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2014 A historical and legal study of sovereignty in the Canadian north : terrestrial sovereignty, 1870–1939

Smith, Gordon W.

University of Calgary Press

"A historical and legal study of sovereignty in the Canadian north : terrestrial sovereignty, 1870–1939", Gordon W. Smith; edited by P. Whitney Lackenbauer. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta, 2014 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/50251 book http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH: TERRESTRIAL SOVEREIGNTY, 1870–1939 By Gordon W. Smith, Edited by P. Whitney Lackenbauer

ISBN 978-1-55238-774-0

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Acknowledgement: We acknowledge the wording around open access used by Australian publisher, re.press, and thank them for giving us permission to adapt their wording to our policy http://www.re-press.org 10 215 Danish Sovereignt y, Greenland, and t he Ellesmere Island Affair of 1919–21

After the hiatus of inactivity during and just after the First World War, Canadian activity in the North was resumed in circumstances of stress and concern somewhat comparable to those that had existed when the Canadian government first took genuine steps to bring these regions under control about the turn of the century. Now, the causes of worry were such problems as the ultimate fate of Danish Greenland; the apparent disinclination of Denmark to recognize Canadian sover- eignty over Ellesmere Island; the international status of the so-called Sverdrup Islands, which had been discovered by this Norwegian explorer during his expedition of 1898–1902; the evident need for Canada to take at least some steps towards occupation and use of her claimed territories in the North generally; the exciting prospect of air travel and transport in and across the Arctic and all that this implied for Canada; and perhaps most important of all, the brooding, restless figure of the explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson, now an ambitious celebrity, and his determined agitation and planning for northern development (discussed in the previous chapter). The story of how Canadian authorities responded to and tried to solve these problems occupied centre stage through most of the following twenty years.

Danish Sovereignty over Greenland and Canadian Interests

The first major problem in the North to engage the attention of the Canadian government at this time was the question of what should happen to Greenland if Denmark should ever decide to dis- pose of it. The old Norse settlements in Greenland, which were established by Norwegian-Icelandic sea voyagers some years after their discovery of the island around 900 AD, were first independent, then fell under the sovereignty of the Norwegian Crown about 1260 AD, and then became subject to the union of Scandinavian states formalized by the Treaty of Kalmar in 1397. Contact with the Old World was gradually lost, and the settlements mysteriously disappeared in the early fif- teenth century. Communications were re-established some years after the Columbian discovery of America; in 1721, the Norwegian pastor Hans Egede started a new colony, which soon was taken over by what was left of the Scandinavian union. By the Treaty of Kiel in 1814, the monarch of Denmark-Norway was obliged to cede Norway to bear out the contention, went on: “It is ob- to Sweden, but he managed to retain Greenland, viously in the interest of the Empire that no along with Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.1 additional territory should be acquired by the During the later nineteenth and early twenti- United States in or adjacent to the north half of eth centuries, Denmark gradually extended its the continent of North America.” Noting that activity and control in Greenland and then, an American attempt some years earlier to pur- 216 starting with a request to the United States in chase the Danish West Indies had been frus- 1915, set about securing formal recognition of trated when the Danish Landstinget (the upper its title in the island from the interested states. house of its legislature) refused to confirm the There was some uncertainty, however, whether agreement that had been made, and that Amer- Denmark was asking for general acknowledg- ican whalers and fishermen were active in the ment of her sovereignty over all of Greenland waters west of Greenland, the memo speculat- or of her right to extend her sovereignty over ed that the United States might try to acquire all of it. This later became a major issue, espe- Greenland. Canada was willing to purchase cially in the dispute with Norway over Eastern the island, however, and Laurier suggested that Greenland (see chapter 13).2 the British authorities ascertain confidentially When Denmark ceded the Danish West whether the Danish government would agree Indies in the Caribbean to the United States by to a British acquisition of Greenland for and at a treaty on 4 August 1916, the treaty had ap- the expense of Canada. pended to it an official declaration by American At the instance of the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the effect matter was brought up in Copenhagen by Sir that “the Government of the United States of Edward Goschen, His Majesty’s Minister in America will not object to the Danish govern- Denmark, with negative results. Johan Henrik ment extending their political and economic Deuntzer, the Danish Foreign Minister, who interests to the whole of Greenland.”3 In 1920, had told Goschen that “Denmark would never similar declarations, essentially unqualified, dream of selling that territory” in the autumn were made by the French and Japanese govern- of 1903, now reiterated his former statement, ments.4 In 1920, Great Britain also recognized adding that “even if the Government wanted to Danish sovereignty over Greenland, but Brit- do so, it was certain that the country would not ain’s recognition was qualified and was preced- sanction such a sale.”5 ed by considerable negotiation. In 1917, the question of Greenland was dis- On 3 December 1903, Governor General cussed by a subcommittee of the Imperial War the Earl of Minto wrote to Colonial Secretary Cabinet. John Douglas Hazen, Canada’s Min- Alfred Lyttelton, enclosing a memorandum ister of Marine and Fisheries, had presented a which Prime Minister Laurier had handed him paper outlining and assessing the strategic im- that morning concerning “the proposal of the portance of the island. The report of the sub- Dominion Government to purchase Green- committee in April of that year stated: land.” The memo stated that “it has long been apparent to those who have noted the trend of events in the United States that the most popu- 1. That the position of Greenland lar policy in the Republic is the extension of makes the question of its terri- its territory” and, after citing certain evidence torial ownership a matter of great

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH importance to the British Em- with the Canadian view but feared that there pire as a whole and to Canada in would be considerable difficulty in getting particular. Denmark to make the desired commitment. Apart from that, Denmark would probably 2. It is extremely undesirable that inform the United States and France, which Greenland should pass out of the had already committed to recognize Danish hands of present owner into those rights in Greenland, and this would put the 217 of any other Power, even a friend- British government in “a somewhat invidious ly Power. position.” The two states mentioned could be 3. In the event of any possible sale sounded out in advance, but this might have or disposal of Danish territory in the unfortunate result of defeating Canadian 9 Greenland, we should have a prior wishes. claim to its acquisition, and at the Great Britain took the lead in opposing first favourable opportunity an Denmark’s wish to place the question of Green- undertaking should be secured land before the powers at the peace conference, from Denmark to this effect.6 on grounds that the delegates wanted to con- centrate on matters arising directly out of the 10 On 10 September 1919, Colonial Secretary war and settle them as quickly as possible. On Lord Milner sent a confidential telegram to 16 March 1920, the Danish government sent Canadian Governor General the Duke of a note to British Foreign Secretary Lord Cur- Devonshire, saying that the Danish govern- zon, saying that it had decided to submit the ment proposed to try to get general recogni- question to each of the principal powers separ- tion of Danish sovereignty over all Greenland ately. Accordingly, the Danes asked the British at the Paris peace conference. He asked for the government for official recognition of Danish Canadian ministers’ view in the matter, adding sovereignty over the whole of Greenland, which that he inferred from the evidence that they they said (apparently not recognizing the in- recognized in practice Danish sovereignty over consistency) might be given in the same form all Greenland.7 On 27 September, following that the American government used in Lan- 11 consultations among Canadian government sing’s declaration of 4 August 1916. Enclosed officials, Devonshire confirmed that Canada with the Danish note was a statement “showing had no claim to any portion of Greenland. The the principles according to which the colony of Canadian government adhered to the April Greenland is governed, which may prove of in- 1917 report of the subcommittee of the Imper- terest in dealing with the matter in question” ial War Cabinet, however, and considered that – but which, whether intentionally or not, con- recognition of Danish sovereignty throughout tained strong evidence that Denmark did not Greenland should be conditional on Denmark at the time consider that it had full sovereignty accepting the recommendations in the sub- over all Greenland: committee report.8 On 28 January 1920, the Colonial Office As already stated, since the be- sent word to the Duke of Devonshire that the ginning of the eighteenth century British government was “in full agreement” Denmark has founded colonies in Greenland. When it became known

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair 218

Figure 10-1: Map of Greenland showing routes of the various expeditions that had crossed the Greenland ice to 1915. Knud Rasmussen, “Report of the First Thule Expedition,” Meddelelser om Grønland 51:8 (1915): 285–340.

that there were Esquimaux beyond Danish explorers have visited the territories hitherto under ad- practically the whole of uninhabited ministration, such as Cape York, Greenland and made maps of the Danish missionary and commercial country, but no formal occupation enterprise was extended to those of the whole of Greenland has ac- localities, which were also formally tually taken place. In view of Danish taken possession of on behalf of the sentiments in this matter, as well Danish crown. as the interests of the Esquimaux

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH population, it would be desirable if sent a forthrightly worded note to Lord Curzon, the Danish Government could ex- insisting that Danish sovereignty over Green- tend its activity by proclaiming its land had never been questioned by any foreign sovereignty over the entire territory power; that what Denmark really asked for was of Greenland. “formal recognition of an existing status sanc- tioned by prescriptive right”; that Denmark’s On 19 May 1920, the Foreign Office sent conviction about the matter had already been 219 a reply to Danish minister Erik Wilhelm confirmed by recognition from France, Italy, Grevenkop-Castenskiold, saying that if the and Japan; and that Great Britain’s wish for a Danish government would grant the right of right of pre-emption (the way such qualifica- pre-emption to the British Empire in case Den- tion made) could therefore not be granted.15 In mark should ever wish to dispose of Green- these circumstances, Lord Milner wrote to the land, the British government would be willing Duke of Devonshire on 5 August advising that at once to recognize officially Danish sover- Canada accept Lord Curzon’s suggestion,16 and eignty over the island. The note added that the Devonshire cabled Canada’s acceptance on 20 governments of France, Italy, Japan, and the August.17 United States were being informed of the Brit- With the consent of Canada thus secured, ish attitude.12 the Foreign Office sent the following notice of As might have been expected, American official recognition to Grevenkop-Castenskiold officials opposed this British proposition. On 8 on 6 September 1920: June 1920, Ambassador John W. Davis wrote a note to Lord Curzon, informing him that the With reference to your note No. American government “is not disposed to rec- 202/30/B. 2, concerning the official ognize the existence in a third Government of recognition by His Majesty’s Gov- a right of pre-emption to acquire this territory ernment of His Danish Majesty’s if the Danish government should desire to dis- sovereignty over Greenland, which pose of it and accordingly reserves for future you were good enough to address to consideration what position it may take in the me on 20th July, I have the honour event of a specific proposal for such a trans- to inform you that His Majesty’s fer.”13 Lord Milner sent a copy of this note to Government recognize His Danish the Duke of Devonshire on 7 July, accompanied Majesty’s sovereignty over Green- by a suggestion from Lord Curzon to adopt “a land, but in view of its geographical less formal procedure” by merely notifying the proximity to the Dominion of Can- Danish government that “in the event of Den- ada, His Majesty’s Government must mark parting with the sovereignty over the ter- reserve their right to be consulted ritory, its acquisition by any third Power could should the Danish Government at not be recognized in view of its geographical any time contemplate the alienation proximity to the Dominion of Canada.”14 of this territory.18 It soon became apparent that Denmark her- self was no more inclined to recognize a Brit- Lord Curzon’s suggested reservation was not ish right of pre-emption than was the United followed in precise terms. Where he had rec- States. On 20 July, Grevenkop-Castenskiold ommended notifying the Danish government

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair that in the event of the alienation of Greenland strange and consequence-laden affair, which “its acquisition by any third Power could not started out as an attempt to stop the Greenland be recognized” by Great Britain, the note of Inuit from killing excessive numbers of musk- recognition adopted the stronger line that the ox on Ellesmere Island. On 11 July 1919, Harkin British government “must reserve their right to wrote the following letter to Deputy Minister be consulted” if Denmark contemplated such of the Interior William W. Cory: 220 alienation. The events summarized above brought I would recommend that a let- to an end any lingering questions and doubts ter along the lines indicated below about Canadian recognition of Danish sover- be sent to the Danish Government eignty in and throughout Greenland. Hence- from the Secretary of State for Ex- forth, Canada’s concern with Denmark in this ternal Affairs. It is understood that region was to be directed primarily to securing Mr. Dagaard Fensen, Direktoren for similar recognition from Denmark of Canada’s Styrelson of Koloniere, 1 Gronland, rights in Ellesmere Island and also to watching, Copenhagen Denmark, is the offi- as an interested observer, the developing dis- cial of the Danish Government who pute between Denmark and Norway over East- deals with these matters. ern Greenland. From reports that have been re- ceived here from Northern Canada, it is understood that as a result of the Vilhjalmur Stefansson and visits of Arctic explorers to Green- land and Ellesmere Land the Green- the Ellesmere Island Affair land Eskimos are now crossing to of 1919–21 Ellesmere Land more frequently than in the past for the purpose of killing One of the most important factors, and perhaps Musk ox. The Government of Can- the most important, in the revival of Canadian ada has created a closed season for concern about the North after the First World Musk ox throughout the Northwest War was the fear of Danish designs upon Elles- Territories of Canada and the Arctic mere Island and perhaps other Arctic islands Archipelago. This was found neces- claimed by Canada. It is not easy to date the sary because of the great decrease in precise beginning of this alarm, but it is appar- the number of these animals, even ent that the figure of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, in remote districts. Three marked as well as his campaign for the protection of copies of the Northwest Game Act, northern game animals and generally of Can- which applies to Ellesmere land are ada’s interests in the Arctic, looms large in the enclosed. background. The commission to investigate the This question was considered possibilities of raising large reindeer and musk- fully at a recent meeting of the Ad- ox herds in the Canadian North, detailed in the visory Board on Wild Life Protection previous chapter, is a case in point. Two mem- and it was decided at this meeting to bers of the commission, James Harkin and approach the Danish Government Stefansson, became much involved in a rather and request their co-operation in

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH the protection of the Musk ox on Ellesmere Land. In all probability a great deal of good could be done by having the authorities in Greenland acquaint the Greenland Eskimos with the provisions of the Canadian 19 Northwest Game Act. 221

Cory responded by writing a letter on 23 July to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Sir Joseph Pope, incorporating the substance of the above letter and making the same request. He also made the extraordinary suggestion that the Danish government should allow the Canadian government “to station such officers as may be necessary in Greenland for the pur- pose of protecting the Musk Ox of Ellesmere Land.”20 Governor General the Duke of Devon- shire sent the request to London in a dispatch on 31 July, which also formed the subject of Figure 10-2: W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister notes that Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon sent of the Interior and Commissioner of the to the Danish government on 27 August and 5 Northwest Territories, 1919-1931. William November. The Danish government conferred J. Topley / Library and Archives Canada / with the Administration of the Colonies in PA-167436. Greenland and then sent a reply to Curzon on 12 April 1920, which was transmitted to Ot- tawa on 26 April. Enclosed with the reply to Curzon was a statement by Knud Rasmussen, and since Inuit killed muskox mainly to obtain explorer and director of the Danish missionary their hides as substitutes for the more desirable and trade station at Thule, who had also been caribou hides, Rasmussen was already trying consulted by the Danish authorities. to remedy the situation by importing reindeer Rasmussen’s statement, written at Copen- hides from northern Europe. His statement hagen on 8 March, described Inuit traditional ended as follows: hunting of the muskox and reindeer (i.e., cari- bou) in both Ellesmere Island and northwestern As head of the Thule Station at Greenland, and the more destructive hunting Cape York I am convinced that it with firearms by modern expeditions (main- would be impossible without dis- ly American) to the extent that the caribou astrous consequences to prohibit in the region had been exterminated and the the hunting of the musk ox with- existence of the muskox was threatened. The in the immemorial hunting areas muskox herds were so large that there was no of the esquimaux unless effective immediate danger of extermination, however,

