Peter N. Stearns

The Riots of 1812 and the Breakdown of the Anglo-American Mob Tradition Author(s): Paul A. Gilje Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Social History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 547-564 Published by: Peter N. Stearns Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3787432 . Accessed: 02/11/2011 21:31

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http://www.jstor.org THEBALTIMORE RIOTS OF 1812AND THE BREAKDOWNOF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MOB TRADITION

The nature of rioting-what riotersdid-was undergoinga transformationin the half century after the . A close examination of the extensive rioting in Baltimoreduring the summer of 1812 suggests what those changes were. Telescopedinto a month and a half of riotingwas a rangeof activity revealing the breakdownof the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.l This tradition allowed for a certainamount of limited populardisorder. The tumultuouscrowd was viewed as a "quasi-legitimate"or "extra-institutionals'part of the political system and was to be tolerated in certain situations as long as its action was circumscribedto an immediategoal with a minimum of violence to persons and property.The idea was predicatedon the assumption that the normal process of government was imperfect and that it was occasionally necessary to resort to "politics out-of-doors" to meet the needs of the community.Just enough force was to be provided by the crowd to rectify an obvious injustice which ofElcial channelswere incapableof handling.2 This Anglo-Americanmob traditioncan be seen operatingin the Englishbread riots E.P. Thompson describes;crowds acted to re-establishthe "just price," set by custom and ancient law, and violated by proflteeringgrain merchants.3 So too, colonial American mobs in the 1760's and 1770's moved to oppose British imperialmeasures in actions which were generallyconfined to limited attackson symbols of that imperialauthority, as in the Tea Party.Occasionally a mob might get carriedaway in the passions of the moment, such as in the destruction of Governor Thomas Hutchinson's house in 1765, but even when it did, it rarely acted in a brutishmanner against persons-rages were limited to attacksagainst property.4 Yet there always remained in each riot situation the potential for excessive disorder.5 This created a tension between the elite, who would reluctantly condone rioting in only the most extreme circumstances, and the lower and middling ranks of society, who were far more willing to countenance collective violence.6 That tension, which was evident in the attempt of American Whig leaders to bridle the pre-Revolutionarymob activity of the 1760's and 1770's, was resolved throughinformal means of social control.If the riot did not appearto threatenthe prevailingsocial system unduly, then a kind of temporarylicense was granted to the mob. When the mob had finished with its attackon its immediate and proscribedobject, or when its actions began seriously to challenge the social system, then it was time for the elite to pull in its reins and reassertits authority. No elaboratepolice powerswere thought necessaryfor this. The Anglo-American mob tradition thrived in small scale pre-industrialcommunities where contacts between all levels of society were fluid and where social relationswere markedby deferenceand personalrecognition. 548 journalof social history

Thus, informal mechanisms combining the personal and public prestige of local magistratesand members of the elite, were the mainstaysof riot control. Very often the magistratewould simply addressthe membersof the mob, inform them that they were actingin an overly tumultuousmanner, and tell them it was time to disperse. The riot acts of both and America were merely a legalizationof this practice;the magistratewould read the act to the disorderly crowd and then wait for a stipulatedtime, ordinarilyan hour, allowingthe mob ample opportunity to disband.8 The posse comitatus can also be viewed as a regularizationof these informal means of social control. Members of the posse were temporarydeputies of the magistraterecruited from the communityat large. Theoreticallyanyone and everyone could be sworn in as partof the posse.More often than not, however, the possewas recruitedfrom men the magistrateknew would supporthim and these were usuallymen of prominenceand standingin the local communitywhose real value lay in their furtherbolstering the moralweight of the magistrate.The , too, might be calledupon to help supressa riot. But the militia, which tended to include all able-bodied men in a community, was likely to be overly sympatheticwith the mob and could hardlybe expectedto turn out and protect an unpopularcause. More importantly,in both England and America there was a deeply ingrainedfear of the military,inhibiting the use of both the militiaand the regulararmy, as well as limitingthe size and powerof the ordinarypolice forces of constablesand night watch.9 Of course, implicitin every one of the magistrate'spossible avenues of action, be he assertinghis authorityalone, readingthe riot act, with a posse comitatus, or with a detachment of the military at his side, there was always the threat of coercion.But few magistratesreally wanted to be taken up on that threat.They did not want to be responsiblefor spillingthe blood of men they knew all their lives and with whom they must continue to deal with long after the riot was over and whateverforce that was musteredhad been dismissed.l° In fact, manymagistrates knew that any force, and especially the army put an extra burden on local resources and hurt everyone in the community.\l Moreover, as E.P. Thompson has reminded us, "the credibility of the gentry and magistracy" had to be maintained and this was most effectively done through the "reassertion of paternalistauthority" rather than the use of troops or force.l2 Therefore, the preferred means of riot control was to "talk the mob down' after the community'sneeds had been served by "politicsout-of-doors."

The Baltimoreriots of 1812 began in the spirit of this deep-seated tradition.l3 The vast majorityof Baltimore'scitizens were Republicansand the publicationin their city of the Federalist partisan news sheet, the Federal-Republicanswas a constantirritant to theirJeffersonian sympathies. Threats had long been mouthed by the Republicanpapers warning the Federal-Republicanthat its persistentattacks on Madison's administrationandon local Republicanswere bound to rouse the wrathof the citizenry.l4With the declarationof waragainst Great Britainin June 1812 the Federal-Republicanonly becamemore vehement in its assertions.On the night of June 22 the people of Baltimoreacted, as agroup of thirty or forty men dismantled the Gay Street printing office of the Federal-Republican.One Republicanpaper reported, "Last night between 9 and 10 o'clocksa partyof men and boys began, with greatsang froidto demolish the printingoffice of the Federal Republican . . . and perservered till they accomplished their purpose. The business went on as regularlyas if they contractedto performthe job for pay."lS Demolishing or "pulling down" buildings was a widespread practice of both THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 549

