A Thesis Entitled Rogue State? the United States, Unilateralism, and the United Nations by Robert L. Macdonald Submitted As
A Thesis
Entitled
Rogue State? The United States, Unilateralism, and the United Nations
By
Robert L. MacDonald
Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The Master of Arts in History
______Advisor: Diane Britton
______Graduate School
The University of Toledo
August 2006
Copyright © 2006
This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no parts of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author.
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Acknowledgements
This project could not have succeeded without the help, support, and encouragement of my family, friends, and professors during the past few years. I wish to thank Dr. Diane Britton for her commitment to be my advisor throughout this process and her open-mindedness in finding a link between her interests and research and the topic discussed in the following pages. I wish to thank Drs. Peter Linebaugh, Charles Beatty
Medina, and Timothy Messer-Kruse for their willingness to serve as members of my committee and for their thoughtful questions and insightful commentary. I will keep their advice close at hand as I continue to develop my researching and writing skills. I wish to especially thank Dr. Ruth Herndon, who has served as a mentor during both my undergraduate and graduate years at the University of Toledo, for always seeing the best in my work while thoughtfully challenging me to do better. I wish also to thank all of the professors that I have worked with while at the University of Toledo, including of course
William Longton, Michael Jakobson, Ron Lora, William O’Neal, Roger Ray, Charles
Glaab, Robert Smith, and Alfred Cave. My family, especially my parents, Richard and
Debbie MacDonald, has provided enormous support and patience throughout this entire process. I thank them for their love and support and hope that they can be proud of the finished product. I wish to express my love and gratitude to my partner, best-friend, and soul mate, Amanda Dennison, who has provided the motivation and inspiration to keep working, kept me sane during the past few months, and lent her expertise in reading, revising, and commenting on my work. Finally, I wish to thank our cat, Layla Gordon, for constantly trying to help by sitting on the computer, books, or notebooks that I was working with at the time. As with all works, I am deeply indebted to everyone who has
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been involved with this project. Those listed above are responsible for any of its successes. I, on the other hand, am completely responsible for all errors and omissions found therein.
Robert MacDonald
July 2006
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements iii
Table of Contents v
List of Tables vi
List of Maps viii
Introduction 1
Chapter One 13 The New American Century
Chapter Two 48 Righteous Aggression
Chapter Three 100 The Law of the Jungle
Chapter Four 151 Israel: Rogue Ally
Chapter Five 202 Vetoing the United Nations
Conclusion 289
Select Bibliography 294
Appendix I 300 Tables of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
Appendix II 417 Maps
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List of Tables
TABLE I 309 40 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 24, 1985 – December 18, 1985
TABLE II 317 41 st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 10, 1986 – December 19,1986
TABLE III 326 42 nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 7, 1987 – August 17, 1998
TABLE IV 334 43 rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 17, 1988 – April 20, 1989
TABLE V 342 44 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 28, 1989 – September 17, 1990
TABLE VI 349 45 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 18, 1990 – August 27, 1991
TABLE VII 354 46 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 17, 1991 – August 25, 1992
TABLE VIII 358 47 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 22, 1992 – September 14, 1993
TABLE IX 362 48 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 8, 1993 – September 19, 1994
TABLE X 366 49 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 17, 1994 – September 14, 1995
TABLE XI 370 50 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 12, 1995 – September 17, 1996
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TABLE XII 374 51 st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 15, 1996 – September 15, 1997
TABLE XIII 379 52 nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 15, 1997 - September 8, 1998
TABLE XIV 383 53rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 1, 1998 - September 13, 1999
TABLE XV 386 54 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 14, 1999 – September 5, 2000
TABLE XVI 390 55 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 5, 2000 – September 7, 2001
TABLE XVII 394 56 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 15, 2001 – September 9, 2002
TABLE XVIII 398 57 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 10, 2002 – September 15, 2003
TABLE XIX 403 58 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 16, 2003 – September 13, 2004
TABLE XX 408 59 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: October 11, 2004 – September 13, 2005
TABLE XXI 412 60 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: September 16, 2005 – July 7, 2006
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List of Maps
MAP I 417 Landownership in Palestine and the UN Partition Plan, 1947; Palestine Villages Depopulated in 1948 and 1967
MAP II 418 The Near East after the 1967 June War
MAP III 419 The Wall in the West Bank (2003)
MAP IV 420 The Wall and Projected Israeli Unilateral Disengagement (February 2005)
MAP V 421 The Wall in Jerusalem (2005)
MAP VI 422 The Occupation’s “Convergence Plan” (April 2006)
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Introduction
We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. . . . We should cease to talk about vague and . . . unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.
George Kennan State Department Policy Planning Study 23 24 February 1948 1
According to the 2002 United States National Security Strategy, rogue states:
Brutalize their own people and squander their natural resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive design of their regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; reject basic human values (and hate the United States and everything for which it stands). 2
The primary purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the chasm-like contradictions between the lofty, idealistic rhetoric and the foreign and domestic policies of the corporate and
1 George Kennan, Policy Planning Study 23, cited in Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants (Berkeley: Odonian Press, 1992), 9-10; Policy Planning Study 23 can be found in the official history of the State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1948, Vol. I, Part II, 510-529. For a more complete discussion of the secret policy document, see Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso Press, 1991).
2 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States,
political elite in the United States and prove that the United States government meets every qualification of its own definition of a rogue state, including fearing real democracy and despising the American people. Americans are unfortunately ignorant of history and the mainstream media fail to place any event in context that would encourage critical thinking or any response beside blind patriotism. 3 When a president plans war on false pretexts or infringes upon the civil liberties of American citizens, the press and the pundits and the politicians treat it as an anomaly, a unique situation in American history requiring obedience to and support for the government’s policy. However, if Americans knew that many presidents have lied about the reasons for war, including James Madison and the War of 1812, James Polk and the Mexican War, Abraham Lincoln and the Civil
War, William McKinley and the war in the Philippines, Woodrow Wilson and World
War I, Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Harry Truman and the Korean War, Dwight
Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon and Vietnam, Ronald
Regan and Grenada and Nicaragua, George H.W. Bush and Panama and Iraq, William
Clinton and Yugoslavia, and George W. Bush and Afghanistan and Iraq, if they knew that all wars are imperial wars despite the rhetoric, then perhaps they would not be so quick to support the president in another imperialistic venture. If Americans knew that the government has incessantly attempted to curb civil liberties and real democracy (in the form of popular criticism and control of policies) especially during war, through the
Alien and Sedition Act, Lincoln’s suspension of habeus corpus and the imprisonment of war dissenters, the Espionage Act during World War I targeting dissenters, the Red
3 For convincing arguments and evidence that the media act as a propaganda machine for the political and economic elite, see for instance Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1989) ; and Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).
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Scares, COINTELPRO targeting leftist activists, and the Patriot Act, then perhaps they would realize that the American public is one of the main targets of the government, which creates and exacerbates threatening situations to force the people’s acquiescence.
The real history of the United States teaches two incontrovertible truths. The first is that there is a fundamental conflict between the U.S. government and the
American people. James Madison, an influential member of the Constitutional
Convention, recognized that the function of government was to adjudicate the inevitable conflict between those who own property and those who do not. As constitutional scholars Charles Beard, J. Allen Smith and others have persuasively documented, the primary aim of those drafting the constitution was to protect the wealthy minority from the masses and somehow convince the majority that the constitution and the national government served their interests. 4 Essentially, American history is the history of class warfare, slave owner against slave, capital against labor, rich against poor, with the deck stacked in favor of the owning class through government and law. The second truth, a logical consequence of the first, is that the government incessantly propagandizes and deceives the American public. Edward Bernays, a member of President Woodrow
Wilson’s Committee on Public Information, established to manufacture consent for
American involvement in World War I, and a pioneer in the modern public-relations industry, revealed:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this
4 See James Madison, Journal of the Constitutional Convention, E.H. Scott, ed., (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1893); Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935); J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence, and Relation to Democracy (Chautauqua , New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1911); and Bertell Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum, eds., The United States Constitution: 200 Years of Anti-Federalist, Abolitionist, Feminist, Muckraking, Progressive, and Especially Socialist Criticism (New York: New York University Press, 1990) .
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unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. 5
Moreover, Bernays argued that “the very essence of the democratic process” is “the freedom to persuade and suggest,” otherwise known as the “engineering of consent.”
Bernays continued, “A leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at even general understanding . . . Democratic leaders must play their part in . . . engineering . . . consent to socially constructive goals and values,” applying “scientific principles and tried practices to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs.” 6 The liberal intellectual Walter Lippman wrote of the “revolution” in “the practice of democracy,” as
“the manufacture of consent” has become “a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government.” Furthermore, “common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.” 7 The linguist and media critic Noam Chomsky adds,
Fifteen years later, [political scientist] Harold Lasswell explained in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences that we should not succumb to “democratic dogmatisms about men being the best judges of their own interests.” They are not; the best judges are the elites, who must, therefore, be ensured the means to impose their will, for the common good. When social arrangements deny them the requisite force to compel obedience, it is necessary to turn to “a whole new technique of control, largely through propaganda” because of the “ignorance and superstition [of] . . . the masses.” 8
5 Quoted in Garry Emmons, “Did PR Firm Invent Gulf War Stories?” In These Times, 22-28 January 1992, 2.
6 Alex Carey, “Reshaping the Truth,” Meanjin Quarterly (Australia), 35.4, 1976; and Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents in American History (Pantheon, 1984), 284, as cited in Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, 16.
7 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), 248, as cited in Ibid.
8 Harold Lasswell, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1933), as cited in Ibid.
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Following media critics Chomsky and Edward Herman’s propaganda model, which argues that the media serve the interests of state and corporate power by framing their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege and limiting discussion and debate, 9 former owner and publisher of the Washington Post Katherine
Graham, expressing contempt for real democracy, opined:
There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn’t. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows. 10
Lawrence Grossman, a former head of PBS and NBC, further revealed the role of the corporate-owned press, admitting that “the job of the president is to set the agenda, and the job of the press is to follow the agenda that the leadership sets.” 11
As the historian and activist Howard Zinn argues, the American people are indoctrinated to believe that the United States is an especially virtuous nation, morally superior to all others, and endowed by Providence for a unique and special role in the world. In every school, children swear an oath of loyalty to a flag, uncritically parroting that this nation has “liberty and justice for all.” At all sporting events, athletes wear the
U.S flag on their uniforms and spectators must stand during the national anthem, an extremely militant song, and salute “the land of the free and the home of the brave,” sometimes while military jets, normally dropping bombs from the safety of twenty- thousand feet, fly in patriotic formation overhead. After 9/11, Major League Baseball decided to perform “God Bless America” during the 7 th inning stretch arrogantly
9 See Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, especially xi-xvi, 1-35.
10 Quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 19-25 February 1992, 4.
11 Allan Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1991, 19.
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expecting the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant and American god to favor one small nation at the expense of all others. American exceptionalism and nationalism are the ideological foundations justifying genocide against the Native Americans, slavery, and imperialistic wars throughout the world. Discussing nationalism, Zinn writes that “we are penned in by the arrogant idea that this country is the center of the universe, exceptionally virtuous, admirably superior.” 12
Historians must educate Americans about history to arm them against government deception and illustrate that American policy and its consequences contradict the supposed benevolence and disinterest of their motives. Political rhetoric regarding such exceptional American values such as democracy, freedom, international law, and human rights does not inform American policy. Indeed, the United States foreign policy consistently contradicts avowed American benevolent principles. The United States record in the United Nations from 1980 to 2004, including its unjustifiable use of veto in the Security Council to protect itself and its allies, especially Israel, from international condemnation for blatant aggression and violations of international law and its opposition to General Assembly resolutions iterated every session promoting peace, disarmament, and social, political, and economic justice, provides important and underutilized evidence supporting the contention that U.S. rhetoric and U.S. policy are mutually exclusive.
Thus, this thesis is for the American people, to encourage them to recognize the emptiness of the political rhetoric, oppose the gratuitous and immoral resort to military force, and accept nothing less than real participatory democracy with the attendant and necessary control over both domestic and foreign policies.
12 Howard Zinn, “America’s Blinders,” The Progressive, Vol. 70, No. 4, April 2006, 22-24.
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The first chapter discusses the foreign policy of the current George W. Bush administration as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, including the illegal aggression against Afghanistan beginning immediately after the attacks against the
United States in September 2001 and Iraq beginning in March 2003 and the aggressive belligerency toward Venezuela and Iran. In contradiction to the avowed principles informing U.S. policy, such as democracy, human rights, and law, actual U.S. behavior and strategic policy intimates that the United States relies on military supremacy and military force in the pursuit of traditional American interests, which include resource and market control and American business hegemony, at the expense of international law and the United Nations Charter. The National Security Strategy egregiously violates the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, and U.S. unilateralism and exceptionalism contribute to a more dangerous and unjust world, where force and the law of the jungle trump international law and ideals of real economic, political, and social democracy.
The second chapter examines the George H. W. Bush administration’s immediate righteous and indignant reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the underlying motives which led to large-scale U.S. military intervention and the destruction of Iraqi military capability and civilization to exacerbate the damage caused to the Iraqi people by the brutal sanctions, which the U.S. illegally and immorally maintained long after the
Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait. The Iraqi aggression allowed the United States an opportunity to manipulate the United Nations to support essentially unilateral American force and avoid a diplomatic solution to the crisis and instead resort to massive state terrorism, exposing the rhetoric against aggression and the use of force as false, in order to justify the continuation of the massive military budget after the cessation of the Cold
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War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent presence in the vital Middle East region, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, and destroy a perceived threat to Israel. The United States unilateral rejection of a diplomatic solution to the crisis in violation of the United Nations Charter, in favor of the use of military force against Iraq, illustrates the American contempt for international law and the United Nations and the U.S.’s reliance on military power.
Chapter three examines U.S. aggression against the essentially defenseless nations of Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s to further elucidate that the
U.S. government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the U.S. government’s contempt for democracy, human rights, and justice. The international community condemned the U.S. military interventions; however, due to the use of the U.S. veto in the Security Council, the United Nations could not adopt enforceable measures to affect the behavior of the U.S. government and prevent future American aggression. The selective American adherence to the principles of international law and the United
Nations Charter intimates that the United States will continue to rely on military force as a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.
The two remaining chapters examine the habitual U.S. support for Israeli aggression, violations of international law, and noncompliance with United Nations resolutions. Although the United States immediately sought enforceable Security
Council resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in order to force Iraq’s withdrawal through sanctions and military intervention, various U.S. administrations
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have prevented any condemnation of Israel for its aggression against neighboring Arab states and its occupation of Palestinian territory since 1967. Chapter four provides background information describing the origin of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the major crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated on the
Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights and self- determination. The revisionist narrative illustrates the U.S. and Israel’s primacy in preventing a just settlement for Middle East peace and the context to critically and skeptically examine and understand the U.S. and Israeli indefensible, minority positions in the United Nations Security Council examined in chapter five. Chapter five catalogues
Israel’s habitual noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based upon the international consensus through the blatant and habitual use of its veto, clearly illustrating that Israel could not afford to maintain its illegal policies in violation of international law and United Nations resolutions without the political, economic, and military support of the United States.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, discussed in the appendix, provide a rich documentary record of the disparity between the U.S. rhetoric and policy and elucidate the heinous double standard that the U.S. applies to the world because of its massive military might. As the record indicates, the United States, standing virtually alone, opposes resolutions iterated every session promoting peace, disarmament, and social, political, and economic justice. This documentary record is ignored by the media and hidden from the American public, preventing the awareness necessary to challenge government policies.
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A few simple truisms influenced this work. The first is the obvious observation that war and violence can only make the world less secure and less inhabitable. The ability to wage war mercilessly, causing all too predictable devastation and destruction, does not mean that a nation’s causes or principles are just; it only means the continuation of the use of force and violence to achieve certain ends. The ideals of peace, justice, and participatory democracy are contradictory with the glorification and use of military power. The American people must refuse to identify American military capability with
American greatness. As Zinn argues:
. . . in the face of the manifest unpredictability of social phenomena, all of history’s excuses for war and preparation for war--self-defense, national security, freedom, justice, stopping aggression--can no longer be accepted. Nor can civil war be tolerated. Massive violence, whether in war or internal upheaval, cannot be justified by any end, however noble, because no outcome is sure . Indeed, the most certain characteristic of any upheaval, like war or revolution, is its uncertainty. Any human and reasonable person must conclude that if the ends, however desirable, are uncertain, and the means are horrible and certain, those means must not be employed. 13
The second truism is the moral concept of universality, any variation of the
Golden Rule: do onto others as you would have them do onto you . The elementary principle of universality requires that people apply to themselves the same standards that they hold others. If an action or behavior is wrong for another, then it is wrong for me.
If an action is right for me, then it is right for everyone else. If it is criminal for an individual to use violence as a solution to conflict, then it is criminal for nations, with their massive capability for force, to use violence to solve domestic and international problems. American exceptionalism is essentially an ideology trumping the principle of universality. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is a clear example of President George
W. Bush’s doctrine of preemptive or preventative war. However, while the Japanese
13 Zinn, “The Optimism of Uncertainty,” in Howard Zinn on History (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 21-22, emphasis in original.
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attack on a U.S. naval base in the Pacific Ocean is heinous and infamous, U.S. preventative attacks are righteous and just. President Reagan cited Article 51 of the
United Nations charter as justification for the bombing of Libya in 1986, claiming that the U.S. has the right to use violent force “in self-defense against future attack.” The
‘liberal’ New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis applauded this “legal argument that violence against the perpetrators of repeated violence is justified as an act of self- defense.” 14
U.S. administrations have incessantly paid tribute to the rule of law. However, as is quite evident, the U.S. government and the elites determining policy consider the rule of law applicable only to other peoples and nations. Putting aside for the moment that elites from the Constitutional Convention designed the legal system to protect the
“opulent minority” from the masses, 15 that progressive changes have only resulted from large popular struggle, and that what is legal is not always right, and what is right is not always legal, 16 international law based on fairness and justice ought to be the barometer
14 Article 51 of the UN charter states that “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The right of self-defense does not apply to preventative attacks against some future, indeterminate threat,
15 Adam Smith: “Civil authority so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those whom have none at all,” from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations cited by Parenti, Democracy for the Few (Fourth edition, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 5. For the designs of the framers of the Constitution see Ollman and Birnbaum, eds., The United States Constitution and Smith, The Spirit of the American Government.
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by which all nations are equally judged and held accountable. All peoples and nations may realize hope for a more just, equitable, and peaceful world only when international law granting political and economic democracy is applied equally to all instead of the law of the jungle and might makes right.
16 Anatole France observed that “The law in its majestic equality prohibits rich and poor alike from stealing bread and sleeping under the bridges,” cited in Parenti, Democracy for the Few , 57.
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Chapter One:
The New American Century
They look doubtful, but in reality they are not. There have been lies; yes, but they were told in a good cause. We have been treacherous; but that was only in order that real good might come out of apparent evil. True, we have crushed a deceived and confiding people; we have turned against the weak and the friendless who trusted us; we have stamped out a just and intelligent and well-ordered republic; we have stabbed an ally in the back and slapped the face of a guest; we have bought a Shadow from an enemy that hadn't it to sell; we have robbed a trusting friend of his land and his liberty; we have invited our clean young men to shoulder a discredited musket and do bandit's work under a flag which bandits have been accustomed to fear, not to follow; we have debauched America's honor and blackened her face before the world; but each detail was for the best. We know this. The Head of every State and Sovereignty in Christendom and 90 per cent. of every legislative body in Christendom, including our Congress and our fifty State Legislatures, are members not only of the church, but also of the Blessings-of-Civilization Trust. This world-girdling accumulation of trained morals, high principles, and justice, cannot do an unright thing, an unfair thing, an ungenerous thing, an unclean thing. It knows what it is about. Give yourself no uneasiness; it is all right. Mark Twain, 1901 1
“U.S. Compromises on Wording of Iran Nuclear Resolution” asserted a New York
Times headline on February 4, 2006. 2 The headline makes sense only if ‘compromise’ means ‘complete rejection of world opinion’ in a classic example of Orwellian doublespeak. The International Atomic Energy Agency delayed a vote on a “landmark” resolution concerning Iran’s nuclear program because the world’s only superpower
1 Mark Twain, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” The Complete Essays of Mark Twain , Charles Neider, ed., (Da Capo Press, 2000), 294-295.
2 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Compromises on Wording of Iran Nuclear Resolution,” New York Times , 4 Februrary 2006,
opposed any linkage, criticism, or concern relating to Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. The Times acknowledges that Egypt and other Arab states, with much of the world’s support, including Russia, China, and the European Union
routinely demand references to a ‘nuclear-free zone’ in the Middle East in Security Council documents. They argue that Israel--which has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons, and, unlike Iran, has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--should be made part of a general security framework in the Middle East. 3
The European Union submitted a clause recognizing that “a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery,” which U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice dismissed as a potential Iranian “propaganda weapon against Israel.” An anonymous ambassador noted that “the Americans are worried that once [the clause] is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it.” In a revealing remark, Sean McCormack, a State Department spokesman, stated that the U.S. “accepted in principle” the “hope for a day when the Middle East achieves a state where there are not nuclear weapons.” 4
While the U.S. ‘hopes’ for a nuclear-free Middle East as if it did not have any power to orchestrate such a reality, the newspaper of record ignores the question of
Israeli nuclear weapons and the relevant issue of the blatant U.S. hypocrisy and double standard concerning weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps the paper should ask why the country with the most nuclear weapons, in fact the only country to use them, and a
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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military budget larger than the rest of the world combined, 5 could condemn any other nation, especially when the U.S. itself could be cited for its “many failures and breaches of its obligations” as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which demands the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery? 6 The Times fails to wonder why Israel is not a signatory of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and fails to elucidate the reasons why the “routine demand” of a nuclear-free Middle East, supported by a majority of the world, has never been incorporated into enforceable Security Council resolutions. The article seems to completely disregard the idea of a nuclear-free region while supporting this “landmark” resolution against Iran, which has the legal right to produce nuclear power under the terms of the treaty. 7 As a revealing example of mainstream journalistic credibility, the newspaper of record fails to consider that the U.S. use of force throughout its history, and
5 Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, U.S. Military Spending VS the World ,
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7 Ibid. Article IV of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. . . .”
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its selection of militarily weak targets, encourages countries understandably fearful of attack to develop weapons as a necessary deterrent against the world’s only superpower.
The United States, perhaps in a maneuver to persuade the domestic population of international support for punishment against Iran for its “many failures and breaches of its obligations” as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, is pushing for immediate Security Council action while much of the world, acknowledging that Iran is voluntarily allowing international scrutiny and inspection of its nuclear program beyond the mandates of the International Atomic Energy Agency, prefers diplomacy over the U.S. modus operandi as the world’s supreme military power: military force. 8
The historian Gary Leupp has written several articles during the past few years chronicling the Bush administration’s policy toward Iran. In a recent article, entitled
“Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran,” Leupp reported that General Lawrence
Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, acknowledged that in May 2003 the government of Iran, using the Swiss ambassador to Tehran as an intermediary, requested diplomatic meetings with the U.S. to address Iran’s nuclear program, the lifting of sanctions, and the normalization of relations between the two countries. According to
Wilkerson, while the Secretary of State supported diplomacy, Vice President Cheney and the neo-conservative “secret cabal” in the administration “got what [they] wanted: no negotiations with Tehran.” 9
8 Sciolino.
9 Gary Leupp, “Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran,” Counterpunch, 26 April 2006,
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One of the main propagandists for the war against Iraq, Douglas Feith, while
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, “hired neo-con ideologue and Iran-Contra principal Michael Ledeen” for the Office of Special Plans in 2002. Ledeen, “an
American Enterprise Institute Scholar and journalist for the neo-con National Review ,” maintained a relationship with the Iranian arms dealer and “fellow Iran-Contra plotter”
Manucher Ghorbanifar. Leupp intimates that Ghorbanifar was a likely source for
Congressman Curt Weldon’s book Countdown to Terror: The Top-Secret Information
That Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America . . . and How the CIA Has
Ignored It, which claimed that Iran was sheltering Osama bin Laden, preparing an attack on the U.S., building nuclear weapons, and aiding the insurgency in Iraq. 10
Leupp observes that while many in the Bush administration support military action against Iran on any pretext and despite the consequences, some policymakers and lifelong bureaucrats oppose force. John Negroponte, current director of national intelligence and President Ronald Regan’s ambassador to Honduras during the U.S. sponsored terror against Nicaragua and no dove, warned the National Press Club on 20
April 2006:
The developments in Iran, clearly they’re troublesome. By the same token, our assessment at the moment is that even though we believe that Iran is determined to acquire or obtain a nuclear weapon, we believe that it is still many years off before they are likely to have enough fissile material to assembly into, or to put into a nuclear weapon; perhaps into the next decade. So I think it’s important that the issue be kept in perspective. 11
Considering that the U.S. poses a more severe threat to Iran than Iran does to the
United States, the Bush administration’s underlying motives must be questioned. Linda
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
17
S. Heard, a British writer on the Middle East, reports in a recent article entitled “Is the
U.S. Waging Israel’s Wars?” that in November 2003, Israeli Minister of Defense Shaul
Mofaz told U.S. officials in Washington that “under no circumstances would Israel be able to abide by nuclear weapons in Iranian possession.” That same month, Meir Dagan, the director of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, asserted that Iran posed an
“existential threat” to Israel. More recently, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom elevated the rhetoric stating “the idea that this tyranny of Iran will hold a nuclear bomb is a nightmare, not only for us but also for the whole world.” 12
Independent journalist and author Joshua Frank writes that at the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee annual conference in 2005 Republicans and Democrats alike called for military action against Iran. The prominent neo-con Richard Perle commented that “if Iran is on the verge of a nuclear weapon, I think we will have no choice but to take decisive action.” The Democratic minority leader Nancy Pelosi observed that “the greatest threat to Israel’s right to exist, with the prospect of devastating violence, now comes from Iran.” 13 Frank records in another article a speech delivered by Senator
Hillary Clinton during a Hanukkah dinner in December 2005:
I held a series of meetings with Israeli officials [last summer], including the prime minister and the foreign minister and the head of the [Israeli Defense Force] to discuss such challenges we confront. In each of these meetings, we talked at length about the dire threat posed by the potential of a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to Israel, but also to Europe and Russia. Just this week, the new president of Iran made further outrageous comments that attacked Israel’s right to exist that are simply beyond the pale of international discourse and acceptability. During my meeting with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, I was reminded vividly of the threats that Israel faces every hour of every day. . . . It became even more clear how important it is for the United
12 Linda S. Heard, “Is the U.S. Waging Israel’s Wars?,” Counterpunch, 25 April 2006,
13 Joshua Frank, “The Facts Don’t Matter: Bombing Iran,” Counterpunch, 3 June 2005,
18
States to stand with Israel . . . . 14
Notice Clinton’s identification with Israeli interests, implying perhaps her loyalty to
Israel or her belief that U.S. interests and Israeli interests are identical. Tellingly, Clinton stated that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a threat to Israel, Europe, and Russia, which is strange considering Europe and Russia have intimate ties with Iran. However, the senator does not mention that Iran poses any threat to the United States.
The investigative journalist Doug Ireland writes that the AIPAC espionage scandal, dismissed or hidden in the apologist mainstream media, was “about helping to prepare an attack by Israel on Iran.” In an article headlined “America Would Back Israel
Attack on Iran,” the British Daily Telegraph recorded the following George W. Bush quote:
Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel and I’d listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded the security of my country, I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we’ve made a very strong commitment to support Israel, we will support Israel if her security is threatened. 15
The Daily Telegraph observed that “his comments appeared to be a departure from the administrations’ line that there are no plans to attack at present and that Washington backs European diplomatic efforts. The remarks may have reflected Mr. Bush’s personal thinking on an issue causing deep concern in Washington . . . . " Ireland comments that
“Bush’s slip of the tongue that revealed his real intentions was front-page news in Le
14 Frank, “Hillary Clinton, AIPAC and Iran,” Counterpunch, 3 January 2006,
15 Doug Ireland, “The Real AIPAC Spy Ring Story--It Was All about Iran,” Z Magazine, 7 August 2005,
19
Monde and other European dailies but received little attention in the state-side major media.” 16
Moreover, Ireland cites a London Times article, dated 13 March 2005, reporting that “the inner cabinet of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, gave ‘initial authorisation’ for an attack at a private meeting last month on his ranch in the Negev
Desert.” The Times continues: “U.S. officials warned last week that a military strike on
Iranian nuclear facilities by Israeli or American forces had not been ruled out should the issue become deadlocked at the United Nations.” The Israeli daily Ha’aretz warned on
13 September 2004 that “what the Americans are unable to do, because of European,
United Nations and Congressional pressure, Israel will do.” 17
Clearly, if the leader of Iran, after listening to some of the statements by the
American and Israeli leaders and observing blatant American and Israeli aggression, would be threatening the security of the Iranian people if he did not attempt to acquire any deterrent to the predictable U.S. or Israeli military action.
Concerning the AIPAC spy scandal, the investigative journalist Justin Raimondo in an article entitled “AIPAC and Espionage: Guilty as Hell,” writes:
This case has received relatively little publicity in relation to its importance. It isn’t just the fact that, for the first time in recent memory, Israel’s powerful lobby has been humbled. What is going on here is the exposure of Israel’s underground army in the U.S. covert legion of propagandists and outright spies, whose job it is to not only make the case for Israel but to bend American policy to suit Israel’s needs and in the process, penetrate closely-held U.S. secrets. 18
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Justin Raimondo, “AIPAC and Espionage: Guilty as Hell,” 30 September 2005,
20
The case involves Douglas Feith’s deputy, Lawrence Franklin, who leaked classified documents to Israel through AIPAC. The indictment of two AIPAC officials,
Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, describes “extensive contracts with a wide range of
U.S. government officials, Israeli diplomats, and other individuals . . . .” One cited official, Kenneth Pollack, who served on the National Security Council during the
William Clinton administration, handed over classified information about “strategy options” against a “Middle Eastern country.” Pollack wrote The Threatening Storm influencing many liberals to support the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Raimondo notes that “the indictments issued against Franklin, Rosen, and Weisman describe a systematic attempt by Israel’s fifth column in Washington to garner top-secret U.S. intelligence about Iran, its weapons program, and U.S. deliberations about what actions to take.” 19
On 26 January 2006, Lawrence Franklin was sentenced to 151 months in prison and fined $10,000 as a result of pleading guilty and providing information helpful to the state’s case. The case against Rosen and Weissman is currently in jeopardy as the judge decides whether to accept the defense’s arguments, including First Amendment rights, and dismiss the case or go to trial, and potentially exposing the extent of the Israeli lobby’s influence on U.S. policy. 20
19 Ibid.
20 See for example, < www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Franklin > for Franklin’s sentence. For the dismissal hearings, see the court transcripts at
21
In a final note, the British journalist Robert Fisk in an article entitled “Breaking the Last Taboo: The United States of Israel?” discusses the Israeli lobby in the United
States. John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, and Stephen
Walt, a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, recently published an academic paper entitled “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” which
Fisk states:
what to many non-Americans is obvious: that the U.S. has been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of Israel, that Israel is a liability in the “war on terror,” that the biggest Israeli lobby group, AIPAC, is in fact the agent of a foreign government and has a stranglehold in Congress--so much so that the U.S. policy towards Israel is not debated there--and that the lobby monitors and condemns academics who are critical of Israel. 21
A few observations are in order. The 2006 National Security Strategy claims that
Iran is the greatest challenge to the United States, not only due to supposed nuclear proliferation concerns, but because the “regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom.” 22 The aforementioned are pretexts that will justify a preventative attack against Iran. According to a Leupp article from July 2005, “Is Iran Being Set
Up?,” Philip Giraldi in the American Conservative indicated that the Vice President’s
the U.S. or benefit a foreign country at the expense of the United States. For evidence that traditional American interests and Israeli interests are not congruent see Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986) and Chapters four and five of this thesis. Although the case has received little in-depth press coverage, with the mainstream media supporting the ex-lobbyists for a foreign country on the grounds that journalists’ First Amendment rights are in jeopardy, one need only replace Israel with another country, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or the Soviet Union, and imagine the media and government’s response to such a case to recognize not only the power of the Israeli lobby in the United States, but also the strange identification with Israeli interests of many U.S. politicians and members of the American media.
21 Robert Fisk, “Breaking the Last Taboo: The United States of Israel?,” Counterpunch, 27 April 2006, < www.counterpunch.org/fisk04272006.html >.
22 The 2006 National Security Strategy can be found at
22
Office has informed the Pentagon that the military would attack Iran immediately after
“another 9-11.” 23 Leupp cites Giraldi remarking that military action was “not conditional on Iran actually being involved in the act of terrorism directed against the United
States.” 24 While Iran is not a viable threat to the United States, the United States poses an immediate and definitive threat to Iran. Mike Whitney, in an article entitled “Offers and
Ultimatums: Endgaming Iran,” opines that the recent offer by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rica to have direct negotiations with Iran “is less a departure from the normal U.S. belligerence than it is a means of enlisting support from Russia and China for future punitive action.” 25 Rice commented that the negotiations would provide Iran
“one last excuse” to resist American demands, demands which counter the United
Nations Charter and international law by attempting to revoke Iran’s inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. 26 Whitney writes that the U.S. had already rejected Iranian proposals allowing for surprise inspection of any Iranian facility suspected of secret nuclear activity and enrichment of uranium in Russia instead of Iran. Further reflecting the inflexibility of the American position, Secretary Rice announced at the end of May that “security guarantees for Iran were off the table.” 27 The U.S. position begs the question of why the Iranians should forgo an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy
23 Leupp, “Is Iran Being Set Up?,” Counterpunch, 27 July 2005,
24 Ibid.
25 Mike Whitney, “Offers and Ultimatums: Endgaming Iran,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006,
26 Ibid.; see also, David Peterson, “Iran: A Manufactured Crisis: Will the Security Council Go Along for the Ride Again?,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006,
27 Whitney.
23
if the United States offers nothing in return. Furthermore, the U.S. belligerent threats toward Iran represent a clear breach of the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter.
The unwillingness of the Bush administration to negotiate with Iran to prevent nuclear proliferation in return for a promise not to attack is incomprehensible unless that is not the real motive for a U.S. invasion. An attack on Iran would only radicalize its leaders and other targets to produce a nuclear weapon quickly to deter the United States or Israel from future action. An attack on Iran would only make the United States more susceptible to retail terrorism. If Iran attempted to attack Israel or the United States, it would face certain annihilation from two countries that both possess awesome nuclear weapon arsenals. The American people must ask why the U.S. government is so anxious for waging perpetual war.
While preparing the world for aggression against Iran due to its supposed nuclear malfeasance and its potential to develop nuclear weapons, the United States reached a
‘historic’ nuclear pact with India, helping supply its civilian energy requirements while permitting the continued development of nuclear weapons, thus rewarding the nuclear power for its dismissal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The plan meaninglessly subjects those nuclear power reactors classified as civilian to international inspection, while allowing its current and future military facilities to operate outside the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. President Bush declared that the agreement “will help both our peoples” and that Congressional opponents “just don’t want to change and change with the times. But this agreement is in our interest.” Critics may highlight not only the threat of further nuclear proliferation, but also the double standard as applied to Iran. However, the administration asserts that
24
India is a “responsible nuclear power,” as of course are the United States and Israel, and
U.S. corporations have a moral right to sell nuclear energy to India’s “booming” economy and population. According to R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs:
India is unique. It has developed its entire nuclear program over 30 years alone because it has been isolated. So the question we faced was the following: Is it better to maintain India in isolation, or is it better to try to bring it into the international mainstream? And President Bush felt the latter. 28
A disingenuous comment considering the international mainstream favors the elimination of nuclear weapons as evident in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the U.S. is currently isolating Iran because it has the potential to develop nuclear weapons in the future. A senior Indian official imagines that the agreement will force the international community to recognize India “in a category of its own,” eroding further the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Perhaps there is no linkage between the disparate U.S. policies toward Iran and India; however, in a just world all nations, including the United States would be held to the same standards. 29
The United States rejected during diplomatic negotiations, which the economist and media critic Edward Herman defines as “restating to the enemy the terms of our [the
U.S.] ultimatum” and not “the process of arriving at a settlement by mutual concessions,” any linkage between Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and Israel’s occupation of Palestine, let
28 Elisabeth Bumiller and Somini Sengupta, “U.S. and India Reach Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation,” New York Times , 2 March 2006, < www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/international/asia/02cnd- prexy.html >; National Security Strategy of 2002: “The concept of free trade is a moral principle. If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom. . . .”
29 Ibid.
25
alone the U.S. invasion and occupation of Panama the previous year. 30 The mainstream media acting as propaganda service of the government and defense department in the moral crusade against Iraq failed to provide linkage between the enforcement of United
Nations Security Council resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression and the complete lack of enforcement of dozens of resolutions condemning Israel for various war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the occupation and settlement of Palestine, the invasion of Lebanon, and the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik. 31 Needless to say, there are no Security Council Resolutions characterizing the U.S. as an aggressive rogue nation and demanding immediate demilitarization and disarmament.
Simultaneously, the mainstream media continues to participate in the Bush administration’s demonization of Venezuela’s President Chavez. 32 Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld speaking to an audience ignorant of history and unquestioning of the administration’s stance against real democracy made the gratuitous comparison to Hitler:
We saw dictatorships there [Latin America]. And then we saw most of those countries, with the exception of Cuba, for the most part move toward democracies. We also saw corruption in that part of the world. And corruption is something that is corrosive of democracy. We’ve seen some populist leadership appealing to masses of people in those countries. And elections like Evo Morales in Bolivia take place that are clearly worrisome. I mean, we’ve got Chavez in Venezuela with a lot of oil money. He’s a person who was elected legally just as Adolf Hitler was elected legally and then consolidated power and now is, of course, working with Fidel Castro and Mr. Morales
30 Edward Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 133.
31 On the occupation of Palestine and invasion of Lebanon, see the fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis; for the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor see General Assembly resolution 36/27 at
32 It is interesting to consider that during the winter of 2005-2006 Venezuela provided heating oil forty-percent below the market price to 150,000 low income residents in nine northeastern U.S. states and various Native American communities and free oil to soup kitchens and emergency shelters in five states, discounts and giveaways worth more than $30 million. Larry Lack, “Is Chavez Hitler or Father Christmas? Venezuela’s Handout to Uncle Sam’s Shivering Poor,” Counterpunch vol 13 no ¾, February 2006.
26
and others. 33
Negroponte testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that President
Chavez “appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, to reduce press freedom, and entrench himself through measures which are technically legal, but which nonetheless constrict democracy.” The
Times amazingly reports without comment that Negroponte said, “Mr. Chavez’s populist government was seeking closer economic and military ties with Iran and North Korea, while meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring countries [by backing particular candidates for elected office].” 34
Perhaps a different perspective is in order. The Venezuelan-American attorney
Eva Golinger, author of The Chavez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in Venezuela , writes that
over the past few years, the Bush administration has funneled millions upon millions of dollars into building up an opposition movement to the Chavez administration in Venezuela, utilizing U.S. taxpayer dollars filtered through the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and has backed a failed coup d’etat against President Chavez and oil industry sabotage that caused billions of dollars in damages to the nation yet failed to oust the government from power. For the year 2006, the U.S. congress has allocated more than $9 million dollars to opposition groups in Venezuela and has launched a psychological operations campaign coordinated from the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. In a document published by the U.S. Army in October 2005 entitled “Doctrine for Asymmetric War Against Venezuela,” President Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution were labeled as the “largest threat since the Soviet Union and
33 AP, Washington Post , “Rumsfeld likens Chavez’s Rise to Hitler’s, 3 February 2006,
34 Juan Forero, “Chavez ousts U.S. diplomat on spying charge,” New York Times , 3 February 2006, < www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/americas/03venz.html >; qualifier in brackets found in Eva Golinger, “Increasing U.S. hostility toward Venezuela: Rumsfeld and Negroponte Amp up Attacks on Chavez,” Counterpunch , 3 February 2006,
27
communism.” 35
One can only understand Negroponte and Rumsfeld with an Orwellian
Doublespeak dictionary close at hand. The two are clearly describing and opposing what
Herman calls an excess of democracy, “a situation in which the forms of government by the people actually threaten to be infused with participatory substance.” 36 Apparently, the mainstream media does not care to remind readers of U.S. economic and military support throughout Latin America, a region the U.S. has sought to control since its early imperial beginnings of the Monroe Doctrine, for corrupt dictatorships mindful of U.S. corporate interests and opposed to the needs of their own people in Cuba, Haiti, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile to name a few. 37 The mainstream corporate press does not even challenge the government when it accuses others of foreign intervention or constricting democracy, when the United States has a long history of both resulting in the domestic limitation and foreign eradication of real democracy in favor of corporate and elite interests. 38 The widespread government spying on American citizens, the Patriot
Act, and the illegal and immoral aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq during the
George W. Bush administration are but the most recent examples.
What is democracy if it is not a populist government ‘appealing to the masses of people in those countries’? How can the Bush administration lecture on democracy? The
35 Golinger.
36 Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy , 131.
37 See for example William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since WWII (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004).
38 Ibid; For domestic history see Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
28
Supreme Court consisting of nine people appointed George W. Bush president in 2000, 39 and there is enough evidence of voter fraud to question the results of 2004 and the dubious political capital claimed by the Bush administration. 40 If we remember the doublespeak definition of democracy, then the demonization of Chavez becomes clear.
Herman defines democracy as “a system that allows the people to vote for their leaders from among a set cleared by the political investment community. In application to the
Third World, it means rule by an elite that understands our [American] interests and needs.” 41 Clearly, the government and mainstream media use Orwellian language to mask true foreign and domestic policy objectives. The Americans belligerent behavior toward Iran and Venezuela illustrates the inherent and consequent hypocrisy and double standard when international law and the principle of universality are engulfed by a policy of might makes right.
39 “The federal judiciary is not only the most important of our Constitutional checks on the people, but is also the means of preserving and enforcing all the other checks.” J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of the American Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence and Relation to Democracy (Chautauqua, New York: 1911), 65. Moreover, Smith argues persuasively in Chapter five that the Supreme Court’s purpose is to defeat reform and diminish the few rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
40 See for example the United States Government Accountability Office September 2005 report to Congress: “Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, But Key Activities Need to Be Completed,” warning of the unreliability of electronic voting machines and the ease of changing the results,
41 Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy, 131.
29
The current War on Terror, a more overt manifestation of an American foreign policy that has been remarkably consistent during the twentieth century, has two main intertwining objectives: the first is a more complete control of the domestic population; the second is American hegemony over strategic and vital resources and markets.
American foreign policy has been largely unencumbered since the demise of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not contain the Soviet Union from seeking and achieving world domination, but the Soviet
Union prevented the United States from always using large-scale force to achieve hegemony. 42 The American government utilized the exaggerated and incessant Soviet threat to justify military intervention abroad and suppress domestic opposition at home.
The historian Samuel Huntington remarked that “you may have to sell military intervention in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting. That is what the U.S. has done ever since the Truman doctrine.” 43
A fundamental principle of government is control of public opinion. Absolute monarchies and dictatorships may maintain power and control through the state monopoly on violence and force. Democracies, while not altogether eschewing state violence on the domestic population, often rely on subtle thought control to maintain the
42 As an example of this belief, the 2002 United States National Security Strategy states: “the nature of the Cold War threat required the United States . . . to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force.” For the view that the Soviet Union constrained the United States, see for example, Rabab Hadi’s interview with Noam Chomsky and Eqbal Ahmad, “The Gulf Crisis: How We Got Here,” in Greg Bates, ed., Mobilizing Democracy: Changing the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1991), 9; and Blum, Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2005), 70-72.
43 Samuel Huntington, International Security, Summer 1981, cited in Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 18.
30
public acceptance or tolerance of elite dominance and policies. 44 As George Orwell has made evident, language is a fundamental tool in thought control. While terrorism is “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature . . . through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear,” the word is only applied to enemies. 45 The American use of large-scale state violence is never considered terrorism even though it is clearly so. Instead it is almost always legitimate; at worst, a strategic or tactical mistake.
Noam Chomsky, philosophy and linguistics professor at MIT and political critic, relates the anecdote of the pirate and the emperor. Alexander the Great asks a captured pirate, “How dare you molest the sea?” And the pirate’s indignant response? “How dare you molest the whole world? I do it with but one ship and am called a pirate. You do it with an entire navy and are called an emperor.” 46 Those fighting against the U.S. occupation of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of Palestine are defined as terrorists, insurgents, evildoers, while the American president, the Israeli prime minister, and the soldiers doing their bidding with the world’s most destructive weapons are heroes deserving our admiration and unquestionable support. An example of the U.S. stance on terrorism is the negative vote for General Assembly resolution 42/159 (1987) concerning measures to prevent international terrorism. The resolution reads in part:
Nothing in the present resolution could in anyway prejudice the right to self-
44 “To deny the right of the people to control the government leads naturally to denial of their right to criticize those who shape its policy.” Smith, The Spirit of the American Government, 152.
45 Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality” in Alexander George, ed., Western State Terrorism cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 188.
46 Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1990), 1.
31
determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation. 47
The United Nations has determined that those suffering under foreign occupation have the right to struggle for freedom and self-determination. The U.S. and Israel reject this right and instead refer to the victims of their massive violence as terrorists who must renounce violence and consent to the oppressor’s unjust and unilateral demands.
Perhaps it is an irony of history that the American soldiers fighting for independence and self-determination against the British would fall under the rubric of terrorists and insurgents today (remember that President Reagan compared the Contra terrorists in
Nicaragua favorably with the Founding Fathers); and that Jews who suffered ethnic cleansing and genocide during World War II would ethnically cleanse the Palestinians to eliminate the demographic problem in the racist Jewish state of Israel.
As an ongoing part of its War on Terror, and despite unprecedented worldwide protest, the United States attacked Iraq in March 2003, an egregious example of aggression, the supreme international crime encompassing all other war crimes and crimes against humanity. 48 Evidence to the contrary, the Bush administration and the mainstream media incessantly propagandized to the American public that Saddam
47 General Assembly Resolution 42/159 (1987): “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes : A. Report of the Secretary-General ; B. Convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation.” The resolution passed 153-2-1. The United States and Israel cast the negative votes and Honduras abstained.
48 In March 2003, the United States, recognizing that it did not have the requisite support, decided not to force a vote in the Security Council on a resolution authorizing military force against Iraq, rendering subsequent U.S. military action as an illegal violation of the United Nations Charter.
32
Hussein was responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001 and possessed weapons of mass destruction, which he could use at some indeterminate future time to harm the United States and allies. 49 At the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued for the success of American policy towards Iraq:
. . . the fact that the sanctions exist--not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein’s ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction. We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they are directed toward that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was ten years ago when we began it. And frankly, they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. So in effect, our policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq . . . . 50
Disregarding for a moment the disingenuous claim that the harming of the Iraqi people was not a primary aim of the sanctions when it was readily apparent that the sanctions exacerbated the already tenuous life support system of a modern nation reliant on technology due to the enormous destruction of Iraqi infrastructure during the Gulf War,
Powell justifies the sanctions because Iraq is not a threat to any country in the Middle
49 Neither the media nor the government deemed it necessary to inform the public as to why another country would attack the world’s only superpower at extreme risk of national suicide except for meaningless comments as “they hate our freedom.” A Zogby poll released 28 February 2006 indicated that 85% of U.S. soldiers in Iraq believe that the war is retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s role in 9/11; 77% believe that the purpose of the war was “to stop Saddam [Hussein] from protecting al Qaeda in Iraq”; and 93% believed that Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction were not the motive for the invasion, < www.zogby.com/news/Readnews.dbm?ID=1075 >. The infamous Downing Street Memo, largely ignored in the mainstream U.S. press, provided evidence that the Bush administration intended to invade Iraq on any pretext and the facts would be made to support the policy. See
50
33
East, let alone the United States. 51 On 29 July 2001 National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice supported Powell:
But in terms of Saddam Hussein being there, let’s remember that his country is divided in effect. He does not control the northern part of his country. We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt. 52
Scott Ritter, the chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, stated in September
2002:
Since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated. This includes all of the factories used to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; the associated equipment of these factories; and the vast majority of the products coming out of these factories. 53
Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, reported in October 2002:
Before being barred from Iraq in 1998 [by the United States], the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities. We neutralized Iraq’s nuclear program. We confiscated its weapon-usable material. We destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all its facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. And while we did not claim absolute certainty, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq’s nuclear program. 54
51 John Ryan, “Madeline Albright and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Counterpunch , 10 December 2005,
52 CNN Late Night with Wolf Blitzer ,
53 The Guardian (London), 19 September 2002, as cited in Blum, Freeing the World to Death , 42.
54 Washington Post, 21 October 2002, A25, as cited in Ibid.
34
Strange, then, that harmless Iraq suddenly became such a threat to the United
States and its allies after the September 11, 2001 attacks. If the Americans destroyed
Iraq’s military capability during the first Gulf War and prevented Hussein from rebuilding as the second Bush administration claimed, how could it credibly assert to the
American public and the world’s nations that an attack on Iraq was necessary and just? 55
Since Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction and was not involved in 9/11, then what were the underlying motives for the U.S. attack and subsequent military occupation?
Leupp describes the desperate Iraqi peace proposals, which are still unknown to most of the American public. In February 2003, through an intermediary, Saddam
Hussein attempted to prevent a U.S. attack on Iraq. In exchange for a U.S. promise not to attack, Iraq would “(1) cooperate in fighting terrorism; (2) give ‘full support’ for any U.S. plan ‘in the Arab-Israeli peace process’; (3) give ‘first priority [to the U.S.] as it relates to
Iraq oil, mining rights;’ (4) cooperate with U.S. strategic interests in the region; and (5) allow ‘direct U.S. involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq.’” Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon and the highest ranking official involved in the discussion, dismissed the Iraqi appeasement offers as U.S. policy was ostensibly regime change. 56 Although international law forbids the threat of or use of
55 The historian Thomas Bailey justifies the Bush administration’s deception: “Because the masses are notoriously short-sighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. Deception of the people may in fact become increasingly necessary unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a free hand.” Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York: 1948), 13 cited in Jesse Lemisch, On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession (Toronto: New Hogstown Press, 1975), 88-89, and Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, 17-18.
56 Leupp, “Wilkerson Fingers the Neo-Cons on Iran.”
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force to coerce concessions, the U.S. seemingly could have avoided war while ensuring the demilitarization of Iraq and gaining economic, political and strategic objectives.
While all of the Bush administration’s pretexts for invasion ring false, one must wonder as to the true motives and policies.
Heard directs attention to Oded Yinon, “an Israeli journalist with links to the
Israeli Foreign Ministry,” who wrote an article published in the World Zionist
Organization’s Kivunim in 1982 outlining Israel’s strategic objectives in the Middle East.
Yinon argued that to survive “Israel must become an imperial regional power and must also ensure the break-up of all Arab countries so that the region may be carved up into small ineffectual states unequipped to stand up to Israeli military might.” Yinon asserted that
the dissolution of Syria and Iraq into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon is Israel’s primary target on the eastern front. Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. . . . In the short run, it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. 57
Yinon predicted that “an Iraqi-Iranian war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a wide front against us.”
Although Iraq survived intact after eight years of war with Iran, the first U.S. invasion, and more than a decade of sanctions, the 2003 aggression has caused civil war and dissolution, fulfilling Yinon’s strategic dream. He envisioned that “in Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible.
So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad, and
Mosul and Shiite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north.” 58
57 Heard.
58 Ibid.
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In his “Anti-Empire Report,” the investigative journalist William Blum cites
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and White Burkett Miller professor of history at the University of
Virginia who stated on 10 September 2002 at the University of Virginia that the U.S. attacked Iraq to eliminate a threat to Israel: “Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell you what I think the real threat [is] and actually has been since 1990--it’s the threat against Israel.” 59 In “Time for Full Disclosure,” William
Hughes mentions important members of the Bush administration who have close ties to
Israel, perhaps even dual citizenship, putting into question their loyalty and motives. 60
Perhaps, Israeli objectives were not the impetus for war in Iraq; however, the consequences have been to Israel’s advantage while harming the security of the American people. The current U.S. policy toward Iran and Syria seems to fit into Yinon’s design.
Although Syria fought with the U.S. against Iraq in the first Gulf War, joined the “war on terror,” and supported the resolution authorizing force against Iraq in 2003, the United
States has recently accused Syria of hiding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, harboring terrorists, and allowing foreign fighters into Iraq. Moreover, the U.S. forced Syria to withdraw its army from Lebanon, and the United Nations is investigating Syria for involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. While some critics of American policy, such as Noam Chomsky, argue that a politically and economically weak U.S. (compared to the European Union, Japan, and even China) must use its overwhelmingly military
59 Blum, “The Anti-Empire Report,” Counterpunch, 6 April 2004,
60 William Hughes, “Time for Full Disclosure,” Counterpunch , 22 February 2003,
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force to retain its dominance and hegemony, one cannot dismiss lightly American politicians’ seemingly odd veneration of Israel, which will be discussed more fully in the fourth and fifth chapters.
Along with Iraq’s dubious involvement in 9/11, al Qaeda’s role in the September
11 attack was not firmly established before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban rulers, wishing to avoid the imminent U.S. attack, were willing to capture and extradite to the United States those responsible if the Bush administration could provide proof of culpability. 61 In June 2002 FBI director Robert Mueller testified before Congress that
investigators believe the idea of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon came from al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. We think the masterminds of it were in Afghanistan, high in the al Qaeda leadership. 62
Disregarding for a moment that armed force is not a viable solution to international conflict, if American intelligence agencies only believe and think that al Qaeda leaders in
Afghanistan were responsible, what right does the U.S. have to invade and occupy a sovereign nation? The 2002 National Security Strategy provides clues pertaining to U.S. designs on world hegemony.
Even though it is written in Orwellian doublespeak, corrupting the meaning and nuance of the English language, masking the administration’s true aims in glib rhetoric, the 2002 National Security Strategy is a compelling document sometimes overtly articulating to the public policy goals that had been somewhat hidden by past
61 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 199.
62 Walter Pincus, Washington Post , 6 June 2002 cited in Ibid., 200.
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administrations. 63 The introduction claims that “the U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.” 64 It is worth discussing in depth to understand the real motives behind the words and realize the real politick underneath the idealism, illustrating American hypocrisy and blatant double standards.
According to the strategy, American principles will inform “our government’s decision about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources.” The principles ostensibly refer to vague concepts as
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom.’ However, an honest examination of American history would conclude that the U.S. government does not act with benevolent disinterest. The document elucidates real administration values and principles, which essentially fall under taxpayer-funded corporate welfare. The administration touts “pro-growth legal and regulatory polices” which value profit over unimportant trivialities that ensure the economic and social well-being of the world’s citizens such as environmental protection, worker safety, living wages, quality healthcare and education. Tax policies, including lower marginal tax rates for the wealthy instead of a truly progressive tax system,
“improve incentives for work and investment,” while social welfare for the poor somehow acts as a disincentive to work, encouraging ‘welfare queens’ to be lazy and live
63 The concept of National Security has played a large role in domestic politics since the Constitutional Convention. J. Allen Smith found that advocates of ratification encouraged the public’s fear of European invasion [and the Indian threat] to promote the idea that a strong national government was vital for defense. See Smith, The Spirit of the American Government , 49. Regarding national interests, the founding father John Jay stated “the people who own the country ought to govern it,” reflecting the anti- democratic principle function of the national government to protect the interests of the wealthy from the interests of the masses. Jay quoted in Bertell Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum, eds., The United States Constitution: 200 Years of Anti-Federalist, Abolitionist, Feminist, Muckraking, Progressive, and Especially Socialist Criticism (New York: New York University Press, 1990).
64 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, found at
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a life of leisure on government largesse. Apparently, the government and private sector must reward the wealthy to encourage their productivity, while the government must slash measly benefits to the poor to encourage them to work. 65 The administration’s primary function is to implement “sound fiscal policies to promote business activity,” instead of embodying the true ideals of a participatory democracy and enacting the policies necessary to ensure the economic and social welfare of the American people. 66
As the government’s response to the devastating Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated, the security of the American people is not a priority.
The administration equates democracy with capitalism, dismissing the form and participatory substance of a democratic government and emphasizing the undemocratic yet fundamental purpose of the federal government, protecting the wealthy minority from the majority. The government heavily influences the U.S. economy, essentially subsidizing big business through the military, technology, and agricultural sectors. The government, instead of meeting the needs of the people, serves the interests of the corporate elite. 67 However, the Bush administration unabashedly asserts that
the lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity
65 See Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977) and his discussion on supply side economics.
66 Russell Long, the Congressional Democrat from Louisiana, honestly remarked that “many of these [corporate] people have much influence. I, like others, have importuned some of them for campaign contributions for my party and myself. Nevertheless, we owe it to the people, now and then, to save one or two votes for them . . . . We democrats can trade on the dubious assumption that we are protector of the public interest only so long if we permit things like this patent giveaway.” Congressional Record Vol 112 Part 9 2 June 1966, cited in Parenti, Democracy for the Few, 230 .
67 Senator Boies Penrose (late nineteenth-century Pennsylvania Republican) spoke to a business audience: “I believe in a division of labor: you send us to Congress; we pass the laws under which you make money . . . and out of your profits you further contribute to our campaign funds to send us back again to pass more laws to enable you to make more money.” Quoted in Mark Green, “Stamping Out Corruption,” New York Times, 28 October 1986, A35, cited in Ollman and Birnbaum, eds., The United States Constitution, 3-4.
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and reduce poverty.
President Bush describes consumerism as the moral principle that precedes human rights, justice, equality, and compassion:
The concept of free trade is a moral principle: If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person--or a nation--to make a living.
Real freedom, the freedom to make a profit and endlessly consume, is justification for a government-subsidized military that destroys life and the precarious ecosystem of our planet to protect the interests, resources, and markets of private corporations.
A majority of the document deals with the perceived threats to the United States and its interests. Although the ‘national interest’ is often utilized to justify American foreign policy, it remains nothing more than a vague, undefined, and nebulous concept.
The government propagandizes that the national interest benefits all Americans, while few profit and most suffer from the domestic and foreign policies of the national government. An obvious example is that the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack has only exacerbated the threat of retail terrorism against Americans. The real motive behind
American foreign policy has been control over resources and markets, and various administrations have justified the U.S. military presence throughout the world as a rational response to exaggerated and even unfounded threats from international communists and terrorists incessantly and unquestionably obsessed with the destruction of the United States. As Michael Parenti has observed, the U.S. hysterically determined that the Communist ideology would infiltrate the entire world as an untreatable virus without realizing that the anti-Communist ideology already had. 68 After the
68 Michael Parenti, The Anti-communist Impulse (New York: Random House, 1969).
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disintegration of the Soviet Union and its integration into the capitalist fold, rogue states and terrorism became the great threat to the American people and the national interest and preventative war against weak states, not deterrence against strong ones, became the modus operandi for the U.S. The National Security Strategy says the following to justify the morally indefensible concept of preventative war:
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat--most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self- defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.
Preventative war simply masks aggression, the supreme international crime, and renames it self-defense. The U.S. claims the right to attack another country on the slimmest of pretexts that at some indeterminate time in the future, the target country may harm the
U.S. or its interests. This policy is flawed because it fails the test of universality.
Imagine if another country, for example Cuba or Iran, understandably determined that the
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U.S. was actively planning an attack or coup d’etat. By the logic of the National Security
Strategy, Cuba or Iran would have the right to preemptively attack the United States as a preventative measure of self-defense. However, in the real world, the only countries with the ability to enact preventative war are military powers against weaker foes. A military weak nation could not act preemptively against a superpower without committing national suicide. The U.S. preventative war strategy relies on unilateral military power and declares international law and the United Nations irrelevant. Francis Fukuyama, a prominent neo-conservative intellectual and member of the Project for a New American
Century, 69 believes that the UN is “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism and indeed may be the primary mechanism through which that unilateralism will be exercised in the future.” 70
In order to implement its ‘defense’ strategy, the United States requires military superiority to act unilaterally and virtually unimpeded. The National Security Strategy
69 The Project for the New American Century includes the following charter members: Elliot Abrams, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot Cohen, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Dan Quayle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. PNAC’s statement of purpose idealizes the Regan administration and encourages a more active foreign policy: We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan administration’s success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities. We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the success of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next. A second policy paper, entitled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Force, and Resources for a New Century,” realizes the difficulty of enacting their strategies: “Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.” Members of PNAC were well placed in the George W. Bush administration on 9/11 to capitalize on the attack and implement long range domestic and foreign policies that would strengthen American elite power at home and abroad
70 Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 29.
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resolves that “it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge.” The justifications, purposes, and logical consequences are made disturbingly clear:
- the unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world’s most strategically vital regions
- to contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces
- to protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space
- to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States
- we will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept
- this vulnerability [to terrorism] will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks
- we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require
- our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States
Through the strategy document, the Bush administration has acknowledged that the U.S. is involved in permanent war and being the only superpower, it has the ability to shun international law and militarize the world and space to ensure its hegemony. The United
States has long maintained a military presence throughout the world on the pretexts of security and stability. During the Cold War, the U.S. surrounded the Soviet Union with military forces and nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was understandably paranoid considering that the Western powers had repeatedly invaded it. However, the Soviet
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Union’s irresponsible and illogical attempt to place nuclear weapons in Cuba almost provoked a nuclear war. Seemingly, the United States is the only country with the right and responsibility to spread its military forces ubiquitously. An immediate consequence of the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq has been the construction of U.S. military bases throughout Central Asia. No other country has the right to develop military forces capable of preventing or defending against a U.S. attack. The document criticizes China for expanding its military capability and thus threatening the Asia-Pacific region. No country has the right to doubt the benevolent and virtuous nature of U.S. foreign policy: the U.S. strongly criticized Russia and France for questioning its motives regarding Iran and Iraq.
The hypocrisy and arrogance of the Bush administration is most evident in its characterizing of rogue states. According to the National Security Strategy, rogue states:
brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive design of their regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; reject basic human values (and hate the United States and everything for which it stands).
Although the Bush administration considers all acts of terrorism illegitimate and wishes to prevent all “further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists,” the U.S. selectively defines what constitutes terrorism, causing its rhetoric and idealism and righteousness to reek of hypocrisy. Members of the U.S. government will never be extradited and tried for war crimes against the people of the world. Terrorists harbored in the U.S., including many responsible for war crimes in Latin America, will never receive justice. The United States government meets every qualification of its own definition of
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a rogue state, including fearing real democracy and despising the American people.
Countless people throughout the world who have suffered first-hand the effects of U.S. arrogance and destructiveness would most certainly agree. It remains for the American people, the enemy the government fears above all, to prevent all future U.S. crimes against humanity, and instead to work for peace and justice for all humankind.
The United Nations and its founding charter oppose the U.S. and its avowed policy of unilateral aggression. The fundamental purpose of the United Nations, elucidated in the preamble to the Charter, is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” 71
The United Nations champions international law and peaceful conflict resolution, including “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,” as opposed to armed aggression. 72 Article
Two demands that
All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 73
Moreover, the Charter articulates a faith in universal human rights and determines to achieve social and economic justice for all “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Membership is a privilege and responsibility, and any nation “which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present charter may be expelled from
71 United Nations Charter.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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the organization. . . .” 74 While much power is vested in the Security Council and its permanent members, the General Assembly represents participatory democracy and the true ideals of the Charter. The U.S. votes in the General Assembly, examined in the
Appendix, illustrate the U.S. government’s double standard applied to others and contempt for substantive democracy and universal human rights, justice and peace.
Although the world has not yet fulfilled the ideals embodied in the charter, it remains a worthy goal for all peoples and nations desiring a more just and peaceful world.
The United States foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration in the initial years of the twenty-first century illustrates a reliance on military force to achieve economic and political objectives and a rejection of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The utilization of military intervention in the egregious examples of aggression against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 reflects a continuation of a stable U.S. policy predicated on supremacy of war-making capability.
However, as the ostensible American indignation towards Iraqi aggression against
Kuwait in the summer of 1990 indicates, only the United States and its allies and clients may disregard international law and the United Nations Charter, thus exposing American rhetoric regarding the disavowal of force, democracy, international law, and human rights as false and clearly elucidating the dangerous double standard whereby those nations with the military capability operate outside international norms.
74 Ibid.
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Chapter Two:
Righteous Aggression
I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war. Never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor will not be asked, later on, whether or not he told the truth. In starting and waging a war, it is not right that matters but victory. Adolf Hitler 24 August 1939 1
“No nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor,” righteously argued
President George H. W. Bush in a response to the unjustifiable Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990. 2 A strange and hypocritical remark considering Bush ordered the brutal assault of Panama barely eight months before in late December 1989, complete with the installation of a new Panamanian government with the President sworn into office on a U.S. military base. 3 The United States’ belligerent and indignantly righteous response to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait fundamentally contrasts with blatant U.S. aggression and intervention throughout American history, especially during the latter half of the twentieth century and continuing apace in the new American century. As the examples of U.S. aggression against Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Nicaragua during the
1 John Balkwill, “Kinder George’s Well-Oiled Propaganda Machine,” In These Times, 20-26 March 1991, 18.
2 Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 20-26 March 1991, 5.
3 Allan Nairn, “The Eagle is Landing,” The Nation, 3 October 1994, 346 as cited in William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2004), 313. For more discussion on the U.S. invasion of Panama see Chapter three.
1980s and overt political, economic, and military support for the illegal aggression and violation of international law of its allies and clients, especially Israel and apartheid
South Africa, indicate, the United States government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of international law.
The international community considers aggression to be the supreme international crime. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals following the allied victory in World War II concomitant with the drafting of the United Nations Charter elucidated to the world that not only was armed aggression the supreme international crime, but nations could no longer utilize force to resolve conflicts with other states. 4 The United Nations resolved that only the Security Council could authorize an international force to preserve peace and enforce international law save those situations requiring immediate self-defense. If international law is to have any validity, the United Nations must deter, condemn, and repel all acts of aggression regardless of the perpetrator. The standard definition of aggression, the General Assembly resolution adopted at its 2319 th plenary meeting on 14
December 1974, states: 5
4 The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal stated: “War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” Moreover, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, declared: “Any resort to war--any kind of war--is a resort to means that are inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive war illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave the war-makers subject to judgment by the usually accepted principles of the laws of crimes.” Nuremberg Tribunal Judgment , 26, and Robert H. Jackson, The Nuremberg Case as Presented by Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, Together With Other Documents (New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1971), 82-84, cited in Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 6.
5 United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, Official Records, Supplement 31, Definition of Aggression, A/RES/3314 (XXIX), 1974.
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Article 1 Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Article 2 The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Article 3 Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
1. The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
2. Bombardment by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
3. The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
4. An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
5. The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
6. The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetuating an act of aggression against a third State;
7. The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
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Article 4 The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provision of the Charter.
Article 5 1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.
Article 6 Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
Article 7 Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.
Article 8 In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.
As the world’s reigning military superpower, the United States has utilized force for economic and political objectives favorable to traditional American interests. While the U.S. castigated Iraq for violations of American-drafted United Nations resolutions and international conventions, the United States violated those same Security Council resolutions, the Charter, and international law including the Geneva Conventions by overstepping the United Nations mandate requiring the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from
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Kuwait and causing apocalyptic devastation to Iraqi infrastructure and the civilian population, suggesting that the removal of Iraq from Kuwait was a pretext for U.S. military action and not the primary concern. While the U.S. habitually opposed intervention and even sanctions against Israel and apartheid South Africa as U.S. vetoes in the Security Council and negative votes in the General Assembly obviously illustrate, there was no hesitation by the Bush administration (as well as the following two administrations) to enforce brutal sanctions and undertake a destructive war on the people of Iraq. The Bush administration’s belligerency toward Iraq and marked determination to prevent any diplomatic or political settlement serves as a foil to U.S. aggression and the international lawlessness of its allies to illustrate a dangerous double standard whereby power is the determining factor as to whether a nation must adhere to international law.
The United States rejected serious international condemnation of Israeli and apartheid
South African crimes and prevented the adoption and enforcement of Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions and other measures as a means to terminate Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and aggression against Middle East nations, including
Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria and apartheid South African racist oppression of its black population and aggression against neighboring African states including Angola and
Namibia. Moreover, in the decade preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United
State committed unjustifiable aggression against Grenada, Panama, Libya, and
Nicaragua. Although the world community condemned U.S. actions against these weak, poor, and defenseless populations, there were no Security Council resolutions demanding sanctions and a military operation against the U.S. decimating vital infrastructure,
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targeting civilians, and eliminating its military capability in order to prevent extremely probable American military action in the future.
The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, predicated from the onset on military force and thus dismissing a diplomatic settlement and a central role for the
United Nations beyond ceremonially acceding to the American diktat, exceeded the
Security Council mandate, which demanded only the removal of Iraqi troops from
Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate (and undemocratic) government, by destroying Iraq’s military capability and civilian infrastructure and imposing brutal sanctions for over a decade after Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait. While not justifying the Iraqi invasion, the background discussing the immediate causes of the Iraqi aggression intimates that the United States encouraged Kuwait to avoid compromise with
Iraq on the border dispute and access to the Persian Gulf and illustrates that Saddam
Hussein invaded only after various attempts to negotiate and compromise with Kuwait failed, contrasting, for instance, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 undertaken to prevent a political settlement with the Palestinian leadership. Dismissing legitimate
Iraqi grievances against Kuwait, the United States ardently sought to manipulate the
United Nations and avoid a diplomatic solution and instead resorted to massive state terrorism, exposing the rhetoric against aggression, intervention, and the use of force for political and economic ends as false, to justify the massive U.S. military budget after the demise of the Soviet Union and the cessation of the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent military presence in the Middle East, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called
Vietnam syndrome, and destroy a perceived enemy of Israel. Additionally, as political
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science professor Manning Marable observes, “Every empire requires an external enemy to justify measures to suppress domestic unrest and silence internal critics.” 6 A foreign adventure distracts the public from more pressing domestic concerns and allows the perpetrators of the military intervention to distance themselves from domestic economic and social problems as the government encourages patriotic fervor and national unity, implying that critical dissent of policies undermines the national interest, national security, and the American troops.
Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, the Bush administration incessantly declared that Iraq undertook unprovoked aggression, thus vehemently dismissing any legitimate
Iraqi grievances against Kuwait and essentially precluding any just diplomatic settlement based on compromise and addressing the fundamentally underlying problems in the region leading to the conflict. The Iraqi grievances against Kuwait, regarding the vaguely defined border between the two countries with the resultant conflict over control of the underlying Rumalia oil field and Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, have both historical roots, centered on the fact that Kuwait had been a district of Iraq under the rule of the Ottoman empire, and more immediate causes, mainly Kuwait’s economic warfare against Iraq during and after Iraq’s aggressive war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. To provide context for the incessant border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, it is necessary to consider that until the British gained control over much of the Middle East during
World War I, Kuwait was a district of Iraq under Ottoman rule. The British colonial power unilaterally determined that Kuwait was separate from Iraq, essentially restricting
Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf as a means to maintain control over the vital oil
6 Manning Marable, “The Quest for Empire and the Struggle for Peace and Justice,” in Greg Bates, ed., Mobilizing Democracy: Changing the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1991), 83.
