Autocrats Untying Their Hands-Political Prosecution Of
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ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] Autocrats Untying Their Hands: Political Prosecution of Corruption in a Limited Autocracy Jia Li, University of Chicago Abstract Autocrats have an incentive to purge rival elites in the course of anticorruption. But can an autocrat purge his rivals by political prosecution in a limited autocracy where power-sharing arrangements tie his hands? Empirical observation from China, an institutionalized autocracy with a history of politicized anticorruption, sheds light on this question. Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign provides network evidence that the autocrat is untying his hands and purging rivals despite the constraints on his power. Studying the network where purged elites are nodes and their colleague relations are ties, this paper argues that the emphasis on political prosecution against an elite explains his centrality in the purged network, which suggests that political prosecution drives the campaign as much as cleansing graft does. The independent variable, emphasis on political prosecution, is estimated by the ratio of intraparty duration to procuratorial duration. Centrality, as the dependent variable, is constructed by PageRank algorithm. The finding suggests that an autocrat in a limited autocracy is capable of reneging on power sharing. Keywords: limited autocracy; network analysis; corruption; China 1 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] Autocrats with hands tied: can they purge rivals by political prosecution? Autocrats have an incentive to purge rival elites in the course of anticorruption. As a strategy to enforce political order, they manipulate judicial processes and employ courts to monitor regime elites (Magaloni, 2008b). Cleansing graft is a convenient excuse for purging rivals. Autocrats use anticorruption agencies as political instruments to repress regime elites (Svensson, 2005). In autocracies, anticorruption is enforced in a highly selective way, based on political considerations as well as economic graft (Manion, 1998). It is a politicized cause that serves to consolidate autocrats’ power. In limited autocracies, however, the power of autocrats is substantially constrained by power-sharing arrangements. Autocrats rule on the consent of small-sized selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). They have to credibly commit themselves to sharing power in institutions with regime elites in order to build and secure the loyalty of their winning coalitions (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008a; Boix & Svolik, 2013). Institutionalization reduces the risk of coup, but the rule of autocrats remains under threat of allies’ rebellion (Svolik, 2012). Regime elites may challenge autocrats via power-sharing institutions. The power of autocrats in limited autocracies is therefore constrained. It leads us to question to what extent those autocrats can prioritize their personal agenda at the expense of regime elites at large when they wield autocratic power. Can an autocrat, with his hands tied by power-sharing arrangements in a limited autocracy, 2 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] take advantage of anticorruption and massively purge his rivals? China is an example of institutionalized durable autocracy. This paper provides evidence from Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign that power-sharing arrangements can be fragile. This paper shows that the network structure of purged elites is shaped by political prosecution as much as by the efforts to cleanse graft. It means that the Chinese autocrat is untying his hands and breaking down the established power-sharing deals. China: anticorruption in a limited autocracy The regime of the Communist Party of China (CCP1) provides an example of institutionalized and durable autocracy. After Mao Zedong, the regime has developed a system of reciprocal accountability: the Central Committee under the command of the Politburo, and the Politburo in turn held accountable to the Central Committee (Shirk, 1993). Power sharing has been effectively established in the post-Deng China. In the absence of a strongman, arrangements that divide the party-state’s supreme power between standing members of the Politburo emerge and consolidate. This institutional design of “collective leadership” (jiti lingdao) is the key to China’s developmental miracle (Hu, 2014b). Some scholars go as far as calling it a “collective presidency (jiti zongtong zhi)” (Hu, 2012; 2014a). The party-state delegates power to its bureaucrats in functional and local agencies who enforce policies made by 1 The party uses “CPC” as its official abbreviation, but “CCP” is more commonly used in the English-speaking world. This paper refers the party as “CCP”. 3 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] the party center, and bureaucratic interests significantly dictate policy outcomes (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). Moreover, conventions on power transition have emerged and functioned effectively on recent occasions: from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin and to Hu Jintao (Kou, 2010), and most lately to Xi Jinping. The durability of CCP regime is largely attributed to its power-sharing institutions that alleviate the monitoring problems between autocrats and regime elites (Svolik, 2012). This durability, however, comes with a cost. An autocrat selected by institutionalized rules is fettered thereby, and so he can hardly overturn the regime’s fundamental programs (Kou, 2006; 2010). His personal autocracy is vulnerable to potential challenges by regime elites at large. Power-sharing arrangements tie his hands when he seeks to meet critical challenges in governance – the “tough bones” (Chan, 2014) – and leave a legacy in CCP history (Zhai, 2014). Many China watchers expect Xi to try untying his hands and striking down his enemies in an anticorruption campaign (Huang, 2014; Sternberg, 2014; Tiezz, 2014; Wang, 2014). This means that he will effectively break down the power-sharing arrangements. Power sharing, indeed, can be fragile. It frequently fails in the emergence of an established autocracy: if the autocrat is able to repress regime elites in the course of his personalizing power, regime elites may eventually lose their capacity of allies’ rebellion that keeps the autocrat in check (Svolik, 2012). In the case of China, a massive anticorruption campaign can evidence such a process. If we observe a campaign that is structurally driven by political prosecution, we may infer that the 4 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] autocrat is pursuing his own agenda against the will of regime elites at large and thus power sharing is falling apart. China has a long record of politicized anticorruption. Cleansing graft is never the only rationale behind (Wedeman, 2005). In part, China’s periodic and concerted anticorruption efforts are by-products of its economic policies (Quade, 2007). The “higher” goals of CCP, including state transformation in 1949-1953, regime consolidation in 1954-1966 and national modernization since 1978, fuel its fight against corruption (Gong, 1994). Leaders in communist regimes are well aware that corruption undermines the foundation of their regimes and sometimes take proactive measures (Holmes, 1993). The regimes wage campaigns when they expect to gain incremental legitimacy therefrom (Manion, 2004). They do not, however, crack down corruption at all cost. In China, CCP omits high-level, high-stakes corruption cases so as to prevent damage to the party’s image (Fabre, 2001). Punishing senior officials results in a waste of the regime’s human capital investment on those fallen cadres (Zhu, 2015). Besides, corruption enhances CCP’s control over its party apparatuses because graft provides elites with economic compensation (Fan & Grossman, 2001). Anticorruption is, therefore, a mere “symbolic” issue (Guo, 2014). When the regime does decide to prosecute top leaders for corruption, it is often more about power struggle than cleansing graft per se (Wedeman, 2012). In China, the issue of corruption has turned a weapon against political enemies (Shirk, 1993). For example, Zhou Yongkang’s downfall is deemed as a result of his 5 ISA Hong Kong 2017 Jia Li June 15 [email protected] conspiracy with Bo Xilai to challenge Xi’s position (Guo, 2014). In this paper, we go beyond analyzing individual cases and look for evidence at the campaign’s structural level. Argument: political prosecution and network centrality The elites prosecuted in an anticorruption campaign can be analyzed in the purged network where each purged elite is a node and their colleague relations are ties. Figure 1 is a sketch that illustrates how such a network may be structured. Some nodes are obviously more central than others in this illustrative network. A number of individual attributes of political elites may account for the varying centrality. First, an elder elite is more likely to occupy a central network position, as an elite with a longer career can form more colleague relations in the course. Second, political mobility of an elite has an impact on his position. If an elite has served in many an institution, he is more likely to be central in the network than someone else who builds the entire career in one single place. Third, political seniority affects centrality. A higher-ranking elite has formed colleague relations at various levels in the political hierarchy of the regime, and so he is expected to occupy a central position. The network we are interested in is not composed of all elites; rather, it is a purged network.