptops, 129 rise of, 211 rising debt-to-GDP ratio of, 131, 132 capitulation wages, 88 social welfare initiatives, 130 CCP, see Chinese Communist Party urban residential income, 127 centrally appointed officials, fall of, 173 Bo Yibo, 125 Central Party Secretariat, 177 BRI, see Belt and Road Initiative Chen Chuanping, 165 bribery, 8, 16, 21, 72 Chengdu, 91 decline of, 190 Cheng Li, 133 definition, 219–21 Chen Liangyu, 75, 111 and embezzlement by rank of officials, China 75,76 2012 CPI ranking of, 2 and embezzlement trend by monetary as gigantic outlier, 2–5, 4 size, 73–74, 74 nineteenth-century America and, large-sum cases, 77 comparison of, 18–19 by low- vs. high-rank cases, 220 single-party autocracy, 19 rise in, 73, 73, 74 UCI and CPI rank comparison, 34 by small vs. large cases, 220 and United States at equivalent levels of British corruption, 191 income, 185 budgets by spending categories, 222 China’s Crony Capitalism (book), 119 bureaucratic compensation, 86, 92 China’s economic expansion, 2, 21 capitulation wages, 88, 93 China’s economy, 83 dual-track, 115, 209 boomed after, 1993, 61 and financial outcomes, systematic links driven by private sector, 67 between, 86 Western media portrayal of, 67 fringe benefit and allowances, see fringe China vs. India’s corruption compensation CPI scores, 40 higher “efficiency” wages, 88 petty bribery, 41–42

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political regimes and, 40, 43 forces driving present pattern of, 52–53 speed money and access money, 41, 42, during “growing out of the plan,” 54–57 43, 50 intensification of, 69–70 structure of, 40 involving larger sums over time, 70 UCI scores, 41 during Maoist era, 54 China vs. Russia’s corruption post-1993 reforms, 61–62 access money, 39 regime collapse risk with, 200–2 anecdotal comparisons, 38 sources of, 67–68 grand theft, 39 structure of, 24–25, 52 reasons for difference in, 37–38 studies on, 5 speed money, 39, 40 temporal patterns, 82, 83 structure of, 40 Chinese corruption and economic growth, UCI scores, 38–40, 39 paradox of, 5–7, 51 China vs. United States’ corruption access money, 14, 182 access money, 44–45, 45 capacity-building reforms, 16–17, aggregate corruption scores, 44 183 UCI scores, 44 challenging belief of, 151 Chinese bureaucracy, 89 data to shed light on, 19–20 attracting and serving investors, 91 explanation for, 17–18 bureaucratic compensation, see penalizing speed money payments, 17 bureaucratic compensation profit-sharing arrangements, 14–16, focus on monetary incentives, 114 182–83 layers of, 76, 89 regional competition, 17, 183 99 percent of public employees, 90–91 Chinese Criminal Law (CCL), corruption predatory states vs., 21 definition of, 68–69 profit-sharing mechanism, see profit- Chinese crony capitalism, 148–51 sharing mechanism competition, 150 street-level bureaucrats, see Chinese cronyism, 149–50 street-level bureaucrats economic development and social Chinese Communist Party, 202 welfare, 148–49 anti-corruption campaigns, 6 provision of preferential policies, 150–51 concentration of power, 199 system of elite profit-sharing, 149 discipline inspection committees, see Chinese highways, construction of, 62 discipline inspection committees Chinese infrastructure expansion list of eight regulations, 157, 159 government debts financing, 62–63 new roles post-1993 reforms, 61 land-related proceeds financing, 62 Organization Department, 198 shadow financing, 64 political scandal, 1 train station, 62 Chinese corruption, 5, 53, 180 Chinese leadership, 19 access money, see access money Chinese officials, varieties of, 225, 226, autocracy and capitalism shaping, 228 199–200 competent and not corrupt, 227–28 Bo Xilai’s arrest, 1 incompetent and corrupt, 225–26 CCL definition, 68–69 incompetent and not corrupt, 226–27 Chinese infrastructure expansion and, see Chinese paradox, see Chinese corruption Chinese infrastructure expansion and economic growth, paradox of competing characterizations of, 47 Chinese Party-state apparatus cyclical pattern, 69 civil servants, 90 decline in, 52 non-civil service public employees, 90 Deng Xiaoping and, see Deng Xiaoping political elites, 89–90 economically destructive corruption and, ranks of officials in, 76 49 Chinese political elites, see political elites