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resources in the region. After the British benevolently granted Kuwait independence in
1961, Iraq has attempted periodically to regain control over its former territory and acquire vital access to the Persian Gulf through immediate annexation or lease of the two small islands which are considered part of Kuwait and prevent any independent Iraqi shipping access to the Gulf. 7
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a direct consequence of the Iran-Iraq war, an example of Iraqi aggression which failed to provoke the interest let alone the condemnation of the international community. Furthermore, the United States instigated the Iraqi aggression against Iran to punish its former client state after revolutionaries overthrew the U.S.-imposed Shah and held Americans in the embassy hostage in response to over twenty years of the oppressive dictatorship and to weaken both countries as a means to prevent either from becoming regional powers. Interestingly, the United
States failed to present any draft resolutions to the Security Council condemning the Iraqi aggression, demanding Iraq’s immediate withdrawal, and invoking enforcement measures to coerce Iraqi compliance. Although the U.S. supported both combatants with intelligence and arms to prolong the war and Israel, perceiving Iraq to be a larger threat, provided arms to Iran, the United States ultimately tipped the balance in Iraq’s favor to prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the anti-American influence of the
Iranian government to the rest of the Middle East. 8 After the brutal and destructive war,
7 For background information see Ramsey Clark, The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), Chapter one; Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam (Houndmills, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Chapters five-eight; Walid Khalidi, “The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 9-10; and Blum, 320-325.
8 For more in-depth examinations of the war between Iran and Iraq and U.S. involvement, see Clark, Chapter one, Simons, Chapter seven; and Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil from the Rumalia oil field underneath the vaguely defined border between the two countries.
Hussein further accused Kuwait of preemptively and unilaterally attempting to demarcate the border and gain control over a large portion of the underlying oil field by building military structures on Iraqi territory, while, he asserted, Iraq was protecting the monarchies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by fighting against the spread of Iranian Shiite extremism. Furthermore, subsequent the conclusion of the war between Iran and Iraq,
Kuwait increased its production of oil beyond the OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries] quota, driving prices down when Iraq desperately needed the oil revenue to recover from the war. 9 Thus Hussein thought that while Iraq fought a destructive war to protect Kuwait and the other Arab nations from the Iranian fundamentalists, Kuwait was undertaking economic warfare against Iraq.
Evidence intimates that the United States colluded with Kuwait to provoke
Hussein to invade Kuwait, perhaps merely to provide a pretext for American military intervention. Considering the ulterior motives informing the Bush administration’s policy and the complete rejection of a feasible peaceful solution to the dispute between the two countries, it is not farfetched to imagine that the United States capitalized on if not orchestrated the Iraqi aggression for goals that had nothing to do with the principles of nonaggression. 10 In a February 1990 speech at a League of Arab States summit,
9 For a discussion of Iraqi grievances, see for example, Clark, Chapter one; Simons, Chapter eight; Khalidi, 10-12; and Blum, 320-325.
10 Clark reveals that the U.S. military created War Plan 1002-90 regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia to replace the contingencies associated with the (exaggerated) Soviet threat that justified enormous military expenditures and incessant U.S. intervention since World War II. Additionally, Blum relates that intelligence agencies provided information to the White House that Iraq would attack Kuwait at least one week before the actual invasion. Yet the administration did not react until immediately after the invasion. See Clark, Chapter one, and Blum, 320-325.
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Hussein, referring to the large U.S. military presence in the Middle East, advised that “if the Gulf people and the rest of the Arabs along with them fail to take heed, the Arab Gulf region will be ruled by American will.” He continued that the U.S. seeks to control the oil resources in the Middle East “all on the basis of a special outlook which has to do solely with U.S. interests and in which no consideration is given to the interests of others.” 11 Perhaps Hussein, as with Noriega only months before, asserted too much independence from his American handlers and benefactors, causing the U.S. intervention in a former client state to illustrate that “what we [the United States] say goes.” 12
In a letter to the League of Arab States in July 1990, Hussein accused Kuwait of refusing to negotiate with Iraq and contended that Kuwait should cancel the Iraqi debt accrued during the war with Iran, reimburse Iraq for the oil taken from the Rumalia oil field, and accede to the OPEC quotas. 13 The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat later stated that after Kuwait rebuffed an Iraqi proposal to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both countries in May 1990, he thought “the U.S. was encouraging Kuwait not to offer any compromise which meant there could be no negotiated solution to avoid the Gulf crisis.” 14 Jordan’s King Hussein asserted that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister declared “we are not going to respond to [Iraq] . . . if they don’t like it, let them occupy our territory . . . we are going to bring in the Americans.” 15 Cataloging the Iraqi grievances against Kuwait and the failed attempts to reach a diplomatic solution with Kuwait, the
11 Ralph Schoenman, Iraq and Kuwait: A History Suppressed (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Veritas Press), 11-12, and New York Review of Books, 16 January 1992, 51, as cited in Blum, 323.
12 See various examples below of “what we say goes” terminology.
13 Khalidi, 10-12.
14 Christian Science Monitor, 5 February 1991, 1, as cited in Blum, 323.
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Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz wrote to the United Nations Secretary-General soon after the Iraqi invasion that “it was inconceivable” that Kuwait “could risk in engaging in a conspiracy of such magnitude against a large, strong country such as Iraq, if it were not being supported and protected by a great power; and that power was the United States of
America.” 16 The Kuwait Minister of Oil and Finance admitted American complicity after the war: “But we knew that the United States would not let us be overrun. I spent too much time in Washington to make that mistake, and received a constant stream of visitors here. The American policy was clear. Only Saddam didn’t understand it.” 17
However, the United States sent Hussein various misleading signals. State
Department officials, including the ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, iterated that the
United States had no interest in Iraq’s border dispute with Kuwait. Shortly before the invasion, Glaspie related directly to Hussein that “I have direct instructions from the president to seek better relations with Iraq.” 18 State Department spokesperson Margaret
Tutwiler declared that “we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.” 19 Seemingly, the Bush
15 Michael Emery, “How Mr. Bush Got His War,” in Greg Ruggiero and Stuart Sahulka, eds., Open Fire (New York: The New York Press, 1993), 39,40,52, as cited in Ibid. 16 Schoenman, 12-13, from a letter sent by the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 4 September 1990; Emery, 32-33, as cited in Ibid., 324.
17 Milton Viorst, “A Reporter at Large: After the Liberation,” The New Yorker, 30 September 1991, 66, as cited in Ibid., 323.
18 Transcript of a discussion between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Ambassador April Glaspie, 25 July 1990, as cited by Sheila Ryan, “Power Projection in the Middle East: Maintaining Control at Any Cost,” in Bates, ed., 41-42.
19 James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 30; New York Times, 23 September 1990, cited in Blum, 322.
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administration failed to inform Hussein of its opposition to an Iraqi attack against
Kuwait, almost implicitly providing if not outright approval then at least tacit acceptance. 20
The historical and immediate causes leading to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait do not justify the Iraqi aggression. However, the immediate causes of the Iraqi aggression intimate that the United States encouraged Kuwait to avoid compromise with Iraq on the border dispute and access to the Persian Gulf and illustrate that Saddam Hussein invaded only after various attempts to negotiate and compromise with Kuwait failed. Moreover, the Iraqi aggression did not justify American military intervention, considering that the
U.S. rejected any diplomatic solution and merely manipulated the Iraqi aggression as a pretext to achieve underlying motives.
The George H. W. Bush administration, merely months after ordering the illegal aggression against Panama, justified the military deployment to the Middle East and the massive air war and subsequent ground war against Iraq as a principled response to unprovoked Iraqi aggression. Immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the White House condemned the invasion as “blatant use of military aggression” and demanded the
“immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.” 21 Invoking principles the
United States has failed to uphold regarding its own actions and that of its allies President
Bush, in an address to the nation in response to the Iraqi action, asserted that “a puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is
20 For more evidence supporting the argument that the U.S. gave Hussein permission to invade Kuwait, see Clark, Chapter one and sources cited; Simons, Chapter eight and sources cited; Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983); and Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation Vol. 251, No. 11, October 1990, 370-371.
21 New York Times, 2 August 1990, 1; Washington Post, 3 August 1990, 1, as cited in Blum, 325; see United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2932 nd Meeting, S/PV.2932, 13, in which the U.S. ambassador quotes the White House statement, as discussed below.
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unacceptable.” Ridiculously comparing Hussein’s Iraq to Hitler’s Germany as a pretext to avoid any diplomatic solution with Iraq so as not to appease aggressive nations, Bush prepared the nation for war by declaring that “standing up for our principles is an
American tradition. . . . America has never wavered when its purpose is driven by principle.” 22 America’s avowed principles served the objectives iterated by the Bush administration:
The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. 23
Furthermore, without a hint of embarrassment or acknowledgement of U.S. history, Bush pretended to be concerned about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations and proclaimed that “. . . America stands where it always has--against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law.” 24
Beside the lofty rhetoric illustrating the ostensible and dubious American opposition to aggression, the Bush administration provided multiple explanations for military intervention, which obscured the fundamental reasons for a blatant show of U.S. military force, in order to garner domestic support for the first U.S. large-scale war since
Vietnam. Acknowledging government propaganda efforts, Congressperson Les Aspin, admitted “what is stated publicly . . . is often aimed at domestic audiences and does not
22 George H.W. Bush, “The Arabian Peninsula: U.S. Principles,” Current Policy No. 1292 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication , 8 August 1990).
23 George H. W. Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf” Current Policy No. 1293 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs , Office of Public Communication, 15 August 1990); see also, Ibid.
24 George H.W. Bush, “America’s Stand Against Aggression,” Current Policy No. 1294 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 20 August 1990).
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reflect actual intentions.” 25 The President contended that “our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.” 26
Disregarding the absurdity that a war with its attendant death and destruction was justified to protect American jobs and conspicuous consumption of the world’s resources and that Iraq posed a threat to the freedom of the American people, it was illogical to insinuate that Iraq was attempting to do anything but slightly raise the price of oil in pursuit of its own interests, a fact understood and supported by the Bush administration as Ambassador Glaspie acknowledged to Hussein when stating that Americans in the oil industry favored higher prices. 27 Hussein would only be hurting the people of Iraq if he inexplicably refused to export oil, as the U.S. sanctions against Iraq after the war, which initially prevented Iraq from selling any oil but eventually allowed for limited export of
Iraqi oil for vital food and medicine, proved.
As a clear indication that the Bush administration sought any pretext that the domestic population would support, President Bush propagandized and exaggerated the nuclear threat that Iraq posed after an opinion poll indicated that a majority of the
American public would support military action to destroy Hussein’s nuclear capability.
However, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John
H. Kelly, testified to Congress on 26 April 1990 that “we do not believe Iraq is close to
25 Les Aspin, “The Military Option: The Conduct and Consequences of War in the Persian Gulf,” in The Aspin Papers: Sanctions, Diplomacy, and War in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 59. Although Aspin was referring to the governments of Arab coalition partners, the statement equally applies to the U.S. government.
26 George H. W. Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf”; see also Theodore Draper, “The True History of the Gulf War,” The New York Review of Books, 30 January 1992, 41, as cited in Blum, 329.
27 Ryan, 41.
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possessing a nuclear weapon, and we recognize that Iraq’s nuclear program is under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” which reported that Iraq was not producing nuclear weapons. 28 Furthermore, according to the Progressive , a left- leaning monthly magazine, Iraq would not have a nuclear weapon for at least five or ten years and would still lack a delivery method. Moreover, the Progressive logically observed that nuclear weapons act as deterrents to unprovoked aggression; if Iraq used a nuclear weapon, it would be committing national suicide. Exposing the U.S. double standard regarding possession of nuclear weapons, the Progressive queried “what if so mercurial and bellicose a figure as Ariel Sharon were to come to power in Israel, and assume control of that nation’s arsenal? Would the United States mass 400,000 troops on
Israel’s border?” 29 The historical record indicates that while Sharon was prime minister of Israel from February 2001 until his incapacitating stroke in late 2005, the United States never threatened or attacked Israel due to its possession of nuclear weapons or its aggression against the Palestinian people. The U.S. policy of preemptive or preventative war begs the question of whether the certainty of mass death and destruction in a U.S. instigated military intervention can be justified to prevent a possible future attack against the U.S. at some indeterminate time and place. Basic morality dictates that war with its attendant destruction of life and unknowable consequences is certainly unjustifiable, especially when the rationale for unprovoked immediate aggression is the prevention of some future unknowable aggression, a complete transmogrification of the theory of self- defense.
28 John H. Kelly, “U.S. Relations with Iraq,” Current Policy No. 1273 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 26 April 1990); for IAEA report see, “Comment: Propaganda War,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1991, 8-9.
29 Ibid.
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Although the United States falsely claimed indignation at Iraqi aggression, the
Bush administration’s underlying motives, which essentially assured military force against Iraq to decimate its military capability and civilian infrastructure instead of any diplomatic settlement, were to justify the massive U.S. military budget after the demise of the Soviet Union and the cessation of the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent military presence in the Middle East, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called Vietnam syndrome, and destroy a perceived threat to Israel. Although on the eve of the bombing campaign, Bush claimed “the allied countries with forces in the Gulf” have “exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution and have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force,” the administration effectively prevented all attempts at serious negotiation and intimated that military force was the desired option to meet U.S. goals not mandated by the Security Council, illustrating that United Nations’ authorization served as propaganda to convince the domestic population to acquiesce to war and supported Francis Fukuyama’s contention that the United Nations was “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism and indeed may be the primary mechanism through which that unilateralism will be exercised in the future.” 30
While the stated policy of the Bush administration centered on the removal of Iraq from Kuwait, ostensibly through sanctions and possibly a negotiated settlement, the Bush administration and elite opinion in the U.S. acknowledged the underlying motives and tacitly admitted that U.S. policy differed from the idealistic rhetoric. The Progressive reported that in early November 1990 President Bush announced that he planned to
30 Bush quote from Ridgeway, 173; Fukuyama quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 29.
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violate the United States Constitution and seek without Congressional approval an
“offensive option” against Iraq to prevent a conflict at some future indeterminate time. 31
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney admitted on 25 November that even if Hussein “were to come into compliance [with United Nations resolutions] and withdraw from Kuwait, you are still going to have to worry about the problem of his acquisition of sophisticated weapons” and to deal with these capabilities would require a “far more aggressive set of sanctions.” 32 On 3 December, Cheney testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that “. . . it is far better to deal with [Hussein] now while the coalition is intact
. . . than it will be for us to deal with him five or ten years from now when the members of the coalition have gone their disparate ways and when Saddam has become an even better armed and more threatening regional superpower than he is at present.” 33 While the Security Council determined that its policies were only to coerce the withdrawal of
Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the United States decided unilaterally to impose further conditions requiring large-scale military force, thus violating the United Nations Charter.
Elite opinion in the mainstream media further illustrated an acute understanding of administration goals that exceeded the United Nations’ mandate, thus implying recognition and support for extralegal military action. Contradicting avowed U.S. principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty, the editors of the Wall Street
Journal, reminiscing about U.S. control over Japan after World War II, advised the Bush administration to “take Baghdad and install a MacArthur regime,” and the National
31 Michael T. Klare, “One, Two, Many Iraqs,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 4, April 1991, 20-21; Ridgeway, 133.
32 Ibid., 21.
33 Ibid.
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Review called for the “overthrow of Saddam and the permanent reduction of Iraqi military power.” 34 Thomas Friedman, a columnist for the New York Times and former
Middle East correspondent from Israel, wrote on 2 September 1990:
In the last 50 years the U.S., whatever its oratory, has tended to support democracy when it serves the interests of stability and to back away from insisting on it when it could destabilize an area of national interest. At stake in the Gulf is the stability of oil supplies. 35
Friedman later opined that
Historians may question whether it was ever right for the Bush administration to make the ‘liberation of Kuwait’ a prime war aim instead of focusing exclusively on dismantling Iraq’s offensive capabilities which after all were the real threat to stability in the Gulf and therefore the real threat to U.S. interests. 36
After the war, journalist Patrick Tyler acknowledged that U.S. interests trump the interests of other states, and therefore the United States has the unique right if not the responsibility to interfere throughout the world to protect its perceived interests at the expense of other peoples and nations. Tyler wrote:
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. . . . As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. 37
34 Wall Street Journal, 29 August 1990, and National Review, 3 September 1990, as quoted in John B. Judis, “Tactical Debate Brews Behind Unanimity Show,” In These Times, 12-18 September 1990, 3.
35 Thomas Friedman, New York Times, 2 September 1990, as quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 3-9 October 1990, 4.
36 Alexander Cockburn, “The Press and the ‘Just War,’” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 6, 18 February 1991, 188.
37 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” New York Times, 8 March 1992, A1, as cited in Clark, 3-4.
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The air and ground war against Iraq was necessary to assert American power and justify the continuation of taxpayer-funded welfare to the military-industrial complex.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War eliminated the justifications and rationales for the enormous military budget that had subsidized the U.S. economy since World War II. As Theodore Sorenson observed:
The touchstone for our nation’s security concept--the containment of Soviet military and ideological power--is gone. The primary threat cited over forty years in justification for most of our military budget, bases, and overseas assistance is gone. 38
While the domestic population pressured politicians to consider transferring a large portion of the military budget to address pressing domestic concerns, policymakers, perhaps recognizing an opportunity for more overt military intervention to propagate U.S. hegemony, began highlighting third-world threats to U.S. interests and security to replace the Soviet Union and justify massive military expenditures. In April 1990, General Carl
Vuono asserted “because the U.S. is a global power with vital interests that must be protected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look beyond the European continent and consider other threats to our national security.” 39 General A. M. Gray, commandant of the Marine Corps, reinforced Vuono’s observations and argued:
The underdeveloped world’s growing dissatisfaction over the gap between rich and poor nations will create a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies. These insurgencies have the potential to jeopardize regional stability and our access to vital economic and military resources. This situation will become more critical as our nation and allies, as well as potential adversaries, become more and more dependent on these strategic resources. If we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations, and deter conflict, we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence
38 Theodore C. Sorenson, “Rethinking National Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 1990, 1, quoted in Ryan, 43.
39 Klare, 23.
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throughout the globe. 40
Unsurprisingly, immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush let slip that Iraqi aggression “underscores the need to go slowly in restructuring U.S. defense forces.” 41 Illustrating the pervasive and alarming militancy of the United States, the
Washington Post reported on 10 August 1990:
Less than a year after political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sent the defense industry reeling under the threat of dramatic cutbacks, executives and analysts say the crisis in the Persian Gulf has provided military companies with a tiny glimmer of hope. “If Iraq does not withdraw and things get messy, it will be good for the industry. You will hear less rhetoric from Washington about the peace dividend,” said Michael Lauer, an analyst with Kidder, Peabody & Co. in New York. 42
While perpetuating the myth that the U.S. military budget served to prepare the United
States to defend against Soviet expansionism instead of recognizing the offensive nature of the U.S. military to assert American hegemony, the Los Angeles Times reinforced the
Washington Post’s observations that Pentagon contractors were a main beneficiary of
Iraq’s aggression:
The political backdrop of the U.S. military deployment in Saudi Arabia played a significant role in limiting defense cuts in Sunday’s budget agreement, halting the military spending “free fall” that some analysts had predicted two months ago, budget aids said. Capitol Hill strategists said that Operation Desert Shield forged a major change in the political climate of the negotiations, forcing lawmakers who had been advocating deep cuts on the defensive. The defense budget compromise . . . would leave not only funding for Operation Desert Shield intact but would spare much of the funding that has been spent each year to prepare for a major Soviet onslaught on Western Europe. 43
40 General A.M. Gray, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, “Defense Policy for the 1990s,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 74, No. 5, May 1990, 19, quoted in Ibid., 47.
41 Summary of Bush’s remarks in the Washington Post, 3 August 1990, as cited in Blum, 325.
42 Washington Post, 10 August 1990, cited in Ibid., 325-326.
43 Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1990, 18, as cited in Ibid., 326.
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However, as James Webb, a former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration, warned:
The President should be aware, that, while most Americans are laboring very hard to support him, a mood of cynicism is just beneath their veneer of respect. Many are claiming that the buildup is little more than a “Pentagon budget drill,” designed to preclude cutbacks of an Army searching for a mission as bases in NATO begin to disappear. 44
Concomitant with providing a continuing justification for large military budgets, the Bush administration perceived a successful war against Iraq as a propaganda tool to persuade the American public to accept large-scale military intervention. From an elite standpoint, the war against Iraq served to illustrate to the American public the efficacy and success of large-scale U.S. military intervention and American benevolence and support for lofty principles and ideals such as international law and nonaggression. The campaign against Iraq partially centered on convincing the American public to accept military force as an extension of benign and benevolent American power and a means to perpetuate American morals and values. The Bush administration and the political elite absurdly equated military supremacy with the extension of morality as if military power causing nothing but death and destruction remotely correlates with freedom, democracy, international law, and supposedly American and Christian moral precepts valuing life.
The President argued “. . . there is no substitute for American leadership, and American leadership can not be effective in the absence of American strength.” 45 On 1 February
1990, President Bush proclaimed:
When we win, and we will, we will have taught a dangerous dictator, and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps, that the U.S. has a new credibility, and what we say
44 New York Times, 23 September 1990, as cited in Ibid.
45 Bush, “Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf.”
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goes, and there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf. 46
Asserting that “what we say goes” does not bode well for democracy or international law.
Moreover, rejecting an Iraqi offer to withdraw from Kuwait on 15 February 1991, Bush confidently asserted that “the American people are strongly in support, not only of the troops, but [our] objectives . . . it is my hope that we have kicked once and for all the so- called Vietnam syndrome.” 47 After the annihilation of Iraq, Bush proudly exclaimed “by
God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all,” and “what we say goes.” 48
Dante Fascell, a Democrat Representative from Florida, exhibiting the bipartisan enthusiasm for the war, echoed President Bush
There is no Vietnam syndrome. It’s behind us. We know that the American people are willing to go to war and win. And in the rest of the world there is great respect not only for the power of the United States, but for the western values that we have been espousing for so long. 49
Bush, disturbingly equating military might with moral standing, stated that “among the nations of the world only the United States has both the moral standing and the means to back it up.” 50 The Wall Street Journal , palpably ecstatic over the military success against
Iraq, declared that the war helped “America, and above all its elite, recover a sense of self-confidence and self-worth.” 51
46 Robert Parry, “The Peace Feeler That Was,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 14, 15 April 1991, 482.
47 Ridgeway, 178.
48 Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 11, 25 March 1991, 366.
49 “Comment: America Triumphant,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 4, April 1991, 8.
50 “Comment: The War Some Wanted,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 3, March 1991, 9.
51 Quoted in Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1991, 17.
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The militancy of the United States concomitant with its enormous military power and the equating of morality and benevolence with military operations is extremely threatening to international law and a peaceful world as are all ideological tenets justifying violence against others. The American people need to realize that there is no reason to be proud about massive military power which causes severe suffering and destruction throughout the world. An individual who commits violence and murder is justly removed from society; however a nation which commits violence and murder on an exponentially larger scale considers itself to be the most virtuous, benevolent, and democratic nation on the planet.
Another fundamental goal of American policy was to eliminate a perceived threat to Israel and prevent any linkage between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Nancy Murray and Hady Amr, Director and National
Coordinator respectively of the Middle East Justice Network during the war, write:
In the debates of November and December, U.S. negotiators had four primary goals: to prevent the Security Council from playing a meaningful role in overseeing the Israeli occupation; to avoid any reference in a binding resolution to a future international peace conference, on the grounds that Saddam Huseein might regard this as a “victory”; to evade any specific mention of Jerusalem as part of the occupied territories; and to avoid using its veto. 52
As Secretary of State James Baker asserted, “we have taken care of the greatest threat to
Israel’s security.” 53 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir declared that not only would
Israel never give up the occupied territories, but it would not tolerate any resolution that
52 Nancy Murray and Hady Amr, “Reclaiming Democracy: Congress and the Creation of a Just Middle East Policy,” in Greg Bates, ed. , 166.
53 James Baker, on “This Week with David Brinkley,” ABC-TV, 17 March 1991, as cited in Donald Neff, “The U.S., Iraq, Israel, and Iran: Backdrop to War,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 1991, 23.
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would appease Saddam Hussein at its expense, implying that Israeli compliance with international law and dozens of United Nations resolutions condemning Israeli aggression and occupation of Arab territory is appeasement of the Iraqi dictator on the scale of appeasement to Adolf Hitler prior to World War II and not the concerted demand of the international community. 54 Reinforcing the Israeli Prime Minister’s belligerent obstinacy to world opinion, members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker demanding a veto of any Security Council resolution critical of Israel because such a resolution would appease Hussein for Iraq’s aggression:
Inevitably, any UN resolution on the Palestine question at this time will implicitly be linked with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This is clearly one of the aims of Saddam Hussein. To permit the passage of such a resolution now would only reward Saddam Hussein’s aggression. 55
Vice President Dan Quayle further elucidated U.S. unconditional support for Israeli violations of Security Council resolutions and international law by maintaining that
“Palestine is not an issue on the table. There is no linkage.” 56 Murray and Amr write that the Jerusalem Post opined on 17 October 1990 that “a solution which left Iraq intact would be, for Israel ‘the worst of all possible outcomes.’” 57 On 5 December 1990 Israeli
Foreign Minister David Levy proclaimed that Israel may attack Iraq if the U.S. failed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and destroy Iraq’s military capability. 58
Furthermore, implying that the protection of Israel on all fronts is somehow a traditional
American interest, even though blatant unconditional support for Israeli policies have
54 Murray, 173-174.
55 Ibid., 173.
56 Ridgeway, 149.
57 Murray, 173-174.
58 Ridgeway, 149.
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seriously undermined traditional U.S. interests in the Middle East region and security at home, the Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, testified to Congress:
If Iraq should seek to play to a spoiler’s role in the Middle East peace process, threaten the security of Israel and other countries in the area, and continue to violate human rights on a widespread scale, the United States and Iraq would become increasingly at odds. We would take appropriate action on behalf of American interests. 59
The underlying motives of the Bush administration essentially made war inevitable and assured complete rejection of a viable peaceable solution to the crisis.
Even though the United States pressed the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on Iraq and maintained the brutal sanctions for over a decade beyond the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in clear violation of those Security Council resolutions, historically the U.S. has opposed sanctions as an ineffective measure to coerce apartheid South Africa and
Israel to comply with international law and United Nations resolutions. While William J.
Crowe, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented that “if the sanctions will work in twelve to eighteen months instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would be worth it,” President Bush argued that “I don’t think there’s time politically for that strategy.” 60
A Congressional report determined that the Iraqis invaded Kuwait to attract the attention of the international community, negotiate improvements to their economic situation, and withdraw. The committee concluded that “a diplomatic solution satisfactory to the interests of the U.S. may well have been possible since the earliest
59 Kelly.
60 Crowe quoted in “Comment: Propaganda War,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1991, 8-9; Bush quoted in Jon Wiener, “Why We Fought,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 22, 10 June 1991, 782.
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days of the invasion.” 61 Despite its rhetoric, the Bush administration failed to seriously consider any peace initiative, especially proposals that recognized the interconnectedness of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the Syrian
Golan, and Palestinian territory. Although not an exhaustive account, the following examples of viable proposals illustrate that the United States rejected a diplomatic settlement.
Three months before the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government offered to destroy all non-conventional weapons if Israel would reciprocate. A week after the attack, on 9 August 1990, Iraq proposed to the United States a peace plan offering withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in exchange for access to the Gulf, control of the
Rumalia oil field, and negotiations with the U.S. on oil prices. The Bush administration responded negatively, contending that nothing in the proposal merited its pursuit. Three days later Iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Palestinian and Syrian occupied territories and both Israel and Syria withdrew from Lebanon. On 23
August Iraq decreased its demands and proposed withdrawal from Kuwait for access to the Gulf and control of the Rumalia oil field. The Iraqi ambassador to Brussels proposed that Iraq would pull out of Kuwait immediately if the U.S. publicly supported the implementation of all United Nations resolutions on the Middle East. Furthermore, Iraq would dismantle all unconventional weapons if the rest of the Middle East did too. Tariq
Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, highlighted the U.S. double standard and argued logically that if United Nations resolutions against Iraq were being enforced, then the resolutions
61 Parry, 481.
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against Israel should be enforced; if weapons of mass destruction were to be denied to
Iraq, then they should be denied to all others in the region as well. 62
Members of the international community sought to foster a diplomatic solution and avoid an American war. After Iraq released all foreign hostages by the end of
December 1990, Japan, concerned that President Bush was closed to compromise and oblivious to how the destruction of Iraq would affect Arab opinion of the west, suggested concessions to Iraq on Gulf access, territory, and oil prices. The French called for an international conference on the Middle East, and the Baltic States appealed to the United
Nations to extend the January deadline for Iraqi withdrawal and forestall certain war. 63
The Soviet Union had earlier proposed a three-stage plan under the aegis of the
United Nations to settle the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian issue and eliminate all chemical and nuclear weapons in the region, and on 21 February, a joint
Soviet and Iraqi proposal designed to avert a U.S. ground offensive offered “full and unconditional withdraw” within three weeks. Bush rejected the proposal and threatened and initiated a ground war after the six weeks of debilitating and virtually unopposed aerial bombardment on the Iraqi people because Hussein failed to withdraw within two days time. 64
The Bush administration and the mainstream media exhibited an inexplicable unwillingness to settle the conflict peacefully and a palpable enthusiasm for
62 See for example, “A New World Order Whose Time Has Passed,” In These Times, 16-22 January 1991, 14; Parry; Chomsky, “America’s Isolation in the Gulf,” in Ridgeway, 104.
63 See for example, “A Plan for Peace as the Danger of War Recedes,” In These Times, 19-25 December 1990, 14; Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 5, 11 February 1991, 150; Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 4, 4 February 1991, 114.
64 See for example, The Nation Vol. 251, No. 18, 26 November 1990, 633; “A Plan for Peace as the Danger of War Recedes,” In These Times, 19-25 December 1990, 14.
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warmongering. On the eve of the war, the Washington Post wrote that the Bush administration feared Iraqi withdrawal as “a nightmare scenario” because “the beginning of an Iraqi withdrawal could make it impossible for Bush to launch military action.”65
The journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported in the final days of the war that the White House had lived in “fear of a peace deal” and praised Bush for exhibiting
“eagerness to avoid peace and confront war.” 66 Barely a week into the unprecedented air war against Iraq, the New York Times quoted an administration official who stated “all along we worried about the implications of a diplomatic success” and reported that the administration could not express the goal of eliminating Iraq as a military power since war was the only method to accomplish it. 67 Ted Koppel, a member of the adversarial press and host of the television news program Nightline, commenting on a Soviet peace initiative, stated that “it would probably be too harsh to call it a peace scare . . . but there is a sense of apprehension in Washington that the Soviet peace initiative may provide
Saddam Hussein with too much of an opportunity to save face, and, more to the point, to retain power.” 68 Joshua Epstein, a defense analyst with the Brookings Institute, expressing contempt for real democracy, admitted “when you come right down to it, it is now evident that all along the Bush administration and its military allies wanted to destroy Hussein and annihilate his military power so it can never be a threat. So we were
65 Quoted in Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 16.
66 Ibid.
67 Andrew Rosenthal, “U.S. Aims Include Elimination of Baghdad as Regional Power,” New York Times, 22 January 1991, as cited in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 30 January–5 February 1991, 4.
68 Quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 27 February–19 March 1991, 5.
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not prepared to negotiate and we set a deadline to avoid the political pressure of a debate.” 69 Fortune magazine approvingly reported that
The President and his men worked overtime to quash freelance peacemakers in the Arab world, France, and the Soviet Union who threatened to give Saddam a face- saving way out of the box Bush was building. Over and over, Bush repeated the mantra: no negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, no rewards, and specifically no linkage to a Palestinian peace conference [a point raised by Iraq on several occasions]. 70
Although Secretary of State Baker traveled to Geneva, Switzerland to supposedly negotiate with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz on the eve of the United Nations’ deadline for
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, President Bush instructed Baker that there were to be absolutely “no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, no rewards for aggression,” thus rendering the administration’s claims that the U.S. sought a diplomatic settlement as completely false. 71
Not only was the U.S. rejection of a diplomatic solution counter to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, but the war against Iraq constitutes aggression and terrorism. Terrorism is “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature . . . through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.” 72 The U.S. war against the people of Iraq was nothing less than state terrorism considering that the Bush administration rejected all proposals for a diplomatic settlement, violated the United Nations Charter, exceeded the mandate of the
Security Council resolutions demanding only the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and
69 Quoted in Sheryl McCarthy, “Truth of the Gulf War on the Streets,” in Ridgeway, 222.
70 Fortune, 11 February 1991, 46, as cited in Blum, 328-329.
71 Ridgeway, 172.
72 Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality” in Alexander George, ed., Western State Terrorism cited in Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 188.
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dismissed all international law and norms protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure during time of war.
The White House and the mainstream media incessantly repeated the propaganda that Hussein was responsible for Iraqi casualties resulting from the U.S. aerial bombardment and subsequent ground war. The Washington Post opined that “the contrast between the determined American effort to avoid civilian casualties and the determined Iraqi effort to inflict them is becoming the moral fingerprint of the war.” 73
White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater argued that “Iraqi deaths are attributable to the invasion [of Kuwait]. . . . You will not find Americans feeling guilty for Saddam
Hussein’s invasion and the destruction of his own people.” 74 NBC news anchor Tom
Brokaw announced that “ we must point out again and again that it’s Saddam Hussein who put these innocents in harm’s way.” 75 By using the subjective “we” in place of reporting that the U.S. government claimed that Hussein was responsible for Iraqi casualties, Brokaw was tacitly implying his allegiance to the government and internalization of U.S. policies and propaganda, speaking volumes about the independence and role of the press in the American-style democracy. 76
73 Washington Post, 21 January 1991, as cited in Joel Bleifuss, “The First Stone,” In These Times, 30 January–5 February 1991, 4.
74 Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 17.
75 Ibid.
76 Racism, prevalent in American society throughout U.S. history, must factor into the determination of U.S. military targets. The facisle demonization of Saddam Hussein and the complete disregard for the lives of Iraqi civilians expressed throughout the media supports the contention that racism influenced policy. I doubt the U.S. would be so quick to threaten the use of force if the aggressor were a European country or Israel. For example, Margaret Spillane describes that on the eve of the air war against Iraq, the host of the Tonight Show, Jay Leno, joked: “What do Hiroshima, Nagsaki, and Baghdad have in common? Nothing . . . yet.” A Today Show regular and a supposed journalist, Deborah Norville, queried, “I wonder what language they speak in Kuwait?” Jennie Anderson, in an article entitled “Blame the Arabs: Tensions in the Gulf Brings Bigotry at Home,” catalogues numerous examples of vicious and violent
77
Contrary to the propaganda, according to all norms of international law and even
U.S. law the United States government was responsible for the immense death and destruction in Iraq. Although the Bush administration explained civilian casualties as unintentional collateral damage, morally and legally the government was ultimately responsible because the death and destruction were predictable consequences of the bombing campaign, a bombing campaign in which the United States and its coalition partners dropped 177 million pounds of bombs, utilized depleted uranium weapons contrary to international norms against the use of chemical and biological weapons, and destroyed two operational civilian nuclear reactors contrary to a United Nations resolution prohibiting such an action. If an individual targets another and in the process kills or maims innocent bystanders, legally that individual is responsible for all the violence perpetrated. The United States seemingly was attempting to once again blame the victims for the crimes resulting from U.S. aggression as it had blamed the Grenadian,
racism against Middle Easterners in the United States. For example, a road crew in Maryland attacked and beat an Iranian-American family. One of the attackers said, “I want to kill these foreigners to teach them a lesson about complaining in our country.” A neighbor of a Palestinian family in Maryland threatened that “if my oldest son sees your children, he is going to run them over.” On Howard Stern’s syndicated radio show, anti-Arab remarks, such as “Arabs are dogs, so treat them as such. Take a newspaper and hit them on the head when they misbehave,” were common. A popular t-shirt pictures a U.S. marine pointing a rifle at a supine Arab, with the caption “HOW MUCH IS OIL NOW?” Interestingly, psychologist Dr. Jerrold Post, profiling Saddam Hussein for Congress, argued: “. . . In pursuing his goals, Saddam uses aggression instrumentally. He uses whatever force is necessary, and will, if he deems it expedient, go to extremes of violence, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. . . . He is ready for retaliation and, not without reason, sees himself as surrounded by enemies. But he ignores his role in creating those enemies and righteously threatens his targets. . . .” Moreover, “Saddam’s world view is narrow and distorted, and he has scant experience out of the Arab world.” Finally, “honor and reputation must be interpreted in an Arab context. . . . His past history reveals a remarkable capacity to find face-saving justification when reversing his course in very difficult circumstances.” The psychological profile, of course, applies to many U.S. politicians and presidents, including George H. W. Bush and his son, George W. Bush. As with the demonization and belittlement of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S. politicians and press criticize foreign leaders for characteristics that the U.S. politicians exhibit themselves. A history of warfare illustrates that the dehumanization of the enemy allows for horrendous crimes against humanity. See Margaret Spillane, “M*U*S*H,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 7, 25 February 1991, 237-239; Jennie Anderson, “Blame the Arabs: Tensions in the Gulf Brings Bigotry at Home,” The Progressive, February 1991, 28-29; and Aspin, “The Role of Sanctions in Securing U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf,” in The Aspin Papers, 20-23.
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Panamanian, Libyan, and Nicaraguan governments for American violence during the
1980s. Understood is the underlying assumption that only unworthy victims of U.S. violence are responsible for the crimes committed against them. Although no one would argue that the United States government was ultimately responsible for the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, perhaps Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are responsible for the thousands of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq since the U.S. acted in self- defense against the perpetrators of that attack. Moreover, U.S. allies and clients have the exclusive right to blame the victims. Israeli “reprisals” against Palestinian civilians are always undertaken in self-defense, and civilian casualties, although regrettable, are ultimately the responsibility of the Palestinian leadership for “terrorism” against Israel.
The Israeli government is never responsible for Israeli worthy victims, even if its policies, such as the illegal settlement building in the occupied territories provoke
Palestinian self-defense of their homeland.
Furthermore, the United States overtly admitted that the military targeted civilians, thus undermining the pretenses at moral superiority. “After the war, the
Pentagon admitted that non-military facilities had been extensively targeted for political reasons.” 77 Government studies after World War II concluded: “the dread of disease and the hardship imposed by the lack of sanitary facilities were bound to have a demoralizing effect upon the civilian populations.” Moreover, investigative journalist William Blum summarizes “There was a ‘reliable and striking’ correlation between the disruption of public utilities and the willingness of the German population to accept unconditional
77 Washington Post, 23 June 1991, as cited in Blum, 335.
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surrender.” 78 Illustrating that the U.S. undertook war to achieve political objectives, an air force planner admitted:
Big picture, we wanted to let people know “get rid of this guy and we’ll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding. We’re not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that, and we’ll fix your electricity.” 79
Reinforcing the evidence that U.S. military force was state terrorism, Colonel John A.
Warden III observed that as a result of the bombing and the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure and civilization
If there are political objectives that the UN coalition has, it can say, “Saddam when you agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity.” It gives us long term leverage. 80
One Pentagon planner explained the correlation between the bombing and the sanctions:
People say, “You didn’t recognize that [the bombing] was going to have an effect on water and sewage.” Well, what were we trying to do with sanctions--help out the Iraqi people? No. What we were doing with the attacks on the infrastructure was to accelerate the effect of sanctions. 81
The Los Angeles Times reported that “officials said Bush assumes that the American public will be mainly concerned about the number of U.S. casualties, not the tens of thousands of Iraqis who stand to die or be maimed in a massive air assault, and that even the killing of thousands of civilians, including women and children, probably won’t undermine American support for the war effort.” 82
78 Middle East Watch/Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War, November 1991, 177-180, as cited in Ibid.
79 Washington Post, 23 June 1991, as cited in Ibid., 335-336.
80 “Comment,” The Progressive Vol. 55, No. 8, August 1991, 10.
81 Barton Gellman, “Allied War Struck Broadly in Iraq,” Washington Post, as cited in Clark, 62.
82 Nairn, “When Casualties Don’t Count,” 16.
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After the bombing of a Baghdad bomb shelter, in which the U.S. incinerated as many as 1500 civilians, overwhelmingly women and children and despite the evidence that the military maintained constant and unimpeded aerial surveillance over the area,
White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater piously claimed that the shelter was “a military target . . . We don’t know why civilians were at this location, but we do know that Saddam Hussein does not share our value in the sanctity of life,” and President Bush asininely declared that “I am concerned about the suffering of innocents.” 83
A reporter writing for the Columbian Journalism Review described the unedited
Baghdad television footage of the aftermath at the shelter:
They showed scenes of incredible carnage. Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been so great that entire limbs were burned off. Among the corpses were those of at least six babies and ten children, most of them so severely burned that their gender could not be determined. Rescue workers collapsed in grief, dropping corpses; some rescuers vomited from the stench of the still- smoldering bodies. 84
Subsequent Iraqi acceptance of Security Council resolution 660 and the initial withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait, Randall Richard of the Providence Journal reported on 26 February 1991 from the U.S.S. Ranger that “air strikes against Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait were being launched so feverishly from this carrier today that pilots said they took whatever bombs happened to be closest to the flight deck.” 85 An
American pilot, referring to the bombing of retreating troops, enthusiastically proclaimed
“this was the road to Daytona Beach at Spring Break; just bumper to bumper. Spring
83 Needless Deaths . . . , 128-147; Los Angeles Times, 18 February 1991, as cited in Blum, 335; for description of the bombing, casualty figures, and evidence that the U.S. military knew that the shelter was for civilians, see Clark, 70-72 and sources cited; and Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 8, 4 March 1991, 258.
84 Laurie Garrett, “The Dead,” Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 1991, as cited in Clark, 70.
85 Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 11, 25 March 1991, 366.
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Break’s over.”86 The bombing of retreating troops reflects another clear American violation of the Security Council resolutions and a perpetuation of an act of aggression which the international community failed to punish by imposing sanctions or invading according to the new world order.
Commenting on Bush’s public approval rating and the media’s complicity in supporting the war and preventing serious discussion of the destruction of Iraq, one journalist wrote:
One minute of nightly truth on the “popular” war would have changed American public opinion. . . . If for just 60 seconds the 6 o’clock Monday news had shown 5,000 Iraqi soldiers with hideous phosphorous burns that alter human anatomy followed by 60 seconds Tuesday night of the slaughter at the Baghdad bomb shelter. . . . What if on Wednesday Americans had seen 10,000 Iraqi soldiers incinerated by American high- tech weapons. 87
A United Nations inspection team concluded that the U.S. bombing transformed Iraq into a “pre-industrial age nation.” 88 Moreover, “the recent conflict has wrought near- apocalyptical results on the infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous.” 89
The United Nations Security Council, contrary to the spirit of the Charter, sanctioned the American annihilation of Iraq. Contrary to its habitual vetoing of enforceable Security Council resolutions, the United States immediately orchestrated
86 Ibid. For gruesome descriptions of the wholesale slaughter of the Iraqi army, see Clark, Chapter two.
87 Dennis Bernstein, quoted in the Newsletter of the National Association of Arab Americans (Greater Los Angeles Chapter), July 1991, as cited in Blum, 337.
88 “The Gulf War and Its Aftermath,” The 1992 Information Please Almanac (Boston, 1992), 974, as cited in Ibid., 338.
89 Klare, “High-Death Weapons of the Gulf War,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 21, 3 June 1991, 738.
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Security Council measures against Iraq within days of its invasion of Kuwait. Between
August and December 1990, the United Nations Security Council drafted and adopted twelve resolutions demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the immediate release of all foreign hostages, and the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government. The U.S. maneuverings manipulating the Security Council to impose expansive sanctions on Iraq within days of the invasion and by late November authorize the use of essentially unilateral U.S. military force without accountability to the Security
Council illustrates an unjustifiable double standard whereby the U.S. influence and use of veto in the Security Council habitually prevented draft resolutions calling for sanctions on Israel and apartheid South Africa, condemning the military aggressions of the United
States and its allies, and enforcing compliance with United Nations decisions.
Commenting on the U.S. manipulation of the Security Council, British political observer
Edward Pearce wrote that the United Nations “functions like an English medieval parliament: consulted, shown ceremonial courtesy, but mindful of divine prerogative, it mutters and gives assent.” 90 While Pearce criticized the undemocratic mechanisms of the
United Nations, the Boston Globe approvingly reported that United States control of the organization meant “the United Nations may finally achieve the lofty status its founders sought 45 years ago.” 91
Violating the principles of the Charter, the United States bribed and threatened the international community to form the “coalition” against Iraq and support the
American diktat. For example, the U.S. cancelled Egypt’s debt, allowed Saudi Arabia to
90 The Guardian (London), 9 January 1991, as cited in Blum, 327.
91 Boston Globe, 6 August 1990, as cited in Cockburn, “Ashes and Diamonds,” In These Times Vol. 14, No. 33, 29 August–11 September 1990, 17.
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curtail the religious and political civil liberties of American soldiers stationed there to
“protect” it from Iraqi invasion, bribed Syria and overlooked its partial occupation of
Lebanon, and abstained from “criticizing the human rights record of any coalition member.” 92 After the Yemeni ambassador cast a negative vote on resolution 678 authorizing the use of force, Secretary of State James Baker, presiding over the Security
Council meeting, reportedly said “I hope he enjoyed that applause, because this will turn out to be the most expensive vote he ever cast,” foreshadowing a drastic decrease in U.S. aid to the Gulf nation. 93 The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, although tacitly aiding the American cause in the months leading to war, admitted that “any intervention . . . would not be in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the United Nations Charter.” 94 After the annihilation of Iraq, Perez de
Cuellar observed “it was not a United Nations war. General [Norman] Schwarzkopf
[commander of the coalition forces] was not wearing a blue helmet.” 95
Within hours of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the Security Council adopted resolution 660 demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops.
The resolution states that
The Security Council , Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
92 Quote is Blum’s summary, 327; for examples of the U.S. bribing and manipulating the members of the United Nations, see “Choose Peace,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 22, 24 December 1990, 809; Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation Vol. 252, No. 5, 11 February 1991, 150; and Blum, 327 and sources cited.
93 Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 237-238, as cited in Blum, 327.
94 Quoted in “Overkill,” In These Times Vol. 14, No. 33, 29 August–11 September 1990, 14.
95 Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1991, as cited in Blum, 327.
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Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 96
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution. 97
The resolution passed unanimously among the fourteen members of the Security Council participating in the vote. 98 The U.S. ambassador quoted a White House press release which stated “the United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and calls for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces. . . . We deplore
96 The following articles are found under Chapter VII of the Charter, which addresses “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what means shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
97 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 167.
98 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2932 nd Meeting, S/PV.2932, 27. The Yemeni delegation did not participate in the vote due to a lack of instructions from its government.
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this blatant use of military aggression and violation of the United Nations Charter.” 99
The ambassador contended that
It is our understanding that the present aggression was completely unprovoked. United States policy has been to support every diplomatic effort to resolve the present crisis. Thus we did not arrive lightly at our position of calling for a Security Council meeting or seeking an immediate resolution which would condemn the Iraqi invasion, call for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, and support a process of negotiated solution to the differences between Iraq and Kuwait, and particularly the efforts being undertaken by the Arab League in this regard. 100
Furthermore, illustrating the United States selective application of avowed principles and contrasting with the American response to the Israeli invasions of neighboring Arab states and the occupation of Palestinian territory, repeated South African aggression against Angola, and U.S. aggression and intervention too numerous to catalogue, the ambassador argued that
We have been in touch with many States in the region in an effort to seek their additional support for the action of the international community to bring about an end to this heinous act of the use of military force, contrary to the Charter, international law, and all the fully accepted norms of international behavior. 101
Further contradicting habitual American rejection of any serious Security Council action regarding Israeli, apartheid South African, or American violations of international law and aggression, whereby the U.S. has repeatedly and absurdly claimed that the United
Nations was not the proper organization to deal with the crisis in question, the American delegation absurdly stated:
99 Ibid., 13.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 14-15.
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The Security Council has seldom faced a more blatant use of force. The Council should act immediately in dealing with this problem. . . . The Council can certainly do no less in this time of present crisis than to deal effectively and rapidly with this transcendental problem of the aggressive use of force. 102
The international community, although conspicuously acceding to the American policies, recognized the inherent hypocrisy of the American position. As one example of universality, the Columbian ambassador argued:
Whatever the circumstances, we have always opposed the use of force and, indeed, the very threat of use of force, regardless of excuses or arguments employed to justify the use of force. . . . That is why, for the same reason we condemned the invasion of Panama in December, we are now co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council, a text which condemns the intervention in Kuwait. 103
In an unprecedented manner, the Security Council adopted the U.S. drafted and sponsored resolution 661 within one week of the Iraqi invasion, quickly invoking Chapter
VII of the Charter, imposing extensive economic sanctions on the Iraqi people and further isolating the Iraqi regime. The resolution states:
The Security Council , Reaffirming its resolution 660 of 2 August 1990, Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues, with further loss of human life and material destruction, Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed it readiness to comply with resolution 660, Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 16.
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2. Decides , as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings; (c) the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;
4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq, or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;
5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations: (a) to examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary- General; (b) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
7. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in
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pursuance of the present resolution;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for that purpose;
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 to 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States: (a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies; (b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq. 104
While the Yemeni and Cuban delegations abstained from the vote, the other thirteen members of the Security Council voted to adopt the resolution, imposing unprecedented sanctions on Iraq. 105 The Kuwaiti ambassador observed, in language that applies as well to the United States and Israel, that
. . . [the members of the Security Council] are recording a historic shift in the work of the Security Council and demonstrating its influence in ensuring that the will of the international community is exerted, through the imposition of sweeping sanctions--an overall embargo against a country that has refused to heed the will of the international community and has, in an unprecedented manner, flouted all principles and values and international norms. . . . 106
The United States manipulation of the Council to quickly invoke Chapter VII of the Charter so as to impose sanctions and authorize the use of force clearly elucidates the
American double standard regarding accountability to international law and the United
104 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, 168-169.
105 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2933 rd Meeting, S/PV.2933, 54, 55.
106 Ibid., 11.
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Nations Charter. After historically protecting Israel and supporting its noncompliance with United Nations resolutions, the United States hypocritically declared that “the draft resolution is in response to Iraq’s blatant aggression against Kuwait . . . and Iraq’s unacceptable failure to comply with resolution 660. . . .” 107 After failing for years to invoke Chapter VII in resolutions against Israel or apartheid South Africa in order to implement measures to enforce Security Council decisions, the U.S. quickly maintained that “by this draft resolution, we declare to Iraq that we will use the means available to us provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to give effect to United Nations
Security Council resolution 660, . . .” because “Iraq must learn that its disregard for international law will have crippling political and economic costs. . . .” 108 Arrogantly implying that the international community must accept United States aggression and military intervention and thus illustrating the double standard by which the U.S. operates, the ambassador hypocritically proclaimed “Our concerted resolve will demonstrate that the international community does not--and will not--accept Baghdad’s preference for the use of force, coercion and intimidation.” 109
Ironically reminiscent of the excuses utilized by the American and European allies of apartheid South Africa in opposition of sanctions to end apartheid and South
African aggression, the Canadian ambassador argued that while “we recognize . . . that these sanctions will impose hardships on many countries, on public and private organizations, and indeed on individuals throughout the world,” the “sacrifices are necessary to maintain the peace and security of States and the integrity of the
107 Ibid., 16.
108 Ibid., 18.
109 Ibid.
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international system.” 110 The United States determined that sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa would harm innocents as well as the government, thus advocating more constructive diplomatic measures, even though the international community through General Assembly resolutions and representatives of the majority of South
Africans demanded international sanctions. However, the United States imposed different standards and criteria upon Iraq. Addressing the United Nations Security
Council, Secretary of State James Baker dissembled that “[the sanctions] are not aimed at the people of Iraq, who are being forced to live with the consequences of a misguided policy.” 111
The ambassador from the United Kingdom made two interesting but false declarations. First, by stating that “economic sanctions are designed to avoid the circumstances in which military action might otherwise arise,” the ambassador implied that sanctions would be given adequate time to be effective and military intervention was not the desired policy, contradicting the U.S. goal of destroying Iraq’s military capability. 112 Second, the ambassador maintained that “. . . the draft resolution [the sanctions] will remain in effect only so long as resolution 660 is not complied with.” 113
The United States and the United Kingdom, in clear violation of the resolution, enforced brutal sanctions against Iraq for over a decade after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, arguing that the sanctions would remain in place to destroy Iraq’s military capability and
110 Ibid., 24-25.
111 James Baker, “U.S. Support for Additional UN Action Against Iraq” Current Policy No. 1302 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs , Office of Public Communication, 25 September 1990).
112 Ibid., 27.
113 Ibid.
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perhaps instigate regime change. Recall that Secretary of State Madeline Albright determined that the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths directly caused by the sanctions were worth it to weaken Saddam Hussein. 114 Clearly, while a coalition of nations invaded Iraq ostensibly because it failed to comply with Security Council resolutions, the
United States violated those same decisions.
While the international community supported condemnation of Iraqi aggression and resolutions demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, the world’s nations did not unanimously support American military intervention in Iraq. The Malaysian ambassador explained that
Malaysia’s support for the draft resolution is predicated on the premise that it will remove the prospect of any unilateral military or quasi-military action in the region by outside Powers. There should not be any justification to utilize the provisions of the draft resolution to take military action. 115
The Cuban delegation, perhaps the most vocally critical of the American manipulation of the United Nations, first declared unequivocal condemnation of the Iraqi aggression:
To Cuba, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, no matter what reason, of the non-use of force in international relations, of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations are essential principles of our international order. It is in defense of these principles that we have expressed our disapproval and condemnation of the entry of Iraqi forces into the territory of Kuwait a few days ago and that we have declared that the state of affairs must be ended with the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait territory and the full restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty. 116
114 John Ryan, “Madeline Albright and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Counterpunch ,
115 S/PV.2933, 22.
116 Ibid., 37-38.
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However, the Cuban ambassador boldly illustrated the United States hypocrisy regarding the principles expressed above, and thus his speech to the Security Council is quoted liberally:
We cannot help recalling that for 23 years all the States of the region . . . all the non- aligned States and the General Assembly, almost unanimously, have condemned Israel’s occupation of the territories which we have come to describe, by diplomatic tradition, as the occupied territories. . . . There seems to be no need to impose sanctions against the occupier when it is Israel. Was any account taken of the opinions of the non-aligned countries and the countries of the Middle Eastern region, with proposals for more effective actions to compel Israel to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories and recognize the rights of that other Arab people, the people of Palestine? But all of us know that some six months ago this same Security Council considered in informal consultations a draft resolution on the latest developments with respect to the occupied territories. What did the Council do? Was it able to act? Why was it not able to act? Is there anybody who does not know the reason? We all know that it was the opposition of the delegation of the United States of America even to a declaration that the occupation was illegal, let alone to sanctions or to more effective means against the occupying State. The territory of Angola--part of it--was occupied for some 15 years by the South African regime’s troops. My delegation does not recall any occasion when anybody discovered the principle of non-interference and respect for territorial integrity, let alone urged the imposition of effective sanctions upon South Africa to compel it to abandon Angolan territory. 117
Commenting upon the U.S.’s pious indignation that Iraq (ineptly) installed a puppet regime in Kuwait and referring to the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989, the
Cuban ambassador observed
There was one innovation in that case which was perhaps without precedent: it installed a new Government, perhaps the first in the world in which the President, the Head of Government, took the oath of office at a United States military base, naturally in the presence of the commanding general of the occupying forces. 118
The imposition of sanctions against Iraq, brutally maintained long after the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, was nothing less than state terrorism, in violation of all international law and moral norms, designed to commit genocide against the Iraqi people through
117 Ibid., 42.
118 Ibid., 43; see note 2 above and Chapter three.
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starvation and disease in order to achieve political gains. Although Iraqi aggression against Kuwait was brutal and unjustifiable, it was a minor affair compared to the resultant American bombing and intended destruction of the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi people. Geoff Simons, author of Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, wrote in 1995 that
The entire Iraqi people, supposedly allowed access to foodstuffs and medical supplies under the terms of the UN resolutions, are suffering appalling privations: diseases, many previously eradicated, are spreading through the population, and hundreds of thousands of men, women, children and babies are dying of preventable illnesses or starving to death. . . . Iraqi claims that a million people have so far been killed by the U.S.-protected embargo are largely supported by the independent aid agencies. 119
“And in the rest of the world there is great respect not only for the power of the United
States, but for the western values that we have been espousing for so long.” 120
While directing the proceedings of the Security Council, the United States drafted and sponsored Resolution 678 which was essentially an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein as it authorized the forced withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait by “all necessary means.”
By declaring its willingness to use force and reject any form of peaceful settlement, the
Security Council placed the onus and responsibility of the predictable war on Saddam
Hussein and Iraq. The resolution states
The Security Council , Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 of 2 August 1990, 661 of 6 August 1990, 662 of 9 August 1990, 664 of 18 August 1990, 665 of 25 August 1990, 666 of 13 September 1990, 667 of 16 September 1990, 669 of 24 September 1990, 670 of 25 September 1990, 674 of 29 October 1990 and 677 of 28 November 1990, Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligations to implement resolution 660 and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council, Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,
119 Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam, (3 rd edition, Houndmills, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ix.
120 See quote by Dante Fascell above and sources cited in note 49.
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Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 above;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 121
While Cuba and Yemen cast negative votes and China abstained, the twelve remaining members of the Security Council voted for military force after a brief period allowing Hussein to withdraw unconditionally. 122 Due to the undemocratic nature of the
Council whereby the five permanent members have the right to veto unacceptable resolutions, the Cuban and Yemeni negative votes did not prevent the adoption of the draft as the negative vote by the United States has rendered various draft resolutions moot and meaningless despite the twelve, thirteen, or fourteen affirmative votes of the other members of the Council.
The Yemeni ambassador, boldly voting against the resolution, observed that
“there is in the Middle East region another crisis that is not being dealt with by the same
121 The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996, 178.
122 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2963 rd Meeting, S/PV.2963, 64-65.
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standard as the Security Council has been applying to the crisis in the Gulf.” 123
Furthermore, the Yemeni delegation drew attention to another example of American hypocrisy, the incessant U.S. claim that only peaceful negotiation can settle the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis as compared to the belligerency against Iraq. The ambassador noted “it is ironic that those States which have for years been lecturing us in the Arab world about the virtues of dialogue and diplomatic negotiation are now the ones who are saying no to the peace initiatives and peace plans.” 124
In the words of the Cuban delegation:
We have also expressed our concern here over the enormous and increasing concentration of military forces from the United States of America and its allies in the Gulf, and over the danger of the outbreak of a war which . . . would bring enormous destruction. . . . 125
Iterating the blatant American double standard which it highlighted in the discussion on the resolution regarding sanctions, the Cuban delegation stated
We have on previous occasions pointed out here the contrast between the attitude of the Council towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, to mention just two examples, towards the United States invasion of Panama not long ago and the situation in Palestine and the Arab territories, under occupation for 23 years now. 126
Illustrating not only the hypocrisy of the United States policy, but also the
American determination to prevent any Security Council action regarding the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, the Cuban ambassador declared
Leaving aside moral, legal and historical considerations, Cuba has not attempted--it does not consider it realistic in the present situation--to establish any linkage between an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the Arab territories occupied by Israel.
123 Ibid., 32.
124 Ibid., 37.
125 Ibid., 54-55.
126 Ibid., 56.
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However, is it not scandalously incongruous to invoke norms for some that we ignore for others? Is this not the very same Council that has been holding consultations these past few days on another draft resolution, which said the minimum, was moderate and exclusively humanitarian, on the subject of Palestine? . . . Yet the President of the Council 127 ignored the request to convene this body, bypassing the established rules and procedures. Can it be that the long-suffering Palestinian people is even now, in the new, post-Cold War era, not considered worthy of the treatment meted out to other people? Can it be that, like the Lebanese, they can have used against them all the terror and brutality of the sophisticated military might of a strategic ally of the United States, without shocking those who say they are shocked by other actions that equally violate international laws and norms? 128
Predicting the intended consequences of the draft resolution and explaining its negative vote, the Cuban delegation proclaimed that
Cuba believes that it would not be advisable to adopt a resolution which is a virtual declaration of war, a fixed-term ultimatum before hostilities are launched, and is equivalent to giving the United States and its allies carte blanche to use their enormous sophisticated military capability. 129
Explaining that the United Nations Charter allows for the use of military force only in self-defense against an imminent attack before the Security Council can decide a course of action or under Security Council supervision as a result of Security Council authorization, the Cubans observed that “the text before us moreover violates the Charter of the United Nations by authorizing some States to use military force in total disregard of the procedures established by the Charter.” 130 Recall that Secretary-General Perez de
127 The presidency of the Security Council revolves among the members of the Council on a monthly basis. During the month of November, the United States delegation presided over the proceedings of the Council.
128 Ibid., 56-57.
129 Ibid., 58.
130 Ibid.
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Cuellar admitted “it was not a United Nations war. General [Norman] Schwarzkopf
[commander of the coalition forces] was not wearing a blue helmet.” 131
The United States Secretary of State James Baker declared that
We can use the end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip back into even more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high road towards peace and the rule of law, or we can take Saddam Hussein’s path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle. 132
U.S. history indicates that the American government, contrary to rhetoric and avowed principles, has habitually chosen the “path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.”
The war against Iraq serves adequately to illustrate the United States opposition to aggression and intervention and the extent that the political and business elite value economic interests over life, freedom, democracy, human rights, and international law.
The United States clearly overstepped the United Nations mandate to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait by destroying Iraq’s military capability and civilian infrastructure, imposing brutal sanctions on the Iraqi people long after the war, and maintaining control over Iraqi airspace and violating its sovereignty, illustrating that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait served as a pretext for the U.S. to justify the massive military budget after the cessation of the
Cold War, secure U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent military presence in the
Middle East, destroy a perceived threat to Israel, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, countering the so-called Vietnam syndrome, and distract the domestic population from more pressing domestic concerns and, in the process, silence dissent. The blatant aggression against essentially defenseless Grenada,
Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s, undertaken on the dubious pretext of
131 See above and sources cited in note 95.
132 S/PV.2963, 104-105.
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self-defense, underscores that the United States has habitually used violence and aggression to serve political and economic interests, thus exposing itself as a rogue nation rejecting international law and natural justice and morality in favor of remaining the world’s only superpower.
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Chapter Three:
The Law of the Jungle
The United States aggression against the essentially defenseless nations of
Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s further illustrates that the U.S. government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the U.S. government’s contempt for democracy, human rights, and justice. The international community condemned the U.S. military interventions; however, due to the use of the U.S. veto in the Security Council, the United Nations could not adopt enforceable measures to affect the behavior of the U.S. government and prevent future American aggression. The selective American adherence to the principles of international law and the United
Nations Charter intimates that the United States will continue to rely on military force as a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. As the world’s only superpower, the law of the jungle is the only law that applies to American actions.
I. Grenada
Draft resolution S/16077/Rev.1 of 27 October 1983 states in part that the Security
Council, “ reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine its own political, economic and social system, and to develop its international relations without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,” “ gravely concerned at the military intervention taking place and determined to ensure a speedy return to normalcy in Grenada,” and “ conscious of the need for States to show consistent respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,”
1. Deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State;
2. Deplores the death of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention;
3. Calls on all States to show strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada;
4. Calls for an immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the development of the situation in Grenada and to report to the Council within forty-eight hours on the implementation of this resolution. 1
Although three countries abstained, the United States recorded the only negative vote against eleven affirmative ones. 2 Exercising its right of veto, the U.S. ambassador claimed without evidence that “Maurice Bishop [the socialist leader of the New Jewel
Movement, which acceded to power in a 1979 coup] freely offered his island as a base
1 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/16077/Rev.1 of 27 October 1983.
2 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2491 st Meeting, S/PV.2491, 39.
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for the projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere.” 3 Dissembling further, the ambassador echoed the Reagan administration’s unsubstantiated allegations that “an enormous, truly enormous, arsenal of Soviet weapons has been come across in the past three days” and “the total number of Cubans present on Grenada is still unknown, but it appears likely that there were over 1000. . . .” 4 Essentially, throughout his speech to the
Security Council, the U.S. ambassador reiterated the same unconvincing and verifiably false justifications for the world’s largest military power to invade an island nation of
110,000 people:
Those circumstances [in Grenada] include danger to innocent United States nationals, the absence of a minimally responsible government in Grenada, and the danger posed to the OECS [Organization of Eastern Caribbean States] by the relatively awesome military might that those responsible for the murder of the Bishop government now had at their disposal. 5
Interestingly, the United States attempted to unilaterally reinterpret international law and the United Nations Charter by proclaiming that “the prohibitions against the use of force in the Charter are contextual, not absolute.” 6 The Jordanian ambassador, echoing a majority of Security Council members and the General Assembly in interpreting the
Charter, argued that “we cannot accept invasion and occupation under the pretext that such and such a party has the intention to commit aggression.” Moreover, “likewise, the right to self-defense does not imply the right to carry out preventative action or to invade and occupy other countries.” 7 The United Nations Charter is brutally absolute on the use
3 Ibid., 6.
4 Ibid., 7.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 6.
7 Ibid., 37-38.
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of force and indeed U.S. preventative attacks, as the Jordanian ambassador clearly argued, are crimes of aggression and cannot in any way be justified as self-defense.
Highlighting further the unjustifiable pretexts for a military invasion with all its attendant consequences, the American ambassador asserted that “we intend . . . to leave
Grenada just as soon as law is restored and the instruments of self-government-- democratic government--have been put in place.” As regarding the current occupation of
Iraq, the United States ignores or dismisses the obvious fact that a country cannot form a democratic government while under foreign occupation. The ambassador claimed that
“when asked to assist this effort, the United States, whose own nationals and vital interests were independently affected, joined the effort to restore minimal conditions of law and order in Grenada and to eliminate the threat posed to the security of the entire region.” 8 As the text of the vetoed draft indicates, no country has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of sovereign states and initiate a preventative attack on a possibly perceived but non-manifested threat. However, the United States government, despite the rhetoric concerning democracy and freedom, maintains the unilateral and exceptional right to operate as the world’s only superpower above international law and against the opinion of humankind.
Investigate reporter and author William Blum easily exposes the various justifications for a military attack as falsifications disguising the underlying motive for the Reagan administration: the invasion of Grenada was a necessary morale booster for the American psyche, to convince the public of the inherent superiority and goodness of
8 Ibid., 7-8.
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the U.S. military. 9 “One of the fundamental falsehoods” was that the OECS, fearing aggression from a leftist regime that had deposed and murdered the socialist leader
Maurice Bishop, requested United States intervention as a preventative measure in clear violation of international law due to the absence of any aggressive action. 10 As for the ruse that the ceremonial governor-general, a position appointed by the British queen in reminiscence of the former British empire, requested military intervention, the British
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe “was emphatic that there had been no request for intervention from [governor-general] Sir Paul Scoon.” 11
According to Blum, the U.S. had been planning an operation in Grenada even before the overthrow of Bishop, as the U.S. ambassador to France Evan Galbraith intimated over French television, and persuaded the other Caribbean nations through the usual threats and bribery to request U.S. intervention. 12 Blum illustrates that immediately after Bishop assumed power, the United States expressed its opposition, in the form of a letter from the U.S. ambassador which stated in part:
Although my government recognizes your concern over allegations of a possible counter-coup [perhaps from the recently deposed Eric Gairy, exiled in the United
9 Much of the following discussion is taken from William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), chapter 45, 269-277, which, as the title implies, is an extremely useful reference guide for U.S. intervention since World War II.
10 Ibid., 270.
11 The Guardian, 31 October 1983 as cited in Ibid.
12 Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London 1984), 153 as cited in Ibid., and discussion on 270 providing evidence that the U.S. approached the Caribbean states with the idea of an invasion.
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States], it also believes that it would not be in Grenada’s best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba. 13
Moreover, the U.S. instigated destabilization measures, including a domestic propaganda campaign designed to limit tourism to Grenada and convince the American people that the Soviets and Cubans were dangerously militarizing the island, thus threatening the
United States. As for the ubiquitous and superficial U.S. criticism that Bishop never held elections and thus Grenada was not a democratic state, Bishop thoughtfully argued:
There are those (some of them our friends) who believe that you cannot have a democracy unless there is a situation where every five years, and for five seconds in those five years, a people are allowed to put an “X” next to some candidate’s name, and for those five seconds in those five years they become democrats, and for the remainder of the time, four years and 364 days, they return to being non-people without the right to say anything to their government, without any right to be involved in running the country. 14
However, as with numerous other examples including Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet
Union, the Grenadian participatory democracy never had a chance to function as the
United States habitually and immediately attempted to destroy any alternative to the
American form of capitalism and democracy that combined genuine democracy with economic and social justice.
Another main justification noted above was the safety of American citizens in
Grenada. As discussed earlier, the government’s genuine concern for the security and well-being of the American people is somewhat dubious, especially considering the obvious social, economic, and political inequality inherent in our democratic system (the
13 Cited by Maurice Bishop in his speech of 13 April 1979, in Chris Searle, ed., In Nobody’s Backyard: Maurice Bishop’s Speeches 1979-1983 (London, 1984), as found in Ibid., 274.
14 O’Shaughnessy, 85, cited in Ibid., 273.
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government (lack of) response to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans should suffice to dispel any notion that national security pertains to the real security of most
Americans); therefore, the safety of nationals in foreign countries serves as a useful pretext for intervention and propaganda for domestic consumption, inculcating the necessary jingoistic, nationalistic, and patriotic fervor for war. Regarding Reagan’s justification that the U.S. needed to evacuate its citizens through a military invasion,
Blum writes that
Two members of the U.S. embassy in Barbados, Ken Kurze and Linda Flohr, reported over the weekend before the invasion that “U.S. students in Grenada were, for the most part, unwilling to leave or be evacuated. They were too intent on their studies.” 15
Moreover, “the White House acknowledged that two days before the invasion, Grenada had offered the United States ‘an opportunity to evacuate American citizens. But officials said the Reagan administration came to distrust the offer.’” The administration distrust stemmed from the claim that the Grenada airport was closed on the day before the invasion, preventing American evacuation; however, the White House later admitted that planes left the airport on the day in question, even evacuating a few American citizens, exposing as false another justification. 16
During the invasion, Reagan announced that the military discovered “a complete base of weapons and communications equipment which makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island had been planned.” A warehouse “contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists.”