English and American mobs in the eighteenth century, while the destructionof the printingpress was an activityreminiscent of several AmericanRevolutionary mobs. Obviously this was not a raging, overly destructive mob; rather it was orderly,workmanlike and restrictedin its goal. Little effort was made by the Republicancity officialsto stop the mob that night. Mayor , a staunch Republican brewer, made a half-hearted aPpearanceat the scene of the riot.l6 His entreaties to halt the riotin&however were respectfullydeclined as one ringleadertold the mayor, "Mr. Johnson, I know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail; that house is the temple of Infamy, it is supportedwith Englishgold, and it must and shall come down to the ground!''17This one statement sums up the very essence of the Anglo-American mob tradition. First, the rioter knew Johnson personally. Both men were members of the larger Republicancommunity. Political office in Baltimorewas still mainly the provinceof the elite. EdwardJohnson was a member of that elite whose base of politicalpower was his close connection with the mechanics and laborersof "Old Town," where he lived and worked,and Fell's Point. On election day the Republican leadership expected Johnson to deliver the workingman's vote.l8 Thus it is not surprisingthat the rioterknew Johnson and treatedhim with deference and respect. Secondly, and more importantly,was the declarationthat the "laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of natureand reason prevail."This short phrase epitomizes the theoreticaljustification of the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.The underlyingassumption was that there was a gap between the "laws of the land" and the "laws of natureand reason." It was the people's right, no, it was the people's duty, to assert themselves in unison to bridge that gap even in the most reasoned of governments. Finally, there was the identificationof the Federal-Republicanwith the national enemy, for war had been declared, and the implicationwas that the destruction of the "temple of Infamy" was a patriotic duty. No doubt MayorJohnson found it difficultto arguewith this statementand was probablynot too disturbedby the banishmentof this maligningtool of his political ¢pponents. In any case, he did not press the point and, as might be expected in good Anglo-Americanmob tradition,he retreatedfor the time being, allowingthe people their moment of riot. The tumult lasted until the early hours of the morningas the mob scoured the streets in pursuit of one of the Federalisteditors, JacobWagner, who had wisely left town. Wagner's own house and the house of his father-in-law,where his family was staying, were both searched by select members of the mob. In doing this no violence was offered to anyone nor was any privateproperty threatened. Had Wagner been captured he would probably have received some rough treatment,for it had been rumoredduring the day that he was to be clothed with a terrapinshell and a sheepskin with a pairof horns, but it is unlikely, considering the overallself-control the mob exercised, that they would carryout their threatof puttinga bullet throughhis 1t.19 So far, then, all the criteriafor the traditionalAnglo-American mob had been Xlfilled: the attackwas limited to only the odious objectof the Federal-Republican printingoffice; opportunityfor doing furtherviolence was declinedwhen the mob had Wagner'shouse and family at its mercy;and the communityapparently gave its tacit approvalto the riot-over five hundredpersons witnessed the evening's activity, includingthe mayorwho made no arrests.With the "laws of natureand reason" satisfied, and the Federalistnewspaper driven from the city, it was time sso journalof social history for the "laws of the land," in the guise of the local authorities,to reassertcontrol. There was no anticipateddifficulty here and on the next day MayorJohnson and the city magistratesissued a statement urging "all citizens who were so disposed to preserve the order and peace of the community" to discountenance "all irregularand tumultuous meetings" and aid the civil ofElcersin supressingthem. If the riot were to i true to the form of the Anglo-Americanmob traditionthis publicstatement, combinedwith the personalsurveillance of the mayor,would be sufflcientto preventany furtherdisturbances.20 MayorJohnson soon had a chance to test his informaltools of riot control.On the evening after the destruction of the Federalist newspaper office a mob threateneda Mr. Hutchinsfor havingspoken out againstthe wareffort. Before the 40 or 50 angry Republicanscould break any law Mayor Johnson arrivedat the scene and persuaded the would-be rioters to leave Hutchins alone. Johnson personally led them away from Hutchins' home to the Market house, several streets away, where he made sure they all dispersed.However, no sooner did the mayorreturn to his vigil at Hutchinsshouse, joined by severalgentlemen friends, than another and larger mob appeared.Standing in the doorwayJohnson was forced to give in and allow an inspectionof the premises.But first he made sure that Hutchins escaped out a back door. With Hutchins safely out of the way, Johnson escorted a committee of the mob on its search. Satisfiedthat Hutchins was not to be found, and leaving his propertyunmolested, the mob began to disband.Again MayorJohnson could congratulatehimself on his handlingof the unruly populace.Yet he was to experience one more scare that night. As the last of the crowd was breakingup Johnson got word ';that a few gentlemen, having heard of the riot, had armed themselves, and were probablyon the way" to support him. Fearing that such a show of force would antagonize the lingering mob, Johnson "privately withdrew" and went off to intercept his would-be saviors. He met with Samuel Hollingsworths a Federalist, and two other horsemen, all armed to the hilt, and, after assuringthem that he had everything undercontrol, he managedto get them to returnhome.21 In all, MayorJohnson could view his night's work as success; he had gone face to face with two mobs and preventedboth from committingany serious violence. However, Johnson was upset by the effortsof the three armedFederalists and was afraidthat bloodshed, and possibly civil war, might be the result of any further popularpolitical disturbances. Definitely committedagainst the use of force, and rather than simply relying on another public statement, the mayor and city magistratesdecided that a more symbolic gesture was needed. Within a few days all of the city's officialsand constableswere massed togetherand paradedthrough the streets in a deliberate attempt to match the theater of the mob with the counter-theaterof the elite and to exhibit before the entire Baltimorecommunity their united stand against any further public disorder.22In a still largely oral society this physical and dramaticdemonstration was calculatedto impress the mechanicand laboreras no high sounding proclamationcould-for it was with "body language' and the "oral-dramaturgical process' that the elite communicatedmost effectivelywith the lowersection of society.23

Somehow the people of Baltimorewere unimpressedwith this show of counter- theater and the mob continued to be active. The Anglo-Americanmob tradition Rouishedin simple, generallyunified communities. Baltimore,howevers was no longer this kind of unified community.In the half centurybefore 1812 the city has experienced phenomenal growth and was transformedfrom a few clusters of THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 551 houses to a thrivingmetropolis of fifty thousand.It was a commercialboom town with many different kinds of people-rich and rising merchants on the make, middlinf tradesmen,native-born and immigrantlaborers, and both slave and free blacks.2 Moreover, the city's work force was undergoinga significanttransition as artisansbecame increasinglyreliant on a pool of unskilledlaborers; apprentices, slaves, and even women were replacing the journeyman at the work place, creatingadditional resentment between employerand employee.25In such a city there were a great number of diverse interests and some of these were starkly exposed in the followingwave of rioting. Racialantagonism, for instance, was revealedin the tearingdown of two houses owned by James Briscoe, a free black.Briscoe had been quoted as saying that "if all the blacks were of his opinion, they would soon put down the whites," and this, combined with a widespreadfear of a British-inspiredslave conspiracy,was quite enough to provoke the ire of the mob. The action, which was not very violent, seems to have been limited in its goals and might therefore easily be consideredas being in the spiritof the Anglo-Americanriot tradition.However, a more careful examination suggests another conclusion. A magistratewas at the scene of the riot and attempted to prevent the destructionof any property.Not only did he fail to stop the mob from pulling down Briscoe's home, but he was equally powerless when the mob decided that they would 'ivisit the sins of the father upon his generation" and, draggingBriscoe's daughter out of her bed, levelled her house to the ground as well. Harassment of blacks continued thereafterand even the Africanchurch was threatened.26 Other divisions in society can be seen in the street fighting which erupted between Protestant and Catholic Irish. Mayor Edward Johnson reported "A number of inferiordisturbances took place, confined to the Irish alone, who were persecutingeach other as orangemen." Alexander Wiley, who was apparentlya ProtestantIrishman, was twice threatenedwith tar and featheringand was finally temporarilyforced to leave town. The mob claimed he had ridden express for Wagner, but Wiley believed that he was attacked"to gratifyprivate revenge, and that the enmity to him partook of religious animosity." Neither Wiley nor his persecutorsknew very much about politics, althouFhthey did use "a cant term, 'Tory',which was the signalfor insult and violence." 7 More directlyconnected to the war effort was the dismantlingof several ships bound for the Iberianpeninsula and the Spanishpossessions in the West Indies. One ship, the schooner Josepha,was regularlycleared at the Customs House and set sail on July 7, but was "broughtback by armedmen, who dismantledher and cut off her rudder." The next morning the Collector put the ship under the protectionof the revenue cutter;however, since no carpenterhad the "hardihood to make a new rudder"it was thought unlikely she would be able to set sail. The reason given for these depredationswas that the Spanish and Portuguese were Britain'sallies against Napoleon and that a number of these ships were loaded with grain and were bound to supply Wellington's army in Spain. Just as important,however, was longstandingprejudice against hispanics and resentment againstprofiteering merchants who seemed willingto tradewith the enemy.28 Nearly every night, then, after the destructionof the Federal-Republicanoffice in late June until late July the mob roamed the streets of Baltimore,striking at a varietyof targets.As it did so, the mob's activityceased to representthe interests of the majority of the Baltimore community and began more and more to represent special and private interests which often reflected the growing animositiesin an increasinglyheterogeneous community. Screened behind a plea 552 journalof social history of patriotismthe mob could begin to vent its pent up anger and frustrationover racial, ethnic, and class issues. To almost all of this the mayor and magistrates continued to use their "gentle" methods of persuasion in dispersingmobs and minimizingviolence despite the a2ppearanceof some evidence that the elite could not always"talk the mob down.' 9