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Chinese political system grand theft, see grand theft bureaucracy, see Chinese bureaucracy impact on economic growth, 1–2, 206–7, Confucian-style meritocracy, 197–98 215–16 patronage, 198–99 inequality caused by, 207–8 Chinese street-level bureaucrats involving elites vs. non-elites, 8–9 common knowledge among, 118 involving two-way exchanges, 8 curbing extractive behavior, 96–97 measurement, 205–6, see also corruption income source of, 96 indices Chongqing, 127 petty theft, see petty theft city Party secretaries, 197 poverty and, correlation between, 1 performance measures, 163–64 problems with national classification in, roles of, 163 49 city Party secretaries, anti-corruption speed money, see speed money campaign outcome for, 163 structure of, 50 event history analysis, see event history systematic qualitative comparisons, analysis 47–49 geographic patterns of fall, 167–68, 168 unbundling, 24 hazard rate of fall, 166, 166–67 wealthy economies, 14 high turnover rate, 167 corruption categories, 9 individual characteristics, 168–69 and countries, 28–29 inverted V-shape pattern of political fall, unbundled into sub-categories, 28, 208 166 corruption indices patronage effects and, 164–65 CPI, see Corruption Perception Index variables for studying, 163, 165–66, measuring effectiveness of, 24 229 perception-based survey, 24 Civil Service Law, 60 problems with, 25–26 civil service pay, 86 Corruption Perception Index, 23 compensation practices, see bureaucratic authoritative gauge of corruption, 25 compensation China’s 2012 score, 2 competition between superpowers, 210 China’s 2014 score, 25 comprehensive administrative reforms of, first-world bias, 25–26, 35 1998, 53, 109–12 flaws in, 25–26 cashless payments, 111 masking structural variances, 50 controlling financial transactions, 109 UCI advantages over, 31 creation of TSA, 110 UCI rank comparison with, 33–35 establishment of TDC, 110–11 corruption scandals, 119 local measures, 112–13 Bo Xilai, see Bo Xilai Confucian-style meritocracy, 197–98 Ji Jianye, see Ji Jianye corruption, 9,50 corruption schemes among Chinese access money, see access money political elites, 11 analogous to drugs, 11, 12 corruption with exchange, trends of, 71, 72 bundled scores for, 7 corruption with theft capitalism and, relationship between, 7 central authorities permitting, 82 citizens’ ability to monitor, 210 mitigating, 209 classic models of, 8 trends of, 71, 72 comparative patterns, 50–51 county Party secretaries, 76 crises linked to, 13 CPI, see Corruption Perception Index definition, 7, 203–5 CPI scores exchange-based, see exchange-based China vs. India’s, 40 corruption plotted against average growth rates, 215 fighting, 208–10 Crisis of 1893, 18 GDP per capita and, 3,3 crony capitalism

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American, 181 event history analysis, 169–73 Chinese, see Chinese crony capitalism definition, 169 structural risks linked to, 201 discrete-time hazard model, 170 Cui Manli, 139 hazard rate for city leaders, 171–73 patron downfall determinants, 170–71, deal-making corruption, 21 171 Dehao Corporation, 146 results of, 173 democracy and corruption, 50 splines for hazard interpretation, 170 Deng Xiaoping, 181 exchange-based corruption, 12–13 banner, 57 expert surveys in UCI, 27 control over officials, 54–55 extra-budgetary revenue, 55 corruption forms under, 55–57 decision to open markets, 15 federal lobbying expenses, 192 economic growth under, 57 fee collection from businesses, blanket market liberalization, 54, 55, 57 order to prohibit, 112 norm of collective leadership, 161 First Amendment of US Constitution, 193 Southern Tour, 