15 O’Shaughnessy, 165, as cited in Ibid., 271.
16 For the U.S. explanation justifying the distrust of the Grenada offer, see the New York Times, 27 October 1983, and for the later admission of administration dissembling, see O’Shaughnessy, 205, both cited in Ibid.
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Reagan declared that Grenada was “a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy, but we got there just in time.” 17 In response, Blum, intimating a quite observable fact that the United States has military bases all over the world projecting U.S. hegemony, writes:
The U.S./Grenada/Cuba scenario staged in Washington was comparable at the time to the Soviet Union invading Great Britain and then announcing that it has prevented an American takeover, and Marx-knows what else, because it had discovered 30,000 U.S. servicemen there, over 100 American military bases, a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, and "enough arms to supply millions of terrorists." The Soviet president could then have declared that "We got there just in time." 18
While the Grenadian government understandably sought to purchase weapons as a possible but futile deterrent to obvious United States destabilization, the U.S. discoveries proved to be overly exaggerated if not completely spun out of whole cloth, while the
American military presence in Great Britain and indeed throughout the world is very real and very large, thus illustrating a very dangerous double standard where only the U.S. and its allies have the right to militarize the world while no other country seemingly has the right to self-defense against American intervention. The Guardian of London reported that in the warehouse “that contained most of the weapons, there were only five mortars to be seen, one recoilless rifle, one Soviet-made quadric-barrelled anti-aircraft gun, and two Koran-vintage British Bren guns on display.” 19 The New York Times limited its report to “significant stockpiles of Soviet arms but also a number of antiquated guns, including rifles manufactured in the 1870s.” 20 After the invasion, the New York
Times reported that the administration “acknowledged that in their effort to rally public
17 New York Times, 28 October 1983, cited in Ibid., 271-272.
18 Ibid., 272.
19 The Guardian, 31 October 1983, cited in Ibid.
20 New York Times, 1 November 1983, cited in Ibid.
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support for the invasion of Grenada, they may have damaged the Government’s credibility by making sweeping charges about Soviet and Cuban influence on the island without so far providing detailed evidence.” 21
After contradicting every Reagan administration justification for the gratuitous military invasion of Grenada, Blum provides a more plausible impetus for a military operation:
The president managed to link the invasion of Grenada with the shooting down of a Korean airliner by the Soviet Union, the killing of U.S. soldiers in Lebanon, and the taking of American hostages in Iran. Clearly, the invasion symbolized an end to this string of humiliations for the United States. Even Vietnam was being avenged. 22
As for the continued U.S. hostility to international law and opinion, Reagan arrogantly opined that “one hundred nations in the UN have not agreed with us on just about everything that’s come before them where we’re involved, and it didn’t upset my breakfast at all.” 23
21 New York Times, 1 November 1983, cited in Ibid., 273. According to Blum, the Cuban government stated there were 784 Cubans in Grenada, 636 construction workers, 43 military personnel, and the rest public health workers, teachers, and others in public service. See O’Shaughnessy, 15, 16, 204 as cited in Ibid., 272. As a side note, Blum writes that the U.S. military damaged and looted the home of the Cuban ambassador, even adding “Eat shit, commie faggot” graffiti to one wall and forced Cuban hostages “to march in front of American jeeps as they advanced on Cuban positions,” an egregious violation of international law that only official enemies are capable of undertaking. See The Guardian, 25 and 27 November 1983 cited in Ibid., 276.
22 Ibid., 277. Reflecting the suppression of any historical fact contrary to the present propaganda campaign, Reagan, when asked about a direct U.S. invasion in Nicaragua in 1986, declared: You’re looking at an individual that is the last one in the world that would ever want to put American troops in Latin America, because the memory of the great Colossus in the north is so widespread in Latin America. We’d lose all our friends if we did anything of that kind. What does it say about a people who are so forgetful or ignorant of history and so easily swayed by the those in power that Reagan could simply erase the recent invasion of Grenada, the current interventions in such countries as El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the incessant hostility, brutal economic sanctions, and military terrorism against Cuba and claim that the U.S. had no intention to directly intervene in Latin America?
23 New York Times, 4 November 1983, 16 cited in Ibid., 276. Grenada soon mirrored other U.S.- imposed democracies to the detriment of its inhabitants: In 1985 the Council on Hemispheric Affairs reported the following: “Reliable accounts are circulating of prisoners being beaten, denied medical attention and confined for long periods without being able to see lawyers. The country’s new U.S.-trained police force has acquired a reputation for brutality, arbitrary arrest and abuse of authority.” Moreover, the
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II. Libya
Draft resolution S/18016/Rev.1 of 21 April 1986 states in part that the Security
Council, “ strongly alarmed at the danger to international peace and security created by the armed attacks against the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi by the armed forces of the United States of America,” and “ Recalling General Assembly resolution 40/61 of 9
December 1985, by which the Assembly unequivocally condemned as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security,”
1. Condemns the armed attack by the United States of America in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct;
2. Calls upon the United States of America to refrain forthwith from any attacks or threats thereof;
3. Condemns all terrorist activities whether perpetuated by individuals, groups or States;
4. Calls upon all parties to refrain from resorting to force, to exercise restraint in this critical situation and to resolve their differences by peaceful means in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps to restore and ensure peace in the Central Mediterranean and to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of the present resolution;
6. Decides to remain seized of this matter. 24
report mentioned U.S.-trained counter-insurgency forces, which exist to essentially fight against and terrorize the domestic population. See The Guardian, 3 January 1986 as cited in Ibid., 277.
24 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18016/Rev.1 of 21 April 1986.
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Three permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, were among the five voting against the draft resolution, thus vetoing another condemnation of United States violence. 25 As discussed below, a bombing of a nightclub in West Germany killing two African-American soldiers was the immediate pretext for the U.S. bombing of two Libyan cities, which was essentially an assassination attempt against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, in violation of U.S. law, even though the U.S. provided no substantial evidence that Libya was involved. Even if
Libyans were implicated, international law allows for criminal proceedings much more acceptable than a military strike against innocent civilians. Once again the U.S. holds the leader of a foreign country responsible for actions of individuals, even without evidence indicating Libyan involvement. However, as the recent controversy over American military atrocities in Iraq indicates, not only is the entire invasion and occupation of Iraq with the attendant large scale death and destruction not considered an atrocity or war crime by the media and political elite, but George W. Bush is not responsible for the acts of soldiers even though he is the Commander-in-Chief, even though all U.S. military actions in Iraq are war crimes. The Pentagon will investigate and perhaps even punish low-ranking soldiers, as it did in the aftermath of the Abu Gharib prison torture scandal, only because the public became aware of these events, to illustrate the civility and the benevolence of the enlightened U.S. military, to absolve the political and military commanders, and to present the false propaganda that the U.S. military does not target civilians, contrary to the historical record. Concerning the draft resolution, the United
States ambassador argued that “the idea that a State should be condemned for seeking to
25 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2682nd Meeting, S/PV.2682, 43.
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protect the lives of its nationals who are subject to armed attack is too absurd for further comment.” 26 While clearly the statement is not applicable to the U.S. bombing of Libya, which is not justified by any principle of self-defense, once again, according to this logic, since Iraqi insurgents are fighting an illegal and immoral act of U.S. aggression and subsequent occupation, a much stronger and more valid example of protecting those subject to armed attack, especially considering that perhaps two million Iraqis have been killed by the U.S. since the first Gulf War, it is absurd to deem these Iraqis as terrorists.
Since the U.S. bombing of innocent civilians was supposedly justified self-defense against terrorism, the ambassador argued that “the text equates the criminal with his victim,” illustrating that the United States has a unique definition of victim hood. 27
The Pakistani representative made a relevant observation that “. . . the root cause of the turmoil and turbulence, particularly the prevalence of terrorism, in one form or the other, is the continued denial of the fundamental and legitimate right of the people of
Palestine to an independent and sovereign homeland.” 28 As the fourth and fifth chapters indicate, U.S. complicity in the Israeli occupation of Palestine and denial of Palestinian rights is well-understood in the international community. The Ugandan ambassador stated: “The United States, citing the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin, invoked article 51 of the Charter to try to justify its actions, claiming the inherent right of self- defense.” However, the ambassador continued, “The purpose of the article is to grant the right of self-defense to any United Nations Member State which is actually being
26 Ibid., 31.
27 Ibid., 32.
28 Ibid., 8.
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attacked, until the Security Council can take appropriate action.” 29 Obviously, as the draft states, the U.S. bombing of Libya was illegal and immoral, perhaps the most blatant example of state terrorism during a year when the United States and its allies were supposedly focused on combating the scourge of state terrorism, although in the United
States the bombing of civilians in Libya was not considered state terrorism because, by definition, only the violence of official enemies is so characterized.
After the U.S. air attack on Libya, which resulted in between 40 and 100 deaths, all but one civilian, including Qaddafi’s adopted daughter, White House spokesman
Larry Speakes stated that “it is our hope this action will preempt and discourage Libyan attacks against innocent civilians in the future.” 30 Perhaps Osama bin Laden’s spokesman proclaimed that “it is our hope that the attack on the United States will preempt and discourage American attacks against innocent civilians in the future and force the United States government to reconsider its foreign policy, which has caused so much suffering throughout the world.” Although both terrorist attacks were completely abhorrent and unjustifiable, the imaginary bin Laden statement would make more sense considering U.S. terrorism exponentially exceeds that of Qaddafi’s Libya. As for
Reagan’s statement that “our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable,” regarding
Libyan culpability in the discotheque bombing, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh found that the German government was “very critical and skeptical” of Libya’s culpability and “some White House officials had immediate doubts that the case against
Libya was clear-cut.” Hersh further related: “What is more, the discotheque was known
29 Ibid., 14, 16.
30 Much of the discussion is taken from Blum, chapter 48, 280-289. For the casualty figures, see Seymour Hersh, “Target Qaddafi,” The New York Times Magazine, 22 February 1987, 22 as cited in Blum, 281. For Speakes absurd comment, see New York Times, 15 April 1986, 11 as cited in Blum, 281.
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as a hangout for black soldiers, and the Libyans had never been known to target blacks or other minorities.” 31
According to Blum, the Reagan administration developed a plan to overthrow
Qaddafi early in its first term and orchestrated various assassination attempts as well as provocative military measures to provoke Libyan retaliation, which would be construed as Libyan aggression, including flights over Libyan territory and the downing of Libyan jets on more than one occasion. The CIA plan, which Newsweek exposed in August
1981, was:
“a large-scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime” and obtain what the CIA called Qaddafi’s “ultimate” removal from power. The plan called for a “disinformation” program designed to embarrass Qaddafi and his government; the creation of a “counter government” to challenge his claim to national leadership; and an escalating paramilitary campaign of small-scale guerilla operations. 32
Regarding the disinformation campaign, which included government reports that Qaddafi was intimately involved in every act of terrorism during the 1980s and assertions that a
Libyan assassin squad was roaming the United States, Hersh later wrote:
According to key sources, there was little doubt inside [Deputy Secretary of State William] Clark’s task force about who was responsible for the spate of anti-Qaddafi leaks—the CIA, with the support of the President, [Secretary of State] Haig and Clark. “This item [the Libyan hit squad] stuck in my craw,” one involved official recalls. “We came out with this big terrorist threat to the U.S. Government. The whole thing was a complete fabrication.” . . . One task force official eventually concluded that [CIA Director William] Casey was in effect running an operation inside the American Government: “He was feeding the disinformation into the (intelligence) system so it would be seen as separate, independent reports” and taken seriously by other Government agencies. 33
31 For Reagan’s quote, see New York Times, 15 April 1986, cited in Ibid., 281. For Hersh’s investigative report, see Hersh, 74, cited in Ibid., 282.
32 Newsweek, 3 August 1981, 19 as cited in Ibid., 283.
33 Hersh, 24, 26, cited in Ibid., 284-285.
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Perhaps Qaddafi was another useful enemy whose real and supposed crimes served as pretexts for American militarism and justified foreign policy initiatives. The
U.S. has throughout its history repeatedly demonized enemies to justify defense spending, foreign intervention, and even the curtailing of civil liberties. Blum writes that
Qaddafi’s principle crime in Reagan’s eyes was not that he supported terrorist groups, but that he supported the wrong terrorist groups; i.e., Qaddafi was not supporting the same terrorists that Washington was, such as the Nicaraguan Contras, UNITA in Angola, Cuban exiles in Miami, the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala, and the U.S. military in Grenada. 34
Moreover, Blum reports that the day after the U.S. bombed Libya, Reagan stated that “I would remind the House voting this week that this archterrorist Qaddafi has sent $400 million [ sic ] and an arsenal of weapons and advisors into Nicaragua.” 35
As a fitting summation of the almost surreal if not pathological American obsession with Libya and Qaddafi, Blum quotes the following apt description:
It is like a grade B horror movie. A dozen times it rises from the dead and lurches towards the audience; a dozen times it is cut to ribbons, staggering back, collapsing in a heap; and a dozen times it rises again and clomps slowly forward. But it is not the mummy’s ghost, and it is not haunting the upper Nile. It is the notion that the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, is responsible for every act of terrorism in the entire world, and it haunts the pages of the western press and the screens of western television sets. 36
III. Panama
Draft resolution S/21048 of 22 December 1989 states in part that the Security
Council, “ reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Panama to determine freely
34 Ibid., 283.
35 New York Times, 16 April 1986, 1, 20, cited in Ibid.
36 Bill Schaap, Covert Action Information Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), No. 30, Summer 1988, 76, cited in Ibid., 288.
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its social, economic and political system and to develop its international relations without any form of foreign intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat” and
“recalling that, in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations, all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations,”
1. Strongly deplores the intervention in Panama by the armed forces of the United States of America, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States;
2. Demands the immediate cessation of the intervention and the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Panama;
3. Calls upon all States to uphold and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Panama;
4. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to monitor the developments in Panama and to report to the Security Council within a twenty-four-hour period after the adoption of the present resolution. 37
The United States, France, and Great Britain vetoed the draft resolution condemning the U.S. invasion of Panama, although the U.S. aggression was clearly an unjustifiable breach of international law and the United States Charter. 38 It is quite revealing that the U.S. invaded Panama only eight months before Iraq invaded Kuwait.
To fully understand U.S. foreign policy and the functioning of the federal government, as a first step to gaining control of both, the American people must realize that avowed allegiance to nebulous concepts devoid of substantive meaning such as freedom, democracy, and national security and principles such as international law are non-factors
37 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/21048 of 22 December 1989.
38 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2902 nd meeting, S/PV.2902, 18-20.
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in the formation of foreign and domestic policy. The only difference between the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the much more pervasive United States aggression and state terrorism throughout its history is that the United States is unaccountable to international law and the opinion of humankind. Only the domestic population in the
United States has the power to thwart their rogue government.
The U.S. ambassador, aware of the ignorance of the American population, brashly asserted:
I am confident that I reflect the long-simmering outrage of the people of my own country . . . who are sick of stolen elections, sick of military dictatorships, sick of narco-strongmen and sick of people like Manuel Antonio Noriega. 39
Considering that Noriega was a longtime CIA asset, considering that the United States has trained, armed, funded, and implanted many military dictatorships, especially in Latin
America, considering the CIA’s known involvement in the illegal drug trade, 40 considering the U.S. government and CIA’s known involvement in stealing countless elections throughout the world for unpopular, yet U.S.-approved candidates, 41 and considering the inherent injustices in the U.S. electoral system and the two recent presidential elections stolen by George W. Bush, one by a majority of the Supreme Court and the second by an undoubtedly fraudulent election, the ambassador made quite a hypocritical statement to the international community. 42 Perhaps the American people
39 Ibid., 9-10.
40 See for example Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs, and the Press (London; New York: Verso, 1998), Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: the CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), and the sources cited therein.
41 See for example, Blum.
42 See for example, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., “Was the 2004 Election Stolen?” Rolling Stone, 1 June 2006.
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are sick of such outrages; yet the U.S. government remains the largest perpetrator of such crimes. Moreover, the ambassador lectured the United Nations that
It is time that the Organization welcomed Noriega’s departure, just as the world has in the past welcomed the departure of Somoza, Duvalier, Marcos and, more recently, Honecker, Zhivkov, Husak and Ceausecu. It is time this Organization put itself on the right side of history. 43
Given that the U.S. supported Somoza in Nicaragua, Duvalier in Haiti, and
Marcos in the Philippines, and continued to support Somoza and Duvalier loyalists and oppressive regimes in the Philippines, training and arming and funding the Contras to overthrow the popular Sandinistas and directly overthrowing the popular socialist priest
Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti more than once, we may rightly wonder when the United
States will put itself on the right side of history. Perhaps it is somewhat superfluous to add that not only did the ambassador intimate that the U.S., by supporting Somoza,
Duvalier, and Marcos, opposed world opinion, but that Somoza, Duvalier, and Marcos were overthrown by their own people, not by a foreign government through illegal military aggression. The U.S. contempt for international opinion and international law and its transmogrification of history would be quite illustrative of a severe social disorder if exhibited by an individual. It is not difficult to imagine how the U.S. government and media would respond if an official enemy behaved in such an anti-social and psychotic manner.
As justification for the invasion, the ambassador claimed that “the United States acted in Panama in self-defense and in defense of the Panama Canal Treaties.”
Additional justifications alluded to protecting American lives, fully implementing the
Canal Treaties, combating narcotics trafficking, and helping the Panamanian people build
43 S/PV.2902, 12.
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an authentic democracy. To illustrate the benevolent intentions of the U.S. military and government, the ambassador optimistically stated:
We welcome the return of democracy to that country, and we shall do all we can to promote it, including through the withdrawal of our forces when their mission has been accomplished. Our problem has been with one man, one corrupt dictator. 44
If perhaps anyone thought a military invasion with its attendant death and destruction was slightly excessive to catch a supposed “outlaw and a fugitive from justice” and fulfill the aims just mentioned, the ambassador had a ready, if ridiculous response, that “the United
States made an arduous effort to accomplish these goals through diplomatic and political means.” 45 Therefore, we have a myriad of aims, from bringing one man to justice for crimes committed while under the good graces and pay of the United States to protecting
American citizens, in this case military personnel, to building more democracy, to weakly and unconvincingly justify illegal aggression, the most egregious violation of international law. Would the United States accept these justifications for aggression by
Iraq, or Cuba, or the former Soviet Union? Perhaps it is unnecessary to draw the obvious parallels between Noriega and Hussein: Both were U.S. clients punished for asserting more independence than Washington was willing to allow and both were put through show trials for crimes committed while under the pay and tutelage of the U.S. government. Once again the obvious contradiction and disconnect between massive military force and democracy went unnoticed and unmentioned, reflecting and foreshadowing the rationales for past and future unchecked U.S. aggression.
Foreshadowing the morally bankrupt Madeline Albright response to a question concerning the sanctions against Iraq previously discussed, President George H. W.
44 Ibid., 9-10, 12, 15.
45 Ibid., 12, 16.
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Bush, answering a reporter’s question on whether capturing Noriega was worth the deaths and destruction in Panama, claimed “. . . every human life is precious, and yet I have to answer, yes, it has been worth it.” 46 If killing a half a million Iraqi children through sanctions to punish Saddam and murdering perhaps thousands of Panamanians and rendering 15,000 in a Panama City tenement barrio homeless to catch Noriega is acceptable to those who mention incessantly that Americans value life, while official enemies do not, then perhaps we ought reconsider what it means to value life and recognize that an inherent characteristic of our political leaders is an amoral if not completely immoral disregard for the human suffering resulting from the quest for U.S. hegemony throughout the world.
“Operation Just Cause,” another example of Orwellian doublespeak, was the seventh U.S. invasion of Panama since 1903, when the United States essentially removed the state of Panama from Columbia in order to build the famous canal. 47 President Bush stated: “I appreciate the support that we’ve received, strong support from the United
States Congress, and from our Latin American neighbors.” 48 However, with the United
States casting the lone negative vote, twenty countries in the Organization of American
States adopted a resolution “to deeply regret the military intervention in Panama.”
Richard Boucher, a State Department spokesman, declared in a very informative
46 Much of this discussion can be found in Blum, Chapter fifty, 305-314. For the Bush quote, see New York Times, 22 December 1989, 16, cited in Blum, 305.
47 Ibid., 311; see Ibid., Appendix II, for descriptions of earlier U.S. invasions against Panama.
48 New York Times, 22 December 1989, 16, as quoted in Ibid., 312.
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statement, “We are outraged.” The OAS, he said, “missed an historic opportunity to get beyond its traditional narrow concern with non-intervention.” 49
While laying the groundwork for the invasion, the United States focused on
Noriega’s criminal activity, which led to a Federal indictment in 1988, the fraudulent
Panamanian election in 1989, and the supposed mistreatment of U.S. military personnel in Panama. However, Blum rebuts each argument, elucidating U.S. culpability or complicity in every instance. Blum meticulously describes how Noriega was involved in drug trafficking and money laundering during the 1970s and early 1980s while working as an informant and asset for the United States, receiving money from the CIA and providing information to the Drug Enforcement Agency. Although the Federal government was aware of his illegal activities, which ironically tapered off by 1984, four years before his indictment, Noriega was a favorite of the Reagan administration until
Congressional pressure, the Iran-Contra scandal, the Federal indictment, and the 1988 election forced the Reagan administration to dissociate from Noriega and instigate his resignation or removal from power, initially attempting economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, methods otherwise dismissed as ineffectual, especially when dealing with South Africa or Israel. 50 Moreover, Blum proposes that Noriega first lost favor with the U.S. government after he asserted too much independence by supporting the
Contadora peace proposal for Central America discussed below, just as Saddam Hussein overstepped his bounds by invading all of Kuwait. 51
49 Los Angeles Times, 23 December 1989, as quoted in Ibid.
50 Ibid., 306-308.
51 Ibid., 298.
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Essentially, the administration needed a pretext to remove Noriega, which led to the justifications concerning the fraudulent election in 1989 and Panamanian treatment of military personnel. As for the fraudulent election, Blum indicates that in 1984, the CIA and the U.S. government were quite complicit in the fraud perpetrated on the Panamanian people when Noriega’s candidate for president, Nicolas Barletta, was determined the winner despite widespread evidence of vote tampering. An unpublished American embassy report concluded that Barletta had been defeated, yet Secretary of State George
Shultz attended the inauguration and the new Panamanian president met Reagan in the
White House. 52 In light of U.S. complicity in the 1984 election, the historical evidence regarding the U.S. (attempted) overthrow of many governments throughout the world during the twentieth century and the demonstration elections in El Salvador, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, for example, for the American public’s consumption, the U.S. indignation at the Panamanian fraudulent election in 1989 seems less than genuine.
As for the incident between American and Panamanian soldiers on 16-17
December 1989, the Defense Department reported to the press the following version of events:
Four American servicemen, unarmed and in civilian clothes, got lost and inadvertently drove up to a PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] roadblock, where they were manhandled. As they drove away, they were shot at, killing one and wounding another. At the same time, an American Navy officer and his wife who witnessed this scene were roughed up considerably by the PDF. 53
52 For CIA involvement see, Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1992, A2 cited in Ibid., 309; for excerpts of the report, see John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (revised edition, New York, 1991) 187-189, 195-200, 369-372, cited by Ibid., 309. Blum adds in the footnote that Dinges received a copy of the report through a Freedom of Information Act request.
53 New York Times, 18 December 1989, 8 cited by Ibid., 310.
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However, Blum paraphrases a Los Angeles Times report, which was published a year later, that contended the incident
was a step in a pattern of aggressive behavior by a small group of U.S. troops who frequently tested the patience and reaction of Panamanian forces, particularly at roadblocks, which they would “dare” by driving up and then refusing to stop or suddenly pulling away. The Americans in this case were not lost; and they were armed. They drove up to a very sensitive roadblock and when told to leave the car by the PDF, the Americans all gave them the finger, shouted an obscenity, and drove off. The Panamanians then opened fire. 54
A recorded phone conservation between a Marine at the American Embassy and his mother substantiated the second version. The Marine said that the Americans
were out of bounds, owing to the fact that they had no reason to be there. The whole world knows that they shouldn’t have gone there. They messed up. If the United States set up a barricade anywhere and someone acted in the same way we would also start firing. 55
Interestingly, Blum relates that two days after the incident, an off-duty American lieutenant shot a Panamanian officer, because he “felt threatened” according to the Bush administration. 56 However, Blum observes, “it was not reported that Panama invaded the
United States as a result of this incident.” 57 Blum further relays that not only had the military been performing training maneuvers in Panama for months before the invasion, even simulating a kidnapping raid as helicopters and jets flew low over Noriega’s house, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, advised General
Max Thurman, on his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern
54 Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1990, cited and paraphrased by Ibid. Blum adds in the footnote that the LAT article cited three U.S. military and civilian sources who verified the information independently of each other and the administration offered no evidence concerning the claim of Panamanian military personnel manhandling the American couple.
55 Kevin Buckley, Panama, the Whole Story (New York, 1991), 228-229, cited in Ibid.
56 New York Times, 19 December 1989, 12, cited in Ibid., 311.
57 Ibid., 311.
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Command in late September 1989, that a military invasion of Panama was imminent:
“We’re going to go [but] I can’t tell you when.” 58
Since other less violent alternatives existed if Noriega’s capture or trial was the sole aim of the U.S. government, even though the U.S. has preferred force as its primary method to achieve political and economic objectives, Blum posits that the United States invaded Panama for three additional and plausible reasons. Perhaps President Bush needed a quick military victory to enhance his image and assert his masculinity.
Considering that in the public relations game that is politics, image is everything and that obviously George W. Bush’s Texas cowboy persona was spun out of whole cloth by his handlers just as Reagan’s public image vastly differed from the reality of a figurehead not cognizant of reality, perhaps President Bush needed a military triumph to portray the image of a strong leader and increase his popularity. Perhaps the U.S. military-industrial complex needed viable threats after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in order to justify the massive military budget and the corporate welfare for the technology sector in the United States economy and conversely the continued stagnation and decline in social spending benefiting the domestic population. Perhaps the
Bush administration wished to send a signal to the Nicaraguan voters to choose the U.S.- backed opposition to the Sandinistas in the upcoming 1990 election as if a decade of the
U.S. Contra War against the people of Nicaragua and incessant threats of perpetual warfare were not persuasion enough. Regardless of the underlying motivations, the
58 For examples of provocation, see Buckley, 187, 191; Timothy Harding, “Why Are We In Panama?,” LA Weekly, 29 December 1984–4 January 1990, 16, as cited in Ibid., 310-311; for Admiral Crowe’s quote, see Buckley, 193, citing the Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 22-28 January 1990, as cited in Ibid., 311.
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gratuitous unjustified aggression against a defenseless people unfortunately illustrates inherent U.S. foreign policy. 59
IV. Nicaragua
When history is written, the contras will be folk heroes. Elliott Abrams 60
During the 1980s, as the U.S. waged a brutal proxy-war against Nicaragua, the
United States vetoed five Security Resolutions condemning American military intervention and demanding immediate cessation of hostilities, respect for international law and the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua. The United States even caustically dismissed the decision of the International Court of Justice, which demanded the U.S. cease all hostile activities toward the government and people of Nicaragua and pay reparations for the immense damage to the economy and fragile infrastructure of the third world nation. Similar to its hostility toward Grenada, the U.S. opposed a popular socialist Nicaraguan government, which overthrew the despised and U.S.-imposed
Somoza dictatorship and began a social program to meet the needs of the Nicaraguan people. The United States again expressed contempt for international law and the rights of other people, exposing its policies as vicious and hypocritical, contrasting the avowed values associated with American democracy.
Draft resolution S/14941 of 1 April 1982 states in part that the Security Council,
“considering that the present crisis in the region of Central American and the Caribbean
59 Ibid., 310.
60 LA Weekly, 9-15 March 1990, 12, Ibid., 304.
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affects international peace and security and that all Member States have an interest in the solution of the crisis by peaceful means,”
1. Reminds all Member States of their obligation to respect the principles of the Charter, and in particular those relating to: (a) non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of States; (b) self-determination of peoples; (c) non-use of force or threat of force; (d) the territorial integrity and political independence of States; (e) pacific settlement of disputes;
2. Reminds all Member States that [General Assembly] resolution 2131 [of 21 December 1965] condemns the use or threat of force in relations between States as acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
3. Appeals to all Member States to refrain from the direct, indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country of Central America and the Caribbean;
4. Appeals to all parties concerned to have recourse to dialogue and negotiation, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations, and calls upon all Member States to lend their support to the search for a peaceful solution to the problems of Central America and the Caribbean;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed concerning the development of the situation in Central America and the Caribbean. 61
Although the text of the draft resolution is so mild as to not even mention the
United States by name, the U.S. cast the only negative vote, thus vetoing the opinion of twelve countries on the Security Council who favored its adoption. 62 The United States ambassador proclaimed the following somewhat contradictory and completely false remark regarding the U.S. subversion of the Sandinista government:
. . . I have also reiterated the attachment of my government to the principles of non- intervention in the internal affairs of other States, our respect for territorial integrity and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and those principles of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use and non-use of force. Obviously, none of this means that the United States renounces the right to defend itself, nor that we will not assist others to defend themselves under circumstances consistent with our
61 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/14941 of 1 April 1982.
62 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2347 th Meeting, S/PV.2347, 14.
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legal and political obligations and with the Charter. 63
For example, a brief examination of American history, including the military interventions against Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s and the more recent aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq during the George W. Bush administration, renders the extent of the U.S. attachment to the aforementioned principles undoubtedly clear. Moreover, the U.S. ambassador argued:
Mr. Ortega states that ‘the problem’ has to do with the danger posed by the United States to the independence and sovereignty of the countries of Central America. The definition of ‘the problem’ merely obfuscates the real issue that is at stake in Central America, which is a conflict between two concepts of organizing society, two ideologies if you will--the one democratic, the other totalitarian. 64
“Totalitarian” is perhaps not the best description for a popular socialist government of a third-world country, which is attempting to lift the people off the ground after decades of a U.S.-imposed dictatorship, while under extreme pressure to defend itself from foreign subversion. Of course, we are not meant to consider how a U.S. invasion or proxy- invasion forces a government to militarize the country at the expense of social programs and civil liberties, especially of those opposition groups armed and organized by the
United States. Examples from American history, such as the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II and the current crusade against civil liberties and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, illustrate that during time of war, even if not taking place on U.S. soil, the United States government takes advantage of opportunities to curtail domestic dissent.
The ambassador disingenuously contended that “Nicaragua invokes the principle of non-intervention but claims the right to intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring
63 Ibid., 2.
64 Ibid., 3.
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States,” namely El Salvador, although the evidence for this proved nonexistent as discussed below. 65 “The Sandinista leadership also opposes such elections [as those held in El Salvador]. Indeed, they have called the Salvadoran election ‘an absolute denial of democracy and civilization.’” 66 While the United States government and media praised the Salvadoran elections as positive steps toward democracy, as with the recent Afghani and Iraqi elections, the U.S. motivation for holding elections was to demonstrate to the
American public that U.S. policies were justified. As discussed below, all the necessary preconditions for a free and fair democratic election in El Salvador were completely absent, while hundreds of foreign observers determined that the Nicaraguan elections in
1984 were legitimate. Moreover, given the fact that in the United States only two political parties, essentially two factions of the same business party, have the requisite capital to campaign for state and national elections concomitant with widespread voter fraud and voter suppression, U.S. elections are “an absolute denial of democracy,” leaving the United States without any justification to impose democracy on other peoples and nations.
While the United States ambassador claimed that regional organizations, in this case the Organization of American States, not the United Nations, should solve the dispute between the U.S. and Nicaragua, perhaps because the U.S. could exert more influence over the OAS than the United Nations, the U.S. prevented the League of Arab
States from adequately solving the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait since the U.S.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 4.
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preferred a military invasion to increase the U.S. presence in the Middle East and destroy
Iraq’s military capability and civilization as previously discussed. 67
Twelve members of the Security Council supported draft resolution S/14941 and opposed the U.S. veto, although Reagan probably suffered no loss of appetite or sleep as a result. The German Democratic Republic ambassador, contradicting the American allegiance to nonintervention, declared:
. . . the United States and the most reactionary forces of the region constantly violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central American States, and under the guise of the struggle against so-called international terrorism and totalitarianism, interfere massively in their internal affairs, negating the principle of a people’s right to self- determination. 68
The Nicaraguan ambassador presciently recognized the imminent threat that the
U.S. posed to the people and government of Nicaragua and politely distrusted any U.S. commitments to nonintervention and international law:
My government asked for the convening of this Council because we considered that the escalation of aggression against Nicaragua on the part of the United States Government was unquestionable proof that the Government was preparing to implement the political decision to overthrow the Sandinist Government in order to restore in Nicaragua a system similar to that of the former admirers, defenders and allies of the Somoza tyranny. 69
Today we heard the representative of the United States say that her country does not intend to invade Nicaragua. We thank her very much. But we are not satisfied, since nothing is said about other types of direct aggression or about indirect intervention through other forces, nor is reference being made to covert activities which the Reagan administration has been financing and directing against Nicaragua. 70
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 9.
69 Ibid., 10.
70 Ibid., 12.
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As events proved, the Nicaraguan ambassador was quite right in doubting the U.S. avowed intentions toward the people of Nicaragua.
Draft resolution S/16463 of 4 April 1984 states in part that the Security Council,
“noting resolution 38/10 of the General Assembly, in which, inter alia , the States of the region, as well as other States, are urged to refrain from continuing or initiating military operations with the objective of exercising political pressure which would aggravate the situation in the region and hinder the negotiation efforts by the Contadora Group,” and
“noting with great concern the foreign military presence from outside the region, the carrying out of overt and covert actions, and the use of neighboring territories for mounting destabilizing actions that have served to heighten tensions in the region and hinder the peace efforts of the Contadora Group,”
1. Condemns and calls for an immediate end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua, which has caused the loss of Nicaraguan lives and injuries to nationals of other countries as well as material damage, serious disruption to its economy and the hampering of free navigation and commerce, thereby violating international law;
2. Affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters and calls on all States to respect this right by refraining from any action which would impede the exercise of this right in the waters of the region;
3. Reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of all the countries of the region to live in peace and security and to determine their own future free from all foreign interference and intervention;
4. Calls on all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting any type of military action against any State of the region as well as any other action that hinders the peace objectives of the Contadora Group;
5. Expresses its firm support to the Contadora Group for the efforts it has so far carried out and urges it to intensify these efforts on an immediate basis;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution;
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7. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 71
While thirteen members of the Security Council favored the adoption of this mild draft, which fails to explicitly mention the United States, the United States cast the lone negative vote, thus vetoing the draft on the dubious grounds:
In voting against this draft resolution we reaffirm our commitment to peace in Central America, to regional negotiations leading to regional settlements, to the demilitarization of the region, to mutual respect for sovereignty and secure borders, the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, respect for the rule of law and the establishment of democratic institutions based on free and periodic elections. 72
Although the ambassador would be hard pressed to provide any evidence to support his contention, considering that the U.S. was the leading violator of these principles throughout the world, including Central America, American benevolence and respect for the aforementioned principles are ingrained assumptions rarely questioned by the media, and American people. After the Sandinistas publicized their intention to sign the
Contadora treaty, which envisioned a 21-point plan that included demilitarization and withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, the United States admittedly subverted the plan as discussed below.
Draft resolution S/18250 of 31 July 1986 states in part that the Security Council,
“recalling resolution 530 (1983) which, inter alia, reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of all the other countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside interference,” “ recalling resolution 562 (1985) which, inter alia , reaffirms the sovereignty and inalienable right of Nicaragua and other States freely to decide their own political, economic and social systems, to develop their international relations according
71 United Nations draft resolution S/16463 of 4 April 1984.
72 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Year: 2529 th Meeting, S/PV.2529, 26.
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to their people’s interests free from outside interference, subversion, direct or indirect coercion or threats of any kind,” and “ recalling all the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the obligation of States to settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means, not to resort to the threat or use of force and to respect the self-determination of peoples and the sovereign independence of all States,”
1. Reaffirms the role of the International Court of Justice as the principle judicial organ of the United Nations and a means for peaceful solution of disputes in the interest of international peace and security;
2. Makes an urgent and solemn call for full compliance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in the case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua;”
3. Recalls the obligation of all States to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international law;
4. Calls upon all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting political, economic or military actions of any kind against any State of the region that might impede the peace objectives of the Contadora Group;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the implementation of the present resolution. 73
The International Court of Justice decided in the case “Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua” that U.S. military actions, both covert and overt, against Nicaragua were violations of international law, and therefore the United States must cease all activities against Nicaragua and make payments of reparations for all damage. 74 The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the draft supported by
73 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18250 of 31 July 1986.
74 “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,” Nicaragua v. the United States of America, < www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus_isummaries/inus_isummary_19860627.htm >, accessed 5 June 2006.
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eleven members of the Security Council. 75 While the international community called for
U.S. compliance with the Court’s decision as expressed in various General Assembly resolutions, the U.S. obfuscated because “in the view of the United States, the Court has asserted jurisdiction and competence over Nicaragua’s claims without any proper basis.” 76 The ambassador argued that “many of the principles asserted by the Court to constitute customary international law have no basis in authority or reason. We do not accede to these baseless assertions.” 77 Preferring military force to destabilize the
Sandinistas instead of a diplomatic or political settlement that would recognize
Nicaraguan sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Sandinista government, the U.S. ambassador unilaterally and unfathomably determined against international opinion that
In a word, the United States has voted against this draft resolution because it would have painted an inaccurate picture of the true situation in Central America, because it would not have contributed to a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the problems in the region, and because it would in fact have done a disservice to the international law and institutions that it purports to uphold. 78
Recognizing that empires need external enemies to distract the domestic population from domestic concerns and control the public through fear-mongering, the
Iranian ambassador presciently observed that “if the United States administration really cares for the American people, it should see to the dangers inside the United States instead of trying to divert public attention from the internal filth and misery to other
75 United Nations Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2704 th Meeting, S/PV.2704, 54-55.
76 See for example General Assembly resolutions 41/31, 42/18, 43/11, and 44/43 in the Appendix. After the 1990 Nicaraguan election, in which the Sandinistas were defeated by a public wary of perpetual war with the United States, the U.S.-back government dismissed the Nicaraguan case against the United States; U.S. ambassador quote is found in S/PV.2704, 61.
77 S/PV.2704.
78 Ibid., 61.
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countries.” 79 Dismissing the U.S. ambassador’s unjustifiable assertion that the
International Court’s decision prohibiting the United States from violating international law and the sovereignty of Nicaragua through military terrorism and subversion is somehow a “disservice” to international law, the Nicaraguan representative described the cause of the instability in Central America in the following unambiguous way: “There are problems of the economy, unjust structures, and a central one--United States intervention in the internal affairs of Central American countries and the aggression against my country.” 80 It is an unmistakable conclusion that U.S. colonialism and incessant intervention in Latin America, which served the interests of American corporations, caused unimaginable suffering for millions of people. As the case of
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez indicates, the United States government continues to oppose any Latin American government that places the interests of its people ahead of the interests of the capitalist elite.
Draft resolution S/18428 of 28 October 1986 states in part that the Security Council,
“aware that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations and that each Member undertakes to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party,” and
“emphasizing the obligation of States, under customary international law, not to intervene in the internal affairs of other States,”
1. Urgently calls for full and immediate compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 in the case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua” in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter;
79 Ibid., 26.
80 Ibid., 62.
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2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on implementation of this resolution. 81
The U.S. vetoed this second draft concerning U.S. compliance with the
International Court of Justice decision regarding Nicaragua on the grounds that the Court has neither the competence nor the jurisdiction to render an opinion. 82 The draft resolution “attempts to portray a false image of this situation as merely a conflict between
Nicaragua and the United States.” The ambassador falsely proclaimed: “The Sandinista
Government is responsible for the crisis. It has waged a conflict with its own people whose revolution it has betrayed. It has waged a conflict with the Governments of its neighbors, all of whom it has sought to subvert.” 83
The ambassador for Great Britain, always a reliable ally, remarked:
Compliance by the parties with International Court of Justice decisions is a clear Charter obligation, but it is nothing less than presumptuous for the Government of Nicaragua, a regime which neither externally nor internally lives up to its obligations, to call for selective application of the Charter in this case. This is not respect for the Charter, but taking advantage of it for narrow political ends. 84
Further reflecting the prevalent U.S. view, the British ambassador continued: “. . . we are unable to support a draft resolution which fails to take account of the wider political factors and fails to acknowledge that Nicaragua has largely brought its troubles upon itself.” 85
81 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/18428 of 28 October 1986.
82 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2718 th Meeting, S/PV.2718, 44-45.
83 Ibid., 44-45.
84 Ibid., 52.
85 Ibid.
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While illustrating profound regard for international law by ignoring the decision of the International Court of Justice, the United States provided another example of its adherence to international norms during the invasion of Panama when the military violated the diplomatic immunity of the Nicaraguan ambassador.
Draft resolution S/21084 of 16 January 1990 states in part that the Security
Council, “ taking note of the letters, dated 4 and 5 January 1990, from the Permanent
Mission of the United States of America to the President of Security Council, regretting the search of the residence of the Ambassador of Nicaragua in Panama by United States military forces, and indicating that the United States has taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such actions,”
1. Declares that the serious events that took place are, as has been acknowledged, a violation of the privileges and immunities recognized under international law and codified in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;
2. Expresses its deep concern over any measure or action that restricts free communication and prevents the functioning of diplomatic missions in Panama in accordance with international law, and calls upon those concerned to take the appropriate steps to avoid the recurrence of such measures or actions;
3. Demands the full respect for the rules of international law that guarantee the immunity of diplomatic officers and the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions, an essential condition for the normal development of their activities. 86
The United States cast the lone negative vote and vetoed the draft mildly criticizing it for violating the diplomatic immunity of the Nicaraguan ambassador during the invasion of Panama in December 1989 discussed above. 87 The United States representative deliberately dissembled that the U.S. “. . . is not supplying and will not supply arms to
86 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/21084 of 16 January 1990.
87 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2905 th Meeting, S/PV.2905, 36.
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guerillas and paramilitary forces in neighboring countries.” 88 If the consequences of U.S. actions were not so destructive and tragic, the speeches of the U.S. ambassadors to the
United Nations would almost be comic. 89 Great Britain, the lone abstainer, again argued that the dispute between the United States and Nicaragua should be settled by regional organizations, not the United Nations, which contradicted the U.S. policy concerning Iraq a few months later. 90 As noted above, the United States prevented the League of Arab
States from settling the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait peacefully through a negotiated settlement, instead favoring and coercing a United Nations approved military intervention.
In 1927, on the eve of the twelfth U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, President Calvin
Coolidge admitted that U.S. military intervention was necessary to protect American business interests, a fact, Blum acknowledges, “flaunted more openly in those days than later.” 91 Coolidge declared:
88 Ibid., 32.
89 The mainstream media oftentimes criticizes foreign leaders for brash or ridiculous statements. Recently both President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran have been castigated by the press for belligerency, a courtesy not extended to American politicians even given their unsurpassed uncompromising and aggressive rhetoric. Moreover, when Ahmadinejad sent a letter to Bush in an effort to open diplomatic channels with the United States, which have been closed since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, instead of commenting on the substance of the letter, which among other things exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. policies, especially concerning Israel and its possession of nuclear weapons, and rightly questioned how a man who claims to be a follower of Jesus can be such a warmonger, the media simply repeated incessantly that the letter was rambling, thus incoherent, in an attempt to dismiss any diplomacy or negotiation between the two countries. The media instead are charmed by the extremely inarticulate George W. Bush, who stutters and dissembles and rambles when not properly handled by Karl Rove and company. While most politicians grandstand and obfuscate without substance (Democrat Senator Joe Biden wasted ninety percent of his allotted time to question the right-wing extremist nominee for the Supreme Court, John Roberts, rambling without asking any questions whatsoever), and incessantly provocatively threaten the world, the media compliantly only criticizes official enemies for such effrontery.
90 Ibid., 34.
91 Much of the following discussion is taken from Blum, chapter 49, 290-305. Quote from Ibid.
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I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been on several occasions . . . shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua . . . I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any other Central American republic. Nevertheless, it must be said, that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good Government in Nicaragua at the present time. . . . The United States cannot, therefore, fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such a state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by any foreign power. 92
To ensure Nicaragua’s attractiveness as a business investment opportunity for American corporations and replace the American military, the tax-payer funded protectors of
American business, the United States established the Nicaraguan National Guard in 1933, under the direction of Anastasio Somoza. Blum describes that the Guardsmen,
“consistently maintained by the United States, passed their time on martial law, rape, torture, murder of the opposition, and massacres of peasants, as well as less violent pursuits such as robbery, extortion, contraband, running brothels and other government functions . . .,” while “the Somoza clan laid claim to the lion’s share of Nicaragua’s land and businesses.” 93 Thus is the standard fare for American imposed governments. The obvious contempt for democracy and human rights need not be commented upon. Profit, clearly, is a higher moral value.
Shortly before Anastasio Somoza II abdicated into exile in Miami with $900 million dollars in July 1979, the head of the U.S. military in Latin America, Lieutenant
General Dennis McAuliffe, informed the dictator that the United States had “no intention
92 New York Times, 11 January 1927, 2 as cited in Blum, 290.
93 Ibid.
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of permitting a settlement which would lead to the destruction of the National Guard.” 94
The Carter administration initiated measures to subvert the Sandinistas and strengthen the opposition, specifically Somoza’s political party and the National Guard. Escalating after
Reagan’s inauguration as president, the U.S. war against Nicaragua targeted civilians in what can only be described as egregious and barbaric violations of international law, providing thus another example of U.S. terrorism against innocent people for political and economic motives. Blum describes the following U.S./Contra targets and methods:
Contra/CIA operations emanating in Honduras also blew up oil pipelines, mined the waters of oil-unloading ports, and threatened to blow up any approaching oil tankers; at least seven foreign ships were damaged by the mines, including a Soviet tanker with five crewmen reported to be badly injured. Nicaragua’s ports were under siege: mortar shelling from high-speed motor launches, aerial bombing and rocket and machine-gun attacks were designed to block Nicaragua’s exports as well as to starve the country of imports by frightening away foreign shipping. 95
Agriculture was another prime target. Raids by contras caused extensive damage to crops and demolished tobacco-drying barns, grain silos, irrigation projects, farm houses and machinery; roads, bridges and trucks were destroyed to prevent produce from being moved; numerous state farms and cooperatives were incapacitated and harvesting was prevented; other farms still intact were abandoned because of the danger. 96
The contras’ brutality earned them a wide notoriety. They regularly destroyed health centers, schools, agricultural cooperatives, and community centers—symbols of the Sandinistas’ social programs in rural areas. People caught in these assaults were often tortured and killed in the most gruesome ways. One example, reported by The Guardian of London, suffices. In the words of a survivor of a raid in Jinotega province, which borders on Honduras: "Rosa had her breast cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off, and their eyes poked out. They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit." 97
94 For Somoza’s wealth, see New York Times, 22 July 1979, III, 1, cited in Ibid.; for McAuliffe quote, see Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York: Random House, 1985), 73- 74, cited in Ibid., 291.
95 The Guardian, 8 and 13 October 1983; 9 and 22 March 1984; 9 April 1984, cited in Ibid., 292.
96 The Guardian, 18 May 1983; 6 June 1983; 30 May 1984, cited in Ibid.
97 The Guardian, 15 November 1984 and other sources cited in Ibid.
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Thus operate America’s “freedom fighters” and the “moral equal of our founding fathers” in Nicaragua and indeed throughout the world, exposing as false the U.S. commitment to democracy, human rights, freedom, and international law and that U.S. atrocities are not anomalies but fundamental policy in dealing with those governments more concerned with their peoples’ welfare than serving Washington’s interests. 98
Moreover, considering that the Reagan administration was forced at times by Congress to illegally fund the Contras through the Iran-Contra affair, we glimpse the almost absolute power of the presidential office and the executive’s contempt for public opinion and real democracy. Furthermore, one need not use a great deal of imagination to plausibly speculate how the U.S. or Israel would respond to such terrorism.
To justify its aggression against Nicaragua, the United States government articulated various pretexts and explanations, including supposed massive Nicaraguan arms transfers to El Salvador, the supposed fraudulent election in 1984, and supposed
Nicaraguan obfuscation of the Contadora process. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. pretexts had no basis in reality, yet the government and mainstream media’s incessant repetition of these explanations in a domestic propaganda campaign created the false and misleading perception in the mind of the American public that the accusations against Nicaragua were veritably true. The Reagan administration claimed that the Sandinistas were arming the El Salvador rebels, whom Reagan referred to as “murderers and terrorists.” 99
Interestingly, the fact that the United States was arming and training the Salvadoran military junta and that El Salvador was aiding the Contras were never pretexts for a
98 Reagan’s descriptions of the Contras can be found in The Guardian, 3 June 1983, cited in Ibid., 293.
99 Ibid., 293-294.
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Nicaraguan invasion of either offending country. Moreover, the U.S. right to arm any country or group was never once questioned; it is only wrong for enemies to aid or arm targets of U.S. violence. The evidence supporting the U.S. accusation against Nicaragua proved to be quite slim if not completely nonexistent. According to Blum, in January
1981, a Salvadoran official “announced that Nicaragua was no longer allowing its territory to be used for arms shipments,” 100 perhaps understandably alarmed of U.S. hostility. Furthermore, the CIA confirmed in March 1981 that the Sandinistas had indeed terminated any arms supply to the Salvadoran rebels. 101 David MacMichael, a CIA analyst of Central America from 1981 to 1983, later observed that “the Administration and the CIA have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to Salvadorean guerillas to justify [their] efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.” 102
Ostensible Nicaraguan obfuscation of the Contadora settlement served as another pretext for American belligerence. The Contadora group, composed of Mexico, Panama,
Columbia, and Venezuela, formed a 21-point treaty dealing with civil war, foreign intervention, elections, and human rights. The Reagan administration, although not a signatory to the treaty, demanded that the Sandinistas sign the document, implying that failure to do so would perhaps justify Washington’s policy toward Nicaragua. Once
Nicaragua announced its intention to sign the treaty, the United States voiced previously unheard of criticism of the Contadora Plan. According to Blum: “What alarmed
100 New York Times, 19 January 1981, 11, cited in Ibid., 295.
101 Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York, 1987), 120, as cited in Ibid.
102 New York Times, 11 June 1984, B6 as cited in Ibid.
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Washington about the treaty was its provisions for the removal from each country of all foreign military bases; restrictions on foreign military personnel, armaments, and military exercises; and a prohibition on aid to insurgent forces seeking to overthrow a government.” 103 Representative Michael Barnes, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, observed that “the Administration’s objections to the treaty reinforce my belief that it’s never had any real interest in a negotiated settlement.” 104 State Department officials conceded that Sandinista willingness to sign the treaty “might undermine the Administration’s efforts to portray the Sandinistas as the primary source of tension in Central America.” 105
The administration proclaimed that the Nicaraguan elections in 1984 were completely fraudulent, explicitly compared to the recent elections in El Salvador, which provided the military junta and the U.S with sufficient political capital to continue the war against the Salvadoran people, and implicitly with the U.S. electoral system.
Interestingly, no foreign country has used fraudulent U.S. presidential elections as a pretext to invade and install real democracy. As for the supposedly flawed elections,
Blum argues that
On the face of it, by the (flawed) standards of Western elections, the Nicaraguan election cannot be much faulted; by the standards of Latin America, it was a veritable paragon of democracy; the fact that there were no deaths reported in connection with the election, by itself, made it rather unique in Latin America; the appearance of minor parties on the ballot in every department (state) of the nation distinguished it from the typical presidential election in the United States. 106
103 Ibid., 297.
104 New York Times, 3 October 1984, 3, cited in Ibid.
105 New York Times, 24 September 1984, 12, cited in Ibid., 297-298.
106 Ibid., 298.
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The elections, observed by 400 foreigners, allowed the Washington Post to report:
Even U.S. diplomats here acknowledge that the Sandinistas have allowed expression of a wide range of political views, including some that were harshly critical of the government. The Sandinistas eased censorship of the sole, opposition newspaper, La Presna , at the start of the campaign, and the state television and radio channels have given air time—although limited—for the small but vocal opposition parties to make their case. 107
As an example of the Orwellian use of history in the United States to manipulate the public and the mainstream media’s complicity in this propaganda exercise, we need look no further than the newspaper of record, the New York Times. While initially informing its readers that the Reagan administration actively sought to de-legitimize the
Nicaraguan election, the Times , relegating its former report to the memory hole, declared that the election was a complete fraud because Nicaragua prevented opposition participation. The Times reported two weeks before the election:
The Reagan administration, while publicly criticizing the Nov. 4 elections in Nicaragua as “a sham,” has privately argued against the participation of the leading opposition candidate for fear his involvement would legitimize the electoral process, according to some senior Administration officials. Since May, when American policy toward the election was formed, the Administration has wanted the opposition candidate, Arturo Jose Cruz, either not to enter the race or, if he did, to withdraw before the election, claiming the conditions were unfair, the officials said. “The Administration never contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race,” one official said, “because then the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to oppose the Nicaraguan government.” Several Administration officials who are familiar with the Administration’s activities in Nicaragua said the Central Intelligence Agency had worked with some of Mr. Cruz’s supporters to insure that they would object to any potential agreement for his participation in the election. 108
However, after the election, the New York Times absurdly editorialized, in complete contradiction to the above article:
107 Washington Post, 4 November 1984, A1, cited in Ibid., 299.
108 New York Times, 21 October 1984, 12, cited in Ibid., 300.
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Only the naïve believe that Sunday’s election in Nicaragua was democratic or legitimizing proof of the Sandinistas’ popularity. . . . The Sandinistas made it easy to dismiss their election as a sham. Their decisive act was to break off negotiations with Arturo Cruz, an opposition democrat whose candidacy could have produced a more credible contest. . . . The opposition . . . was finally shrunk to four small left-wing groups and factions of two traditional parties. Even so, and after five years of unchallenged power, the Sandinistas appear to have won less than two-thirds of the vote. 109
Disregarding that in a United States national election the press would consider that a candidate who collected sixty-five percent of the vote would have won in a landslide, the New York Times failed to observe after the 2004 presidential election in the
United States that “after four years of unchallenged power, George W. Bush appears to have won barely fifty-one percent of the vote,” nor that the election was a “sham” because the two factions of the business party, most notably the Democrats, actively prevented the independent candidate Ralph Nader and the Green Party candidates from being put on the ballot in many states. Moreover, only in a country where the government, media, and economic elite control the historical record presented to the public at large could such disparate versions of events be presented in the newspaper of record without virtually any mainstream comment. 110
The U.S. placed a great deal of emphasis on Nicaraguan censorship of La Prensa and the supposed failings of the 1984 election as compared to the “democratic” election in El Salvador the same year. As for La Prensa , one of the paper’s chief editors during the 1980s, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Jr., was “a member of the directorate of a contra
109 New York Times, 7 November 1984, 26, cited in Ibid.
110 See for example, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989); Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).
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umbrella group, The Nicaraguan Resistance of Washington, D.C.” 111 Moreover, the paper was funded by the CIA and the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization chartered to “do somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly for decades—manipulate the political process in a target country by financing political parties, labor unions, book publishers, newspapers, etc. . . .” 112 One may inquire whether the United States would allow a foreign enemy to finance an opposition newspaper in the
United States. Furthermore, an honest appraisal of the U.S. government’s policies severely curtailing civil liberties throughout American history would somewhat dampen the Reagan administration’s indignation at Nicaraguan censorship of an enemy publication. For example, John Adams’ Alien and Sedition Act, which limited criticism of the government; Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which allowed the president to put critics of the war in prison without due process; Woodrow
Wilson’s Espionage Act, which made it a crime to criticize American involvement in
World War I; and George W. Bush’s Patriot Act, which has limited civil liberties while increasing the power of the state to spy upon American citizens.
The United States government and media unfavorably compared the Nicaraguan election in 1984 to the El Salvador elections in 1982 and 1984, which the media critic
Edward Herman considers classic examples of demonstration elections orchestrated by the United States “to mobilize support back home for the intervention in favor of a military solution and a ‘death squad democracy.’” 113 Vice President Dick Cheney,
111 In These Times, 21-27 October 1987, citing a spokeswoman at the Nicaraguan Resistance, as cited in Ibid., 303.
112 New York Times, 1 June 1986, and other sources cited in Ibid.
113 Edward Herman, “The Afghan, El Salvador, and Iraq Elections,” Z Magazine, Volume 17, Number 12, December 2004, 32-36. For a more in depth analysis on demonstration elections, see Herman
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referring to the recent Afghani election while under U.S. occupation, stated during the 5
October 2004 vice presidential debate:
Twenty years ago we had a similar situation in El Salvador. We had [a] guerilla insurgency [that] controlled roughly a third of the country, 75,000 people dead, and we held free elections. I was there as an observer on behalf of the Congress. The human drive for freedom, the determination of these people to vote, was unbelievable. The terrorists would come in and shoot up polling places; as soon as they left, the voters would come back and get in line and would not be denied the right to vote. 114
Herman relates that not only was there “no shooting up of polling places,” but also an
“UN-sponsored Salvadoran Truth Commission found that over 90 percent of those
75,000 dead were civilians killed by the U.S.-sponsored army and paramilitaries. . . .” 115
Furthermore, the contemporary mainstream media emphasized the Salvadoran voter turnout as a justification for U.S. policies and support of the military junta without mentioning that voting in the election was legally required, with each person’s ID card, which the police could demand at any time, marked as verification, and the vote boxes were transparent allowing the government and military observers to easily examine a person’s ballot. Cheney, in his recollection, and the contemporary media did not mention
“that the left did not offer candidates and couldn’t do so because all their leaders who had not been murdered were on a 138 person army death list,” and
the two dissident newspapers in El Salvador had been eliminated by threats, physical destruction of facilities, and outright murder; that intermediate organizations like unions and independent political groupings had been dismantled; that there was no freedom of assembly or speech; and that state terror was rampant and had traumatized the population. 116
and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984).
114 Ibid., 32.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., 32-33.
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Herman concludes that “in short, not one of the conditions of a free election was met in
El Salvador’s ‘free elections.’” 117
Illustrating the use of history as a propaganda weapon, the Kissinger Commission on Central America asserted that the Sandinistas were worse than Somoza, and Kissinger himself compared Nicaragua under the Sandinistas to Nazi Germany. 118 Similarly,
Reagan compared the Contras’ war against Nicaragua favorably to Great Britain’s defense against the Nazis in World War II. 119 The propaganda campaign directed upon the American domestic population was orchestrated by an Office of Public Diplomacy, formed in 1983 as “a huge psychological operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in denied or enemy territory.” 120 The OPD’s Deputy Director,
Colonel Daniel Jacobowitz, described the essentials of the propaganda campaign:
“Overall theme: the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters [the Contras] are fighters for freedom in the American Tradition, FSLN [Sandinistas] are evil.” 121 One example suffices to describe the transmogrification of history: Secretary of State Alexander Haig proclaimed a picture of blazing corpses as “atrocious genocidal actions that are being taken by the
Nicaraguan Government” against the Miskito Indians. However, the photo was taken
117 Ibid., 33.
118 International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1984; Blum writes that “both attributions are from a letter of Eugene Stockwell who testified before the Commission following a visit to Nicaragua with the World Council of Churches,” cited in Blum, 300.
119 The Guardian, 15 March 1986, cited in Ibid.
120 Miami Herald, 19 July 1987, 18A, cited in Ibid., 301.
121 Peter Kornbluh, “Propaganda and Public Diplomacy: Selling Reagan’s Nicaragua Policy,” Extra! (published by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), Summer 1989, 20, cited in Ibid.
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during 1978, while Somoza was still in power. 122 Blum describes the workings of the
Office of Public Diplomacy in the following way:
Opinion pieces and “news” stories prepared by OPD staffers or contractors were planted in major media outlets under the signatures of contra leaders or ostensibly independent scholars, pretending to offer independent confirmation of White House claims, while other materials were distributed to thousands of university libraries, faculties, editorial writers, and religious organizations. Private sector public relations experts, lobbying groups, and think tanks were also enlisted for the cause and paid large chunks of taxpayer money to promote the OPD agenda. By OPD’s own assessment, its work significantly changed public and congressional opinion, including winning approval in the House of $100 million in contra aid in June 1986. 123
Clearly, the U.S. war against Nicaragua, which was an egregious violation of international law and universal morality, had absolutely nothing to do with freedom or democracy or human rights or national security (even if the Nicaraguan army could drive to Texas undetected and invade the United States). The United States obsession with destroying the Sandinista experiment in Nicaragua, an experiment whereby the government attempted to provide for the welfare of its people, was adequately described in the liberal Boston Globe, which reported in February 1986:
Few U.S. officials now believe the contras can drive out the Sandinistas soon. Administration officials said they are content to see the contras debilitate the Sandinistas by forcing them to diver scarce resources toward the war and away from social programs. 124
The United States has habitually excused and supported aggression, apartheid, occupation of foreign lands, military juntas, and dictatorships throughout its history. However, the political and economic elite have never accepted the formation of a socialist or
122 New York Times, 3 March 1982, 5; Blum writes that “the photograph was first printed in the right-wing French newspaper Le Figaro, which then admitted its ‘mistake’ after being exposed by other French publications; it appears that Haig did not make any public retraction,” cited in Ibid.
123 Kornbluh, 20-22; Extra!, October/November 1987, 4, citing the example of Prof. John Guilmartin’s op-ed “Nicaragua is Armed for Trouble,” in the Wall Street Journal, 11 March 1985, as cited in Ibid.
124 Boston Globe, 9 February 1986, A20, cited in Ibid., 302.
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communist government, whether it be Cuba, the Soviet Union, Grenada, or Nicaragua.
The greatest threat is the threat of a good example--a government and society which places the welfare of human beings and the welfare of the earth above the infinite pursuit of profit that care neither for human welfare or the sustainability of the world.
Blum provides the following pertinent summation of the American war against another helpless and weak third world country, causing this author to wonder why Ronald
Reagan has been deified as a great American and how his policymaking cabal ever ascended again to control the Oval Office:
By the time the War in Nicaragua began to slowly atrophy to a tentative conclusion during 1988-89, the Reagan administration’s obsession with the Sandinistas had inspired both the official and unofffical squads to embrace tactics such as the following in order to maintain a steady flow of financing, weaponry and other aid to the Contras: dealings with other middle-eastern and Latin American terrorists, frequent drug smuggling in a variety of imaginative ways, money laundering, embezzlement of U.S. government funds, perjury, obstruction of justice, burglary of the offices of American dissidents, covert propaganda to defeat domestic political foes, violation of the neutrality act, illegal shredding of government documents, plans to suspend the Constitution in the event of widespread internal dissent against government policy . . . and much more, as revealed in the phenomenon known as Iran/Contra . . . all of it to support the band of rapists, torturers and killers known as the contras. 125
The above quote by Elliott Abrams, who was a prime mover behind the Iran/Contra scandal, intimated that history is written by the victors. American history is revised and rewritten everyday as the enormous machinery of the political and corporate elite is put into motion to constantly propagandize and educate a public ignorant of history to patriotically acquiesce to their diktats and unconsciously accept not only the unquestionable tenets of American benevolence and American freedom, but the status
125 Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters (Washington, D.C., 1993), Volumes I and II, passim; The National Security Archive, The Chronology (New York, 1987), passim; Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection (Boston, 1987), passim; Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the CIA (New York: 1987), see index; Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Boston, 1988), see index, as cited in Ibid.
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quo of American hegemony, American militarism, and the inalterability of the capitalist system, which creates so much economic and social inequality to render democracy meaningless. If the contras are folk heroes, then we are indeed living in an Orwellian world where power determines history, justice, and truth and defines the victims of brutal
American military aggression as unworthy of their lives, unworthy of our compassion, and indeed unworthy of our notice.
The United States oftentimes utilizes overwhelming military force as a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. The George H. W. Bush administration’s righteous indignation against Iraqi aggression is more an anomaly reserved for designated enemies rather than a fundamental principle of American foreign policy, as the military interventions in Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Nicaragua indicate. While enemies are chastised and punished for violating international law, the United States and its allies and clients, especially Israel, oftentimes act with impunity knowing that although world opinion may oppose their policies, no international body has the power to deter and punish them. Contrary to the U.S. manipulation of the Security Council to adopt resolutions mandating sanctions and force against Iraq, the United States has habitually vetoed resolutions critical of Israeli policies. Without U.S. military, political, economic, and diplomatic support, Israel would not have the power to act as a rogue state, commit aggression against neighboring Arab states under the pretext of self-defense, violate dozens of United Nations resolutions, and prevent a political process leading to peace and security for all inhabitants of the Middle East. Before cataloging Israel’s habitual noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine
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the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based on the international consensus, it is necessary to examine the origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the major crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated upon the Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights.
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Chapter Four:
Israel: Rogue Ally
[Palestine is] the land without people--for the people [Jews] without a land . Israel Zangwill Early Zionist, c. 1897 1
What are Palestinians? When I came here–there were 250,000 non-Jews, mainly Arabs and Bedouins. It was desert–more than underdeveloped, nothing. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol February 1969 2
. . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist. Prime Minister Golda Meir June 1969 3
There is no such thing as ‘Palestinian people’ . . . there are no Palestinians. Rabbi Meir Kahane Founder, Jewish Defense League February 1988 4
1 Quoted in Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 149 as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993) , 6.
2 Newsweek, 17 February 1969, quoted in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming the Victims (New York: Verso, 1988), 241 as cited in Ibid., 168-169.
3 Sunday Times (London), 15 June 1969, quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 264 as cited in Ibid., 169.
4 Meir Kahane, “No Jewish Guilt!,” New York Times, 2 February 1988 as cited in Ibid., 169. According to historian Benny Morris, after World War I, there were 618,000 Muslims, 70,000 Arab Christians, and 59,000 Jews in Palestine; by 1947, there were 1.2 or 1.3 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews. International Relations professor Cheryl Rubenberg cites the post-World War II population as 1,319,434 Arabs and 589,341 Jews. While the Arab population increased naturally, the Jewish population increased largely through immigration. To support the mythology that Palestine was an empty wasteland and justify Jewish settlement and dispossession of Palestinian Arabs land and denial of their right to self-determination, some “scholarship”
We firmly stand by the historic right of the people of Israel to the entire Land of Israel. Every hill in Samaria and every valley in Judea [the West Bank] is part of our historic homeland. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert January 2006 5
The David and Goliath conflict between Palestine and Israel, perhaps the fundamental barrier to peace and justice in the Middle East, essentially begs the question of whether human rights apply equally to all or if parochial identity concepts centered upon such exclusionary categories as race, ethnicity, sex, religion, and nationality dictate a group’s political, economic, and civil rights. To state another way, do the rights of
Jews to a Jewish homeland, to security, to resources, to freedom trump the same rights of
Palestinians and other Arabs to such an extent that Israel can forcibly deny their humanity
has purported to provide demographic proof illustrating that there were no Palestinians, and, in fact, Arabs from neighboring states migrated to Palestine after the Jewish colonizers had developed the land into a paradise. The historian Norman Finkelstein has assiduously endeavored to catalogue the myriad falsifications and expose these hoaxes as scholarship that cannot suffer minimal scrutiny. As a graduate student, Finkelstein exposed Joan Peters’ best-selling and celebrated From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine as a complete fraud. More recently, in Beyond Chutzpah and in a lecture given at the University of Toledo, Finkelstein demonstrated that portions of Alan Dershowitz’s The Case for Israel are essentially a shoddy plagiarism of Peters’ work, perpetuating the misconception that the Jewish colonizers settled on an empty, undeveloped land. The post-World War I figures are in Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 26, cited in Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 83; post-World War II figures are in Ibid., 192, and General Monthly Bulletin 12 (December: 1947), 686 (Table I) cited in Janet Abu-Lughod, “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine,” in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 155 as cited in Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 26; For Finkelstein’s discussion of Peters see In These Times, Sept. 5- 11, 1984, 12-14, Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestine Conflict, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2003), and for Dershowitz’s plagiarism of Peters see Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). Finkelstein spoke at the University of Toledo as part of the Engaged History Lecture series during the Fall 2005 semester.
5 Quoted in Nick Dearden, “Israel’s New Government, Old Policies,” Z Magazine, Vol. 19, No. 6, June 2006, 4-5. Moreover, Olmert promised that “Israel will maintain control over the security zones, the Jewish settlement blocs, and those places which have supreme national importance to the Jewish people, first and foremost a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.”
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and violate their fundamental human rights? Does international law apply equally to all persons and nations, or does American, Israeli, German, and Indian exceptionalism allow some to operate according to self-defined unique standards and rules?
Before embarking on an examination of Israel’s habitual noncompliance with
Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based upon the international consensus, it is necessary to provide some background information describing the origin of the conflict, the major crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights and self-determination. While not a comprehensive history, the necessary revisionist narrative counters the standard orthodox scholarship within the United States, thus illustrating the U.S. and Israel’s primacy in preventing a just settlement for Middle
East peace and the context to critically and skeptically examine and understand the U.S. and Israeli indefensible, minority positions in the United Nations Security Council.
Without U.S. military, political, economic, and diplomatic aid, Israel would not have the power to act as a rogue state and prevent a political process leading to peace and security for all inhabitants of the Middle East. As George Marshall presciently observed, “If Jews follow counsel of these extremists who favor contemptuous policy toward Arabs, any
Jewish state to be set up will be able to survive only with continuous assistance from
Abroad.” 6 U.S. support for Israel concomitant with its own policies in the Middle East explain a great deal of animosity toward and retail terrorism against the U.S, highlighting further the need to hold the United States and its allies accountable to international law.
6 Secret Telegram “INFOTEL from Secretary of State,” 14 May 1948, as cited in Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: Morrow, 1984) , 70-71, found in Paul Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 13-14.
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On 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution
181 partitioning Palestine into two independent sovereign ethnic states, one Jewish and the other Palestinian Arab, and designating the Holy City of Jerusalem as a special international regime under United Nations administration. 7 Palestinian historian Walid
Khalidi writes
the partition resolution awarded 55.5 percent of the total area of Palestine to the Jews (most of whom were recent immigrants), who constituted less than a third of the population and who owned less than 7 percent of the land. The Palestinians, on the other hand, who made up over two thirds of population and who owned the vast bulk of the land, were awarded 45.5 percent of the country of which they had enjoyed continuous possession for centuries. 8
The United Nations proceeded to violate its Charter and the founding principle of self- determination when thirty-three nations supported the partition against thirteen negative votes and ten abstentions, thus validating the Jewish colonizers dispossession and expulsion of the indigenous Palestinians. Khalidi notes that
the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust . . . they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population--the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil--to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule. 9
Nahum Goldmann, former president of the World Jewish Congress, admitted the Zionist demand for a Jewish state “was in full contradiction with all principles of modern history
7 For the full text of the partition resolution and a detailed map of the plan see George J. Tomeh, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume I: 1947-1974 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies , 1975), 4-14. For a map of the Partition Plan, see Appendix II, Map I, 419. The map created by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) can be found at
8 Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1997, 11, 13, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah , 284.