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair counter-balancing measures as above to carry out the protective measures indicated are previously introduced. indicated in this statement, I shall The havoc wrought by white men need no assistance whatever from should also be made good by them. the Canadian government.21 And it would be morally indefensible first to exterminate the reindeer and The reply of the Danish government contained 222 then to prohibit the hunting of the the following statement: musk ox. It is well known that the terri- The Government therefore sub- tory of the polar esquimaux falls mitted the matter to the director of within the region designated as “no the above mentioned Thule station, Man’s land” and there is therefore no Mr. Knud Rasmussen, who there- authority in the district except that upon has handed to the Administra- which I exercise through my station tion of the Colonies of Greenland a – an authority which I have hither- statement on the subject in which he to had no difficulty in maintaining comes to the conclusion that he will chiefly because the polar esquimaux, not need the assistance of the Can- when reasonably treated, adopt a adian Government in order to carry very rational attitude toward all de- out the protective measure indicated cisions which the station considers it in his statement. advisable to take. Having acquainted themselves The musk ox hunts have hither- with the statement in question my to only taken place in the months of Government think that they can March, April and May, during the subscribe to what Mr. Rasmussen remainder of the year these animals says therein and have instructed me are practically speaking protected, to submit a copy of it to His Britan- and it is to be hoped that it will not nic Majesty’s Government.22 be long before the station will be able to agree to their complete pro- Receipt of the Danish notes in Ottawa on tection, but this will not be feasible 11 May 192023 caused a worried reaction on for the reasons already given, before the part of Canadian authorities. By a rath- the quantity of hides needed by the er strange coincidence, Harkin had written a population can be provided from memo to Cory one week earlier, noting that elsewhere. no reply from the Danish government had as This plan should, it must be yet been received and suggesting that a further hoped, in consequence of the ar- letter be sent asking for one. His memo also al- rangements already made, be real- leged that Rasmussen had sent an expedition of ized within a few years. Greenland Inuit to Axel Heiberg Island to kill Fully conscious of the work muskox and to take furs.24 Harkin immediately which is ahead and of the respons- showed Rasmussen’s statement to Stefansson, ibility I assume, I venture to close who wrote a lengthy memorandum about it on with the observation that, in order 15 May, contradicting Rasmussen’s statement

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH that the danger of exterminating the muskox A short time after this, on 6 September, was not yet imminent and strongly suggesting Great Britain (with Canada’s approval) recog- that the Canadian government should assert nized Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. “very definite authority” over all the lands As noted above, Britain dropped her earlier to the west of Baffin Bay, Smith Sound, and demand for a right of pre-emption if Denmark Robeson Channel.25 On 16 June, Harkin wrote should ever decide to dispose of Greenland, a memorandum to Cory, which repeated and and claimed only the right to be consulted in 223 enlarged upon the substance of Stefansson’s this eventuality. Obviously, British recognition memorandum, ending with the following had been granted without getting any corres- recommendations: ponding Danish recognition of Canada’s rights either over Ellesmere Island in particular or It seems to me that Canada over the Arctic Archipelago in general, thus should in the first place take a very failing to ease Canadian worries. strong stand in regard to its exclu- In the meantime, Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s sive ownership of and authority over potent influence was felt behind the scenes. Ellesmere land; Stefansson did not believe in wasting time with That the Danish Government little fish if he could get the big ones to bite, and should be advised that a continuance at this time he was trying to hook Sir Robert of the slaughter of musk ox in Elles- Borden (who had just vacated the prime minis- mere land by Greenland Eskimos tership). On 29 September 1920, Borden wrote cannot be tolerated because it inevit- a confidential letter to his successor Meighen, ably will mean the early extermina- as follows: tion of the musk ox; That if Denmark will not im- Recently I have had some cor- mediately agree to entirely stop this respondence with Mr. V. Stefansson slaughter Canada should establish respecting the introduction to his ac- a Mounted Police post in Ellesmere count of the Arctic Expedition which land for the purpose of stopping the he has requested me to write. From slaughter and asserting Canadian one of his letters dated 6th Septem- authority.26 ber I extract the following: –

Cory incorporated Harkin’s recommenda- “The recognition of the value tions in a note to Sir Joseph Pope on 23 June of the islands north of Canada will and asked on behalf of his minister (Arthur come during the next fifty years as Meighen) “to have an appropriate communi- the recognition of the value of Alas- cation sent through the proper channels at ka has come during the last fifty. It once.”27 This was done by means of a dispatch has therefore been for me excellent from Governor General the Duke of Devon- fortune that the chance fell to me to shire to Colonial Secretary Lord Milner on 13 increase the land area of Canada by July, which repeated the recommendations and the addition of these islands. asked that the matter be brought to the atten- “Should the country, upon a fair tion of the Danish government.28 scrutiny of my work and an estimate

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair of the difficulties under which had to Ellesmere Island and the other [sic] to be done, consider me worthy islands in the vicinity of Greenland. of confidence, I should like to devote I want to urge the equal importance the next ten years, as I have the last of an occupation of Wrangel Island fourteen, to increasing our know- and an exploration of the ocean to ledge of the northern half of our the north. Ellesmere Island is already 224 country and to the possible increase valued enough by Denmark for her of its are [sic] by the discovery and to question our title, but nobody has exploration of further new lands.”29 as yet taken any steps with regard to Wrangel Island. A quiet occupation About a month later, on 3 November, Borden by us now will probably not bring wrote another confidential letter to Meighen, forth any protest for several years again quoting extensively from another letter and by then our title will be clear, from Stefansson, who on this occasion was especially in view of the fact that it more specific about what he thought should be is originally a British discovery and done: that the only people who have occu- pied it for any length of time were the In a recent letter from Mr. members of our expedition in 1914 Stefansson reference is made to the (they were there six months). importance of maintaining and There are two regions in which strengthening the claims of Can- there seems reasonable prospect of ada to which lands in the far North the discovery of new land. One is which in future years may have a to the north of Wrangel Island and much greater value than is apparent for this work Wrangel Island should at present. be used as a base. The other is to the northwest of Borden Island (First I extract from Mr. Stefansson’s Land, discovered by us in 1915). For letter the following: – exploration in this quarter a base should be maintained in Melville Is- “The signs are continually land. The domestication of the musk multiplying that other countries ox in Melville Island could well be are beginning to suspect there may undertaken in connection which be considerable economic value in [sic] such a scientific expedition and even the remotest lands. Any that without greatly increasing the ex- are hereafter discovered are sure to pense or complicating the program.” go to those who discover them, for with a clear realization of their value I feel that a good deal of import- a discovery is likely to be followed by ance should be attached to these ob- occupation. servations and that such steps as are It seems that there are many now reasonably necessary to attain the in Ottawa who see clearly the im- object suggested ought to be taken.30 portance of making good our claim

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH Stefansson wrote and spoke persistently in this was planning originally to come vein during these months, for the most part to up through, I do not know exact- senior government officials or to influential -pri ly where – I heard about it eight or vate figures whose co-operation and support he ten years ago. The plan then was wished to secure. Perhaps his most significant to explore the mainland of north performance came before the Advisory Tech- Greenland and the north coast of the nical Board, created by the Department of the mainland of Canada for purely sci- 225 Interior in June to deal with technical issues entific purposes, but they never got (including Arctic sovereignty and related prob- the funds for it and nothing seemed lems), in a special meeting on 1 October 1920.31 to happen but the country has been Evidently the meeting was called suddenly and branching out in commercial de- as a matter of great urgency; the chairman of velopment and they have a trading the board, Surveyor General Édouard-Gaston station on North Star Bay around 77° Deville, had received only verbal notification north latitude on the north coast of of it, and one of the principal members, Parks Greenland. They are being well sup- Commissioner James Harkin, knew nothing ported. The Company is semi-com- about it until three hours before it began.32 mercial, semi-patriotic and philan- Stefansson had an opportunity to present his thropic. Their aim is scientific as well case to this influential group, and he made the as a commercial profit. Now they most of the occasion. The minutes begin as have announced the final expedition follows: is going to cover a term of 5 years. They seem now to be going north Chairman – We have been told to Lancaster Sound. I will name all that you (Mr. Stefansson) were to these islands for you…. These are the speak to this Board so that the Board islands north of Lancaster Sound. might report to the Minister. This is what Mr. Harkin and I took Mr. Stefansson – Yes. up with the Commission, that these Chairman – Perhaps you might people were going to kill a lot of our explain to the Board what you wish muskox. They are trying, I believe, to to say. establish trading stations over there Mr. Stefansson – It starts with and colonize the country with Dan- Mr. Harkin and myself, we are both ish Eskimos from Greenland and members of the Reindeer and Musk- that meant the killing of muskox ox Commission. both for food and sale purposes. So, I am not sure exactly how it Mr. Harkin here, really knows better started but I found that the Danes than I – I think we sent a note over to are planning a scientific expedition them, the note was sent to the Secre- which is semi-commercial, to cover tary of External Affairs of Denmark, five years. Now that expedition was saying, that the muskox is an animal thought of years ago. It has been protected under the Game Laws and in the air that long. Mr. Rasmus- they must not kill them. Then, I be- sen is to be at the head of it and he lieve a reply came back, which I heard

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair directly from Mr. Rasmussen, he 1. Whether steps should be taken by wrote me in Danish, he said among the Government to secure Can- other things, “There is no question of adian title to those islands. our breaking Canadian Game Laws because we are not coming into Can- 2. If the Board is of opinion that ada but a part farther north. It is not such steps should be taken, then what should these steps be. 226 under Canadian jurisdiction”. I have heard since in his communication to 3. Report as to the advisability you (Mr. Harkin) he referred to it as of further exploration in those “No Man’s Land.” Northern Seas.35 Mr. Harkin – Yes, he did. Mr. Stefansson – It amounts to It was decided to refer these questions to a the same thing. It struck me right subcommittee of the board, which would in- away that anyone making claim to vestigate the whole matter and prepare a report that country will get ahead of us. We upon it. Those selected for the subcommittee have got a great deal of claim on it, were Deville, Harkin, and four others from but whether it will be recognized or the Department of the Interior: Dr. Otto Klotz, 33 not is another thing. Director of the Dominion Observatory and Chief Astronomer; Noel Ogilvie, Superintend- In his lengthy address, Stefansson summarized ent of the Geodetic Survey of Canada; F.C.C. both British and foreign exploration in the Arc- Lynch, Superintendent of the Natural Resour- tic islands, pointed out the vulnerability of the ces Intelligence Branch; and J. J. McArthur, Sverdrup Islands (which had been discovered Commissioner of the International Boundary by Norwegians and were unoccupied by any- Survey.36 one), and, disagreeing with the concept of the It would appear on the evidence that this sector principle, suggested that Canada might performance by Stefansson before the Advis- well claim the unoccupied Wrangel Island (see ory Technical Board, as well as the resultant chapter 11) and any new islands which could appointment of a subcommittee to consider the be discovered. He also implied, erroneously, issued he had raised, initiated the tangled skein that there were no treaty provisions between of events that followed. In any case, a great flur- the United States and Russia delimiting their ry of activity behind the scenes went on with- territories or rights in that region. out let-up for months. In the discussion that followed, Harkin The subcommittee submitted a brief pre- remarked that the main question was whether liminary report, with very little delay, on 13 Oc- it was worthwhile for Canada to establish her tober 1920, recommending “that the Govern- sovereignty over these northern islands, and ment should take effectual steps immediately 34 he expressed his own strong view that it was. to firmly establish the Sovereignty of Canada Finally Deville, as chairman, put into sum- with respect to the Northern Islands.” It added mary form the three main points upon which that it was preparing to submit a specific rec- the board had to report. They were as follows: ommendation as soon as possible “respecting the method of establishing such sovereignty.”37

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH considered premature: copies in the Canadian public archives contain notes on them, saying that the board’s memo was sent back to it on 16 October “for further attention” and that Cory’s memo was “not used.”38 Perhaps nonplussed for the moment, the Advisory Technical Board passed a resolution at its meeting on 20 Octo- 227 ber, authorizing its chairman to interview the Deputy Minister of the Interior regarding the proposed Arctic expedition.39 In the meantime, a continuing effort was being made to obtain as much information as possible about the Arctic islands and to consid- er all available evidence to meet what some of the board members considered an emergency situation. A technical, non-political report on Ellesmere Island completed on 13 October by Compiler of Geological Information Wyatt Malcolm was circulated,40 as was a larger, more detailed report on the Arctic islands general- ly that Malcolm completed on 6 November.41 Figure 10-3: J. B. Harkin, 1937. Yousuf Karsh / W. F. King’s 1905 Report on Canada’s title to the Library and Archives Canada / accession archipelago became urgent reading, and a sup- 1987-054 no. 12326. plement was prepared summarizing the work of both Canadian and foreign expeditions in the Arctic during the years since King’s docu- ment had appeared.42 A letter written by Knud Evidently acting on this recommendation, the Rasmussen to the Governor of Canada on 10 Advisory Technical Board sent Deputy Minis- August 1920, and signed for in his absence by ter Cory a draft memorandum to council on 15 an otherwise unidentified man named Carlail- October, authorizing the Minister of the Inter- lollr (who also wrote an accompanying letter ior to send an expedition to northern Canada on 15 September 1920), seemed to cause great and providing $100,000 to meet preliminary apprehension when it arrived in Canada. Ras- expenses. It considered that the total cost might mussen wrote the letter to say that he might not run to $200,000 or $250,000, but the $100,000 be able to accept an invitation to appear before would be sufficient to purchase or charter a the Reindeer-Muskox Commission, which had ship and provide crew and supplies. On the been holding hearings in Ottawa, but if unable same day, Cory composed a memorandum to to attend, he would share his views in writing. Cabinet incorporating the board’s recommen- On the face of it, this was innocent enough, dations, at the same time adding his strong but he gave, without explanation, a sudden and advice that “further explorations be carried unanticipated journey to northern Greenland on.” These recommendations must have been as his reason for not getting to Ottawa. Some

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair Canadian officials saw this emergency voyage about him, he was given a one-year contract on as cause for serious alarm.43 16 December 1920 to command the Arctic on a On 21 October, Harkin wrote a confiden- northern expedition.47) tial memorandum to Deputy Minister Cory on The whole problem was discussed in detail the subject of an urgent Canadian expedition at the seventeenth regular meeting of the Ad- to Ellesmere Island. He suggested three pos- visory Technical Board on 27 October. Deville 228 sible methods of getting there without waiting brought instructions from the minister and until next summer: (1) overland from Fullerton the deputy minister that “immediate action if near the northwestern extremity of Hudson possible should be taken by the Board.” Klotz Bay (“difficult and hazardous…. In an emer- reported the substance of two letters, which gency I think Stefansson could make it but I he had recently received from Stefansson. Af- doubt if there is anyone else who could”); (2) ter due deliberation, the board passed the fol- by a staunch ship to Bylot Island and the rest of lowing resolution proposed by Harkin and se- the way either over land and ice, or by plane, or conded by McArthur: in the ship as soon as navigation opened next summer (the plane trip could be undertaken if That in the opinion of the Tech- it “will not exceed 500 miles”); and (3) by zep- nical Board immediate action should pelin from Britain, dropping men and supplies be taken in the matter of occupation by parachute (“the Imperial Government would and administration of Ellesmere expect a guarantee. For advice about the sea Land for the purpose of definitely voyage into and through Baffin Bay reference establishing Canadian sovereignty should be made to Captain Bob Bartlett, who, therein. although at present in New York…. Of course is That in that connection the Gov- a Newfoundlander, not an American”).44 ernment should immediately ascer- The following day, Harkin wrote a memo tain whether it is practicable to send to Cory, evidently by prearrangement, sug- a boat into Baffin Bay this autumn. gesting three reliable sea captains as top possi- That if reports in that connec- bilities for the position of ship commander if tion are favourable a ship should be a northern expedition were dispatched. The forthwith despatched to Baffin Bay three were Captain H. C. Pickels of Mahone with instructions to proceed to Bylot Bay, Nova Scotia, who was considered the best Island. choice, and the brothers Will and John Bartlett That as soon as Bylot Island is of Newfoundland, who were father and uncle, reached an aeroplane party should respectively, of the famous Captain Bob.45 One be sent to Ellesmere Land to start oc- day later, Cory wired Canadian government cupancy and administration. immigration agent W. H. Sullivan in New York, That an overland party with the requesting that he contact Pickels immediately same object in view should also be after his expected arrival there to ask him to sent from the ship at Bylot Island. come to Ottawa for consultation.46 (To look That the ship should proceed ahead for a moment, Pickels arrived in Ottawa from Bylot Island as soon as ice con- after a few days’ delay, and after senior officials ditions permit, to Ellesmere Land had interviewed him and secured testimonials to extend and amplify the work