57 fiscal transfers, 101 descriptive statistics, 229 fly, definition of, 76 developing countries, study of, 118 formal public salaries, see bureaucratic development challenges to China, 65 compensation development outcomes and bureaucratic fragmented democracies, 199 efforts, 96 fringe compensation, 15, 88, 118 discipline inspection committees, 68 difficulty in measuring, 97–98 disciplinary actions by, 68 fringe benefit and allowances, 88, 93 drugs, corruption analogous to, 11, 12 income source for, 94 dyadic patron–client relations, 159 Tanzania, 97 fringe compensation in Shandong East Asian economies, 133 dataset for estimating, 98–99, 222–24 economic growth, 18 formal public wages and, 100, 102, 103 Chinese corruption and, paradox of, see forms of, 100 Chinese corruption and economic growth of, 102, 103 growth, paradox of regional variance in, 100, 101 corruption impact on, 1–2, 206–7, share in total compensation, 100 215–16 UCI scores and, correlations between, GCB, see Global Corruption Barometer 46–47, 47 GDP growth and corruption, 215–16 Economist Intelligence Unit, 25 GDP per capita, corruption plotted against, efficiency wage, 15 3,3 Egypt, predatory corruption in, 201 Geng Yanbo, 227–28 elite exchanges, 51 GGF, see government guiding funds elites vs. non-elites, corruption involving, Global Corruption Barometer, 41–42 8–9, 28 golden goose maxim, 86 embezzlement, 16, 72 Golden Mantis, 143 and bribery by rank of officials, 75,76 government procurement projects and bribery trend by monetary size, 74,75 awarded to, 143–44 decline in, 73,73 IPO on stock market, 144 definition, 221 government debts, 62–63 large-sum cases, 77 government guiding funds by low- vs. high-rank cases, 220 for industrial and innovation promotion, by small vs. large cases, 220 202–3 tolerating small-scale, 82 susceptibility to corruption, 203 “Embezzlement vs. Bribery” (article), 82 government spending by items, 222, 223

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grand theft, 9 land-based public finance analogous to drugs, 12 land-related proceeds, 62 China vs. Russia’s, 39 public infrastructure construction with, definition, 10 62 in Nigeria, 37 “large-sum” corruption cases, 68 Guo Boxiong, 156 “leave businesses alone days,” 112 GuoYongchang, 225–26 legal-rational bureaucracy, 176 liberal market economies, 176 HDI, see Human Development Index Ling Jihua, 156 higher “efficiency” wages, 88 lobbying high-income countries, 28 corruption and, 204–5 Hubei province, 112 expenses, federal, 192 leadership’s slogan in, 17 local governments, revenue sources for, 101 Hu Jintao, 121 local leaders Human Development Index, 207 competing to offer preferential policies, “Humble Dwellings” (drama series), 17 147 motivated to curb “grabbing hands,” 17, Hunan province, 112 18 profit-sharing among, 21 India and China’s corruption, see China vs. promotion tied to economic growth, 15 India’s corruption low-income countries, 28 inequality within society and firms, 147, 181, 207–8 Manion, 77 institutional corruption, 29, 193 mass protests, 57 investors, attracting and serving, 91 media coverage, word cloud analysis of, 121 media mentions of corruption, see also Bo Jiang Zemin, 57 Xilai, Chinese media coverage of; Ji Jiang–Zhu leadership, 60 Jianye, Chinese media coverage of Ji Jianye, 21, 64, 136 “bribery” and “bribe-giving,” 79 contributions to Yangzhou, 139 “elegant bribery,” 80 demolition schemes, 138 limitations of, 78 development works in Kunshan, 137 money laundering, 79–80 government procurement projects to “naked official,” 80 Golden Mantis, 143–44 non-transactional forms of corruption, indicted on corruption, 140–41 81 industrial policy for Yangzhou, 139 official statistics vs., 78 massive infrastructural overhaul of “rent-seeking” and “hidden rules,” 80 Nanjing, 140 terms falling under, 78 milestones in career path, 136–37, vote-buying, 79–80, 81 137 Wen Qiang, 80 “Operation Iron Wrist,” 64, 140 middle-income countries, 28 strategies for growth promotion, Minxin Pei, 5–6, 197 148–49 misappropriation of public funds, 16, 69, transferred to Yangzhou, 137 72 Ji Jianye, Chinese media coverage of, 124 decline in, 73,73 after announcement of investigation, 123 media mentions of, 81 prior to being investigated for misuse of public funds, 221 corruption, 123 mixed methods research, 116 top 10 words describing, 124 money politics, 192 monitoring agencies for local businesses, Lai Xiaomin, 157 112 Lambsdorff, Johann, 25 monopoly privileges, 145