9 Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), 305-306, cited in Benny Morris, Righteous Victims , 186.
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and international law.” Goldmann continued, “If the demand were to serve as precedent, the Indians of North America could claim for themselves the United States . . . .” 10 The
1919 U.S. King-Crane Commission concurred, deciding that a claim “based on an occupation two thousand years ago can hardly be seriously considered.” 11 The historian
Norman Finkelstein asks “is there any example in history of a people voluntarily relinquishing a fragment, let alone most, of their country to settlers coming from abroad to colonize it and then drive them out?” Finkelstein concludes that “the embryonic
Jewish state emerging from the British mandate was imposed by force on, and against the will of, the indigenous Palestinian Arab population. On no generally accepted principle of morality or law could the flagrant violation of the Palestinian’s right to self- determination be justified.” 12
Finkelstein, in Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, meticulously catalogues the Zionists designs for Palestine and its indigenous
Arab inhabitants revising the standard narrative found in U.S. scholarship. After the
British Balfour Declaration, 13 David Ben-Gurion, a Zionist movement leader and future
10 Quotation from Goldmann in Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 53, cited in Rubenberg, 4.
11 Excerpts from the King-Crane Commission report are in Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), 213-218, and Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israeli-Arab Reader (New York: Penguin, 1987), 34-42, as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions , 4.
12 Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 284.
13 The British, perhaps recognizing that a Jewish state in the Middle East beholden to and dependent on Great Britain would be a useful client in a wholly unstable region, provided support to the Zionists through the Balfour Declaration, a letter from the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, president of the British Zionist Federation, on 2 November 1917. The declaration pronounced that “his majesty’s government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use the best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
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Prime Minister of Israel, described the Jewish state as including Palestine, Jordan, and parts of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. 14 According to Finkelstein, the Israeli Declaration of
Independence, written after the partition, purposefully made no mention of a Palestinian
Arab state: “On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel.” 15
While an official commission predicted that the Jewish state would contain 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs and others, Finkelstein asserts that the United Nations excluded
90,000 to 105,000 Bedouins from the survey, thus perhaps making the Jews a minority in the future Jewish state. 16 The Zionist leaders Chaim Weizmann and Ben-Gurion
Saw partition as a stepping stone to further expansion and the eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine . . . . [Ben-Gurion] wrote to his son Amos: "[A] Jewish state in part [of Palestine] is not an end, but a beginning . . . . Our possession is important not only for itself . . . through this we increase our power, and every increase in power facilitates getting hold of this country in its entirety. Establishing a [small] state . . . will serve as a very potent lever in our historical efforts to redeem the whole country." 17
As for the Palestinian demographic problem, Finkelstein relates that “it was impossible to carve out a Jewish state in Palestine without a substantial Palestinian Arab existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Ronald Sanders, The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), 612-613 cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 5.
14 Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestine Arabs: From Peace to War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 34-35, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 280.
15 Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), 162, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 286.
16 Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 273n31; Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 117-119; Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 112-113, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.
17 Morris, Righteous Victims, 138, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 280. Moreover, Morris, citing Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (London: Collins, 1965), 212-213, quotes Ben-Gurion as saying “no Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel.”
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population and thus–in light of the Zionist goal of creating a demographically “stable”
Jewish state–without massive expulsion.” 18 Finkelstein quotes the Israeli historian Benny
Morris:
For many Zionists, beginning with [Theodor] Herzl, the only realistic solution lay in transfer. From 1880 to 1920, some entertained the prospect of Jews and Arabs coexisting in peace. But increasingly after 1920, and more emphatically after 1929, for the vast majority a denouement of conflict appeared inescapable. Following the outbreak of 1936, no mainstream leader was able to conceive of future coexistence and peace without a clear physical separation between the two peoples–achievable only by way of transfer and expulsion. 19
Therefore, Morris notes “what happened in 1948 was inevitable. 20 If the Jews wanted to establish a state in Eretz-Israel that would be located on an area a little larger than Tel
18 Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.
19 Morris, Righteous Victims , 139, cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 259. Moreover, Morris writes that “Ben-Gurion argued in a letter to his son that the Jews’ acceptance of partition–that is, acceptance of only 20 percent or so of their Promised Land–justified the transfer: ‘[W]e never wanted to dispossess the Arabs. But since England is giving part of the country promised to us–for an Arab state, it is only fair that the Arabs in our state be transferred to the Arab area.’” D. Ben-Gurion to A. Ben-Gurion, 27- 28, July 1937 cited in Morris, Righteous Victims, 139.
20 Jewish forces began fighting and expanding into designated Palestinian land immediately after the General Assembly resolution. Several Arab nations entered Palestine to aid Palestinian resistance after the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948; however, as Rubenberg notes “with the sole exception of the Egyptian army of 10,000 men that crossed the Negev Desert (the status of which had not yet been decided),” no Arab army entered into land partitioned to Israel. After the 1948 war, Israel controlled eight thousand square miles or almost eighty percent of Palestine, including the Negev desert, and according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA], 726,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees. The U.S. State Department reported in 1949 that seventy-five percent of the Palestinian Arab refugees were a combination of pregnant or nursing mothers, children, the infirm, and the aged. Moreover, the U.S. public “generally is unaware of the Palestinian refugee problem since it has not been hammered away at by the press or radio.” While the United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 iterated that a special international regime would administer Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees had the right to return to their homes or receive just compensation, as the discussion above indicates, Israel actively sought sole Jewish control over Palestine, ensuring Israel’s rejection of international law and United Nations resolutions demanding that refugees be allowed to return to their homes. Contemporary Knesset member Eliahu Carmeli stated that “. . . I am not willing to take back one Arab, not even one goy [i.e., non-Jew]. I want the Jewish state to be wholly Jewish.” For an extensive history of the first Arab-Israeli war see Morris, Righteous Victims , 161-258; for the Rubenberg quote see Rubenberg, 44; for the UNRWA figure see Rony Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study) (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, and Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959) cited in Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949
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Aviv, a removing of population was needed . . . . Without a population expulsion, a
Jewish state could not have been established.” 21 Morris writes “what remained was for the Jews to translate the formal leasehold into concrete possession and statehood, in war– and for the Palestinians to pay the price,” admitting that “in general, in most cases, the final and decisive precipitant to [Palestinian Arab] flight was [Israeli] attack or the inhabitants’ fear of such attack.” 22 Ben-Gurion, who declared in 1938 that there was nothing immoral about the compulsory transfer of Arabs, demanded “in each attack a decisive blow should be struck, resulting in the destruction of homes and the expulsion of the population.” 23
Cheryl Rubenberg, professor of international relations, argues in Israel and the
American National Interest: A Critical Examination, that “American support for the creation of the state of Israel was based primarily on domestic political considerations, not on calculations of U.S. national interest.” 24 Rubenberg quotes President Harry
Truman honestly admitting to State Department officials, “I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 297; for the Carmeli quote see Labour Party Archives 2- 11/1/1, Protocols of the Special Meeting of the Mapai Secretariat and Knesset Faction, 1 August 1949 cited in Ibid., 281 and cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions , 22; for the State Department report see FRUS 1949 , “Palestine Refugees,” 15 March 1949, 6:828-42 as cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 20-21; for full text of the General Assembly resolution 194 see Tomeh, 15-17.
21 Meron Rappaport, “Interview with Benny Morris,” Yediot Ahronot (11 November 2001), cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 283.
22 Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004), 294 cited in Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, 265. 23 See Central Zionist Archives S-100/24B, protocol of the joint meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive and the Political Committee of the Zionist Executive, June 12, 1938 as cited in Morris, Righteous Victims, 253 and Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People from Their Homeland (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987), 40, cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 10.
24 Rubenberg, 48.
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not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.” 25 While observing that Great Britain maintained its position in the Middle East through good Arab relations, the State Department concluded that American support for Zionism was contrary to
American interests and would allow the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East and develop ties with Arab nations, create a barrier to American access to oil and markets, and violate the ostensible American support for the principle of self-determination.
Moreover, the State Department perceptively warned that supporting a Jewish state in
Palestine would require force for its implementation and destabilize the Middle East. 26
Foreshadowing orthodox U.S. policy toward Israel, especially after 1967, Truman prevented the implementation of the Bernadotte Plan, designed to end the hostilities during the 1948 war. Count Folk Bernadotte, the United Nations special envoy to
Palestine, called for an adjustment of the Israel-Palestine partition borders whereby the
Galilee region would become part of Israel and the Negev would become part of the
Palestinian Arab state, formal Arab recognition of Israel, and the right of return for
Palestine refugees. 27 The U.S. ambassador to Israel, James G. McDonald, wrote “I am convinced that neither Ben-Gurion nor [Moshe] Shertok, in their talks with me exaggerated when they said in substance: ‘On no matter adversely affecting our independence or our security will we yield to the threat of United Nations sanctions, even if these are backed by your government, which we know to be our friend. What we have won in the battlefield, we will not sacrifice at the council table!’” 28 Truman, recognizing
25 William Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), 36-37 cited in Ibid., 31.
26 Ibid., 32-33. 27 Ibid., 43-44.
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Israel’s determination to reject the United Nations’ call for the return of refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem--instead declaring it as the capital of the Jewish state-- and succumbing to domestic pressure, failed to encourage and enforce the rights of the
Palestinian Arabs and force the Israelis to forgo acquisition of any territory beyond the partition.
Rubenberg contends the prevalent but false orthodoxy that the Arab states would destroy Israel led to U.S. commitment to Israel’s military might which ultimately encouraged Israeli militarism, provided means for Israeli expansion, and allowed Israeli rejection for a just Middle East settlement. 29 Rubenberg concludes that
it is understandable why Palestinians, who lost their homes and lands and were transformed from a secure, stable existence on a land to which they had profound cultural and historical attachment into destitute refugees cramped into squalid camps, were unaccepting of the “legitimacy” of the Jewish state and the “right” of Jews from all over the world to immigrate there. 30
While the Jewish state existed upon a solid foundation backed with formidable military might after the 1948 war, the situation in the Middle East was precariously unstable as many nations dealt with the legacy of eroding colonialism, with latent but growing nationalism competing with the western powers for control of resources and populations as a new superpower exerted its influence supposedly in the name of freedom and democracy and justified by anti-communist rhetoric to secure hegemony in the emerging global capitalist world. However, the old European imperialist powers would
28 Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1948 , Vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia and Africa (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1337-1339, cited in Ibid., 47.
29 Ibid., 51. 30 Ibid., 50.
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haphazardly and weakly attempt to secure their former domains, especially in the oil rich
Middle East, thus instigating the second conflict involving Israel and the Arab states.
According to Rubenberg, a secret arrangement between Israel, France, and Britain precipitated confrontation with Egypt and the 1956 Sinai-Suez crisis. The arrangement, following Israeli aggression against Egypt with an incursion into the Gaza Strip and the
Sinai Peninsula, allowed the British and French to gain military control over the Suez
Canal in a move against the burgeoning independent nationalism of Egyptian President
Gamal Abdul Nasser. The General Assembly adopted three resolutions in 1956 (997,
999, 1002) demanding British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. 31
Moreover, Rubenberg notes that preceding the Israeli invasion, in what is known as the
Lavon affair, Israeli operatives secretly attacked U.S. installations in Egypt to undermine the developing relationship between the two countries, foreshadowing perhaps the blatant
Israeli attack against the USS Liberty during the Six-Day War. 32
Rubenberg, explaining the impetus behind the aggression against Egypt, observes that Israeli policy makers believed military force against neighboring Arab states would force them to meet Israel’s political demands. Essentially, Israel sought rewards for aggression such as formal peace treaties recognizing Israel’s right to exist. While official policy maintained that Israel would not withdraw from the occupied territories until certain conditions were obtained, the Eisenhower administration, against Congressional opposition, demanded unconditional withdrawal preceding negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Illustrating official policy, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Henry
31 For the text of the General Assembly resolutions calling for British, French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian Territory see Tomeh, 31, 32, 34. 32 See Rubenberg, Chapter three.
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Cabot Lodge, declared that no nation had the right “to seek political gains through the use of force or to use as a bargaining point a gain achieved by means of force.” 33 Former
Congressman Paul Findley, author of Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the
U.S.-Israeli Relationship and They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront
Israel’s Lobby, quotes Eisenhower’s Undersecretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., who warned the Israeli representative to the U.S. that the occupation of the Sinai would result in “termination of all United States government and private aid, United Nations sanctions and eventual expulsion from the United Nations. . . .” 34 Findley notes that Eisenhower himself stated in a television address to the American people that Israel needed to follow international law and the United Nations Charter for security: “Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of the United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.” 35
During the Sinai-Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration opposed aggression as an acceptable means to achieve policy objectives, and Rubenberg argues that as U.S. aid to Israel continued to increase, especially after 1967, the United States could check
33 United States Policy in the Middle East September 1956–June 1957, Documents, Department of State Publication 6505, Near and Middle East Series 25 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), 322-327, cited in Ibid., 83.
34 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1981; Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana, 1988), 416, cited in Findley, Deliberate Deceptions, 32. 35 Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: Morrow, 1984), cited in Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985), 119.
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Israeli militarism and expansionism by threatening to withhold American aid and even enforce United Nations resolutions.
Lest we imagine that Eisenhower’s stance embodied a universal principle guiding his administration’s policies, we must recognize that U.S. action against France, Britain, and Israel was a warning that the United States considered the Middle East under its aegis. The Eisenhower doctrine, drafted during the Suez-Sinai crisis, resolved that “the
United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.” Moreover, the U.S. “is prepared to use armed forces to assist” countries in the Middle East “requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” As freelance investigative journalist William Blum comments, “Nothing was set forth about non-communist or anti-communist aggression which might endanger world peace.” Supposedly to combat the ubiquitous international communist menace, the
Eisenhower administration orchestrated the overthrow of the government of Iran in a coup, placing the Shah in power as dictator; invaded Lebanon with 14,000 troops to support the pro-American government, although the Americans did not fire a shot and withdrew after the election of a new government, admittedly less beholden to the U.S.; and attempted to assassinate the Iraqi nationalist General Abdul Karim Kassem, who attempted to counter the power of the Western oil monopolies –to name but a few examples of U.S. intervention in the Middle East counteracting the avowed respect for international law and the United Nations Charter. The United States, with customary arrogance, decided it could interfere in the internal politics of Middle Eastern countries ostensibly to prevent outside, especially Soviet, intervention, but actually to prevent
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nationalist and even socialist governments from controlling their countries’ resources for domestic benefits, much as Chavez’s Venezuela, thus preventing the United States’ natural right to world hegemony as a Superpower. 36
In the months leading to the June 1967 war, Israel openly provoked its Arab neighbors, threatening to overthrow the Syrian government and boasting that Egypt was powerless to interfere. 37 Rubenberg quotes Israel’s chief of staff General Yitzhak
Rabin’s radio address on 11 May: “The moment is coming when we will march on
Damascus to overthrow the Syrian Government, because it seems that only military operations can discourage the plans for a people’s war with which they threaten us.” 38
Rubenberg argues that the escalation of various Syrian-Israeli conflicts, including the massive Israeli military reprisals against Syria for allowing Palestinian commando incursions into Israel and Israel’s annexation and cultivation of the demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border, which resulted in a Syrian mortar attack against a single Israeli tractor and an Israeli incursion of seventy jets into Syria, precipitated the June war. 39
Morris observes that Israel’s decision to attack the Golan Heights was predicated on
Syria’s harassment of border settlements “stemming from disagreements about the use of
Jordan River waters and Israeli cultivation of land along the border,” which attracted various Israeli reprisals, and Israeli settlers’ wish to expand into the Golan. Moreover,
36 For Eisenhower’s Middle East policy see William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II (updated edition, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 64-72, 89-99.
37 The following discussion borrows heavily from Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapter seven and Rubenberg, Chapter four.
38 See Godfrey Jansen, “New Light on the 1967 War,” Daily Star (Beirut), 15, 22, 26, November 1973, quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London: Futura Macdonald, 1983) , 216 as cited in Rubenberg, 105. 39 Rubenberg, 98-103.
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after the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in May 1964, Morris asserts that Palestinian guerillas, operating from various Arab states against Israeli targets, were “largely armed, trained, and run by the Syrian general staff.” Plausibly, the settlers’ expansionism provided the impetus and the Syrian and PLO commando raids provided the justification. 40
Reacting to the Israeli threats against Syria, Egypt mobilized troops in the Sinai, which the U.S. and Israel recognized as a defensive and demonstrative move to appease the other Arab nations angry with Nasser for not responding to Israeli military strikes against Syria and Jordan, including an unprovoked Israeli raid on the West Bank which the United Nations Security Council censured 14-0 as a blatant violation of the Charter.
In what all parties recognized as a provocative move making war almost unavoidable, the
Israelis mobilized and called upon the reserves to concentrate in the Negev bordering
Egyptian territory, causing Nasser to close the Straits of Tiran and request the United
Nations force leave the Sinai, but not the Gaza Strip or Sharm al-Sheik. When the
Secretary-General U Thant inexplicably provided Nasser with an ultimatum that either all the United Nations forces will maintain their positions or all will evacuate, Nasser, to save face, requested that all the forces withdraw, further exacerbating the conflict. The
United States and the United Nations attempted to deescalate the situation by requesting
Israel to allow the UN forces to reassemble on the Israeli side of the border. Israel promptly refused. 41
To gain domestic and U.S. support for a military solution to the crisis, Israel propagandized that Egypt was the aggressor and Israel must defend itself, perhaps with a
40 Morris, Righteous Victims, 303, 325-326. 41 Rubenberg, 106-108.
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preemptive attack, to prevent its destruction. However, the evidence leads to a much different interpretation. Morris admits that “Israel’s explicit, publicly stated assumption was that Egypt was intent on attacking the Negev. But captured Egyptian documents show that Egypt’s army was in fact preparing for a defensive battle, to absorb and repel an initial IDF blow.” 42
Rubenberg cites a General Mattityahu Peled, “one of the architects of the Israeli victory in 1967” who exposes the true military reality in the Middle East:
“There is no reason,” he said, “to hide the fact that since 1949 no one dared, or more precisely, no one was able to threaten the very existence of Israel. In spite of that, we have continued to foster a sense of our own inferiority, as if we were a weak and insignificant people, which, in the midst of an anguished struggle for its existence, could be exterminated at any moment.” “True,” General Peled went on, Arab leaders may have sounded menacing, “but it is notorious that the Arab leaders themselves, thoroughly aware of their own impotence, did not believe in their own threats. . . . I am sure that our General Staff never told the government that the Egyptian military threat represented any danger to Israel or that we were unable to crush Nasser’s army, which, with unheard-of foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of our army . . . . To claim that the Egyptian forces concentrated on our borders were capable of threatening Israel’s existence not only insults the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this kind of situation, but is an insult to Zahal [the Israeli army]."43
Furthermore, other Israeli leaders iterated that Israel was the aggressor. Rabin observed after the war, “I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into the Sinai on 14 May would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.” 44 In 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin said that “in June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the
42 Morris, Righteous Victims, 313.
43 Ma’ariv, 24 March 1972, cited in Hirst, 210-211 as cited in Rubenberg, 104.
44 Le Monde, 29 February 1968, cited in Hirst, 211 as cited in Ibid., 104.
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Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” 45
As for the Egyptian motives, Nasser declared that “I am not in a position to go to war; I tell you this frankly, and it is not shameful to say it publicly. To go to war without having the sufficient means would be to lead the country and the people to disaster.” 46
Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad admitted that “navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba was a matter to which a final solution could be secured, either through the
International Court of Justice as was proposed at the time by Senator [William] Fulbright, or through the redeployment of United Nations forces at Sharm el-Sheikh, once Israeli threats were eliminated.” 47 Quickly accepting United Nations proposals regarding the
Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, Nasser assured the Secretary-General U Thant that “we have never at any time intimated that we will attack Israel. It was Israel who has formally threatened to invade Syria. What we are attempting now is a defensive measure to prevent such a threat from materializing. You may have my word therefore that we will never begin an attack.” 48
According to Morris, the main objective of the Israeli offensive was the destruction of the Egyptian army in Sinai. Recognizing that the international community would demand an immediate ceasefire, “Israel’s diplomatic missions, and particularly its delegations in Washington and at the UN, were ordered to stall for as long as possible, to
45 New York Times, 21 August 1982, cited in Ibid., 107.
46 Quoted from the Egyptian press in Hisham Sharabi, “Prelude to War: The Crisis of May-June 1967,” in The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 53 cited in Ibid., 109.
47 Mahmoud Riad, Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Quartet Books, 1981) , 19-20 cited in Ibid., 109-110. 48 Riad, 20 cited in Ibid., 110.
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allow the IDF to complete its work.” 49 Morris concludes that “the Six-Day War was in all essentials a clockwork war carried out by the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] against three relatively passive, ineffective Arab armies: indeed the Israeli offensives in most areas proceeded more rapidly than the planners had envisioned.” 50 During the short war, the IDF destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces, routed the Arab armies, and gained control over the Sinai, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank, including all of Jerusalem. To explicate Israeli thinking regarding these territories, Morris writes that “since 1949 Ben-Gurion had been calling Israel’s failure to conquer East Jerusalem and, by extension, the whole of the West Bank ‘a lamentation for generations.’” 51
Shortly before the war, Labor Minister Yigal Allon, who during the war proposed “to transfer to Egypt the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the Gaza Strip,” stated that “in
. . . a new war, we must avoid the historic mistake of the War of Independence [1948] . . . and must not cease fighting until we achieve total victory, the territorial fulfillment of the
Land of Israel.” 52
Perhaps the understood Israeli policy toward the territories explains why as
Morris writes: “A number of IDF commanders, apparently without cabinet authorization, though most probably with [Israeli Defense Minister Moshe] Dayan’s approval, tried to repeat the experience of 1948–to drive Palestinians into exile and demolish their
49 Morris, Righteous Victims, 313.
50 Ibid., 313.
51 Ibid., 321. For a map illustrating the territory Israel acquired during the war, see Appendix II, Map II, 420. 52 Eitan Haber, (Heb.) Today the War Will Break Out (Tel Aviv: Idanim/Yediot Aharonot Press, 1987), 213 and Michael Brecher with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 100 cited in Ibid., 319 and 321 respectively.
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homes.” 53 Acknowledging that Israel captured an area three-and-a-half times larger than
Israel itself, Morris indicates that between 200,000 and 300,000 Arabs fled or were expelled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and between 80,000 and 90,000 inhabitants of the Golan Heights experienced a similar fate, joining the over 700,000 refugees from the 1948 war. 54 Morris rationalizes that the military occupation of and the almost immediate massive settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the
Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights was haphazard and seemingly beyond the government’s control and comprehension as if eventual annexation were not the understood if not official policy. Even though the international community, including
Israeli and American politicians, understood the settlements as “a major obstacle to peace,” “by the mid-1990s, the number of settlements in the West Bank alone surpassed a hundred, with the Jewish population of the territories, including Jerusalem’s satellite neighborhoods, passing the 150,000 mark.” 55
Morris remarked that Dayan and the ruling Labor Party at this time “firmly opposed such [Palestinian] statehood, deeming it a mortal threat to Israel’s existence.” 56
Moreover, Israel invoked a policy to encourage Arab emigration, with Dayan conceding that “we must understand the motives and causes for the continued emigration of the
Arabs, from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and not undermine their causes, even if they are lack of security and lack of employment, because after all, we want to create a
53 Ibid., 327.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 329, 332, 335-336. 56 Ibid., 338.
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new map.” 57 Morris identifies that “Israeli thinking was . . . governed by the notion that the Arabs of the territories, starved of land and resources (primarily water), and denied the possibility of industrial development, would gradually drift away.” 58 As for those
Palestinians who remained in the territories, Morris indicates that “Israel intended to stay in the West Bank, and its rule would not be overthrown or ended through civil disobedience and civil resistance, which was easily crushed. The only real option was armed struggle.” 59 The brutal measures to repress any form of resistance to Israeli occupation included “midnight sweeps and arrests; beatings, sensory deprivation measures, and simple, old-style torture to extract information and confessions; a system of military courts which bore no resemblance to the administration of justice in Western democracies (or, for that matter, in Israel proper); the demolition (or sealing) of suspects’ houses; long periods of administrative detention; and deportations. . . .” 60
The United States certainly failed to take appropriate action to prevent the foreseeable war and in fact provided diplomatic and military support to Israel. Israel, for its part, lobbied the Johnson administration, propagandizing the imaginary threat Egypt and the Arab armies posed to Israel’s existence, to prevent a reoccurrence of the Sinai fiasco and ensure U.S. support for an Israeli offensive and any attendant territorial gains.
As an example of Israel’s success in persuading the American public of its dire situation,
Rubenberg cites a letter from twenty-four members of the House of Representatives
57 Arie Braun, (Heb.) Moshe Dayan and the Six-Day War (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1997), 170 cited in Ibid., 338.
58 Ibid., 339.
59 Ibid., 341.
60 Ibid., 342.
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pledging “. . . the fullest support to measures which must be taken by the administration to make our position unmistakably clear to those who are now bent on the destruction of
Israel, that we are now prepared to take whatever action may be necessary to resist aggression against Israel and to preserve the peace.” 61 Furthermore, Rubenberg observes that “Israel demanded unilateral guarantees from the United States, rejecting both multilateral diplomacy or [ sic ] the use of the United Nations as a means for resolving the conflict.” 62 Not only did his administration demand Egyptian concessions without any
Israeli quid pro quo and send an emergency air shipment of military equipment to Israel, but President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, signaling to the Soviet Union that the U.S. would use military force if the Soviet Union intervened on behalf of its Arab clients. Rubenberg argues that clearly it was not in the
United States’ best interest to protect Israel to such an extent as to risk an overt war with the Soviet Union. 63 Moreover, the U.S. and Israel, in what amounted to a diplomatic coup in the United Nations, orchestrated the adoption of unconditional ceasefire resolutions, with the U.S. vetoing the usual demand for withdrawal to pre-conflict lines and thus allowing Israel to occupy territory it had acquired by force, against the mandates of the United Nations Charter, exacerbating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which continues forty years later. 64
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence contradicting the orthodoxy that Israel supports American interests, and in turn the U.S. should blindly support Israel, is the
61 Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues being the Six Day War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970) , 85, cited in Rubenberg, 114.
62 Ibid., 109.
63 Ibid., 113, 121. 64 Ibid., 122-123.
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blatant Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, an intelligence gathering ship inexplicably unescorted in the Mediterranean off the Sinai and Gaza coasts during the Six-Day War.
Morris confines his discussion of the attack to the following two sentences in his forty- five page chapter on the Six-Day War, which reinforces the traditional account covering up the truth: “On June 8, off Al-‘Ar ī sh, Israeli torpedo boats and aircraft attacked and badly mauled the American spy ship Liberty, which they apparently mistook for an
Egyptian vessel. Thirty-four American servicemen died and seventy-five were injured.” 65
Jeffrey St. Clair, co-editor of Counterpunch, wrote an essay entitled “Israel’s
Attack on the Liberty Revisited,” for a book he edited with Alexander Cockburn called
The Politics of Anti-Semitism. 66 St. Clair provides the following narrative of events:
After eight reconnaissance flights during the morning of 8 June, a few waves of Israeli fighters attacked the ship with rockets, machine guns, and napalm. Following the air attack, Israeli ships launched two torpedoes at the boat, tearing a hole in the hull and flooding the lower compartments. The Israeli boats then fired at the life boats which crew members dropped into the water, thus preventing an evacuation. Before leaving, an
Israeli officer aboard an attacking ship asked over a bullhorn in clear English if the
Americans required any help. The Liberty’ s quartermaster responded with a vehement
“fuck you.” Sixteen hours after the attack and six hours after a Soviet destroyer offered
65 Morris, 327.
66 Jeffrey St. Clair, “Israel’s Attack on the Liberty Revisited,” in Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, eds., The Politics of Anti-Semitism (Oakland, Calif.: AK Press, 2003). The essay appeared on the online edition Counterpunch at < www.counterpunch.org/stclair1126.html > on 24 October 2003. St. Clair’s essay provides the information for this section, but for further analysis see James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship (New York: Random House, 1979).
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assistance, U.S. destroyers reached the scene. Mysteriously, as the 174 wounded were being evacuated, the men were instructed not to speak with the press. In a matter of weeks, the U.S. Navy published a report claiming that the accidental attack was aborted as soon as Israel discovered its egregious mistake and reaffirming the Israeli false excuses (blaming their victim), including that the U.S. did not notify Israel of any ships in the area, that the U.S. ship failed to identify itself, and that Israel mistook the U.S. vessel for an Egyptian tanker.
Contrarily, analyses by U.S. intelligence agencies, which the U.S. government has suppressed and classified, and James Ennes’ (the officer of the deck during the attack)
Assault on the Liberty provide compelling evidence that Israel purposefully attacked, knowing that it was a U.S. ship, on the orders of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. St.
Clair postulates that Israel attacked the Liberty to prevent the U.S. from prematurely knowing that Israel planned on breaching the ceasefire, invading Syria, and securing the
Golan Heights, which took place on 9 June, to prevent U.S. pressure against an attack so as not to antagonize the Soviet Union. A second motive perhaps was that Israel planned to completely destroy the vessel and blame the Egyptians, thus solidifying the U.S. and
Israeli relationship and echoing the Lavan affair during the Suez crisis mentioned above.
St. Clair exposes another possible motive, one that did not come to light until much later: on the day of the attack, Israeli soldiers massacred over 1,000 Egyptian and Palestinian
POWs in Al-‘Ar ī sh, committing a war crime that Israel wanted to keep secret.
As for the U.S. motives in classifying the truth, the primary is an obvious cover- up for Pentagon incompetence, including allowing the defenseless ship to enter a war zone without an escort, failing to order it to move further into the Mediterranean (as the
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Joint Chiefs instructed Admiral John S. McCain II to do on 6 June), and arriving a full sixteen hours after the attack to aid the survivors. Moreover, St. Clair posits that the
Johnson administration and the Pentagon were pressuring Congress to overturn a weapons sales ban against Israel, which supposedly had been in force during the 1960s against both Israel and Jordan. If the U.S. acknowledged that Israel had indeed purposefully attacked a U.S. ship, then the profitable military relationship between the
U.S. and Israel, which began in earnest in 1968 with Israel becoming the largest buyer of
American arms, usually with generous U.S. taxpayer financing, would not have developed. Tellingly, the attack on the Liberty remains the only one on a U.S. ship that has not been investigated by Congress.
The international response to the Six-Day War was the United Nations Security
Council resolution 242, essentially a statement of principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The resolution reads:
The Security Council , Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity: (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized
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zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 67
Although Israel’s subsequent actions strengthening its hold on the occupied territories, including the continuation of settlement building and the annexation of
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, essentially undermined resolution 242, the United
States maintained that the PLO accept the resolution as a precondition for U.S. recognition and negotiation. Recognizing that the resolution makes no reference to
Palestinian self-determination and a Palestinian state, the PLO argued that instead of accepting resolution 242 and recognizing Israel without an Israeli quid pro quo, it would accept 242 in the context of all resolutions pertaining to Palestine and Israel, specifically
181 allowing for a Palestinian state and 194 demanding the right of return for all refugees. The U.S. and Israel rejected this compromise, illustrating complete opposition to Palestinian self-determination, right of return of Palestinian refugees, and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 68
While certainly not a comprehensive history of the Six-Day War, the necessarily brief discussion illustrates Israel’s preference for massive military force to solve political problems and its complete rejection of Palestinian rights. Considering the evidence
Morris provides, Israeli intransigence toward the United Nations and international law regarding the occupied territories and the Palestinians represents a premeditated
67 Tomeh, 143. 68 Rubenberg, 146.
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aggressive and expansionist policy that has nothing to do with Palestinian “terrorism.”
While Israel ensured that the Palestinians resisting would resort to force, the “terrorism” rhetoric utilized by the U.S. and Israel placed the blame for the conflict on the Palestinian victims, allowing Israel to falsely claim victim hood while brutally oppressing the
Palestinians, stall any peace process because there were no partners for peace, and expropriate Palestinian land and resources in an attempt to change the demographic status of the territories in favor of the Jewish state .
The October War in 1973 commenced when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to illustrate that Israeli military superiority was not an assurance of security and stability in the region. Only a peace settlement with Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories would ensure security for all countries in the Middle East. According to Rubenberg,
“Egyptian and Syrian goals extended only to regaining parts of their territory occupied by
Israel in 1967 and to serving forceful notice on Israel and the United States that the post-
1967 status quo was untenable.” 69 After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israelis based their claims justifying the occupation of Arab territories on either a pragmatist security or strategic necessity or a more nationalist and rightist ideology supporting the “Greater
Israel” thesis. Regardless of the justification, the Israelis adamantly and provocatively rejected a return to the pre-1967 borders, a re-division of Jerusalem, any negotiation with the PLO, and a Palestinian state. 70 With Richard Nixon in the Oval Office and Henry
Kissinger, who saw the world through Cold War glasses and interpreted Arab actions as
Soviet instigated plots, forming foreign policy, the United States tacitly supported Israeli
69 Ibid., 130. 70 Ibid., 131-132.
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rejectionism, regarding that any Israeli concession was somehow an appeasement to the
Soviet Union. 71
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, while initially unwilling to negotiate directly and bilaterally with Israel from positions of weakness, were amenable to a political solution designed and guaranteed by the United Nations. Essentially, if the Arab states offered recognition and peace, then the Israelis must offer something in return--the land occupied in 1967. Immediately after the June 1967 War, King Hussein declared that Jordan would recognize Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and end the existing state of belligerency if Israel would evacuate the newly captured territories. Nasser in 1970 said that “it will be possible to institute a durable peace between Israel and the Arab states, not excluding economic and diplomatic relations, if Israel evacuates the occupied territories and accepts a settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.” After Nasser’s death, the new Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, offered Israel a full peace treaty, including security guarantees, based on pre-June1967 borders. In early 1973, Jordan once again offered a proposal for direct negotiations, a full peace, recognition of Israel, and territorial changes conducive for Israeli security. 72
However, subsequent its military victory in 1967 over three of its neighboring
Arab states and its seemingly insuperable military power, the Israeli government “felt no real incentive to reach political agreement with the Arabs based on withdrawal from occupied territories.” 73 Israel rejected Arab offers of peace, even bizarrely claiming that
71 Ibid., 138-142. 72 Ibid., 133-134; for the Nasser quote see Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 19 February 1970, quoted in Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 64.
73 Morris, 362.
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the Arabs “continued to refuse to meet us or deal with us in any way . . . in 1971 or
1972.” 74 Even the U.S. State Department recognized that “Israel will be considered responsible for the rejection of the best opportunity to achieve peace since the establishment of the state.” 75 Israel, as well as Nixon and Kissinger, rejected the
American peace proposal introduced by Secretary of State William Rogers on the grounds that Israeli withdrawal from the territories would prejudice Israel’s negotiating position and threaten its security and the return of refugees would threaten Israel’s character as a Jewish state.76 Morris admits that “the failure of the UN–and American– sponsored peace proposals had proved that Israel was not going to give up territory through negotiation.” 77
Thus, the underlying intention for the initiation of another Middle East war was to break the political impasse, otherwise known as Israeli (and American) rejectionism that had paralyzed any conciliatory diplomacy and prevented a rapprochement and possible comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Although the war resulted once again in an Israeli military victory, it forced the Israelis and the Americans to reconsider the status quo and develop a policy of bilateral agreements between Israel and various
Arab states, rejecting as stridently as possible a comprehensive, multilateral peace process addressing the Palestinians. Thus, toward the end of the 1970s after numerous
Arab peace offerings and another unnecessary war, the U.S. finagled a peace with Egypt
74 See Golda Meir, My Life (London: Futura, 1976), 334, cited in Ibid., 390.
75 See William Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington D.C.: University of California Press/Brookings Institution, 1993), 122, cited in Ibid., 389.
76 Rubenberg, 150.
77 Morris, Righteous Victims, 398.
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that ultimately engendered greater freedom for Israel regarding military occupation of the territories and military action against the PLO, Lebanon, and Syria. 78
The war further cemented the relationship between the United States and Israel as the U.S. politically, economically, and militarily aided Israel during the war--the most conspicuous examples being a massive resupply of military and maneuvering in the
United Nations to Israel’s advantage, essentially avoiding ceasefires “. . . while the attacking side was gaining territory, because it would reinforce the tendency to use the
United Nations to ratify the gains of surprise attack.” 79 In fact, Rubenberg argues that the massive U.S. support for Israel during the war jeopardized the American relationship with NATO allies, Japan, the Soviet Union, OPEC--which initiated an oil embargo as retaliation to American actions--and the Arab world in general, rendering the U.S. a dubious neutral proponent of peace in the Middle East. Kissinger justified the resupply effort, which possibly could have provoked a Soviet resupply of Egypt, escalating the crisis, as necessary to assuage the Israeli psyche (Prime Minister Golda Meir “. . . may
78 See Rubenberg, Chapters five and six, and Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapters nine and ten, for a more comprehensive history of the October 1973 war and resulting bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
79 See Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 471 cited in Rubenberg, 161. The United Nations ceasefire resolution 338 states: The Security Council , 1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts; 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. Thus the United States delivered to Israel a resolution that became enshrined with resolution 242 as the official principles for a just Middle East peace. Tellingly, both resolutions are mute concerning Palestinian self-determination, even though that issue is a major component of a just and lasting peace. For resolution 338 see Tudeh, 151.
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have implicitly threatened to resort to the use of Israel’s nuclear option . . .” 80 ) and perhaps to moderate Israeli territorial claims and foster flexibility in a political settlement. However, Kissinger knew otherwise as he wrote: “When I ask Rabin to make concessions, he says he can’t because Israel is too weak. So I give him arms and he says he does not need to make concessions because Israel is strong.”81 The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz warned Kissinger that he would “go public” and
“unleash his shock troops” if the U.S. failed to satisfy Israel’s demands for weapons, raising a few questions on the nature of the relationship between the superpower and its client. 82 Interestingly, the official Israeli opinion of the American resupply maintains that
the U.S. effort was insufficient and late-coming, threatening the existence of Israel. 83
After the war, the United States promised to fulfill Israel’s economic, military, and energy needs and committed itself to ignore and dismiss the PLO unless it recognized
Israel’s right to exist and accepted resolutions 242 and 338, thus requiring the
Palestinians to accept what the Israelis consistently rejected and preventing a comprehensive just peace. 84
80 See Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University press, 1978) , 482-483 cited in Rubenberg, 165.
81 See Edward R. F. Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It: Step-by-Step in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy 27 (Spring 1976), 3-71 cited in Ibid., 165.
82 Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976) , 34; Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle/Times Books, 1976), 51; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 464, cited in Ibid., 165. 83 Ibid., 166; Morris, Righteous Victims, 434; for general discussion of U.S. aid see Rubenberg, Chapter five, and Morris, Righteous Victims, Chapter nine.
84 Morris, Righteous Victims, 441.
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During the 1970s, the PLO decidedly moderated its positions, accepting a two- state solution with the Palestinian state encompassing only the West Bank and Gaza, less than twenty-three percent of Palestine, as opposed to all of Palestine or even a single democratic secular state. Furthermore, the leadership endorsed diplomatic and political struggle for Palestinian self-determination and eschewed an armed one. Ironically,
Rubenberg indicates that Israel used as a pretext to preclude negotiations open dissension in the PLO, the closest approximation to real democracy in the region. 85 In the larger
Arab world, Arab leaders at the Algiers Summit in 1973, set upon liberating the occupied territories, declared a “willingness to participate in a peace process based on Israeli withdrawal and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” The summit determined that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination and demonstrated a willingness to recognize Israel. 86
The Israeli and U.S. policy of rejecting any concessions toward the Palestinians, however, weakened the moderates and inexorably help create more fundamentalist, desperate, and violent groups struggling against foreign occupation. 87 Further portending a rejection of a moderate PLO, the right-wing Likud 88 coalition gained power in Israel for
85 Rubenberg, 193-194.
86 Ibid., 178. 87 Interestingly, Nixon, despite domestic pressures resulting from his illegal actions, including spying on American citizens (in his case, the political elite of the opposition party), and the growing opposition to the Vietnam War, due in no small part to the immoral saturation bombing of Laos and Cambodia, that would force his resignation, wrote to Kissinger “we would serve even Israel’s best interests if we now used ‘whatever pressures may be required in order to gain acceptance of a settlement which is reasonable and which we can ask the Soviets to press on the Arabs.’” Moreover, “United States political considerations will have absolutely no, repeat no, influence on our decision in this regard. I want you to know that I am prepared to pressure the Israelis to the extent required, regardless of the domestic political consequences.” However, Kissinger simply ignored the message, preferring to determine policy according to an inflexible and exaggerated Cold War assessment, missing perhaps an opportunity for a comprehensive settlement. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 550-551, as cited in Ibid., 168-169.
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the first time in June 1977, with Menachem Begin, a revisionist Zionist favoring a
“Greater Israel” and former leader of the terrorist Irgun gang responsible for the bombing of the King David Hotel during the British Mandate and the massacre of 250 Palestinians at Deir Yassin in 1948, assuming the prime minister’s position. 89 Referring to a
Palestinian state, future Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin unambiguously stated that
“I repeat firmly, clearly, categorically: it will not be created.” 90 Rabin later argued that
Israel would not negotiate with the PLO “even if it accepts all of the conditions of negotiations on the basis of the Camp David agreements, because the essence of the willingness to speak with the PLO is the willingness to speak about the establishment of a
Palestinian state, which must be opposed.” 91
Morris writes that “throughout Israel’s history . . . the government had successfully hidden from the public the fact that there were Arab leaders who were willing to make peace and to make concessions to achieve it.” 92 Realizing the futility of war against Israel, the Arab states pursued peaceful solutions based on return of territory for guarantees of peace. Mustafa Khalil, the secretary-general of Egypt’s Socialist Party, admitted: “We know that we have no chance of winning in war, and we also know that
88 The Labor party controlled the Israeli government from the creation of Israel until the election of Begin in June 1977. Based on my readings, I would posit an imprecise and inexpert, yet useful, distinction between the Labor and Likud by comparing them to the U.S. Democrat and Republican parties respectively. The Israeli parliamentary system differs from the American-style democracy in that usually multiple parties must form coalition governments in order to maintain a majority and govern. Labor and Likud may differ slightly on domestic policies; however, as with the Democrats and Republicans, foreign policy differences are negligible. Both have been militaristic and expansionist, rejecting Arab peace offerings and Palestinian sovereignty, while settling political issues with overwhelming military force.
89 For history on Begin, see Rubenberg, 197-198.
90 Quoted by Amnon Kapeliouk in Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1982, from Ma’ariv, 5 December 1975, cited in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 70, cited in Ibid., 199. 91 Davar, 11 November 1982; interview in Trialogue, journal of the Trilateral Commission (Winter, 1983), cited in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 112, cited in Ibid., 199.
92 Morris, 455.
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you have the atomic bomb. . . . Egypt has no military solution, and we must seek another solution.” 93 Israel’s overconfidence in military solutions to political problems precluded political settlements. Thus it was not until the surprise Egyptian and Syrian attack that the United States and Israel considered meaningful negotiations; however, Israel, with
U.S. acquiescence, continued to hedge on the fundamental issues, including the
Palestinian “problem” and the occupation of Arab territories, preferring to engender bilateral agreements without providing substantial and necessary concessions. In a bold gesture, Sadat traveled to Jerusalem in November 1977 to outline before the Knesset a proposal for peace: Israeli withdrawal from the territories, Palestinian self-determination, and the “right of all states in the area to live in peace within . . . secure boundaries . . .
[with] appropriate international guarantees.” 94 Responding to Sadat, Prime Minister
Begin “recounted the history of Arab aggression aimed at destroying the Jewish state, and he asserted Israel’s desire to make peace.” Insinuating a rejection of any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Begin stated that “we have a different position regarding the final borders between us and our neighbors.” 95
Morris writes that Begin “regarded the continued occupation of and settlement in the West Bank as [Israel’s] historic, divine mission.” At most, Begin was willing to concede “autonomy” to the Palestinians with Israel maintaining the settlements and
“retaining military control and overall governmental oversight as well as specific control
93 Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), 60-61; Eitan Haber, Ehud Ya’ari, and Ze’ev Schiff, (Heb.) The Year of the Dove (Tel Aviv: Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1980), 138- 140, cited in Ibid., 454. 94 Quandt, Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 345-355, cited in Ibid., 453.
95 Weizman, The Battle for Peace, 136-137, cited in Ibid., 453-454.
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over land and water.” 96 Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who succeeded the
Nixon/Ford administration in January 1977, maintained the official U.S. position that resolution 242 applied to all the territories and Israeli settlements were illegal and obstacles to peace. 97 At the Camp David meetings, Egypt essentially eschewed the
Palestinian issue in favor of a peace agreement with Israel guaranteeing complete withdrawal from Sinai. Begin unsurprisingly rejected Palestinian self-determination and any withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, but further and somewhat surprisingly argued for Israeli control over air bases and settlements in eastern Sinai. Morris quotes
Begin as saying: “My right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off, before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement.” Rejecting resolution 242 and its demand for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Begin ultimately asserted
Israel’s right to the eastern Sinai so as not to set a precedent for Israeli withdrawal from other settlements as well as maintain a ready pretext to militarily invade Egyptian territory to protect the settlers. 98 Defense Minister Ezer Weizman later remarked:
If anyone, Arab or American, thought that our evacuation of Sinai was to be taken as a model for the other fronts, he was deluding himself. Neither from the West Bank and Gaza, nor from the Golan Heights would we remove our settlements or fail to maintain a military presence. 99
Further rejecting 242, Begin planned and began the construction and expansion of
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and declared that Jerusalem is “one city, indivisible,
96 Ibid., 456.
97 Ibid., 459. 98 Begin quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 263, cited in Ibid., 468. Discussion of Camp David in Ibid, Chapter ten, especially 463-477.
99 Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 228, cited in Rubenberg, 241.
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the Capital of the State of Israel.” 100 Soon after the Camp David accords, then
Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon bluntly told Carter, while in Israel, that “Jordan is
Palestine” and the West Bank was inseparable from Israel. 101 Ultimately, given the concessions of an international force and warning stations in the eastern Sinai, Israel agreed to a full, yet gradual, withdrawal from the Sinai, which removed Egypt from the
Arab-Israeli conflict and drastically weakened the Palestinian cause, allowing Israel greater freedom for military expansion as “it was doubtful whether the remaining Arab states could contemplate war against Israel without Egypt.” 102 Morris crowns Israel the clear victor in the peace process with Egypt as Begin had “warded off all efforts to pin him down on the Palestinian problem; and he had avoided a commitment to withdraw from any part of the West Bank and Gaza.” 103 Signaling that Begin was simply not serious about granting the Palestinians any autonomy nor about peace, Israel imposed its law and administration on East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan. 104 Perhaps the continued
Israeli rejection of 242 by both Labor and Likud governments has caused observers to wonder why the U.S. and Israel demanded the Palestinians accept the resolution.
With Egypt on the sidelines, Israel maintained its inflexibility regarding the
Palestinians and became emboldened to continue using military aggression for political gain. Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirik in 1981, radicalizing Saddam
100 Quandt, Camp David, 383-387, cited in Morris, Righteous Victims, 474.
101 Quandt, Peace Process , 317 cited in Ibid., 483.
102 Ibid., 486. 103 Ibid.
104 On 30 July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed the Jerusalem Law, imposing Israeli law in East Jerusalem, Ibid., 487; The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 497 of 17 December 1981 declaring the Israeli decision to impose its laws, administration, and jurisdiction on the Syrian Golan to be illegal. See Regina S. Sharif, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II: 1975-1981 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988), 200.
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Hussein to pursue weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as a deterrent to Israeli aggression. As an example once again of the U.S. double standard regarding aggression and nuclear weapons, Israel never complied with Security Council resolution
487 of 19 June 1981 condemning the strike and demanding reparations to Iraq and United
Nations inspection of Israel’s nuclear facilities. 105 The massive invasion of Lebanon in
1982 with the objectives of destroying the PLO as a political entity and if possible the
Syrian military, annexing Lebanon south of the Litani River, and creating a Lebanese
Christian government beholden to Israel illustrates the major repercussions of the bilateral peace with Egypt, instead of a comprehensive settlement for all parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The parallels to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait are obvious; however, in this case the United States provided the necessary political, economic, and military support which allowed Israel to aggressively invade Lebanon on the flimsiest of pretexts, eschewing international law in favor of committing war crimes resulting in the killing of almost 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, mostly civilians. 106
Although the immediate justification for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 centered on the PLO’s supposed threat to Israel’s security, Israel had long developed ambitions regarding annexation of Lebanese territory and resources and the creation of a
105 Rubenberg, 266-267. For text of resolution, see Sharif, 198-199. 106 Rubenberg, citing the Christian Science Monitor of 21 December 1982, writes that between 4 June and 31 August 1982, 19,085 people were killed, 30,302 wounded. Finkelstein, in “Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 43-56, writes that 20,000 people died due to the invasion. Morris claims these numbers are “vast” exaggerations and writes that “Israeli spokesmen usually claimed that Lebanese and Palestinian civilian dead during the war ran into the hundreds rather than the thousands,” Morris, Righteous Victims, 558. To provide one small example of U.S. support for Israel and complicity in aggression, Rubenberg writes: “A more resolute American response would have strengthened moderate elements in the cabinet and would have prevented the two- month shelling of Beirut. Israeli cabinet ministers who were against extending the war to Beirut saw they could not oppose the plans as long as Washington did not come out against them. ‘I cannot show myself to be less of a patriot than the Americans,’ one minister said.” See Schiff, “The Green Light,” Foreign Policy 50, Spring 1983, 83, cited in Rubenberg, 271.
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Christian-dominated government strategically allied with Israel in a sea of hostile Muslim states. Morris indicates that the prospective Jewish state proposed by the Zionist
Organization at the Versailles peace conference after World War I included southern
Lebanon up to the Litani River. 107 In 1954 Ben-Gurion suggested:
Perhaps (there is never certainty in politics) now is the time to bring about the creation of a Christian State in our neighborhood. . . . Without our initiative and our vigorous aid this will not be done. It seems to me that this is the central duty, or at least one of the central duties, of our foreign policy. This means that time, energy and means ought to be invested in it and that we must act in all possible ways to bring about a radical change in Lebanon. . . . If money is necessary, no amount of dollars should be spared . . . . We must concentrate all our efforts on this issue. . . . This is an historic opportunity. Missing it will be unpardonable. . . . Everything should be done, in my opinion, rapidly and at full steam. 108
Rubenberg concludes: “Thus, Israel’s interest in fostering exclusive [Christian] Maronite dominance in Lebanon, in securing jurisdiction over the Litani River, and in annexing southern Lebanon have long historical precedents.” 109
As an example of continued intransigence toward any peace process resulting in the loss of territory, Israel rejected the Fahd plan. During the summer of 1981, Saudi
Crown Prince Fahd proposed a comprehensive peace settlement calling for Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 1967 borders (including East Jerusalem) and an attendant removal of settlements, Palestinian right of return, a Palestinian state, and the right for all nations to live in peace and security. The Fahd plan was essentially an acceptance of the United
Nations partition plan with land adjustments favorable to Israel, accepting the status quo after the 1948 war and Israel’s control of almost eighty percent of Palestine. Begin
107 Morris, Righteous Victims, 494.
108 Livia Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diaries and Other Documents, 2d ed. (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980), 24-25, cited in Rubenberg, 273. 109 Ibid., 273.
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characterized the plan as a means “to liquidate Israel in stages,” while Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamir described it as “a poisoned dagger thrust into the heart of Israel’s existence.” As with previous Arab offerings, Israel countered in an uncompromising way, by building more settlements in the West Bank. 110 Acceding to Israel’s rejectionist stance, the Reagan administration personified the PLO as a terrorist proxy of the Soviet
Union, interpreting the Arab-Israeli conflict as a reflection of competition between the
U.S. and Soviet Union, failing intentionally or not to understand the Middle East on its own terms and recognize that the Palestinians and various Arab states had legitimate grievances against Israel. Reagan, clearly opposing the Fahd plan, overturned the supposed U.S. opposition to settlements, declaring unilaterally that they were not illegal, and precluded any valid compromise by accepting Israel’s continued control over
Jerusalem. 111
As a means to prevent any peace process, the Israelis desired to destroy the PLO political and social infrastructure in Lebanon, expel the surviving Palestinians to crush
Palestinian nationalism, and assert final sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.
According to Morris, “Israel spent the months between August 1981 and June 1982 seeking a pretext to invade Lebanon.” 112 During that year before the major invasion in
110 Quotes are cited in George Rentz, “The Fahd Plan,” Middle East Insight Vol. 2, No. 2, January/February 1982, 21-24, cited in Ibid., 259. 111 Ibid., 258-265.
112 Morris, Righteous Victims, 509. The PLO essentially established a state within the state of Lebanon in the late 1960s and early 1970s after King Hussein, wary of the developing PLO sovereignty in parts of Jordan, instigated a civil war to regain control over the mostly Palestinian population, ultimately forcing the PLO to find a new base of operations. The PLO signed an agreement with Lebanon in 1969, allowing for Palestinian autonomy, and began developing a social, political, and economic infrastructure for the Palestinian refugees. According to Rubenberg, from the middle of 1968 to the middle of 1974 Israel’s air force attacked Lebanese towns and Palestinian refugee camps on at least 44 occasions, killing almost 900 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. In March 1978, in response to a Palestinian guerilla attack
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June 1982, Israel repeatedly bombed the PLO in southern Lebanon in the hopes of provoking minor Palestinian retaliation, killing 300 and wounding 800, mostly civilians, in one air assault on Beirut on 17 July 1981. 113 Rubenberg writes that “between 1978 and
1981 PLO rocket and guerilla activity across Israel’s northern border decreased markedly, and PLO terrorist activity . . . ceased altogether.” 114 Morris admits that
“indeed, subsequent Israeli propaganda notwithstanding, the border between July 1981 and June 1982 enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968.” 115
Escalating the hysterical propaganda for domestic and American consumption,
Begin, who often compared Arafat to Hitler, seriously proclaimed: “Believe me, the alternative to this [attacking the PLO in Lebanon] is Treblinka, and we have decided that there will not be another Treblinka.” 116 Dr. Herzl Rosenblum, editor of the Israeli daily
Yediot Aharonot, ludicrously wrote:
Arafat, were he stronger, would do to us things that Hitler never even dreamed of . . . . Hitler killed us with a measure of restraint. . . . . If Arafat were to reach power, he would not amuse himself with such “small things.” He will cut off our children’s heads with a cry and in broad daylight and will rape our women before tearing them to pieces and will throw us down from all the rooftops and will skin us as do hungry leopards in the jungle . . . without the famous “order” of the Germans. . . . Hitler is a pussycat compared to what Arafat will bring upon us. 117
The public Israeli plan was to push the Palestinians forty kilometers from the border so as to ostensibly protect Israeli citizens in northern Israel from attack. Begin even wrote to near Tel Aviv, Israel in a disproportionate response invaded Lebanon, conquered territory up to the Litani River, and killed hundreds of Arabs.
113 Morris, Righteous Victims, 507.
114 Rubenberg, 275.
115 Morris, Righteous Victims, 509. 116 Arye Naor, (Heb.) Cabinet at War, the Functioning of the Israeli Cabinet During the Lebanon War (1982) (Israel: Lahav, 1986), 47-48; Tom Segev, (Heb.) The Seventh Million (Tel Aviv: Keter/Domino, n.d.), 274-375, cited in Ibid. , 514.
117 Yediot Aharonot , 2 July 1982, cited in Ibid., 514-515.
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Reagan that “Israel would not attack any Syrian forces in Lebanon or Syria unless the
Syrians engaged the Israelis,” and the operation was not “aimed at acquiring any
Lebanese territory.” 118 However, Israel attacked Lebanon to destroy the PLO and
Palestinian nationalism, strengthening Israeli control over primarily the West Bank, create a Christian minority government in Lebanon friendly and beholden to Israel, annex southern Lebanon, including the Litani River, and possibly strike Syrian positions in
Lebanon, weakening their military capability and the anti-Israel government. 119 As
Rubenberg cogently writes:
The intensification of the campaign against the PLO was related to the Begin government’s decision to absorb the West Bank and Gaza (for which Israel needed a compliant Palestinian population). The PLO was first and foremost the symbol of Palestinian national aspirations. Thus Begin and his advisors believed that if the PLO could be destroyed as an organization, the idea of Palestinian nationalism could be suppressed and eliminated, and those Palestinians living under occupation would have to acquiesce in the extension of Israeli sovereignty over all of historic Palestine. Such acquiescence, it was assumed, would then lead to the emigration of the indigenous population, ensuring continued Jewish exclusivity in the state. The nature of this objective made the elimination of the social and political organizations of the PLO even more important than the destruction of its military capability. 120
Rubenberg further argues that Israel preferred a militant PLO rather than a political one so as to justify Israel’s perpetual refusal to negotiate and give up Arab territories, contrasting with Morris’ incorrect assertion that the Israeli invasion moderated the PLO when in fact the threat of a moderate PLO caused the invasion. 121 Rubenberg cites Yehoshua Porath, an Israeli academic, who stated:
118 New York Times, 6 June 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 282. Both assurances proved to be false, as Israel destroyed the Syrian anti-aircraft defenses in Lebanon, in the hopes of further educating Syria that it could not militarily fight against Israel, and made it quite clear that an annexation of southern Lebanon was a definite possibility. 119 Ibid., 278; Morris, Righteous Victims, 509.
120 Rubenberg, 277.
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The Government’s hope is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base will return to its earlier terrorism; it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes and murder many Israelis. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained and will mobilize the large majority of the Israeli nation in hatred and disgust against it, undercutting the danger that events will develop among the Palestinians that they might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodation. 122
While Israel initiated a provocation campaign in Lebanon and the Arab territories under its control in order to precipitate Palestinian retaliation, thus providing the necessary, yet dubious, pretext for a massive invasion of Lebanon, the PLO essentially resisted taking the bait. Thus a 3 June 1982 assassination attempt in London on Israel’s ambassador to Great Britain by Abu Nidal’s anti-PLO faction precipitated an immediate and massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon and attack on the PLO. The international community considered Israel’s justifications to be dubious and subsequent attack on
Lebanon to be disproportionate and completely immoral, especially considering that the
PLO immediately disclaimed any responsibility, the assailants were captured within twenty-four hours, and a hit list found on a suspect named the PLO’s London representative along with the Israeli ambassador as targets. 123 More legitimate options existed, such as the international legal system, to bring to justice those responsible for heinous crimes. 124 Full-scale warfare punishes thousands upon thousands of innocents, precipitates more violence and terror, and is often far worse than the original crimes committed. The Israeli invasion, dubbed with Orwellian military doublespeak the “Peace
121 Ibid., 277; Morris, Righteous Victims, 558.
122 Ha’aretz, 25 June 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 278. 123 Ibid., 279-281; Morris, Righteous Victims, 507-514.
124 The Israeli use of military force in response to a crime parallels the American illegal invasion against Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil.
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for Galilee,” 125 caused the premature death of almost 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, mainly civilians, and rendered 200,000 Palestinians homeless through the wholesale destruction of refugee camps. 126
The international community called for immediate ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Israel refused, determined that its illegal military aggression would result in political advantages, including the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut and southern Lebanon, a reduction of Syrian forces in Lebanon, and the creation of a
Lebanese government free from Syrian and PLO pressure and instead amenable to Israeli diktat . The Israeli government justified its Lebanese aggression as an example of its commitment against Soviet-sponsored “international terrorism.” 127
Israel violated various Security Council resolutions and ceasefires with the
Palestinians, massively bombing and laying an almost ten-week siege on Beirut, curtailing the delivery of electricity, food, water, fuel, and medicine to the entire western sector of the city (much as the U.S. did to the Iraqi city of Fallujah), in response to PLO willingness to offer recognition to Israel and withdraw from Beirut under a U.S. guarantee for the safety of Palestinian civilians. 128 Despite the Israeli massive bombing
125 Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of military intelligence, states: “It would have been more honest to call [the Lebanon war] ‘The War to Safeguard the Occupation of the West Bank.’” See Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel’s Fateful Hour (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 101, cited in Finkelstein, “Israel and Iraq,” 44.
126 See note 102 above; for refugees see Advisory Committee on Human Rights in Lebanon, Lebanon: Toward Legal Order and Respect for Human Rights (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 10 August 1983), cited in Rubenberg, 281. 127 Ibid., 286; Similarly, Israel is currently justifying its actions against the Palestinians as part of the U.S. War on Terror.
128 Ibid., 290-293. As for the U.S. guarantee of civilian safety, the Philangist militia, under direct Israeli supervision, massacred between 700 and 1500 women, children, and old men in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in September 1982. Due in no small part to U.S. pressure, the United Nations Security Council resolution 521 condemned the massacre but did not call for an investigation or
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of Beirut every time the PLO proposed plans for evacuation, Israeli Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamir falsely declared “we prefer a diplomatic solution. . . . But we are convinced that the PLO will not leave Beirut or Lebanon unless they will be convinced that they have only one choice before them–to leave by negotiations or other means.”129
The U.S. threat and use of veto ensured that adopted Security Council resolutions were not too harsh in condemning Israeli aggression and prevented any enforcement of the
United Nations mandate through sanctions or force, an opposite reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. President Reagan deemed resolution 509, the second ceasefire adopted, irrelevant, arguing that Israel need not withdraw until the Syrian and PLO forces withdrew, thus rewarding Israel’s aggression by acceding to its objectives, once again in complete opposition to the American response to Saddam and the adamant refusal to
“reward” aggression. 130
The Reagan plan for a comprehensive peace dismissed any role for the PLO in negotiations and opposed a Palestinian state; however, much to Israel’s dislike, Reagan opposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank and future settlement building, instead postulating Jordanian supervision over the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli control over
Jerusalem. Considering the Israelis precipitated the Lebanon war to gain sovereignty over the territories, Israel rejected the initiative and continued “. . . a vigorous program of establishing Jewish settlements on the West Bank in order to consolidate Israel’s hold on the area.” Begin said that “such settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral
action to punish the perpetrators, although the evidence insinuated that the Israeli government and army were complicit in the crime.
129 New York Times, 3 August 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 302. 130 See Rubenberg, 298.
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part of our national security. Therefore, there shall be no settlement freeze.” 131 Contrary to the historical record, Reagan bizarrely blamed the Palestinians for the failure of the
Reagan Plan: “Unless the Palestinian leadership makes ‘a bold and courageous move’ to break the Middle East deadlock, the Palestinian people will face continued frustration in meeting their national aspirations.” 132
After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Arab states unanimously adopted a comprehensive peace plan based on the Fahd initiative and resolutions 181 and 242, recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, demanding Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, and annunciating that all nations in the Middle East, including a Palestinian state and Israel, had the right to peace. 133 Shamir described the plan as “a renewed declaration of war on Israel” and “a threat to Israel’s existence. Moreover, the Arab proposal “has no weight, no value . . . and contains the same hate, the same war against peace, the same coldness.” 134
131 For discussion of Reagan Plan, see Rubenberg, 308-314; for Israeli response see Miami Herald, 3 September 1982; New York Times, 3 September 1982, cited in Rubenberg, 309.
132 New York Times, 13 April 1983, cited in Rubenberg, 324. An interesting incident occurred when Reagan declared that unless the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon, the United States possibly would not transfer 75 fighter jets to Israel, scheduled to be delivered almost two years in the future. If the United States were serious about ensuring Israeli withdrawal, surely there were more serious and tangible alternatives than making a dubious threat. However, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens was encouraged to reply: “It has never happened that an American president has said that the supply of aid to which the United States obligated itself is conditional on concessions on policy. Today Lebanon, tomorrow on another front.” Apparently the United States is obligated to provide enormous economic and military aid, as well as political support to Israel, seemingly without gaining any influence on Israel’s actions or receiving a quid pro quo in return. Moreover, while American troops were stationed in Lebanon, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow vehemently stated that “the Israeli troops are deliberately threatening the lives of American military personnel.” For Arens quote see New York Times, 14 April 1983 and Middle East Policy Survey, 8 April 1983, cited in Ibid., 323-323.
133 Ibid., 312.
134 Miami Herald, 11 September 1982; New York Times, 11 September 1982, cited in Ibid., 313.
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The illegal Israeli aggression against Lebanon ultimately failed to produce the desired political results. Israeli maneuverings to orchestrate a puppet government in
Lebanon and maintain control over southern Lebanon proved futile. After the war, a mainly indigenous guerilla movement in southern Lebanon developed to force the Israeli military to withdraw. Israel reacted with “curfews, searches, mass arrests, torture of suspects, vandalism, looting, and occasional on-the-spot executions.” Morris contends that “perhaps a harsher policy, with mass executions and expulsions, and the destruction of whole villages, could have halted the [guerilla] campaign. But given Israel’s behavioral and democratic norms, this was never an option.” 135 Although Israel’s history somewhat belies Morris’ contention, it is telling that Israel clings to forceful military methods to compel enemy populations’ acquiescence to Israeli diktat without seemingly considering political or diplomatic compromise that would possibly foster peaceful coexistence.
Moreover, the invasion did not bring to fruition the destruction of a political PLO and the eradication of Palestinian nationalism and dignity. Morris writes: “Over the decades the security forces detained tens of thousands of inhabitants, holding them for weeks and months on end, often without trial. Interrogation involved physical and psychological abuse and, frequently, varying degrees of torture.” 136 Responding to decades of oppression and dire economic straits, the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza erupted in a grassroots resistance to Israeli occupation in December 1987. The uprising, known as the Intifada, “. . . was not an armed rebellion but a massive persistent campaign of civil resistance, with strikes and commercial shutdowns, accompanied by
135 Morris, Righteous Victims, 553. 136 Ibid., 568.
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violent (though unarmed) demonstrations against the occupying forces.” 137 The Intifada raised the world’s consciousness on the plight of the Palestinians. Israel, almost incapable of fathoming a political and just settlement, resorted to force to quell the
Palestinian people. Morris rhetorically queries: “How was Israel to respond [to the
Intifada]? Almost everything was tried: shooting to kill, shooting to injure, beatings, mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative detention, and economic sanctions.” 138
Despite that Israeli contempt for international law and human rights rivals that of the
United States, Morris, in a spout of unjustified praise, believes that “as a democracy bound by respect for the rule of law and subject to internal and external public scrutiny, there were measures that Israel could not undertake,” as if those listed above were acceptable. 139 However, if these measures “such as transfer, starvation, and genocide, were applied,” the Intifada could be suppressed. “But none of these methods is acceptable to the State of Israel,” 140 even though history exposes the ethnic cleansing policies of the Israeli government and its callous disregard for Arab lives and “one opinion poll indicated that almost half the electorate looked to some sort of transfer solution” during the Intifada. 141 Illustrating the extent that Israel embodies the ideals of democracy, human rights, equality, and so on, Morris writes: “But almost all continued to resist the possibility of talking to the PLO and of a Palestinian state. ‘Transfer’ seemed
137 Ibid., 561.
138 Ibid., 587. 139 Ibid.
140 CGS Dan Shomron interview in Ha’aretz, 17 March 1989, cited in Ibid., 587.
141 Ibid., 598.
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to hold a simply decisive way out, though most acknowledged that the Arab world and the West would never accede to the idea.” 142
At the Algiers Summit in 1988, the Palestinian National Congress proposed the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of resolution 181, a comprehensive political settlement with Israel, and an international conference based on resolutions 242 and 338. Moreover, the PLO renounced terrorism, but asserted its legitimate right to struggle against foreign occupation. Morris describes Israeli opposition: “But whatever the PLO said or did, Shamir, now Prime Minister in a unity government formed by Labor and Likud, believed that the West Bank and Gaza were an inalienable part of the Jewish people’s heritage and must not revert to Arab sovereignty.” The Israeli response, the
Shamir plan, asserted an ostensible Israeli commitment to the Camp David accords, although Israel repeatedly rejected resolution 242, and opposed PLO participation in negotiations and a Palestinian state. However, Shamir let slip that his plan was “idle fancy,” a maneuver meant to prolong and stall negotiations in order to establish facts on the ground, namely Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. Sharon iterated that Israel would not give up land and the settlement building would continue apace. Morris argues unconvincingly that the U.S. “despite its deep commitment to Israel’s security and future” was a “relatively objective broker” for Middle East peace. 143
An article by Virginia Tilley, political science and international relations professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and author of The One-State Solution: A
142 Ibid., 599. Interestingly, Morris writes that Israel’s 800,000 Arab citizens aspired “to attain political, social, and economic equality with Israel’s Jews.” Yet, this fact did not foster any skepticism on his part regarding Israeli democracy. During the Intifada, Israel maintained a policy of house demolition and massive deportation that were upheld by the Israeli courts even though counter to the conventions and precepts of international law. During the Intifada, 50,000 Palestinians served time in prison, thousands without trial. See Ibid., 602, 592-593, 597. 143 Ibid., 607-611.
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Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock, dissecting recent events in the Middle East fitfully concludes this background leading into the discussion of United
Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Israel. 144 Due essentially to U.S. and
Israeli pressure, the European Union, the Netherlands, and Canada rescinded desperately needed financial aid to the Palestinian people ostensibly because the recently democratically elected Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority has not recognized Israel’s “right to exist” or “renounced violence” as outlined most recently in the Oslo Road Map, the American initiated peace process implemented after the first
Intifada. On the face of the matter, it is extremely hypocritical and illogical to demand that the Palestinians accede to the Oslo Accords and recognize Israel’s “right to exist” while not demanding that Israel cease and reverse its blatant construction of illegal settlements and the illegal barrier wall in the West Bank, which is in complete opposition to their Road Map obligations.