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH of occupation and administration the Interior, Denmark had gone beyond merely started by the two preceding parties. contemplating an expedition to occupy Elles- That if expert advice indicates mere Island and had actually sent it. (In fact, it that it is not possible for a boat to was reported to have already arrived there.) The navigate Baffin Bay this autumn, the only islands that might be in danger were those British Government should be asked north of Lancaster Sound. The only threat ap- to immediately transport a Canadian peared to be that from Denmark, since neither 229 party to Ellesmere Land by airship.48 the United States nor Norway, which had both been more active in the region than Denmark, Although the records of the meeting do not showed any intention of taking action. Christie indicate any disagreement within the board, recommended that a Canadian government ex- one important member of it obviously dis- pedition, which would be announced as a con- sented strongly from the proposed course of tinuation of the Stefansson and Bernier exped- action. On 29 October, Deville wrote a memo itions, should be sent north as soon as possible to Cory about the board’s resolutions, con- to map known islands and discover new ones, taining the following: establish customs and game regulations, and construct police posts. He also suggested that I wish to dissociate myself from Stefansson should be engaged for the explora- these resolutions. From the informa- tion work.50 tion to which I have had access, I am In spite of the Advisory Technical Board’s satisfied that the alleged intention of recommendation for immediate action, no de- Knud Rasmussen or of the Danish cision was taken to do anything in precipitous Government to occupy Ellesmere fashion. On 30 October, Cory sent a memo to island or to establish a trading post Deville and Harkin informing them that he on it has never existed otherwise had discussed the question of Arctic sovereign- than in Mr. Sefanson’s [sic] imagin- ty with the minister, and it had been decided ation. The wild schemes suggested that it would be inadvisable to attempt an ex- for the immediate occupation of the pedition until navigation opened up in the island can only result, if they become spring. In the meantime, however, planning known, in bringing ridicule over the and preparation should continue.51 Department.49 This decision was not acceptable to Harkin, who wrote back to Cory on 1 November saying On 28 October, Loring Christie, Legal Ad- that it was not certain that the Danes had start- viser to the Department of External Affairs, ed to occupy Ellesmere Island and that a Brit- wrote a secret memorandum for the Prime ish or Canadian expedition might still get there Minister entitled “Exploration and Occupation first. He therefore advised two things: to get the of the Northern Arctic Islands.” In the memo, advice of a reliable ice captain about whether Christie expressed fears akin to those of Har- a ship could still be sent into Baffin Bay “this kin. He insisted that it had become “more ur- fall” and to ask the British government whether gent” for Canada to confirm her sovereignty it would transport an expedition to Ellesmere over the Arctic islands because, according to Island by airship.52 information possessed by the Department of

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair In the meantime, Stefansson continued to a good deal of mental anguish, judging by the promote his projects by mail and through per- number of preliminary drafts and versions, sonal interviews. On 30 October, he sent a let- generally undated and unsigned, which have ter to Cory, saying that he was writing it at the survived in various collections of documents request of Sir James Lougheed, whom he had in the archives.59 One of these, prepared for the interviewed two days earlier.53 On 3 November, meeting of the Advisory Technical Board on 10 230 he wrote to Deville suggesting that he should November, seems to represent the outcome of find out from the Department of Marine how his effort.60 long it would take and how much it would cost In his report, Harkin summarized the to put the Arctic in seaworthy condition, since background of events that had revived Can- she was really “the logical vessel” for the pro- adian fears for the security of the northern jected northern expedition.54 On the same day, islands and then proposed a course of action. he wrote a note to Harkin, asking him to send He started from the premise that although the names and addresses of all the members of Canadians had generally taken complete Brit- the Advisory Technical Board to his secretary, ish sovereignty over the archipelago for grant- Olive Rathburn, in New York;55 and at about ed, it might well be that under standard rules this time, he sent Deville a complimentary of international law there was room for grave copy of an article he had recently published doubts about it – and Denmark might already titled “The Region of Maximum Inaccessib- have undertaken to appropriate Ellesmere Is- ility in the Arctic,” which located this region land. Referring to Dr. King’s memo of 1905 between Alaska and the North Pole.56 Here, as evidence that the problem was not new, he presumably, was where remaining unknown noted that the issue had arisen again when islands were most likely to be discovered. De- Canada protested to Denmark over the killing ville answered Stefansson’s letter two days later, of muskox by Greenland Inuit on Ellesmere Is- saying that the board had already come to the land, and he summarized the correspondence same conclusion about the Arctic and, if ap- and unsatisfactory response of the Danes. Cit- proval could be obtained, would refit and use ing Oppenheim’s International Law as authori- her.57 On the same day, Minister of Marine and tative on the acquisition of territory and the Fisheries Charles Colquhoun Ballantyne wrote need for genuine occupation and administra- to Lougheed (the acting Prime Minister at the tion, he observed that there was neither occu- time) informing him that the Arctic could be pation nor administration of Ellesmere Island made available next spring but that it would or the other islands of the archipelago. Concen- cost about $35,000 to make her ready for sea trating specifically on Ellesmere, since this was service. the one where doubt as to British sovereignty In the meantime, Captain Pickels had at- had been raised, Harkin provided an overview tended part of the 3 November meeting of the of the history of the activity of white men there, Advisory Technical Board by invitation. The which indicated that the British title to the is- discussion revealed the impracticability of land would be at best inchoate, resulting mainly starting a northern expedition at that time, and from rights of discovery and acts of possession. the members agreed that Harkin should draft Denmark apparently regarded Ellesmere Island a report on the subject of Arctic sovereignty.58 as “No Man’s Land,” an aspect of the situation Preparing this report must have caused Harkin “first raised” by Stefansson, whose talk to the

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH Advisory Technical Board on 1 October 1920 by giving information to the Reindeer-Musk- Harkin quoted at length. There were peculiar ox Commission. He would not be able to come features about Denmark’s behaviour in the to Ottawa in person, however, because he had matter, such as Rasmussen’s letter of 10 August responsibilities with a Danish commission dis- 1920, saying that he was making a hasty trip to cussing Greenland and, in June 1921, he would Greenland after he had accepted an invitation be starting a four-year expedition to the Cen- to testify before the Reindeer-Muskox Com- tral Inuit and the Arctic Archipelago. Never- 231 mission in Ottawa; the fact that his secretary theless, he would send by mail detailed replies had held the second letter until September 15 to any questions asked of him.63 before mailing it; his secretary’s statement that In the meantime, Stefansson’s proposal Rasmussen had taken all correspondence con- regarding Wrangel Island had been under dis- cerning the matter with him; and Denmark’s cussion (see chapter 11). Sir Joseph Pope, who at evident recent attention to questions of inter- the suggestion of Lougheed had been attending national law, as shown by her performance in some of the meetings of the Advisory Technical seeking general recognition of the sovereignty Board, indicated his disapproval with the idea in Greenland.61 Digressing to discuss in detail in a memo to Prime Minister Meighen on 25 matters such as the Monroe Doctrine and the November. On the other hand, Pope strongly wildlife and mineral resources of Ellesmere Is- favoured action in the archipelago north of the land, Harkin returned to his main theme with Canadian mainland: a strong plea for action by Canada to establish its sovereignty beyond possibility of doubt. His It [Wrangel Island] is far removed recommendations were mainly reiterations of from the Dominion – in fact is not what had already been put forward by himself even in the western hemisphere, as and others: establishment of Mounted Police the 180th meridian of longitude falls posts in selected northern locations and ex- upon it. Essentially, it is an Asiatic tension of their patrols; a special expedition to island.... It was generally considered the most northerly islands; permanent occupa- that any pretensions we might have tion, scientific investigation, and commercial to this island must be of a very un- exploitation where possible; establishment of substantial character, and could only post offices as symbols of sovereignty; and use result in weakening our legitimate of aircraft. The project of most immediate -im claims to the Arctic islands contigu- portance was to send a government expedition ous to our own territory, for if we can to northern waters as soon as possible the fol- go so far afield as Wrangel to take lowing year. For that purpose, he suggested the possession of islands, unconnected Arctic with Captain Pickels as skipper.62 with Canada, what is there to prevent Harkin’s papers include a copy of a letter the United States or any other power, of 17 November 1920 from Knud Rasmussen laying claim to islands far from their to H. G. Henderson of the Governor General’s shores but adjacent to our own. Office (erroneously described as the Secretary Our claim to the islands north of of State for External Affairs). In it, Rasmussen the mainland of Canada rests upon said that he had now returned from his jour- quite a different footing, by reason ney to North Greenland and was ready to help of their geographical position and

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair contiguity.... I think the suggestion could give him.69 He then sent a copy of Orr’s to send a Mounted Police force to letter to Cory, remarking: “I have repeatedly occupy certain stations on Ellsmere pointed out that in my opinion it is imperative [sic] Land and adjacent regions an that the utmost secrecy should be maintained excellent one, and one which should with regard to this matter, and that at least from be no longer postponed. In the past this moment on steps should be taken which 70 232 our territorial claims have suffered will absolutely insure secrecy.” Cory advised not a little by inaction and delay, e.g., (too late) that it would be well to delay replying Alaska and Labrador.64 to Orr, but Harkin might inquire where he got his information.71 When Cory sent Craig to see Evidently feeling that there was need for a Harkin on the morning of 6 December about a capable person who could give his undivided safe name for the expedition, Harkin suggest- attention to the increasing complexities of the ed that it should be called “The Reindeer Ex- projected Arctic voyage, Cory wrote a memo to pedition” because many people in Canada and Commissioner of the International Boundary elsewhere knew about the plans for reindeer Survey James J. McArthur on 1 December, ask- herds and “this name could be used effectively ing him to “have the services of Mr. J. D. Craig to camouflage the real purpose of the expedi- made available for special work in connection tion.” Any announcement should be delayed as with the northern expedition.”65 The response long as possible, he urged, because if the Danes must have come immediately, because on the same day Cory wrote to Craig asking that he are really now in occupation in proceed immediately upon the anticipated ar- Ellesmere Land, or intend to take rival of Captain Pickels to make the necessary action in that regard next Spring, arrangements with him, after consulting with even a Canadian announcement Deville and Harkin.66 On 4 December, Har- of the Reindeer Expedition would kin wrote to Cory referring to the minister’s arouse suspicion on their part and instructions for the preparation of a memo to would probably result in special ef- council about the northern islands and reiter- forts on their part. If they believe ating the legal and other questions that worried that Canada is still asleep they prob- him. He suggested that these questions should ably will not hurry. be brought to the attention of Craig, since The United States is undoubt- responsibility for the preparation of the memo edly in a position to put in claims “will now naturally devolve upon” him.67 with respect to Ellesmere Land and Concern about the secrecy aspect of the I imagine that a reindeer expedition proposed expedition was aroused by a letter would be a good camouflage insofar written to Harkin on 30 November by Dr. Row- as they are concerned.72 land B. Orr, Director of the Ontario Provincial Museum, in which Orr said that he understood So far as can be divined from the documents, a scientific expedition was being sent to Baf- a lull ensued, and little of significance is re- fin Bay next spring and asked for information corded during the next four or five weeks. about it.68 Harkin replied promptly, saying in Stefansson was as anxious as ever to get in- curt fashion that he knew of no information he volved in a northern expedition, however, and

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH on 8 January 1921, he wrote to Prime Minister Meighen had a copy of this letter sent to Min- Meighen in the following vein: ister of the Interior Lougheed on 11 January for his consideration.74 This was unnecessary: You know my anxiety that Stefansson had already written a similar letter Canada shall continue the work of to Sir James three days earlier.75 Stefansson also exploration in the North and my wrote essentially the same letter to Sir Robert 76 eagerness to help in that work. This Borden, at Borden’s own request. Stefansson 233 exploration would be not only for the had evidently been in Ottawa a few days before, increase of knowledge but to make and Borden remarked, when sending a copy of good Canadian claims to territor- the letter to Meighen, that “Stefansson’s views ies already discovered and to make as expressed to me seem to have a good deal of Canadian any islands that may yet cogency, and at any convenient time, I shall be be found. glad to discuss them with you.”77 I have now been ten years in As plans for the expedition proceeded, the service of the Government of various officials offered advice to achieve -dif Canada in exploratory work in the ferent objectives. Dr. Klotz was interested in North. This has been without salary. the possibilities for scientific research and As a result, I am not well off finan- wrote a memo to Craig on 10 January, noting cially. I have now received an offer the heavy representation of scientific personnel of wages for lecturing thirty-five on earlier expeditions. Although exploration weeks next summer and winter that and scientific observation were “a side issue” in are high from my point of view. I the present instance, Klotz noted, the oppor- have signed a contract for this work tunities offered “should be exploited to the full- which has a clause providing that it est extent of the time available.”78 His memo may be cancelled should I go North provoked several others on the same subject. on a polar expedition the summer The same day, W. Stuart Edwards, Assistant of 1921. For that reason it is import- Deputy Minister of the Department of Justice, ant for me to know before the end of made the following suggestions: January whether the Government needs my services. If you think you do, I should consider it both an hon- (1) In any actual taking possession or and a public duty to serve either in of the northern islands the settle- planning the expeditions or in actual ments established should be at command of them. the mouths of the largest river I shall hold myself in readiness systems, to establish claims to the until February 1st for this Govern- drainage basins; ment service and hope the Govern- (2) A large-scale map should be pre- ment can let me know before that pared showing all available data, time whether those services are and as much historical and other 73 wanted. information as possible should be acquired;

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair Century Atlas showed Ellesmere Island in the same colour as the United States and Alaska;

(5) The cooperation of the Depart- ment of the Naval Service should be secured; and 234 (6) The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the British Embassy in Washington, and the Department of Trade and Commerce should all be asked to provide all possible useful information.79

On 14 January, Cory wrote a confidential note to Sir Joseph Pope, enclosing part of a New York dispatch of 3 January which had appeared in the Montreal Gazette that told of sixteen ex- ploratory expeditions presently being planned or carried out around the world. He drew par- ticular attention to three being prepared by Rasmussen, the Dane Lauge Koch, and Amer- ican Donald B. MacMillan for different parts of the North American Arctic. Noting that Can- ada was “vitally interested,” Cory suggested Figure 10-5: John Davidson Craig on board that Pope communicate by cipher cablegram the CGS Arctic, 1922. J.D. Craig / Library and with the Home Office in London to find out Archives Canada / PA-210045. what he could.80 Pope threw cold water on the idea, however, expressing that “I really do not see what the Home Office has got to do with the (3) The shortest distance from Elles- subject” and suggesting instead a letter to the mere Island to Devon Island High Commissioner.81 and to Greenland should be On 11 January, Craig wrote a memo to ascertained; Harkin, referring to “our conversation yester- (4) A comprehensive knowledge day with Mr. Cory regarding Mr. Stefansson of past and present Danish and and the northern expedition” and asking him American activity in the Can- to draft a letter to Stefansson inquiring whether adian islands and Greenland he would be willing to undertake an explora- should be obtained quickly, that tory trip to Ellesmere Land. “You have met Mr. of the United States being par- Stefansson and have discussed it with him,” ticularly important because the he added, “and it would seem that you could