It was againstthis backgroundof constant mob activitythat the other editor of the Federal-Republican,the aristocraticAlexander Contee Hanson, decided to re- establish his paperin Baltimore.30The paper,which was being printedin the less volatile Georgetown, was to be distributedfrom a Baltimoreaddress. Asserting that the "empire of the laws' had been "overthrown' and that society had become "unhinged" and 'idegradedto a state of nature," Hanson plannedto do what he felt Mayor Johnson and the other city ofElcialswere failing to do- guaranteethe freedom of the press. He had no intention of facing the Baltimore mob alone and at least fifty ardent Federalists were recruited from both the countryside and Baltimore to help defend Hanson's "natural and constitutionalrights.''3l On Sunday, July 27, the Federalist host quietly collected at No. 45 Charles Street. Although Hanson and company attempted to attractas little attention as was possible, they made no secret of their location-the CharlesStreet address was defiantlyplaced on the mastheadof the paper.By Monday,the twenty-eighth, everyone in Baltimoreknew that Hanson and his Federal-Republicanwere back in town, and the Federalists on Charles Street preparedthemselves to meet the onslaughtof the mob. Being well armedand committed to stand their groundthe Federalistswere confidentthat the cowardlymob would not dare risk a prolonged attack.32 That night proved them wrong. A large crowd collected outside the Federalist fortressand a riot broke out as men and boys pelted stones and shouted insults at the Federalist defenders. Warningsto the crowd only intensified the shower of stones and after some debate inside the Federalistfortress a blankvolley was fired in the hope of intimidatingthe mob. The loud blast from the Federalistguns had the desired effect as the street was quickly cleared of the crowd of people. But findingthat no harmwas done, and angeredby the temerityof this new Federalist affronts the mob soon returned and re-commenced its taunting activities Becomingbolder and bolder, Dr. Gale, a crackpotapothacary, led a rush upon the house. As Gale entered throughthe battereddoor the Federalistsleveled another? this time lethal, volley. More shots followed and the dying Gale was carriedaway. Others were hit as they retiredto cover. The firingcontinued intermittentlyfrom the house and the mob, which now began to arm itself.33 OfElcialreaction to the riot was slow. MayorJohnson left Baltimorethat day for his country residence. Furtherup CharlesStreet lived GeneralJohn Stricker,the commanderof the city's militia. He obviously knew something was going on as much of the crowd had to file past his house on their way to the Federalist stronghold. Perhapshe hoped that the events of the night of June 22 would be repeated and once again the Federalist news organ would be expelled from Baltimore.In any case, he and several friends, who were at his house that night, became increasinglyalarmed by the constant stream of reportsof the intensifying conflict and by the first shots. Finally, after many appeals by Federalists and others, Strickerset the complicatedmachinery for calling the militiainto motion. Before any troops could be musteredhe needed the signatureof two of the city's magistrates.Unfortunately, magistrates were an extremely rare commodity that THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 553 night and those who could be found, even Federalists,were reluctantto sign the order for fear of mob retaliation. Four different magistrateswere brought to Stricker's house and each managed to disappear before their signatures were secured 34 After much delay the properorders were signed and deliveredto MajorWilliam Barney around midnight. Two more hours passed before the thirty militia men, out of the two companies called, were ready to move down CharlesStreet. Both MajorBarney and General Strickerwere apprehensiveof the crowd's reactionto the appearanceof the militia. On Stricker's advice Barney removed the proud aristocratic eagle and ribbon of the Order of Cincinnati from his uniform, believing that if Barneywore this insignia he would be attackedby the mob as a i'foreigner.' By the same token, Barney ignored militaryeitquette and allowed the more robust and lower class red-featheredChausseurs to lead ahead of his own white-featheredHussars because, so he later claimed the red feathersmade less obvious targets+35No doubt he also felt that the mob would be less willing to attack the innkeepers, peddlers, butchers, carpenters, and ship joiners of the Chausseurs than the merchants in the Hussars.36Barney, who was to lead this expedition, removed his own white feather from his hat. He did not want to wear anythingthat might antagonizethe mob. Meanwhilethe situationwas becomingincreasingly serious. A cannon had been brought up by the mob and placed opposite the building occupied by the Federalists It remained unused, but the exchange of musket fire continued. At this criticaljuncture Barney and his small bandof militiaarrived. Considering the size of the mob, which some estimates put as largeas a thousandpersons, and the fortitude of an undetermined number of Federalists defending No. 45 Charles Street, Barney's predicamentwas extremely delicate. Rather than attemptingto use brute force (which he did not have) Barneyzstripped of his white featherand emblem of the Cincinnati,resorted to the time-tested method of personalappeal. He pleaded with the mob declaring himself their "political friend," and gave assurances that those inside would not escape. The moment was precarious; hostilities had ceased upon the arrivalof the mounted uniformedmilitia and the mob even temporarilywithdrew. But the cannon remainedpoised to fire upon the Federalists, and the mob, seeing how small Barney's force really was, quickly regathered.Barney stalled for time, believing that reinforcementswere bound to come and that the impendingdawn would dispersethe mob as its memberswould fear recognitionin the growing daylight.He placed his militia between the mob and the defenderswith orders to guardevery window and door of the buildingto preventanyone from enteringor leaving.A tense cease-firewas established.37 With ehe mob incensed over the murderof Gale, the wounds of its friends, and the presenceof the Federalists,there was nothing for Barneyto do but negotiate. Finally,aided by MayorJohnson, who arrivedfrom the countryzGeneral Strickers and a numberof other gentlemen, a compromisewas workedout. The Federalist defenders surrenderedto the authorities for protection. Since they were to be placedin the jail for safe keepingthe mob could be assuredthat the "murderers" of Gale would not go free. As daylightarrived one last insult was offered to the people of Baltimore.The Federalistswanted to call for carriagesto convey them to the jailhouse. Stricker thought it best to submit this proposalto the sovereigntyof the people and asked the mob if they would allow this. The idea of these 'imurderers"riding to prison in a symbol of wealth and prestige was unacceptableto the crowd. Instead of carriages they shouted that the Federalists should be taken in carts-the 554 journal of social history common mode of conveyance for criminals and victims of the mob.38 It was decidedthat the processionwould walkand at about seven o'clock the Federalists filed out of the house they had defended all night. The mob surrounded the twenty-threefearless Federalistsand their meager guard.39Insults were heaped upon the defenders all the way to the jail house and some stones were thrownat both the guardand their charge. A fife and drum serenadedthis odd assemblage with the "Rogue's March.'z40 All in all, the Republicanleadership could heave a sigh of relief that Tuesday morning. The situation had been on the brink of disaster, yet somehow that disaster had been averted. The mob appearedsatisfied to see the Federalistsput into jail. The militiahad to be called upon but it had provedunnecessary for them to use force. Ultimately, it was the persuasive powers of the city's leadership which held sway. Furthermore,the Republicanpoliticians, and the populacethey represented, were once again assured that the insidious Federalist tabloid was silenced in Baltimore.Two men lay dead-one was only a spectator-but still the Anglo-Americanmob traditionwas left somewhat intact. Had the mob been unrestrainedin their attackon the CharlesStreet fortressand had MajorBarney and company failed in quelling the disturbancethat night that traditionwould have been whollyabandoned. By no means, however, was the Charles Street disturbancecast completely in the traditionalmold of the Anglo-Americanmob. Firstof all, the rioters, both the Federalistdefenders and the Republicansin the street, were much too violent and preoccupiedwith inflictingphysical damage on one another.Normally, riots in the Anglo-Americanmob traditionfocused on property,not persons.Second, had the informalmethods of social control been fully operative,the mob, seeing so many of the city's elite attemptingto restrainthem, would have feared recognitionin the growing daylight and dispersed as Major Barney expected. Instead their numbers doubled after dawn. General Strickerdid recognize many of the rioters as being members of his militia brigadebut they almost uniformly ignored his entreaties that morning to join the military escort and protect the Federalists. They preferredto remainwithin the ranksof the mob ratherthan being recruited for such an obnoxious duty.41Finally, the traditionalbonds of deference and respect were sorely tested a number of times that night. Before marchingdown Charles Street, Barney saw a group of men with muskets and a drum heading towardsthe riot. He ran to interceptthem and in the ensuing scraphe was almost bayonetted.In the midst of the fight one lad, 15 or 16 years old, shouted to the man Barneywas wrestlingwith "give me the gun and I'll shoot the son of a bitch in a minute.'42 Neither Barney'ssocial position nor his uniform intimidatedthis young man. MajorBarney was awareof this-hence his removal of the Orderof Cincinnatiinsignia and his aristocraticwhite feather.These symbols of wealthand prestige,which should have been assets in gainingthe deferenceof the mob were now consideredliabilities which were best discarded.In short, the Baltimoremob appearedready to transcendthe boundariesof acceptedriot behavior. During the day, despite the mob's promisesto the contrary,the buildingat No. 45 Charles Street was destroyed. In marked contrast to the workmanlike demolitionof the Federal-Republicanoffice in JuneSthis activitywas carriedon in an unorganizedfashion by looters and scavengerswho grabbedwhat they coulds down to the bricks and lumber, and then scurried off into the side streets of Baltimore.Talk and rumor were everywhere.Close to one thousand militia men were called for; only about forty reportedfor duty and since General Strickerfelt that the uniforms might anger the Baltimore citizenry they were dismissed THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 555 without even going near the jailhouse. Crowds milled in and about the jail and gazedat the Federalistprisoners to assure themselves that the "murderers"had not been bailedout.43 That evening, after the militiawas dismissed, the crowdoutside the jail became more hostile and threateneda general assault. MayorJohnson stood in the front of the door as the mob began to press towardsit. Once againhe hoped to curb the furor of the mob. As he was being swept aside he declared:"I am the mayor of