On a deeper level, Tilley lays bare the U.S. and Israel’s underlying motives for demanding the Palestinians accept Israel’s “right to exist.” First and foremost, international law does not recognize a country’s “right to exist,” only the “fact” of existence within defined territory. Hamas has the legitimate right to withhold diplomatic recognition on the grounds that Israel has not designated its official borders. Indeed, the new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has declared that perhaps Israel will unilaterally determine its final borders by 2010, a mere sixty-two years after its creation. Tilley observes that recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” implies its “right to exist” as a Jewish
144 The following discussion is from Virginia Tilley, “Making (Non) Sense of the Funding Cut- Off: Hamas and Israel’s “Right to Exist,”” Counterpunch, 12 May 2006,
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state, maintaining the policies and practices necessary to maintain a Jewish majority within its boundaries. Essentially the phrase “right to exist” justifies and legitimizes
Israel’s right to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing, rejecting international law and the right of return of Palestine refugees and preventing any demographic threat of non-Jewish citizenship in Israel. 145
Tellingly, the international community has not recognized the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. The United Nations’ sole mention of a Jewish state was in the partition plan’s two-state solution based on ethnic nationalism with gerrymandered borders to orchestrate a Jewish and an Arab majority in each state. Israel’s immediate acquisition of designated Palestinian territory and expulsion of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants rendered the partition plan and a two state solution quite untenable. Ascribed in the Geneva Conventions, international law requires the right of return for refugees, a right that Israel prevents the Palestinians from asserting because it would drastically jeopardize a Jewish majority in Israel. The United Nations, as numerous resolutions demonstrate, cannot recognize Israel as a Jewish state, legitimately maintaining a Jewish majority, without opposing international law, especially regarding the right of return for
Palestinian refugees, and the norms regarding human rights, whether political, economic,
145 On 15 May 2006, The Toledo Blade published an Associated Press story reporting on A2 that the Israeli Supreme Court upheld a racist and discriminatory law that prevents Palestinians from reuniting and living with their Israeli families in Israel proper supposedly on the security grounds that some Arab men who marry Israeli Arab women were terrorists. Without comment, the article states that “[the ruling] centered on two very touchy issues that have faced Israel for decades: balancing security and human rights, and maintaining the state’s Jewish identity while dealing fairly with a large Arab minority.” The law which affects Palestinian women under twenty-five, even though the Israeli government did not mention that women were involved in terror attacks, and men under thirty-five reeks of collective punishment and a disavowal of sincere democratic values. For maps illustrating the current Israeli policy to permanently acquire Jerusalem and land and settlements in the West Bank through the construction of an apartheid Wall, see Appendix II, Maps III, IV, V, VI on pages 421-424. The maps, from the Palestine Land Development Information Systems (PALDIS) and the Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, can be found at
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or social, applying equally to all regardless of discriminating characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religion, or sex.
Tilley argues that the international community insists that the future State of
Palestine “must comprise a stable democracy that secures equal rights for all its citizens irrespective of religion or race. But if they hold Palestine to this standard, then why are they not holding Israel to the same standard?” Tilley concludes that “if Israel’s ‘right to exist’ does not entail sustaining a Jewish majority (which necessitates discriminatory legislation, ethnic cleansing, land grabs, and social engineering), then the ethnic logic supporting two states disappears.” 146
In the United States large-scale propaganda describes Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East, a benign and benevolent occupier, intent on peace, yet surrounded by those seeking its very destruction. The real history of the Arab-Israeli conflict describes Israel as an expansionistic and militaristic nation more intent on securing land than peace due in large part to the United States’ military, economic, and political support. The brief background narrative indicates Israeli and U.S. rejection of peace, international law, and human rights providing a necessary context explaining U.S. obstructionism in the United Nations Security Council, which prevents any serious condemnation of Israel or enforcement of pertinent resolutions on the most flimsy of pretexts.
146 Further illustrating the complete Israeli rejection of a Palestinian state and the racism underlying Israeli policies, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confessed to the U.S. Congress in May 2006 that “I believed, and to this day still believe, in our people’s eternal and historic right to this entire land,” and “Israel must still meet the momentous challenge of guaranteeing the future of Israel as a democratic State with a Jewish majority, within permanent and defensible borders and a united Jerusalem as its capital.” For text of Olmert’s address, see the online edition of the Jerusalem Post , 24 May 2006, at
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Chapter Five:
Vetoing the United Nations
Beginning with its fundamental rejection of the United Nations’ partition plan, the
State of Israel has failed to comply with literally dozens of Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions condemning Israel’s aggressive expansion and occupation of Arab lands in the Middle East. The United States has habitually used its veto, especially from
1980 through 2004, as a permanent member of the Security Council to prevent the adoption and enforcement of dozens more resolutions pertaining to Israel. While three
U.S. administrations have cited supposed Iraqi violation of United Nations Security
Council resolutions to justify two military invasions, one extended and present occupation, numerous bombings, and over a decade of brutal sanctions, not one president, save Dwight Eisenhower during the Suez crisis, has demanded Israel comply with relevant United Nations demands and international law. U.S. policy contradicts and opposes the virtuous rhetoric concerning democracy, the rule of law, peace, and justice and instead contributes toward a more unstable, unequal, and dangerous world.
During the twenty-five year period from 1980 through 2004, the United States vetoed thirty-two resolutions criticizing Israeli aggression in the Middle East and the illegal occupation of Palestinian Arab lands. 1 The U.S. and its clients operate on a double
1 During this time period permanent members of the Security Council vetoed sixty-three resolutions; the United States vetoed fifty-four, forty alone, seven with both France and the United
standard, oftentimes eschewing international law as merely applicable to other nations and peoples. The statements made to the Security Council during the sessions that the following draft resolutions were voted upon provide a rich documentary record highlighting not only the U.S. and Israel’s opposition to the international consensus on the Middle East, but also Israel’s contempt for the United Nations and Palestinian rights and the U.S.’s tortured explanations justifying veto after veto, preventing the Security
Council from forcing Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories, including
Jerusalem, allow the return of Palestinian refugees, and end the discriminatory policies against Arabs which violate international norms and human rights. Although all the draft resolutions are interrelated, for ease of discussion, the drafts are divided into three categories: the occupation of Arab territories since 1967, the invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, and other acts of Israeli aggression.
The main paragraphs of the Jordanian draft resolution S/14943 of 1 April 1982 state that the Security Council
1. Denounces measures imposed on the Palestinian population such as the dismissal of elected mayors by Israeli authorities, as well as the violation of the liberties and rights of the inhabitants of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip which followed the measures taken by Israel with regard to the [Syrian] Golan Heights, and which could only damage the prospects for peace;
2. Calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to rescind its decision disbanding the elected municipal council of El Bireh and its decision to remove from their posts the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah;
3. Reaffirms that all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 continue to apply in full to all of the occupied territories;
4. Calls upon Israel to cease forthwith all measures applied in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, which contravene
Kingdom, and seven with only the U.K. The Soviet Union/Russian Federation vetoed seven resolutions and China two.
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the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
5. Calls upon the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 7 April 1982 on the implementation of this resolution;
6. Decides to remain seized with this item. 2
As Rubenberg indicates, the Israeli dismissal of Palestinian mayors in the West
Bank and Gaza was part of the provocation campaign before the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon to elicit a PLO retaliatory response. A second motive was to show the
Palestinians the impotence of the PLO, thus demoralizing the population, which would create Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli occupation. 3 While thirteen members of the
Security Council voted in favor of this resolution, the negative vote of the United States, a permanent member of the Council, prevented its adoption and enforcement. 4 The
United States ambassador claimed that the “draft resolution . . . uses strongly denunciatory language and does not take into account the complexity of the problem.” 5
While the resolution hardly “uses strongly denunciatory language,” the American pretext to veto the draft seems quite dubious. As for the “complexity of the problem,” the United
Nations merely demands that Israel follow international law, especially the Geneva
Conventions, when orchestrating policies and practices in the occupied territories. The
U.S. ambassador further argued that not only has Israel maintained the Geneva
2 Jody A. Boudreault, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume IV: 1987-1991 (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), 416-417.
3 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 280.
4 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2348 th Meeting, S/PV.2348, 2.
5 Ibid., 3.
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Conventions in the occupied territories but since “there is no provision . . . for the election of public officials–which Israel none the less permitted in 1972 and 1976,” Israel has humanely and benevolently surpassed “the requirements of the convention.” 6 As for the election of Palestinian officials, Israel maintained military control over the people, land, and resources rendering any political Palestinian autonomy negligible. The draft clearly refers to other Israeli policies that violate the Geneva Conventions, polices that the Security Council was well aware, which contradicts the American contention that
Israel accedes to the Conventions, let alone surpassing their requirements. The U.S. claim implicitly justifying the dismissal of elected officials failed to consider that the
Israeli policy was a grave violation of Palestinian human rights warranting condemnation.
Although not a member, the Israeli ambassador addressed and directly accused the Security Council of being an obstacle to peace, implying that the Israeli occupation of
Arab territories is not the contributing factor to the instability and violence in the region. 7
Ignoring or tacitly not admitting that the United States provides enormous diplomatic, military, and economic aid to Israel, the Israeli ambassador asserted “some Arab countries have been funneling money through their agents into these areas and organizing subversion.” 8 Israel’s actions in the occupied territories are understandable and justifiable as self-defense since “Israel will not tolerate terror and subversion in Judea,
Samaria, and the Gaza district.” 9 The Israeli government often refers to the West Bank as
Judea and Samaria, intimating that the Arab territory is part of historic Israel. The
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 1-2.
8 Ibid., 2.
9 Ibid.
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Palestinians, needless to say, have no right to resist occupation or fight for self- determination in their homeland. Just as the United States has absurdly asserted that the insurgency in Iraq, which developed after the U.S. invasion in 2003, is due mainly to foreign fighters, the Israeli ambassador in 1982 just as absurdly blamed Palestinian resistance on foreign subversion. 10 While attempting to justify the illegal occupations, both countries deliberately fail to acknowledge that the inhabitants of Iraq and the occupied territories have legitimate grievances and the moral duty to resist blatant
American and Israeli foreign subversion and oppression of their homelands.
The remaining fourteen members of the Council denounced Israel’s actions and repeated the international consensus regarding a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. The French ambassador lamented Israel’s adoption of a law illegally extending its legislation, jurisdiction and administration to the Syrian Golan, which the United Nations condemned and deemed invalid in Security Council resolution 497. 11 The Irish ambassador reiterated that resolution 242, which demands Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and full acceptance of the right of all states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, is insufficient for a total peace because it does not address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. 12 Japan stated “Israel’s latest actions clearly violated the relevant Council resolutions as well as the Geneva
Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 3; for the text of the Security Resolution on the Syrian Golan see Regina S. Sharif, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II: 1975-1981 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 200.
12 Ibid., 4.
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1949.” 13 Poland recognized “these events are the tragic consequences of the expansionist policy of Israel aimed at breaking the determined resistance of the Arab people.” 14 Zaire, abstaining due to the lack of consensus on the draft owing to the U.S. veto, concluded the obvious that “there can be no question of settling the complex problem of the Middle
East and Palestine by expedient unilateral solutions, which consist purely and simply of grabbing the occupied Arab territories.” 15
Although not able to vote, the Syrian representative addressed the Council, accusing the United States of vetoing the self-determination principle of the Charter. 16
Moreover, the Palestinian representative declared that “U.S. has opted to be a minority of one against the rest of the international community. . . . The PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization] holds the government of the United States to be not only an accomplice but also an equal partner in the crime committed against our people, in the crime to deprive our people to a life in its own homeland. The United States is equally responsible for those crimes.” 17
The draft resolution S/14985 of 20 April 1982, concerning an Israeli soldier’s attack at the al-Haram al-Sharif holy site in Jerusalem, states that the Security Council
“recalling its relevant resolutions pertaining to the status and character of the Holy City of Jerusalem,” and affirming once more that the Geneva Convention relative to the
13 Ibid., 5.
14 Ibid., 6.
15 Ibid., 7.
16 Ibid., 9.
17 Ibid., 12.
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Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to all territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,”
1. Condemns in the strongest terms these appalling acts of sacrilege perpetrated within the precincts of al-Haram al-Sahrif;
2. Deplores any act or encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem as tending to disturb world peace;
3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to observe and apply scrupulously the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the principles of international law governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem;
4. Requests the Secretary General as he deems appropriate to keep the Security Council fully informed on the implementation of this resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of this serious matter. 18
The United States cast a veto negating the affirmative votes of the remaining fourteen members of the Security Council and preventing the adoption of the draft resolution.19 The U.S. ambassador claimed the resolution would create more violence and vetoed the draft because it “implies that the responsibility for the terrible event lies not with the individual who was responsible for the incident but with the Israeli authorities, who have unequivocally denounced the act.” 20 While the U.S. interpretation of the resolution is disputable given the actual wording of the draft, it is necessary to realize that the U.S. and Israel consistently have blamed the Palestinian leadership, especially Yasser Arafat and presently the democratically elected Hamas party, for any
Palestinian violence against Israelis, a useful ploy to perpetually forestall political
18 Boudreault, 417.
19 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2357 th Meeting, S/PV.2357, 9.
20 Ibid., 10.
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negotiations with the Palestinians until their leadership has renounced and prevented all violence and resistance to the occupation. Echoing the Israeli ambassador’s referral to the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, the U.S. ambassador controversially maintained that “the final status of Jerusalem can only be determined through negotiations among all concerned parties,” thus unambiguously supporting the Israeli position contrary to the
1947 partition plan and all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security
Council. 21 Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, is a nonnegotiable precondition for any peaceful settlement. Not only is the acquisition of territory by force illegal in international law, but the partition plan designated Jerusalem an international city precluding it from falling under the sole jurisdiction and administration of the separate Jewish or Palestinian Arab state. The United States essentially declared before the Security Council its rejection of Palestinian self- determination and a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The other participants in the debate opposed the U.S. position and unequivocally supported the relevant United Nations resolutions and international consensus concerning the occupied territories. The Uganda ambassador remarked that “it must be emphasized that the root of the turmoil in the Middle East is the denial of the right to self- determination of the Palestinian people and the continued illegal occupation of Arab lands by Israel.” 22 The League of Arab States representative stated
the attempt to absolve the occupying power in Jerusalem, ab initio , of its direct responsibility under the Fourth Geneva Convention and under international law is an attempt to create a situation where Jerusalem is not treated as an occupied territory, an attempt to legitimize what the international community has correctly defined as illegal
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 5.
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and illegitimate occupation. 23
The ambassador from the Soviet Union reiterated that the U.S. vote signals to the world that it does not recognize East Jerusalem as occupied territory. Moreover, U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism in the Middle East dismiss the international principle of non-acquisition of territory by force. 24 The Syrian ambassador reminded the council that
Israel annexed Jerusalem in 1967 and declared it the “eternal capital” in 1982 rejecting world opinion and relevant United Nations resolutions prohibiting such a move. The
United States supported Israel in this regard, even attempting to delete “in Jerusalem” from the preamble paragraph of this draft resolution referring to the applicability of the
Geneva Convention in the occupied territories. 25
The Palestinian representative referred to his comments from a previous meeting debating this draft resolution, arguing that the United States
is duty-bound to reaffirm that the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem has not been changed and that the United States is committed to upholding the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to reaffirm the applicability of its provisions to occupied Jerusalem. The failure of the United States government to state that in very clear terms can only be interpreted by us Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims all over the world as a clear and unambiguous commitment of the government to support and encourage Israel in its policies and practices. 26
After the vote, the understandably frustrated Palestinian representative stated that
the United States has in very clear terms and with no ambiguity chosen to be a minority of one, isolated from the rest of the world and a renegade. The government of the United States of America has rendered the Council and the United Nations–the
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 Ibid., 12.
26 S/PV.2356 as cited in Ibid., 13.
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hope of mankind–helpless and ineffective. 27
While the Palestinians would continue to acknowledge the Security Council as the appropriate forum to implement a just peace in the Middle East, their representative promised that if the United States continued to undermine the United Nations, then the
Palestinians would have no choice but to resist occupation and Israeli military power by all available means. 28
Similarly, the United States cast the sole negative vote against the draft resolution
S/17769/Rev.1 of 30 January 1986, which states in part that the Security Council,
“bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious dimensions of the Holy Places in the
City,” “ strongly deploring the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,” and “deeply concerned at the provocative acts by Israelis, including members of the Knesset, which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem,”
1. Strong deplores the provocative acts which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem;
2. Affirms that such acts constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the failure of which could also endanger international peace and security;
3. Determines once more that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian or other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that the policy and practices of Israel of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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4. Reiterates that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter that character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and in particular the “basic law” 29 on Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
5. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to observe scrupulously the norms of international law governing military occupation, in particular the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to prevent any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem, including any cooperation that the Council may desire from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places;
6. Urgently calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to implement forthwith the provisions of this resolution and the relevant Security Council resolutions;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution before 1 May 1986. 30
Although members of the Israeli Knesset and government ministers had violated the sanctity of the Muslim holy site on several occasions, the U.S. ambassador, echoing the argument above and ignoring the fundamental elements in the resolution, claimed that the draft unfairly places culpability on the government of Israel instead of the few individuals responsible for the acts. 31 Hence the American veto against thirteen affirmative votes and one abstention, despite that the draft primarily condemns all Israeli policies that consolidate and extend Jewish control over the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, in clear violation of international law. 32 The Palestinian representative exposed the U.S. double standard, arguing that when Palestinians commit
29 The “basic law” on Jerusalem declares a united and completed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
30 Boudreault, 423-424.
31 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record, 2650 th Meeting, S/PV.2650, 24- 25.
32 Ibid., 31.
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an act the U.S. and Israel consider terrorist, the United States holds the PLO responsible. 33 The Israeli ambassador, arrogantly claiming victim hood and placing the onus for violence on the Palestinians, quoted a “leader of Israel” who said “I will forgive our enemies everything except one thing: that they force our children to learn war.” The ambassador related that
anyone who has lived in my country knows the terrible price that we have had to pay in our scholars, in our poets, in our men of letters, in our men of science who have been forced to take up the sword so that we may live in our ancient homeland. 34
By falsifying the unambiguous historical record and implying that foreign settlers and colonizers who have forcibly expanded into Arab territory, expelled a large proportion of the indigenous population, and imposed discriminatory laws and policies favoring those of Jewish ethnicity have been victims merely attempting to legitimately defend themselves and their “ancient homeland,” the Israeli ambassador attempted to dehumanize the Palestinians and de-legitimize their resistance as uncontrollable, unconscionable, and irrational hatred against Jews. Remembering that Israel is the aggressor in the Middle East, one should wonder at the “terrible price” that the
Palestinians “have had to pay” in lives and potential under almost forty years of Israeli occupation.
The draft resolution S/15895 of 1 August 1983, concerning Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, states in part that the Security Council “ affirming that the situation in the occupied Arab territories remains grave and volatile and that the Israeli settlement policies and practices constitute a major obstacle to all efforts and initiatives towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” and “ affirming once
33 Ibid., 42.
34 Ibid., 46.
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more that the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time or War, of 12 August 1949, are applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including Jerusalem,”
1. Reaffirms all its relevant resolutions;
2. Determines that the policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, have no legal validity, constitute a major and serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and are in contravention with article 49(b) of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949;
3. Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the provision of the above-mentioned Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, to rescind its previous measures, to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab Territories occupied in 1967 and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories and to force transfers of Arab populations from these territories;
4. Strongly deplores the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements, to desist from expanding and enlarging the existing ones and, in particular, to cease on an urgent basis from the planning, construction and establishment of new settlements in the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. Rejects all Israeli arbitrary and illegal actions, especially those which result in the expulsion, deportation and forcible transfers of Arab populations from the occupied Arab territories;
6. Condemns the recent attacks perpetuated against [the] Arab civilian population in the occupied Arab territories, especially the killing and wounding of students at the Islamic college of the Arab city of Al-Khalil on 26 July 1983;
7. Calls upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;
8. Reaffirms its determination, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of the
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present resolution;
9. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied Arab territories under constant and close scrutiny;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution. 35
As mentioned above, the General Assembly partitioned Palestine against the wishes of the majority indigenous population, granting over fifty-five percent of the land to less than one-third of the people. After the 1948 war and the mass expulsion of the
Arab inhabitants, Israel controlled over seventy-seven percent of Palestine, and after the
Six-Day war in 1967, Israel almost tripled its territory, controlling the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.
Although Israel illegally gained territory during the 1948 hostilities, the international consensus demands only Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, which the General Assembly designated an international city. The debate on the substance of this draft resolution concerning the Jewish settlements illustrates that the United States and Israel completely reject the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus remaining the primary obstacles to a peaceful and just settlement.
The United States vetoed the draft resolution, protecting Israel and undermining the will of the Council, because the text implied that Israel has forcibly transferred Arab populations from the occupied territories. Although the resolution rejects Israeli actions that result in deportation or expulsion, the stress of the resolution is on the illegal Israeli settlers and settlements in the occupied territories and the U.S. ambassador explicated
35 Boudreault, 419-420.
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that the international stance toward Israeli settlements provided the real impetus for the veto. The United States was against the dismantlement of the settlements in the occupied territories because “the future of the settlements is precisely one of the key issues which will need to be addressed in negotiations.” Moreover, “nor can we accept continuing the sterile argument as to whether the settlements are “legal” or “illegal”. . .” because apparently the legality of the settlements “fails to address the real problems.” The United
States, rejecting all relevant United Nations resolutions, favored “unconditional negotiation without prejudgment, with preconditions, precluding no issue. . . .” 36 While international consensus demands unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a precondition for a Middle East peace, the United States and Israel continue to claim that negotiations between the parties, which may not include the Palestinian representatives, will determine the status of the illegal settlements and Jerusalem, thus rewarding Israel for aggression and violating the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.
In an interesting statement that seemingly opposes and definitely weakens the mandate of the Security Council the ambassador commented that “the United States, for its part, rarely tries to enforce decisions which do not arise out of the genuine self- initiated will of the parties to a conflict or to any form of dispute.” 37 The statement seems completely absurd because of course the United States does not abide by this policy when it presents resolutions to the Council on Iraq or Iran. Perhaps the ambassador was implying that the Palestinians and the Arab states are not valid parties to the Arab-Israeli
36 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2461 st Meeting, S/PV.2461, 23.
37 Ibid., 24.
216
conflict. Perhaps the ambassador thought that all parties to a dispute must wish for
Security Council intervention, and since Israel clearly dismisses the Council, all resolutions pertaining to it are invalid and unwarranted. Most likely, recognizing that the
Security Council would honor the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to self- determination, thus infringing on Israel’s territorial expansion, the United States favors a
Middle East peace process wholly outside United Nations jurisdiction.
The Israeli representative to the United Nations displayed his nation’s contempt for the Security Council and complete rejection of the international consensus for a just
Middle East peace. Israel’s arguments and accusations are disingenuous attempts to justify occupation and settlement and deserve to be examined closely. The Israeli ambassador bluntly asserted that the Security Council “has systematically disqualified itself on matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.” 38 Moreover, he maintained that
this foul, abusive and offensive language reflects the inability or unwillingness, or both, of Israel’s enemies to come to terms with the very existence of my country and its right to exist. This has been the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict all along, ever since 1948, since the establishment of Israel as an independent state, and before. 39
The ambassador’s proof is the University of Illinois professor Fred Gottheil, who testified before the Congressional Committee on International Relations on 12 September 1977 that
Jewish settlements on the West Bank is [ sic ] an issue today only because the existence of Israel is an issue. The issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank today is simply one thin layer that emanates from and partially conceals the core of the conflict, namely the non-recognition by the Arab states of Israel’s right to exist. 40
38 Ibid., 8.
39 Ibid., 7.
40 Ibid., 12.
217
Recognition of Israel’s “right to exist” implies Israel’s “right to exist” as a Jewish state with the right to ethnically cleanse the non-Jewish population in the territory that Israel deems will be within its final borders, which Israel will unilaterally establish at some indeterminate point in the future. No entity in the international community recognizes
Israel’s “right to exist,” including the United Nations because that particular type of recognition would violate international law and the United Nations Charter regarding the return of refugees, aggression, and acquisition of territory by force. Moreover, various
Arab states including Egypt and Jordan and the PLO actively sought peace treaties with
Israel that recognized Israel’s existence and Israel, recognizing its military supremacy, rejected many substantial peace offerings. The Israeli ambassador’s argument on this point is not only invalid, but also disingenuous because it places the blame for Israeli expansion and settlement on the Palestinian victims.
The ambassador concluded that Jews “may live in Hebron, Nebraska; or in
Bethel, Connecticut; or in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; or in Jericho, New York. We shall not accept that Jews qua Jews shall be barred from living in Hebron, Judea; or in
Bethlehem, Judea; or Bethel, Samaria; or Jericho, Samaria,” a complete rejection of the partition’s demand for a Palestinian Arab state and compelling evidence for Israel’s overall plan for annexation of portions of the occupied territories. 41 The question then arises, are Palestinians allowed to live in the aforementioned cities in the West Bank?
Tellingly, while Jews are able to live anywhere within Israel’s undefined borders,
Palestinian refugees are not allowed to return to their homes contrary to international law because that would jeopardize the Jewish majority in Israel. Moreover, in order to consolidate settlement blocs in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, a Jewish
41 Ibid.
218
population must immigrate while the Palestinians are encouraged or forced to emigrate, changing the demographic character of the territories.
Contradicting over thirty years of history and a reality-based assessment, the ambassador argued that
at the same time it has never been the aim of Israel to exercise control over the lives and activities of the Arab inhabitants there. We have repeatedly stated, and I wish to state it here again, that we seek to live as equals with them, not to replace them. Furthermore, it has been the policy of the government of Israel that no single Palestinian Arab resident of these areas legally holding claim to land should be made homeless by the establishment of these villages. Incidentally, many of the present-day Jewish villages in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district have been established on Jewish-owned land expropriated in 1948 by the Jordanian or Egyptian government. Most of them have been set up on government and public land which have been barren for centuries. 42
Notice the use of “villages” as quite an innocuous euphemism for “illegal settlements.”
The ambassador further asserts that “. . . Israel has better title to any territory of the former Palestine mandate than any other state,” meaning Egypt and Jordan. To substantiate his claim, the Israeli ambassador quoted Stephen Schwebel, a justice on the
World Court, who said “where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self- defense has, against that prior holder, better title.” Moreover, Israel contended that the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12
August 1949, is inapplicable to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District since Jordan was not a legitimate sovereign when Israel, in self-defense, gained control over the territory during the Six-Day war. 43
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 13-14.
219
However, the Israeli legal argument is somewhat ingenuous and does not stand under minimal scrutiny. The sovereignty over the occupied territories belongs to the
Palestinian people, not Jordan, not Egypt, not Israel. Moreover, it is false to claim that
Israel gained control over the territories in self-defense. The ambassador next played the
“security” card declaring that
until 1967 all of Israel’s major towns and cities were within range of medium Arab artillery, and our capital, Jerusalem, was within light mortar range of Arab forces. Villages of the kind we are discussing have proved to be an effective form of early warning system. 44
Once again referring to illegal settlements as “villages” and Jerusalem as “our capital,” the Israeli ambassador, while providing no evidence and contrary to common sense, claimed that the settlements provided security to Israel. While Israel has made devastating raids into various Arab countries, including Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and
Tunisia, and while many Arab cities are within range of Israeli rockets, Israel has the right to establish buffer zones in foreign territory. The Arab states hardly possess the same right.
Finally, Israel called for “direct and substantive negotiation between the states concerned,” leaving out a main party to any negotiations, the Palestinians. Declaring that
“the expression of this unwillingness [to recognize Israel’s existence and its right to exist] has been a refusal to sit down with us and negotiate without any prior conditions,” Israel ignores history, indicates its rejection of the international consensus, and exposes its intent to reap rewards for aggressive and expansionist policies. 45
44 Ibid., 14.
45 Ibid., 14-15.
220
The other participants in the debate unambiguously rejected the U.S. and Israel’s actions preventing a viable peace process. The German Democratic Republic stated that
“nobody can ignore the fact that the present escalation of Israel’s policy of aggression and occupation is possible only with the unqualified support of the United States.” 46 The
Soviet ambassador, observing that twenty Arab nations submitted the draft proposal, commented that the U.S. veto dismisses the “just demands” of Arab countries, sanctions
Israel’s illegal annexation of territory, and exhibits a pro-Israeli imperialist policy. 47 The
Palestinian representative iterated that since 1976 the PLO has called for negotiations within the Security Council on the basis of the principles of United Nations Charter and the relevant resolutions. 48 The League of Arab States, affirming that the annexed territories are non-negotiable, argued the settlements are “deliberate attempts to pre-empt the emergence of any form of a Palestinian identity--any form of Palestinian self- determination.” 49
The debate surrounding the draft resolution S/17459 of 12 September 1985 illustrated more U.S. hypocrisy and Israeli obfuscation of international law. Although four nations abstained, the United States cast the lone veto, thus shouldering responsibility for the consequences of further Security Council inaction. The draft requested that the Security Council, “ affirming once again that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,”
46 Ibid., 6.
47 Ibid., 23-24.
48 Ibid., 24-25.
49 Ibid., 25-28.
221
1. Deplores the repressive measures taken by Israel since 4 August 1985 against [ sic ] civilian population in the Israeli occupied territories specially in the West Bank and Gaza and expressed serious concern that the persistence of Israeli authorities in applying such measures would lead to further deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories;
2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately stop all repressive measures including curfews, administrative detentions and forceful deportation and to release all detainees and refrain from further deportations;
3. Further calls upon Israel to abide scrupulously by the provision of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. 50
The Israeli ambassador argued that nothing, not “national liberation,” not fighting for “legitimate rights,” justified the “deliberate murder of children.”51 However, the philosopher Michael Neumann counters the noble claims of the imperial oppressor through a comparison familiar to most Americans. Neumann states
the Indians’ very existence as a people was threatened. More than threatened; their society was doomed without resistance. . . . Moreover, every single white person, down to the children, was an enemy, a being which, allowed to live, would contribute to the destruction of the Indians’ collective existence. 52
Obviously, Neumann observes, the Native Americans did not have the conventional military power to defeat a white population that had no right to travel to the Americas to
50 Boudreault, 422.
51 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fortieth-Year: 2605 th Meeting, S/PV.2605, 15. As for whether these standards apply to Israel itself, recall that the historian Benny Morris observed the Israelis precluded nonviolent forms of Palestinian resistance and this section details the U.S. prevention of Security Council action, leaving Palestinians with few options. As for casualty figures, Finkelstein writes: “From 1947 to the present, the number of Israeli deaths during all its wars and policing operations--1947- 1949, 1956, 1967, 1967-1970, 1973, 1982, the first and second intifadas--as well as from all terrorist attacks comes in total to under 22,000, the overwhelming number of them combatants. By comparison, just in the course of Israel’s June-September 1982 invasion of Lebanon, between 18,000 and 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, the overwhelming number of them civilians.” See Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley, University of California Press) , 276.
52 Michael Neumann, Counterpunch, 9 April 2002,
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commit genocide against the indigenous peoples, steal their land, and destroy their cultures. Neumann argues that the Native Americans were justified in utilizing any means necessary for self-preservation and self-defense and were limited in their capabilities to attacking soft targets. Similarly, Jewish colonizers, legitimized by the
United Nations, have done nothing less than steal the land and resources and destroy the culture and population of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine. Similarly, the
Palestinians struggling for self-preservation lack the conventional capacity to fight a
“legitimate” resistance against a military superpower where every able-bodied adult is at least an army reservist. 53 The Palestinians have the moral duty to resist until Israel withdraws from their territory and allows Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty over land and resources, as the Soviet ambassador unambiguously affirmed when he stated that “we reject any attempt to equate the occupiers with the inhabitants of the territories who are resisting occupation.” 54
An interesting corollary is that the United States and Israel have a monopoly on language. While those fighting against U.S. occupation in Iraq and Israeli occupation in
Palestine are “terrorists” or “insurgents,” the U.S. supported Contra force in Nicaragua and Mujahadeen guerillas and warlords in Afghanistan during the 1980s are legitimate
“freedom fighters,” a distinction not lost on much of the world’s population. The Syrian ambassador noted that the United States has supported diplomatically, economically, and militarily “the two racist regimes in Pretoria [South Africa] and Tel Aviv [Israel].” 55 The
53 Ibid.
54 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fortieth-Year: 2605 th Meeting, S/PV.2605, 18.
55 Ibid., 5.
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Syrian ambassador continued that the U.S. veto illustrated the “intention to abolish or destroy international law because it applies to the American aggression against the people of Nicaragua.” 56
Interestingly, the United States ambassador justified its veto of the draft resolution as an expression of the public will. Interesting because the U.S. population is disappointingly ignorant of its governments policies and practices in the United Nations, a dangerous ignorance considering the enormous influence the U.S. wields internationally due to its economic and military power. While representatives at the debate criticized the
U.S. government for its decision and policy, the affronted and disingenuous ambassador in an attempt to obfuscate lamented that
it is particularly distressing to listen to rhetoric charging the United States government with the “heinous crimes” of responding to public opinion in determining its foreign and domestic policies, helping to provide Israel with a sense of security and attempting to find a way to bring about a just and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. 57
The remarks require no comment. The extent of public control over the government’s policies and the absence of real participatory democracy in the United States is quite apparent as the citizen’s main participatory functions are to vote periodically for either of the two parties, Democrat or Republican, and consume endlessly. The historical record regarding U.S. aggression and obstructionism in the United Nations contradicts avowed
U.S. benevolence and exposes the ambassador’s claims that U.S. encouragement of perpetual antagonism between Israel and the Arab states and complete rejection of the international consensus and United Nations decisions on the matter honor commitments to a just peace. Explicating the reasons behind the veto, the ambassador lectured that
56 Ibid., 21.
57 Ibid., 16.
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any system of law . . . has as its first rule the equal application of the law. Universality is the very cornerstone of the United Nations. The unfortunate obsession of some several states in the Council debate with the selective application of international conventions is destructive to the quest for world order as envisaged by the Charter. . . . Either these conventions apply to all or they apply to none. Selective application of the Charter or international conventions strikes at the very heart of the institution. My government will continue to oppose such destructive tendencies. 58
The U.S. dedication to international law and the United Nations is quite selective at best, rendering the ambassador’s rhetoric and indignation as hypocritical posturing. While quick to enforce resolutions and international law against the supposed infractions of official enemies, the United States and its allies and clients reject the principle of universality and the applicability of the rule of law to their actions and policies.
Draft resolution S/19466 of 29 January 1988 states in part that the Security
Council, “ expressing its grave concern over the increasing sufferings of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories,” and “ bearing in mind the inalienable rights of all people recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”
1. Expresses its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report;
2. Calls upon Israel, as the occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention;
3. Recalls the obligation of all the High Contracting Parties, under article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances;
4. Calls again upon Israel to desist forthwith from its policies and practices which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people;
5. Requests Israel to facilitate the task of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and requests all Members to give them their full support;
58 Ibid.
225
6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied territories by all means available to him and to make regular and timely reports to the Council;
7. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work towards that end;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his endeavors to promote such a settlement and to keep the Council regularly informed;
9. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review. 59
The vote on this resolution was 14 to 1 with the United States providing the lone veto “because we believe it is an untimely effort to involve the Security Council on issues which are, at this time, best dealt with through diplomatic channels.” 60 The U.S. stance is questionable considering the purpose of the Security Council and the United Nations in general is to solve disputes such as the Arab-Israeli conflict through diplomacy.
Concerning the consensus in favor of an international conference on the Middle East, the
U.S. ambassador declared his opposition, stating that an “agreement on a negotiating process and the appropriate auspices for negotiations can succeed only through the consent of the parties directly concerned. It cannot be imposed upon them.” 61
The representative from the League of Arab States countered, observing that
the mechanism of a United Nations international conference becomes a commitment to substantive results, while the concept of direct bilateral negotiations becomes a way of
59 Boudreault, 425.
60 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record: 2790 th Meeting, S/PV.2790, 41- 42.
61 Ibid., 41; Compare to the current push for Security Council sanctions against Iran. The Bush administration has rejected Iranian offers for direct negotiations between the two countries, favoring to impose a unilateral [military] solution on Iran.
226
dictating the hegemony of Israel and running away from the parameters of a clear cut, genuine, authentic and mutually acceptable outcome. 62
As the General Assembly has repeatedly asserted, an international peace conference on the Middle East is the only viable option to achieve a just settlement. The U.S. and Israel have consistently opposed such a conference and any preconditions for Israel, like Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Instead, both countries argue for a peace process void of international oversight and maintain that the Palestinians must meet certain impossible preconditions before Israel will consider negotiations, while Israel continually alters the facts on the ground. The United States has consistently imposed conditions, often impossible demands, on its opponents in diplomatic disputes, usually as a means to prevent a negotiated settlement and utilize force to achieve U.S. aims. As its veto indicates, the United States rejects a viable peace conference and favors continual violence and conflict in the Middle East.
Reaffirming resolutions 605, 607, 608, the draft resolution S/19780 of 14 April
1988 requires the Security Council, “ having been appraised of the deportation by Israel, the occupying Power, of eight civilian Palestinians on 11 April 1988 and of its decision to continue the deportation of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories,” “ gravely concerned and alarmed by the measures adopted by Israel against the civilian Palestinian people and its persistent policy of taking measures of collective punishment, such as the recent demolition of homes in the village of Beita,” “ also expressing grave concern over the action taken by the forces of the occupying Power against Sheikh Saad Eddin El-
Alami, Head of the Supreme Islamic Council, who was assaulted and beaten in the
Haram Al Shareef in Jerusalem on 1 April 1988,” “reaffirming once again that the
62 Ibid., 27.
227
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12
August 1949, is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,” and “ recalling in particular the provisions of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and expressing alarm that Israel has continued to transfer its civilian population into the territory it occupies and has equipped those settlers with arms which have been used against the civilian Palestinian people,”
1. Urges Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violation of the provisions of the Convention;
2. Urges further Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported;
3. Urges once again Israel to desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;
4. Condemns those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians;
5. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work toward that end;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit periodic reports on the situation in the occupied territories, including those aspects relating to endeavors for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation;
7. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review. 63
By vetoing the resolution, the U.S. once again rejected the international consensus, preventing a settlement and allowing Israel to unabashedly continue its
63 Boudreault, 425-426.
228
policies and violate the United Nations Charter and various resolutions. 64 While the
Security Council is “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism” 65 essentially as a propaganda mechanism for domestic persuasion and justification of U.S. aggression, the Security Council was not the proper forum to solve the Middle East conflict, perhaps because the untenable and immoral U.S. and Israeli position is opposed by an overwhelming majority of nations. The United States ambassador contended that the United Nations request for an international peace conference was counterproductive to the U.S. effort to coax Israel and its neighbors to begin negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement. 66 The U.S. proposal ostensibly would guarantee the security of Israel and the other states in the region and the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people; however, U.S. unilateralism in this endeavor would ultimately prevent a peaceful resolution on various pretexts, including ubiquitous Palestinian “terrorism” signifying that Israel, while seeking peace, has no negotiating partner, thus placing the blame on the Palestinians and other Arabs as Israel aggressively expands, with U.S. military, economic, and political support, dispossessing Arabs of their land, resources, and legitimate rights.
The Algerian ambassador observed that the U.S. position “cannot be described as anything other than an obstacle to a just and lasting settlement” of the Middle East problem, iterating that the international community recognizes that the Security Council
64 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2806 th meeting, S/PV.2806, 53.
65 Francis Fukuyama, quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest forGlobal Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 29. See notes 69 and 70 in Chapter One.
66 Ibid., 56-57.
229
and an international peace conference are the valid forums for a just peace. 67 The U.S. veto was “on the function of the Security Council and its role in order to pave the way for an initiative undertaken by a global power towards which it is necessary to act with deference when it comes to its operational diplomacy,” stated the League of Arab States representative. 68 Regarding the U.S. plan, the League of Arab States declared that “any attempt to circumvent the representative character of the PLO means that there is no seriousness in proposing negotiations.” 69 Moreover, while the U.S. plan “envisages an interim period and then ultimately discussions and negotiation of the ultimate status of the territories,” “. . . we believe that the right of the Palestinians to self-determination is not negotiable, Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories is not negotiable.” 70 A just solution can only be achieved through an international conference “fully mandated to conduct simultaneous discussions and negotiations on all the issues arising from the
Arab-Israeli conflict, on the basis of the jurisprudence that the various relevant resolutions of the United Nations have clearly spelled out.” 71 One may wonder how the
United States, given its enormous support to Israel, could act as an unbiased and fair mediator in negotiating a settlement. The Palestinian representative, very much aware of the U.S. position, rhetorically opined that “perhaps the representative of the United States will tell us what his government has contributed to ease the tension in the occupied
67 Ibid., 61-62.
68 Ibid., 23-25.
69 Ibid., 27.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
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territories, other than supplying more sophisticated toxic gas and hundreds of millions of dollars to the occupying Power and giving it all the protection that it needs.” 72
Draft resolution S/20463 of 17 February 1989 proposes that the Security Council,
“bearing in mind the inalienable rights of all peoples recognized by the Charter of the
United Nations and proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gravely concerned over the increasing suffering and continued violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,” and “ gravely concerned in particular over the imposition of new measures by Israel , the occupying Power, which have led to increased injuries and deaths of innocent Palestinian civilians, including children,”
1. Strongly deplores Israel’s persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, especially the violation of human rights, and in particular the opening of fire that has resulted in injuries and deaths of Palestinian civilians, including children;
2. Strongly deplores also the continuing disregard by Israel, the occupying Power, of the relevant decisions of the Security Council;
3. Confirms once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories;
4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, as well as to comply with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violation of the provisions of the Convention;
5. Calls furthermore for the exercise of maximum restraint to contribute towards the establishment of peace;
6. Affirms the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict, an integral part of which is the Palestinian problem, and expresses its determination to work towards that end;
72 Ibid., 63.
231
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution, including examining the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, by all means available to him and to report to the Security Council;
8. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories, under review. 73
The resolution failed to be implemented due to the U.S. veto, which negated the affirmative votes of the other fourteen members of the Council. 74 The U.S. ambassador claimed that the United States opposed Israel’s policies condemned in the resolution and has voiced its concern to the Israeli government. 75 However, opposition to Israeli practices has not prevented the United States from protecting Israel in the Security
Council and sending the copious military and economic aid necessary for Israel to continue its belligerent policies and ignore United Nations resolutions. Justifying Israel’s behavior and contradicting its avowed opposition, the United States maintained that “as the occupying Power, Israel has a responsibility recognized under international law to maintain order and security in the territories.” 76 While violating international law and
Security Council resolutions regarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, the U.S. and Israel justify Israel’s deplorable security measures and its illegal occupation of Arab lands as maintaining law and order.
Similarly, draft resolution S/20677 of 8 June 1989 deplores Israeli human rights violation in the occupied territories and states that the Security Council, “ recalling its
73 Boudreault, 427-428.
74 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2850 th meeting, S/PV.2850, 34.
75 Ibid., 32-33.
76 Ibid., 33.
232
relevant resolutions on the situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since
1967, including Jerusalem, and in particular its resolutions 446 (1979), 465 (1980), 607
(1988) and 608 (1988),” and “ expressing its grave concern and alarm over the increasing sufferings of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,”
1. Strongly deplores those policies and practices of Israel, the Occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory as well as vigilante attacks Palestinian towns and villages and desecration of the Holy Koran;
2. Calls upon Israel, as the Occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention and in particular its “responsibility for the treatment accorded to the protected persons by its agents;”
3. Recalls the obligations of all the High Contracting Parties, under article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances;
4. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory and ensure the safe and immediate return of those already deported;
5. Expresses great concern about the prolonged closure of schools in parts of the occupied territory, with all its adverse consequences for the education of Palestinian children, and calls upon Israel to permit the immediate reopening of those schools;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory by all means available to him, to make timely reports to the Council, including recommendations on way and mans to ensure respect for the Convention and protection of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territory, including Jerusalem;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the first such report no later than 23 June 1989;
8. Decides to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review. 77
77 Boudreault, 428-429.
233
By casting a veto, the United States negated the affirmative votes of the other fourteen members of the Council. 78 As mentioned above, the United States politely
“urges” Israel to abide by international law and refrain from oppressive practices. While rushing to the Security Council to chastise and punish official enemies for real and imagined transgressions, the United States fails to take any proactive measures to change
Israeli behavior in the Middle East. In fact, U.S. military and economic aid and continual support in the United Nations imply positive endorsement for Israeli actions. The U.S. ambassador argued that “over the years the United States has repeatedly urged that in addressing the Arab-Israeli problem, the Security Council refrain from unhelpful, divisive, one-sided rhetoric.” 79 Moreover, the draft resolution “is unbalanced in that it makes sweeping condemnations of Israeli policies and practice without any reference to any of the serious acts of violence by the other side.” 80 Grossly redefining the reality and rejecting the international consensus regarding the illegal Israeli occupation, the United
States disingenuously and immorally equates Palestinian resistance with Israeli oppression, Palestinian stones and homemade rockets with Israel’s massive military power. The U.S. rejection of United Nations resolutions and an international peace conference forces the Palestinians to resist occupation in the only means available, while allowing Israel to change the facts on the ground and continue to expropriate Palestinian land and resources. A telling example of the U.S. position is that, according to the
Palestinian representative, the United States delegation attempted to remove “Jerusalem”
78 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2867 th meeting, S/PV.2867, 31.
79 Ibid., 28.
80 Ibid.
234
from all references in the draft resolution to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, exhibiting a completely pro-Israel stance and wholly rejecting the Security Council and the consensus of the international community as evidenced by various General Assembly resolutions. 81 While rejecting any solution, the U.S. maintains that the Security Council prevents a just peace by attempting to adopt and enforce resolutions critical of Israel.
Iterating condemnation of Israel’s human rights violations in the occupied territories, draft resolution S/20945/rev.1 of 6 November 1989 states in part that the
Security Council, “ taking into account the immediate need to consider measures for the impartial and international protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation,” and “ considering that the current policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied territory are bound to have grave consequences for the endeavors to achieve comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,”
1. Strongly deplores those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory, and in particular the siege of towns, the ransacking of the homes or inhabitants, as has happened in Beit Sahur, and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and valuables;
2. Calls upon Israel to desist from committing such practices and actions and lift its siege;
3. Urges that Israel return the illegally and arbitrarily confiscated property to its owners;
4. Reaffirms once again that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to desist forthwith from those policies and practices which are in violation of provisions of the Convention;
81 Ibid., 36.
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6. Calls upon all the High Contracting Parties to the fourth Geneva Convention to ensure respect for it, including the obligation of the occupying Power under the Convention to treat the population of the occupied territory humanely at all times and in all circumstances;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to conduct on-site monitoring of the present situation in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, by all means available to him, and to submit periodic reports thereon, the first such reports as soon as possible. 82
The U.S. veto once again negated the fourteen affirmative votes of the Council favoring adoption of the draft resolution. 83 The U.S. ambassador maintained that “such
[one-sided] draft resolutions and the divisive debate that accompanies them do not help to alleviate conditions in the area.” Indeed, “such resolutions and debates exacerbate tensions and distract the parties from the critical issues that need to be addressed in the region.” 84 Although the international community agrees that the United Nations has been addressing the critical issues regarding the conflict, the U.S. unilaterally rejects the
United Nations framework for a peaceful solution in favor of a peace process that rewards Israel for its continual aggression and expansion and prevents Palestinian self- determination. The United States opposed a permanent United Nations presence in the occupied territories to monitor Israeli actions and protect Palestinian civilians. More generally, the U.S. opposed Security Council debates, resolutions, and intervention on the pretext that the United States had a constructive dialogue with Israel. Once again, Israeli illegal occupation of Palestinian land and oppression of Palestinian rights is not the primary cause exacerbating tensions in the Middle East. Moreover, American
82 Boudreault, 429-430.
83 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2889 th meeting, S/PV.2889, 42.
84 Ibid., 43.
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obstructionism is not a fundamental problem preventing a just peace. Rather, according to the logic of the U.S., the international community’s attempts to enforce and implement
Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Charter have prevented a peaceful settlement.
Draft resolution S/21326 of 31 May 1990 reads in part that the Security Council,
“reaffirming that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,” and “ gravely concerned and alarmed by the deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,”
1. Establishes a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied by Israel since 1967;
2. Requests the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 20 June 1990, containing recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its mission;
4. Decides to keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny and to reconvene to review the situation in the light of the findings of the Commission. 85
The United States, ignoring the affirmative vote of the other fourteen members of the Council, vetoed the draft resolution on the unfounded pretext that a United Nations
Observer Commission would not help resolve the problems in the Middle East, but add to
85 Boudreault, 430.
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them. 86 Illustrating Israel’s rejection of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and a state in Palestine and contempt for the United Nations, the Israeli ambassador contended that “even if Israel, as some here have claimed, is labeled ‘an occupying Power’ . . . ,”
“Israel is the exclusive and only authority responsible for the restoration of peace and tranquility in the territories.” 87 The League of Arab States representative wondered aloud, “By what authority, if not as an occupying Power, does Israel claim exclusive jurisprudence and jurisdiction in the occupied territories?” 88 Further denigrating the
United Nations, the Israeli ambassador stated that there was no justification for an observer force because “stationed in Israel is one of the largest press corps in the world.
Israel is a democracy, and the media have unhampered and free access to all areas.” 89
Although the veracity of the statement is quite dubious, 90 if Israel had nothing to hide, why did the ambassador unequivocally make clear that Israel would not accept a
United Nations Commission in the occupied territories? 91 The ambassador argues that a
86 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2926 th meeting, S/PV.2926, 36-38.
87 Ibid., 17-18.
88 Ibid., 22.
89 Ibid., 17.
90 How can Israel be a democracy when it claims to be a Jewish state and its non-Jewish citizens are granted second-class status? A recent survey indicated that almost sixty-eight percent of Jewish citizens in Israel would refuse to be neighbors with an Arab, sixty-three percent agreed that “Arabs are a security and demographic threat to the state,” and forty percent believed “the state needs to support the emigration of Arab citizens.” Journalist Gideon Levy wrote, “Only one ambition unites everyone – to get rid of [the Arabs], one way or another. Transfer or wall, ‘disengagement’ or ‘convergance’ – the point is that they should get out of our sight.” Israel’s democracy is comparable to the American form, with both lacking in substantive participatory democracy and economic, social, and political equality. See Eli Ashkenazi and Jack Khouri, “Poll: 68% of Jews Would Refuse to Live in Same Building as an Arab,” Ha’aretz, 22 March 2006, and Gideon Levy, “One Racist Nation,” Ha’aretz, 26 March 2006, as cited in Omar Barghouti, “The Israeli Elections: A Decisive Vote for Apartheid,” Counterpunch, 3 April 2006,
91 Ibid., 18.
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double standard exists where Israel is condemned for killing Arabs, but Arabs are celebrated for killing Jews. While “when a tragic outburst of violence occurs in Israel in which Arabs are killed by Jews, the condemnation is instant, bitter, unanimous and unequivocal,” yet “on the other hand, when Jews are killed by Arabs, it is an occasion for ultranationalist celebrations and hyped up incitement, engulfing the Arab world in a paroxysm of hate.” 92 The ambassador is correct in declaring a double standard, considering Israel has been unaccountable to international law due to U.S. support. As far as the U.S. “free press” is concerned, Arab violence against Israel is always
“terrorism,” while Israeli violence is “retaliatory,” or “self-defense.”
In rebuttal to the Israeli assertions, the Pakistani ambassador provided a few examples of Israelis celebrating Arab deaths. After a former Israeli soldier killed seven and wounded eleven Palestinians, the Israeli army repressed the demonstrations of mourning, killing 23 and wounding 900 Palestinians. 93 The right-wing extremist Rabbi
Meir Kahane planned to hold a demonstration supporting the former soldier responsible for the massacre. 94 Citing the journalist Alexander Cockburn, the Pakistani ambassador noted that Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who was sentenced to a harsh five months for killing a
Palestinian shopkeeper, was honored at a celebration by General Yitzhak Mordechai, the military commander of the West Bank. 95 Pakistan declared its support for a United
Nations force to protect Palestinian civilians, immediate Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including Jerusalem and a Middle East peace conference with the
92 Ibid., 8.
93 The New York Times, 27 May 1990, as cited in Ibid., 4-5.
94 The New York Times, 29 May 1990, as cited in Ibid., 6.
95 Alexander Cockburn, The Wall Street Journal, 24 May 1990, as cited in Ibid.
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five members of the Security Council. 96 The Japanese ambassador observed that because the Security Council did not enforce resolutions against Israel, “. . . the Palestinians in the occupied territories have been forced to endure conditions of severe political, economic and social hardship.” 97 On a more general note, the brief historical background regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, illustrates Israel’s regard for the value of human life, just as an honest rendering of U.S. history belies the ostensible American support for human rights, intimating that human beings for the most part have yet to rise above exclusionary and parochial identity concepts to consider the Golden Rule as moral principle applicable to all people, not just those born in the same country with the same color skin, professing the same faith and speaking the same language.
The draft resolution S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995 states in part that the Security
Council, “ reaffirming its previous resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, including resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969), 476 1980), 478 (1980) and 672 (1990),” and “ expressing concern over the recent declaration of Israeli appropriation orders of 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem,”
1. Confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel, the occupying Power, in East Jerusalem is invalid and in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions and provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;
2. Calls upon the government of Israel to rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such action in the future;
3. Expresses its full support for the Middle East peace process and its achievements, including the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as the following implementation agreements;
4. Urges the parties to adhere to the provisions of the agreements reached and to follow up with the full implementation of those agreements;
96 Ibid., 6-7.
97 Ibid., 21.
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5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 98
The United States, continuing to apply a unique double standard toward Israeli transgressions against the United Nations and international law, declared that “the only path to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is direct talk between the parties.” 99 Of course, direct talks will not take place as long as Israel rejects any Palestinian leadership that asserts legitimate Palestinian rights on the grounds that the
Palestinians do not renounce violence or recognize Israel’s “right to exist,” while the same standard is not applied to the Israeli government. More telling, U.S. diplomacy with official enemies such as Saddam Hussein and the current Iranian regime is merely a propaganda tool to justify a military solution on the pretext that all other options have been exhausted, while in reality meaningful diplomatic talks are scarcely considered and even rejected.
The U.S. ambassador continued, arguing that “my government will not agree to a resolution that prejudges or prejudices the outcome of negotiations over such a sensitive issue as Jerusalem.” 100 Seemingly, Israel’s declaration of a unified Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel in no way prejudices or prejudges the outcome. The U.S. and
Israel therefore reject the General Assembly partition resolution declaring Jerusalem under an international regime and all other resolutions declaring that the acquisition of territory by force is invalid and demanding that Israel withdraw from all the occupied territories, including Jerusalem. An alarming development for international law and
98 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995.
99 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3538 th meeting, S/PV.3538, 6.
100 Ibid., 7.
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basic morality was that the Palestinians, in a considerable position of weakness, consented to negotiating the matter of illegal settlements and the status of Jerusalem at some future point in the peace process. While Israel clearly lacks the right to expropriate more land from the Palestinians, such continued expropriation intimates at the very least a lack of good faith in negotiations if not a complete rejection of such a settlement. The entire peace process must be understood as an American and Israeli victory. The international consensus, which demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a precondition for negotiations, has been discarded in favor of a unilateral American process legitimizing Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza district, rendering a just, lasting and comprehensive peace a remote possibility.
Draft resolution S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997 reads in part that the Security
Council, “ expressing deep concern at the decision of the Government of Israel to initiate new settlement activities in the Jebal Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem, expressing concern about other recent measures that encourage or facilitate new settlement activities, stressing that such settlements are illegal and a major obstacle to peace, recalling its resolutions on Jerusalem and other relevant Security Council resolutions, [and] confirming that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status,”
1. Calls upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and have negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process;
2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
242
of Civilians in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
3. Calls upon all parties to continue, in the interests of peace and security, their negotiations within the Middle East Peace Process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached;
4. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 101
The United States vetoed the fourteen affirmative votes of the other Security
Council members on the pretext that it is inappropriate for the Security Council to interfere in direct negotiations. 102 In other words, the U.S continues to ignore all United
Nations resolutions and unilaterally orchestrates a peace process that protects and rewards Israel in a negotiating process that at best is between two vastly unequal parties and at worst is a pretext to justify Israeli occupation and aggression. In what must be described as arrogance and provocation, the Israeli ambassador stated:
Now that the Security Council has decided not to take any action regarding the decision of the government of Israel to begin construction in her home and in ten predominantly Arab neighborhoods throughout Jerusalem, it is our hope that the sponsors of the proposed resolution will recognize that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum for discussion of outstanding issues between Israel and the Palestinians. 103
Disregarding that the Security Council did decide to condemn the settlement building and demand its immediate cessation but for the American veto, we must recognize, as the Palestinian representative did, that
the approach proposed by some states seems to suggest that Israel has the right to take unilateral steps and impose new realities on the ground, while at the same time, the Palestinian side should commit itself to resolving through negotiations the problems
101 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997.
102 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3747 th meeting, S/PV.3747, 3-4.
103 Ibid., 6.
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resulting from those steps. 104
In other words, Israel, in a complete rejection of the United Nations Charter and
Security Council resolutions, will continue to build settlements in Arab areas under U.S. protection and with U.S. funds and then demand that the settlements are perhaps negotiable. The only recourse beside violence for the Palestinian resistance is the
Security Council, which the United States continues to paralyze and undermine on this
Middle East conflict.
Iterating the demand that Israel cease settlement building in East Jerusalem, draft resolution S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997 states in part that the Security Council,
“recalling its relevant resolutions, in particular those concerning Jerusalem and Israeli settlements,”
1. Demands that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the developments in this regard. 105
The United States ambassador, in clarifying its veto, declared that “no circumstances can justify the resort to violence or terror against innocent civilians.” 106
Perhaps the United States should apply this standard to its own actions, specifically the murderous sanctions imposed on Iraq during this time, and those of its allies, specifically
Israel’s policies and practices toward the Palestinian people which are often violent and wholly designed to terrorize. Moreover, “the United States does not believe that the
104 Ibid.
105 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997.
106 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3756 th meeting, S/PV.3756, 5.
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Security Council or the General Assembly should be in the business of inserting themselves into issues that the negotiating partners have decided will be addressed in their permanent status talks.” 107 Seemingly, the United Nations must recognize that its true role is to justify U.S. policies, not follow the mandates of the Charter and strive for peace and justice. By continuing to build settlements, the Israeli government indicates its contempt for negotiating in good faith. While the U.S. undermines the United Nations, what options are left for the Palestinians to realize a just peace?
Draft resolution S/2001/270 of 26 March 2001 states in part that the Security
Council, “e xpressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, resulting in many deaths and injuries, mostly among Palestinians, r eiterating the need for protection of all civilians as expressed in its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), e xpressing its determination to contribute to ending the violence, protecting Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories and promoting dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian sides” and “e xpressing grave concern at the dire economic and humanitarian situation as a result of the closures of the occupied Palestinian territories and towns and villages within them,”
1. Calls for the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation and collective punishment, as well as the return to the positions and arrangements which existed prior to September 2000;
2. Calls upon the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to implement promptly and without preconditions the understandings reached at the Summit convened at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, of 17 October 2000;
3. Urges a resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis taking into account the previous positive developments in the negotiations between the two sides and calls on them to reach a final agreement on all issues, on the basis of their previous agreements, with the objective of implementing its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);
107 Ibid.
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4. Expresses grave concern at recent settlement activities, in particular the recent decision to expand the settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim and calls for full cessation of settlement activities;
5. Calls on the parties to take the following immediate steps: (a) resumption of contacts at all levels on implementation of reciprocal commitments including in the field of security previously made by both sides; (b) an end to the closures of the occupied Palestinian territories to permit resumption of full normal activities of daily life; (c) the transfer by Israel to the Palestinian Authority of all revenues due, in accordance with the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations of 29 April 1994; (d) additional confidence-building measures by both sides including unequivocal public statements in support of all commitments made at Sharm El-Sheikh and of this resolution;
6. Expresses full support for the work of the Fact-Finding Committee established at Sharm El-Sheikh, calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with it, and looks forward to its report;
7. Appeals to the international donor community to extend, as rapidly and as generously as possible, economic and financial assistance to the Palestinian people, and stresses in this regard the importance of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the parties on immediate and substantive steps to implement this resolution and to report to the Council within one month of the adoption of this resolution and expresses the readiness of the Council to act upon receipt of the report to set up an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a United Nations observer force;
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 108
In justifying another veto, the United States ambassador shows his country’s contempt for the United Nations when it does not accede to U.S. demands and provides yet another example of blatant U.S. hypocrisy. The ambassador stated that “some pretended that the Council could impose a solution, including a protection mechanism for civilians, in the absence of an agreement between the parties. Instead, the Security
Council, acting on behalf of the international community, should have called on the
108 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2001/270 of 26 March 2001.
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parties to end all violence, to protect civilians and to resume negotiations.” 109 In this case, the United Nations cannot impose or enforce a solution in the Middle East because it is a regional problem requiring the two parties to work on their own. Thus, the U.S. argued that the “most basic precept of peacemaking [is] the need to encourage the parties to find and implement their own lasting solutions,” and “the road to the just and lasting peace we all seek in the Middle East does not begin in this Council.” 110 While the
United States absurdly contends that the United Nations has no right to fulfill its mandate, the United States saw fit to impose a military solution and enforce United
Nations resolutions on the “regional” conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, precluding a diplomatic settlement and righteously asserting that blatant aggression is intolerable. Just as the United States is currently railroading the United Nations to accept the justifications for the third instance of U.S. aggression since George W. Bush took office, forcing the
Security Council to imposing sanctions against the victim instead of the aggressor, the
U.S. vetoes in the Security Council allow for further Israeli aggression and illegal occupation of Palestinian lands, preventing necessary enforcement of international law and United Nations mandates in favor of nebulous negotiations between two unequal parties which serves only to dismiss the international consensus regarding a just solution.
Clearly, the U.S. record in the United Nations has more to do with policy objectives than with any universal principles of law or morality.
Draft resolution S/2001/1199 of 14 December 2001 reads in part that the Security
Council, “ emphasizing the need for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the
Middle East based on its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338
109 United Nations Security Council Provisional Record of the 4305 th meeting, S/PV.4305, 5.
110 Ibid., 5-6.
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(1973) of 22 October 1973 and the principle of land for peace, emphasizing further in that regard the essential role of the Palestinian authority which remains the indispensable and legitimate party for peace and needs to be preserved fully,” “e mphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians in the whole Middle East region, and condemning in particular all acts of violence and terror resulting in the deaths and injuries among Palestinian and Israeli civilians,” and “reiterating the need for Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 12 August 1949,”
1. Demands the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation and destruction, as well as the return to the positions and arrangement which existed prior to September 2000;
2. Condemns all acts of terror, in particular those targeting civilians;
3. Condemns all acts of extrajudiciary executions, excessive use of force and wide destruction of properties;
4. Calls on the two sides to start the comprehensive and immediate implementation of the recommendations made in the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) in a speedy manner;
5. Encourages all concerned to establish a monitoring mechanism to help the parties implement the recommendations of the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) and to help create a better situation in the occupied Palestinian territories;
6. Calls for the resumption of negotiations between the two sides within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis, taking into consideration developments in previous discussions between the two sides, and urges them to reach a final agreement on all issues, on the basis of their previous agreements, with the objective of implementing its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 111
111 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2001/1199 of 14 December 2001.
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The U.S. ambassador in iterating that Yasser Arafat and the PLO must end terrorism determined that “terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad are deliberately–and brutally–seeking to sabotage any potential there may be for Israelis and Palestinians to conclude a negotiated peace.” 112 The British ambassador concurred, demanding that Palestinians dismantle terrorist networks and asserting that “Israel has a right to security and is entitled to take steps to protect itself from terrorist attacks, but it should ensure that its actions remain proportionate and avoid civilian casualties.” 113 The Israeli ambassador, observing that “there is no equivalence between those who perpetuate terror and those who fight it,” contended that only for
Palestinian terrorists are civilian deaths “deliberate, premeditated, and desired.” 114 In fact, Palestinians are responsible for their own civilian deaths, because terrorists have used civilians as “human shields.” 115 Just as the U.S. bombing of a Baghdad bomb shelter in 1991 killing hundreds of women and children caused the American government and media to blame Saddam Hussein, the Israelis too blame the victims for their callous disregard of human life. The ambassador continued, arguing that “there is no cause so just, no grievance so severe, no objective so noble that it can justify killing innocent civilians.” 116 Apparently the ambassador is not familiar with Zionist justifications for securing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Perhaps the ambassador is unfamiliar with the historical record cataloging the Israeli government’s disregard for Palestinian lives, and
112 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4438 th meeting, S/PV.4438, 11.
113 Ibid., 9.
114 Ibid., 18.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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the “deliberate” and “premeditated” policies designed to expel and oppress the
Palestinian people. According to international law, premeditation is not a prerequisite for culpability. A person or nation must be aware of all the possible consequences of an intended course of action. If a person intends to kill an individual, but in the process kills others, the person is responsible for those deaths even if unintended. Even if the U.S. military was unaware of the Baghdad bomb shelter, which is a dubious supposition considering that the Americans had unimpeded reconnaissance flights continually over
Iraq, international law contends that the military commanders ordering the strike must have been aware of possible consequences including the death of civilians. Therefore, those commanders are responsible for those deaths, regardless of whether or not it was an intentional act.
The Israeli ambassador attempted to revise the historical record, declaring:
in the Palestinian case, the grievance that is cited is that of occupation, and the objective ascribed to the terrorist murderers is that of liberation. Yet even if one were to accept the ludicrous notion that occupation is a legitimate basis for killing innocent civilians, the Palestinians still would not qualify. The Palestinians have sought to portray Israeli occupation as an outgrowth of a type of colonial quest for power and domination over another people, and yet the historical record demonstrably asserts the contrary.
Israel’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza was the result of a war in which Israel’s very existence was threatened by the combined armies of several Arab nations. The hostilities of 1967 were a war imposed upon Israel, not a war undertaken in order to conquer new territory and subjugate its people. The Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza is a result not of Israeli aggression, but of Israeli self-defense.117
117 Ibid., 19.
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Moreover, the ambassador argued that the League of Arab States rejected the partition plan and “launched a war to eliminate the Jewish State.” 118 The historical record refutes the Israeli claims and justifications for its expansionism and militarism.
The Palestinian representative observed that the United States and Israel require that Palestine end terrorism, while nothing is required of Israel. In fact, Israel continues to attack the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatus, thus preventing the
Palestinian authorities to apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of violence against Israel.
The Palestinian leadership is caught in a catch-22: Israel demands that the Palestinians cease terrorism, but Israeli authorities prevent the Palestinian authorities from fulfilling that demand and negate any peace process because the Palestinians are not fighting terrorism. The Palestinian Authority reiterated that it does not support or condone acts of violence; however, it does not accept that legitimate resistance to foreign occupation is considered terrorism. Furthermore, there are no protected Israeli civilians in the occupied territories. The illegal settlers, who live in heavily fortified enclaves and are armed and trained well-enough to be considered paramilitary organizations, are not innocent civilians, echoing Neumann’s argument above. 119
The ambassador from Mauritius described Israeli attempts to undermine Arafat as legitimizing more militant extremist groups. 120 The United Nations Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, calling for the “immediate and total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Palestinian territories and the immediate cessation of all acts of violence and provocation, together with the deployment
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 3-5.
120 Ibid., 8.
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of a protection or observation force in the area,” acknowledged that “the Israeli government disregards the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to stop the violence and punish those who perpetuate violent acts.” 121 It can be argued convincingly that the Israeli government actively seeks to destroy any viable political settlement, instead relying on military power as the only method to fulfill Israeli expansionist goals.
The Iranian representative, recognizing that occupation is a primary cause of the conflict, observed that “it is very unfortunate that those governments that criticize the
Palestinians and hold them responsible for the ongoing violence in the area ignore the crimes perpetuated by the Israelis and do nothing to stop them.” Iterating the Palestinian representative, the ambassador noted that “no link whatsoever can be established between terrorism and the right of the Palestinian people to resist Israeli aggression and occupation, considered to be a legitimate right ensured by international law and conventions.” Moreover, “as to the real intention of the Israeli regime, it is significant that the Israelis continue to reject the call for a freeze on all settlement construction activities in the West Bank and Gaza strip.” 122
Draft resolution S/2003/891 of 16 September 2003 states in part that the Security
Council, “reiterating its grave concern at the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000 throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in
Israel and the recent dangerous deterioration of the situation, including the escalation in extrajudicial executions and suicide bombing attacks, all of which have caused enormous suffering and many innocent victims, reaffirming the illegality of the deportation of any
Palestinian by Israel, the occupying Power, and affirming its opposition to any such
121 Ibid., 21.
122 Ibid., 26-27.
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deportation, reiterating also the need for respect in all circumstances of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,”
1. Reiterates its demands for the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;
2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, desist from any act of deportation and cease any threat to the safety of the elected President of the Palestinian Authority;
3. Expresses its full support for the efforts of the Quartet and calls for increased efforts to ensure the implementation of the road map by the two sides, and underlines , in this regard, the importance of the forthcoming meeting of the Quartet in New York;
4. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 123
The American government, arguably the most destructive terrorist organization in the world, arrogantly asserts that ending terrorism is its highest priority. Of course this is axiomatically a given if terrorism is defined as non-American sanctioned use of violence.
The acceptable definition of terrorism necessarily does not include enormous American or Israeli violence. The bombing of Iraq in 1991 rendering the once modern country on the verge of collapse, the murderous sanctions that prematurely caused the deaths of over a million people, and the re-bombing of Iraq and current occupation are not terrorist actions according to Western rationalizations and propaganda even though the U.S. utilized large-scale violence to achieve political and economic advantages.
Arguing that the Palestinian terrorists are the main threat to peace, the U.S. ambassador contended that the resolution failed to include a condemnation of terrorism and the Palestinian groups responsible for such violence. The ambassador further asserted, “While Mr. Arafat is part of the problem, we believe that this problem is best
123 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2003/891 of 16 September 2003.
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solved through diplomatic isolation.” 124 The Israeli ambassador iterated the American sentiment, contesting that Palestinian terrorism and acts of murder “lie at the very heart of the problem,” and continued that the resolution “found its criticism on the victims of terrorism and on the response to terrorists rather than on terrorism itself.” 125 Once again the position of the United States is in complete opposition to the international consensus.
It is quite clear that the United States and Israel stand in virtual isolation to the international opinion that Israeli practices and policies are the main and intentional barrier to peace. Another example of an untenable U.S. position is that the United States continuously opposed sanctions and diplomatic isolation for the racist government of
South Africa, claiming that the U.S. never endorses sanctions as a enforcement measure, even though almost every other country in the world, besides the former European colonial powers, supported sanctions and other measures to end apartheid and South
African aggression against neighboring African states. 126 As is obvious, the U.S.
124 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4828 th meeting, S/PV.4828, 2.