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH put the matter up to him in better shape than work could be carried on under the anyone else.”82 On 12 January, Roy Gibson as one commander. It is not considered acting deputy minister wrote to Harkin mak- here that such would be practicable ing the same request and enclosing a copy of or desirable. The two purposes are Stefansson’s letter of 8 January to Meighen.83 entirely different in character and The communiqués mentioned in the pre- from their nature could not be satis- ceding paragraph seem to have been largely re- factorily carried out under the same 235 sponsible for setting afoot the tangled skein of leadership. The occasion however of- events that followed regarding this mysterious fers an excellent opportunity for pro- Stefansson expedition which did not material- viding for additional exploration in ize. The truth about this strange affair, in which the region immediately to the north he figured so largely, was denied to Stefansson; and the west of the better known although he remained curious about it and islands. My wire was sent to ascertain sought the explanation in puzzlement and whether you would undertake com- frustration until the end of his life, he evidently mand of an exploration expedition never learned the full story. into the area in question. My idea is Harkin’s draft letter to Stefansson was evi- that the ship provided for the other dently a struggle for him, judging by the pen- work could be used to transport your cilled notes in his papers. He also wired Stefan- party to a suitable point from which sson at the Harvard Club in New York on 15 the expedition could take its depar- January, asking him when he could come to ture overland under your command. Ottawa to discuss matters.84 Stefansson wired I wired you because I was anxious to back promptly on 18 January from Petersburg, go into the details with you person- Virginia. ally in connection with this matter. I notice that your Lecture Bur- Your telegram January sixteenth eau contract provides that notice forwarded stop am lecturing in given prior to February 1st would South till early Feby cant get back relieve you for northern work. I New York before fifth or Ottawa be- know that so far as you are person- fore eighth Feby you know my ideas ally concerned you recognize that and plans please write me fully on everything in connection with the that basis stop use my New York expeditions is strictly confidential address.85 but it is imperative that you should also see that nothing is said to the On 21 January, Harkin sent Gibson his com- lecture bureau which will enable it pleted draft letter to Stefansson with the com- to indulge in publicity which might ment: “I think it is in a safe form.” The vital part call attention to these expeditions. of it went as follows: There is always a temptation for a lecture bureau to endeavour to get I infer from your letters upon free publicity when opportunity of- the subject that you have in mind fers and in writing to you upon this that exploration work and other subject I take it for granted that you

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair will take all the necessary safeguards (3) it might be necessary to have dif- in that connection. ferent commanders in the field, but from Ottawa the work should Having reproduced Stefansson’s wire of 18 be planned by someone who January in his letter, Harkin concluded by thoroughly understood polar observing that, so far as the department was conditions; 236 concerned, there was no reason why discussion of the matter should not be delayed until 8 Feb- (4) his acceptance of the command ruary.86 The main point that emerges from the of the exploratory expedition letter is that Harkin and his colleagues had al- was contingent upon satisfactory ready decided that although Stefansson might backing and support from the be considered for an exploratory expedition, government; the “other work” – that relating to sovereignty (5) there should be during the com- – would not be entrusted to him if they could ing summer “a quiet, entirely prevent it. unostentatious taking possession Stefansson replied by telegram on 2 Feb- of Wrangel Island,” which might ruary, from Atlanta, Georgia, saying in part: be carried out by a Canadian fur “Consider it both privilege and duty to accept trader (see chapter 11); and command expedition to carry out purposes we have discussed and have at heart shall be glad (6) there should be a public an- to accept stop lecture managers know nothing nouncement that the Canadian our plans there will be no publicity.”87 He fol- government was continuing sci- lowed up this wire with a lengthy letter, written entific exploration in the North, in New York on 7 February, in which he said without mention of any political that he expected to be in Ottawa no later than aims, so as to deter competing na- 14 February and in the meantime was setting tions from entering the field. down “a basis for discussion.” Briefly para- phrased, the points he made were as follows: He concluded with the caution to Harkin, rath- er ironic in the circumstances, to “remember that this letter is very confidential.”88 (1) it would be fortunate if the exped- A further exchange of telegrams followed, ition were under the Department with Stefansson saying that 14 February would of the Interior, but it should be suit him best to meet Harkin in Ottawa, Har- outfitted by Desbarats and his kin saying that he was not sure he would be subordinates in the Naval Service; in Ottawa on that date, and Stefansson ask- (2) the difficulties of the expedition ing rather curtly, “If you are absent fourteenth 89 should not be overestimated, and when will you be back?” By 17 February, with proper methods its ends however, Harkin reported to Cory that he had might be achieved with little had several conferences with Stefansson; that effort; they had framed a plan for an exploratory ex- pedition to start the coming summer, which might cost a total of $75,000 to $100,000; and

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH that he recommended approval of the plan. About this time, the English explorer Sir He attached to his note a memo by Stefansson Ernest Shackleton entered the scene, a develop- which set forth the plan in some detail. Briefly, ment which Stefansson always blamed for the five men were to go north on theArctic in the fact that his own expedition did not take place. summer of 1921, under the command of Fred The true circumstances, however, were some- Lambert of the Geodetic Survey, and establish what different than Stefansson thought. a main base on Axel Heiberg Island. When the Shackleton had had an interview with 237 Arctic sailed north again in 1922 to take sup- Prime Minister Meighen in Montreal on 5 Feb- plies to the police stations which by then would ruary and had asked for financial help from have been established, Stefansson would lead the Canadian government for an expedition another party of five which would cross Elles- he was planning for the Beaufort Sea region. mere Island and join the first party, after which At the same time, he intimated that he under- some members of the combined party would stood Stefansson was not interested in taking carry on extensive exploratory and scientific an active role in such work. The following day, work north, west, and southwest of the Sver- Meighen wrote Sir James Lougheed, then Min- drup Islands. Lambert would probably return ister of the Interior, enclosing a memorandum south in 1924 and Stefansson himself probably by Shackleton and saying that he (Shackleton) the following year, perhaps by way of Alaska sought an appointment with the minister on or Siberia. Harkin remarked in his note, “Of Tuesday next. Meighen added, “I told Sir Er- course it is to be distinctly understood that Mr. nest that I did not understand Mr. Stefansson’s Stefansson will be in supreme command of the attitude in the same way as he did and I was of exploratory work of this expedition.”90 the opinion Mr. Stefansson was anxious him- Evidently unaware of the true situation, or self to take charge of such work in the North only faintly suspicious, Stefansson went ahead as the Government desired to have done.”93 with plans for the expedition. On 25 February, The Department of the Interior looked into the he wrote two letters to Cory, one asking for matter promptly. By 7 February, J. D. Craig was permission to employ E. Lorne Knight (a mem- writing at the beginning of a memo to Cory ber of his last expedition) and the other ask- that, “in accordance with your memorandum ing for a written commission stating his exact of this date, I have had a conference with Dr. relationship with the Canadian government. Deville and Mr. Harkin concerning the prop- On 28 February, he wrote to Harkin suggesting osition of Sir Ernest Shackleton that the Do- the employment of a young Cornell student minion of Canada should contribute towards named E. P. Wheeler, who like Knight was an his proposed Beaufort Sea Expedition.” Craig American, and saying that although he agreed observed that it was impossible to tell from that the personnel of the expedition should be the information provided whether Shackleton mainly Canadian, he “would certainly rather would go to the intended region of activity by take a good man of any nationality whatever the west coast or the east coast, but if it were than an indifferent Canadian.”91 Cory sent his the first, he could not get there in 1921, and if two letters to Harkin on 1 March, saying, “By it were the second, he would come into conflict a copy of this memorandum I am asking Mr. with the department’s plans for Stefansson. He Craig to call on you in order that something thought that Shackleton’s expedition might ac- may be drafted.”92 complish more from a scientific point of view

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair than Stefansson’s, but Stefansson’s would be or Denmark, or in fact any other used in connection with the sovereignty ques- country that might have ambitions tion and in any case was already arranged. to acquire new territory. Stefansson Therefore, Craig advised that the department is a Canadian in the sense that he should not support Shackleton’s expedition un- was born in Canada but that is all. It less, perhaps, Shackleton succeeded in getting a would therefore be unwise to bank 94 238 large subscription in England and elsewhere. on his Canadian loyalty too much. On 14 February, Lougheed answered The Canadian expedition has been Meighen’s note, saying that he had had an developed on the line of keeping him interview with Shackleton and told him that with us through self interest. the government could not at the present time Stefansson wrote to both the take the action he desired. He added that Premier and Sir James Lougheed Shackleton had appeared to understand his ex- asking that he should be made com- planation and had hinted that he might submit mander of the Canadian expedition. a more limited proposition later on.95 For obvious reasons this was impos- The true situation respecting Stefansson is sible. At the same time it was felt here revealed quite clearly in a confidential memo that Stefansson’s friendship must be Harkin wrote to Cory on 2 March, after they retained and on the Minister’s sug- had met with Lougheed. After some prelim- gestion he was wired in January to inary remarks about the two proposed exped- come to Ottawa. It was felt that in the itions and about his fears of Danish and Amer- interests of Canada he must be kept ican designs, Harkin continued: enthusiastically with us at least until the Arctic got away next June and that There is a grave probability that to avoid further danger from him it if any aid or recognition is given was in Canada’s best interests to get the Shackleton expedition either (or him away to the north as soon as pos- both) the United States and Den- sible where he would not be able to mark may receive advance informa- damage the Canadian cause. It being tion from Stefansson, the Canadian impossible to let him take command Arctic explorer, because Shackleton of the expedition our proposition to proposes to explore the identical re- him was that he should go up on the gion that Stefansson also proposes Arctic as a passenger and then with to explore. Stefansson was the first a small party proceed over the land person to specifically call attention and the ice to the Beaufort Sea on a to the weakness of Canada’s claim to new exploration trip. It was felt this the Northern Islands. No one is more would effectually keep him out of the familiar than he with the weakness way during the danger period. He of our case. He is aware of Canada’s suggested a compromise, viz. – that plans for remedying that weakness. a small advance party should go up He therefore is in a position to ruin on the Arctic this year to locate a base the Canadian scheme by tipping for him and that in 1922 he himself off the facts to the United States, should proceed to the base and begin

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH his exploration. This naturally did of Canadian sovereignty in the not suit us as well as the original north. Even if that point can be safe- idea of his going up in 1921 but it guarded the situation would still be was felt that it would meet our main that Canada in a period of financial purposes, viz. – to keep Stefansson stress was financing two expeditions silent. Accordingly I recommended to the same region. it and the Minister approved. At With the authority of the Min- 239 this juncture Shackleton arrived. He ister I explained the whole situation of course knew nothing about the to Shackleton. He expressed anxiety title difficulty as regards the north. to safeguard Canada’s interests but Presumably he came to Canada for advanced the idea that he should financial aid because he would not be used in connection with the ex- raise enough funds in England. His pedition. Finding that his first sug- expectation probably is that if he gestion that the Arctic should be could get recognition from Canada abandoned and his boat used instead this would stimulate contributions was impracticable because his boat in the Old Country. The purpose of was too small for the purpose he his expedition is solely the securing suggested that the Arctic should es- of scientific information in the Beau- tablish the two northern police posts fort Sea. So far as this information proposed and that his boat should es- is concerned there is no pressing tablish the two more southerly posts need of it. Delay of a few more years and then proceed on its way towards in that connection is of no signifi- Beaufort Sea. Apparently this was cance to Canada. Therefore in view advanced to give the Government an of Canada’s financial position there excuse on which to justify assistance are no substantial grounds for giving for his expedition. He expressed the him aid. Equally from the scientific opinion that in the short northern standpoint there is no pressing need season the Arctic alone might not of the proposed Stefansson explora- be able to establish all four posts tion expedition. It has been recom- this year. Captain Pickels who has mended solely to conserve Canada’s been engaged as Master of the Arc- interests in the matter of the north- tic has been consulted on this point ern titles. and contends that there is an ample Both Stefansson and Shackle- season of open water to permit of the ton propose going to the same area. Arctic doing all the work this year. It is so far unexplored. It cannot be It is inconceivable that any aid ignored that if the Shackleton exped- given to Shackleton can be kept so ition is endorsed in any way Stefan- secret that it will not reach Stefans- sson is practically certain to get up son’s ears. What may then happen is in arms. What the result will be is a left to your own judgment. matter of grave concern to the main Insofar as I may have any respons- issue, viz. – the definite completion ibility in this matter I consider the

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair chance of putting Stefansson in the statement that “the announcement camp of our enemies is too great a from Christiania is, to say the least, one to be taken. If it is felt some aid premature” is bound to arouse must be given Shackleton then at Stefansson. When he was here a least he should be told that there will week or two ago he manifested a be none until 1922. With all talk of good deal of nervousness about 240 the Shackleton expedition dropped Shackleton and, therefore, I fear that we doubtless can keep Stefansson the newspaper item referred to will in line until the police posts are es- aggravate him very much. It seems tablished. If it is then considered to me that at all costs we must guard desirable to assist Shackleton in 1922 against Stefansson being alienated. and at the same time carry out the I feel quite sure that entirely apart arrangements with Stefansson that from the Denmark danger Stefans- he too explore Beaufort Sea at least son could very readily convince the there will be no danger of imperil- United States to send an expedition ling the main question, that of the to Ellesmere Land. That country has definite establishment of Canadian probably a better title at present to sovereignty in the north.96 Ellesmere Land than Canada has. Moreover, the United States have On the same day, Harkin wrote another been very anxious to carry on musk confidential memo to Cory about a news item ox breeding in Alaska and their from Christiania (Oslo), published in the Ot- Biological Service have asked us to tawa Evening Journal of 1 March. The news let them have musk ox from Elles- item said that Shackleton was leaving on a new mere Land for that purpose. I feel Arctic expedition in May or June, having pur- that if the United States recognized chased the Norwegian whaling boat Foca I. the weakness of Canada’s title, as He would proceed via Hudson Bay, Baffin Bay, Stefansson knows it, they would not and Lancaster Sound to Axel Heiberg Island, hesitate to try to establish occupa- and from there he would explore the islands tion of Ellesmere Land in advance of “eastward to Parry Island [sic]”. The Canadian Canada. Such a possibility suggests government had officially informed theJour - very serious and very dangerous nal that it had no connection with the exped- complications.97 ition, although Shackleton had approached the Prime Minister and other government officials Perhaps the most surprising thing about these for help, and thus the announcement from remarkable communiqués is their revelation Christiania was “premature.” After repeating that, although Harkin and others clearly dis- briefly his fears about Stefansson and gener- trusted Stefansson, they were nevertheless ally the substance of the other memo, Harkin willing to take Shackleton, virtually a stran- continued: ger, into their confidence. A pencilled note on a letter written by Stefansson to Lougheed on You are well aware that Stefan- 26 February, and sent on to Craig and Harkin, sson is an exceedingly difficult man says, “Get him on phone and tell him to pay no to handle. It seems to me that the

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH attention to reports re Shackleton.”98 The note exploration which Mr. Cory tells me was unsigned, but it was evidently for Harkin, is definitely decided on. who must have complied. In a postscript to a To Mr. Cory’s inquiry (through letter to Harkin dated 5 March, Stefansson Mr. Harkin) I have said I prefer to do wrote, “Thanks awfully for phoning me last this work for the Government with- night – I appreciate the thoughtfulness very out salary. 99 much.” The “thoughtfulness” was obviously Rather than receive any pay, no 241 not quite what Stefansson imagined it to be. matter how great, for mere ordinary In the Harkin Papers there is a pencilled work, I prefer to carry on the work memorandum, obviously in Stefansson’s hand- of exploration, because I feel I am writing, recording details of a conversation be- helping to build the foundation for tween Stefansson and Harkin in the Chateau Canada’s greatness. I am proud to Laurier on 11 March. Among the miscellany have a part in that work, and thank of details are a list of supplies and equipment you for the part you have had in its needed for the planned expedition, Stefans- inception.102 son’s lecture itinerary for the rest of March and part of April (which would take him from In the meantime, while Stefansson proceeded Michigan to Florida), and notes about a letter with his lecture tour, memos continued to fly that Stefansson was going to write to colleges back and forth in Ottawa. Harkin wrote one to and universities about personnel for the ex- Cory on 15 March which, after referring to his pedition.100 On the same day Stefansson draft- earlier one of 17 February about Stefansson’s ed this memorandum, which he sent to Dean proposed expedition, continued as follows: Reginald Brock of the University of British Col- umbia; the presidents of the Universities of To- You returned this memoran- ronto, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta; dum to me marked A.O.K., B.O.M.” and the principal of McGill University. In the I accordingly have proceeded with letter, he expressed his preference for young arrangements in that connection Canadian college graduates, since the exped- with Mr. Stefansson. The first defin- ition was to be “a Canadian enterprise,” and he ite commitment in this matter was cautioned that the matter was confidential “in made on Saturday. Mr. Stefansson, so far that I should not like to get any mention as you know, wants a man named of the undertaking into the public press.”101 Knight, who formerly worked with On 14 March, Stefansson wrote the follow- him in the far North, engaged as ing note to Sir James Lougheed. He used his the practical man though not the New York stationery, but, according to his lec- Commander of this advance party. ture itinerary, he would have been at Saginaw, On Saturday I found that it was un- Michigan: avoidable to tell Mr. Stefansson to close arrangements with Mr. Knight I have refused a $60,000.[00] a in that connection. Particularly since year lecture contract for 1922–23 to the advent of Shackleton I fear there take charge of the work of northern has been more or less of a feeling that once Canada’s Police posts have been