your city; they are my prisoners, and I must protect them.' Johnson recieved several answers, but the one he remembered as the most vicious was "you damn'd scoundreldon't we feed you, and is it not your duty to head and lead us on to take vengeance for the murders committed."44For the first time that summer MayorJohnson completelyfailed in a face to face confrontationwith the mob. His personalauthority meant little to the riotersand in a perversesense of democracythey viewed him as a mere hireling,dependent upon them for his very sustenance and duty bound to lead them in their wild depredations. This separationof personaland politicalauthority left the mayor helpless and with the protectionof a few gentlemen friendsJohnson beat a hastyretreat. The mob, with the possible connivanceof the turnkey,was instantlyinside the jailhouse. Confusion reigned and some of the Federalist prisoners escaped through the crowd unscathed. Others, includingAlexander Contee Hanson and the RevolutionaryWar generals Light Horse Harry Lee and James Maccuban Lingan, did not. All told, eight or nine of these Federalistprisoners fell into the hands of the mob and receiveda ferociousbeating from fists, clubs, and whatever else was handy: penknives were stuck into their faces and hot candle grease droppedinto their eyes. GeneralLingan attempted to addressthe mob and remind them of his past services to the country, but the mob could not care less about his personal stature and proven patriotismand they turned upon him with renewed vigor. Linganwas beaten until he stoppedmoving-by then he was dead.45 John Hall, one of the Federalistprisoners, vividly describedthe scene. As Hall tried to run out of the jail he was caught by "two rough looking men" who promised to take "care" of him. "They held me by the wrist for about ten minutes, duringwhich I saw several of my friends knockeddown and their blood scattered all over the pavement . . . they either cut off or tore off my coat, leaving none of it on me but the cape and the sleeves. Having thus securedmy pockets, they tore my shirt leaving my bosom bare." He feared extra torture because he was a resident of Baltimore. "I made another effort but just as I escapedtheir hands, I receiveda blow on my head which broughtme senseless to the floor. I was revived by some one jumping on my arm ...." Hall made yet another attempt to escape with the same results-more and harsher beating. Finally he realizedthat every time he moved he attractedattention to himself as being alive and decidedjust to lie there, playingdead. He was then thrown in a heap with the others who had fallen victim to the mob.46 Although it may appearthat this torturewas senseless brutality,all of the mob's actions were symbolicallyimportant.47 Hall may have felt that his coat was torn off him to secure his pockets, but in that moment of riotous excitement, the "rough looking men" who attacked him were probablymore concerned with stripping him of that importantsymbol of Hall's wealth and standing-his clothing. Each of the Federalist victims had their clothes ripped off them and after the "massacre" the jailhouse was strewn with "foreign clothing," "Montgomery coats," and "VirginiaBoots."48 So too, Hall's final realizationthat the only way for him to survive the ordeal was to play dead is significant.Others among the 556 journalof social history victims related how they came to the same conclusion;49in each case the mob seemed to be demandingthat these members of the Federalistelite surrender,at last, to the forcefulwill of the people. GeneralLingan alone steadfastlyrefused to submitand his appeal, based upon his statureas an aged patricianand war hero, wasrewarded with the mob's beatingthe very life out of him. After piling up their victims in front of the jailhouse the mob searched for Hanson's body, planning special cruelties. But amidst the darkness, blood and gore it was impossible for them to find Hanson in the stack of nearly naked "corpses."50 In a society where personal recognition was crucial the mob's inabilityto identify Hanson, who was no strangerto Baltimoreans,is curious. It was almost as if the distinguishingcharacteristics were purposefullybeaten off of the faces of the Federalistvictims. For the moment Hanson, Lingan, Lee, Halls and the others were no longer land owners, RevolutionaryWar heroes, lawyers, or merchants,they were mere criminals,stripped of clothes and rank fit only to be surrenderedto the city's medicaldoctors as cadaversfor dissection.51 Reaction to the "massacre"was terrific.Federalists, with their families, began to leave Baltimore and it was feared that there would be a run on the banks. Newpapers across the country carried accounts of witnesses and some of the victims. Even Republicanswere shocked. A few of the party leaders expressed sympathywith the aim of punishing the Federalist "murderers'7but almost all were displeasedover the way this was done.52The mob meanwhileseemed to rule triumphantin Baltimore. In early August the relentless and intrepid editors of the Federal-Republican mailed their paperto subscribersin Baltimore.What AlexanderContee Hanson failed to do was now left to the government. Again the mob threatened.This time, however, the authoritiesmoved quickly and exhibited a new willingness to use force. On August 4, without even pausing to get the requisitemagistrates' signaturesl General Strickerordered out the militia, which reportedin strength.Contrary to the fears of the Republicanleaders, there was no mutiny of the militia that night and a chargeby two members of a troop of horse was enough to send the mob on its heels. For six nights thereafterthe militiawas calledout to guardthe Post OfE1ce.Baltimore had had enough of mobs and on one of those nights as many as seven hundred men were in uniform.53That the old techniques of riot control, using personal appeal and conciliation, were now abandoned was further indicated when several ringleadersof the "massacre" were arresteda few weeks later. Once again the mob seemed readyto strike, only now with the aim of setting the prisonersfree. Several companies of the militia were orderedout and artillerywas placedin the hall of the prison.54The barrelof a cannon proved to be a far more effective deterrent to mob action than the entreatiesof an unarmedmayor. The mob yielded under the show of force and its powerwaned Although the viciousness of the Baltimoreriots burnta deep markof infamyon the conscience of America, so deep that twenty years later Alexis de Tocqueville would hear of the riots on his visit to America and for generations Baltimore would be known as a "mobtown," the summer of 1812 marks no irreversible breakwith the past.55Mobs would still occasionallybe raised in the spiritof the Anglo-American riot tradition as whole communities attempted to pure themselves of undesirables,be they abolitionists grain hoarders,or criminals.6 Yet the Baltimore riots of 1812 are an importantbenchmark in the history of American populardisorder because they suggest the outlines of a new trend of THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 557 rioting in which the larger community was divided into warring factions of competing sub-communitiesand because they presagethe intense racial, ethnic, and class conflicts of Jacksonian America.s7Compressed in the shift from the organizedand workmanlikedestruction of the ofElceof the Federal-Repulicanin June to the near anarchicand brutal"massacre' at the jailhouse is an example of the disintegration of the traditional Anglo-American mob behavior and the emergence of a new form of rioting representativeof the heterogeneous and confused democratic society. As the mob moved from objects which were disapprovedby the entire community to objects detested by only one segment of the communitynew tensions within society were exposed-in Baltimorethis was shown by the attacks on blacks, Irishmen and grain ships. Furthermore,these same tensions could be expressed with an added vehemence and savagery,as in the 'imassacre" at the jailhouse, which was unlike anything ever experienced under the old norms of the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.Yet even at-its most violent the mob retained a purposefulnessin its action, revealed in the demand that the Federalists symbolicallysurrender their lives, wealth, and prestige or suffer death at the hands of the mob. The Republicanelite did not recognize this purposefulness;they only saw a bloodthirstymob severing its unwrittencontract with the elite and offeringan unprecedentedchallenge to the social order.All that the elite city ofElcialscould do was to slowly react to this challenge, hesitating because they were loath to give up the deferentialperquisites they had enjoyedfor so long. With this failureof the old informalmeans of social control the mob denied all paternalisticauthority and asserteda new, purelydemocratic order of society.58In response the elite had to turn to its one remainingtool to controlsocial disorder- the use of force. But no longer did that force act as a mere bulwarkto the personal authority of the magistrate.Nor did that force represent the coercion of some outside power-as did the use of the militaryin the Shays' Whiskey, and Fries Rebellions. Rather the force used representeddivisions within the community. Most adult males in Baltimorein 1812 were in the militia and the failure of that militia to report for duty until after the 4'massacre" as well as the presence of some militia men in the crowdon CharlesStreet, indicatesthat there was a broad level of support for the mobwsactivities up to the fateful night at the jailhouse. However, after the 'imassacre' that support was no longer so widespread.By musteringto defend the Post OfElcein August one segment of Baltimoreshowed that the consensus behind the mob had ended. Battle lines were drawn,loyalties tested, and luckily for Baltimore, the mob was sufficiently cowed by men in uniformthat furtherbloodshed was avoided. Under the old Anglo-Americanmob traditionit was assumed that the entire communityshared certain basic values and could agree on when the "laws of the land must sleep." Now, however, the bloodstained halls of the Baltimore jailhouse stood as a gruesome testament to the variety of meaning a diverse and complicatedsociety could have for the "laws of nature and reason." As a result the mob lost whateverlegitimacy it may have once had in the eyes of the elite. The trend towards condemnation of "politics out of doors' became even more evident as the nineteenth centurywore on. Rioting, which occurredmore often in the earlynational period than is generallyrealized, became a majorsocial problem by the Jacksonianera and was an importantimpetus behind the formation of urbanpolice forces.S9As the elitess attitudetowards the mob hardenedthere was an increasedwillingness to use force to supressany disturbance,and the historyof the nineteenth centuryis marredby a continualchronicle of bloody head-to-head combatbetween the militaryand the mob.60 558 journalof social history In the wake of the Baltimorerioting in 1812 a few observers recognized that there had been some greatchanges in society. George WashingtonParke Custis, a Federalistspokesman, gave the funeraloration for the martyredGeneral Lingan. In the "good old Federalist times," declaredCustis, no one would have dared touch Lingan, and his venerablepresence along would have been enough to hold back the mob. Those halcyon days were now gone, and Custis cautioned, soon every city would have its own Baltimoremob.61