125 Ibid., 6.
126 As the record in the Security Council and General Assembly indicates, the U.S. rejected any enforceable measures against South Africa for its aggression against other African nations and the racist apartheid regime. From 1980 to 1988, the U.S. vetoed eleven Security Council resolutions condemning South Africa. Contrary to the United States immediate advancement of sanctions against Iraq, the Reagan administration prevented the adoption of measures against South Africa to force its compliance with international law, United Nations resolutions, and natural justice. Although the U.S. claimed the sanctions against Iraq were not against the Iraqi people, the delegation to the United Nations argued that “economic pressure of that magnitude would have the least impact on the South African Government and would mainly harm the very people it was ostensibly intended to help–that is, South Africa’s oppressed black minority” (S/PV.2797). Declaring a hypocritical attitude toward violence, the U.S. ambassador declared that “my government totally rejects the notion that we should eliminate apartheid by provoking the collapse of the South African economy and a subsequent violent revolution. Those who advocate violence as a policy to bring about change in South Africa seem willing to tolerate an enormous loss of life and appear to overlook the fact that such violence might well strengthen rather than weaken oppression. My Government believes that we must pursue every possible avenue leading to the peaceful elimination of apartheid. With this conviction very much in mind, the United States has committed itself to a continuing diplomatic effort to persuade all parties to enter in negotiations” (S/PV.2738). Explaining its veto of four resolutions regarding South African aggression against and occupation of Namibia, the U.S. stated “each of those
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opposition to sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and enforcement of United Nations resolutions dissipates when the target is an official enemy, obvious given the American belligerence toward Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinian leadership.
Familiar to students of American history is the concept that the government and its stenographers in the mainstream press quite exaggeratedly demonize official enemies to prepare and persuade the public for U.S. military action, covert or overt. For example,
Donald Rumsfeld comparing Hugo Chavez to Adolf Hitler and the George H. W. Bush administration portraying former ally Saddam Hussein as the new Hitler. As the United
Nations record indicates, not only in the Security Council resolutions and meeting minutes but also in the General Assembly resolutions, the international community
drafts one way or another relates to sanctions, and therefore represents what we are persuaded is the wrong course towards the achievement of our common goal of independence for Namibia. We do not believe that economic sanctions are an effective means of influencing political policy” (S/PV.2277). Along with the United States, the decedents of the European colonizers, especially Great Britain and France, supported the racist South African regime military, politically, and economically. The British ambassador maintained that the United Kingdom supported the end of apartheid and the cessation of South African aggression, “but it is our firm view that the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions could not fail to hamper efforts to reach a settlement” (S/PV.2277). However, the international community repeatedly criticized and opposed the U.S. and its NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies for aiding the racist regime and preventing measures meant to end apartheid and South African aggression against neighboring countries. The Cuban ambassador quoted Castro: “If it is true that, as the representative of the United States said, they want to see the end of apartheid, we might wonder why they continue to veto the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the South African racists. Why do they try to impede the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia with arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by everyone? Why do they continue collaborating with the Pretoria regime in the economic, political and military spheres, including the nuclear sphere, contrary to the wishes of the African peoples to ensure that their continent should be a denuclearized continent?” The South West Africa People’s Organization observed: “Once again the same countries elected to stand in isolation in defense of apartheid, notwithstanding their passionate claims to the contrary, and in opposition to Namibia’s independence” (S/PV.2747). The Soviet ambassador related that “we are all accustomed to the fact that the United States never hesitates to employ political, economic and other sanctions against countries struggling to attain national liberation and independence or against socialist states” (S/PV.2686). The Spanish ambassador remarked: “. . . the persistent refusal of South Africa to comply with the Council’s resolutions with regard to the illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia, its continual delaying tactics and the challenge to the international community constituted by the many acts of aggression perpetrated against neighboring African countries compel us today to take upon ourselves the painful duty of considering those measures that might induce South Africa to reconsider its position on Namibia and ensure respect for international law and the resolutions of the Security Council” (S/PV.2277). For other examples of U.S. votes protecting South Africa against the overwhelming international consensus, see the General Assembly voting records in the appendix.
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recognizes Israeli and American culpability in preventing and rejecting a just peace settlement in the Middle East. Yet the U.S. and Israeli statements to the Security Council and the portrayal of the situation in the American press serve as propaganda for a compliant and ignorant American public. Labeling the Palestinians as terrorists, especially in the overall context of the American war on terror, essentially de-legitimizes
Palestinian resistance and positively sanctions Israeli oppression in all its forms, including the expropriation of Palestinian land and resources, under the guise of Israeli security at the expense of Palestinian self-determination and security.
Draft resolution S/2003/980 of 14 October 2003 states in part that the Security
Council, “ reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders, condemning all acts of violence, terror and destruction, stressing the urgency of ending the current violent situation on the ground, the need to end the occupation that began in 1967 and the need to achieve peace based on the vision of two States mentioned above, reiterating its call upon Israel, the occupying
Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, reiterating its opposition to settlement activities in the Occupied Territories and to any activities involving the confiscation of land, disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and the de facto annexation of land,”
1. Decides that the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the compliance with this resolution periodically, with the first report to be submitted within one month;
256
3. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 127
The U.S. ambassador, neglecting the core issue of the resolution, declared the draft unbalanced. Moreover, according to the United States, the resolution failed to explicitly condemn terrorism and declare that “ending terrorism must be the highest priority.” 128 The Israeli ambassador noted that Palestinian terrorism is the heart of the problem and the cause of Israeli defensive measures. The Palestinians must dismantle the terrorist organizations and fight terrorism in order for Israel to negotiate. 129 While the international community recognizes that the not only is the Israeli wall a land grab, but also that violence against Israel would disappear if Israel withdrew to the pre-1967 borders and allowed Palestinian self-determination, the United States and Israel continue to imply that only Palestinian actions constitute terrorism.
Draft resolution S/2004/240 of 25 March 2004 reads in part that the Security
Council, e xpressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as a result of the escalation of violence and attacks,”
1. Condemns the most recent extrajudicial execution committed by Israel, the occupying Power, that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City and calls for a complete cessation of extrajudicial executions;
2. Condemns also all terrorist attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and destruction;
3. Calls on all sides to immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;
127 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2003/980 of 14 October 2003.
128 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4842 nd meeting, S/PV.4842, 2.
129 Ibid., 3.
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4. Calls for the cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law;
5. Calls on both parties to fulfill their obligations under the road map endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) and to work with the Quartet to implement it in order to achieve the vision of the two States living side by side in peace and security;
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 130
The U.S. ambassador justified the American veto by arguing that the draft one- sidedly condemned Israel. 131 The British ambassador reiterated the American statement, arguing that the resolution “failed to condemn terrorist atrocities against Israel and it limited its condemnation of terrorist attacks to those against civilians.” 132 While the resolution clearly condemns all terrorism and violence on both sides rendering the rationale for the American veto and British abstention unconvincing, the second part of the British ambassador’s statement is somewhat baffling, if not outright self-serving. If the British ambassador is implying that retail violence against military personnel falls under the rubric of terrorism, then all resistance to military occupation, in Iraq and in
Palestine, is completely invalid. Thus the British are unilaterally dismissing General
Assembly resolution 42/159 (1987), which reads in part that
Nothing in the present resolution could in anyway prejudice the right to self- determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right . . . particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation. 133
130 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2004/240 of 25 March 2004.
131 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4934 th meeting, S/PV.4934, 2.
132 Ibid., 4.
133 General Assembly Resolution 42/159 (1987).
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The Palestinian representative observed that the attempt to broaden the definition of terrorism beyond acts against civilians was “bizarre and unacceptable, particularly in a case involving foreign occupation.” 134 The British furthermore maintained that the draft must have a paragraph condemning the death of hundreds of Israelis, which makes no sense considering there is not a paragraph condemning Israel for the death of hundreds of
Palestinians. 135 While the draft was an immediate response to the Israeli military’s extrajudicial murder of Sheik Ahmed Yassin and six other Palestinians, the Security
Council clearly condemned all violence.
The historical record indicates that just as the military might of the Palestine
Arabs and Israel is not remotely comparable, the injustice and violence perpetrated against each other is not comparable. Israel is occupying the Palestinian land beyond the original partition, including the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. On 10 May 2006 the
Prime Minister of Israel declared that unless Hamas accedes to Israeli demands, Israel will unilaterally draw its borders, which will include Jerusalem and large settlements in the West Bank to maintain water access, while partitioning Palestine into noncontiguous open-air prisons reminiscent of South African Bantustans; 136 Israel is dispossessing the
Palestinians of their homes, fields, and natural resources; Israel is arbitrarily imprisoning thousands of Palestinians, including children; Israel’s military operates arbitrary checkpoints preventing Palestinians from completing everyday normal activities, including going to work or a hospital; Israel continues to freeze tens of millions of dollars of Palestinian tax revenue in Israeli banks to starve the people because the Israeli
134 S/PV.4934, 6.
135 Ibid., 4-5.
136 Toledo Blade, 10 May 2006.
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government wants the world to believe that Hamas is a terrorist government, leaving
Israel without a partner for peace; Israel’s military terrorizes Palestinians every day and night as shells are continuously fired by air, land, and sea. 137
The Israeli ambassador identified Yassin, a leader of Hamas, as “a mass murderer and the godfather of terrorism,”--as if that justified the extrajudicial murder of the Sheik and six other bystanders--forgetting the terrorist past of Israel’s Prime Ministers, including Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. 138 Whoever controls the past controls the future, and whoever controls the present, controls the past. History is written by the victors. While George W. Bush, responsible for tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands dead Afghanis and Iraqis, will never be tried for his crimes, the victims, who dare to resist with any means available, are the terrorists, summarily executed. The
Israeli ambassador, illustrating racist contempt for the Palestinian Arabs, declared that
“there will probably not be peace until the Palestinians learn to love their children more than they hate us.” 139 All victims of large-scale state violence seemingly inherit the gene that causes them to devalue their lives. The Native Americans, the Filipinos, the
Vietnamese, the Japanese, the Iraqis, the Palestinians, and so on–as the United States and its allies are committing mass murder against them, they are the ones who do not value
137 See for example, Michael Dickenson, “Sonic Weapons Over Palestine,” Counterpunch, 3 November 2005,
138 S/PV.4934, 7.
139 Ibid.
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life. Perhaps, we should quote David Ben-Gurion, who in December 1938, stated: “If I knew it was possible to save all the [Jewish] children of Germany by their transfer to
England and only half of them by transferring them to Eretz-Yisrael, I would choose the latter–because we are faced not only with the accounting of these children but also with the historical accounting of the Jewish people.” 140
The Israeli ambassador argued that “there is no difference between Palestinian terror and international terror, as there is no difference between Hamas and al Qaeda.” 141
Obfuscating and falsely revising Middle East history, the ambassador states that the
Palestinians must “. . . decide to choose the path of peace and reconciliation – as has been offered to them by Israel time and time again and as has been rejected by them time and time again.” 142
The Palestinian representative responded in length:
The real problem is that the Council has long tolerated and allowed illegal Israeli actions; it has tolerated and allowed foreign occupation for more than thirty-six years– occupation that has been transformed into blatant colonialism: colonizing Palestine land, destroying the lives of a whole people and preventing the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including our right to exercise our sovereignty in our State, Palestine. 143
He continued:
We object to the . . . immoral attempts to link illegal Israeli practices and policies with the international fight against terrorism. Israel is not a passive, peaceful country that is subject to attacks from outside. Israel is a terrible occupying Power that has never stopped violating all aspects of international law and international humanitarian law in particular. Israeli policies are not part of the battle against international terrorism; they
140 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-199 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 199) , 162.
141 S/PV.4934, 8.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 7.
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are part of the problem of creating terrorism. 144
The American and Israeli position implied of course that massive state terrorism and violence, which dwarfs the retail international terrorism exponentially, is legitimate, while the violence perpetrated by the victims of state terrorism against its perpetrators is always assumed illegitimate terrorism, violence without cause or context.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, undertaken on the false pretext of self-defense, was predicated on the Israeli government’s determination to eliminate the
PLO as a viable political entity and therefore prevent a political settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict so as to gain permanent control over the occupied territories. The United
States provided the necessary military, economic, and political support for the invasion and prevented the adoption of any Security Council resolutions which would possibly lead to sanctions or other measures to force Israeli compliance with the United Nations demands. Furthermore, in a policy completely opposing the Bush administration’s stance toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein in 1990, the U.S. supported the Israeli position that it would not withdraw from Lebanon until certain conditions were met, violating the
Security Council’s repeated demand for unconditional and complete withdrawal.
The draft resolution S/15185 of 8 June 1982, referring to the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, requests that the Security Council,
1. Condemns the non-compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) by Israel;
2. Urges the parties to comply strictly with the regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907;
144 Ibid.
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3. Reiterates its demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon;
4. Reiterates also its demand that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraphs 1 of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities with Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;
5. Demands that within six hours all hostilities must be stopped in compliance with Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and decides, in the event of non-compliance, to meet again to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 145
The resolution was drafted in response to Israel’s continued noncompliance with the previous resolutions calling for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal from Lebanon during the summer of 1982. The fundamental difference, leading to a U.S. veto, is that this resolution called for practical methods to enforce the resolutions upon further Israeli intransigence. The Spanish delegation, which submitted the draft to the Council, argued that Israel could not use the recent assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to
Great Britain to justify its aggression against Lebanon:
It is difficult for the representative of Israel, in an equivocal attempt to turn the accused into the accuser, to convince the Council by citing a long list of acts of violence, when the most serious violence is that of depriving a people of the right to its homeland, its territory and to a free life. 146
Moreover, recognizing a crime of aggression, the ambassador states that “this grave act of belligerency represents a regrettable breach of the peace and a violation of the most fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” 147
145 Boudreault, 417-418.
146 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty- Seventh Year: 2377 th meeting, S/PV.2377, 2.
147 Ibid.
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The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the resolution supported by the other fourteen members of the Council on the dubious grounds that “unfortunately, the resolution now before us is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objectives of ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting peace in
Lebanon.” 148 Since Israel was the only party refusing to accept the previous resolutions, it is only logical that the Security Council focused on Israel noncompliance. As mentioned above, the United States, complicity abetting Israel’s illegal aggression, undertook to prevent any resolution that would force Israeli compliance or undermine
Israeli objectives.
The Irish ambassador drew attention to the fact that Israel, the aggressor, would only withdraw on certain conditions. Although Lebanon and the PLO accepted the previous ceasefires, since the resolutions demand unconditional withdrawal, it was obvious that Israel would not comply. 149 The Soviet ambassador argued that Israel was attempting to coerce the Arabs “to renounce their legitimate rights and to submit to the military, strategic plans of imperialism in the Middle East. . . .” 150
The PLO representative asserted that “once again the United States has chosen to be in a minority of one in support of aggression, mass murder, the invasion of territory and a campaign of annihilation of a people.” Drawing attention to the massive American support for Israel, the representative said: “We would think that the United States government is party to the invasion of Lebanon and to the criminal acts committed against the Lebanese people and the Palestinians in Lebanon.” The representative quoted
148 Ibid., 3.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., 5.
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the U.S. State Department spokesman Alan Romberg, who, while assuring Israel of the delivery of $1 billion in armaments, stated, “Israel could hardly have been in the dark about what our attitudes are about an invasion.” The State Department further asserted, contrary to the facts, that “the United States has been doing its very best, not only in recent days, but also as far back as last year, to forestall the terrible tragedy that is now unfolding,” implicitly implying American knowledge of the Israeli plans. Illustrating
U.S. identification with Israeli interests, the Palestinian representative quoted Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, who let slip: “We [meaning Israel] not only lost an aircraft and a helicopter yesterday. There is a claim a second aircraft has been shot down, a second helicopter and a number of army vehicles.” 151
Challenging the American and Israeli interpretation of Middle East history and the fundamental origin of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, the Palestinian representative stated:
There is no cycle of violence. There is an escalation of violence with a starting point, and the starting point is the invasion of Palestine, the expulsion of the Palestinian people, the methods, including the brutality, used to prevent and prohibit the Palestinians from returning to their homes and living in peace in their homes. 152
The Israeli ambassador chose to ignore the substance of the debate and attack a straw man, in this case the Soviet Union:
The respect of his country for international law and for the rights of other nations is common knowledge. That respect has been abundantly demonstrated over the years throughout the world, more particularly in recent years through the ongoing Soviet genocide of the people of Afghanistan. 153
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., 6.
153 Ibid., 7-8.
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Israel elucidated a strong contempt for the international community, international law, and the principles of the United Nations Charter by vehemently asserting to the Security
Council that “no amount of bullying . . . will intimidate the people of Israel.” 154
Implicitly asserting its exceptionalism regarding enlightened values, the ambassador claimed that Israel is sensitive “to the loss of every human life.” 155 However, just as with the case of the United States, the historical record fails to support his claim.
Draft resolution S/15347/Rev.1 of 6 August 1982 states in part that the Security
Council is “ deeply indignant at the refusal of Israel to comply with the decisions of the
Security Council aimed at terminating the bloodshed in Beirut” and
1. Strongly condemns Israel for not implementing resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982);
2. Demands that Israel immediately implement these resolutions fully;
3. Decides that, in order to carry out the above-mentioned decisions of the Security Council, all the States Members of the United Nations should refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and from providing it with any military aid until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. 156
The United States claimed it was unilaterally working for a negotiated solution which would “secure the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces. . . .” The ambassador noted: “We voted against the draft resolution because it called for sanctions
154 Ibid., 8.
155 Ibid.
156 Boudreault, 419.
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against Israel and because it was unbalanced and would not have contributed to our goal of achieving, through negotiation, a peaceful settlement.” 157
The Israel ambassador claimed support for the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty “free from any foreign intervention.” The ambassador moreover argued that
“Israel supports the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory,” and “. . .
Israel has no territorial ambitions whatsoever in Lebanon.” 158 Contrary to the historical record discussed above describing Israel as the main terrorist aggressor across the
Lebanese border as the PLO restrained retaliation against Israeli large-scale provocations, the ambassador attempted to justify Israeli aggression and argued for conditions satisfactory to Israel, in essence rewards for aggression:
We are entitled to demand that proper arrangements be made to prevent Lebanese territory from being used against us in the future as a staging ground for hostile activities and terrorist acts against Israel and its population. 159
Recall that Israel had repeatedly violated Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and massively assaulted southern Lebanon and Beirut. Moreover, Israel attempted to provoke the PLO into retaliation as a pretext for invasion. While for a year before the war, the PLO showed a strong resistance to Israeli provocation, Israel’s ambassador is quite off the mark. The ambassador once again maintained that Israel was held to a double standard; however, the double standard is Israel’s exceptionalism and amnesty from international law and the United Nations Security Council, luxuries inapplicable to other nations as the U.S. and international community’s response to the Iraqi invasion of
157 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Year: 2391 st meeting, S/PV.2391, 5.
158 Ibid., 6.
159 Ibid.
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Kuwait illustrates. Bizarrely, in a flourish that requires no comment, the ambassador contended that Israel was not an imperialistic country because the state of Israel was very small. 160
The Lebanese ambassador, referring to the Israeli conditions for withdrawal mentioned above, argued:
We cannot conceive of Israeli withdrawal being contingent on the withdrawal of others, nor can we conceive of the withdrawal of other, non-Lebanese forces as being contingent on Israeli withdrawal. 161
The French ambassador, commenting upon Israel’s repeated obfuscation in the Security
Council, stated that “it is deplorable that lies, invective and intimidation have become common rhetorical devices in the Council, thanks precisely to that representative [from
Israel.]” 162 The resolution, supported by eleven members of the Council, failed due to the U.S. veto, leading the PLO representative to declare:
We shall hold the Council--or, to be more precise, the permanent member that obstructed the functions of the Council today--responsible for any military action by Israel, in particular in or around Beirut, in pursuing its criminal acts of aggression and in resuming its barbarous attacks against Beirut. 163
As the history of the Lebanese invasion intimates, for its complicity in abetting the Israeli crime, the U.S. deserves some of the blame for further denigrating international law and promoting a world ruled by the law of force.
160 Ibid., 13.
161 Ibid., 2.
162 Ibid., 9.
163 Ibid., 10.
268
Draft resolution S/16732 of 6 September 1984 states in part that the Security
Council, reaffirming all resolutions relating to the situation in Lebanon, and “ recalling the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and stressing the humanitarian principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,”
1. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Affirms that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 apply to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law;
3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to respect strictly the rights of the civilian population in the areas under its occupation in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and to comply strictly with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;
4. Demands that Israel immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly concerning the closing of roads and crossings, the limitation of freedom of movement of individuals and the normal flow of persons and goods between those areas and the rest of Lebanon, and the obstruction to the normal conduct of Lebanese Government institutions and personnel;
5. Urges all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of to 1949 to make every effort to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district;
6. Decides to remain seized of the question. 164
The United States, casting the only negative vote, vetoed the resolution supported by the other fourteen members of the Council. 165 While Israel continued to falsely assert that it justly invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO terrorists threatening Israeli citizens
164 Boudreault, 420-421.
165 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Year: 2556 th meeting, 5.
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and blame others for abrogating ceasefires justifying its continued but reluctant occupation of southern Lebanon, the U.S. ambassador claimed that Israel has upheld the
Geneva Conventions and that “Israel has repeatedly expressed its willingness and desire to leave southern Lebanon.” 166 Once again the United States and Israel claim preconditions for its withdrawal, while the international community demanded immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, refusing to reward an aggressor.
Commenting on the U.S. veto, the Syrian ambassador stated: “. . . the United States has prevented the Council from adopting a draft resolution that merely stresses the Fourth
Geneva Conventions. . . .” 167
The draft resolution S/17000 of 11 March 1985 states in part that the Security
Council, reaffirming all its relevant resolutions regarding Lebanon, and “ having heard the statement of the representative of Lebanon, and noting with great concern the deterioration of the situation in the area occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district as a result of the Israeli practices,”
1. Condemns the Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;
2. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, and in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982), and 509 (1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;
3. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
166 Ibid., 6-8.
167 Ibid., 10.
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4. Affirms that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 apply to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law;
5. Demands that the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, desist forthwith from its practices against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and other norms of international law;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission to report to the Council on these Israeli practices and measures in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashays district.
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Council on the implementation of and compliance with this resolution as soon as possible. 168
The United States vetoed the resolution, supported by eleven members of the
Council, on the grounds that the Security Council was holding Israel, the aggressor, to a double standard, requiring its unconditional withdrawal, instead of securing the withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon. 169 The United States long-standing position that the U.S. and its allies may use military force for political gain is quite evident in the American obstruction in the Security Council. The ambassador argued that the U.S. has worked diligently to secure Israeli withdrawal, even though U.S. efforts to secure Israeli objectives as preconditions for withdrawal have opposed the mandates of the international community. 170
Israel continued to justify its actions on the false pretext that the PLO incessantly attacked Israeli civilians in northern Israel from bases in Lebanon, blaming Lebanon for
168 Boudreault, 421-422.
169 United Nations Security Council Official Records, 2573 rd meeting: S/PV.2573, 18-19.
170 Ibid.
271
preventing any attack from its soil: “As for attacks on Israel and its citizens, we shall hold
Lebanon responsible for failing to live up to its international obligations.” 171 No further comment is necessary regarding Israel’s failure to honor its international obligations.
The Polish ambassador stated: “The Israelis’ attempts to vindicate the actions of their occupying force boils down to trying to justify a policy based on the use of force and claim the legitimacy of a threat to the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of another state.” 172 The Syrian ambassador recognized that “for Israel, the right of self-defense has come to mean the right to wage pre-emptive wars . . .,” and noted that, due to the United States, Israel, as aggressor, believes in its right to determine the terms of Israeli withdrawal, thus illustrating the true double standard in international relations. 173
Draft resolution S/17730/Rev.2 of 17 January 1986 states that the Security
Council,
1. Strongly deplores the Israeli acts of violence as well as abusive practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;
2. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, and in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982), and 509 (1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon;
3. Reiterates its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
171 Ibid., 13.
172 Ibid., 5.
173 Ibid., 14-16.
272
4. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from its practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, which impede the restoration of normal conditions in the area and threaten the reconciliation efforts towards restoring peace and security in the whole country;
5. Decides to keep the situation under review and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate. 174
While casting another veto and preventing Security Council action regarding the
Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the United States ambassador dissembled that “the United
States has demonstrated repeatedly its unwavering commitment to the restoration of
Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty, and independence.” Strangely, “it is precisely our attachment to the cause of peace in Lebanon that compels us to cast a negative vote on the draft resolution now before us” because “the text fails to deal in a fair and balanced manner with the security problems of southern Lebanon, including the security of the
Lebanon-Israeli border.” 175 Once again no comment is necessary to illustrate that it is
Lebanon’s security from Israeli invasion that needs dealt with by the Security Council, not as the Americans and Israelis suppose, the relatively minor violent acts perpetuated against Israel threatening its security. The ambassador contended that “negative, one- sided draft resolutions such as this one only serve those who wish to prevent progress towards peace in the region,” attempting to obfuscate that the U.S. and Israel are preventing any peace settlement in the Middle East. 176 The Israeli ambassador, declaring the proceedings in the Security Council “ridiculous,” maintained that Lebanese instability precipitated the Israeli invasion in 1982, while refraining from recognizing that the
174 Boudreault, 422-423.
175 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2642 nd meeting, S/PV.2642, 37-38.
176 Ibid., 38.
273
numerous invasions of Lebanon, violations of sovereignty, and massive bombing of
Beirut helped create that instability. 177
The British delegation presciently observed that Israel invaded Lebanon, yet “the
Council has sought to assist in providing a response to both the Israeli and the Lebanese concerns.” Furthermore, Israel complains of Lebanese instability, when Israeli actions have created that instability, and Israel complains that the Lebanese government cannot control the southern region, when in fact Israel prevents the United Nations force and the
Lebanese government to assert that control. 178 The Chinese ambassador stated that
“international opinion unanimously holds that the root-cause of the tense situation in southern Lebanon lies in the invasion and occupation by Israel.” Moreover, Israel justified the invasion on the pretexts of “ensuring the security of their own civilians” and
“preventing terrorist attacks,” and the “hypocrisy of these pretexts has long been laid bare by the Israeli authorities’ own words and deeds.” Furthermore, “we cannot accept the confusion between acts in self-defense and terrorism, nor can we tolerate aggression against other countries under the pretext of opposing “terrorism.” 179
Draft resolution S/19434 of 15 January 1988 states that the Security Council,
“Deeply concerned with the encroachment of land and setting up of fences effecting the internationally recognized boundaries, as described in the Secretary-General’s note
(S/19318, annex) of 4 December 1987,”
1. Strongly deplores the repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory and all
177 Ibid., 21-23.
178 Ibid., 11-12.
179 Ibid., 26-27.
274
other measures and practices against the civilian population;
2. Strongly requests that Israel cease all acts of encroachment of land, destruction of roads and setting up of fences that violate the border, and any attempts to occupy or change the status of Lebanese territory or to impede the return of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon in sovereign Lebanese territory;
3. Reaffirms its calls for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;
4. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982), which demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned in the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and to report thereon to the Security Council;
6. Decides to keep the situation in southern Lebanon under review. 180
While thirteen members of the Council supported the resolution the United States used its right of veto to prevent its implementation. 181 Illustrating its complete identification with Israeli interests, the United States threatened that “continuing a review of the situation in southern Lebanon, without an attendant concern for the security of northern Israel will have no consequences.” 182 The Yugoslavia representative argued that
“we reject any pretext whatsoever, invoked by whatever country, to justify the threat to the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, as well as the lives of civilians, of
180 Boudreult, 424-425.
181 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2784 th meeting, S/PV.2784, 49-50.
182 Ibid., 51.
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another country.” 183 While obviously immediate security concerns had little bearing on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and would not justify it in any case, it is interesting that the United States and Israel continually assert the false pretexts, despite the substantial evidence leading to the conclusion that Israel committed an unfounded and unjustifiable act of aggression against international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
Draft resolution S/19868 of 6 May 1988 states in part that the Security Council,
“noting with grave concern the deterioration of the situation in southern Lebanon as a result of the recent invasion by Israeli forces,” and “ deeply concerned also by the recent action of those forces causing heavy casualties, displacement of civilian population, the destruction of houses and property, and in particular the devastation of the entire village of Meidoun,”
1. Condemns the recent invasion by Israeli forces of southern Lebanon;
2. Repeats its call for the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and calls for the cessation of all acts that violate the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of its civilian population;
3. Reaffirms its calls for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;
4. Reaffirms the urgent need to restore international peace and security through the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982) which in particular demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned in the implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), and to report thereon to the Security Council;
183 Ibid., 6.
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6. Decides to keep the situation in southern Lebanon under review. 184
While the other fourteen members supported the resolution, the United States vetoed the draft ostensibly because it “fail[ed] to recognize the attacks and reprisals originating on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border.” 185 The Kuwaiti representative queried “what kind of security is this that gives [Israel] the right to violate the security of others?” 186 The Palestinian representative, quoting Israeli authorities, illustrated the historical precedents informing and supporting Israeli policy. According to the representative, Defense Minister Yitzhak General Rabin proposed
routine operations as part of the policy of routine security measures in south Lebanon . . . to transmit a clear message to the local population that they should not cooperate with those circles which aid the terrorists against us from any type of organization. 187
Moreover, “the maintenance of the security zone is not sufficient without preventative actions against terrorist targets, whether deep in Lebanon or in the zone and its immediate environs.” 188 The ambassador cited Ben-Gurion, who wrote:
The Moslem rule in Lebanon is artificial and easily undermined. A Christian state ought to be set up whose southern border would be the Litani River. Then we’ll form an alliance with it. 189
The League of Arab States representative noted a prevalent phenomenon, especially in the United States as Finkelstein, Findlay, and Rubenberg have documented in the cited
184 Boudreault, 426-427.
185 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2814 th meeting, S/PV.2814, 58-60.
186 Ibid., 11-12.
187 Ibid., 18.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid., 22.
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works, that any criticism of Israeli policy is oftentimes immediately branded anti-
Semitism, to prevent any substantive debate:
Or is it that the Israeli representative, as well as others, are going to interpret, through a form of political and intellectual terrorism, that any dissent from their official policy, and questioning of their aggressive designs, any criticism of their oppressive measures, any reference to their documented conference of Zionism, is going to be treated as anti-Semitic in order to pre-empt any form of criticism, condemnation or skepticism about their ideas and policies. 190
Tellingly, the Israeli delegations to the United Nations have often attempted to obfuscate the real issues and undermine any sort of debate by declaring any criticism of Israeli policies as latent anti-Semitism or extreme Arab hatred of Jews, an intellectually dishonest tact to prevent Israeli concessions to the United Nations resolutions regarding a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Draft resolution S/20322 of 14 December 1988 states in part that the Security
Council, “ deeply concerned with the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory by
Israeli naval, air and land forces on 9 December 1988,”
1. Strongly deplores the recent Israeli attack against Lebanese territory by Israeli naval, air and land forces on 9 December 1988;
2. Strongly requests that Israel cease immediately all attacks against Lebanese territory;
3. Reaffirms its call for strict respect for the sovereignty of Lebanon, its independence, unity and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized boundaries;
4. Reaffirms the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and resolution 509 (1982), which demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with implementation of resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and to report to the Security Council;
190 Ibid., 37.
278
6. Decides to keep the situation in Lebanon under review. 191
The United States cast the lone negative vote, vetoing the draft on the dubious grounds that “in requesting that Israel cease all attacks against Lebanese territory regardless of provocation, this draft resolution would deny to Israel its inherent right to defend itself.” 192 In an attempt to frame the debate, the ambassador, assuming that Israeli violence never falls under the rubric of terrorism, declared that “what is needed are practical measures to curb terrorist activities, not more unbalanced resolutions that achieve nothing.” 193 The Lebanese representative pleaded that the Security Council must implement and enforce the resolutions requiring an Israeli ceasefire and withdrawal from
Lebanon. 194 The ambassador from Senegal cogently observed:
By adopting the draft resolution the Security Council would once again express the international community’s refusal to go along with the use of force and policies of aggression as a means of ensuring the security of any state whatsoever. 195
Unfortunately, the United States continued to support Israel in egregious violations of international law and the United Nations Charter, illustrating a double standard where the
U.S. and its allies utilize force for political, economic, territorial, or diplomatic gains due to enormous military power, while holding other nations accountable to the letter of international law and brutally punishing those which do not accede to their diktats.
191 Boudreault, 427.
192 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2832 nd meeting, S/PV.2832, 28-29.
193 Ibid., 29.
194 Ibid., 8-10.
195 Ibid., 22-23.
279
In addition to the resolutions regarding the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and invasion of Lebanon, the Security Council attempted to address other Israeli acts violating international law between 1980 and 2004, including the killing of United
Nations employees in the occupied territories in 2002 and the forcible interception and diversion of a Libyan civilian airliner in international airspace in 1986. Applying a unique double standard to the Israeli violations of international law, the United States, through the use of its veto, unjustifiably prevented the international community from adequately responding to the Israeli actions in order to force Israel into compliance with
United Nations demands.
Draft resolution S/2002/1385 of 20 December 2002 states in part that the Security
Council, “e xpressing grave concern at the killing by the Israeli occupying forces of several United Nations employees, including the recent killing of one international staff member in the Jenin refugee camp,” and “e xpressing deep concern at the deliberate destruction by the Israeli occupying forces of a United Nations World Food Programme warehouse in Beit Lahiya in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in which 537 metric tons of donated food supplies intended for distribution to needy Palestinians had been stored,”
1. Condemns the above-mentioned killings and destruction;
2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council on any developments in this regard. 196
196 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2002/1385 of 20 December 2002.
280
The United States ambassador to the United Nations vetoed the resolution, declaring that “the proponents of the resolution appear more intent on condemning Israeli occupation than on ensuring the safety of UN personnel. Mixing these two issues is inappropriate. . . .” 197 The American position regarding an egregious breach of international norms requires no comment.
Draft resolution S/17796/Rev.1 of 6 February 1986 states in part that the Security
Council, “ considering that this act by the Israeli airforce constitutes a serious interference with international civil aviation, and a threat to security and stability in the region,”
1. Condemns Israel for its forcible interception and diversion of the Libyan civilian aircraft in international airspace, and its subsequent detention of the said aircraft;
2. Considers that this act by Israel constitutes a serious violation of the principles of international law, and in particular the relevant provisions of the international conventions on civil aviation;
3. Calls on the International Civil Aviation Organization to take due account of this resolution when considering adequate measures to safeguard international civil aviation against such acts;
4. C alls on Israel to desist forthwith from any and all acts endangering the safety of international civil aviation and solemnly warns Israel that, if such acts are repeated, the Council will consider taking adequate measures to enforce its resolutions. 198
As a precursor to the debate on this issue, recall that the Soviet Union shot down a
Korean civilian airliner, which had intruded deeply into sensitive Soviet air space, on 1
September 1983. The United States, Japan, Canada, and South Korea quickly drafted a
197 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 4681 st meeting, S/PV.4681, 2.
198 Boudreault, 424.
281
resolution for the Security Council condemning the Soviet Union. 199 Although the
Council’s vote was 9-2-4, the measure was not adopted due to the Soviet veto. The
British ambassador tellingly stated that “the Soviet Union, by vetoing the draft resolution before us, has shown that it is impervious to the strength of opinion round the world on this issue.” 200 The United States ambassador, chastising an official enemy for qualities the U.S. exemplifies, asserted:
In its determined defense of this indefensible act, the Soviet Union has demonstrated an attitude that is as contemptuous of the truth as it is callous towards human life, an attitude underscored by its veto of the draft resolution before us today. 201
Interestingly, the ambassador claimed that “We do not believe that the protection of the sovereignty of any nation gives that nation a right to shoot down any plane in peacetime, flying any place over its territory,” exhibiting a double standard for the actions of the
U.S. and its allies and clients as opposed to the acceptable behavior of official enemies. 202
The United States government and media quickly capitalized on the event to demonize the Soviet Union. President Ronald Reagan determined that the downing of the airliner was “an act of barbarism, born of a society that wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life.” 203 The United States Congress absurdly and unanimously adopted a measure describing the Soviet action as “one of the most infamous and reprehensible acts in history.” CBS anchorperson Dan Rather referred to
199 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/15996/Rev.1 of 12 September 1983.
200 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Thirty-Eighth Year: 2476 th meeting, S/PV.2476, 12.
201 Ibid., 14.
202 Ibid., 16; The Soviet defense of its actions given in Ibid., 6-9.
203 R.W. Johnson, “KAL 007: Unanswered Questions,” World Press Review March 1984, 23-26, cited in Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 156.
282
the event as “the barbaric act,” while the New York Times, which devotes seven full pages to the event in its index in September 1982 alone, opined that “the Soviet Union is different-call it tougher, more brutal or even uncivilized–than the rest of the world.” 204
Subsequent investigation determined that the United States willfully provoked the
Soviet Union, callously disregarding the lives of the civilian passengers of that plane.
The political scientist Michael Parenti writes that “the belated revelations demolishing the official version of the incident never undid the cascade of disinformation and manipulated outrage that had initially inundated the public.” 205 For example, contrary to the U.S. government’s position, the Soviet planes had frequently attempted radio contact with the Koran airliner, which had turned off its automatic identification system and attempted evasive maneuvers, and fired warning shots before shooting it down.
Moreover, referring to the Korean plane’s immediate and subsequently large discrepancy from its original flight plan into a known dangerous area, Captain Thomas Ashwood,
Vice-President of the Airline Pilots Association at the time, called the chances of such a navigational error “astronomical.” Five weeks after the event, U.S. intelligence experts admitted there was no evidence that Soviet air defense personnel had known that the plane was a civilian airliner and had probably mistaken it for a U.S. spy plane. Two former intelligence specialists revealed that U.S. spy planes monitor the military-sensitive area of the Soviet Union constantly (more than twenty-five have been shot down since the 1950s), and, therefore, “the entire sweep of events . . . was meticulously monitored
204 Ibid.; The reference to the New York Times index in Noam Chomsky, “1984: Orwell’s and Ours,” The Thoreau Quarterly Vol. 16, cited in Ibid., 160.
205 Ibid., 159.
283
and analyzed instantaneously by U.S. intelligence,” begging the question of why the
United States never attempted to deescalate the situation. 206
Illustrating the lack of media attention in other instances, including the CIA- backed terrorist bombing of a Cuban airliner in 1976, killing 73 civilians, and the Israeli downing of a civilian plane over the Suez Canal in 1973, killing 110, the media critic
Noam Chomsky writes:
In the midst of the furor, UNITA, the “freedom fighters” supported by the U.S. and South Africa, took credit for downing an Angolan jet with 126 killed. There was no ambiguity; the plane was not off course flying over sensitive installations. . . . It was simply premeditated murder. The incident received 100 words in the NY Times and no comment any where in the media. 207
“None of these incidents demonstrate ‘barbarism,’” and indeed, the New York Times commented after the Israeli downing of the civilian plane in 1973 that “no useful purpose is served by an acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame.” 208
As Chomsky indicates, the American response to the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner contrasts with the U.S. position in similar instances when the perpetrators are
U.S. allies and clients, thus foreshadowing the U.S. vetoing of the draft resolution and the protection of Israeli actions as justified self-defense.
During the debate surrounding the vote on the draft resolution condemning the interception and diversion of the Libyan civilian airliner, the United Arab Emirates ambassador quoted the former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, who remarked after
Israel hijacked a Syrian civilian airliner on 12 December 1954 that “what shocks and
206 Ibid., 157-159.
207 Chomsky, cited in Ibid., 160.
208 Ibid.
284
worries me is the narrow-mindedness and the short-sightedness of our military leaders.
They seem to presume that the state of Israel may--or even must--behave in the realm of international relations according to the laws of the jungle.” 209 As a contrast, the UAE ambassador recalled the words of the Israeli ambassador at a debate a couple days before the vote on the resolution: the Israeli ambassador “arrogated to his country the right to intercept any civilian airliner if Israel believed some of the passengers on board were what he called terrorists or enemies of Israel.” 210 The Ghana representative asserted that
“the statement of [Israel’s] representative indicated quite clearly that it knew the action contravened international conventions and law but felt that it should be excused under the special circumstances that it adduced.” 211 Moreover, “it would be a certain prescription for anarchy if the Council should give any member states, least of all Israel--which, sadly, has a belligerent record--the assurance that it can use force in its relations with other member states and then seek retroactive endorsement of its wrongful ways from the
Council.” 212
The Indian ambassador blamed Israeli defiance of the international community as the primary factor preventing a just and lasting peace. 213 The Democratic Republic of
Germany maintained that the “prerequisite for [peace in the Middle East] is the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, implementation of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right
209 United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2655 th meeting, S/PV.2655, 7-10.
210 Ibid., 11.
211 Ibid., 26.
212 Ibid., 27.
213 Ibid., 44-45.
285
to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state of its own, as well as implementation of the right of all states of the region to independent existence and development.” 214 The Iranian ambassador strongly recommended that the United States support the international consensus in condemning Israel’s actions, instead of supporting
“a lawless, criminal entity” and “destroying the Council’s credibility.” The ambassador noted that “the United States is supposed to be a permanent member, not a permanent problem, in this Council.” 215 Once again, an Arab member state argued that the
Council’s failure to solve the Middle East problem and enforce the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples forces the Palestinians to resist by any means available. The Iranian ambassador warned: “Let us remember, that the slothful attitude of this Council--thanks again to the irresponsible position of certain permanent members will automatically force the people in the region to rely only on whatever measures are available to them, conventional or unconventional, acceptable--in terms of your norms--or unacceptable.
You members of the Council give them no choice but to do whatever is possible, whatever is available in order to get rid of the enemy and of the occupation of their land.” 216
The Israeli ambassador, while absurdly and immorally claiming that Israel was not responsible for the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in
1982, declares that Israel is a victim with the courage to resist terrorism.217 The ambassador asserts that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the world’s chief terrorist
214 Ibid., 53-55.
215 Ibid., 66.
216 Ibid., 69.
217 Ibid., 88-90, 96.
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organization. Continuing, he stated “if those [Arab] regimes were to confine those attacks to themselves, that would be a tragic thing for the people of those regimes but a minor concern to the international community,” implying perhaps that if Arabs killed other Arabs, what he defines as terrorism would not be an international problem. 218 The racist remark intimates that the lives of white Europeans, Americans, and Israelis are worth more than those with darker skin, who invariably do not value life as much as we do anyway. Those with the atomic bombs, the depleted uranium, the air forces, the navies, the napalm, and the death squads value life. Those responsible for the genocide of Native Americans, the death of perhaps three million Vietnamese and two million
Iraqis, and the murder and maiming of millions more throughout the world, value life.
Invariably, their victims do not value life and that is why we kill them.
The United States, casting the lone veto and thus preventing the adoption of the resolution, recognized the right to intercept civilian airliners as self-defense. The ambassador argued that “the United States recognizes and strongly supports the principle that a state whose territory or citizens are subject to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks.” 219
Moreover, “we must be clear that terrorist violence, not the response to terrorist violence, is the cause of the cycle of violence which increasingly and tragically mars the Middle
East and the entire world.” 220 The United States categorically accepts the principle of preventative attack, aggression disguised as self-defense against a future indeterminate attack, a concept completely at odds with international law and the United Nations
218 Ibid., 93.
219 Ibid., 112.
220 Ibid.
287
Charter. A fundamental point is that terrorism is not applicable to U.S. actions throughout the world. By definition, terrorism applies only to enemies of the United
States regardless of motives, context, or history. Therefore, while the U.S. aggression against Iraq is not considered terrorism, the actions of those Iraqis resisting occupation are characterized as such. Additionally, the concept of preventative attack only applies to the United States and its allies and clients. Those nations not possessing military might on par with the United States could not possibly fathom attempting an attack on the
United States, even if those nations are “subject to continuing terrorist attacks” by the
U.S. and its clients. While the United States raged with apoplectic indignation at the
Soviet Union for downing the Korean flight, as a useful propaganda device against the
“Evil Empire,” the U.S. affords to itself and its clients the same course of action as self- defense.
288
Conclusion
According to President George W. Bush, the terrorists who attacked the United
States on September 11, 2001 hate our freedom. In a society where the U.S. government’s mainstream media stenographers are quick to focus on the deficiencies and double standards of official enemies instead of thoroughly examining U.S. policies and providing historical context so that a knowledgeable citizenry could enact change, perhaps many Americans still believe that there was no logic behind the 9/11 attacks. By branding the attackers as mindless fanatical fundamentalists, the president has provided justification for endless war--the terrorists will not stop until they are all killed. An understood implication of this policy is that the more people the United States military kills, the more people will oppose the U.S. and by definition become terrorists.
The five chapters demonstrated that the United States is not the benevolent, virtuous, and righteous nation as it claims. However, the American people are indoctrinated by the media, government, and educational system to believe that the
United States is an especially virtuous nation. In her examination of American history textbooks, Frances Fitzgerald wrote:
According to these books, the United States had bee n a kind of Salvation Army to the rest of the world: throughout history, it had done little but dispense benefits to poor, ignorant, and diseased countries. . . . The United States always acted in a disinterested fashion, always from the highest of motives; it gave, never took. 1
However, democracy, freedom, justice, and human rights are not the principles guiding domestic and foreign policies. Instead, the United States government acts as a rogue state with the impunity of an imperial superpower, utilizing massive military and technological force to impose and maintain world hegemony through the control of resources and markets.
The first chapter examined the foreign policy of the current George W. Bush administration as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, including the illegal aggression against Afghanistan beginning immediately after the attacks against the
United States in September 2001 and Iraq beginning in March 2003 and the aggressive belligerency toward Venezuela and Iran. The National Security Strategy elucidates
American contempt for the United Nations Charter and international law and explicitly asserts the principles of U.S. unilateralism and exceptionalism, which only contribute to a more dangerous and unjust world, where force and the law of the jungle trump international law and ideals of real economic, political, and social democracy.
The second chapter examined the George H. W. Bush administration’s immediate righteous and indignant reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the underlying motives which led to large-scale U.S. military intervention and the destruction of Iraqi military capability and civilization. The Iraqi aggression allowed the United States an
1 Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (New York, 1980), 129, 139, as cited in William Blum, Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005), 1.
290
opportunity to manipulate the United Nations into violating its mandate as embodied in the Charter to support essentially unilateral American force and massive state terrorism, exposing the American righteous rhetoric against aggression and the use of force as false, in order to justify the continuation of the massive military budget after the cessation of the Cold War, assert U.S. hegemony, acquire a more permanent presence in the vital
Middle East region, convince the American public of the efficacy of direct U.S. military intervention, and destroy a perceived threat to Israel.
The third chapter described unprovoked U.S. aggression against the essentially defenseless nations of Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Nicaragua during the 1980s to further elucidate that the U.S. government does not principally oppose aggression or egregious violations of international law. Moreover, the aggression demonstrates the
U.S. government’s contempt for real democracy, human rights, and justice. Although the international community condemned the U.S. military interventions, the United Nations could not force American compliance with international law and decisions of the international court and affect the behavior of the U.S. government to prevent future
American aggression, illustrating the military might trumps international law. The historical evidence indicates that the United States will continue to rely on military force against weak, poor, defenseless nations as a first resort for territorial, economic, or political advantage, the control of resources and markets, and the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.
The two remaining chapters highlighted the habitual U.S. support for Israeli aggression, violations of international law, and noncompliance with United Nations resolutions. Although the United States immediately sought enforceable Security
291
Council resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in order to force Iraq’s withdrawal through sanctions and military intervention and although the George W. Bush administration is attempting to coerce a Security Council resolution to prevent Iran from developing nuclear technology as is its inalienable right, 2 various U.S. administrations have prevented any condemnation of Israel for its aggression against neighboring Arab states, its occupation of Palestinian territory since 1967, and various violations of international law. Chapter four provided a revisionist history (for an American audience) describing the origin of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the major crises and wars between Israel and the Arab states, the massive injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian Arabs, and the complete Israeli rejection of Palestinian human rights and self-determination to demonstrate, contrary to government and media propaganda, that the U.S. and Israel have habitually rejected a just political settlement for Middle East peace. Chapter five catalogued Israel’s habitual noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and the blatant U.S. effort to undermine the United Nations and prevent a just Middle East peace based upon the international consensus through the unjustifiable use of its veto. Israel clearly maintains its illegal policies in violation of international law and United Nations resolutions only because of the political, economic, and military support of the United
States.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, discussed in the appendix, provide a rich documentary record of the disparity between the U.S. rhetoric and policy and
2 Thus the United States policy violates the United Nations Charter and international law by placing the Security Council in the difficult position of punishing a nation for completely legal actions. Unlike the United States nuclear program, Iran’s nuclear program complies with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. See David Peterson, “Iran: A Manufactured Crisis,” Counterpunch, 1 June 2006,
292
elucidate the heinous double standard that the U.S. applies to the world because of its massive military might. As the hidden history indicates, the United States, standing virtually alone against international opinion, opposes resolutions iterated every session promoting peace, disarmament, and social, political, and economic justice.
In a democracy, the government is the people, and thus the American people have the ability and the responsibility to influence and direct the domestic and foreign policies of the government. In a world marred by war, inequality, massive poverty, and inhumane injustice, the American people must struggle for economic, social, and political equality, the preconditions for real participatory democracy in order to develop the policies and the conditions necessary for a more just, equal, and viable world. The history of the twentieth century painfully indicated that militant nationalism and patriotism, supported by the inherent ideologies of racism and exceptionalism, and manifested through massive military intervention, undermine international law, the idealism of the United Nations
Charter, and the progress of humankind. Thus far, the policies and actions of the George
W. Bush administration, based upon the perpetuation of the interests of the elite through military force, at the beginning of the twenty-first century represents an all too dangerous continuation and repetition of the twentieth century policies and ideologies that caused unparalleled and perhaps irreparable destruction to the world. All peoples and nations may realize hope for a more just, equitable, and peaceful world only when international law granting political and economic democracy is applied equally to all instead of the law of the jungle and might makes right. The American people must struggle and oppose its rogue government and establish a system that truly embodies the values of democracy, human rights, and political, social, and economic justice for all humankind.
293 Select Bibliography
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Findley, Paul. Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993.
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Appendix I:
The U.S. against the World in the United Nations General Assembly
The American public is woefully ignorant of the United Nations General
Assembly, the world body’s participatory democracy experiment comprising 191 nations.
The U.S. government and mainstream media virtually ignore the United Nations except to applaud the Security Council when it succumbs to U.S. demands or lament the democratic excess or radicalism of third world nationalists when the U.S. is in the minority against world opinion. While the U.S. government has much more power to manipulate the Security Council through coercion and its veto as a permanent member, along with China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, its influence in the more democratic General Assembly, while considerable, is not as great to incessantly prevent or weaken all undesirable resolutions. 1 Although in the current structure of the United
Nations, U.S. political and financial support is ultimately necessary for serious implementation of resolutions, the U.S voting record in the General Assembly provides essential evidence that illustrates the true U.S. policy on human rights, peace, and justice
1 Recall that the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama asserted that the United Nations is “perfectly serviceable as an instrument of American unilateralism,” quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (Zed, 1985), 183, cited in Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003) , 29. The George W. Bush administration’s attempted manipulation of the Security Council to dismiss the UN Charter and sanction the war on Iraq in 2003 and its pressing of the Security Council to punish Iran and North Korea during the summer of 2006 are recent examples.
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issues which conflicts with the lofty rhetoric emanating from various administrations and characterizes the U.S. as a rogue state often opposing the opinion of the world. 2
However, the lack of coverage in the U.S. press concerning United Nations resolutions renders the domestic consequences for American votes negligible.
According to the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly performs duties relating to the promotion of international cooperation, the maintenance of international peace and security and the social, political, and economic progress of humankind. Article
11 states that the General Assembly
may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.3
Article 13 empowers the Assembly to make recommendations “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification” and “assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 4
The political scientist Michael Parenti asserts that “a nation’s greatness can be measured by its ability to create a society free of poverty, racism, and sexism and free of
2 President George H. W. Bush repeatedly remarked during the buildup toward the Gulf War that “this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of American. It is between Iraq and the entire world community.” As the General Assembly voting records indicates, the U.S. opposes the world on many vital issues including disarmament, nuclear weapons, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and unilateral economic, political, and military coercion against weaker states. Bush quoted in the New York Times, 23 August 1990, as cited in Norman Finkelstein, “Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 1991, 50).
3 United Nations Charter
4 Ibid.
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domestic and overseas exploitation and social and environmental devastation.” 5 The progressive sentiment applies to the United Nations General Assembly, which exists to create such a world society through international cooperation. However, the ideals are not always supported by practice. The Constitutional scholar J. Allen Smith argues that while checks in the U.S. Constitution prevented majority rule, the people’s possession of voting rights propagated the misconception that the majority’s opinion was “a controlling factor in national politics.” 6 Similarly, due to the power dynamics of the United Nations, world opinion as expressed through large majorities in General Assembly resolutions may not translate into practical action. The U.S. government, in its quest for stability-a world free from change-opposes progressive political, social, and economic policies that conflict with the status quo and the property and economic rights of the world’s elite.
The following tables and accompanying brief discussion on the U.S. voting record in the
United Nations General Assembly is intended for an apathetic American public that has claimed ignorance of and abdicated responsibility for its government’s role in the world.
A knowledgeable and aware public is vital for a democratic government to function.
Real liberty is the power to actively influence and control government decision-making and policy to enact the necessary changes for the well-being of humankind and the planet which we inhabit.
This chapter serves as a complimentary discussion of the General Assembly voting records tables that follow. The tables cover the period from the 40 th session of the
5 Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 8.
6 J. Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government: A Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence and Relation to Democracy (Chautauqua, New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1911), vi.
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General Assembly (September 24, 1985 to December 18, 1985) through the current 60 th session (September 16, 2005 to December 23, 2005). 7 The tables provide detailed information for all General Assembly resolutions adopted with a vote during the period, recording the U.S. vote and oftentimes listing the nations that cast a negative vote or abstained on various topics. The study encompasses four U.S. administrations, that of
Presidents Ronald Regan, George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush, highlighting remarkable consistency in American foreign policy and elucidating the fundamental underlying principles and values informing that policy. It is unmistakably evident that the United States is often in opposition to world opinion regarding human rights, economic, social, and political progress, peace, justice, security, and the illegality and immorality of militarization and aggression. The U.S. record in the General
Assembly intimates an obvious conclusion that its rhetoric concerning freedom, democracy, and human rights is empty and hypocritical. Moreover, an honest history of its practices and policies exposes a rogue state relying preponderantly on large-scale military force to solve international disputes and provide economic or political gain while condemning official enemies and targets for violations of international law and retail violence. Due to its military and economic strength, the United States shuns the principle of universality and international law and demands that weak nations succumb to its dictates or suffer the consequences. The General Assembly voting record provides strong
7 I have culled the data found in the tables from the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. General Assembly resolutions for the period are found at < www.un.org/documents/resga.htm > and the voting records are accessed at < www.unbisnet.un.org >. The Institute for Palestine Studies multivolume compilation entitled United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict provides additional information. At the time of this writing, the 60 th session had not yet adjourned.
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documentary evidence illustrating how U.S. policies oppose meaningful rights and security for all peoples while exacerbating very real threats to human existence.
During the twenty-one sessions examined, the United Nations General Assembly introduced, discussed, and passed approximately 6,755 resolutions encompassing human rights, disarmament, social, political, and economic progress, apartheid, and the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The assembly voted on 1,823 of those resolutions with the U.S. voting in the negative (1,112) or abstaining (361) a remarkable eighty-one percent of the time. The U.S. voted with the majority on only eighteen percent of the votes (326). 8 The assembly reiterates virtually all resolutions every session, suggesting a lack of progress in implementing recommendations. As mentioned above, the United Nations has the power to enforce resolutions only with the acquiescence and political and economic support of the more powerful nations, especially the United States.
While the voting record tables need no extraneous comment, it is illustrative to catalog some of the resolutions adopted with a vote in the General Assembly during the two sessions encompassing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the first chapter indicated, the Bush administration reacted with indignant righteousness toward Iraqi aggression.
An examination of the General Assembly voting records highlights once again the enormous disconnect between U.S. rhetoric, which implies an almost surreal American idealism and benevolence, and U.S. policy, which ignores human rights and progressive
8 Additionally, accounting for the remaining one percent of U.S. votes, the U.S. did not record a vote on twenty-three occasions, most dealing with the question of Antarctica, and the assembly did not record its vote on one resolution during the 43 rd session–43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which passed 149-0-5 (on this resolution during other sessions, the U.S. voted in the affirmative).
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principles and relies on the threat or use of force. The U.S. politicians and the mainstream media completely ignore and dismiss the General Assembly, which seems rather odd for a country that renders democracy as its gift to the world considering the assembly is the democratic international body representing the world’s nations and peoples. The U.S. voting record in the General Assembly is beyond deplorable for a nation that pretends to value democracy, freedom, justice, peace, and human rights. In the words of Edward Herman, it is beyond hypocrisy.
The General Assembly recorded a vote on 116 of the 336 resolutions adopted during its 44 th session from 28 September 1989 to 17 September 1990. The U.S. sided with the majority on ten occasions and dissented on 104 resolutions through 74 negative votes and 30 abstentions. 9 The U.S. dissented against resolutions relating to cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (44/7), the law of the sea
(44/26), international solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa (44/27A), international financial pressures on the apartheid economy of South Africa (44/47E), an oil embargo against South Africa (44/27H), concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid (44/27K), the peaceful settlement of disputes between States
(44/31), the judgment of the International Court of Justice concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (44/43), the prevention of an arms race in outer space (44/112), the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (44/116A), the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war (44/119B), the human rights situation in Chile (44/166), the trade embargo
9 The U.S. did not vote on resolutions 44/124A and 44/124B concerning the question of Antarctica, which passed by votes of 114 to 0 with 7 abstentions and 101 to 0 with 8 abstentions respectively.
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against Nicaragua (44/217), and the effects of military intervention by the United States in Panama on the situation in Central America (44/240). Additionally, the U.S. opposed initiatives regarding the uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people (44/2), the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people (44/40A), the illegality of Israeli administration of Jerusalem (44/40C), an International Middle East Peace Conference
(44/42) the resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine refugees (44/47F), the return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967 (44/47E), the protection of Palestine refugees (44/47I), Israel’s illegal polices in the occupied territories (44/48C), Israel’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions (44/48E), Israeli nuclear armament
(44/121), the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory
(44/174), and assistance to the Palestinian people (4/235).
The assembly voted upon 68 of the 343 resolutions adopted during its 45 th sessions from 18 September 1990 to 27 August 1991. The U.S. sided with the majority on thirteen occasions and dissented on seventy-one resolutions through fifty-five negative votes and sixteen abstentions. 10 The U.S. failed to support initiatives regarding the question of Guam (45/32), a zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic (45/36), the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions (45/49), the prevention of an arms race in outer space (45/55A), the nuclear capability of South Africa (45/56B), cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (45/82), the adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic, and other forms of assistance given to the racist and colonialist regime of South Africa
10 The U.S. did not record a vote on resolutions 45/78A and 45/78B concerning the question of Antarctica, which passed with a vote of 98 to 0 with seven abstentions and 107 to 0 with 7 abstentions respectively.
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(45/84), the world social situation (45/87), the law of the sea (45/145), concerted and effective measures aimed at eradicating apartheid (45/176B), and military collaboration with South Africa (45/176C). Moreover, the U.S. opposed resolutions regarding Israeli nuclear armament (45/63), an international peace conference on the Middle East (45/68), the uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people (45/69), the return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967 (45/73G), the University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for
Palestine refugees (45/73J), the protection of Palestine students and educational institutions and safeguarding of the security of the facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Occupied Palestinian territory (45/73K), Israel’s noncompliance with United Nations resolutions (45/74E), Israel’s illegal occupation of the Syrian Golan (45/74F), and assistance to the Palestinian people (45/183).
While the United States opposed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, it aggressively invaded Panama, instigated and supplied the terrorist Contra effort to overthrow the legitimate Nicaraguan government, and supported economically, militarily, and political the continued illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. While the United States condemned Iraqi human rights violations during Iraq’s invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, it supported the racist apartheid policies in South Africa, trained and supplied the military juntas throughout Latin America that waged war on their domestic populations, encouraged the Contras to attack soft civilian targets in Nicaragua, and funded Israel’s brutal dispossession and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
While the United States demanded Iraq’s demilitarization, it opposed all efforts to make the world safer through the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the denuclearization of Israel and South Africa, and the prevention of an arms race in outer
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space. While the United States vehemently and somewhat unilaterally enforced resolutions against Iraq, it prevented the United Nations from implementing resolutions concerning the United States, South Africa, and Israeli illegal aggression.
The brief discussion and the accompanying voting record of United Nations
General Assembly resolutions illustrate that U.S. policy, which has been remarkably consistent regardless of the political party occupying the White House, contradicts ostensible U.S. principles such as democracy, freedom, equality, and justice. The U.S. votes in any session of the General Assembly are not an anomaly easily rectified by the
American electoral system. The study of the resolutions is fundamental to understanding the underlying principles of the American policymakers, whose decisions have a great effect on the security and well-being of the world’s people. Only by recognizing that
American foreign policy goals and actions are logical consequences of a system designed to protect the opulent minority from the majority can progressive social movements challenge the lofty, but dubious, political rhetoric with substantial contradictory evidence and work for universal political, economic, and social justice.