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair definitely established by the Arctic It is quite true that insofar as the expedition there might be a move- north is concerned once our police ment to drop the Stefansson exped- posts are established we will have ition of 1922. As you know I am con- nothing to fear from Stefansson in- vinced that so far as any results to be sofar as the eastern frontier of the expected from either the Stefansson Arctic Archipelago is concerned. 242 or the Shackleton expeditions are I may say that up to date I am concerned there is no need whatever convinced that Stefansson is play- to-day of these expeditions, having ing the game absolutely loyally to in mind Canada’s financial position. Canada. In this connection it must The Stefansson expedition as pro- always be kept in mind that we owe posed really has nothing whatever him a debt of gratitude as the man to do with scientific or other results who actually brought the weakness that may be obtained. The position of Canada’s case to the Government’s has simply been that Stefansson attention. being thoroughly familiar with the I have before me a memorandum weakness of Canada’s case with re- with respect to the organization and spect to the North and it not being equipment of Stefansson’s advance possible to really look upon him as party and estimates concerning cost a real Canadian this expedition idea with respect to his main party of was developed with a view to provid- 1922 and feel that we must proceed ing a positive assurance by this sop immediately with the arrangements to Stefansson’s pride and selfishness concerning the advance party. As it that there would be no chance of his appears to me that Stefansson is act- tipping off the actual situation con- ing in good faith in this matter I feel cerning the north to either Denmark that I am in a very delicate position or the United States. when I realize the possibilities of I do not think the proposed there being attempts to make Canada Stefansson expedition could be car- withdraw from final steps in connec- ried out for less than one hundred tion with the expedition. Through- thousand dollars ($100,000). It is out, practically all the negotiations quite a price but I do not think it with Stefansson have been left to is too high a one to pay for the as- me. I therefore feel a keen personal surance that it gives us. Of course I responsibility in connection with the do not know whether this Stefans- matter of the complete arrangements son expedition has been considered being fully carried out. Despite the in Council but from the activities fact that I see no need of this exped- with respect to Shackleton I fear ition from a scientific standpoint I there might later on be opposition nevertheless consider that Canada’s in Council to seeing the Stefansson good faith must be maintained with expedition through. regard to it.

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH Under the circumstances recited real danger in the first possibility, but there I feel that as a go between with re- might be in the second: spect to Stefansson it is my duty to bring this situation clearly to your So far as the United States is con- attention.103 cerned official Washington might be considered as unlikely to do any- Harkin followed up this memo to Cory thing hostile towards Canada but 243 with two others of rather similar import, dat- there would be the greatest danger ed 21 March and 22 March. In his memo of 21 if Stefansson went to the Hearst out- March, which was written after he and Cory fit. His claims as to the importance had seen the minister, he referred to Stefans- of the North Islands both as regards son’s letter of 14 March to Lougheed and said submarines and aircraft would give that it would be very difficult to answer. He the Hearst people great material to had gathered from Lougheed that he was not work with. And it is quite possible in favour of asking council to finance Stefans- they might force official Washington son’s expedition. Harkin said this was “a com- to take action.... plete change of policy.” If this meant that the There is no doubt that purely 1922 expedition to Beaufort Sea (to be led by as a matter of newspaper enterprise Stefansson) was to be cancelled, then there the Hearst people would finance would be no point in sending an advance party an expedition themselves. It would to Axel Heiberg in 1921. Harkin repeated his be great newspaper work for them opinion that the price of the expedition was to have Stefansson in a race with not too much to pay in order to assure Stefan- Shackleton. sson’s loyalty, although on the other side there was the feeling against paying “hush money.” Harkin repeated his view that if Canada turned He concluded, “Personally I think it will be far Stefansson down it was “obviously taking better in the end to definitely decide one way or chances” and that the issue called for “the most the other and advise Stefansson rather than go careful consideration.” Perhaps some alterna- on as at present.”104 tive could be found: Much of the memo of 22 March went over ground previously covered. He felt strongly If it is definitely decided to turn that Stefansson’s course would be decided “en- down the Stefansson expedition the tirely on personal and selfish grounds.” Factors question arises as to whether it is de- that would help to hold him were his ambition sirable to take any other steps to pre- to become the “Reindeer King” of Canada, his vent the possibility of his going over expectation of additional reindeer leases in the to our enemies. There are a number North, and his personal interest in the official of items that might be considered: he reports of his last expedition. If the entry of might be asked to visit Scandinavia Shackleton caused Stefansson to think he was and Finland for the purpose of mak- being put aside, however, he might go to Den- ing investigations re. reindeer indus- mark or the United States. There was not much try; It might be arranged that the Hudson Bay Company send a boat

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair to Wrangel Island and Stefansson go You made a remark that you along to investigate and report; he would not take this matter to Coun- might be asked to make a trip across cil. My impression from your remark the Barren Lands to study caribou was that you had in mind only the conditions in relation to the reindeer second part of the expedition, viz. – industry; or he might be asked to be the trip in 1922 by Stefansson him- 244 a Government candidate at the next self. Mr. Harkin got the impression election in an Icelandic constituency. that your remark included the ad- Stefansson’s letter to the Minis- vance party as well. ter, it seems to me, was written for You will remember that early in the purpose of putting something February you agreed to this advance definite on record, in other words, to party being sent up with a view to overcome the difficulty arising from guaranteeing Stefansson remaining our negotiating with him re. the ex- loyal to us until we had succeeded in pedition but refusing to put anything establishing our police posts in the in writing. Unanswered or evaded North. it is virtually an admission that we have contracted with him to lead an The memo noted that if the advance party were expedition; and his case is strength- still to be sent out in 1921 there would be a great ened by the statement that he is sac- deal of preparatory work to do in a very short rificing a $60,000 lecture contract to time, and asked that “on receipt of this letter” undertake the expedition.105 the minister should advise “definitely” as to his views in the matter. However, most of the The deep distrust of Stefansson revealed in memo is crossed out and the words “not sent” these memos fits rather oddly with the admit- are pencilled on it, so evidently the matter was ted conviction that up to date he “is playing the dropped for the time being or taken up with game absolutely loyally to Canada.” The memos Lougheed in some other way.106 also suggest that Harkin was undergoing men- In spite of these efforts to bring about a tal conflict regarding the ethics of his own role. decision in the matter, no quick decision was The alternative proposals he had in mind for made, and Stefansson’s frequent communiqués Stefansson are interesting, and it is quite likely to Ottawa continued to receive evasive and that in favourable circumstances some of them negative answers. He wired Harkin from might have attracted him. Cleveland on 23 March, asking for news.107 On 23 March, a memo to Lougheed was Harkin replied the same day, saying that there drafted under Cory’s signature, which was ob- was “nothing doing” regarding either Lambert viously prompted by the memos from Harkin or Alcock, whom Stefansson had suggested and was intended primarily to clarify whether for the 1921 Axel Heiberg party, and that he the minister was opposed to only the Stefans- was trying to find a suitable man.108 Stefans- son phase of the proposed exploratory exped- son wired back promptly on 24 March, from ition or to both phases of it. The memo said in Bloomington, Indiana, suggesting Elmer Ek- part: blaw who had been botanist with MacMillan’s 1913–17 expedition.109 Harkin, again replying

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH the same day, said that only a Canadian could well be that Cory, lacking a definite Cabinet de- be considered.110 Stefansson sent another wire, cision to guide him, was feeling as frustrated also on 24 March, dealing with several matters over the whole affair as Harkin obviously was. but emphasizing that the man chosen should This pattern of events continued for sev- be accustomed to outdoor winter life.111 Harkin eral more weeks, with Stefansson becoming wrote a brief letter on 26 March, saying that increasingly anxious and Harkin increasingly Stefansson’s letter of 14 March to Lougheed had embarrassed over his inability to send a def- 245 been referred to him because the minister was inite reply. On 12 April, Knight wrote another out of the city. Although the minister would letter to Harkin, this time from his home in appreciate the “high ground” Stefansson was Oregon, saying that he had had no reply to his taking, Harkin advised Stefansson not to turn letter of 27 March and again asking for instruc- down the lecture tour because the “unsettled tions.117 Harkin sent this letter to Cory, again conditions” in Canada might change plans for asking for advice about an answer and noting the expedition.112 Already, however, Stefansson that it had been found necessary to approve had hired E. Lorne Knight, a member of his last the hiring of Knight.118 Stefansson wired from expedition whom he had been authorized to New Braunfels, Texas, on 18 April to say that he employ; Knight wrote to Harkin on 27 March had had no replies from the Canadian univer- saying that Stefansson had accepted him and sity presidents to whom he had written and no that he desired instructions.113 reply from Harkin to his telegram of 11 April.119 Harkin wrote a lengthy memo to Cory on Harkin sent the wire on to Cory, saying that he 7 April, summarizing the situation as it then was still without instructions but thought it existed. He said little about the complications “important that a message of some kind should involving Stefansson, however, and the memo go to Mr. Stefansson.”120 On 20 April, Cory re- was mainly a review of the legal situation as he turned the communiqués he had received from saw it. To a large extent it simply repeated argu- Harkin, with a memo saying only, “So far we ments that had already been made many times have not received the decision of Council.”121 by both Harkin and Stefansson, and it suggests Stefansson sent two wires from Phoenix, Ari- that there actually was a good deal of affinity in zona, on 24 April, one to Cory saying that he the thinking of the two.114 had received no replies from Harkin122 and the Stefansson sent another urgent wire on 11 other to Harkin saying that he now had answers April, this time from Galveston, Texas, saying from the university presidents and that from in part, “Referring your letter it is now too late Toronto strongly recommended Allan, the to retain lecture contracts they were cancelled son of Professor Crawford of that university.123 months ago I assume absolute good faith on Harkin again sent the wire he had received to part officials now in power and am willing to Cory.124 Another wire from Stefansson on 3 take chances on change of administration.” He May announced that he had now heard from asked Harkin to wire a summary of the situa- all the university presidents and recommended tion to Beeville, Texas.115 Harkin sent the wire several of the candidates they had named, on to Cory as usual, with the usual request for Crawford being mentioned as one of the two advice about a reply.116 There is little documen- best.125 Harkin sent it on to Cory with the usual tary evidence that his repeated requests of this request for instructions, suggesting strongly kind attracted any helpful response, and it may that “the cards should be laid on the table.”126

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair Stefansson’s next wire, from Los Angeles on send a scientific expedition to the Arctic with 11 May, said that the time had now arrived for a view to claiming lands where oil was discov- Knight to report to Ottawa according to the ar- ered, formed a subject for discussion in a typ- rangement made and that he had resigned the ical Harkin-to-Cory memo about a week later. position he had held more than a month ago.127 Stefansson had written regarding the proposal: Harkin’s note to Cory accompanying the wire “I can beat them [the Americans] to it if Can- 132 246 observed rather bluntly that it was now almost ada wants me to.” the middle of May and the situation was still By this time the decision respecting the “all up in the air.”128 Knight wrote a letter to northern expedition had been taken, and Harkin from McMinnville, Oregon, on 12 Stefansson’s fate was sealed. Stefansson re- May, saying that he was without funds and had mained unaware of what had happened, and he not felt free to take another job; he had written wired Harkin anxiously on 29 May from Eur- twice already and did not wish to become “a eka, California: nuisance,” but nevertheless he would appreci- ate some information.129 Am in very embarrassing situ- A memo dated 13 May, unsigned but ob- ation Knight and various men in viously written by Harkin, explained the situa- Canadian universities whom I ap- tion up to that date and strongly recommended proached according our agreement that an immediate decision be reached regard- are writing and wiring me stop you ing both the northern expedition and the role should know it is safe to let me know of Stefansson in it. For the most part, the memo facts even if Shackleton or others went over ground covered many times before, have been selected but I must have but it emphasized that the program approved some word from you stop I have by council “was being carried out without a sent in no expense account and shall hitch” until Shackleton appeared on the scene not but I expect some courtesy you and that although Stefansson was considered have always shown in our dealings “unsuitable” for the command, there was “every reply Fort-Bragg till Tuesday mor- evidence” that he had “preserved absolute con- ning Lakeport Thursday Sebastopol fidence in connection with this subject.” The Saturday.133 memo took the view that the Arctic should be sent north on a more limited and less expensive A short note from Cory on 18 May informed trip than that originally planned; but regard- Harkin that the expedition was cancelled. The ing Stefansson, even though to eliminate him note began as follows: “I herewith return the at such a late date would seem to him to be “an memoranda relating to the Arctic Expedition. act of bad faith on the part of the Government,” This whole matter has been called off.” Little the only advice was to decide promptly one way else was said, except that Cory was asking or the other.130 Craig to prepare a memorandum to show the Stefansson sent a wire to Harkin from minister’s position clearly and that Craig would Lindsey, California, on 17 May, asking him consult Harkin.134 to read the editorial page of the American Harkin sent Stefansson the basic news of magazine World’s Work for May.131 The editor- the cancellation on 30 May in a wire which ial, dealing with a proposal that the US Navy said only, “Re. your wire twenty-ninth entire

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH expedition abandoned. Am writing.”135 His fol- did want to go north, he said, “the shores and lowing letter gave little additional detail, how- the seas are wide, and there is room for all.”138 ever, and the curt, uninformative tone must On 6 April, Lougheed directed Harkin have carried quite a sting: to prepare a financial statement of the Arctic expedition. He submitted an approximate es- Doubtless you have received timate the following day, and he also made a my wire of even date advising you comparative financial statement of theArctic 247 that the entire expedition has been and the Shackleton expeditions, which he pre- abandoned. sented to the minister on or before 23 April. I may say that for some time there His figures are difficult to follow, but he ap- had been a great deal of uncertainty. parently concluded that if only one police post Things were in such condition that it was established, the Arctic expedition would was quite impossible for me to send cost $50,000, while the Shackleton expedition any satisfactory reply to your several would cost $20,000 plus whatever grant it re- previous messages. Through all the ceived. Additional money had already been period of uncertainty I personally committed to the Arctic, however, and since thought that in the end the decision this money could not be recovered, he seemed would be favourable. However as al- to favour the Arctic expedition.139 ready advised such is not the case.136 Shackleton, like Stefansson, had been do- ing his best to win the support of influential Stefansson thus received word of the elimina- people who could help him. Three men who tion of the expedition upon which he had built seem to have been inclined to support his pro- such high hopes. It does not appear that Harkin ject were Loring Christie, legal adviser to the sent him any further information or explana- Department of External Affairs; John Bassett tion, or that he asked for any. of the Ottawa office of the Montreal Gazette; In the meantime, while the negotiations and Sir John Eaton of the T. Eaton Company. with Stefansson were running their course, On 9 April, while still in Ottawa, Shackleton other important events relating to the exped- sent a handwritten note to Christie saying that ition were taking place – particularly nego- he could “carry and place” the one (police) sta- tiations with Shackleton.137 On 15 April 1921, tion proposed and that his expedition would be Shackleton (while in Ottawa) put his case dir- “entirely featured as Canadian.”140 On 11 April, ectly to Meighen in a lengthy letter, accompan- he wired Bassett from New York, asking him to ied by a curriculum vitae, a list of the scientific tell Christie that he could relieve the northern staff who would accompany him, and a copy of party next year “without equipping the ship Stefansson’s letter. He emphasized that he had they proposed to use.”141 He referred, of course, already secured $125,000 of the $250,000 he to the Arctic.142 When he had arrived back in needed and would ask the Canadian govern- England and inspected his ship, however, ment for only $100,000. The expedition would Shackleton was obliged to cable Bassett saying be Canadian and for the benefit of Canada, and that he found it impossible to accommodate he pledged to co-operate fully to establish the the proposed party because of their large re- proposed posts in the North. Even if Stefansson quirements in coal, stores, and “huts.” He pre- sented three alternative requests to Bassett: (1)

