Crociata Anti-Corruzione E Nuovi Equilibri Di Potere
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Sopa-Scoopzhoutarget
Friday, August 30, 2013 A3 Beam me up LEADING THE NEWS K-pop stars are embracing hologram COMMERCE Oil giants technology to reach a wider audience > L I F E C 7 banned Unwelcome guest Create your dream home Health headache from new Aquino cancels visit to China: Chic, stylish furniture Migraines can cause INVESTMENT TEAMS TO BE REINED IN Beijing says he was never and accessories for permanent brain damage projects invited in the first place discerning buyers and raise risk of strokes Commerce Ministry targets extravagance by delegations sent Foreign direct investment is a Previously, investment jun- key economic indicator used to kets were believed to be immune > LEA D ING T HE N EWS A 3 > 20-PAG E SPE CIA L REP O R T > WORLD A15 to Hong Kong and Macau to seek investment for their regions gauge officials’ performance, and from the campaign against offi- Beijing makes state ................................................ dozens of delegations from local cial extravagance. overstated the number of partici- His remarks followed the flag- governments flock to Hong Kong The The People’s Daily said busi- energy companies pay Daniel Ren pants and the value of deals ship newspaper’s harsh criticism every year to seek such invest- ness delegations stayed in five- [email protected] phenomenon the price for failing to signed during their promotional on Monday of investment dele- ments. star hotels and invited business- activities. gations travelling to Hong Kong. Yao admitted that the delega- reflects a severe men to expensive restaurants, meet pollution targets The Ministry of Commerce has “They were desperate to get This was the first time that a tions played a positive role in level of spending as much as 1,000 yuan pledged to rein in extravagance abig number of foreign business- Communist Party mouthpiece spurring the nation’s economic (HK$1,260) per head for a break- ............................................... -
Xi Jinping's Inner Circle
Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 1: The Shaanxi Gang) Cheng Li Like successful politicians elsewhere, President Xi Jinping assumed China’s top leadership role with the support of an inner circle. This group has been crucial to Xi’s efforts to consolidate power during his first year in office. Xi’s inner circle of confidants has smoothed the way for him to undertake a bold anti-corruption campaign, manage the Bo Xilai trial, and begin the process of crafting ambitious economic reforms. This series examines various power bases that make up Xi’s inner circle—individuals who serve as his hands, ears, mouth, and brain. This first article focuses on native-place associations, namely the so-called Shaanxi Gang, which includes the “Iron Triangle” grouping in the Politburo Standing Committee. Such discussion can help reveal the future trajectory of politics and policy-making during the Xi administration. The analysis of the positioning and promotion of some of Xi’s longtime friends provides an invaluable assessment of both Xi’s current power and the potential for effective policy implementation. Much of the current discussion about the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s power centers on the top leadership positions that he holds concurrently.1 Xi not only took control of all the supreme institutions in the party, state, and military during the latest political succession, but he also now chairs the newly established National Security Committee and the Central Leading Group on Comprehensive Deepening of Economic Reform—two crucial decision-making bodies in Zhongnanhai. There is now widespread recognition that the party leadership enthusiastically endorsed Xi’s comprehensive market reform agenda at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee held in November 2013.2 These big, bold, and broad policy initiatives ostensibly reflect Xi’s growing power and influence.3 Less noticed, but equally important, is Xi’s substantial reliance on an inner circle of confidants, especially his quick moves to promote longtime associates to key leadership positions. -
The Lions's Share, Act 2. What's Behind China's Anti-Corruption Campaign?