Brown UniversiW Paul A. Gilje

FOOTNOTES 1. Some historians reject the term "mob" and prefer the less perjorative "crowd." However, "mob" has been used here beeause it is what is found in the sourees. "Crowd" seldom appearsin the primarymaterial and when it does it ordinarilyrefers to spectators watching riot aetivity. "Mobs," on the other hand, were the perpetratorsof the riot. Furthermore,"mob" was also used as a generalslur and tag wordfor the lowerelasses. This ambiguitysuggests that the elite not only mistrustedthe lower classes but feared them as well. For interestingdiseussions on the definition of "mob' see: WilliamAnders Smith "Anglo-AmerieanSoeiety and the Mob" (Ph.D. diss., ClaremontGraduate Sehool, 1965) 10-12; and George Rude, "The London SMob'of the EighteenthCentury,1' in Parisand Londonin theEighteenth Century: Studies in Popu/arProtest (, 1971), 293-318.

2. This is but a briefsummary of a complex body of literature.The mainworks include: E.P. Thompson, 'iThe MoralEeonomy of the EnglishCrowd," Past and Present,51 (1971), 76- 136; Thompson, "PatrieianSoeiety, PlebianCulture," Journalof SocialHistory, 7 (1974), 382-405;Thompson, "Eighteenth-eenturyEnglish Society: Class StruggleWithout Class," SocialfiIistory, 3 (1978), 133-165;George Rude, TheCrowd in History:A Studyin Franceand England,1730-1848 (New York, 1964); R.B. Rose, "EighteenthCentury Priee Riots and Publie Policy in England," InternationalReview of Social History,6 (1961), 277-292; John Brewer,Part Ideologyand PopularPolitics at theAccession of GeorgeIII (Cambridge,1976) PartIII; PaulineMaier, FromResistance to Revolution:Colonia/ Radicals and theDevelopment of AmericanOpposition to Britain,1765-1776 (New York, 1972), 3-48; Gordon S. Wood, "A Note on the Mobs in the AmerieanRevolution," Williamand ANaryQuarterly, 3d Ser., 23 (1966), 635-642; John Philip Reid, 'iIn a Defensive Rage: The Use of the Mob, the Justifieationin Lawand the Comingof the AmerieanRevolution," New YorkUniversiw Law Review,49 (1974), 1043-1091;Smith, "Anglo-AmerieanSoeiety and the Mob;" and Charles Tilly, "Colleetive Violenee in EuropeanPerspeetive," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted RobertGurr, eds., TheAlistory of Violencein America:Historical and ComparativePerspectives (New York, 1969), 4-45.