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair to try to obtain $50,000 from the government “on his own responsibility.” Harkin knew noth- without any stipulation to carry their party, (2) ing, either, about any proposition to the HBC to obtain $100,000 from the government, in involving the question of sovereignty, although which case he would carry the party on a vessel he knew from contacts with company officers he would charter himself, or the “most attract- that they planned to extend their posts north- ive,” or (3) to get the government to give him wards. This would constitute occupation, but 248 $100,000 or less, provisions already purchased, for sovereignty purposes official government and magistrate powers, in which case he would action would have to follow.147 make his base and winter on the Ellesmere Is- In his eagerness and anxiety for a favour- land coast and renew the party yearly at cost.143 able decision, Shackleton attempted to put On 3 May, Shackleton sent a further cable pressure upon Meighen, and in so doing he to Bassett, evidently in response to a com- probably helped to cook his own goose. On 6 muniqué he had received, saying, “Yes I will May, he sent Meighen the following cable from undertake this year government Ellesmere London: proposition and leave main expedition until next year.” He went on to detail the difficulties Respectfully urge action and the delay put him in, including his debt to sup- confirmation government support porters who had provided him with a ship and stop it is vital for me to know im- wanted some action, and his withdrawal “long mediately stop I have fallen in with since” of members of his staff from other oc- every line indicated at various inter- cupations.144 Bassett sent a copy of this cable views with members of council stop to Meighen, saying that he would “respectfully during first visit I was told govern- suggest that the Government give Shackleton ment would support me if I would some definite reply as he is anxiously waiting.” get adequate outside help stop on re- He added that Sir John Eaton was willing to ceiving this help I returned to Can- contribute $100,000 to the expedition.145 Thus, ada the government then suggested at this stage, the Stefansson and Shackleton ex- that as a reason for their assistance peditions were in comparable positions. I should carry and place their station This correspondence came to Cory’s atten- thus saving the larger cost of equip- tion, and on 4 May he sent copies of it to Har- ping and running the Arctic stop I kin, asking if he knew what proposition had agreed to this and have been hold- been made to Shackleton. He asked also if ing my ship for final ratification for Harkin knew about a communication suppos- I realized I could not equip for my ed to have been sent to the department about long expedition and at the same time work by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) carry the large amount of stores and in this connection.146 Harkin replied in detail coal which commissioner north west on 6 May, saying that he knew nothing about police considered necessary stop any proposition to Shackleton and, surprising- therefore I concentrated on helping ly, that he had consulted with Christie about government plan stop I was given it, and Christie said he knew nothing about it to understand whole matter would either. Christie had expressed the opinion that come up before council on April elev- Bassett had cabled a proposition to Shackleton enth stop time passed stop hearing

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH nothing I took the step of holding not admit of assistance your exped- myself ready to carry out promise ition this year.149 to government and to postpone my main expedition until next year hav- Not willing to accept rejection, Shackleton pro- ing obtained the approval of donors tested strongly in another cable on 12 May. of ship on this side and my Canadian supporters stop in justifyable [sic] Keen disappointment adverse 249 hope of government support I have decision stop cannot see where I taken my principal experienced staff failed to comply with conditions from other occupations and with my which were firstly reasonable outside ship have been awaiting your deci- help stop secondly scientific per- sion stop I propose immediately you sonnel to be largely Canadian stop cable to make necessary accommo- thirdly to carry and lay government dation alterations commission ship station stop the first two conditions proceed Canada stop my position is were settled before I sailed for Eng- growing equivocal in this country land in April stop regarding the due to delay stop please cable govern- third I have held my ship awaiting ment’s definite support and amount confirmation of government and bearing in mind the government that is why the main expedition was Arctic expedition would have cost postponed stop my message being approximately quarter of a million I would hold main expedition over dollars stop urgently awaiting your so as to comply with government action.148 plan stop earnestly beg your recon- sideration and allow me lay your Meighen’s chilly answering cable on 9 May station stop failing this please cable shows clearly that he was in no mood to be me definite promise of support next badgered into any decision other than one of year and meanwhile I will carry on the government’s own choosing. A copy of it in general scientific work as main part his papers reads as follows: of staff is engaged and ship is ready.150

Referring your cablegram sixth. Meighen’s curt response on 16 May must have Government has made no definite ended Shackleton’s hopes: “My cable May ninth commitment whatever as regards states our position. Stop. Cannot give any def- your proposed Expedition and prom- inite promise for next year.”151 ise of consideration was upon con- In the concluding scene of this strange ditions that at no time to date have drama, there is one feature which seems to been complied with Stop Further- stand out clearly. Meighen’s cable telling more Government was advised re- Shackleton the government would give no as- cently on your behalf that you could sistance to his expedition in 1921 was dated 9 not go on with your expedition this May. On the other hand, Cory’s note to Harkin year Stop Our arrangements now do saying that the whole matter, including Stefan- sson’s part in it, had been called off was dated

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair 18 May, and it may be assumed that this mes- so be of practical use as a guide in sage was sent without delay. There seems to be issuing our instructions.153 no document recording the Cabinet’s decision or decisions, but the evidence indicates that In his second report, dated 13 January, Craig Shackleton’s expedition had been rejected eight was able to say that the Deputy Minister of or nine days before the final adverse verdict Justice had already forwarded a preliminary 154 250 was pronounced upon Stefansson’s. memorandum on the Canadian title. The Neither of the two explorers permitted Hon. J. C. Patterson, appointed under Order himself to accept his failure with the Canadian in Council PC No. 1170 in 1910 to investigate government as a final defeat. Almost immedi- the same subjects, had not made a report, but ately, each was planning his next large project, arrangements were under way to have Loring Stefansson the occupation of Wrangel Island Christie (then in London) to investigate there.155 and Shackleton the expedition to the Antarc- On 17 January, Craig sent Harkin a detailed tic which resulted in his death early in 1922. In list of questions that Christie might be asked both cases, the change of plans was made with to investigate in London.156 A few changes hardly a moment’s delay. Shackleton, having were made, and the revised list, together with received Meighen’s final rejection on 16 May, some key documents and papers, was sent to sent a cable the same day to Dr. Alexander Hep- Gibson157 and then to Deputy Minister Cory158 burne Macklin, a colleague who was then in on 19 January for transmittal to Christie. In Canada, telling him to return immediately to the meantime, a cable was sent to Christie, England and prepare for an Antarctic voyage.152 who had gone to Geneva, to inform him of the While the involved question of the Arc- work that awaited him in London. Among the tic expeditions was under consideration, offi- key documents and papers were copies of Dr. cials also looked into Canada’s legal position King’s memorandum of 1905, Christie’s own respecting its sovereignty over the northern memorandum of 28 October 1920, and Har- islands. Not long after being appointed to take kin’s memorandum of 25 November 1920. The charge of planning the proposed expedition, questions on the revised list were as follows: J. D. Craig was asked to make a weekly prog- ress report to the Minister of the Interior. In Re Dr. King’s memorandum. the first of these reports, dated 4 January 1921, he said, inter alia: 1. Precisely what did Great Britain in 1880 consider as “British ter- The question of Canada’s title ritory in North American not al- to the northern islands is also being ready included in the Dominion looked into from the viewpoint of of Canada”? International law, and an effort is be- 2. Was the Imperial Order in Coun- ing made to get a memorandum on cil of 1880 intentionally indefinite this point from someone, possibly in and, if so, why? the Department of Justice or the De- partment of External Affairs, whose 3. What does “adjacent” mean? opinion will carry some weight and

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH 4. Is there any reason to differ from see Mr. Harkin’s memorandum, Dr. King’s interpretation of the page “A” and copy of Rasmussen’s intention of the parties to the letter, paragraph #3. It is very im- transfer of 1880? portant that information on this subject should be secured and it Re. Mr. Harkin’s memorandum. would seem desirable to make an attempt to ascertain through the 251 5. Can Canada of itself, that is with- British diplomatic representative out specific instructions from at Copenhagen, the real object of the Imperial Government, take the Rasmussen expedition. any effective action regarding the sovereignty of lands which may 11. If Denmark has taken any such be regarded by other nations as steps, what are the views of the outside of Canada? Imperial authorities in regard to these acts? 6. Were the Low and Bernier exped- itions, in this respect, authorized 12. What steps should be taken by in a form in compliance with the Canada in such an event and principles of International Law? how will the Imperial authorities regard the steps that will un- 7. Is it possible that it might be ne- doubtedly be taken by Canada to cessary to repeat all the formal counteract any official action of acts carried out by them? Denmark along the lines of occu- 8. What is the situation in regard to pation and administration? Axel Heiberg and the Rignes [sic] Islands? Does Norway hold an in- Re. Mr. Christie’s memorandum. choate title for them? 13. Are permanent posts necessary 9. Can Canada take any action look- for the establishment of effective ing towards the establishment occupation in the Arctic Zone? of a full sovereignty here with- out specific official endorsation of such action by the Imperial Re. The despatch in the Montreal Government? Gazette.

10. Has Denmark taken any steps to 14. Is there any official knowledge of establish sovereignty on Elles- the United States Expedition and mere Land, or elsewhere? This its object?159 may be covered by the inquiry being made through Sir Joseph The plans for Christie’s investigation in Pope or through Colonel Perry London were nullified by his return to Canada who is referring the matter to at the end of January, without having received Scotland Yard. In this connection information prior to his departure from Europe

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair about what was expected of him.160 In a conver- any serious intention of occupying any of the sation with Craig, Dominion Archivist Arthur islands; and third, so far as Denmark was con- Doughty had already suggested that Christie cerned, on every ground Canada should “pro- should get in touch with Henry Percival Biggar, ceed without hesitation.” “If he [Rasmussen] or the London representative of the Dominion any of his party is encountered he should be Archives, to obtain help. On the same occa- clearly told what our position is, informed of 252 sion, Craig took up with Doughty the question our laws, and requested to conform to them.” of getting a member of the archives’ staff in Ot- The background of the writing of Holmden’s tawa to look into the problem of Canada’s title memo is also rather confused. In acknowledg- to the Arctic islands, and Doughty replied that ing receipt of Christie’s memo of 17 February, although all personnel trained for this sort of Craig asked him for his opinion about the best research were at the time fully occupied with way to get the information from London that the Labrador boundary controversy, he never- it had been hoped he would obtain himself theless expected someone to undertake the before returning to Canada.165 In his reply on work shortly.161 The outcome of negotiations 25 February, Christie referred to the fourteen was that Christie undertook to prepare another questions in Craig’s memo of 19 January, which memo on the subject; Hensley R. Holmden, had been sent to him in London, and expressed who was associate archivist in charge of the the opinion that the first four should be inves- Maps Division, was engaged to examine histor- tigated by the Dominion Archives’ representa- ical aspects of the problem from archival and tive in London, while the remainder could be other materials, and arrangements were made handled elsewhere.166 Craig passed this advice to get certain information from London.162 on to Cory on 26 February, suggesting that the Christie prepared his report without delay first four questions be submitted to Doughty;167 and had it ready by 17 February.163 He promptly and Cory complied on 3 March, asking that withdrew it the same day and then submitted a Doughty have the four questions investigated revised version in two separate parts, the first by his London representative.168 Holmden, who on 17 February and the second on 28 Febru- did the work, carried on his investigation in ary.164 The essential change was that a section at the Dominion Archives and in the Governor the end of the first version strongly condemning General’s secretary’s office, and in doing so, he the proposal to occupy Wrangel Island was endeavoured mainly to answer five questions separated and became the substance of the which Craig had submitted to Doughty on 21 second part of the revised version. Christie had January.169 These five questions were, however, obviously changed his mind. The part of the re- identical to the first five on the list in Craig’s vised version dated 17 February gives evidence memo of 19 January. Holmden had a prelimin- of hasty and rather superficial preparation, and ary draft of his “Memo re The Arctic Islands” has little of concrete importance in it other ready on 14 April 1921170 and followed it with a than the following advice: first, Canada should larger, more complete version on 26 April.171 He take a very firm stand in asserting sovereignty subsequently added some missing documents over the northern islands; second, of the three after they arrived from England.172 foreign states to be considered, namely the Holmden based his answers to Craig’s five United States, Norway, and Denmark, neither questions mostly upon Colonial Office docu- the United States nor Norway had ever shown ments dealing with the transfer of 1880, which

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH he apparently found either in the archives or in exploiting mines, and main- the office of the Governor General’s secretary. taining law and order.173 Briefly summarized, his answers were: Holmden went on to discuss other questions relating to the transfer of 1880 and subsequent 1. In 1880 Britain considered as matters, including the speeches in the House of “British territory in North Amer- Commons on Hudson Bay by David Mills and 253 ica not already included in the Charles Hibbert Tupper on 28 May 1894, the Dominion of Canada” all un- sector speech of Senator Poirier on 20 February annexed territories and islands, 1907, and the patrol voyages of Wakeham, Low, but found it impossible to state and Bernier. He ended with several long lists of precisely what these possessions relevant maps. were. His long memo, running to a total of sixty- 2. The Imperial order in council of four pages, is one of the most important works 1880 was beyond doubt inten- on the subject which has ever been written, es- tionally indefinite, because those pecially in its treatment of the official corres- 174 handling the transfer “could not pondence leading to the transfer of 1880. Un- define, that which in their own fortunately the memo was never published, and minds was indefinite.” for years about the only work in print on the above-mentioned official correspondence was 3. The word “adjacent” was evident- the partial treatment of it by Albert E. Mill- ly used regularly to mean “apper- ward, which was on a much smaller scale.175 The taining to” or “of right belonging anxieties of the post–First World War years re- to” and was applied to islands specting the security of the northern territories “lying within, or washed by terri- led to the writing of several such memos which torial waters.” never found their way into print, including Wyatt Malcolm’s memo of 6 November 1920, 4. There would not appear to be Harkin’s memo of November 1920, and Chris- any major reason to dissent from tie’s memos of 28 October 1920 and 17 Febru- Dr. King’s interpretation of the ary 1921. Holmden’s memo was the ablest and intention of the parties in 1880, had the most fundamental significance.176 although Dr. King did not have Besides the political and legal questions access to all the correspondence bearing upon Canada’s position in the northern and thus was not completely islands, there was also the practical problem of informed. getting a ship ready to carry out the expedition 5. Canada could evidently do a great that had been proposed. This task fell under the deal independently to assert her direct supervision of J. D. Craig, who was given sovereignty over these northern this responsibility by appointment on 1 De- lands, by establishing patrols, cember 1920.177 Almost immediately after the making settlements of Eskimos, appointment of Pickels as captain of the Arctic on 16 December, he and Craig made a trip to Quebec to inspect the ship on 21 December.178