The Lions’s Share, Act 2. What’s Behind China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign? Guilhem Fabre To cite this version: Guilhem Fabre. The Lions’s Share, Act 2. What’s Behind China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign?. 2015. halshs-01143800 HAL Id: halshs-01143800 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01143800 Preprint submitted on 20 Apr 2015 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Séminaire BRICs FMSH - CRBC The Lions’s Share, Act 2. What’s Behind China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign? Guilhem Fabre N°92 | april 2015 As we have seen in a previous working paper ( « The lion’s share : What’s behind China’s economic slowdown ? »), China’s elite have largely benefited from control of state assets and manipulation of the factors market (land, labor and capital) during the first decade of this cen- tury. Along with strong growth and social mobility, the accumulation of wealth has created some of the most flagrant social polarization worldwide, much higher than the official statistics. Instead of taking concrete measures to correct these inequalities, according to the new blueprint of reforms launched by the 3rd Plenum in November 2013, the new direction has focused on a gigantic campaign against corruption. -
Insights Huining on the Liaison Office
The intriguing appointment of Luo Insights Huining on the Liaison Office In late December 2019, Luo Huining 骆惠宁 was set aside and taken down from his provincial position (Shanxi Party Secretary [2016-2019]) and instead sent, as several 65-year-old Cadres often do before their official retirement, to a commission led by the National People’s Congress (NPC). Luo, a provincial veteran (Anhui Standing Committee [1999-2003], Governor [2010-2013] and Party Secretary of Qinghai [2013-2016]), seemed then to follow in the footsteps of his Qinghai predecessor, Qiang Wei 强卫1. Replaced by Lou Yangsheng 楼阳生 – part of Xi’s Zhejiang “army”, Luo, despite being regarded as competent when it came to the anti-corruption campaign, has never shown any overt signs of siding with Xi. As such, the sudden removal of Wang Zhimin 王志民2 – now ex-director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office for the Central government, which, to be fair, was predictable3, became even more confusing when it became known that he would be replaced by Luo. Some are saying this “new” player could bring a breath of fresh air and bring new perspectives on the current state of affairs; some might see this move as either an ill-advised decision or the result of lengthy negotiations at the top – negotiations that might not have tilted in Xi’s favor. A fall from “grace” in the shadow of Zeng Qinghong Wang Zhimin’s removal, as previously stated, is almost a non-event, as Xi was (and still is) clearly dissatisfied with the way the Hong Kong - Macau affairs system 港澳系统 is dealing with the protests. -
Asia Focus #3
PROGRAMME ASIE QUELLE COMPOSITION DU POLITBURO ET DU COMITÉ CENTRAL CHINOIS APRÈS 2017 ? Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL CRSH UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTREAL OCTOBRE 2016 Septembre 2016 ASIA FOCUS #3 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #3 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2016 lors que 2016 se termine et que la campagne anticorruption agressivement menée par la tristement célèbre « jiwei » [纪委] a pris fin, il ne reste que A quelques mois pour finaliser la sélection interne des cadres qui seront appelés à être élus en novembre au Politburo ainsi qu’au Comité central. Cela dit, depuis la fin de 2015, nous avons pu remarquer un certain durcissement, voire même un « repli » de la part de Xi, tant dans son attitude face au pouvoir (p. ex. retour aux idiomes/symboles maoïstes, méfiance ouverte de l’Occident, attitude de plus en plus inflexible en matière de structures internationales, etc.), que dans son attitude envers certains patriarches du Parti, notamment Jiang Zemin (président de la République populaire entre 1993 et 2003) et Hu Jintao (président de 2003 à 2013), ainsi qu’envers les autres forces en présence sur la scène politique chinoise (par exemple la Ligue des jeunesses communistes [共青团]1, la « faction du pétrole » [石油帮]2, la bande Shanghai [ 上海帮], la bande du Jiangxi [江派], etc.). Ce dernier a également resserré son emprise non seulement sur Beijing – par le biais de son proche collaborateur Wang Xiaohong [王 小洪]3-, mais bien aussi sur le pays en entier. Tandis que le temps d’« abattre les tigres » [打虎] et que les déraillements de la jiwei sont encore perceptibles, en particulier dans la province du Hebei4, fort est de constater que l’impact n’est pas celui escompté, sauf dans les cas de Su Shulin [苏树林]5 et Jiang Jiemin [蒋洁敏]6, et qu’il ne sera pas vraiment possible d’évaluer les dégâts de cette campagne avant la formation du Comité central de 2022. -
Petroleum Politics: China and Its National Oil Companies