3. Thompson,'iMoral Economy," 76-136.

4. Maier,Resistance, passim. 5. The elite viewed riot as a "calamityto be avoided if at all possible.'7Thompson, "Moral Economy,"98, 120-126.

6. E.P. Thompson emphasizes the differeneesbetween what he calls patrieiansoeiety anck plebianeulture in two reeentartieles on eighteentheentury England. Although he fallsshort of eallingthis a elass alignment1he does assert "The mob may not have been noted for an impeeeableeonseiousness of elass; but the rulersof Englandwere in no doubt at all that it [the mob] was a horizontal sort of beast." Thompson also points out that the gentry tolerated mobs as a part of the priee they paid for a limited monarehyand weak state. "PatrieianSoeiety, PlebianCulture" 397; and i'Eighteenth-eenturyEnglish Soeiety," 145. THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 559

7. Some historianshave stressed the differencesbetween the aims of the elite and the aims of the people in the riots leading up to the American Revolution. Jesse Lemisch, i;The AmericanRevolution Seen From the Bottom Up" in BartonBernstein, ed., Towardsa New Past:Dissenting Essays in AmericanHistory (New York, 1968), 3-45; Lemisch, "JackTar in the Streets:Merchant Seamen in the Politicsof RevolutionaryAmerica," WilliamandMaly Quarterly,3d Ser., 25 (1968), 371-407; Dirk Hoerder, Peopleand Mobs: CrowdAction in MassachusettsDuringtheAmericanRevolution,1765-1780(Berlin,1971);Hoerder,"Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776," in Alfred Young, ed., TheAmerican Revolution: Explorationsin the Historyof AmericanRadicalism (DeKalb, Ill., 1976), 233-271; Hoerder, "'Mobs, A Sort of Them at Least, Are Constitutional;'The AmericanRevolution, Popular Participation,and SocialCharge," AmerikastudienJAmerican Studies, 21 (1976), 289-306.

8. Of course the original English Riot Act of 1715 was intended to strengthen the magistrate'shand by makingriot a felony and allowingthe use of coercionwithout liability. Yet Englishsensibilities dictated restraining the use of force with the odd resultof giving the mob an hour of unmolested freedom after the Riot Act was read. The justice, however, could use that hour to persuadethe mob to disperse, that is if he wantedto limit the mob's activityt with the Riot Act and threat of force acting only as an added rationalefor his influence over the mob. On the origins of the Riot Act see Max Beloff, PublicOrder and PopularDisturbance, I660-1714 (London, 1938), 136-137.

9. Maierz Resistance,16-20; Thompson, "PatricianSociety, Plebian Culture," 403-405; David R. Johnson, Policingthe UrbanUnderworld: The Impact of Crimeon theDeveJopment of theAmericanPolice,1800-1887(, 1979),13-14.

10. Furthermoreza magistratesor anyone who would supporthim, might himself be liable to a suit or criminalcharges if excess forcewere used. Maier, Resistance,19.

11. Thompson,'iMoral Economy," 121-126

12. Thompson,4 'Patrician Society PlebianCulture, 't 404-405.

13. Two articles on the Baltimoreriots have recently appeared.Frank A. CassellS"The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812," MarylandHistorical Magazine, 70 (1975), 241-258, concentrateson the politicalcontlict and the apparentbreakdown of democracy.Donald R. Hickey, "The Darker Side of Democracy: The Baltimore Riots of 1812," Maryland Afistorian,7 (1976), 1-20, is more concernedwith the threatposed to the libertyof the press. Both echo earlierinterpretationsv Alexis de Tocquevilleused the riotsas a i'strikingexample of the excesses to whichdespotism of the majoritymay lead,5'J.P. Mayerzed., Democracyin America(Garden City, N.Y., 1969), 252 fn. HenryAdams emphasizedthe politicalconflict in his Historyof the UnitedStates of America:During the First Administration of JamesMadison, VI (New York, 1931) 405-408. Gelnn Tucker, Poltroonsand Patriots:A PopularAccount of the Warof 1812 (New York, 1954), 136-144,focuses on the freedomof the pressissue. See also RichardBuel, Jr., Securingthe Revolution:Ideolog in AmericanPolitics, 1789-1815 (Ithaca, 1972), 286-288; and David HackettFischer, TheRevolution of AmericanConservarism: The FederalistParw in theEra of JeffersonianDemocracy (New York, 1965), 156-158.

14. Reportof the Committeeof Grievances. . . on theSubject of theRecent Riots in theCity of BaltimoresTogether with the Depositions takenfor the Committee (Annapolis, 1813)l 1-2.

15 AnnapolisMaryland Republican, July 1, 1812.William Gwyn an eye witnessconfirms this impression,"The work of the destructionwas performedwith great regularityand but little noise." Report. . ., 21. See also AnnapolisMaryland Gazette July 2 1812; and John Howard Payne to Virgil Maxcyl June 24, 1812, Yol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-MarkoeMss., Libraryof Congress. journalof social history 560 alone. He was almostalways accompanied by a group 16.Johnson seldom confronteda mob his as an informalposse comitatus and bolstered both of"gentlemen" friends who acted before position.The mayor recognizedthis and told an acquaintance, offlcialand unofficial by only a few friendsat to stop a laterdisturbance, that "if he could be supported attempting able to prevent mischief." Report. . .. thecommencement . . . Iof a riot] he might be 161. John Scott also made a futile Report. . ., 242, 160-161, 199, 336, 344-345. Iudge 17. 153-154. attemptto influence the mob. Report. . ., 119-120, in politics see William B. Wheeler, iiUrban Politics 18.For Johnson's role in Baltimore Cities in the Development of Political Parties in the Seaport Nature'sRepublic: The WilburH. Hunter, diss., Universityof ,1967), 168-169;and FederalistEra" (Ph.D. Anthem," American War:Its Gallant Defence producedAmerica's National i'Baltimore's politicssee Wheeler, "Urban Heritage3 (1952), 31. For the generalstructure of Baltimore's Battles and Beginnings in Maryland" Politics,"144-120; Dorothy Marie Brown, "Party Loverly Verstandig,"The Emergenceof (Ph.D.diss., GeorgetownUniversity, 1961); Lee (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1970); J.R. Poleo theTwo Party System in Maryland" Maryland and Election Statistics in Maryland, 1790-1812," "ConstitutionalReform Structureof Baltimore's A{agazine,55 (1960) 275-292; Frank A. Cassell, "The Historical Land, et al., eds.7 Law, Societ, the Age of Jefferson, 1795-1812,"in AubreyC. Politicsin L. Marx Renzulli, Jr., Matyland, andPolitics in EarlyMaryland (Baltimore, 1977), 277-296; N.J., 1972); Whitman H. Ridgeway, i'Community TheFederalist Years(Rutherford, Historical During the First and Second Party System," A8aryland Leadership:Baltimore Federalist Revivalb1808- Magazine71 (1976), 334-349; and Victor Sapio, iiMaryland's 1812,"ANarylandHistoricalMagazine64 (1969), 1-17. had strict laws imposing heavy The terrapinshell was to be used because Maryland 19. 292-296, 321-324;and New YorkEvening penaltiesfor tar and feathering.Report . . . , 174, Post,July 13, 1812.