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair Pickels remained to make a more detailed and arrangements were made to provide extra examination, and on 5 January, he reported space and supplies for them.186 In spite of the to Craig that it would cost almost $60,000 to efforts of Craig, Pickels, and others to speed repair, outfit, and supply theArctic for a six preparation, there remained considerable doubt months’ northern cruise. With the addition of whether the old Arctic could be made ready wages and incidentals, he estimated the total in time for the voyage, and on 4 May, Pickels 179 254 cost at $82,615. Craig, in turn, urged the wrote an angry note to Craig, complaining of government to allot $85,000 to cover costs.180 lack of co-operation and effort on the part of Since the expedition was to be the responsib- the Department of Marine and Fisheries per- ility of the Department of the Interior, it was sonnel who were supposed to be working on necessary to transfer the Arctic to this depart- the ship.187 These difficulties were smoothed ment from the Department of Marine and over, and Pickels wrote notes to Craig on 18 Fisheries.181 Later, an additional $70,000 was May and 20 May, reporting that the work was placed in the main estimates, and this sum was “progressing nicely,” Arctic had been taken out retained (in case of emergency), even after the of dock, and the final phases of outfitting were expedition had been cancelled. The designation under way.188 “Reindeer Expedition,” which had been adopt- On 20 May, Craig wrote Pickels a brief ed for the expedition for camouflage purposes, note informing him that the expedition had was dropped, and in the estimates the $70,000 been cancelled and added his own resigned appeared under the heading “Northwest Terri- comment: “There is no use trying to write tories Explorations.”182 what I think about it.”189 He enclosed a copy With the financial arrangements in place, of a memorandum from Cory, advising that preparations for the expedition proceeded the Arctic should be kept in good condition steadily – although the entry of Shackleton in case a northern expedition should become upon the scene soon cast a shadow of uncer- necessary at a later date.190 For a time the fate tainty over its future. There were various sug- of the Arctic was in doubt, especially since the gestions about what might be accomplished by Department of Marine and Fisheries was ask- the expedition, especially in scientific work, but ing that she be returned to them so that she Craig took the view that such activities were not could be used again as a lightship.191 Cory’s the primary purpose of the expedition and that wish prevailed, however, and the Department there would be little time for them anyhow.183 of the Interior decided to retain the ship tem- Lougheed concurred with this view and was re- porarily and kept it in a state of near readiness ported by Cory to agree thoroughly “that this is in case an emergency demanded a northern not a scientific expedition, but one undertaken expedition at short notice.192 Captain Pickels, primarily for the establishment of police posts bitterly disappointed as might be expected, re- and the maintenance of British Sovereignty in ported that the Arctic was “in splendid order” the Northern Islands.”184 It was then decided to and if wanted could be made completely ready take only a photographer and a cartographer, for sailing in two weeks.193 One cause of con- and other technical and scientific personnel cern was a rumoured American expedition to were ruled out.185 The Royal Canadian Mount- the Arctic later that summer under Donald B. ed Police (RCMP, the new name given to the MacMillan, although it was also reported that RNWMP in 1920) enjoyed a favoured position,

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH government would contribute 100,000 kroner to support it.196 On 4 April, Cory cabled the High Commissioner’s office in London, and on 25 April, the Governor General cabled Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill about Rasmussen and his expedition. The High Commissioner’s office replied to Cory on 28 April, and Churchill 255 replied to the Duke of Devonshire on 29 April, both referring to an interview Rasmussen had had with Sir Henry Lambert at the Colonial Office on 15 or 16 March, in which Rasmus- sen had indicated no propensity to challenge Canadian authority. Although the British had yet to receive a memorandum of application requested of Rasmussen, both Churchill and Lambert reported that the Dane had “used no language contesting Canada’s unrestricted do- minion over Ellesmere Land.”197 On 30 April, Ambassador C. M. Marling at Copenhagen reported to Lord Curzon that although the Figure 10-4: Knud Rasmussen. Library of Danish government was contributing 100,000 Congress, George Grantham Bain Collection. kroner to the expedition, it was nevertheless purely scientific, and Rasmussen had no of- ficial status.198 Canadian suspicions were not completely put at rest, however, and on 12 May, the expedition had only scientific objectives Craig wrote a memo to Cory, saying that since (see chapter 14).194 the Danish government was supporting Ras- While all these preparations had been go- mussen’s expedition and since the requested ing on, the responsible Canadian authorities memorandum had not been received, both he kept their eyes on the Danes and tried to dis- and Harkin felt that the matter could not be cover what they (and particularly Knud Ras- overlooked.199 mussen) were doing. On 1 April 1921, Harkin On 26 May, after the northern expedition wrote a memo to Cory, suggesting that a code had been cancelled, Harkin wrote a long memo cable should be sent to Sir George Perley in to Cory, reviewing the entire situation and ur- London to ask him to try to get a written appli- ging that the Arctic be used for some kind of cation from Rasmussen that would constitute a northern patrol expedition, even if no police recognition of Canadian sovereignty in any of posts were established. In the memo, he went the northern islands he might visit.195 About into detail about the Danish aspect and, in so a week later, newspapers carried announce- doing, revealed his extraordinary and almost ments of Rasmussen’s projected expedition to morbid suspicion and fear of the supposed the North American Arctic. Although details Danish threat: were scanty, one report said that the Danish

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair When Rasmussen was in Lon- The Kock [sic] (Danish) exped- don, Sir Ernest Shackleton had an ition left Denmark last year and interview with him. One of the early its departure synchronized with suspicious circumstances in connec- Rasmussen’s sudden departure for tion with Rasmussen was his sudden Greenland last Summer. The an- decision not to come to America nounced purpose of this expedition 256 last Summer and his departure for is to make a circular trip in north Greenland and the delay of a month Greenland. The Colonial Office re- by his Secretary in the mailing of his ports the following from the Royal letter to the Musk Ox Commission Geographical Society: announcing this change of plans. “The Danish State has lent them Shackleton asked Rasmussen why a ship and the Chairman of his com- he had so suddenly gone north last mittee is a former rear-admiral of Summer and Rasmussen replied the Danish Navy – the State bears that he had gone to investigate the part of the expenses.” murder of a Greenland Eskimo by This is an expedition that one of the McMillan [sic] exped- could easily be used for invading ition. This was obviously an untruth the northern islands if the Danish and an evasion because the murder Government has such in mind. If took place in 1914 and Rasmussen Denmark has any ulterior motives has been up in Greenland practical- the Rasmussen expedition and Ras- ly every year since and so had had mussen proposals re. Conservation ample opportunity to investigate the of musk ox may only be a blind to murder. Moreover the murder took distract attention from the Koch ex- place in Axel Heiberg Land which pedition and give Denmark time to lies in the Arctic to the westward of establish occupation in the north. It Ellesmere Land where Denmark has must be kept in mind that according no jurisdiction. to the Colonial Office Rasmussen has It seems pretty clearly estab- no official status in Denmark. All in lished that Rasmussen’s proposed all the attitude of Denmark seems to expedition to the Canadian islands continue to be suspicious.200 is a scientific one. However it was he who contended that these islands Suspicion of Rasmussen was such that on 20 were “No Man’s Land” and if he ar- May the Winnipeg office of the HBC cabled rived at Bylot Island about August the London office, to which he had applied for 15th as expected he will have per- supplies and transportation during his stay in sonal evidence that Canada is not the North, advising that he should be given no administering the north islands. help whatsoever. Harkin advised Cory on 30 Should Denmark wish to raise the May, and Cory agreed that Rasmussen should question later on his evidence will be not be prevented from making his trip so long available. It seems unfortunate that as Canadian officials were on hand to make this should be the case. him observe Canadian laws.201 When Edward

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH Fitzgerald of the Winnipeg office of the HBC declared towards the British Empire, learned that Rasmussen had satisfied the Brit- and your Ministers may, in his opin- ish Foreign Office that the expedition was pure- ion, rest assured that any such action ly scientific, evidently by presenting them with is not the intention of the Danish a plan of it, he wired Sir James Lougheed on 4 Cabinet.204 June asking permission to give Rasmussen any 202 needed assistance. Lougheed replied by wire This was followed a day later by a “Clear 257 on 8 June granting the requested permission, the Line–Urgent” cable, in which Churchill provided that Rasmussen accepted Canadian informed the Governor General that the Danish sovereignty.203 minister had submitted a memorandum Rasmussen and the Danish government “containing definite guarantee by Government had become aware, if they were not already, of Denmark that expedition has no political of the extent of the distrust with which Can- or mercantile aims but is of entirely scientific adian officials regarded their activities in the character and that no acquisition of territory High Arctic of North America, and they were whatsoever is contemplated in regions in anxious to demonstrate that this distrust was question.”205 On 10 June, Churchill wrote needless. It is also evident that there was much a short note206 to accompany a copy of the less worry over the matter in London than in Danish memorandum, which he sent to Ottawa. A series of communiqués in early June, inform the Canadian government. The Danish starting with the above-mentioned Rasmussen memorandum, dated 8 June, is certainly the plan presented on 4 June, would appear to have key document of the closing stages of the removed all cause for Canadian suspicion, at drama and is worth reproducing in full: least insofar as official statements could serve this end. At the same time, unless there is The Government of the Domin- much more to this strange affair than has been ion of Canada having apparently en- revealed, they provide a sort of dénouement to tertained some misconception with the involved and mysterious business which regard to a Danish scientific exped- has formed the subject of the preceding pages. ition which under the leadership of On 8 June, Colonial Secretary Winston Mr. Knud Rasmussen is about to leave Churchill sent Governor General the Duke Denmark for the Arctic regions of of Devonshire a cypher cable, a paraphrase of Canada, the Danish Minister has the which read in part: honour by order of the King’s Gov- ernment to transmit the following Regarding Rasmussen and ap- statement to His Britannic Majesty’s prehension that Danish Government Government with the request that it may be disposed to question Can- may be telegraphed immediately to adian Sovereignty over Ellesmere the Canadian Government. Land, a report has been received The entire committee of the from His Majesty’s Minister at Knud Rasmussen polar expedition, Copenhagen that such a step would with the exception of professor Bog- be directly against policy of friend- gild and professor Jensen, now absent ship which Danish Cabinet has on leave, has submitted the following

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair signed statement to the Ministry of soon as possible and communicated Foreign Affairs. to this Legation.207

1. The expedition was planned in Word of the Danish assurance was telegraphed 1909 by Knud Rasmussen and the by Lougheed to Fitzgerald on 10 June, and Fitz- late Dr. Stensby [sic], professor gerald cabled the London office of the HBC of geography at the University of 258 the next day, advising them that the Canadian Copenhagen; government agreed that the company might 2. The plan was set forth in 1910 furnish assistance to Rasmussen’s expedition, in the Danish scientific journal so long as he did not dispute Canadian sover- 208 “Geografisk Tidaskrift”; eignty in the northern islands. On 13 June, Fitzgerald informed Lougheed by telegraph 3. The expedition has a purely scien- that London had cabled back, saying “every- tific character and is unconnected thing satisfactorily settled Rasmussen express- with any political or commercial es many thanks.”209 On 21 June, W. L. Griffith objects whatever; its chief aim is at the Office of the High Commissioner in ethnographical exploration and, London wrote a letter to Sir Joseph Pope, say- in addition, general researches in ing that although he had at first thought that the interest of natural history. Rasmussen’s neglect to furnish a memorandum might have been calculated, in the light of later His Majesty the King has ac- events he had concluded that he “was bona fide corded his patronage to the exped- throughout, and … a man of great intelligence, ition after having received from the capacity, and good character.”210 committee a detailed explanation of Nevertheless, suspicion of Rasmussen died the project in conformity with the hard, at least in some quarters. On 4 January foregoing statement. 1922, after the expedition had begun, Harkin His Danish Majesty’s Govern- wrote a memo to Cory, saying he thought it ment therefore guarantees that the “at least a matter of bad taste” that Rasmussen expedition has no political or mer- should give the name “Danish Island” to an is- cantile aims but is of entirely scien- land at the mouth of Lyon Inlet, Melville Penin- tific character and that no acquisi- sula, and advising that the government should tion of territory whatsoever is con- “keep a close eye on this expedition.”211 Os- templated in the regions in question. wald Sterling Finnie sent a copy of this memo The Danish Minister begs to to Commissioner Aylesworth Bowen Perry of add that Mr. Knud Rasmussen’s ex- the RCMP on 23 January, asking that if pos- pedition is to leave Copenhagen for sible he should arrange for observation of the Greenland, their starting point, on expedition.212 As it proceeded other complaints the 16th instant wherefore it would were raised: that it had flown the Danish flag,213 be much appreciated if the consent that it had interfered with the trade of others,214 of the Government of Canada to that it had carried on trading itself,215 and that the landing and further progress of no licences had been issued to it in 1922.216 the expedition might be obtained as Most of these complaints were cleared up in

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH one way or another: when asked, Rasmussen about MacMillan than Rasmussen was. The readily agreed to fly a Union Jack over his Dan- Danish explorer made a favourable impres- ish flag,217 the charge that the expedition had sion during his visit to Ottawa, in the course engaged in trading activities was repeatedly of which, thanks to his intimate knowledge denied,218 Rasmussen had asked permission in of Inuit and the circumstances in which they August 1922 to kill one male muskox for sci- lived, he was able to answer the many questions 219 entific purpose, and he had been granted a put to him by the Canadian officials. He also 259 hunting and trapping licence for that year.220 reiterated his and Denmark’s acknowledgment By April 1925, matters had changed to such of Canadian sovereignty over Ellesmere Island an extent that it was Rasmussen who was do- in a letter written to O. D. Skelton while still in ing the complaining. Reports about the coming Ottawa.223 Over the following years, Rasmus- MacMillan expedition indicated that it would sen maintained contacts with people in Ottawa receive more favourable treatment than had who were concerned with the Arctic, notably been extended to him. In a letter to Finnie he O. S. Finnie, and made himself a much respect- wrote: ed figure there, enjoying this new status with- out serious interruption until his premature All this makes me assume that death in 1933. any new land discovered by him or The foregoing pages have attempted to his expedition will be taken in pos- document the story of this extraordinary affair, session for the U.S.A. If that is so I insofar as it can be gleaned from surviving gov- feel justified in asking how Canada ernment files and other materials. On at least can grant any such right while it two key matters probably more could be said: was made an absolute condition to the supposed Danish challenge that touched off me, that I should sign a statement in the whole business and the cancellation of the which I declared that under no cir- Arctic expedition in 1921. cumstances would take possession To look at the second matter first, the most of any area in behalf of my country striking feature about the cancellation of the Denmark or any other country. expedition is that no authoritative or detailed I did sign this statement in Lon- explanation for it has ever been made public. don by the High Commission before Stefansson was anxious to discover the truth I left.... I will, as a son of a small na- about it, and he remained uneasy and dissatis- tion feel extremely sorry if any ex- fied with the partial explanation given him for plorer from any other country would the rest of his life. He made public his own in- be given any right which was not terpretation of this partial explanation, and al- given me.221 though there is obviously much truth in what he says, it is equally obvious that it does not A handwritten note by Finnie on the original tell the whole story. In his narration, the basic of Rasmussen’s letter says that he discussed the issue was the question of who should command matter with him while he was in Ottawa be- the expedition, with Shackleton becoming his tween 27 April and 6 May,222 and it may safely principal rival. The dispute eventually involved be assumed that the Canadian officials empha- (and had to be settled by) the entire Cabinet, sized that they were a good deal more worried with half supporting him and the other half

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair supporting Shackleton. Although not fully in- evident in Harkin, was also apparent among formed about the details of the dispute, he had many senior officials with responsibilities con- “no reason to doubt what a Cabinet member nected to the expedition, and undoubtedly was told me: that, in effect, the two factions said relevant in its cancellation. Nevertheless, the to each other that if they could not agree they evidence shows that Stefansson was not guilty might as well do nothing.”224 of deceiving the Canadian government as to his 260 This is correct up to a point, but the im- real intentions, and he was quite sincere in his pression given is inaccurate in some respects, expressed wish to continue serving Canada in and the affair was much more involved than the North. Even Harkin admitted that he was this would imply. First, Shackleton’s expedition “convinced that Stefansson is playing the game was eliminated by Prime Minister Meighen’s absolutely loyally to Canada”229 and that there cable on 9 May 1921, and so Shackleton had was “every evidence” that he had “preserved ceased to be an active rival when the decision absolute confidence in connection with this was taken on or about 18 May to cancel the subject.”230 Both Stefansson and his biograph- expedition of the Arctic to Ellesmere Island.225 er suggest strongly that “the Anderson faction” Second, Stefansson was not going to be the (his detractors following the Canadian Arctic overall commander of the Arctic expedition Expedition) had a good deal to do with the can- anyway, and he knew it, as he had been so in- cellation of the expedition,231 but there is little formed by Harkin in late January 1921.226 Craig direct evidence of this, at least in government had been placed in charge of preparing the ex- records. pedition on 1 December 1920,227 and he was Certain documents in departmental and expedition commander when the Arctic finally other archival files throw additional light on sailed in 1922. Third, according to Stefansson’s the cancellation and related matters. Harkin own plan agreed upon with Harkin in February wrote a memo for Cory on 13 May 1921, a few 1921, Stefansson himself would not go north days before the cancellation, for the minister to in 1921 but would go with a small exploratory use in Cabinet deliberations. In it Harkin sum- party in 1922 and join an advance party which marized the situation to date, his comments would have established a base on Axel Heiberg revealing an attitude that placed most of the Island.228 Fourth, and rather sad to relate be- blame for complicating matters upon Shackle- cause it went far beyond any suspicions that ton. For example: Stefansson may have had at the time, influen- tial figures who Stefansson thought were for The programme approved by him really had been against him all along (or Council in the Autumn of 1920 was had turned against him). Harkin, for example, being carried out without a hitch whose thinking on many subjects was akin to until the early part of March when Stefansson’s, was anxious to send a sovereignty Sir Ernest Shackleton seeking aid for expedition north, but he was determined that an exploration trip into the Beaufort Stefansson should not command it. Harkin Sea approached the Canadian Gov- wanted Stefansson to go north with the exped- ernment.... In this connection the ition, but only to get him away so that, as Harkin question was also raised as to the saw it, he would be unable to harm Canadian amount of expenditure involved in interests. This deep suspicion of Stefansson, so the original Arctic scheme.