MASTER IN ADVANCED EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ANGLOPHONE BRANCH - Academic year 2012/2013 Master Thesis Petroleum Politics: China and Its National Oil Companies By Ellennor Grace M. FRANCISCO 26 June 2013 Supervised by: Dr. Laurent BAECHLER Deputy Director MAEIS To Whom I owe my willing and my running CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures v List of Abbreviations vi Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Literature Review 2 1.2 Methodologies 4 1.3 Objectives and Scope 4 Chapter 2. Historical Evolution of Chinese National Oil Companies 6 2.1 The Central Government and “Self-Reliance” (1950- 1977) 6 2.2 Breakdown and Corporatization: First Reform (1978- 1991) 7 2.3 Decentralization: Second Reform (1992- 2003) 11 2.4 Government Institutions and NOCs: A Move to Recentralization? (2003- 2010) 13 2.5 Corporate Governance, Ownership and Marketization 15 2.5.1 International Market 16 2.5.2 Domestic Market 17 Chapter 3. Chinese Politics and NOC Governance 19 3.1 CCP’s Controlling Mechanisms 19 3.1.1 State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 19 3.1.2 Central Organization Department 21 3.2 Transference Between Government and Corporate Positions 23 3.3 Traditional Connections and the Guanxi 26 3.4 Convergence of NOC Politics 29 Chapter 4. The “Big Four”: Overview of the Chinese Banking Sector 30 Preferential Treatment 33 Chapter 5. Oil Security and The Going Out Policy 36 5.1 The Policy Driver: Equity Oil 36 5.2 The Going Out Policy (zou chu qu) 37 5.2.1 The Development of OFDI and NOCs 37 5.2.2 Trends of Outward Foreign Investments 39 5.3 State Financing: The Chinese Policy Banks 42 5.4 Loans for Oil 44 Chapter 6. -
China Regulatory Enforcement Quarterly
CHINA REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT QUARTERLY WHAT’S INSIDE Executive Summary China’s Anti-Terrorism Law New Measures on Healthcare Donations Major Enforcement News Overseas Regulators Q4 – 2015 | www.dlapiper.com EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Legal and regulatory developments in Q4 2015 continue to reflect attempts by the Chinese government to respond to the significant challenges presented by the slowing market economy and other domestic crises, while the country aspires to transition into a more consumption-driven, innovative, and diversified economy. For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which crashed in Q3 and made a small recovery in Q4, collapsed to a 52-week low in the first week of 2016. The government implemented a number of reforms aimed at preventing future crashes which, ironically, may have in some cases compounded the problem. One such reform was the introduction of a “circuit breaker system” which halted the trading of Chinese stocks that made gains or losses of more than seven percent on any given trading day. The circuit breaker system may have contributed to the crash as anxious investors looked to quick sell when markets began to tumble. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) suspended the system within three trading days, having publicly admitted that the measure was unsuccessful in achieving its aim. Furthermore, the central government’s stance against corruption remains steadfast as evidenced in its propensity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals responsible for such crimes. Disaster struck in Shenzhen on December 20 when a dumpsite of construction debris collapsed toppling dozens of buildings and apartments. Official reports state that 69 people were killed while eight remain missing. -
Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized. -
Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping's Administration— Proactive Policies
Chapter 3 China: Xi Jinping’s Administration— Proactive Policies at Home and Abroad or China, 2014 was a year when initiatives of the Xi Jinping administration Fcame to the forefront. In domestic politics, it was a year of important changes, as the anti-corruption campaign continued to make itself felt, resulting, for example, in Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Military Commission (CMC), being expelled from the party. Xi Jinping, who was already president as well as general secretary of the party, took the position of chairman of the new National Security Commission and created a number of small leading groups, part of his efforts to strengthen his structural authority. Meanwhile elements of instability grew as well, such as the number of bombings that took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and the CPC is cracking down vigorously. President Xi has assertively engaged in foreign policy, leading at times to strong unilateral positions such as China’s location of oil drilling equipment in the South China Sea. China is seeking to form “a new type of major-power relations” with the United States, but China’s actions in the South China Sea and the confrontation over cyber spying make it unclear whether China will be able to achieve the kind of US-China relations it desires. President Xi is also engaging in periphery diplomacy, seeking to ensure China’s peaceful development by reinforcing its economic relations with its neighbors and calling for an Asian New Security Concept, while strengthening its criticism of the system of alliances centered on the United States. -
Firm Control: Governing the State-Owned Economy Under Xi Jinping