20. Report. . . , 161, 326-327. to Maxcy, June 24, 1812, Vol. 31 21. Report. . ., 3, 63-65 161-164, 222; and Payne Galloway-Maxcy-MarkoeMss., Libraryof Congress. between the elite examines the role of theater and counter-theater 22. E.P. Thompson Culture," 382-405; and and the mob (plebs). "PatricianSocietys Plebian (patricians) . . . , 161-164,300-320. "Eighteenth-centuryEnglish Society, " 133-165.Report Isaac, 'iDramatizingthe Ideology The term "oral dramaturgicalprocess" is from Rhys 23. to 1776," Wil/iamand Mary Qtlarterly, of Revolution:Popular Mobilization in Virginia,1774 3d Ser., 32 (1976), 357-385. of a Community" (Ph.D. Rankin Clark, "Baltimore, 1729-1829:The Genesis 24. Denis P. Gould, "EconomicCauses of The CatholicUniversity of America, 1976);Clarence diss., Presentedto CharlesMclean Andrews by the Rise of Baltimore,"in Essaysin ColonialHistozy 225-231; RichardM. Bernard,'iA Portraitof Baltimore: his Students(New Haven, 1931), Historical Pattern in an Early American City," Maryland Economic and Occupational and Baltimore,1790-1840: A A{agazine,69 (1974), 341-361;Jane N. Garret, "Philadelphia HistoricalA6agazine, 55 (1960) 1-13; James S. Study of Intra-RegionalUnity," lWaryland in Richard Development, Socialand CulturalChanges, 1800-1850," Van Ness, i'Economic 1974), 156-238. Walsh,etal., eds., Maryland,A History1632-1974 (Baltimore, of ArtisanProduction in Baltimore. CharlesG. Steffen, "Changesin the Organization 25. 36 (1979), 101-117. 1790to 1820," Williamand MaryQuarterly, 3d Ser. THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 561

26. Report. . ., 3, 149, 160-163, 23; David Hoffman to Maxcy, July 11, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-MarkoeMss., Libraryof Congress.

27. Report. . . , 169, 177, 200, 203.

28. New YorkEveningBost,July 13,1812; New YorkSpectator,July 15,1812; Report... 50-51,243, 254, 346-347.

29. Report. . ., 22-24, 97, 160-162, 337. The militiawas called out to protectthe African church,but there was no recordedclash or confrontationwith the mob. Report. . ., 3, 149.

30. For Hansons background see Joseph Herman Schauinger, "Alexander Contee Hanson, FederalistPartisan," Maryland Historical Magazine, 35 (1940), 354-364.

31. Report. . . , 3-4; Niles' WeeklyRegister (Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812; GeorgetownFederal- Republican,July 27, 1812.

32. Report . . ., 5; A.C. Hanson to , July 24, 1812, Harper- PenningtonCollection, MarylandHistorical Society; An Exactand AuthenticNarrative of the EventsWhich Took Place In Baltimore,on the 27th and 28th of JulyLast} Carefully Collected From Some °S the Sufferersand Eyewitnessess. . . (n.p., 1812); Grace Overmyer, "The BaltimoreMobs and John HowardPayne,s' MaClandHistorical Magazinen 58 (1963), 54-61.

33. Report. . ., 56, 282-284, 303-306; Henry Lee, CorrectAccount °S tE7eBaltimore lWob (Winchester,1814), 6-8; An Exactand AtlthenticNarrative . . ., 6-10; Niles' WeeklyRegister (Baltimore)Aug. 8, 1812.

34. Report . . ., 25, 230-232, 257-260, 279-280, 308; Jacob Wagner to Alexander C. MagrlldersDec. 3, 1812, from Executive Archives, printedin "BaltimoreRiot of 1812," ANarylandHistorical Magazine, 5 (1910), 191.

35. Report. . . 260.

36. A list of the Hussarsand Chausseursof the Baltimoremilitia for 1814was examinedand the names there checked for occupationsin the city directory.Of the 81 Hussarsonly 32 were not listed.Of the 49 names in the directory,27 were listed as merchants.A numberof others had positions like ';cashier of the city," "masonic lottery ofElce" "atty-at-lawts' i;Presidentof the Levy Courtand a J.P ," etc. Some had only theiraddress listed, suggesting that they were men of means without an occupation.There were very few tradesmen In contrast, the 47 Chausseurs were less likely to be listed-only 23 were found in the directory.Other than the officers, a few of whom were merchants,the companyhad more mundaneoccupations like those listed in the text. A list of the Baltimoremilitia by company can be found in The CitizenSoldiers at NorffiPoint and FortA6cHenry, September 12 & 13 (Baltimores1889); the directoryused was John Lakin, TheBaltimore Directory and Register for 1814-1815: Containingthe Names, Residence and Occupationsof the Citizens . . . (Baltimore,1814). 37. Report. . ., 27, 150-151, 192-197,211-213, 235-236, 260-272, 316, 320, 339-343;Lee, CorrectAccount . . ., 8-12; An Exact and AuthenticNarrative . . ., 10-13; Niles' Weekly Register(Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812.

38. Report. . ., 288-289, 312-313. Criminals at this time were executed from a cart. ThomasW. GrifElth,Annals of Baltimore(Baltimore, 1829?), 227. journalof social history 562 in the Charles Federalistswere taken into custody.Many others had been 39.Twenty-three nightor had been sent out fortressthat night but eitherescaped some time duringthe Street "The Baltimore Mobst'' 191; tocontact city officials or reconnoiter. Overmyer, Report. . . , 16-18,259, 282-284. 317; An Exact and Authentic 40.Report . . ., 118, 191, 211-212, 224-225, 305, Narrative. . ., 14-16.

41.Report . . . , 79, 165-166.

42.Report . . ., 259-260. Aug. 8a 1812; 43.Report . . ., 132, 135, 227-228, 290; Niles' WeeklyRegister(Baltimore), Phi/adelphiaPoulson 's American Daily Advertiser, July 30, 1812.

44.Report . . . , 170, 48, 190. Narrative. . . , 27-35?60-62, Niles' 45.Report . . . , 7-8) 28, 171; An Exactsnd Authentic WeeklyRegister(Baltimore),Aug. 8, 1812. (Philadelphia,1812), 55-59. 46.Interesting Papers Illustrative of theRecent Riots at Baltimore in the religious Davis remindsus that even in the most extremecases, as 47.Natalie Zemon symbolicmeaning studied, "crowdsdo not act in a mindlessway." There is violenceshe has Religious Riot in form and occasion of that violence. "The Rites of Violence: behindthe especially91. Sixteenth-CenturyFrance," Pastand Present59 (1973), 51-91, in Marylandknown for its Montgomerycounty was an importantFederalist center 48. Report. . . , 275, 295. aristocraticgentry. It was also the countyHanson lived in. and feathered, as well as John Thomson, who was taken from the jailhouse, tarred 49. further maltreatment. After the tortured, claimed to have feigned death to escape Peregrine WarF1eld,Charles Kilgour, Hall, and Hanson all "massacre"Henry Nelson, senses" in which they asserted that they "perfectlyretained their signeda joint statement of life. or and that "they sustained without betrayingany signs throughoutthe ordeal that were inflictedon their butchers with a groan or murmer, all the tortures gratifying . . ., 29-30. them." InterestingRapers. . ., 45; AnExactandAuthenticNarrative personally but could not At least one member of the mob said he knew Hanson 50. Narrative. . . a 30. recognizehim amongthe "corpses."A n Exactand Authentic . . ., 28. 51. Report. . ., 7-8, 294-295;AnExactandAathenticNarrative Aug. 3, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway- 52. Report. . ., 29, 251; WilliamLansdale to Maxcy, of Congress;Philadelphia Poulson s AmericanDaily Advertiser, Maxcy-MarkoeMss., Library against the YorkEvening Post, July 31, and Aug. 1, 1812. Meetings July 30, 1812, New Boston, and other were held in several Marylandcounties, , Baltimoremob castigatingHanson et InterestingPapers . . ., 66-80. For typicalRepublic reaction, places. brutality,see AnnapolisA8aryland al. for provoking the mob while deploring the mob's Republican,July 29, Aug. S, 12, 1812. Pringleto RobertSmith, Aug. 5, 53. Report. . ., 8-9, 155-159, 171, 177, 200-201; Mark 1812, Letterbookof MarkPringle, Maryland Historical Society. 54. Report. . . , 9, 216-217. THE BALTIMORERIOTS OF 1812 563