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40 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 24, 1985 – December 18, 1985
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 40/5 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 133- N N: Israel; A: Grenada, League of Arab States 2-2 Ethiopia 40/6 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear 88- N installations and its grave consequences for the 13-39 established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security 40/7 The situation in Kampuchea 114- Y 21-16 40/11 Right of peoples to peace 109- A 0-29 40/12 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for 122- Y international peace and security 19-12 40/18 Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 76-0- A 12 40/19 Return or restitution of cultural property to the 123- A countries of origin 0-15 40/21 Question of the Falkland Islands 107- Y N: Belize, Oman, 4-41 Solomon Islands, UK 40/23 National experience in achieving far-reaching social 133- N and economic changes for the purpose of social 1-11 progress 40/25 Importance of the universal realization of the right 118- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 17-9 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 40/27 Status of the International Convention on the 120- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-24 Apartheid 40/28 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 136- N A: Belgium, France, Racial Discrimination 1-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 40/50 Question of Western Sahara 96-7- A N: Central African 39 Republic, Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Morocco, Philippines, Democratic Republic of the Congo 40/51 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 149- A A: France, UK transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3
United Nations 40/52 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 125- N N: Belgium, France, which are impeding the implementation of the 9-16 Federal Republic of Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Germany, Italy, Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in Luxembourg, all other Territories under colonial domination and Netherlands, Portugal, efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial UK discrimination in southern Africa 40/53 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 126- N N: Israel, UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-22 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 40/56 Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration on the 139- A Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 0-13 and Peoples 40/57 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 141- N N: Israel, UK; A: of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-7 Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi 40/59A Financing of the United Nations Disengagement 96-2- Y N: Albania, Syria Observer Force 13 40/59B Financing of the United Nations Disengagement 93- Y N: Afghanistan, Albania, Observer Force 10-6 Bulgaria, Belarus, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Syria, Russia; A: Algeria, Benin, Iraq, Morocco, Romania, Yemen 40/62 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 117- A N: France 1-22 40/63 Law of the sea 140- N N: Turkey; A: Federal 2-5 Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 40/64A Comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime 122- N of South Africa 18-14 40/64B Situation in South Africa and assistance to the 128- N N: Belgium, France, liberation movements 8-18 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK 40/64C World Conference on Sanctions against Racist 137- N N: Belgium, Federal South Africa 6-10 Republic of Germany, Italy, Portugal, UK; A: Austria, Belize, Canada, France, Grenada, Israel, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Spain 40/64D Public information and public action against 150- A A: Grenada, Israel, apartheid 0-5 Malawi, UK 40/64E Relations between Israel and South Africa 102- N 20-30 40/64F Program of work of the Special Committee against 141- N N: UK
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Apartheid 2-12 40/64G International Convention against Apartheid in 125- A Sports 0-24 40/64I Concerted international action for the elimination of 149- N N: UK; A: Federal apartheid 2-4 Republic of Germany, Grenada, Israel, Malawi 40/67 Progressive development of the principles and 125- A norms of international law relating to the new 0-19 international economic order 40/70 Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the 119- N Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force 14-12 in International Relations 40/79 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 139- Y A: Argentina, Central 39/51 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-7 African Republic, Cuba, Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the France, Guyana, Cote Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America D'Ivoire, Mali (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 40/80A Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 124- N N: France, UK 3-21 40/80B Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 131- N N: France, UK 3-24 40/81 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 116- N N: France, Grenada, UK treaty 4-29 40/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 104- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-41 Mauritius 40/85 Conclusion of an international convention on the 101- N strengthening of the security of non-nuclear- 19-25 weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 40/86 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 142- A A: Argentina, Brazil, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-6 Grenada, India, St Kitts or threat of use of nuclear weapons and Nevis 40/87 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 151- A A: Grenada 0-2 40/88 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 120- N N: France, UK 36/60 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of 3-29 nuclear-weapon tests 40/89A Implementation of the Declaration on the 148- A A: Belgium, France, Denuclearization of Africa 0-6 Israel, Malawi, UK 40/89B Nuclear capability of South Africa 135- N N: France, Israel, UK 4-14 40/90 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of 128- N new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 1-21 systems of such weapons 40/91B Reduction of military budgets 113- Y 13-15 40/92A Prohibition of Chemical and biological weapons 93- N 15-41 40/92C Chemical and biological weapons 112- Y 16-22 40/93 Israeli nuclear armament 101- N N: Israel 2-47 40/94A Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 128- Y A: Afghanistan, Angola, 0-8 Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Uganda,
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Vietnam 40/94F General and complete disarmament: study on the 146- N A: Grenada, India, St naval arms race 1-3 Kitts and Nevis 40/94G General and complete disarmament: prohibition of 145- A N: France A: Argentina, the production of fissionable material for weapons 1-7 Brazil, China, India, St. purposes Kitts and Nevis, UK 40/94H General and complete disarmament: nuclear 120- N weapon freeze 17-10 40/94I General and complete disarmament: curbing the 71- N naval arms race 19-59 40/94M General and complete disarmament: 3rd Review 138- Y Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- 0-11 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 40/94N General and complete disarmament: disarmament 99-0- A and the maintenance of international peace and 53 security 40/96A Question of Palestine 128- N N: Israel 2-22 40/96B Question of Palestine 129- N N: Canada, Israel 3-20 40/96C Question of Palestine 131- N N: Canada, Israel 3-18 40/96D Question of Palestine 107- N N: Canada, Israel 3-41 40/97A Question of Namibia: situation in Namibia resulting 131- A from the illegal occupation of the territory by South 0-23 Africa 40/97B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security 130- A Council resolution 435 0-25 40/97C Question of Namibia: program of work of the UN 147- A A: Canada, France, Council for Namibia 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 40/97D Question of Namibia: dissemination of information 132- A and mobilization of international public opinion in 0-23 support of Namibia 40/97E Question of Namibia: UN Fund for Namibia 148- A A: Canada, France, 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 40/97F Question of Namibia: special session of the General 148- A A: Canada, France, Assembly 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Malawi, UK 40/100 World social situation 127- N 1-24 40/111 Human rights and use of scientific and 127- N N: Belgium, Canada, technological developments 9-16 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 40/112 Human rights and scientific and technological 131- A developments 0-22 40/114 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, 134- N social, cultural, civil and political rights 1-19 40/124 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 130- N the United Nations System for improving the 1-22 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
312
40/137 Question of human rights and fundamental 80- Y freedoms in Afghanistan 22-40 40/139 Situation of human rights and fundamental 100- A N: Chile, Guatemala freedoms in El Salvador 2-42 40/140 Situation of human rights and fundamental 91-8- A N: Bangladesh, Chile, El freedoms in Guatemala 47 Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay 40/141 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 53- Y Iran 30-45 40/145 Situation of human rights and fundamental 88- N freedoms in Chile 11-47 40/148 Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo- 106- N Fascist activities and all other forms of totalitarian 19-13 ideologies and practices based on racial intolerance, hatred and terror 40/150 Economic and social consequences of the 139- N A: Belgium, France, armaments race and its extremely harmful effects 1-7 Federal Republic of on world peace and security Germany, Grenada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 40/151A Disarmament and international security 123- N 1-23 40/151B World disarmament campaign 139- A 0-11
40/151C Nuclear-arms freeze 131- N N: Belgium, Canada, 10-8 France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Turkey, UK; A: Bahamas, China, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain 40/151D World disarmament campaign: actions and 114- A activities 0-34 40/151E Freeze on nuclear weapons 126- N 12-10 40/151F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 126- N Nuclear Weapons 17-8 40/151H UN programs of fellowship on disarmament 148- N A: Grenada 1-1 40/152A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 123- N nuclear war 19-7 40/152B Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations 107- Y 0-40 40/152E Disarmament week 129- A 0-22 40/152G Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear 141- N A: Belgium, France, winter 1-10 Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, UK 40/152H Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 70- N 11-65
313
40/152I International cooperation for disarmament 109- N 19-17 40/152J Implementation of the recommendations and 128- A decisions of the 10th special session 0-20 40/152M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 133- N N: France 2-18 40/152N Implementation of the recommendations and 135- N decisions of the 10th special session 13-5 40/152P Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 131- N disarmament 16-6 40/156A Question of Antarctica 96-0- Did 11 Not Vote 40/156B Question of Antarctica 92-0- Did 14 Not Vote 40/156C Question of Antarctica 100- Did 0-12 Not Vote 40/158 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on 127- A the Strengthening of International Security 0-26 40/159 Implementation of the collective security provisions 114- N of the Charter of the United Nations for the 21-16 maintenance of international peace and security 40/161A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 95-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 37 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/161B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 137- A N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-6 Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Population of the Occupied Territories Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 40/161C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 138- A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-6 Grenada, Cote D'Ivoire, Population of the Occupied Territories Malawi, St. Lucia 40/161D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 109- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-34 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/161E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 126- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-19 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/161F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 136- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-10 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/161G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 112- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-32 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/164A Questions relating to information 121- N 19-8 40/164B Questions relating to information 122- N 16-9 40/165A United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 149- Y A: Israel Palestine Refugees in the Near East 0-1 40/165D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 147- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 40/165E Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip 146- N N: Israel; A: Grenada,
314
2-2 Democratic Republic of the Congo 40/165F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 127- N refugees 20-4 40/165G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 127- N N: Israel 2-23 40/165H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees 122- N N: Israel properties 2-26 40/165I Protection of Palestine refugees 116- N N: Israel 2-33 40/165J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 146- N N: Israel; A: Grenada, 2-2 Malawi 40/165K University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine 149- N N: Israel; A: Grenada refugees 2-1 40/167 Israel's decision to build a canal linking the 150- Y N: Israel Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea 1-0 40/168A The situation in the Middle East 98- N 19-31 40/168B The situation in the Middle East 86- N 23-37 40/168C The situation in the Middle East 137- A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: 2-10 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, Liberia, Malawi, Paraguay, Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo 40/169 Economic development projects in the occupied 138- N N: Israel; A: Australia, Palestinian territories 2-7 Canada, Finland, Grenada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 40/170 Assistance to the Palestinian people 145- N N: Israel; A: Grenada 2-1 40/173 International economic security 96- N 19-28 40/182 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 134- N 1-19 40/183 Specific action related to the particular needs and 152- A problems of land-locked developing countries 0-1 40/185 Economic measures as a means of political and 128- N economic coercion against developing countries 19-7 40/188 Ending trade embargo against Nicaragua 91-6- N N: Gambia, Grenada, 49 Israel, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone 40/191 Reverse transfer of technology 152- N 1-0 40/197 Remnants of war 132- A 0-23 40/200 International cooperation in the field of the 149- A A: France, Federal environment 0-6 Republic of Germany, Israel, Portugal, UK 40/201 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the 153- N N: Israel; A: Grenada occupied Palestinian territories 2-1 40/207 Long-term trends in economic development 141- N 1-13 40/239 Program budget for the biennium 1984-1985 125- N
315
12-10 40/241B Financial emergency of the United Nations 132- N 12-2 40/246A Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 124- Y Lebanon 15-4 40/246B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 122- Y Lebanon 14-5 40/247 Review of the rates of reimbursement to the 120- Y Governments of troop-contributing States 14-7 40/248 Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the 109- N expenses of the United Nations 15-27 40/253A Program budget for the biennium 1986-1987 127- N N: Belarus, Bulgaria, 10-11 Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Ukraine, USSR 40/253B Income estimates for the biennium 1986-1987 137- N N: Belarus, Bulgaria, 10-0 Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Ukraine, USSR 40/253C Financing of appropriations for 1986 126- N 11-11 40/254 Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the 139- Y N: Belarus, Bulgaria, biennium 1986-1987 8-0 Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, USSR 40/255 Working Capital Fund for the biennium 1986-1987 124- N 11-3 40/257 Emoluments, pension scheme and conditions of 121- N service for the members of the International Court 11-15 of Justice
316
TABLE II
41 st Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 10, 1986 – December 19, 1986
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 41/4 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 106- N N: Israel; A: Cyprus League of Arab States 2-1 41/6 The situation in Kampuchea 115- Y 21-13 41/10 Right of peoples to peace 104- A 0-33 41/11 Declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of 124- N A: Belgium, France, the South Atlantic 1-8 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 41/12 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear 86-5- N N: El Salvador, installations and its grave consequences for the 55 Honduras, Israel, St Kitts established international system concerning the and Nevis peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security 41/13 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 149- A A: France, UK transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 41/14 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 125- N which are impeding the implementation of the 11-15 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa 41/15 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 123- N N: Israel, Malawi, UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 4-27 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 41/16 Question of Western Sahara 98-0- A 44 41/30 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 122- A N: France 1-22 41/31 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 94-3- N N: El Salvador, Israel June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary 47 activities in and against Nicaragua 41/33 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for 122- Y international peace and security 20-11 41/34 Law of the sea 145- N N: Turkey; A: Federal 2-5 Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 41/35A Situation in South Africa and assistance to the 130- N N; Belgium, France,
317
liberation movements 8-18 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, UK 41/35B Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the 126- N racist regime of South Africa 16-13 41/35C Relations between Israel and South Africa 102- N 29-26 41/35D Program of work of the Special Committee against 142- N N: UK; A: Belgium, Apartheid 2-10 Cote D’Ivoire, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal 41/35E Statue of the International Convention against 131- A Apartheid in Sports 0-24 41/35F Oil embargo against South Africa 136- N N: France, Federal 5-15 Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 41/35H Concerted international action for the elimination of 149- N N: UK; A: Cote apartheid 2-5 D’Ivoire, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Lesotho, Malawi 41/38 Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and 79- N Government of the Organization of African Unity 28-33 on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986 41/39A Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal 130- A occupation of the Territory by South Africa 0-26 41/39B Namibia: implementation of Security Council 133- A resolution 435 0-25 41/39C Program of work for the UN Council of Namibia 151- A A: Canada, Fiji, France, 0-7 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 41/39D Dissemination of information and mobilization of 135- A international public opinion in support of the 0-23 immediate independence of Namibia 41/39E UN Fund for Namibia 152- A A: Canada, Fiji, France, 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, UK 41/40 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 116- Y N: Belize, Oman, Sri 4-34 Lanka, UK 41/41A Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 89- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 24-34 41/41B Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 144- N N: France, UK; A: of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-9 Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal 41/42 Dissemination of information on decolonization 148- N N: UK; A: Belgium, 2-7 Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
318
Netherlands 41/43A Question of Palestine 121- N N: Israel 2-21 41/43B Question of Palestine 125- N N: Canada, Israel 3-18 41/43C Question of Palestine 124- N N: Canada, Israel 3-19 41/43D Question of Palestine 123- N N: Antigua and Barbuda, 3-19 Israel 41/44A Financing of the UN Disengagement Observer 110- Y N: Albania, Comoros, Force 3-21 Syria 41/44B Financing of the UN Disengagement Observer 115- Y N: Albania Force 1-22 41/45 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 145- Y A: Argentina, Central 40/79 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-7 African Republic, Cote Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the D’Ivoire, Cuba, France, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Guyana, Mali (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 41/46A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 135- N N: France, UK 3-14 41/46B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 127- N N: France, UK 3-21 41/47 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 137- A N: France treaty 1-15 41/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 107- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-41 Mauritius 41/51 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 105- N on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear- 18-25 weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 41/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 149- A A: Argentina, Brazil, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-4 India or threat of use of nuclear weapons 41/53 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154- A 0-1 41/54 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 123- N N: France, UK 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of 3-26 nuclear-weapon tests 41/55A Implementation of the Declaration on the 150- A A: France, Israel, Denuclearization of Africa 0-5 Malawi, UK 41/55B Nuclear capability of South Africa 139- N N: France, Israel, UK 4-13 41/56 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of 128- N new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 1-25 systems of such weapons 41/58B Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons 100- N 11-43 41/58C Chemical and bacteriological weapons 137- Y 0-14 41/59B Objective information on military matters 116- Y 0-26 41/59D Contribution of the specialized agencies and other 117- N organizations and programs of the UN system to the 16-19 cause of arms limitation and disarmament 41/59E Confidence-building and security-building measures 129- Y and conventional disarmament 0-21
319
41/59G Conventional disarmament 150- Y A: India, Libya 0-2 41/59H Comprehensive study on the military use of research 137- N and development 1-17 41/59I Prohibition of the development, production, 111- N N: France, Israel stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons 3-38 41/59K Naval armaments and disarmament 153- N 1-0 41/59L Prohibition of the production of fissionable material 148- A N: Israel; A: Argentina, for weapons purposes 1-6 Brazil, China, India, UK 41/59M Conventional disarmament on a regional basis 137- A A: Afghanistan, Angola, 0-7 Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam 41/59N Notification of nuclear tests 130- A N: France 1-22 41/60A World Disarmament Campaign: actions and 114- N N: France, UK activities 3-36 41/60B World Disarmament Campaign 144- A A: Belgium, France, 0-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK 41/60E Freeze on nuclear weapons 136- N 12-5 41/60F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 132- N Weapons 17-4 41/60H UN program of fellowships on disarmament 154- N 1-0 41/60I Implementation of General Assembly resolution 139- N 40/151C on a nuclear arms freeze 12-4 41/63A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 108- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-34 Population of the Occupied Territories 41/63B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-6 Cote D’Ivoire, El Population of the Occupied Territories Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia 41/63C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-5 Cote D’Ivoire, Population of the Occupied Territories Equatorial Guinea, St Lucia 41/63D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 114- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-36 Population of the Occupied Territories 41/63E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 131- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-21 Population of the Occupied Territories 41/63F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 142- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-11 Population of the Occupied Territories 41/63G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 119- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-32 Population of the Occupied Territories 41/68A Questions relating to information 148- N A: Canada, Israel,
320
1-4 Malawi, UK 41/68B Questions relating to information 143- N N: UK; A: Canada, 2-7 Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands 41/68E Questions relating to information 134- N N: Australia, Belgium, 10-9 Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, UK; A: Austria, Finland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 41/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 150- Y A: Israel 0-1 41/69D Grants and scholarships for Palestine refugees 153- Y A: Israel 0-1 41/69E Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip 146- N N: Israel; A: Cameroon, 2-5 Costa Rica, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 41/69F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 130- N refugees 20-4 41/69G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 126- N N: Israel 2-25 41/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees properties 124- N N: Israel 2-28 41/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 121- N N: Israel 2-29 41/69J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 145- N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 2-6 Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 41/69K University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” 152- N N: Israel 2-0 41/71 Observer status of national liberation movements 125- N N: Belgium, Canada, recognized by the Organization of African Unity 10-17 France, Federal Republic and/or by the League of Arab States of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 41/73 Progressive development of the principles and 131- A norms of international law relating to the new 0-23 international economic order 41/75 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 141- N N: France, Federal Security of Mankind 5-8 Republic of Germany, Israel, UK; A: Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey 41/86A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 88-0- Y 56
321
41/86B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 118- N nuclear war 17-10 41/86D Disarmament week 123- N 1-23 41/86F Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 130- N disarmament 15-5 41/86G Prevention of nuclear war 134- N N: France, UK 3-14 41/86H Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear 140- N A: Belgium, France, winter 1-10 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK 41/86I Review of the implementation of the 138- N recommendations and decisions adopted by the 1-11 General Assembly at its 11th Special Session : resolution 41/86J Review of the implementation of the 128- A recommendations and decisions adopted by the 0-18 General Assembly at its 11th Special Session : resolution 41/86K International cooperation for disarmament 118- N 19-9 41/86M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 133- N N: France, UK 3-17 41/86N Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 140- A 0-13 41/86O Implementation of the recommendations and 135- N decisions of the 10 th Special Session 13-5 41/86P Report of the Conference on Disarmament 101- Y 0-50 41/88A Question of Antarctica 94-0- Did 12 Not Vote 41/88B Question of Antarctica 96-0- Did 12 Not Vote 41/88C Question of Antarctica 119- Did A: Austria, Canada, Fiji, 0-8 Not Ireland, Luxembourg, Vote Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey 41/90 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on 126- N the Strengthening of International Security 1-24 41/91 Need for result-oriented political dialogue to 117- N improve the international situation 1-33 41/92 Establishment of a comprehensive system of 102- N N: France international peace and security 2-46 41/93 Israeli nuclear armament 95-2- N N: Israel 56 41/95 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human 126- N N: Belgium, Cameroon, rights of political, military, economic and other 10-17 France, Federal Republic forms of assistance given to the racist and of Germany, Israel, Italy, colonialist regime of South Africa Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 41/101 Importance of the universal realization of the right 126- N
322
of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 18-12 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 41/102 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 120- N rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 11-23 peoples to self-determination 41/103 Status of the International Convention on the 128- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-27 Apartheid 41/113 Human rights and use of scientific and technological 129- N N: Belgium, Canada, developments 10-15 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 41/115 Human rights and scientific and technological 131- A developments 0-24 41/117 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, 129- N social, cultural, civil and political rights 1-25 41/123 Measures of assistance provided to South African 147- N A: Belgium, France, and Namibian refugee women and children 1-8 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 41/128 Declaration on the Right to Development 146- N A: Denmark, Finland, 1-8 Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, UK 41/131 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 134- N the United Nations system for improving the 1-21 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 41/132 Respect for the right of everyone to own property 109- Y alone as well as in association with others and its 0-41 contribution to the economic and social development of Member States 41/133 Right to development 133- N 11-12 41/141 Assistance to displaced persons in Ethiopia 150- N A: Israel 1-1 41/143 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 135- N and Protection of Minorities 1-19 41/146 Realization of the right to adequate housing 153- A A: Israel 0-2 41/151 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the 148- N A: Belgium, Canada, human rights and dignity of all migrant workers 1-4 Federal Republic of Germany, UK 41/155 Strengthening of international co-operation in the 154- A field of human rights 0-1 41/156 Situation of the human rights and fundamental 134- Y freedoms in Guatemala 0-21 41/157 Situation of human rights in El Salvador 110- Y 0-40 41/158 Question of human rights and fundamental 89- Y freedoms in Afghanistan 24-36 41/159 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 61- Y
323
Iran 32-42 41/161 Situation of human rights and fundamental 94-5- N N: Chile, Indonesia, freedoms in Chile 52 Lebanon, Paraguay 41/162A The situation in the Middle East 104- N 19-32 41/162B The situation in the Middle East 90- N 29-34 41/162C The situation in the Middle East 141- A N: Costa Rica, El 3-11 Salvador, Israel 41/164 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 83-2- N N: Israel 44 41/165 Economic measures as a means of political and 115- N economic coercion against developing countries 23-3 41/179A Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 125- Y N: Albania, Syria; A: Lebanon 2-9 Angola, Cuba, Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen 41/179B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 116- Y N: Albania, Syria Lebanon 2-19 41/180 Net transfer of resources from developing to 125- N N: Australia, Belgium, developed countries 10-10 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK; A: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Spain, Sweden 41/181 Assistance to the Palestinian people 142- N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica 2-1 41/184 Report of the Secretary-General in implementation 117- A of General Assembly resolution 40/173 16-11 (International economic security) 41/187 Proclamation of the World Decade for Cultural 146- N A: Israel, UK Development 1-2 41/195 Assistance to Uganda 150- N 1-0 41/197 Assistance to Mozambique 152- N 1-0 41/199 Special assistance to front-line states 152- A 0-1 41/200 Assistance to Benin, the Central African Republic, 152- A the Comoros, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, 0-1 Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Haiti, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Vanuatu 41/209C UN budget: Health insurance 132- N N: Bulgaria, Belarus, 10-3 Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR; A: Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, UK
324
41/209E New service of the Department of Political and 124- N Security Council Affairs 11-10 41/209F Loan to UN Industrial Development Organization 124- N 13-9 41/209H Judgment of the UN Administrative Tribunal 135- Y N: Bulgaria, Belarus, 10-1 Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR; A: Singapore 41/209I Job classification 101- N 19-24 41/211A Program budget for the biennium 1986-1987: 122- N revised budget appropriations 13-10 41/211B Revised income estimates 132- N 11-2 41/211C Financing of appropriations for the year 1987 123- N 14-9 41/212B UN Conference for the Promotion of International 119- A Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 0-28 Energy
325
TABLE III
42 nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 7, 1987 – August 17, 1998
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 42/3 The situation in Kampuchea 117- Y 21-16 42/5 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 153- N N: Israel League of Arab States 2-0 42/7 Return or restitution of cultural property to the 103- A countries of origin 0-15 42/14A Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal 131- A occupation of the Territory by South Africa 0-24 42/14B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security 130- A Council resolution 435 0-24 42/14C Program of work of the UN Council for Namibia 149- A A: Canada, France, 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, UK 42/14D Dissemination of information and mobilization of 133- A international public opinion in support of the 0-22 immediate independence of Namibia 42/14E UN Fund for Namibia 149- A A: Canada, France, 0-5 Federal Republic of Germany, UK 42/15 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for 123- Y international peace and security 19-11 42/16 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South 122- N A: Belgium, France, Atlantic 1-8 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 42/17 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 128- A N: France 1-22 42/18 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 94-2- N N: Israel June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary 48 activities in and against Nicaragua 42/19 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 114- Y N: Belize, Gambia, 5-36 Oman, Sri Lanka, UK 42/20 Law of the sea 142- N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 2-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 42/23A International solidarity with the liberation struggle 129- N N: Portugal, UK in South Africa 3-22 42/23B Application of coordinated and strictly monitored 128- N N: Federal Republic of measures to South Africa 3-24 Germany, UK 42/23C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the 126- N racist regime of South Africa 11-17 42/23D Relations between Israel and South Africa 103- N
326
29-23 42/23E Program of work of the Special Committee against 145- N A: Belgium, Canada, Apartheid 1-10 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 42/23F Oil embargo against South Africa 138- N N: France, Federal 4-12 Republic of Germany, UK 42/23G Concerted international action for the elimination of 149- N N: UK; A: Cote apartheid 2-4 D'Ivoire, Federal Republic of Germany, Lesotho, Malawi 42/25 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 147- Y A: Argentina, Central 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-7 African Republic, Cote Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the D'Ivoire, Cuba, France, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Guinea, Guyana (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 42/26A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 137- N N: France, UK 3-14 42/26B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 128- N N: France, UK 3-22 42/27 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 143- N N: France; A: Angola, treaty 2-8 Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Israel, UK 42/29 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 114- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-36 Mauritius 42/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 112- N on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear- 18-20 weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 42/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 151- A A: Brazil, India to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-3 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 42/33 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154- N 1-0 42/34A Implementation of the Declaration on the 151- A A: France, Israel, UK Denuclearization of Africa 0-4 42/34B Nuclear capability of South Africa 140- N N: France, Israel, UK 4-13 42/35 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of 135- N new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 1-18 systems of such weapons 42/38A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 115- Y 0-39 42/38C Notification of nuclear tests 147- A N: France; A: Angola, 1-8 Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, UK 42/38D Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 143- A 0-13 42/38F Prohibition of the development, production, 119- N N: Israel stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 2-32 42/38I Objective information on military matters 133- Y 0-12 42/38J Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in 128- N N: Israel
327
the field of disarmament 2-24 42/38K Naval armaments and disarmament 154- N A: Grenada, India 1-2 42/38L Prohibition of the production of fissionable material 149- A N: France; A: Argentina, for weapons purposes 1-6 Brazil, China, India, UK 42/39A Review and implementation of the Concluding 129- N Document of the 12 th Special Session of the General 1-23 Assembly 42/39B Freeze on nuclear weapons 139- N 12-4 42/39C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 135- N Weapons 17-4 42/39G World Disarmament Campaign 146- N A: Belgium, Canada, 1-9 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 42/39H Implementation of General Assembly resolution 140- N 41/60I on a nuclear-arms freeze 13-2 42/39I UN program of fellowships on disarmament 156- N 1-0 42/42A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 125- N nuclear war 17-12 42/42B Review of the implementation of the 137- A N: Iran recommendations and decisions adopted by the 1-14 General Assembly at its 10 th special session 42/42C Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 137- N disarmament 13-7 42/42D Prevention of nuclear war 140- N N: France, UK 3-14 42/42E International cooperation for disarmament 118- N 18-14 42/42H Disarmament Week 133- A 0-21 42/42K Report of the Conference on Disarmament 127- A 0-28 42/42L Report of the Conference on Disarmament 135- N N: Belgium, France, 5-15 Portugal, UK 42/42M Implementation of the recommendations and 142- N decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 12-3 10 th special session 42/42N Rationalization of the work of the 1 st Committee 134- Y 0-20 42/44 Israeli nuclear armament 97-2- N N: Israel 52 42/46A Question of Antarctica 122- Did A: Canada, Cote 0-9 Not D'Ivoire, Ireland, Vote Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal 42/46B Question of Antarctica 100- Did A: Antigua and Barbuda, 0-10 Not Canada, China, Fiji, Vote Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey,
328
Venezuela 42/50 National experience in achieving far-reaching social 144- N A: Australia, Austria, and economic changes for the purpose of social 1-10 Belgium, Canada, progress Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK 42/52 Efforts and measures for securing the 156- N implementation by States and the enjoyment by 1-0 youth of human rights in conditions of peace, particularly the right to education and to work 42/56 Status of the International Convention on the 128- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-27 Apartheid 42/66A Question of Palestine 131- N N: Israel 2-22 42/66B Question of Palestine 133- N N: Israel 2-20 42/66C Question of Palestine 133- N N: Canada, Israel 3-18 42/66D Question of Palestine 129- N N: Israel 2-24 42/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 153- Y A: Israel 0-1 42/69D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 154- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 42/69E Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip 150- N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 2-3 Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 42/69F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 131- N refugees 20-4 42/69G Population and refugees displaced since 1967 125- N N: Israel 2-27 42/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties 123- N N: Israel 2-28 42/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 124- N N: Israel 2-27 42/69J Palestine refugees in the West Bank 145- N N: Israel; A: Central 2-7 African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 42/69K University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine 151- N N: Israel; A: Equatorial refugees 2-1 Guinea 42/70 Financing of the United Nations Disengagement 94-3- Y N: Albania, Libya, Syria; Observer Force 5 A: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Maldives, 42/71 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 131- N N: UK; A: Belgium, of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-7 Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
329
Netherlands 42/72 Dissemination of information on decolonization 135- N N: UK; A: Belgium, 2-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 42/73 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 154- A A: France, UK transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 42/74 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 133- N N: Belgium, France, which are impeding the implementation of the 10-12 Federal Republic of Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Germany, Israel, Italy, Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in Luxembourg, all other Territories under colonial domination and Netherlands, Portugal, efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial UK discrimination in southern Africa 42/75 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 130- N N: Israel, UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-23 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 42/78 Question of Western Sahara 93-0- A 50 42/79 Question of New Caledonia 69- A 29-47 42/91 Implementation of the Declaration on the 128- A Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace 0-24 42/92 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on 131- N the Strengthening of International Security 1-23 42/93 Comprehensive system of international peace and 76- N security 12-63 42/95 Importance of the universal realization of the right 126- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 17-10 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 42/96 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 125- N N: Belgium, France, rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 10-19 Federal Republic of peoples to self-determination Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 42/99 Human rights and use of scientific and technological 129- N N: Belgium, France, developments 9-15 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 42/100 Human rights and scientific and technological 131- A developments 0-24 42/101 Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child 154- A 0-1 42/102 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, 129- N social, cultural, civil and political rights 1-22 42/115 The impact of property on the enjoyment of human 124- N rights and fundamental freedoms 24-2 42/119 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 129- N
330
the United Nations System for improving the 1-24 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 42/134 Need to enhance international co-operation in the 145- N N: Israel; A: Denmark, field of the protection of and assistance for the 2-8 Finland, France, Iceland, family Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 42/135 Question of human rights and fundamental 94- Y freedoms in Afghanistan 22-31 42/136 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 64- Y Iran 22-45 42/139 Assistance to displaced persons in Ethiopia 153- A A: Malaysia 0-2 42/140 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the 150- N A: Canada, Federal human rights and dignity of all migrant workers 1-3 Republic of Germany, UK 42/145 Improvement of social life 129- N 17-8 42/146 Realization of the right to adequate housing 156- A 0-1 42/147 Situation of human rights and fundamental 93-5- A N: Chile, Indonesia, freedoms in Chile 53 Lebanon, Paraguay, Thailand 42/149 Progressive development of the principles and 131- A norms of international law relating to the new 0-24 international economic order 42/150 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 136- A 0-20 42/151 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 136- N N: France, Federal Security of Mankind 5-14 Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 42/153 Draft Convention on International Bills of Exchange 114- A and International Promissory Notes 0-40 42/158 Development and strengthening of good- 133- A neighborliness between States 0-22 42/159 Measures to prevent international terrorism which 153- N N: Israel; A: Honduras endangers or takes innocent human lives or 2-1 jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes 42/160A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 111- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-36 Population of the Occupied Territories 42/160B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 142- A N: Israel; A: Belize, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-8 Central African Population of the Occupied Territories Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 42/160C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 143- A N: Israel; A: Belize, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-8 Central African Population of the Occupied Territories Republic, Costa Rica,
331
Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 42/160D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 112- N N: Costa Rica, Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 3-38 Population of the Occupied Territories 42/160E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 130- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-23 Population of the Occupied Territories 42/160F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 143- A N: Israel; A: Belize, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-10 Cameroon, Central Population of the Occupied Territories African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 42/160G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 137- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-14 Population of the Occupied Territories 40/162A Question relating to information 136- N 1-15 40/162B Question relating to information 140- N 1-11 42/165 International economic security 119- N N: Belgium, France, 10-20 Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, UK 42/166 Assistance to the Palestinian people 152- N N: Israel 2-0 42/173 Economic measures as a means of political and 128- N economic coercion against developing countries 21-5 42/174 Specific action related to the particular needs and 152- N problems of land-locked developing countries 1-0 42/176 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 94-2- N N: Israel 48 42/184 International co-operation in the field of the 149- Y N: Israel environment 1-0 42/190 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the 151- N A: Togo occupied Palestinian territories 1-1 42/198 Furthering international co-operation regarding the 154- N external debt problems 1-0 42/199 Assistance for reconstruction and development of 152- N Lebanon 1-0 42/200 Special economic assistance to Chad 150- A 0-1 42/201 Special assistance to front-line States 154- A 0-1 42/202 Special assistance to Maldives for disaster relief and 153- A the strengthening of its coastal defenses 0-1 42/203 Assistance to El Salvador 154- A 0-1 42/204 Special economic assistance to Central America 154- A 0-1 42/205 Assistance to Benin, the Central African Republic, 154- N
332
Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, the Gambia, 1-0 Madagascar, Nicaragua and Vanuatu 42/209A The situation in the Middle East 124- N N: Honduras, Israel 3-22 42/209B The situation in the Middle East 99- N 19-33 42/209C The situation in the Middle East 82- N 23-43 42/209D The situation in the Middle East 140- A N: Costa Rica, El 3-7 Salvador, Israel; A: Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi 42/210B Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 145- Did N: Israel Country 1-0 Not Vote 42/223 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 133- Y N: Albania, Iran, Syria; Lebanon 3-9 A: Angola, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen 42/224 Review of the rates of reimbursement to the 133- Y N: Albania, Iran, Syria; Governments of troop-contributing States 3-10 A: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Vietnam, Yemen 42/226A Program budget for the biennium 1988-1989 146- A N: Israel; A: Australia, 1-3 Japan 42/229A Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 143- Did N: Israel Country 1-0 Not Vote 42/230 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 148- N N: Israel Country 2-0 42/232 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 136- N N: Israel Country 2-0
333
TABLE IV
43 rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 17, 1988 – April 20, 1989
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 43/3 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 146- N N: Israel League of Arab States 2-0 43/11 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 89-2- N N: Israel June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary 48 activities in and against Nicaragua 43/12 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 140- N Organization of African Unity 1-0 43/13 Pretoria's racial "municipal elections" 146- A A: UK 0-2 43/14 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 127- A N: France 1-25 43/18 Law of the sea 135- N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 2-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Peru, UK, Venezuela 43/19 The situation in Kampuchea 122- Y 19-13 43/21 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 130- N N: Israel 2-16 43/22 Right of peoples to peace 118- A 0-29 43/23 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South 144- N A: Belgium, France, Atlantic 1-7 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands 43/25 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 109- Y N: Belize, Gambia, 5-37 Oman, Sri Lanka, UK 43/26A The situation in Namibia resulting from illegal 130- A occupation of the territory by South Africa 0-23 43/26B Question of Namibia: implementation of Security 140- A Council resolution 435 0-13 43/26C Program of work of the UN Council for Namibia 147- A A: Canada, France, 0-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, UK 43/26D Dissemination of information and mobilization of 129- A international public opinion in support of the 0-23 immediate independence of Namibia 43/26E UN Fund for Namibia 148- A A: Canada, France, 0-5 Federal Republic of Germany, UK 43/28 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 154- A A: UK transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-2 United Nations
334
43/29 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 133- N N: Belgium, France, which are impeding the implementation of the 9-14 Federal Republic of Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Germany, Italy, Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in Luxembourg, all other Territories under colonial domination and Netherlands, Portugal, efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial UK discrimination in southern Africa 43/30 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 124- N N: Federal Republic of of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 4-27 Germany, Israel, UK by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 43/33 Question of Western Sahara 86-0- A 53 43/45 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 147- N N: UK; A: Belgium, of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-7 Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 43/46 Dissemination of information on decolonization 149- N N: UK; A: Belgium, 2-5 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands 43/47 International Decade for the Eradication of 135- N Colonialism 1-20 43/48 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 151- N N: Israel; A: UK Country 2-1 43/49 Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host 154- N N: Israel; A: UK Country 2-1 43/50A International solidarity with the liberation struggle 131- N N: Portugal, UK in South Africa 3-21 43/50B Military collaboration with South Africa 123- N N: Israel 2-29 43/50C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the 123- N racist regime of South Africa 12-19 43/50D Imposition, coordination, and strict monitoring of 136- N N: Federal Republic of measures against racist South Africa 4-14 Germany, Portugal, UK 43/50E Relations between South Africa and Israel 106- N 23-26 43/50F Program of work of the Special Committee against 144- N A: Belgium, France, Apartheid 1-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/50H Dissemination of information against the policies of 132- N apartheid of the regime of racist South Africa 1-21 43/50J Oil embargo against South Africa 138- N N: UK 2-14 43/50K Concerted international action for the elimination of 149- N N: UK; A: Federal apartheid 2-2 Republic of Germany, Portugal 43/54A The situation in the Middle East 103- N 18-30 43/54B The situation in the Middle East 83- N 21-45
335
43/54C The situation in the Middle East 143- A N: El Salvador, Israel; 2-7 A: Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, St Kitts and Nevis 43/57A Assistance to Palestine refugees 152- Y A: Israel 0-1 43/57D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 153- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 43/57E Palestine refugees in territory occupied by Israel 152- N N: Israel since 1967 2-0 43/57F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 130- N refugees 20-3 43/57G Return of population and refugees displaced since 129- N N: Israel 1967 2-23 43/57H Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties 151- N N: Israel; A: UK 2-1 43/57I Protection of Palestine refugees 151- N N: Israel; A: Democratic 2-1 Republic of the Congo 43/57J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine 152- N N: Israel refugees 2-0 43/58A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 106- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-43 Population of the Occupied Territories 43/58B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 148- A N: Israel; A: Cote Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-4 D'Ivoire, Liberia, Population of the Occupied Territories Democratic Republic of the Congo 43/58C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 149- A N: Israel; A: Liberia Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-2 Population of the Occupied Territories 43/58D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 150- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-0 Population of the Occupied Territories 43/58E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 152- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-1 Population of the Occupied Territories 43/58F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 149- A N: Israel; A: Liberia, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-3 Democratic Republic of Population of the Occupied Territories the Congo 43/58G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 147- N N: Israel; A: Chile, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-3 Liberia, Democratic Population of the Occupied Territories Republic of the Congo 43/60A Questions relating to information 128- N N: Belgium, Canada, 8-16 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, UK 43/60B Questions relating to information 141- N 1-11 43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 149- NON RECORDED 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-5 VOTE Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 43/63A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 136- N N: France, UK, Yemen
336
4-13 43/63B Cessation of all nuclear -test explosions 127- N N: France, UK 3-21 43/64 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 146- N N: France; A: Argentina, treaty 2-6 Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK 43/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 116- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-34 Mauritius 43/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 117- N on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear- 17-16 weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 43/69 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 152- A A: Brazil, India to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-3 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 43/70 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 154- N 1-0 43/71A Implementation of the Declaration on the 151- A A: France, Israel, UK Denuclearization of Africa 0-4 43/71B Nuclear capability of South Africa 138- N N: France, Israel, UK 4-12 43/72 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of 152- A A: Israel new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 0-2 systems of such weapons 43/75A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 141- A 0-12 43/75G Objective information on military matters 130- Y A: Algeria, Bahrain, 0-10 Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 43/75H Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in 131- N N: Israel the field of disarmament 2-20 43/75I International arms transfers 110- A N: Djibouti 1-38 43/75J Prohibition of the development , production, 116- N N: Israel stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons 2-29 43/75K Prohibition of the production of fissionable material 144- A N: France; A: Argentina, for weapons purposes 1-7 Brazil, China, India, Luxembourg, UK 43/75L Naval armaments and disarmament 152- N A: Israel 1-1 43/75N Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons 141- N A: Belgium, France, 1-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/75O Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 103- Y 0-46 43/75Q Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for 129- Y N: Togo; A: Angola, hostile purposes 1-10 Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Congo, Mali, Niger, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia
337
43/75S Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 125- A 0-23 43/75T Dumping of radioactive wastes 141- A 0-13 43/76A Disarmament and international security 129- N 1-21 43/76B Nuclear arms freeze 135- N 12-3 43/76C World disarmament campaign 144- A A: Belgium, Canada, 0-10 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/76E Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 133- N Weapons 17-4 43/77A Scientific and technological developments and their 129- N N: France, Federal impact on international security 7-14 Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, UK 43/77B Third special session of the General Assembly 152- A A: UK devoted to disarmament 0-2 43/78B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 127- N nuclear war 17-6 43/78C International cooperation for disarmament 136- N 1-13 43/78D Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear 145- A A: Belgium, France, winter 0-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, UK 43/78E Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 135- N disarmament 13-5 43/78F Prevention of nuclear war 136- N N: France, UK 3-14 43/78I Report of the Conference on Disarmament 96-0- A 53 43/78J Economic and social consequences of the 143- N A: Belgium, France, armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on 1-9 Federal Republic of world peace and security Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/78M Report of the Conference on Disarmament 136- N N: France, UK 3-14 43/80 Israeli nuclear armament 99-2- N N: Israel 51 43/81B Study of the role of the UN in the field of 150- N verification 1-0 43/82 Implementation of the conclusions of the 3rd 137- Y Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 0-11 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the 4th Review Conference 43/83A Question of Antarctica 100- Did A: China, Fiji, Ireland, 0-6 Not Portugal, Turkey, Vote Venezuela
338
43/83B Question of Antarctica 111- Did A: Botswana, Cote 0-10 Not D'Ivoire, Ireland, Vote Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Paraguay, Portugal, Swaziland 43/86 Need for a result-oriented political dialogue to 127- N improve the international situation 1-24 43/87 Tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration 128- A on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace 0-24 43/88 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on 128- N the Strengthening of International Security 1-22 43/89 Comprehensive approach to strengthening 97-3- N N: Israel, Japan international peace and security in accordance with 45 the Charter of the United Nations 43/92 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human 129- N N: Belgium, France, rights of political, military, economic and other 10-17 Federal Republic of forms of assistance given to the racist and Germany, Israel, Italy, colonialist regime of South Africa Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/97 Status of the International Convention on the 128- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-26 Apartheid 43/106 Importance of the universal realization of the right 124- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 15-15 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 43/107 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 125- N N: Belgium, France, rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 10-21 Federal Republic of peoples to self-determination Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/110 Human rights and scientific and technological 133- A developments 0-24 43/113 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, 132- N social, cultural, civil and political rights 1-23 43/124 The impact of property on the enjoyment of human 129- N rights and fundamental freedoms 24-1 43/125 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 130- N the United Nations System for improving the 1-25 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 43/126 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 135- Did N: Belgium, Canada, the United Nations System for improving the 8-14 Not France, Federal Republic effective enjoyment of human rights and Vote of Germany, Japan, fundamental freedoms Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 43/137 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 61- Y Iran 25-44 43/146 Measures to improve the situation and ensure the 154- N A: Federal Republic of human rights and dignity of all migrant workers 1-2 Germany, UK 43/156 Improvement of social life 130- N 16-9 43/158 Situation of human rights and fundamental 97-1- A N: Chile
339
freedoms in Chile 55 43/160A Observer status of national liberation movements 117- N N: Israel recognized by the Organization of African Unity 2-31 and/or the League of Arab States 43/160B Observer status of national liberation movements 124- N N: Belgium, France, recognized by the Organization of African Unity 9-18 Federal Republic of and/or the League of Arab States Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 43/162 Progressive development of the principles and 129- A norms of international law relating to the new 0-24 international economic order 43/163 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 132- A 0-22 43/164 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 137- N N: France, Federal Security of Mankind 5-13 Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 43/171A Development and strengthening of good- 67-9- Y N: Bulgaria, Cameroon, neighborliness between States 65 Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Vietnam 43/171B Development and strengthening of good- 124- N N: Belgium, France, neighborliness between States 8-22 Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 43/175A Question of Palestine 123- N N: Israel 2-20 43/175B Question of Palestine 123- N N: Israel 2-20 43/175C Question of Palestine 127- N N: Israel 2-17 43/176 Question of Palestine 138- N N: Israel; A: Canada, 2-2 Costa Rica 43/177 Question of Palestine 104- N N: Israel 2-36 43/178 Assistance to the Palestinian people 118- N 14-13 43/182 Preparation for an International Development 151- A Strategy for the 4th United Nations Development 0-1 Decade 43/185 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 89-2- N N: Israel 50 43/187 International Conference on Money and Finance 127- N 19-5 43/195 International co-operation for the eradication of 128- N poverty in developing countries 1-21 43/197 Fulfillment of the target for official development 148- A assistance 0-1 43/198 External debt crisis and development 150- N A: Japan 1-1 43/209 Special assistance to front-line States 152- A 0-1 43/222B Status of Committee on Conferences 129- N N: Federal Republic of
340
4-14 Germany, Israel, UK 43/228 Financing of the United Nations Disengagement 133- Y N: Libya, Syria; A: Observer Force 2-8 Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Maldives, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen 43/229 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 134- Y N: Syria; A: Cuba, Iran, Lebanon 1-8 Iraq, Libya, Maldives, Poland, Vietnam, Yemen 43/233 Question of Palestine 129- N N: Israel; A: Liberia 2-1
341
TABLE V
44 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 28, 1989 – September 17, 1990
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 44/1 Death sentence passed on a South African patriot 149- A A: UK 0-2 44/2 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian People 140- N N: Israel; A: Antigua 2-6 and Barbuda, El Salvador, Grenada, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay, Democratic Republic of the Congo 44/7 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 143- N N: Israel League of Arab States 2-0 44/9 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 128- A N: France 1-24 44/18 Return or restitution of cultural property to the 139- A countries of origin 0-16 44/20 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South 146- N A: Canada, Japan Atlantic 1-2 44/22 The situation in Kampuchea 124- Y 17-12 44/24 African Alternative Framework to Structural 137- N Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic 1-0 Recovery and Transformation 44/26 Law of the sea 138- N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 2-6 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 44/27A International solidarity with the liberation struggle 129- N N: Israel, Portugal, UK in South Africa 4-21 44/27C Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against 118- N the racist regime of South Africa 11-22 44/27D Imposition, co-ordination and strict monitory of 135- N N: Portugal, UK measures against racist South Africa 3-15 44/27E International financial pressures on the apartheid 140- N N: Federal Republic of economy of South Africa 4-11 Germany, Netherlands, UK 44/27F Relations between South Africa and Israel 114- N 22-18 44/27G Program of work of the Special Committee against 145- A A: Belgium, France, Apartheid 0-10 Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 44/27H Oil embargo against South Africa 139- N N: UK 2-14
342
44/27I Military collaboration with South Africa 106- N 17-26 44/27K Concerted international action for elimination of 151- N N: UK; A: Federal apartheid 2-3 Republic of Germany, Lesotho, Portugal 44/27L Support for the work of the Commission against 127- N Apartheid in Sports 1-23 44/30 Progressive development of the principles and 126- A N: Luxembourg norms of international law relating to the new 1-24 international economic order 44/31 Peaceful settlement of disputes between States 131- A 0-21 44/32 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 133- N N: France, Federal Security of Mankind 5-14 Republic of Germany, Israel, UK 44/40A The situation in the Middle East 109- N 18-31 44/40B The situation in the Middle East 84- N 22-49 44/40C The situation in the Middle East 147- A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: 2-8 Belize, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Malawi 44/41A Question of Palestine 132- N N: Dominica, Israel 3-21 44/41B Question of Palestine 133- N N: Dominica, Israel 3-20 44/41C Question of Palestine 136- N N: Dominica, Israel 3-17 44/42 Question of Palestine 151- N N: Dominica, Israel; A: 3-1 Belize 44/43 Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 91-2- N N: Israel 27 June 1986 concerning military and paramilitary 41 activities in and against Nicaragua 44/47A Assistance to Palestine refugees 134- Y A: Israel 0-1 44/47D Offers by Member States of grants and 141- Y A: Israel scholarships for higher education for Palestine 0-1 refugees 44/47E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory 140- N N: Israel; A: Dominica occupied by Israel since 1967 2-1 44/47F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 121- N refugees 20-3 44/47G Return of the population and refugees displaced 126- N N: Israel since 1967 2-19 44/47H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees 125- N N: Israel properties 2-21 44/47I Protection of Palestine refugees 146- N N: Israel; A: Dominica 2-1 44/47J University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for Palestine 147- N N: Israel; A: Dominica refugees 2-1 44/47K Protection of Palestinian students and educational 146- N N: Israel; A: Dominica institutions and safeguarding of the security of the 2-1 facilities of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the
343
occupied Palestinian territory 44/48A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 107- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-41 the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 149- A N: Israel; A: Dominica Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-2 the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 146- A N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-3 Kenya the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- N N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-2 Kenya the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 150- A N: Israel; A: Dominica Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-2 the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 148- A N: Israel; A: Costa, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-4 Rica, Dominica, Kenya the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/48G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 150- N N: Israel; A: Dominica Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-1 the Population of the Occupied Territories 44/50 Questions relating to information 127- N N: Israel 2-21 44/56 World social situation 131- N 1-23 44/63 Alternative approaches and ways and means 129- N within the United Nations system for improving 1-25 the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 44/69 Status of the International Convention on the 124- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-27 Apartheid 44/79 Importance of the universal realization of the right 123- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 15-16 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 44/81 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 125- N N: Belgium, France, rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 10-21 Federal Republic of peoples to self-determination Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 44/83 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 150- A A: France, UK transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 44/84 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 125- N N: Belgium, France, which are impeding the implementation of the 10-17 Federal Republic of Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Germany, Israel, Italy, Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in Luxembourg, all other Territories under colonial domination and Netherlands, Portugal, efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and UK racial discrimination in southern Africa 44/85 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 142- N N: UK; A: Australia, of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-10 Belgium, France,
344
Peoples by the specialized agencies and the Federal Republic of international institutions associated with the Germany, Israel, Italy, United Nations Japan,, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal 44/100 Program of activities in observance of the 30th 137- N N: UK anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of 2-14 Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 44/101 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 142- N N: UK; A: Belgium, of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-8 Canada, France, Federal Peoples Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 44/102 Dissemination of information on decolonization 143- N N: UK; A: Belgium, 2-7 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 44/104 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 147- Y A: Argentina, Cuba, 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-3 France Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 44/105 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 136- N N: France, UK 3-13 44/106 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 127- N N: UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 2-22 and under Water 44/107 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 145- N N: France; A: Argentina, treaty 2-6 Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK 44/109 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 116- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-32 Mauritius 44/110 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 131- A on the strengthening of the security of non- 0-21 nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 44/111 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 151- A A: Brazil, India to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-3 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 44/112 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 153- N 1-0 44/113A Implementation of the Declaration on the 147- A A: France, Israel, UK Denuclearization of Africa 0-4 44/113B Nuclear capability of South Africa 137- N N: France, Israel, UK; 4-10 A: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 44/114A Reduction of military budgets 116- N N: Belgium, Canada, 10-19 France, Federal Republic of Germany,
345
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 44/114B Military budgets 127- Y 0-15 44/116A Prohibition of the development, production, 124- N N: Israel stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 2-26 44/116B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 91-0- Y 61 44/116E Objective information on military matters 132- Y 0-13 44/116G Implementation of resolutions in the field of 129- N disarmament 1-25 44/116H Prohibition of the production of fissionable 147- A N: France; A: Argentina, material for weapons purposes 1-6 Brazil, China, India, UK 44/116J Conversion of military resources 153- A 0-1 44/116K Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 134- A 0-18 44/116M Naval armaments and disarmament 154- N 1-0 44/116N International arms transfers 143- Y 0-12 44/116P Defensive security concepts and policies 131- A 0-19 44/116R Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes 150- Y A: Belgium, France, 0-4 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy 44/116S Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 119- N 1-31 44/117A World disarmament campaign 144- A A: Belgium, Canada, 0-10 France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 44/117C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 134- N Nuclear Weapons 17-4 44/117D Nuclear-arms freeze 136- N 13-5 44/117F UN regional centers for peace and disarmament in 153- N A: UK Africa and Asia and the UN Regional Centre for 1-1 Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean 44/118A Scientific and technological developments and 137- N N: France, UK their impact on international security 3-14 44/118B Science and technology for disarmament 154- A 0-1 44/119A Comprehensive program of disarmament 154- A 0-1 44/119B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of 129- N nuclear war 17-7 44/119D Report of the Conference on Disarmament 138- N N: Belgium, France, 8-9 Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
346
Netherlands, UK; A: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey 44/119E Cessation of nuclear-arms race and prevention of 138- N nuclear war 11-6 44/119F South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty 151- A A: France, UK, Vanuatu 0-4 44/120 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 137- N N: France, Japan, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 4-14 44/121 Israeli nuclear armament 104- N N: Israel 2-43 44/123 Education for disarmament 149- A A: France, Federal 0-5 Republic of Germany, Italy, UK 44/124A Question of Antarctica 114- Did A: Botswana, Ireland, 0-7 Not Luxembourg,, Malta, Vote Mauritius, Portugal, Swaziland 44/124B Question of Antarctica 101- Did A: China, Fiji, Ireland, 0-8 Not Luxembourg, Malta, Vote Portugal, Swaziland, Turkey 44/126 Review of the implementation of the Declaration 128- N on the Strengthening of International Security 1-24 44/128 Elaboration of a 2nd Optional Protocol to the 59- N International Covenant on Civil and Political 26-48 Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty 44/130 Indivisibility and interdependence of economic, 124- A social, cultural, civil and political rights 0-23 44/147 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 113- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of 23-11 States in their electoral processes 44/166 Situation of human rights in Chile 84-2- A N: Chile, Morocco 60 44/167 Enlargement of the Commission on Human Rights 151- N N: Israel; A: Japan, and the further promotion of human rights and 2-2 Democratic Republic of fundamental freedoms the Congo 44/168 International assistance for the economic 150- A A: Israel rehabilitation of Angola 0-2 44/170 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 131- N 1-23 44/174 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the 146- N N: Israel; A: Canada, occupied Palestinian territory 2-8 Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Federal Republic of Germany, Grenada, Netherlands, UK 44/181 Special assistance to the front-line States 154- A 0-1 44/205 Towards a durable solution of external debt 139- N problems 1-0 44/214 Specific action related to the particular needs and 144- A A: Angola, India, Iran, problems of land-locked developing countries 0-5 Pakistan
347
44/215 Economic measures as a means of political and 118- N economic coercion against developing countries 23-2 44/217 Trade embargo against Nicaragua 82-2- N N: Israel 47 44/218 Commodities 146- A A: UK 0-2 44/232 Trends in the transfer of resources to and from the 147- N developing countries and their impact on the 1-0 economic growth and sustained development of those countries 44/235 Assistance to the Palestinian people 146- N N: Israel; A: Canada 2-1 44/240 Effects of the military intervention by the United 75- N States of America in Panama on the situation in 20-40 Central America
348
TABLE VI
45 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 18, 1990 – August 27, 1991
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 45/11 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 118- A N: France 1-30 45/16 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 145- A A: France, UK transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 45/17 Activities of foreign and other interests which are 113- N impeding the implementation of the Declaration on 11-24 the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa 45/18 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 115- N of Independence to Colonial Countries and 12-20 Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 45/32 Question of Guam 110- N N: Israel, Vanuatu 3-31 45/33 Thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration on the 124- N N: UK Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 2-21 and Peoples 45/34 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 131- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-15 Peoples 45/35 Dissemination of information on decolonization 133- N N: UK 2-14 45/36 Zone of peace and co-operation of the South 150- N A: Japan Atlantic 1-1 45/37 Observer status of national liberation movements 116- N N: Belgium, France, recognized by the Organization of African Unity 9-26 Germany, Israel, Italy, and/or by the League of Arab States Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 45/39 Consideration of effective measures to enhance the 148- Y N: Iraq protection, security and safety of diplomatic and 1-0 consular missions and representatives 45/44 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of 147- Y A: Libya the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the 0-1 Role of the Organization 45/45 Rationalization of existing United Nations 149- Y A: Cuba procedures 0-1 45/48 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 141- Y A: Argentina, Cuba, 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of 0-3 France Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
349
and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 45/49 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 127- N N: France, UK 3-17 45/50 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 116- N N: UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 2-28 and under Water 45/51 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban 140- N N: France; A: Argentina, treaty 2-6 Brazil, China, India, Israel, UK 45/53 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 114- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-28 Mauritius 45/54 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 145- A A: France, UK to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-3 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 45/55A Prevention of an arms race in outer space 149- A 0-1 45/55B Confidence-building measures in outer space 149- A 0-1 45/56A Implementation of the Declaration on the 145- A A: France, Israel, UK Denuclearization of Africa 0-4 45/56B Nuclear capability of South Africa 118- N N: France, Israel, UK 4-27 45/58B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 131- A 0-22 45/58H Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 99-0- Y 50 45/58J Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities 141- N 1-11 45/58K Prohibition of dumping radioactive wastes 144- A A: Belgium, France, 0-9 Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 45/58L Prohibition of the production of fissionable 146- A N: France; A: Argentina, material for weapons purposes 1-6 Cameroon, China, India, UK 45/58N Charting potential uses of resources allocated to 138- N N: France, UK military activities for civilian endeavors to protect 3-12 the environment 45/58O Defensive security concepts and policies 148- A A: France, Israel, Japan, 0-5 UK 45/58P Regional disarmament 142- Y A: Afghanistan, 0-10 Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mauritius, Vietnam 45/59B Convention on the Prevention of the Use of 125- N Nuclear Weapons 17-10 49/59D Nuclear-arms freeze 126- N 14-12 45/60 Scientific and technological developments and 133- N N: France, UK their impact on international security 3-16 45/62C Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear 132- N disarmament and prevention of nuclear war 12-19
45/62D Report of the Conference on Disarmament 128- N N: Belgium, France,
350
8-16 Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 45/62E Comprehensive program on disarmament 123- N N: Belgium, France, 6-22 Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 45/63 Israeli nuclear armament 98-2- N N: Israel 50 45/67A Question of Palestine 122- N N: Israel 2-23 45/67B Question of Palestine 121- N N: Israel 2-22 45/67C Question of Palestine 124- N N: Israel 2-20 45/68 International Peace Conference on the Middle East 144- N N: Israel 2-0 45/69 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 141- N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 2-3 Dominica, Honduras 45/73A Assistance to Palestine refugees 146- Y A: Israel 0-1 45/73D Offers by Member States of grants and 146- Y A: Israel scholarships for higher education, including 0-1 vocational training, for Palestine refugees 45/73E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory 145- N N: Israel occupied by Israel since 1967 2-0 45/73F Resumption of the ration distribution to Palestine 118- N refugees 20-9 45/73G Return of the population and refugees displaced 121- N N: Israel since 1967 2-24 45/73H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees’ 120- N N: Israel properties 2-25 45/73I Protection of Palestine refugees 145- N N: Israel 2-0 45/73J University of Jerusalem “Al Quds” for Palestine 145- N N: Israel refugees 2-0 45/73K Protection of Palestine students and educational 145- N N: Israel institutions and safeguarding of the security of the 2-0 facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works agency in the occupied Palestinian territory 45/74A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 101- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-43 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-1 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 144- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-1 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 144- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-0 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel
351
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-1 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 144- A N: Israel; A: Malawi Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-2 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/74G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-0 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 45/77 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 128- N N: France, Japan, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 4-17 45/78A Question of Antarctica 98-0- Did A: Fiji, Ireland, 7 Not Liechtenstein, Malta, Vote Portugal, Turkey, Ukraine 45/78B Question of Antarctica 107- Did A: Ireland, 0-7 Not Liechtenstein, Malawi, Vote Malta, Mauritius, Portugal, Ukraine 45/80 Review of the implementation of the Declaration 123- N on the Strengthening of International Security 1-29 45/82 Co-operation between the United Nations and the 147- N N: Israel; A: Dominica League of Arab States 2-1 45/83A The situation in the Middle East 99- N 19-27 45/83B The situation in the Middle East 84- N 23-41 45/83C The situation in the Middle East 145- A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 1-4 Dominica, Malawi 45/84 Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human 120- N N: Belgium, France, rights of political, military, economic and other 9-22 Germany, Italy, forms of assistance given to the racist and Luxembourg, colonialist regime of South Africa Netherlands, Portugal, UK 45/87 World social situation 146- N A: Germany, Israel, 1-4 Japan, UK 45/90 Status of the International Convention on the 120- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-30 Apartheid 45/96 Alternative approaches and ways and means 121- N within the United Nations system for improving 1-29 the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 45/130 Importance of the universal realization of the right 113- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 15-23 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 45/132 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 121- N N: Belgium, France, rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 10-21 Germany, Italy, Japan, peoples to self-determination Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 45/145 Law of the sea 140- N N: Turkey; A: Ecuador,
352
2-6 Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 45/150 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 129- Y N: Angola, China, periodic and genuine elections 8-9 Columbia, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Vietnam; A: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Syria 45/151 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 111- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of 29-11 States in their electoral processes 45/164 International Year for the World's Indigenous 150- Y A: Antigua and Barbuda, People 0-4 Dominica, Grenada, Guyana 45/170 The situation of human rights in occupied Kuwait 144- Y N: Iraq 1-0 45/176B Concerted and effective measures aimed at 115- N eradicating apartheid 11-19 45/176C Military collaboration with South Africa 116- N N: UK 2-29 45/176D Relations between South Africa and Israel 99- N 28-19 45/176E Program of work of the Special Committee against 133- A Apartheid 0-14 45/176F Oil embargo against South Africa 125- N N: UK 2-19 45/176G Support for the work of the Commission against 113- N Apartheid in Sports 1-26 45/183 Assistance to the Palestinian people 135- N N: Israel 2-0 45/188 Entrepreneurship 138- Y N: Cuba 1-0
353
TABLE VII
46 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 17, 1991 – August 25, 1992
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 46/9 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 115- A N: France 1-34 46/10 Return or restitution of cultural property to the 134- A countries of origin 0-23 46/16 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 141- Y A: Algeria, Cuba, Ghana, 0-9 Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Sudan, Yemen 46/19 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 141- N Atlantic 1-0 46/24 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 140- N N: Israel League of Arab States 2-0 46/28 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 110- N N: UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 2-35 and under Water 46/29 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 147- N N: France; A: China, 2-4 Israel, Micronesia, UK 46/31 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 121- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-26 Mauritius 46/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 152- A A: UK to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-2 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 46/33 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 155- A 0-1 46/34A Implementation of the Declaration on the 108- A N: Israel Denuclearization of Africa: nuclear capacity of 1-47 South Africa 46/36D Production of fissionable material for weapon 152- N N: France; A: China, purposes 2-3 India, UK 46/36I Regional disarmament 154- Y A: Bhutan, Cuba, India, 0-4 Lao People's Democratic Republic 46/36J Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 130- A 0-26 46/36L Transparency in armaments 150- Y A: Cuba, Iraq 0-2 46/37C Nuclear-arms freeze 119- N 18-23 46/37D Convention on Prohibition on Use of Nuclear 122- N Weapons 16-22 46/37F UN Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament 160- N A: UK 1-1 46/38B Comprehensive Program of Disarmament 123- N N: Belgium, France, 6-32 Germany, Netherlands, UK 46/38C Report of the Conference on Disarmament 131- N N: Belgium, France,
354
8-23 Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 46/39 Israeli nuclear armament 76-3- N N: Israel, Romania 75 46/41A Question of Antarctica 101- Did A: Fiji, Ireland, 0-7 Not Liechtenstein, Malta, Vote Portugal, Turkey, Ukraine 46/41B Question of Antarctica 107- Did A: Ireland, Liechtenstein, 0-6 Not Malta, Mauritius, Vote Portugal, Ukraine 46/46A Assistance to Palestine refugees 137- Y A: Israel 0-1 46/46D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 147- Y A: Israel for higher education for Palestine refugees 0-1 46/46E Palestine refugees in Palestinian territory occupied 143- N N: Israel by Israel since 1967 2-0 46/46F Resumption of ration distribution to Palestine 115- N refugees 21-13 46/46G Return of the population and refugees displaced 115- N N: Israel since 1967 2-32 46/46H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' 114- N N: Israel properties 2-33 46/46I Protection of Palestine refugees 147- N N: Israel; A: Cote 2-2 D'Ivoire, Russia 46/46J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 146- N N: Israel; A: Cote 2-2 D'Ivoire, Russia 46/46K Protection of Palestinian students and educational 151- N N: Israel institutions and safeguarding of the security of the 2-0 United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the occupied Palestinian territory 46/47A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 96-5- N N: Israel, Latvia, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 52 Romania, Uruguay Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 46/47B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 153- A N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-3 USSR Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 46/47C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 153- A N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-3 USSR Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 46/47D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 153- N N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-2 USSR Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 46/47E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 153- A N: Israel; A: Dominica, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-3 USSR Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 46/47F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 152- A N: Israel; A: Cote Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-4 D'Ivoire, Dominica, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the USSR Occupied Territories
355
46/47G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 150- N N: Israel; A: Canada, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-4 Cote D'Ivoire, Dominica, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the USSR Occupied Territories 46/49 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 127- N N: France, Japan, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 4-30 46/52 Progressive development of the principles and 117- N norms of international law relating to the new 20-17 international economic order 46/63 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 157- A A: France, UK transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 46/64 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 109- N which are impeding the implementation of the 34-16 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa 46/65 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 115- N of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 28-17 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 46/71 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 137- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-22 46/72 Dissemination of information on decolonization 143- N N: UK 2-16 46/74A Question of Palestine 121- N N: Israel 2-28 46/74B Question of Palestine 121- N N: Israel 2-28 47/74C Question of Palestine 125- N N: Israel 2-23 46/75 International Peace Conference on the Middle East 104- N N: Israel 2-43 46/76 The uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people 142- N N: Israel; A: Bahamas, 2-5 Costa Rica, Panama, USSR, Uruguay 46/78 Law of the sea 140- A N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 1-7 Germany, Israel, Peru, UK, Venezuela 46/79B Program of work of the Special Committee against 143- A Apartheid 0-16 46/79C Military and other collaboration with South Africa 121- N N: UK 2-34 46/79D Relations between South Africa and Israel 93- N 31-30 46/79E Oil embargo against South Africa 127- N N: Swaziland, UK 3-28 46/82A The situation in the Middle East 93- N 27-37 46/82B The situation in the Middle East 152- N N: Israel; A: Barbados, 1-4 Dominica, Dominican Republic 46/84 Status of the International Convention on the 118- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-39
356
Apartheid 46/86 Elimination of racism and racial discrimination 111- Y 25-13 46/87 Importance of the universal realization of the right 113- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 22-24 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 46/89 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 122- N rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 11-28 peoples to self-determination 46/95 World social situation 157- N A: Belgium, Germany, 1-5 Israel, Japan, UK 46/117 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 123- N N: Israel the United Nations System for improving the 2-34 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 46/130 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 102- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 40-13 in their electoral processes 46/134 Situation of human rights in Iraq 129- Y N: Iraq 1-17 46/135 Situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi 155- Y N: Iraq occupation 1-0 46/137 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 134- Y N: Cuba, Democratic periodic and genuine elections 4-13 People's Republic of Korea, Kenya, Namibia 46/153 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention 108- A of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 0-37 46/162 Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the 135- N N: Israel; A: Belarus, occupied Palestinian territory 2-5 Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominica, USSR 46/199 Adverse economic effects of Israeli settlements in 125- N N: Israel; A: Bulgaria, the occupied Palestinian territory, including 2-9 Canada, Cote D'Ivoire, Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied since Germany, Kenya, 1967 Netherlands, Romania, UK, Uruguay 46/201 Assistance to the Palestinian people 137- N N: Israel 2-0 46/210 Economic measures as a means of political and 97- N economic coercion against developing countries 30-9 46/216 International cooperation to mitigate the 135- Did A: Iraq environmental consequences on Kuwait and other 0-1 Not countries in the region resulting from the situation Vote between Iraq and Kuwait 46/242 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 136- Y N: Yugoslavia; A: 1-5 Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Russia
357
TABLE VIII
47 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 22, 1992 – September 14, 1993
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 47/1 Recommendation of the Security Council of 19 127- Y N: Kenya, Swaziland, September 1992 6-26 Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 47/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 146- Y A: Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, 0-5 Sudan, Yemen 47/9 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 126- A N: France 1-40 47/12 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 119- N N: Israel; A: San Marino League of Arab States 2-1 47/14 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 142- A A: France, UK transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 47/15 Activities of those foreign economic and other 95- N interests which impede the implementation of the 34-12 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa 47/16 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 100- N of Independence to Colonial Countries and 30-19 Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 47/19 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 59-3- N N: Israel; Romania financial embargo imposed by the United States of 71 America against Cuba 47/23 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 127- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-22 Peoples 47/24 Dissemination of information on decolonization 132- N N: UK 2-17 47/29 Observer status of national liberation movements 100- N N: Belgium, France, recognized by the Organization of African Unity 9-34 Germany, Israel, Italy, and/or by the League of Arab States Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 47/43 Scientific and technological developments and 128- N N: France, UK their impact on international security 3-30 47/46 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 118- N N: UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 2-41 and under Water 47/47 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 159- N A: China, France, Israel, 1-4 UK 47/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 144- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-13 Mauritius
358
47/50 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 162- A A: UK to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-2 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 47/51 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 164- A A: Micronesia 0-2 47/52C Prohibition of production of fissionable material 164- A A: India, UK 0-3 47/52J Regional disarmament 168- Y A: India 0-1 47/53C Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 126- N Weapons 21-21 47/53E Nuclear-arms freeze 121- N 19-27 47/53F Regional confidence-building measures 159- N A: UK 1-1 47/55 Israeli nuclear armament 64-3- N N: Israel, Romania 90 47/57 Question of Antarctica 96-1- Did N: Argentina; A: 9 Not Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Vote Herzegovina, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta Portugal, San Marino, Turkey, Venezuela 47/59 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 129- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-35 47/60A Review of the implementation of the Declaration 122- N on the Strengthening of International Security 1-43 47/60B Maintenance of international security 79-0- Y 84 47/63A The situation in the Middle East 72-3- N N: Israel, Micronesia 70 47/63B The situation in the Middle East 140- A N: Israel; A: Croatia, 1-5 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Togo 47/64A Question of Palestine 115- N N: Israel, Micronesia 3-40 47/64B Question of Palestine 119- N N: Israel 2-37 47/64C Question of Palestine 152- N N: Israel; A: Dominican 2-3 Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 47/64D Question of Palestine 93-4- N N: Israel, Marshall 60 Islands, Micronesia 47/64E Question of Palestine 146- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-10 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Russia, Togo, Uruguay 47/65 Law of the sea 135- A N: Turkey; A: 1-9 Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Germany, Israel, Panama, Peru, UK, Venezuela 47/69A Assistance to Palestine refugees 136- Y A: Dominica, Israel
359
0-2 47/69D Grants and scholarships for Palestine refugees 139- Y A: Israel 0-1 47/69E Palestine refugees in territory occupied since 1967 138- N N: Israel 2-0 47/69F Resumption of ration distribution to Palestine 103- N refugees 24-14 47/69G Return of population and refugees displaced since 103- N N: Israel 1967 2-37 47/69H Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' 100- N N: Israel properties 2-39 47/69I Protection of Palestine refugees 138- N N: Israel; A: Russia 2-1 47/69J University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 139- N N: Israel; A: Russia 2-1 47/69K Protection of Palestinian educational institutions 141- N N: Israel and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 2-0 Palestine refugees in the Near East 47/70A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 83-5- N N: Israel, Marshall Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 55 Islands, Romania, the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Uruguay Occupied Territories 47/70B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 141- A N: Israel; A: Cote Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-4 D'Ivoire, Micronesia, the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Russia Occupied Territories 47/70C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 143- A N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-3 Russia the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 47/70D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 142- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-2 Russia the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 47/70E Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 143- A N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-3 Russia the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 47/70F Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 142- A N: Israel; A: Cote Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-4 D'Ivoire, Micronesia, the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Russia Occupied Territories 47/70G Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 143- N N: Israel; A: Canada, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-4 Cote D'Ivoire, the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Micronesia, Russia Occupied Territories 47/74 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 144- N Atlantic 1-0 47/81 Status of the International Convention on the 113- N N: Latvia Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 2-44 Apartheid 47/82 Importance of the universal realization of the right 107- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 22-33 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights
360
47/84 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 118- N N: Belgium, Bulgaria, rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 10-36 France, Germany, Italy, peoples to self-determination Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 47/89 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention 121- N of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 1-45 47/116D Oil embargo against South Africa 111- N 1-44 47/116E Military and other collaboration with South Africa 106- N N: UK 2-47 47/116F Relations between South Africa and Israel 93- N 39-23 47/116G Support for work of Commission against 121- A Apartheid in Sports 0-39 47/121 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 102- Y 0-57 47/130 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 99- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of 45-16 States in their electoral processes 47/137 Alternative approaches and ways and means 115- A within the United Nations System for improving 0-48 the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 47/138 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 141- Y periodic and genuine elections 0-20 47/139 Situation of human rights in Cuba 69- Y 18-64 47/142 The situation in the Sudan 104- Y N: China, Cuba, Iran, 8-33 Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria 47/145 Situation of human rights in Iraq 126- Y N: Iraq, Sudan 2-26 47/146 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 86- Y of Iran 16-38 47/151 International cooperation to mitigate the 159- Y A: Iraq, Sudan environmental consequences on Kuwait and other 0-2 countries in the region resulting from the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 47/170 Assistance to the Palestinian people 155- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 2-3 Islands, Micronesia, Samoa 47/172 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli 150- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: settlements on the Palestinian people in the 3-5 Croatia, Marshall Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, Islands, Russia, Samoa, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population Uruguay of the Syrian Golan
361
TABLE IX
48 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 8, 1993 – September 19, 1994
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 48/14 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 140- Y N: Democratic People's 1-9 Republic of Korea; A: Angola, China, Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Senegal, Vietnam 48/15 Return or restitution of cultural property to the 106- A countries of origin 0-25 48/16 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 88-4- N N: Albania, Israel, financial embargo imposed by the United States of 57 Paraguay America against Cuba 48/23 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 103- N A: Bahamas Atlantic 1-1 48/28 Law of the sea 144- A N: Turkey 1-11 48/40A Assistance to Palestine refugees 159- A A: Israel 0-2 48/40D Offers by Member States of grants and 161- Y A: Israel scholarships for higher education, including 0-1 vocational training, for Palestine refugees 48/40E Palestine refugees in the Palestinian territory 157- N N: Israel occupied by Israel since 1967 2-0 48/40F Return of population and refugees displaced since 152- N N: Israel; A: Central 1967 2-5 African Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nigeria, Russia 48/40G Revenues derived from Palestine refugee's 114- N N: Israel properties 2-44 48/40H Protection of Palestine refugees 153- N N: Israel; A: Canada, 2-6 Central African Republic, Georgia, Kenya, New Zealand, Russia 48/40I University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine 156- N N: Israel; A: Central refugees 2-2 African Republic, Russia 48/40J Protection of Palestinian students and educational 159- N N: Israel institutions and safeguarding of the security of the 2-0 facilities of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees 48/41A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 93-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 65 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 48/41B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 152- A N: Israel; A: Central Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 1-6 African Republic,
362
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Marshall Islands, Occupied Territories Micronesia, Russia, Samoa 48/41C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 106- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 2-48 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 48/41D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 85-1- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 68 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 48/45 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 159- A A: France, UK transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-3 United Nations 48/46 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 111- N which impede the implementation of the 43-3 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination 48/47 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 113- N N: France, Netherlands, of Independence to Colonial Countries and 5-43 Russia, UK Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 48/52 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 139- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-19 Peoples 48/53 Dissemination of information on decolonization 141- N N: UK 2-18 48/56 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 91-2- A N: France, Monaco 36 48/58 Middle East peace process 155- Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Syria; 3-1 A: Libya 48/59A The situation in the Middle East: Jerusalem 141- A N: Israel 1-11 48/59B The situation in the Middle East: Syrian Golan 65-2- N N: Israel 83 48/66 Scientific and technological developments and 126- A N: France, Israel, their impact on international security 4-35 Monaco, UK 48/67 The role of science and technology in the context 161- A A: Andorra, France, of international security, disarmament and other 0-5 Monaco, UK related fields 48/68 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of 145- A the United Nations in the field of verification 0-22 48/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 118- N N: Israel, UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 3-45 and under Water 48/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 153- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-12 Mauritius 48/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 166- A A: France, Monaco, UK to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-4 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 48/74A Prevention of an arms race in outer space 169- A 0-1 48/75C General and complete disarmament 114- N N: France, Israel, 6-45 Monaco, Russia, UK