China Perspectives 2018/1-2 | 2018 New Approaches to the Political Regime Under Xi Jinping Firm Control: Governing the State-owned Economy Under Xi Jinping Wendy Leutert Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7605 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 June 2018 Number of pages: 27-36 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Wendy Leutert, « Firm Control: Governing the State-owned Economy Under Xi Jinping », China Perspectives [Online], 2018/1-2 | 2018, Online since 01 June 2019, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7605 © All rights reserved Special feature China perspectives Firm Control Governing the State-owned Economy Under Xi Jinping WENDY LEUTERT ABSTRACT: How has the Xi Jinping administration recentralised authority over China’s politics and economy? Studies of Xi’s rule often suggest that his “core leader” status, revolutionary heritage, and informal network of loyalists underpin this consolidation of central control. In contrast, this article focuses on the state sector to highlight how the Xi administration’s recentralisation of authority is grounded in existing governance mecha - nisms and techniques: central leading small groups, the cadre management system, Party committees, and campaigns. Using policy documents and an original dataset on central state-owned enterprise leaders, I provide evidence that the Xi administration has leveraged each of these four methods to reclaim central authority relative to the preceding Hu Jintao administration. These findings contribute to scholarship on adaptive authoritarian governance and economic reform in China by underscoring that administrations can use existing instruments of central control in divergent ways. -
中國石油天然氣股份有限公司 PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED (A Joint Stock Limited Company Incorporated in the People’S Republic of China with Limited Liability)
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this announcement, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this announcement. 中國石油天然氣股份有限公司 PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED (a joint stock limited company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability) (Hong Kong Stock Exchange Stock Code: 857 Shanghai Stock Exchange Stock Code: 601857) Announcement of the interim results for the six months ended June 30, 2011 (Summary of the 2011 Interim Report) 1. Important Notice 1.1 The Board of Directors (“Board”) of PetroChina Company Limited (the “Company”), the Supervisory Committee and the Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management of the Company warrant that there are no material omissions from, or misrepresentation or misleading statements contained in this announcement, and jointly and severally accept full responsibility for the truthfulness, accuracy and completeness of the information contained in this summary of the 2011 Interim Report. This announcement is a summary of the 2011 Interim Report. Investors should read the 2011 Interim Report carefully for more details. A full version of the 2011 Interim Report can be downloaded from the websites of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (website: http://www.sse.com.cn), The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Hong Kong Stock Exchange”) (website: http://www.hkex.com.hk) and the Company (website: http://www.petrochina. com.cn). 1.2 This summary of the 2011 Interim Report has been approved unanimously at the Second Meeting of the Fifth Session of the Board. -
2009 Annual Report Petrochina Company Limited 010-80427356 64435201
PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED ANNUAL REPORT 2009 ANNUAL REPORT ANNUAL 2009 PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED 010-80427356 64435201 010-80427356 ( Hong Kong Stock Exchange Stock Code: 857 ) ( New York Stock Exchange Symbol: PTR ) ( Shanghai Stock Exchange Stock Code: 601857 ) This report is printed on recycled paper made in the People’s Republic of China. PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED ANNUAL REPORT (香港联合交易所股票代号:857) (纽约证券交易所股票代号:PTR) (上海证券交易所股票代码:601857) Contents Important Notice 2 Corporate Profile 2 Summary of Financial Data and Financial Indicators 5 Changes in Share Capital and Information on Shareholders 9 Chairman’s Report 16 Business Operating Review 20 Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Position and Results of Operations 26 Significant Events 39 Connected Transactions 45 Corporate Governance 56 Shareholders’ Meetings 64 Directors’ Report 65 Report of The Supervisory Committee 75 Directors, Supervisors, Senior Management and Employees 79 Information on Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 93 Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with China Accounting Standards 96 Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 166 Corporate Information 232 Documents Available for Inspection 236 Confirmation from the Directors and Senior Management 237 IMPORTANT NOTICE The Board of Directors of PetroChina Company Limited (the “Company”), the Supervisory Committee and the Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management of the Company warrant that there are no material omissions from, or misrepresentation or misleading statements contained in this annual report, and jointly and severally accept full responsibility for the truthfulness, accuracy and completeness of the information contained in this annual report. No substantial shareholder of the Company has utilised the funds of the Company for non-operating purposes.