55. De Tocqueville, Mayer, ed., Democracyin America,252 fn. Of course Baltimorewould have plentyof other riots in the nineteenthcentury to reinforcethe epithetof "mobtown," but as J. Thomas Scharfpoints out, the riots in 1812 were "the chief cause of the evil repute into which Baltimorefell." Historyof BaltimoreCiS and Count Fromthe Earliest Period to the PresentDay: IncludingBiographical Sketches of theirRepresentative Men (Philadelphia,1881), 780-781;see also FrancisF. Bierne, TheAmiableBaltimoreans(New York, 1951), 142-155.

56. A number of anti-abolitionistriots were apparentlyin the spirit of this tradition.The flour riots of New York City in 1837 and the 1863 bread riot in Richmond, Virginiaalso seem to fit this model, while the long vigilantetradition in Americais probablyderived from the Anglo-Americanmob tradition.Leonard Richards, "Gentlemen of ProperSand Standing:" Anti-AbolitionMobs in JacksonianAmerica (New York, 1970); Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace,eds., AmericanViolence: A DocumentaryAfistory (New York, 1970), 126- 129; WilliamJ. Kimball,"The BreadRiot in Richmond, 1863," Civil WarHistoly 7 (1961), 149-154;Richard Maxwell Brown, Strainof Violence:Historical Studies of AmericanViolence and Vigilantism(NewYork, 1975).

57. The bulk of riotingin the nineteenthcentury appears to be of this type. Recent workson Jacksonian rioting which emphasize racial, ethnic, and class divisions include: Michael Feldberg, "Urbanizationas a Cause of Violence:Philadelphia as a Test Case," in Allen F. Davis and MarkH. Haller, eds., ThePeoples of Philadelphia:A Historyof EthnicGroups and Lower Class Life, 1790-1940 (Philadelphia, 1973), 53-69; Feldberg, "The Crowd in Philadelphia History: A Comparative Perspective," Labor History15 (1974), 323-336; Feldberg, ThePhiladelphia Riots of 1844:A Studyin EthnicConf7ict (Westport, Conn., 1975); David Grimsted, "Rioting in its JacksonianSetting," AmericanHistorical Review77 (1972), 361-397;Theodore K. Hammet, "Two Mobs of JacksonianBoston: Ideology and Interest," Journalof AmericanlAistory62 (1976), 845-868;Vincent P. Lannieand BernardC. Diethorn, "For the Honor and Glory of God: The PhiladelphiaBible Riots of 1840," Histoty °S EducationQuarterly 8 (1968), 44-106; Bruce Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs in Southwark:the 1840's' in Davis and Haller, eds., Peoplesof Philadelphia,71-87; David Montgomery,"The Shuttle and the Cross:Weavers and Artisansin the KennsingtonRiots of 1844," Journalof Social Afistoly,5 (1972), 187-218; John Charles Schneider, "Mob Violence and PublicOrder in the AmericanCity, 1830-1865" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1971); Schneider,"Urbanization and the Maintenanceof Order:Detroit, 1824- 1847," MichiganHistory 60 (1976), 260-281; Paul Weinbaum, "Temperance,Politics, and the New YorkCity Riots of 1857," New YorkHistorical Society QuarterlyS9 (1975), 246-270.

58. There is some evidence suggestingthat even the membershipof the mob was changed over the course of the summer.The men arrestedin the fall of 1812 for participatingin the destructionof the Federal-Republicanoffice (N-11) were recruitedfrom a wide spectrumof society, includinga keeper of baths worth over $1000, a grocer worth $133, three artisans an unpropertieddruggist and his son, some journeymen, a drummerin the army, a sailor from a privateer,and a numberof unidentifiedothers. The men triedwith the CharlesStreet riot (N= 16) includeda few less men of middlingproperty and a numberof journeymen.At the "massacre," however, none of those charged with the murder of General Lingan (N= 16) seem to have been artisansor men with property.Those chargedwith the tar and feathering of John Thomson (N=12), which occurred the night of the "massacre," includeda few men who had some property:the same keeperof bathslisted above, a grocer worth $255, and a cooper worth $90. There were also a number of unpropertiedand unidentifiedindividuals. Thus, despitethe overlappingof one or two persons,there seems to be a generalshift towarda mob composedof journeymenand the unpropertied. In each phase of the riot only about half of the men named in the court dockets could be reasonablyidentifled using directories.A tradesmanwas considereda journeymanif he had less than $100 of taxableproperty or if he was not listed in the tax recordsat all. There were others arrestedfor variousintermediate disturbances between the destructionof the Federal- Republicanoffice and the "massacre."See BaltimoreCourt of Oyerand TerminerDockets, 564 journalof social history

July and SeptemberTems, 1812, MarylandHall of Records, Annapolis,William Fry, rhe BaltimoreDirectoryforl810. . . (Baltimore,1810), Fry, Fry'sBaltimoreDirectorFortheYear 1812 . . . (Baltimore, 1812); James Lakin, TheBaltimore Directory and Register,for 1814- 1815 . . . (Baltimore,1814); BaltimoreCity Assessment Records, 1813, BaltimoreBureau of Archives.

59. My researchon populardisorder in the early nationalperiod has revealed nearly 200 instancesof riot between 1793and 1829 in New YorkCity alone. PaulA. Gilje, 'iMobocracy: Popular Disturbances in Post-Revolutionary New York City 1783-1829" (Ph.D. diss. BrownUniversity, forthcoming). For the developmentof Americanpolice see: RogerLane Policingthe City:Boston, 1822-1885(Cambridge, Mass., 1967), James F. Richardson, The New YorkPolice: ColonialTimes to 1901 (New York, 1970); Wilbur R. Miller, Cops and Bobbies:Police Authorit in New Yorkand Londonl1830-1870 (, 1977), 3Ohnson Po1icingthe UrbanUnderworld.

60. Frederick T. Wilson, FederalA id in DomesticDisturbances, 1 787-1903 (Washington D.C., 1903); Robert Rheinders, "Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth Century America," Journalof AmericanStudies 11 (1977), 81-101.Ultimately the trend impliedin the last stages of the Baltimoreriots is seen most starklyin the great draft riots of New York City, 1863, in which the riotersand the militaryfought pitchedbattles in the streets. For a nineteenth-centuryview of that and other disturbancessee Joel Tyler Headley, TheGreat Riots of New York,1712-1873. Introduction by Thomas Rose and James Rodgers (New York, 1970;originally published 1873). The best modernaccount of the draftriots is Adrian Cook, TheArmies of theStreets: The New YorkCity Draft Riots of 1863(Lexington, , 1974).

61. George WashingtonParke Custis, Orationby Custis . . . withan Accountof theFuneral So/emnitiesinhonor of . . . Lingan(Washington, D.C. 1812), 13, 18-20.