363
48/75H Measures to curb illicit transfer and use of 146- A conventional arms 0-22 48/75I Regional disarmament 170- Y A: India 0-1 48/75J Conventional arms control at regional and 156- Y subregional levels 0-11 48/76A Review and implementation of the concluding 168- N A: Georgia, UK document of the 12th special session of the 1-2 General Assembly 48/76B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 120- N Nuclear Weapons 23-24 48/78 Israeli nuclear armament 53- N 45-65 48/79 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 162- A A: Georgia, Russia Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 0-3 Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 48/80 Question of Antarctica 96-0- Did A: Gabon, Ireland, 7 Not Liechtenstein, Malta, Vote Portugal, Turkey, Venezuela 48/82 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 130- N N: France, Monaco, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 4-36 48/83 Review of the implementation of the Declaration 122- N on the Strengthening of International Security 1-45 48/84A Maintenance of international security 84-0- Y 83 48/88 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 109- Y 0-57 48/89 Status of the International Convention on the 119- N Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 1-48 Apartheid 48/92 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 108- N rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 14-39 peoples to self-determination 48/94 Importance of the universal realization of the right 101- N of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 26-37 granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights 48/101 United Nations African Institute for the Prevention 119- N of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 1-49 48/123 Alternative approaches and ways and means 115- N within the United Nations System for improving 34-21 the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 48/124 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 101- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of 51-17 States in their electoral processes 48/131 Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 153- Y periodic and genuine elections 0-13 48/142 Situation of human rights in Cuba 74- Y 20-61 48/144 Situation of human rights in Iraq 116- Y N: Iraq, Sudan 2-43 48/145 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 74- Y
364
of Iran 23-51 48/147 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 111- Y 13-30 48/158A Question of Palestine: Committee on the Exercise 106- N N: Dominican Republic, of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People 3-40 Israel 48/158B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107- N N: Israel 2-41 48/158C Department of Public Information of the 147- N N: Israel; A: Georgia, Secretariat 2-2 Russia 48/158D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 92-5- N N: Dominican Republic, 51 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 48/168 Economic measures as a means of political and 116- N economic coercion against developing countries 32-16 48/182 Enhanced international cooperation towards a 164- N durable solution to the external debt problems of 1-0 developing countries 48/212 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli 143- N N: Israel, Marshall settlements on the Palestinian people in the 3-13 Islands Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan 48/263 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part 121- Y A: Columbia, Nicaragua, XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 0-7 Panama, Peru, Russia, of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Thailand, Venezuela
365
TABLE X
49 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 17, 1994 – September 14, 1995
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 49/9 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 101- N N: Israel financial embargo imposed by the United States of 2-48 America against Cuba 49/18 Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte 87-2- A N: France, Monaco 38 49/28 Law of the sea 130- Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 1-7 Kazakhstan, Peru, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela 49/33 Enlargement of the Committee on the Peaceful 165- N Uses of Outer Space 1-0 49/35A Assistance to Palestine refugees 164- A A: Israel 0-2 49/35C Persons replaced as a result of the June 1967 and 160- N N: Israel; A: Japan, subsequent hostilities 2-4 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Samoa 49/35D Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 165- Y A: Israel for high education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 49/35E Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 162- N N: Israel; A: Japan, Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 2-3 Micronesia, Russia 49/35F Revenues derived from Palestine refugees 113- N N: Israel properties 2-51 49/35G University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" resolution 161- N N: Israel; A: Japan, 2-2 Russia 49/36A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 85-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 75 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 49/36B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 155- N N: Gambia, Israel; A: Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 3-5 Gabon, Marshall Islands, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Micronesia, Russia, Occupied Territories Samoa 49/36C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-17 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 49/36D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 145- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-15 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 49/40 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 113- N which impede the implementation of the 44-6 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under
366
colonial domination 49/41 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 119- N of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1-48 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 49/43 The situation in the occupied territories of Croatia 142- Y 0-18 49/52 Draft articles on the law of the non-navigational 143- Y A: Benin, India, Iran, uses of international watercourses 0-8 Lesotho, Niger, Qatar, Sudan, Swaziland 49/58 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of 155- Y A: Democratic People's the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the 0-1 Republic of Korea Role of the Organization 49/62A Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 103- N N: Israel Rights of the Palestinian People 2-40 49/62B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 105- N N: Israel 2-40 49/62C Question of Palestine : Department of Public 142- N N: Israel; A: Georgia, Information of the Secretariat 2-3 Russia, Tajikistan 49/62D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 136- N N: Israel; A: Belarus, 2-7 Georgia, Marshall Islands, Russia, Tajikistan, Uruguay, Uzbekistan 49/65 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 161- Y N: Democratic People's 1-6 Republic of Korea; A: China, Cuba, Ghana, Iran, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vietnam 49/67 Scientific and technological developments and their 118- N N: France, Israel, UK impact on international security 4-47 49/68 The role of science and technology in the context of 166- A A: Democratic People's international security, disarmament and other 0-5 Republic of Korea, related fields France, Iran, UK 49/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 116- N N: Israel, Russia, UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 4-49 and under Water 49/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 156- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-10 Mauritius; A: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar, Vanuatu, Vietnam 49/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 168- A A: France, UK to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-3 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 49/74 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 170- A 0-1 49/75B Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third 139- N N: France, UK Disarmament Decade 3-26 49/75C Transparency in armaments 150- Y 0-19 49/75E Step-by-step reduction of nuclear threat 111- N 24-33
367
49/75F 1995 Review and Extension Conference of States 103- N Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 40-25 Nuclear Weapons 49/75G Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in 169- A small arms and collecting them 0-1 49/75H Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate 163- A A: Brazil, Cuba, elimination of nuclear weapons 0-8 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, UK 49/75K Request for an advisory opinion from the 78- N International Court of Justice on the legality of the 43-38 threat or use of nuclear weapons 49/75N Regional disarmament 171- Y A: India 0-1 49/75O Conventional arms control at the regional and 164- Y A: Brazil, Cuba, subregional levels 0-7 Ecuador, India, Mexico, Singapore, Venezuela 49/75P Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear 171- Y A: India disarmament 0-1 49/76E Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear 115- N weapons 24-31 49/77D Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate 158- Y types of confidence-building measures 0-11 49/78 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 60-4- N N: Israel, Marshall 100 Islands, Micronesia 49/82 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 131- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-35 49/84 The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free 161- N N: France, UK; A: zone 3-3 Andorra, Canada, Italy 49/87A The situation in the Middle East: Jerusalem 138- A N: Costa Rica, Israel; A: 2-7 Antigua and Barbuda, Cote D'Ivoire, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia 49/87B The situation in the Middle East: The Syrian Golan 77-2- N N: Israel 70 49/88 Middle East peace process 149- Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Libya, 4-2 Syria; A: Antigua and Barbuda, Sudan 49/90 Dissemination of information on decolonization 130- N N: UK 2-24 49/132 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli 133- N N: Israel settlements on the Palestinian people in the 2-23 Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan 49/149 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 147- N N: Israel determination 2-19 49/150 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 118- N rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 19-33 peoples to self-determination 49/151 Importance of the universal realization of the right 113- N N: France, Israel, of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy 5-51 Monaco, UK granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights
368
49/180 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 97- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 57-14 in their electoral process 49/182 Respect for the universal freedom of travel and the 88-5- N N: Australia, Israel, vital importance of family reunification 70 Japan, UK 49/186 Alternative approaches and ways and means within 110- N the United Nations System for improving the 35-24 effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 49/190 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in 155- Y N: Iran enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 1-12 periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization 49/196 Situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia 150- Y and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the 0-14 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 49/198 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 101- Y 13-49 49/200 Situation of human rights in Cuba 65- Y 23-70 49/202 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 74- Y of Iran 25-55 49/203 Situation of human rights in Iraq 114- Y N: Iraq, Libya, Sudan 3-47 49/204 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 114- Y N: India, Russia 2-40 49/243 Accreditation of non-governmental organizations to 86-0- Y A: China the 4th World Conference on Women 1
369
TABLE XI
50 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 12, 1995 – September 17, 1996
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 50/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 144- Y N: Democratic People's 1-8 Republic of Korea; A: China, Cuba, Ghana, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Vietnam 50/10 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 117- N N: Israel, Uzbekistan financial embargo imposed by the United States of 3-38 America against Cuba 50/11 Multilingualism 100- N 35-29 50/18 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 124- A Atlantic 0-1 50/21 Middle East Peace Process 148- Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Libya, 4-1 Syria; A: Sudan 50/22A Jerusalem resolution 133- A N: Israel 1-13 50/22B The Syrian Golan 66-2- N N: Israel 79 50/22C The situation in the Middle East 64-2- N N: Israel 65 50/23 Law of the sea 132- Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 1-3 Peru, Venezuela 50/28A Assistance to Palestine refugees 145- A N: Israel 1-1 50/28C Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 147- N N: Israel subsequent hostilities 2-0 50/28D Offers by Member States of grants and 150- Y A: Israel scholarships for higher education, including 0-1 vocational training, for Palestine refugees 50/28E Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 146- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Agency for Palestine Refugees 2-3 Islands, Micronesia, Russia 50/28F Revenues derived from Palestine refugees' 98-2- N N: Israel properties 48 50/28G University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" for Palestine 148- N N: Israel; A: Russia, refugees 2-2 Swaziland 50/29A Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 69-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 80 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 50/29B Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 147- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-4 Islands, Micronesia, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Nicaragua, Russia Occupied Territories 50/29C Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 144- N N: Israel; A: Argentina,
370
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 2-7 Marshall Islands, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Micronesia, Nicaragua, Occupied Territories Panama, Russia, Uruguay 50/29D Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 139- A N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 1-13 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 50/32 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 153- A A: France, Guinea- transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-4 Bissau, UK United Nations 50/33 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 93- N which impede the implementation of the 51-3 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination 50/34 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 107- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-50 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 50/38A Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, 146- N N: Georgia, Israel, UK; Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman 4-3 A: Argentina, Belgium, Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, France Tokelau, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands 50/38B Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, 146- N N: Georgia, Israel, UK; Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman 4-3 A: Argentina, Belgium, Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, France Tokelau, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands 50/39 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 130- N N: Israel, Russia, UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 4-25 50/40 Dissemination of information on decolonization 133- N N: Israel, UK 3-25 50/52 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of 155- Y A: Cuba, Democratic the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the 0-3 People's Republic of Role of the Organization Korea, Libya 50/56 Return to restitution of cultural property to the 124- A countries of origin 0-24 50/61 Verification in all its aspects, including the role of 157- N A: Democratic People's the United Nations in the field of verification 1-6 Republic of Korea, France, Georgia, Israel, Monaco, UK 50/62 The role of science and technology in the context 104- N N: France, Israel, of international security and disarmament 6-53 Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK 50/63 The role of science and technology in the context 157- A A: Cuba, Democratic of international security, disarmament and other 0-9 People's Republic of related fields Korea, France, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, UK 50/64 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear 110- N N: Israel, Russia, UK Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 4-45 and under Water 50/67 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 154- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-9 Mauritius; A: Algeria,
371
Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam 50/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 122- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-44 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 50/69 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 121- A 0-46 50/70A Nuclear testing 85- A 18-43 50/70B Small arms 140- Y 0-19 50/70C Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate 154- Y A: Algeria, Brazil, elimination of nuclear weapons 0-10 China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan 50/70D Transparency in armaments 149- Y 0-15 50/70F Convening of the 4th special session of the General 111- N N: Israel Assembly devoted to disarmament 2-49 50/70I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear 150- Y disarmament 0-14 50/70K Regional disarmament 165- Y A: India 0-1 50/70L Conventional arms control at the regional and 158- Y A: Brazil, Cuba, India, subregional levels 0-7 Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela 50/70M Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 157- N N: France, Israel, UK; and implementation of agreements on disarmament 4-2 A: Canada, Japan and arms control 50/70N Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear 105- N disarmament 37-20 50/70P Nuclear disarmament 106- N 39-17 50/70Q 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the 161- Y A: India, Israel Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 0-2 Nuclear Weapons 50/71E Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 108- N Nuclear Weapons 27-28 50/73 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 56-2- N N: Israel 100 50/76 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 123- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-39 50/84A Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 95-2- N N: Israel Rights of the Palestinian People 52 50/84B Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 96-2- N N: Israel 53 50/84C Department of Public Information of the 142- N N: Israel; A: Cote Secretariat 2-7 D'Ivoire, Ecuador, Grenada, Lesotho, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Russia
372
50/84D Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 143- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-3 Costa Rica, Marshall Islands, Russia 50/89B Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 104- N N: Israel; A: Iran, Syria Lebanon 2-2 50/96 Economic measures as a means of political and 100- N economic coercion against developing countries 30-22 50/129 Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli 126- N N: Israel settlements on the Palestinian people in the 2-28 Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan 50/138 Use of mercenaries as a means to violate human 106- N rights and to impede the exercise of the right of 18-31 people to self-determination 50/140 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 145- N N: Israel; A: Argentina, determination 2-9 Georgia, Lithuania, Micronesia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 50/172 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 91- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 57-21 in their electoral processes 50/175 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 86-4- N N: Canada, Israel, Japan and the vital importance of family reunification 80 50/185 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in 156- Y enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 0-15 periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization 50/188 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 78- Y of Iran 27-58 50/190 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 115- Y N: India, Russia 2-43 50/191 Situation of human rights in Iraq 111- Y N: Libya, Nigeria, Sudan 3-53 50/193 Situation of human rights in the Republic of 144- Y N: Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia 1-20 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 50/197 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 94- Y 15-54 50/198 Situation of human rights in Cuba 66- Y 22-78 50/199 Situation of human rights in Nigeria 101- Y 14-27 50/245 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 158- Y N: Bhutan, India, Libya; 3-5 A: Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania
373
TABLE XII
51 st Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 15, 1996 – September 15, 1997
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 51/10 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 141- Y N: Democratic People's 2-8 Republic of Korea, Lebanon; A: China, Cuba, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Micronesia, Sudan, Syria, Vanuatu, Vietnam 51/17 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 137- N N: Israel, Uzbekistan financial embargo imposed by the United States of 3-25 America against Cuba 51/19 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 117- A Atlantic 0-1 51/22 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a 56-4- N N: Israel, Micronesia, means of political and economic compulsion 76 Uzbekistan 51/23 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 104- N N: Israel Rights of the Palestinian People 2-46 51/24 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107- N N: Israel 2-46 51/25 Special information program on the question of 157- N N: Israel; A: Fiji, Palestine of the Department of Public Information 2-3 Marshall Islands, of the Secretariat Micronesia 51/26 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 152- N N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 2-4 Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 51/27 Jerusalem 148- A N: Israel 1-13 51/28 The Syrian Golan 84-2- N N: Israel 71 51/29 The Middle East Peace Process 159- Y N: Iran, Lebanon, Syria; 3-2 A: Sudan, Libya 51/30I Emergency assistance to the Sudan 103- N 34-15 51/34 Law of the sea 138- Y N: Turkey; A: Ecuador, 1-4 Peru, Tajikistan, Venezuela 51/39 The role of science and technology in the context 105- N of international security and disarmament 39-24 51/40 The role of science and technology in the context 161- A A: Democratic People's of international security, disarmament and other 0-8 Republic of Korea, related fields India, Iran, Japan, Micronesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 51/42 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 156- Y N: Bhutan, India, South Asia 3-8 Mauritius; A: Afghanistan, Algeria,
374
Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam 51/43 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 125- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the 0-45 use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 51/44 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 126- A 0-44 51/45A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 167- Y A: India, Israel Weapons 0-2 51/45B The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 129- N N: France, UK adjacent areas 3-38 51/45C Convening of the 4th special session of the 163- N N: Israel; A: Denmark, General Assembly devoted to disarmament 2-5 Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 51/45E Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 137- N N: France, Israel, UK and implementation of agreements on disarmament 4-27 and arms control 51/45G Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate 159- Y elimination of nuclear weapons 0-11 51/45H Transparency in armaments 154- Y 0-15 51/45I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear 107- N disarmament 37-24 51/45K Regional disarmament 170- Y A: India 0-1 51/45M Advisory opinion of the International Court of 115- N Justice on the legality of the threat or use of 22-32 nuclear weapons 51/45O Nuclear disarmament 110- N 39-20 51/45P Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 165- A A: Belarus, Israel, Geneva Protocol 0-7 Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan 51/45Q Conventional arms control at the regional and 164- Y N: India; A: Cuba, Libya subregional levels 1-2 51/45R Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear 160- Y disarmament 0-11 51/45S An international agreement to ban anti-personnel 155- Y A: Belarus, China, Cuba, landmines 0-10 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Syria, Turkey 51/46D Review and implementation of the Concluding 114- N Document of the 12th Special Session of the 31-27 General Assembly 51/47A Review of the implementation of the 171- A A: Turkey recommendations and decisions adopted by the 0-2 General Assembly at its 10th special session 51/48 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 129- N N: Israel, Micronesia 3-32 51/51 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 131- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-37
375
51/55 The maintenance of international security 162- Y A: Algeria, Armenia, 0-8 China, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania 51/57 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 158- Y A: Armenia, Micronesia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in 0-4 Nepal, Papua New Europe Guinea 51/82 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 159- N N: Israel, Palau determination 3-12 51/83 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 117- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 17-39 peoples to self-determination 51/89 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 89-4- N N: Canada, Israel, Japan and the vital importance of family reunification 76 51/100 Enhancement of international cooperation in the 114- N field of human rights 42-16 51/103 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 57- N 45-59 51/106 Situation of human rights in Iraq 103- Y N: Libya, Sudan, 3-59 Turkmenistan 51/107 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic 79- Y of Iran 30-54 51/109 Situation of human rights in Nigeria 92- Y 19-55 51/111 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 114- Y N: India, Russia 2-48 51/112 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 100- Y 16-50 51/113 Situation of human rights in Cuba 62- Y 25-84 51/116 Situation of human rights in the Republic of 136- Y N: Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia 1-28 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 51/124 Assistance to Palestine refugees 159- A N: Israel; A: Micronesia 1-2 51/126 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 157- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia subsequent hostilities 2-1 51/127 Offers by Member States of grants and 163- Y A: Israel scholarships for higher education, including 0-1 vocational training for Palestine refugees 51/128 Operations of the United Nations Relief and 159- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 2-2 Islands, Micronesia East 51/129 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 152- N N: Israel; A: Fiji, 2-6 Guatemala, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Turkey, Uzbekistan 51/130 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine 159- N N: Israel, Palau; A: refugees 3-1 Micronesia 51/131 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 79-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 76 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 51/132 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 156- N N: Israel; A: Marshall the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 2-3 Islands, Micronesia,
376
of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Palestinian Palau territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories 51/133 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian 152- N N: Israel; A: Guatemala, territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied 2-6 Marshall Islands, Syrian Golan Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay 51/134 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 149- N N: Israel; A: Argentina, Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian 2-8 Guatemala, Kenya, territory, including Jerusalem Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay 51/135 The occupied Syrian Golan 153- A N: Israel; A: Guatemala, 1-9 Kenya, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Swaziland, Uruguay 51/139 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 162- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-7 Marshall Islands, United Nations Micronesia, Palau, UK 51/140 Activities of foreign economic and other interests 107- N which impede the implementation of the 49-4 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination 51/141 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 115- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and 0-51 Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 51/146 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 143- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and 2-19 Peoples 51/147 Dissemination of information on decolonization 154- N N: Israel, UK; A: 3-8 Belgium, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Russia 51/190 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 133- N N: Israel, Vanuatu the occupied Palestinian territory, including 3-21 Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources 51/193 Report of the Security Council 111- N N: France, Russia, UK 4-41 51/203 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 149- Y A: Belarus, Russia 0-2 51/205 Proclamation of 21 November as World Television 141- A Day 0-11 51/217 United Nations pension system 102- Y N: Ukraine 1-12 51/223 Israeli settlement activities in the occupied 130- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Palestinian territory, in particular in occupied East 2-2 Islands, Micronesia Jerusalem 51/229 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 103- Y N: Burundi, China, Uses of International Watercourses 3-27 Turkey
377
51/233 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 127- N N: Israel; A: Russia Lebanon 2-1
378
TABLE XIII
52 nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 15, 1997 - September 8, 1998
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n- a 52/10 Embargo by the United States of America against Cuba 143- N N: Israel, 3-17 Uzbekistan 52/11 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 151- Y N: Democratic 1-5 People's Republic of Korea; A: China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Syria, Vietnam 52/14 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic 157- A 0-1 52/22 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization for 126- Y A: Armenia Security and Cooperation in Europe 0-1 52/24 Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries 87-0- A of origin 23 52/26 Oceans and the law of the sea 138- Y N: Turkey; A: 1-4 Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela 52/33 Science and technology in connection with security and 103- N disarmament 43-19 52/35 Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 153- Y N: Bhutan, India 3-8 Mauritius; A: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam 52/36 Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 116- A of nuclear weapons 0-51 52/37 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 128- A 0-39 52/38A Anti-personnel mines convention 142- A 0-18 52/38B Transparency in armaments 98- N 45-13 52/38E Environmental norms in drafting disarmament 160- A A: France, Israel, agreements 0-6 Japan, Monaco, UK
379
52/38H Banning anti-personnel landmines 147- Y 0-15 52/38J Small arms 158- Y A: Bahamas, 0-6 Israel, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 52/38K Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate 156- Y A: Algeria, Cuba, elimination of nuclear weapons 0-10 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan 52/38L Nuclear disarmament 109- N 39-18 52/38M Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear 161- Y A: Cuba, disarmament 0-8 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tanzania 52/38N Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere 131- N N: France, UK 3-34 52/38O International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the 116- N legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 26-24 52/38Q Conventional arms control at regional and subregional 164- Y N: India; A: Cuba, levels 1-2 Libya 52/38R Transparency in armaments 155- Y 0-11 52/39C Nuclear weapons prohibition convention 109- Y 30-27 52/40C Role of the UN in disarmament 111- N 41-12 52/41 Nuclear proliferation risk in the Middle East 147- N N: Israel 2-14 52/44 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 125- N N: France, UK 3-40 52/49 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of 115- N N: Israel the Palestinian People 2-45 52/50 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 113- N N: Israel 2-47 52/51 Special information program on the question of Palestine 158- N N: Israel; A: 2-4 Bulgaria, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Rwanda 52/52 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 155- N N: Israel; A: 2-3 Bulgaria, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 52/53 Jerusalem 148- A N: Israel; A: Costa 1-9 Rica, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua
380
New Guinea, Samoa, Swaziland, Zambia 52/54 The Syrian Golan 92-2- N N: Israel 65 52/57 Assistance to Palestine refugees 159- A N: Israel; A: 1-2 Micronesia 52/59 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 159- N N: Israel; A: subsequent hostilities 2-1 Micronesia 52/60 Education and training grants and scholarships for 163- Y A: Israel Palestine refugees 0-1 52/61 158- N N: Israel; A: Operations of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 2-3 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia 52/62 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 158- N N: Israel; A: 2-3 Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 52/63 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine refugees 158- A N: Israel; A: 2-3 Liberia, Micronesia, Zambia 52/64 Work of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli 83-2- N N: Israel practices in the occupied territories 72 52/65 Applicability of the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949 156- N N: Israel; A: relative to the occupied Palestinian and other Arab 2-3 Marshall Islands, territories Micronesia, Swaziland 52/66 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, 149- N N: Israel; A: including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan 2-7 Bulgaria, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Uruguay 52/67 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 151- N N: Israel; A: Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, 2-7 Democratic including Jerusalem People's Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Zambia 52/68 The occupied Syrian Golan 152- A N: Israel; A: 1-7 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Uruguay, Zambia 52/71 Non-Self-Governing Territories 161- A A: France, Israel, 0-4 UK 52/72 Economic and other activities affecting the interests of the 156- N N: Israel, Marshall peoples of Non-Self-Governing territories 3-5 Islands; A: Bulgaria, Equatorial Guinea,
381
France, Micronesia, UK 52/73 Implementation of the decolonization declaration by the 117- A specialized agencies and international institutions 0-50 associated with the UN 52/78 Implementation of the decolonization declaration 139- N N: UK 2-23 52/79 Dissemination of information on decolonization 159- N N: Israel, UK; A: 3-3 France, Micronesia, Russia 52/112 Use of mercenaries to violate human rights 113- N 18-41 52/114 Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 160- N N: Israel; A: 2-6 Dominican Republic, Georgia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Norway, Uruguay, 52/119 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and 96- N non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their 58-12 electoral processes 52/120 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 91- N 46-26 52/121 Right to universal freedom of travel and the importance 94-1- N of family reunification 73 52/129 UN role in enhancing elections and promoting 157- Y democratization 0-15 52/131 UN promotion of human rights through international 116- N N: Israel cooperation and the importance of non-selectivity, 2-50 impartiality and objectivity 52/133 Human rights and terrorism 115- A 0-57 52/136 Right to development 129- N 12-32 52/139 Human rights situation in Kosovo 102- Y N: India, Russia 2-56 52/140 Human rights situation in the Sudan 93- Y 16-58 52/141 Human rights situation in Iraq 99-3- Y N: Libya, Nigeria, 60 Sudan 52/142 Human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran 74- Y 32-56 52/143 Human rights situation in Cuba 64- Y 29-75 52/144 Human rights situation in Nigeria 81- Y 18-64 52/147 Human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 133- Y N: Belarus, Russia Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 2-27 and Montenegro) 52/169F Emergency Assistance to the Sudan 95- N 38-13 52/181 Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and 109- N economic coercion against developing countries 1-50 52/207 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people over 137- N N: Israel their natural resources 2-14 52/237 Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 109- N N: Israel
382
2-0 52/250 Participation of Palestine in the work of the UN 124- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-10 Islands, Micronesia; A: Bulgaria, Democratic People's Republic of the Congo, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Zambia
383
TABLE XIV
53 rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 1, 1998 - September 13, 1999
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 53/4 Embargo against Cuba 157- N N: Israel 2-12 53/10 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a 80-2- N N: Israel means of political and economic compulsion 67 53/21 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 113- Y N: Democratic People's 1-8 Republic of Korea; A: Bhutan, Botswana, China, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam 53/32 Oceans and Law of the Sea 134- Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, 1-6 Ecuador, El Salvador, Iceland, Peru, Venezuela 53/34 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South 126- A Atlantic 0-1 53/37 Jerusalem 149- A N: Israel; A: Costa Rica, 1-7 Marshall Islands, Samoa, Swaziland, Uzbekistan, Zambia 53/38 The Syrian Golan 97-2- N N: Israel 58 53/39 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 110- N N: Israel Rights of the Palestinian People 2-48 53/40 Division for Palestinian Rights 111- N N: Israel 2-48 53/41 Department of Public Information Program on 156- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Palestine 2-2 Islands, Uzbekistan 53/42 Peaceful settlement of the Palestine question 154- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 2-3 Islands, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan 53/46 Assistance to Palestine refugees 157- A N: Israel; A: Micronesia 1-2 53/48 Displaced persons since the June 1967 and 156- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia subsequent hostilities 2-1 53/49 Education aid for Palestine refugees 160- Y A: Israel 0-1 53/50 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 157- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, Palestine Refugees 2-2 Zambia 53/51 Properties and revenues of Palestine refugees 156- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia 2-1 53/52 University of Jerusalem "Al Quds" 156- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia, 2-2 Zambia 53/53 Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices 86-2- N N: Israel in the occupied territories 67
384
53/54 Applicability of Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 155- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 1949 to the occupied Palestinian and other 2-2 Islands, Micronesia, territories, including Jerusalem 53/55 Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian and 150- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: other territories 3-2 Marshall Islands, Swaziland 53/56 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of 151- N N: Israel; A: Cameroon, Palestinians in the occupied territories 2-4 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Zambia 53/57 The occupied Syrian Golan 150- A N: Israel; A: Marshall 1-6 Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland, Uruguay, Zambia 53/60 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 156- A A: France, Israel, 0-5 Monaco, UK 53/61 Economic and other activities affecting peoples of 154- N N: Israel; A: France, Non-Self-Governing Territories 2-5 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, UK 53/62 Decolonization declaration 112- A 0-51 53/68 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 144- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-18 53/69 Dissemination of information on decolonization 156- N N: Israel, UK; A: France, 3-3 Micronesia, Russia 53/71 Violent disintegration of States: prevention 156- Y A: Armenia, Chile, 0-6 China, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Pakistan 53/73 Disarmament: role of science and technology 99- N 45-23 53/75 Use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear-weapon 117- A States 0-52 53/76 Arms race prevention in outer space 165- A A: Israel, Marshall 0-4 Islands, Micronesia 53/77E Small arms 169- Y A: Russia 0-1 53/77F Reducing nuclear danger 108- N 45-17 53/77G Nuclear testing 118- Y N: Angola, Antigua and 9-33 Barbuda, Bhutan, India, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe 53/77H Regional disarmament 63- N 44-47 53/77J Agreements on disarmament and arms control: 170- A A: France, Israel, UK environmental norms 0-4 53/77L Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 168- A A: Israel, Marshall Geneva Protocol 0-5 Islands, Micronesia, Republic of Korea 53/77N Anti-personnel Mines Convention 147- A 0-21 53/77P Conventional arms control at regional and 164- Y N: India; A: Bhutan, subregional levels 1-2 Cuba 53/77Q Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 154- N N: France, UK; A: adjacent areas 3-10 Bhutan, Estonia, Gabon
385
Georgia, India, Israel, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Russia 53/77S Transparency in armaments (further development 104- N of Register of Conventional Arms) 46-17 53/77U Ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons 160- Y 0-11 53/77V Transparency in armaments (participation in the 159- Y Register of Conventional Arms) 0-12 53/77W International Court of Justice advisory opinion on 123- N the legality (threat or use) of nuclear weapons: 25-25 follow-up 53/77X Nuclear disarmament 110- N 41-18 53/77Y Nuclear-weapon-free world: need for a new agenda 114- N 18-38 53/77Z Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations 166- Y A: Cuba, Democratic 0-8 People's Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Tanzania 53/78D Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Convention 111- N 39-22 53/80 Middle East Nuclear Proliferation 158- N N: Israel 2-11 53/85 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization 143- Y A: Armenia, China for Security and Cooperation in Europe 0-2 53/135 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 115- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 18-35 peoples to self-determination 53/136 Right of the Palestinian people to self- 162- N N: Israel; A: Fiji, determination 2-6 Georgia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Uruguay, Uzbekistan 53/141 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 110- N 45-10 53/143 Freedom of travel and family reunification 103- N N: Angola 2-66 53/155 Right to development 125- N 1-42 53/157 Human rights in Iraq 103- Y N: Libya, Nigeria, Sudan 3-56 53/158 Human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran 64- Y 41-56 53/163 Human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 141- Y Republic of Croatia, Federal Republic of 0-21 Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 53/164 Human rights in Kosovo 122- Y N: Belarus, India, Russia 3-34 53/196 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 144- N N: Israel the occupied territories over their natural resources 2-12 53/227 Financing of UN Interim Force in Lebanon 119- N N: Israel; A: Iran 2-1
386
TABLE XV
54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 14, 1999 – September 5, 2000
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 54/21 Embargo against Cuba 155- N N: Israel; A: Estonia, 2-8 Georgia, Latvia, Micronesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Senegal, Uzbekistan 54/26 International Atomic Energy Agency Report 122- Y N: Democratic People's 1-6 Republic of Korea; A: Benin, Laos, Lebanon, Syria, Tanzania, Vietnam 54/31 Oceans and the law of the sea 129- Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, 1-4 Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 54/35 Zone of peace: South Atlantic 97-0- A 1 54/37 Jerusalem 139- A N: Israel; A: Swaziland, 1-3 Uzbekistan 54/38 Syrian Golan 92-2- N N: Israel 53 54/39 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 105- N N: Israel, Marshall Rights of the Palestinian People 3-48 Islands 54/40 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-47 Islands 54/41 Special information program on the question of 151- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestine of the Department of Public Information 3-2 Islands; A: Micronesia, Uzbekistan 54/42 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 149- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-2 Islands; A: Micronesia, Uzbekistan 54/47 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 120- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-41 54/50 Role of science and technology in the context of 98- N international security and disarmament 46-19 54/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 111- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-53 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 54/53 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 160- A A: Israel 0-2 54/54A Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on 80-4- N N: Albania, Israel, the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 68 Micronesia 54/54B Implementation of the Convention on the 139- A N: Lebanon Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 1-20 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 54/54D Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate 153- Y elimination of nuclear weapons 0-12 54/54F Missiles 94-0- A
387
65 54/54G Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for 111- N a new agenda 13-39 54/54I Transparency in armaments 97- N 48-15 54/54K Reducing nuclear danger 104- N 43-14 54/54L Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 157- N N: France, UK; A: India, adjacent areas 3-4 Israel, Micronesia, Russia 54/54M Conventional arms control at the regional and 159- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1 54/54O Transparency in armaments 150- Y 0-12 54/54P Nuclear disarmament 104- N 41-17 54/54Q Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 114- N International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 28-22 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 54/54S Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 159- A A: France, Israel, UK and implementation of agreements on disarmament 0-4 and arms control 54/54V Small arms 119- Y A: Lebanon, Russia 0-2 54/55D Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 104- N Nuclear Weapons 42-17 54/57 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 148- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-9 Barbados, Cameroon, Canada, India, Kenya, Marshall Islands, Norway, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago 54/62 Maintenance of international security-stability and 155- Y A: Belarus, China development of South-Eastern Europe 0-2 54/63 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 158- Y A: Bhutan, India, 0-6 Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania 54/69 Assistance to Palestine refugees 155- A N: Israel; A: Micronesia 1-2 54/71 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 154- N N: Israel; A: Marshall subsequent hostilities 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 54/72 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 158- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 54/73 Operations of UN Relief and Works Agency for 154- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia Palestine refugees in the Near East 2-1 54/74 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 154- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 54/75 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine 155- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia refugees 2-1 54/76 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 84-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 67 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 54/77 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 154- N N: Israel; A: Micronesia the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 2-1
388
to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories 54/78 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 149- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied 3-3 Marshall Islands, Syrian Golan Swaziland, Uruguay 54/79 Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 150- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian 2-3 Islands, Micronesia, Territory, including Jerusalem Swaziland 54/80 The occupied Syrian Golan 150- A N: Israel; N: Marshall 1-5 Islands, Micronesia, Swaziland, Uruguay 54/83 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 155- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the 0-6 Micronesia, Monaco, UK United Nations 54/84 Economic and other activities which affect the 153- N N: Israel; A: France, interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 2-5 Georgia, Micronesia, Territories Monaco, UK 54/85 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 101- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-52 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 54/91 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 141- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-14 54/92 Dissemination of information on decolonization 149- N N: UK; A: France, Israel, 2-3 Monaco 54/110 Measures to eliminate international terrorism 149- Y A: Lebanon, Syria 0-2 54/117 Cooperation between UN and Organization for 124- Y A: Armenia, China Security and Cooperation in Europe 0-2 54/151 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 100- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 16-35 peoples to self-determination 54/152 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 156- N N: Israel; A: Georgia determination 2-1 54/164 Human rights and terrorism 106- A 0-58 54/165 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 99-2- N N: Togo of all human rights 64 54/168 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 91- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 59-10 in their electoral processes 54/169 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 95-1- N and the vital importance of family reunification 66 54/172 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 109- N 48-7 54/173 Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the 153- N effectiveness of the principle of periodic and 0-11 genuine elections and the promotion of democratization 54/175 The right of development 119- N N: Canada, Denmark, 10-38 Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Sweden 54/177 Human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of 61- Y Iran 47-51
389
54/178 Human rights situation in Iraq 100- Y N: Iran, Libya, Sudan 3-53 54/179 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 91- Y N: Angola, Burkina- Republic of the Congo 10-54 Faso, Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe 54/182 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 89- A 30-39 54/183 Situation of human rights in Kosovo 108- Y N: Belarus, India, Iran, 4-45 Russia 54/184 Situation of human rights in Bosnia and 123- Y N: Belarus, Russia Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the 2-34 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 54/197 Towards a stable international financial system, 155- N responsive to the challenges of development, 1-0 especially in the developing countries 54/200 Unilateral economic measures as a means of 94-2- N N: Marshall Islands political and economic coercion against developing 43 countries 54/230 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 145- N N: Israel, Marshall the occupied Palestinian territory and of the Arab 3-6 Islands; A: Australia, population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their Cameroon, Georgia, natural resources Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Zambia 54/267 Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 110- N N: Israel 2-0
390
TABLE XVI
55 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 5, 2000 – September 7, 2001
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 55/6 Elimination of coercive economic measures as a 136- N N: Israel; A: Albania, means of political and economic compulsion 2-10 Australia, Canada, Dominican Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Nauru, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Tonga, Uruguay, 55/7 Oceans and law of the sea 143- Y N: St Kitts and Nevis, 2-4 Turkey; A: Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 55/8 Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing 103- Y 0-44 55/20 Embargo against Cuba 167- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-4 Islands; A: El Salvador, Latvia, Morocco, Nicaragua 55/29 Role of science and technology 97- N 46-21 55/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 111- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-54 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 55/33A Missiles 97-0- A 65 55/33B Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on 88-5- N N: Albania, Honduras, the Limitation of ABMS 66 Israel, Micronesia 55/33C Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for 154- Y N: India, Israel, Pakistan; a new agenda 3-8 A: Bhutan, France, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 55/33D 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the 163- Y N: India; A: Cuba, Israel, Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1-3 Pakistan 55/33I Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 159- N N: France, Monaco, UK; adjacent areas 4-5 A: Andorra, India, Israel, Russia, Spain 55/33J Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 163- A A: Israel, Marshall Geneva Protocol 0-5 Islands, Micronesia, Republic of Korea 55/33K Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 165- A A: France, Israel, UK and implementation of agreements on disarmament 0-4 and arms control 55/33N Reducing nuclear danger 110- N 45-14 55/33P Conventional arms control at the regional and 163- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1
391
55/33R A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 155- Y N: India 1-12 55/33T Nuclear disarmament 109- N 39-20 55/33U Transparency in armaments 149- Y 0-16 55/33V Implementation of the Convention on the 143- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 0-22 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 55/33X Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the 119- N Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 28-22 55/34G Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 109- N Nuclear Weapons 43-16 55/36 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 157- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-8 Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago 55/41 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 161- Y A: Bhutan, India, Libya, 0-6 Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania 55/49 Zone of peace: South Atlantic 119- A 0-1 55/50 Jerusalem 145- A N: Israel; A: Angola, 1-5 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru 55/51 Syrian Golan 96-2- N N: Israel 55 55/52 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 106- N N: Israel Rights of the Palestinian People 2-48 55/53 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107- N N: Israel 2-48 55/54 Special information program on the question of 151- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Palestine of Department of Public Information 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 55/55 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 149- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 2-3 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru 55/66 Elimination of crimes against women committed in 146- Y N: Lesotho the name of honor 1-26 55/86 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 119- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 19-35 peoples to self-determination 55/87 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 170- N N: Israel; A: Canada, determination 2-5 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Tonga 55/92 Protection of migrants 165- A A: India, Israel, 0-8 Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, Palau, Singapore 55/96 Promoting and consolidating democracy 157- Y 0-16 55/100 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 106- N and the vital importance of family reunification 1-67 55/101 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 104- N
392
the Charter of the UN to achieve international 52-15 cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 55/102 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 112- N of all human rights 46-15 55/107 Promotion of a democratic and equitable 109- N international order 52-7 55/110 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 117- N 49-6 55/114 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 67- Y Iran 54-46 55/115 Human rights situation in Iraq 102- Y N: Libya, Mauritania, 3-60 Sudan 55/116 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 85- A 32-49 55/117 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 102- Y N: Rwanda, Uganda Republic of the Congo 2-63 55/123 Assistance to Palestine refugees 156- A N: Israel; A: Marshall 1-3 Islands, Micronesia 55/125 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 156- N N: Israel; A: Marshall subsequent hostilities 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 55/126 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 160- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 55/127 Operation of UN Relief and Works Agency for 157- N N: Israel; A: Marshall Palestine Refugees 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 55/128 Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues 156- N N: Israel; A: Marshall 2-2 Islands, Micronesia 55/129 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine 156- N N: Israel; A: Marshall refugees 2-2 Islands, Nauru 55/130 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 91-2- N N: Israel Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 61 Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 55/131 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 152- N N: Israel; A: Marshall the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 2-2 Islands, Micronesia of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Arab territories 55/132 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 152- N N: Israel, Marshall Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied 4-0 Islands, Micronesia Syrian Golan 55/133 Israeli Practices affecting the human rights of the 150- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia Territory, including Jerusalem 55/134 The occupied Syrian Golan 150- A N: Israel; A: Marshall 1-4 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru 55/137 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 153- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the 0-5 Micronesia, UK UN 55/138 Economic and other activities which affect the 151- N N: Israel; A: Croatia, interest of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 2-5 France, Georgia, Territories Micronesia, UK 55/139 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 109- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-50 by the specialized agencies and the international
393
institutions associated with the UN 55/145 Dissemination of information on decolonization 153- N N: UK; A: France, Israel, 2-3 Micronesia 55/146 2nd International Decade for the Eradication of 125- N N: UK Colonialism 2-30 55/147 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 138- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-18 55/158 Measures to eliminate international terrorism 151- Y A: Lebanon, Syria 0-2 55/179 Cooperation between UN and OSCE 147- Y N: Armenia 1-0 55/180A Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 140- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-0 Islands 55/180B Financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 115- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-0 Islands 55/209 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 147- N N: Israel; A: Fiji, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 2-3 Marshall Islands, Nauru Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
394
TABLE XVII
56 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 15, 2001 – September 9, 2002
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 56/7 Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic 93-0- A 1 56/9 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and 167- N N: Israel, Marshall financial embargo imposed by the United States of 3-3 Islands; A: Latvia, America against Cuba Micronesia, Nicaragua 56/12 Oceans and the law of the sea 121- Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, 1-4 Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 56/16 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 110- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-41 56/20 Role of science and technology in the context of 92- N international security and disarmament 46-17 56/22 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 105- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-54 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 56/23 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 156- A A: Georgia, Israel, 0-4 Micronesia 56/24A Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on 82-5- N N: Albania, Benin, Israel, the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 62 Micronesia 56/24B Missiles 98-0- A 58 56/24C Reducing nuclear danger 98- N 45-14 56/24F Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 154- A A: France, Israel, and implementation of agreements on disarmament 0-5 Micronesia, UK and arms control 56/24G Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 148- N N: France, Monaco, UK; adjacent areas 4-4 A: Israel, India, Russia, Spain 56/24I Conventional arms control at the regional and 151- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1 56/24M Implementation of the Convention on the 138- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 0-19 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 56/24N A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 139- N N: India, Micronesia 3-19 56/24O 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the 156- Y N: India; A: Cuba, Israel, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 1-3 Pakistan Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 55/24Q Transparency in armaments 135- Y 0-23 56/24R Nuclear disarmament 103- N 41-17 56/24S Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 111- N
395
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 29-21 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 56/25B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 104- N Nuclear Weapons 46-11 56/27 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 153- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-6 Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago 56/31 Jerusalem 130- A N: Israel, Nauru 2-10 56/32 The Syrian Golan 90-5- N N: Israel, Marshall 54 Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu 56/33 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 106- N N: Israel, Marshall Rights of the Palestinian People 5-48 Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu 56/34 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 107- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-47 Islands, Micronesia, Tuvalu 56/35 Special information program on the question of 153- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestine of the Department of Public Information 4-3 Islands, Micronesia; A: of the Secretariat Nauru, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 56/36 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 131- N N: Israel, Marshall 6-20 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Tuvalu 56/49 Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory 134- N A: India, Pakistan Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- 1-2 Ban Treaty Organization 56/52 Assistance to Palestine Refugees 151- A N: Israel, Marshall 2-2 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/54 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 151- N N: Israel, Marshall subsequent hostilities 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/55 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 154- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestinian refugees 56/56 Operations of the UN Relief and Works Agency for 151- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestine Refugees in the Near East 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/57 Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues 150- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/58 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine 151- N N: Israel, Marshall refugees 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/59 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 83-4- N N: Israel, Marshall Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 58 Islands, Micronesia Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 56/60 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 148- N N: Israel, Marshall the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 4-2 Islands, Micronesia; A: of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Angola, Nicaragua Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories 56/61 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 145- N N: Israel, Marshall Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied 4-3 Islands, Micronesia; A: Syrian Golan Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands 56/62 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 145- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 4-2 Islands, Micronesia; A:
396
Territory, including Jerusalem Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea 56/63 The occupied Syrian Golan 147- A N: Israel, Marshall 2-3 Islands; A: Micronesia, Nicaragua 56/65 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 149- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the 0-6 Marshall Islands, UN Micronesia, UK 56/66 Economic and other activities which affect the 147- N N: Israel; A: France, interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 2-5 Georgia, Marshall Territories Islands, Micronesia, UK 56/67 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 106- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-50 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the UN 56/73 Dissemination of information on decolonization 147- N N: UK; A: France, Israel, 2-4 Marshall Islands, Micronesia 56/74 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 132- N N: UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-21 56/94 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 150- Y N: Democratic People’s 1-2 Republic of Korea; A: Cote D’Ivoire, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 56/142 The right of Palestinian people to self-determination 161- N N: Israel, Marshall 3-1 Islands; A: Micronesia 56/146 Equitable geographical distribution of the 113- N membership of the human rights treaty bodies 47-5 56/148 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 114- N 51-2 56/150 The right to development 123- N N: Denmark, Israel, 4-44 Japan 56/151 Promotion of a democratic and equitable 109- N international order 53-6 56/152 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 100- N the Charter of the UN to achieve international 54-15 cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character 56/154 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 99- N and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 10-59 in electoral processes as an important element for the promotion and protection of human rights 56/155 The right to food 169- N N: Israel; A: Australia, 2-2 New Zealand 56/159 Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the 162- Y A: Brunei Darussalem, effectiveness of the principle of periodic and 0-8 China, Cuba, Democratic genuine elections and promotion of democratization People’s Republic of Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam 56/160 Human rights and terrorism 102- A 0-69 56/165 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 116- N of all human rights 46-9
397
56/171 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 72- Y Iran 49-46 56/173 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 90-3- Y Republic of the Congo 69 56/174 Situation of human rights in Iraq 100- Y N: Libya, Sudan 2-63 56/175 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 79- A 37-48 56/179 Unilateral economic measures as a means of 100- N political and economic coercion against developing 1-46 countries 56/204 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 148- N N: Israel, Marshall the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 4-4 Islands, Micronesia; A: Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the Cameroon, Fiji, occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea 56/214A Financing of the UN interim force in Lebanon 123- N N: Israel; A: Papua New 2-2 Guinea, Tuvalu 56/214B Financing of the UN interim force in Lebanon 121- N N: Israel 2-0 56/216 Cooperation between the UN and the Organization 123- Y A: Armenia, Belarus, for Security and Cooperation in Europe 0-4 South Africa, Tanzania 56/232 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 77- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 20-20 peoples to self-determination 56/266 Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to 134- N N: Israel; A: Australia, the World Conference against Racism, Racial 2-2 Canada Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
398
TABLE XVIII
57 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 10, 2002 – September 15, 2003
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 57/5 Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive 133- N N: Israel; A: Australia, economic measures as a means of political and 2-2 Latvia economic compulsion 57/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 138- Y N: Democratic People's 1-2 Republic of Korea; A: Angola, Vietnam 57/11 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and 173- N N: Israel, Marshall financial embargo imposed by the United States of 3-4 Islands; A: Ethiopia, America against Cuba Malawi, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan 57/49 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 128- N A: Cambodia, Ghana, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 1-3 Pakistan Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 57/54 Role of science and technology in the context of 90- N international security and disarmament 48-21 57/56 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 106- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-55 or the threat of use of nuclear weapons 57/57 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 159- A A: Israel, Micronesia 0-3 57/58 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 120- N N: France, UK 3-42 57/59 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for 125- N N: France, India, Israel, a new agenda 6-36 Pakistan, UK 57/62 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 164- A A: Israel, Micronesia Geneva Protocol 0-3 57/63 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of 105- N disarmament and non-proliferation 12-44 57/64 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 163- A A: France, Israel, and implementation of agreements on disarmament 0-5 Micronesia, UK and arms control 57/65 Relationship between disarmament and 160- N A: France, Israel, development 1-4 Micronesia, UK 57/71 Missiles 104- N N: Israel, Micronesia 3-60 57/73 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 160- N N: France, UK; A: India, adjacent areas 3-5 Israel, Micronesia, Russia, Spain 57/74 Implementation of the Convention on the 143- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 0-23 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 57/75 Transparency in armaments 143- Y 0-23 57/77 Conventional arms control at the regional and 165- Y N: India; A: Bhutan
399
subregional levels 1-1 57/78 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 156- N N: India 2-13 57/79 Nuclear disarmament 107- N 41-21 57/84 Reducing nuclear danger 107- N 46-17 57/85 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 117- N International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 30-24 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 57/94 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 110- N Nuclear Weapons 45-12 57/97 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 158- N N: Israel, Micronesia; A: 3-8 Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago 57/100 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 164- N A: Columbia, India, 1-5 Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria 57/107 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 109- N N: Israel, Marshall Rights of the Palestinian People 4-56 Islands, Micronesia 57/108 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 108- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-56 Islands, Micronesia 57/109 Special information program on the question 159- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestine of the Department of Public Information 5-0 Islands, Micronesia, of the Secretariat Nauru 57/110 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 160- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-3 Islands, Micronesia; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu 57/111 Jerusalem 154- N N: Costa Rica, Israel, 5-6 Marshall Islands, Micronesia; A: Albania, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 57/112 The Syrian Golan 109- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-57 Islands, Micronesia 57/117 Assistance to Palestine refugees 158- A N: Israel; A: Honduras, 1-5 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 57/119 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 155- N N: Israel, Marshall subsequent hostilities 5-3 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands 57/120 Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships 164- Y A: Israel for higher education, including vocational training, 0-1 for Palestine refugees 57/121 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 155- N N: Israel, Marshall Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East 5-4 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu
400
57/122 Palestine refugees ' properties and their revenues 159- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-2 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Solomon Islands 57/123 University of Jerusalem "Al-Quds" for Palestine 155- N N: Israel, Marshall refugees 5-4 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 57/124 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 86-6- N N: Israel, Marshall Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 66 Islands, Micronesia, Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Nauru, Palau Territories 57/125 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 155- N N: Israel, Marshall the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6-3 Islands, Micronesia, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Nauru, Palau; A: Papua Territory , including East Jerusalem, and the other New Guinea, Solomon occupied Arab territories Islands, Vanuatu 57/126 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 154- N N: Israel, Marshall Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the 6-3 Islands, Micronesia, occupied Syrian Golan Nauru, Palau; A: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 57/127 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 148- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 6-6 Islands, Micronesia, Territory, including East Jerusalem Nauru, Palau; A: Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 57/128 The occupied Syrian Golan 155- A N: Israel; A: Marshall 1-9 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 57/131 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 156- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-8 Marshall Islands, United Nations Micronesia, Monaco, Palau, UK 57/132 Economic and other activities which affect the 156- N N: Israel, Marshall interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 3-3 Islands; A: France, Territories Micronesia, UK 57/133 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 111- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-51 by the specialized agencies and institutions associated with the United Nations 57/139 Dissemination of information on decolonization 154- N N: Israel, Micronesia, 4-2 UK; A: France, Netherlands 57/140 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 139- N N: Micronesia, UK of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-19 57/141 Oceans and the law of the sea 132- Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, 1-2 Venezuela 57/156 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 92-0- A Council of Europe 65 57/175 Future operation of the International Research and 136- N N: Australia, Canada, Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 7-29 Israel, Japan,
401
Netherlands, Republic of Korea 57/188 Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children 108- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-60 Islands, Micronesia, Palau 57/190 Rights of the child 175- N N: Marshall Islands 2-0 57/195 The fight against racism, racial discrimination, 173- N N: Israel, Palau; A: xenophobia and related intolerance and the 3-2 Australia, Canada comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action 57/196 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 124- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 31-34 peoples to self-determination 57/198 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 172- N N: Israel, Marshall determination 4-3 Islands, Palau; A: Micronesia, Tonga, Vanuatu 57/199 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 127- N N: Marshall Islands, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 4-42 Nigeria, Palau or Punishment 57/205 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 124- N of all human rights 52-5 57/213 Promotion of a democratic and equitable 116- N international order 55-7 57/214 Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 130- Y 0-49 57/216 Promotion of the right of peoples to peace 116- N 53-14 57/217 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 114- N the Charter of the United Nations to achieve 54-15 international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character 57/222 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 122- N 55-1 57/223 The right to development 133- N N: Australia, Marshall 4-47 Islands, Palau 57/226 The right to food 176- N A: Australia, Canada, 1-7 Fiji, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 57/227 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 109- N N: Israel, Palau and the vital importance of family reunification 3-71 57/228A Khmer Rouge trials 150- Y 0-30 57/230 Situation of human rights in the Sudan 80- Y 62-33 57/232 Situation of human rights in Iraq 97-3- Y N: Libya, Sudan, Syria 77 57/233 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 92-2- Y N: Rwanda, Uganda Republic of the Congo 81 57/269 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 155- N N: Israel, Micronesia, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 4-4 Palau; A: Madagascar, Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the Nauru, Papua New
402
occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources Guinea, Tuvalu 57/298 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 147- Y A: Armenia, Belarus, Organization for Security and Cooperation in 0-3 Madagascar Europe 57/325 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 135- N N: Israel Lebanon 2-0
403
TABLE XIX
58 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 16, 2003 – September 2004
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 58/7 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and 179- N N: Israel, Marshall financial embargo imposed by the United States of 3-2 Islands; A: Micronesia, America against Cuba Morocco 58/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 129- Y N: Democratic People's 1-0 Republic of Korea 58/18 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 97-7- N N: Australia, Israel, Rights of the Palestinian People 60 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 58/19 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 98-6- N N: Israel, Marshall 63 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 58/20 Special information program on the question of 159- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestine of the Department of Public Information 6-6 Islands, Micronesia, of the Secretariat Nauru, Palau 58/21 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 160- N N: Israel, Marshall 6-5 Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Uganda 58/22 Jerusalem 155- N N: Costa Rica, Israel, 8-7 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Uganda 58/23 The Syrian Golan 104- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-61 Islands, Micronesia, Palau 58/29 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 130- N N: France, UK Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-42 58/33 Role of science and technology in the context of 106- N international security and disarmament 49-19 58/35 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 119- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-58 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 58/36 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 174- A A: Israel, Marshall 0-4 Islands, Micronesia 58/37 Missiles 113- N N: Israel, Micronesia 3-57 58/39 Conventional arms control at the regional and 172- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1 58/43 Confidence-building measures in the regional and 73- N subregional context 48-46 58/44 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of 118- N disarmament and non-proliferation 12-46 58/45 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 173- N A: France, Israel, UK, and implementation of agreements on disarmament 1-4 Micronesia and arms control 58/46 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 124- N International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 29-22
404
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 58/47 Reducing nuclear danger 114- N 47-17 58/49 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 168- N N: France, UK adjacent areas 3-8 58/50 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 128- N N: France, Russia, UK 4-43 58/51 Towards a nuclear weapon-free world: a new 133- N France, India, Israel, agenda 6-38 Pakistan, UK 58/53 Implementation of the Convention on the 153- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 0-23 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 58/54 Transparency in armaments 150- Y 0-27 58/56 Nuclear disarmament 112- N 45-20 58/59 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 164- N N: India 2-14 58/64 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 118- N Nuclear Weapons 46-13 58/68 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 162- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-10 Islands, Micronesia 58/71 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 173- N A: Syria, Mauritius, 1-4 India, Columbia 58/91 Assistance to Palestine refugees 167- A N: Israel; A: Cameroon, 1-8 Honduras, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Papa New Guinea, Tuvalu 58/92 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 168- N N: Israel, Marshall subsequent hostilities 5-3 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Rwanda, Honduras, Papua New Guinea 58/93 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 162- N N: Israel, Marshall Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 5-8 Islands, Micronesia, Palau 58/94 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 164- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-4 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Cameroon, Honduras, Papa New Guinea, Rwanda 58/95 Assistance to Palestine refugees and support for the 133- Y United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 0-35 Palestine Refugees in the Near East 58/96 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 87-7- N N: Australia, Israel, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 78 Marshall Islands, Palestinian Peoples and Other Arabs of the Micronesia, Nauru, Occupied Territories Palau, 58/97 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 164- N N: Israel, Marshall the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6-4 Islands, Micronesia, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Nauru, Palau; A: Territory , including East Jerusalem, and the other Cameroon, Papua New occupied Arab territories Guinea, Honduras, Rwanda
405
58/98 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 156- N N: Israel, Marshall Territory, including East Jerusalem and the 6-13 Islands, Micronesia, occupied Syrian Golan Nauru, Palau, 58/99 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 150- N N: Israel, Marshall Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 6-19 Islands, Micronesia, Territory, including East Jerusalem Nauru, Palau, 58/100 The occupied Syrian Golan 163- A N: Israel 1-11 58/102 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 163- A A: Angola, France, transmitted under Articles 73 e of the Charter of the 0-6 Israel, Micronesia, UK United Nations 58/103 Economic and other activities which affect the 164- N N: Israel; A: France, interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 2-3 Micronesia, UK Territories 58/104 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 116- A of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-55 by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 58/110 Dissemination of information on decolonization 162- N N: Israel, UK 3-0 58/111 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 154- N N: UK; A: Albania, of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-8 Estonia, Belgium, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Micronesia 58/113 Assistance to the Palestinian people 170- Y A: Israel, Kenya 0-2 58/123 Special assistance for the economic recovery and 169- Y N: Rwanda reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the 1-0 Congo 58/155 Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children 106- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-65 Islands, Micronesia, Palau, 58/157 Rights of the child 179- N 1-0 58/160 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, 174- N N: Israel; A: Australia, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 2-2 Canada intolerance and the comprehensive implementation and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action 58/161 Universal realization of the rights of peoples to self- 109- A N: Bhutan, India, determination 3-61 Mauritius 58/162 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 125- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 26-29 peoples to self-determination 58/163 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 169- N N: Israel, Marshall determination 5-0 Islands, Micronesia, Palau, 58/171 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 125- N 53-0 58/172 The right to development 173- N N: Israel, Palau; A: 3-5 Australia, Canada, Georgia, Japan, Sweden 58/173 The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 174- N N: Marshall Islands; A: highest attainable standard of physical and mental 2-4 Australia, Czech health Republic, Sweden, UK
406
58/174 Human rights and terrorism 120- N 42-18 58/179 Access to medication in the context of pandemics 181- N such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 1-0 59/180 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in 169- Y A: Brunei Darussalam, enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 0-8 China, Cuba, Democratic periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of People's Republic of democratization Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam 58/184 Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance 179- Y A: Israel 0-1 58/186 The right to food 176- N A: Israel, Marshall 1-2 Islands 58/187 Protection of human rights and fundamental 181- Y A: India freedoms while countering terrorism 0-1 58/188 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 106- N the Charter of the United Nations to achieve 55-19 international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character 58/189 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 111- N N: Argentina, Australia, and diversity of democratic systems in electoral 10-55 Canada, Chile, Israel, processes as important element for the promotion New Zealand, Norway, and protection of human rights Switzerland, Sudan 58/192 Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the 119- N full enjoyment of all human rights by all 50-9 58/193 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 123- N of all human rights 51-4 58/194 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 73- Y 40-56 58/195 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 68- Y Iran 54-51 58/196 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 81-2- Y N: Rwanda, Uganda Republic of the Congo 91 58/198 Unilateral economic measures as a means of 125- N political and economic coercion against developing 1-37 countries 58/229 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 157- N N: Israel, Marshall the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 4-10 Islands, Micronesia Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources 58/240 Oceans and the law of the sea 156- Y N: Turkey; A: Columbia, 1-2 Venezuela 58/244 Future operation of the International Research and 126- N N: Australia, Canada, Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 5-30 Japan, New Zealand 58/245 Office of the Special Representative of the 115- N Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 20-28 58/292 Status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 140- N N: Israel, Marshall including East Jerusalem 6-11 Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, 58/307 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 131- N N: Israel Lebanon 2-0 58/317 Reaffirming the central role of the United Nations 93-2- N N: Israel in the maintenance of international peace and 47 security and the promotion of international
407
cooperation
408
TABLE XX
59 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly October 2004 – September 13, 2005
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 59/6 Cooperation between the United Nations and the 104- N Preparatory Mission for the Comprehensive 1-0 Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 59/11 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and 179- N N: Israel, Marshall financial embargo imposed by the United States of 4-1 Islands, Palau; A: American against Cuba Micronesia 59/18 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 123- Y N: Democratic People's 1-0 Republic of Korea 59/24 Oceans and the law of the sea 141- Y N: Turkey; A: 1-2 Columbia, Venezuela 59/28 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 104- N N: Australia, Canada, Rights of the Palestinian People 7-63 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/29 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 103- N N: Australia, Grenada, 8-64 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 59/30 Special information program on the question of 162- N N: Grenada, Israel, Palestine of the Department of Public Information 7-9 Marshall Islands, of the Secretariat Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 59/31 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 167- N N: Australia, Grenada, 7-10 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/32 Jerusalem 155- N N: Costa Rica, Grenada, 7-15 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/33 The Syrian Golan 111- N N: Grenada, Israel, 6-60 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/62 Role of science and technology in the context of 106- N international security and disarmament 48-21 59/64 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 118- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-63 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 59/65 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 178- A A: Haiti, Israel, Palau 0-4 59/67 Missiles 119- N N: Israel, Micronesia, 4-60 Palau 59/68 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 175- N N: Palau; A: France, and implementation of agreements on disarmament 2-3 Israel, UK and arms control 59/69 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of 125- N N: Albania, Israel, disarmament and non-proliferation 9-49 Latvia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Poland, UK 59/70 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 179- A A: Israel, Marshall Geneva Protocol 0-5 Islands, Micronesia,
409
Palau 59/75 Acceleration the implementation of nuclear 151- N N: France, Israel, Latvia, disarmament commitments 6-24 Palau, UK 59/76 A Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 165- N N: India, Palau 3-16 59/77 Nuclear disarmament 117- N 43-21 59/78 Relationship between disarmament and 180- N N: Palau; A: France, development 2-2 Israel 59/79 Reducing nuclear danger 116- N 46-18 59/81 To negotiate a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and 179- N N: Palau; A: Israel, UK international effectively verifiable treaty banning 2-2 the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 59/83 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 132- N International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 29-24 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 59/84 Implementation of the Convention on the 157- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 0-22 Transfer of Anti-personnel mines and on Their Destruction 59/85 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 171- N N: France, Palau, UK adjacent areas 4-8 59/88 Conventional arms control at the regional and 178- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1 59/91 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 161- Y N: Iran, Egypt Missile Proliferation 2-15 59/102 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 125- N Nuclear Weapons 48-12 59/106 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 170- N N: Israel, Marshall 5-9 Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/109 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 177- N N: Palau; A: Columbia, 2-4 India, Mauritius, Syria 59/117 Assistance to Palestine refugees 167- A N: Israel 1-11 59/118 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 162- N N: Grenada, Israel, subsequent hostilities 6-9 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 56/119 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 163- N N: Grenada, Israel, Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 6-7 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/120 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 161- N N: Grenada, Israel, 6-9 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/121 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 84-9- N N: Australia, Canada, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 80 Grenada, Israel, Marshall Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Islands, Micronesia, Territories Nauru, Palau 59/122 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 160- N N: Grenada, Israel, the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 7-11 Marshall Islands, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Mauritania, Micronesia, Territory including East Jerusalem, and the other Palau occupied Arab territories 59/123 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 155- N N: Australia, Grenada,
410
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the 8-15 Israel, Marshall Islands, occupied Syrian Golan Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 59/124 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 149- N N: Australia, Israel, Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 7-22 Marshall Islands, Territory, including East Jerusalem Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 59/125 The occupied Syrian Golan 160- A N: Israel, Palau 2-15 59/127 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 172- A A: France, Israel, transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-6 Micronesia, Palau, UK United Nations 59/128 Economic and other activities which affect the 173- N N: Israel, Palau; interests of the people of the Non-Self-Governing 3-3 A: France, Haiti, UK Territories 59/129 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 121- A Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by 0-57 the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations 59/131 Question of Western Sahara 50-0- A 100 59/135 Dissemination of information on decolonization 170- N N: UK, Israel; A: France 3-1 59/136 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 167- N N: UK; A: Belgium, of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 2-4 France, Germany, Israel 59/173 The situation of and assistance to Palestinian 117- N N: Israel, Marshall children 5-62 Islands, Micronesia, Palau 59/177 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, 183- N N: Israel, Palau; A: racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related 3-2 Australia, Canada intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action 59/178 Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 129- N rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 46-13 peoples to self-determination 59/179 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 179- N N: Israel, Marshall determination 5-3 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu 59/181 Equitable geographical distribution in the 128- N membership of the human rights treaty bodies 52-4 59/184 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 129- N of all human rights 53-4 59/185 The right to development 181- N N: Israel; A: Australia, 2-4 Canada, Japan, Sweden 59/188 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 132- N 53-0 59/193 Promotion of a democratic and equitable 125- N international order 55-6 59/195 Human rights and terrorism 127- N 50-8 59/197 Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 142- Y 0-43 59/201 Enhancing the role of regional, subregional, and 172- Y other organizations and arrangements in promoting 0-15 and consolidating democracy
411
59/202 The right to food 182- N N: Israel, Palau 3-0 59/203 Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel 122- N N: Israel, Palau and the vital importance of family unification 3-61 59/204 Respect for the purposes and principles contained in 118- N the Charter of the United Nations to achieve 55-13 international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character 59/205 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 71- Y Iran 54-55 59/206 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 69- Y 47-63 59/207 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 76-2- Y N: Rwanda, Uganda Republic of the Congo 100 59/221 International trade and development 166- N N: Palau; A: Australia, 2-6 Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea 59/251 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 156- N N: Israel, Marshall the Occupied Palestine Territory, including East 5-11 Islands, Micronesia, Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the Palau occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources 59/260 Future Operation of the International Research and 125- N N: Australia, Canada, Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 10-30 Denmark, Finland, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Sweden, UK 59/261 Rights of the child 166- N N: Marshall Islands; A: 2-1 India 59/280 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning 84- Y 34-37 59/307 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 126- N N: Israel; A: Tonga Lebanon 2-1
412
TABLE XXI
60 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 16, 2005 – July 7, 2006
Res Topic Vote US Others y-n-a 60/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 137- Y N: North Korea 1-0 60/12 Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and 182- N N: Israel, Marshall financial embargo imposed by the United States of 4-1 Islands, Palau; A: America against Cuba Micronesia 60/30 Oceans and the law of the sea 141- Y N: Turkey; A: Libya, 1-4 Venezuela, Ecuador, Columbia 60/36 Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights 106- N N: Canada, Israel, of the Palestinian people 8-59 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Australia 60/37 Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat 105- N N: Australia, Canada, 8-59 Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 60/38 Special information program on the question of 160- N N: Australia, Israel, Palestine of the Department of Public Information 7-6 Marshall Islands, of the Secretariat Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 60/39 Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine 156- N N: Australia, Israel, 6-9 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 60/40 The Syrian Golan 106- N N: Canada, Israel, 6-62 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 60/41 Jerusalem 153- N N: Costa Rica, Israel, 7-12 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau 60/45 Developments in the field of information and 177- N telecommunications in the context of international 1-0 security 60/46 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of 180- N A: Israel new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 1-1 systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament 60/48 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 132- N N: United Kingdom, Ocean as a Zone of Peace 3-46 France 60/51 Role of science and technology in the context of 110- N international security and disarmament 53-17 60/53 Conclusion of effective international arrangements 120- A to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use 0-59 or threat of use of nuclear weapons 60/54 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 180- N N: Israel 2-0 60/55 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation, 163- Y A: Cuba, Egypt, Russia, and disarmament agreements 0-10 Venezuela, Iran, Indonesia, South Africa,
413
Barbados, Belarus, Jamaica 60/56 Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating 153- N N: UK, Israel, India, the implementation of nuclear disarmament 5-20 France commitments 60/58 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 167- N N: UK, France adjacent areas 3-8 60/59 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of 122- N N: UK, Israel, France, disarmament and non-proliferation 8-50 Albania, Latvia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 60/60 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting 176- N A: UK, Israel, France, and implementation of agreements on disarmament 1-4 Palau and arms control 60/61 Relationship between disarmament and 177- N A: France, Israel development 1-2 60/62 The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic 158- Y N: Iran missile proliferation 1-11 60/65 Renewed determination towards the total 168- N N: India; A: Israel, elimination of nuclear weapons 2-7 Pakistan, N. Korea, China, Bhutan, Myanmar, Cuba 60/66 Transparency and confidence-building measures in 178- N A: Israel outer space activities 1-1 60/68 Addressing the negative humanitarian and 177- N development impact of the illicit manufacture, 1-0 transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation 60/70 Nuclear disarmament 113- N 45-20 60/72 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations 87- N agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences 56-26 of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 60/75 Conventional arms control at the regional and 174- Y N: India; A: Bhutan subregional levels 1-1 60/76 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 126- N International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 29-24 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 60/79 Reducing nuclear danger 115- N 49-15 60/80 Implementation of the Convention on the 158- A Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 0-17 Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 60/88 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of 111- N Nuclear Weapons 49-13 60/92 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 164- N N: Palau, Micronesia, 5-5 Marshall Islands, Israel; A: Australia, India, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tonga 60/95 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 172- N A: Mauritius, Syria, 1-4 India, Columbia 60/100 Assistance to Palestine refugees 161- A N: Israel 1-11
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60/101 Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and 161- N N: Israel, Palau, subsequent hostilities 6-5 Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Grenada 60/102 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works 159- N N: Grenada, Israel, Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East 6-3 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 60/103 Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues 160- N N: Grenada, Israel, 6-3 Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau 60/104 Work of the Special Committee to Investigate 86- N N: Australia, Canada, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 10-74 Grenada, Israel, Marshall Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Islands, Micronesia, Territories Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu 60/105 Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to 158- N N: Israel, Grenada, the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6-7 Micronesia, Marshall of August 12, 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Islands, Palau Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other Occupied Arab territories 60/106 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 153- N N: Israel, Palau, Territory, including East Jerusalem and the 7-10 Micronesia, Marshall occupied Syrian Golan Islands, Australia, Grenada 60/107 Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the 148- N N: Israel, Palau, Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian 7-17 Micronesia, Marshall Territory, including East Jerusalem Islands, Australia, Grenada 60/108 The occupied Syrian Golan 156- A N: Israel 1-15 60/110 Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 169- A A: Albania, UK, Israel, transmitted under article 73 e of the Charter of the 0-5 France United Nations 60/111 Economic and other activities which affect the 169- N A: Albania, UK, France interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing 1-3 territories 60/112 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 123- Did of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 0-50 not by the Specialized agencies and the international vote institutions associated with the United Nations 60/118 Dissemination of information on decolonization 167- N N: UK, Israel; A: 3-2 France, Albania 60/119 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 166- N N: Israel, UK; A: of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 3-4 Albania, Belgium, France, Germany 60/120 Second International Decade for the Eradication of 133- N N: Israel, UK Colonialism 3-36 60/143 Inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to 114- N N: Japan, Marshall fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial 4-57 Islands, Micronesia discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance 60/144 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, 172- N N: Marshall Islands, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related 3-4 Israel intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of an follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Program of Action 60/146 The right of the Palestinian people to self- 170- N N: Israel, Marshall determination 5-1 Islands, Micronesia, Palau; A: Australia
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60/150 Combating defamation of religions 101- N 53-20 60/152 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 121- N of all human rights 53-4 60/155 Human rights and unilateral coercive measures 125- N 53-0 60/157 The right to development 172- N N: Marshall Islands; A: 2-5 Australia, Israel, Canada, Japan, Palau 60/162 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in 173- Y Tuvalu enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of 0-1 periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization 60/163 Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the 116- N full enjoyment of all human rights by all 53-8 60/164 Respect for the principles of national sovereignty 110- N N: Australia, Israel, and diversity of democratic systems in electoral 6-61 Marshall Islands, processes as an important element for the promotion Micronesia, Palau and protection of human rights 60/165 The right to food 176- N A: Israel 1-1 60/170 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 102- Y N: Egypt, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo 3-67 Uganda 60/171 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of 75- Y Iran 50-43 60/172 Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan 71- Y 35-60 60/173 Situation of human rights in the Democratic 88- Y People's Republic of Korea 21-60 60/174 Situation of human rights in Uzbekistan 74- Y 39-56 60/183 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in 156- N N: Palau, Micronesia, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 6-8 Marshall Islands, Israel, Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the Australia occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources 60/184 International trade and development 121- N 1-51 60/185 Unilateral economic measures as a means of 120- N political and economic coercion against developing 1-50 countries 60/200 International year of Deserts and Desertification, 120- A N: Syria 2006 1-47 60/226 Transparency in armaments 99-0- Y 22 60/229 Future operation of the International Research and 95- N N: UK, Sweden, New Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 10-25 Zealand, Netherlands, Japan, Finland, Canada, Denmark, Australia 60/230 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 127- N Discrimination Against Women 1-0 60/231 Rights of the Child 130- N 1-0 60/251 Human Rights Council 170- N N: Israel, Marshall 4-3 Islands, Palau; A: Belarus, Iran, Venezuela 60/260 Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger 121- N
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Organization worldwide 50-2 60/278 Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in 150- N N: Israel, Palau; A: Lebanon 3-1 Austrailia
417
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