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH So many questions concern- finally Council was doubtful if the ing Shackleton and concerning the expedition should be proceeded with question of economy have been this year. Finally on May 18th last I raised since the early part of March indicated to Council that, owing to that to date the whole question of the the preparations which we had made, Northern expedition has been large- the ship or the expedition would be 232 ly up in the air. ready to sail about the first of June, 261 [and] it was absolutely necessary that When Cory informed Craig on 18 May that the a decision should be arrived at as to expedition had been cancelled, he added the re- whether we should not carry out our quest that Craig consult with Harkin and pre- original plan. pare a “historical statement” of the action the Council declared against the ex- department had taken throughout the affair so pedition being proceeded with dur- that “the Minister’s record on the subject may ing the present year.234 be clear.”233 This statement went through sever- al drafts before Lougheed received and signed This revealing statement gives additional infor- it on 15 June. The final page reads as follows: mation about the matter, notably Lougheed’s attitude. As might be expected, it discloses no The outfitting of the ship and details about the division of opinion within preparations generally for the ex- Cabinet. pedition proceeded satisfactorily In his long memo to Cory on 26 May, Har- until about the middle of February kin commented, “It is assumed that the aban- when Sir Ernest Shackleton, seeking donment of the Arctic expedition is not the re- aid for an exploratory trip into the sult of any doubt as to the worth-whileness of northern regions, and more par- the Northern Islands but due to a feeling that ticularly Beaufort Sea, approached there is no danger of any challenge of Canadian the Government with a request for sovereignty.” He also detailed his fears of Dan- a substantial grant. Being informed ish or American occupation.235 The forthright of the expedition already arranged Danish denial of any designs upon Ellesmere for and its purposes, and being ad- or any other Canadian Arctic island in early vised that for reasons of economy it June brought about a change in the Canadian was impossible for the Government view of the sovereignty problem and of the to support two expeditions, he made function of any government expedition which a counter proposition that was con- might be sent north. In a letter to Cory on 29 sidered favourably by some Members June 1921, dealing with a Danish proposal to of the Government, although I did protect muskox on Ellesmere Island, Harkin not approve of it, thinking that the remarked that even though the program ap- arrangements already entered upon peared adequate and even though Denmark by the Government were much more was admitting British sovereignty there, it satisfactory. nevertheless “does not seem to me to be good The matter came up for con- policy for Canada to be dependent upon the sideration from time to time until actions of a foreign country for the observance

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair of Canadian law upon Canadian territory.”236 for the minister.241 The response was a ten-page In a long memo written on 16 February 1922, document, written mainly by Craig,242 which Craig said that, even though the Danish admis- in revised form became the memorandum of sion was “somewhat reassuring ... it did not dis- 16 February.243 After a lengthy résumé of the pose of the existing doubt as to the validity of entire background of the case, Craig presented Canada’s title, and in fact the incident empha- the following three basic alternatives: first, to 237 262 sized the weakness of Canada’s case.” These do nothing further; second, to commission comments reflect the continuing feeling that, officers of trading companies to perform the even though the Danes evidently no longer desired duties; or third, to establish an annual posed a serious threat, Canada needed to take government patrol and set up RCMP posts on positive action. the islands. The officials expressed clear pref- Finnie brought up the matter in a memo erence for the third alternative which “would, of 18 January 1922. “I think we are all agreed in a short time, certainly establish Canada’s that the proper course to insure sovereignty title beyond any doubt.” They strongly rec- over the various Islands in the Arctic is to have ommended sending out the first such patrol Government officials stationed, permanently, expedition in 1922. By this time, fear of what on the larger Islands,” he wrote. “Just as soon Denmark might do – which still figured prom- as the Minister returns this matter will be re- inently in the thinking of officials at the time vived.” Finnie added that if the minister would of the cancellation – had been replaced by con- not approve sending out the Arctic, an alterna- cern for the future status of the Arctic islands if tive might be to accept the offer of a trader to Canada continued to do nothing. establish a trading station on the south coast of On the other key matter, the real or sup- Ellesmere Island, and to appoint him a govern- posed Danish challenge, other archival sources ment agent.238 Harkin replied on 25 January, may contain further explanatory detail.244 indicating his strong agreement that action What remains unclear can be summarized in should be taken. “On account of the solution of this way. Because of several Danish statements the Danish question there is perhaps not now – a letter written by Rasmussen on 8 March the same necessity for rushing action,” he add- 1920, in an official communication from the ed. “Nevertheless the fact remains that Can- Danish government to the British government ada has not established its sovereignty in the on 12 April 1920, and in a letter from Rasmus- Northern islands.” He firmly advocated that sen to Stefansson on 11 May 1920, as reported government officers should take action, rather by Stefansson in his talk to the Advisory Tech- than traders holding delegated powers.239 nical Board on 1 October 1920 – Canadian au- In a memo to Cory on 31 January, Finnie put thorities got the impression that both Rasmus- forward the alternative propositions of sending sen and the Danish government denied Can- out the Arctic to establish posts on the northern adian sovereignty over Ellesmere Island and in- islands or contracting the HBC to perform the tended to establish their own sovereignty there. same duties. He indicated his preference for the They clung to this suspicious view thereafter, first alternative and suggested that it should be and they felt that subsequent Danish behaviour made an annual patrol.240 Cory requested that gave it substance. When Canadian suspicions Finnie, in consultation with Craig and Harkin, threatened to create difficulties for them in prepare a detailed memorandum on the subject this region, however, the Danes took steps to

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH remove them, and in June 1921, they categor- that involving the developing Danish-Norwe- ically denied any intention of challenging Can- gian dispute over Eastern Greenland, which adian sovereignty or attempting to acquire new might offer at least a partial explanation of territory themselves in the archipelago claimed Danish behaviour. In the Eastern Greenland by Canada. If one can take all this at face value, dispute, Denmark attempted to draw a distinc- it amounts to a categorical Danish denial of tion between the possession of sovereignty and Canadian sovereignty in 1920 and a categoric- the exercise of sovereignty, and held that even 263 al denial of any intention to interfere with it in though she had not in earlier years exercised 1921. But is this the whole story, and is it entire- sovereignty throughout all parts of Greenland, ly correct? There are at least two possibilities of she possessed this sovereignty nonetheless.246 additional complications. Thus certain activities by other states or by pri- The first of these, put in blunt terms, is that vate individuals in areas where she was not act- the Danish denial of Canadian sovereignty in ively exercising her own jurisdiction might be 1920 was genuine, but the Danish denial of any unobjectionable, but they would become objec- intention to interfere with Canadian sovereign- tionable if they constituted a direct challenge ty in 1921 was not genuine. This would imply to her ultimate sovereignty. In the somewhat that, even after the undertaking in 1921, the similar Ellesmere Island situation, but with the Danes still cherished hopes that in some way roles changed so that Canada occupied Den- they could establish a foothold in the Canadian mark’s position and Denmark found herself in archipelago and, presumably, only gave up Norway’s, a consistent Danish attitude would these hopes when it became obvious they could have held that certain Danish activities (such not do so. All the available evidence is against as killing muskox) in regions where Canada this possibility, and in all probability it can be was not asserting her own jurisdiction were discounted. unobjectionable, even though ultimate sover- The other, more interesting possibility is eignty in the region was Canadian. that the Danish guarantee in 1921 was per- In connection with Canadian fears of the fectly straightforward and genuine, but the supposed Danish threat, and indeed with Can- suspected Danish challenge in 1920 was gross- adian handling of the whole affair, the woeful ly exaggerated, if indeed it existed at all. This lack of knowledge of international law amongst would suggest that Canadian authorities per- responsible government personnel in Ottawa mitted themselves to become obsessed with a stands out clearly. Stefansson, who was large- morbid, neurotic, unreasoning fear, which had ly responsible for initiating Canadian worries, little basis in reality and which caused them to had only an elementary knowledge of inter- see, figuratively, burglars under every bed, even national law. What is surprising, however, is though there were none. Dr. Édouard-Gaston that most of the senior people he had to deal Deville said his colleagues were being misled in with in Ottawa had even less, and they showed this way when he refused to associate himself a distinct tendency to take his pronouncements with the resolution of the Advisory Technical at face value and defer to his opinions. The Board on 27 October 1920.245 rather naïve performances of Legal Adviser If Denmark had no acquisitive inclinations Christie in his memo of 28 October 1920 and of in Ellesmere Island in 1920, it seems likely that Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice Edwards there was a parallel between this situation and in his memo of 10 January 1921, as well as the

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair disinclination of the Department of Justice to would have had upon the handling of this mat- commit itself on the matter, are obvious exam- ter is indiscernible, but it is at least safe to say ples. Harkin emphasized this general weakness that the course of events would not have been in international law in a couple of memos to the same. Craig early in 1922. In the first, written on 7 Once the excitement had died down, a February in reply to Craig’s proposal to try to blanket of silence fell over this strange affair, 264 secure authoritative opinion from the Depart- and the inside story of it has never been made ment of Justice, Harkin said: public. It is almost as if those who participated in it had conspired to consign it as inconspicu- I quite agree with you that it is ously as possible to the graveyard. It is difficult, desirable that there should be an for example, to find in Canadian sources any authoritative statement from the Jus- published acknowledgement of or comment on tice Department regarding the ques- the official Danish denial in 1921 of any pred- tion of sovereignty. My recollection atory intentions towards Ellesmere Island, and of the situation last year when we yet one would have thought that this important had this matter up personally with news would have been made public property the Department of Justice is that that at an early stage. The conspicuous exception Department had not had any spe- among the leading participants to the gen- cial occasion to specialize on Inter- erally observed silence was Stefansson, who national Law. You will remember wanted the story to be made public, feeling that that we largely looked the matter up on balance it would help his reputation rather ourselves in consultation with Sir Jo- than hurt it. In this he was probably correct. seph Pope and Mr. L. C. Christie.247 Yet even Stefansson said little publicly and did not divulge many inside details about which In the second, dated 13 February and com- he was in a better position to speak than any- menting on Craig’s long draft memo of 11 Feb- one else. He believed that Harkin retained the ruary about the northern expedition, Harkin real story and that Harkin’s refusal to release wrote in similar vein: his information maintained the veil of se- crecy. For example, Stefansson suggested in his I am also inclined to think that autobiography: there should be a section inserted explaining the application of Inter- I never knew why Harkin was national Law, so far as we could get brought in, but I do know that he it, to situations such as exist in the came to be the best-informed man north. I think you may take it for in Ottawa, or anywhere, on both granted that the Minister, like near- overt and secret matters connected ly everyone else in Canada, is prac- with our plans. I was told that the tically unfamiliar with International only files our project ever had were Law.248 in either Harkin’s private apartment in Ottawa or his office.... What effect a sophisticated knowledge of inter- The one man who knew all sides national law in appropriate circles in Ottawa of the official Canadian government

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH position, or at least a great deal more been a marked and understandable reluctance than I did, was James Harkin. At on the part of both elements to draw any un- first I felt sure that he would eventu- necessary publicity to the affair. ally release his information, but the Third, there may have been an accidental last time I saw him his position still or circumstantial aspect, in that even if the af- was that Borden had trusted him to fair was not deliberately withheld from public keep certain matters secret. He had view, it gradually receded into the background 265 not been released from that pledge regardless. Nobody was given the responsibil- during Borden’s lifetime. With the ity of telling the full story in detail, and those Prime Minister’s death, Harkin felt, who could have done so gradually passed from the secret became inviolate.249 the scene. Fourth, even though certain issues which It is unsurprising, given the circumstances, had occupied the centre of the stage in 1920, that negotiations and preparations for the ex- 1921, and 1922 had apparently been settled, pedition were hushed up as much as possible they were so bound up with others that re- and that they proceeded in a sort of cloak-and- mained (or were likely to arise) that continued dagger atmosphere, replete with suspected silence seemed advisable. One need think only spies, traitors, predators, invaders, and villains. of Wrangel Island, the Sverdrup Islands, and But why was this secrecy maintained, especial- the expeditions of MacMillan (the subjects of ly after Denmark had made it clear that she had subsequent chapters) to appreciate the likeli- no designs on the Canadian archipelago? Sev- hood of this attitude and the weight it would eral possible answers may be suggested, all of have. them speculative, each containing probably a Fifth, there may have been an aftermath modicum of truth, but some more than others. of feeling among senior officials that they had First, fear about what Denmark might do botched the whole affair and that silence would in the archipelago was gradually replaced by spare them the embarrassment that would re- concern over what Canada herself ought to do sult if their ineptness were publicized. That is – hence the decision to institute regular patrol to say, they had made a big issue out of what voyages and establish RCMP posts to establish had turned out to be a very small one, and then a tangible form of Canadian sovereignty. It may they had mishandled it by overreacting to pre- well have been thought that this effort would sumed threats posed by Stefansson, Danes, and proceed more efficiently, and with less oppos- Americans. Regarding Stefansson in particu- ition, with minimal publicity of what had al- lar, senior officials in the civil service had been ready happened and particularly to the Danish determined that they would not follow his lead, commitments of June 1921. yet in some respects they had done so, naïve- Second, the affair was handled mainly by ly if only temporarily, and had, as they saw it senior civil servants and senior cabinet offi- afterwards, been led down the garden path. cials. Civil servants are normally, by virtue of So far as the political leaders were concerned, their calling, unable to speak freely and openly; any inhibition of this sort would attach itself Cabinet ministers are not likely to do so, in a mainly to the Meighen administration, which muddled and unsatisfactory affair such as this gave up office in December 1921. This might one, if it can be avoided. There seems to have help to account for the silence until that time.

10 | Danish Sovereignty, Greenland, and the Ellesmere Island Affair Mackenzie King’s administration, taking of- of 1921 were left to gather dust in government fice immediately afterwards, presumably was files. Thus the Canadian public remained in -al not subject to such inhibitions, at least at the most total ignorance of this extraordinary af- outset. In such circumstances, it is known for fair, even though it embodies what is in many an incoming administration to point to the ways the key story concerning Canada’s Arctic failings of its predecessor with considerable territories in the immediate years after the First 266 relish. There seems to be little evidence of this, World War. More than that, it established cer- however, which in turn suggests that the King tain broad lines of policy and basic patterns of government either found itself in accord with thought and behaviour respecting the North, Arctic policy as developed during the preced- which became almost self-perpetuating, and ing Conservative years or, if it disagreed, chose thus it went a long way to determining the kind to remain discreetly silent. of administration the Canadian government Whatever the reason or reasons for the deep applied to its northern territories for years to silence, the records of the projected expedition come.

A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL STUDY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANADIAN NORTH