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Murong Xuecun, 160 patronage, 159–62 mutual prosperity, 144 timing, 162 prebendalism, 114 Nanjing, 64 in pre-modern times, 87 National Development Reform replacement with fixed salaries, 87 Commission, 175 predatory corruption National Supervisory Commission, 157 Egypt, 201 NDRC, see National Development Reform regional competition checking, 17 Commission predatory states, 200 NERI (National Economic Research private farming, 55 Institute) Marketization Index, 165 private investment, decline in, 66 Nigeria’s corruption private sector grand theft, 37, 52 contributions in China’s economy, 67 UCI and CPI rank comparison, 34–35 embracing, 59 on illegal state seizures of private assets, Office for Enhancing Business 66–67 Environment, 112 procuratorate, 68, 76 official statistics on corruption profit-sharing mechanism, 14–16, 21, 56, investigations 118, 182–83 corruption categories captured by, 70, 71 allowances and perks, 93–94 embezzlement, misuse of public funds, among leaders, 21 and bribery, 72–75 bureaucratic compensation, see limitations of, 68–69 bureaucratic compensation low- and high-rank officials, 75–76 “carrot and stick” approach, 107–9 trends of corruption with exchange, 71, consequence of, 95 72 wage linked with tax and non-tax income, trends of corruption with theft, 71, 72 94 “Operation Iron Wrist,” 64, 140 profit-sharing model, 86 organizational corruption, 56, 86 Progressive Era, 186–88, 192 media mentions of, 81 promotion incentives among elites, 91 prosperity and corruption, paradox of, see patronage, 154, 164–65, 198–99 Chinese corruption and economic pay-for-performance models, 113, 114 growth, paradox of petty bribery provincially appointed officials, fall of, China vs. India’s, 41–42 174 mitigating, 209 PSC, see Politburo Standing Committee petty theft, 9, 56 public administration analogous to drugs, 12 practices of first world, 85–86 definition, 10 standard theories of, 87 Thailand, 37 transformation to state-funded, 87 Politburo Standing Committee Western centeredness, 115 members of, 161 public agents, 85 top post within, 161 public compensation, see bureaucratic political elites, 89–90, 118 compensation above chu rank, 77 public esteem, 120 corruption schemes among, 11 public sector incentives, problem of, profit-sharing mechanism among, 14–16 114 political regimes and corruption, link public sector reforms, 209 between, 40, 43, 50 China’s experience, 114–15 Political Risk Services Guide, 25, 26 objectives of, 113 political survival, predictor of raising formal wages, 113 economic performance, 159 reasons for failure of, 113–14

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public sector wage incentives, classical as painkillers, 12 theories of, 88 wealthier countries, 46, 48 in developing countries, 88 spending categories, budgets by, 222 higher “efficiency” wages, 88 Stanford, Leland, 180 limitations of, 88 state dominance in economy, resurgence “public service motivation,” literature on, of, 66 115 state-owned enterprises, 55, 58 stimulus package, 63 qualitative and quantitative research, subways, construction of, 62 116–17 Sun Zhengcai, 156, 160, 165 “super-clientelism,” 65 rank-and-file bureaucrats, profit-sharing among, 15 Tanzania, fringe compensation in, 97 refund, 95 tax revenue, 101 regional competition, 17, 183 and agency collection impact on resource allocation risk with access money, compensation, 102–7 13 TDC, see Treasury Disbursement Centers revenue sources Thailand, petty theft in, 37 link with compensation, 102–7 TI, see Transparency International local governments, 101 Tiananmen crisis, 60 Rudd, Kevin, 160 Tong Mingqian, 226–27 Russia and China’s corruption, see China vs. total compensation, 100, 223 Russia’s corruption train station, 62 transactional corruption, 24 self-finance, 112 transitional administrative institutions, 115, shadow financing, 64 209 Shide Private Limited, 142 Transition Period, The (documentary), 225 single bundled perception and UCI scores, Transparency International comparison of, 35–36 anti-corruption efforts, 26 small treasuries, 56 third-party surveys for CPI, 25–26 socialist market economy Treasury Disbursement Centers, 110–11 administrative modernization campaign, Treasury Single Account, 110 59–61 TSA, see Treasury Single Account CCP’s decision to establish, 57 two-way exchanges, corruption involving, 8 integration into global economy, 59 meaning of, 57–58 UCI, see Unbundled Corruption Index private sector, 59 UCI scores role of communist officials in, 52–53 China vs. India’s, 41 state enterprise downsizing and reform, China vs. Russia’s, 38–40, 39 58–59 China vs. United States’, 44 social norms, triggering change in, 86 and economic growth, correlations SOEs, see state-owned enterprises between, 46–47, 47 Soviet Union, 16 and ranks by country, 32, 33 speed money, 10, 37, 52 in typological clusters, 32 analogous to drugs, 12 Unbundled Corruption Index, 20, 27–32, analogy of “greasing the wheels,” 11 50, 208 China, 49 advantages over standard measurements, China vs. India’s, 41, 42,43 31,36–37 China vs. Russia’s, 39, 40 comparing overall perception scores and, definition, 10 35–36, 36 enhancing efficiency, 12 corruption categories and countries, imposing cost on citizens, 12 28–29, 218

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CPI rank comparison with, 33–35, 34 corruption, 14 expert surveys in, 27 low aggregate corruption scores, 50 methodological innovations, 29–31 speed money and access money in, 46, 48 survey methodology, 217–18 Wen Jiabao, 121, 134 total and unbundled scores, 32–33, 33 Wen Qiang, 80 undue influence, 204 Wolf, Martin, 199 United States, 50 word cloud analysis of media coverage, 121 battle against graft in Progressive Era, 19 World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, China as “gigantic outlier” vis-à-vis, 4,4 26 and China at equivalent levels of income, World Competitiveness Yearbook, 26 185 and China, comparison of Gilded Ages Xi Jinping, 152, 154 of, 181 anti-corruption campaign, see anti- vs. Chinese corruption, see China vs. corruption campaign United States’ corruption bottom-up initiatives, 210 contemporary China and, comparison of, centralization of power, 193 18–19 coming to power in 2012, 65 Gilded Age in, 67–68 first speech before the Politburo, 154 resilience despite corruption crises, recentralizing personal power, 161 201–2 social and political freedoms, 176 taxless (public) financing in, 63–64 speech to the CCDI in 2019, 175–76 UCI and CPI rank comparison, 35 stance on state’s role in economy, 66 United States Financial Crisis Inquiry top-down disciplinary apparatus, 192 Commission, 192 Xinhai Square, 143 urban housing, 147 Xu Dongming, 141, 143 soaring prices, 147 Xu Ming, 142–43, 145 speculative bubbles and over- Xu Songtao, 92 construction, 146–47 Yangzhou, 137 validity problem, 30 canal tourism, 138–39 vignette-focused survey, evaluating city-wide greening campaign, 138 corruption using, 29–31 demolition schemes, 138 access money, 29 industrial policy for, 139 based on real events, 30 Ji’s contributions to, 139 conflict of interest among influential Yuan Chunqing, 165 actors, 30 perceptions of corruption, 29 Zambia, fringe benefit and allowances of, vote-buying scandal, 227 88 Zhou Yongkang, 30, 42, 156 Wang Lijun, 133 Zhu Rongji, 17, 57, 60, 109 Wang Qishan, 65 Zhu Tianxiao, 141, 146 wealthy countries Zhu Xinliang, 143

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