Japan and the Question of Israel/Palestine, 1917-1956
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Volume 3 | Issue 3 | Article ID 2159 | Mar 28, 2005 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Before Oil: Japan and the Question of Israel/Palestine, 1917-1956 John de Boer Before Oil: Japan and the Question characterizing Japan's Middle East policy as of Israel/Palestine, 1917-1956 "non-assertive," "neutral," and "normal."[3] by John de Boer The word "conjecture" is used because no serious study of Japan's position on the question of Israel/Palestine before oil became a "Israel and Japan are situated at opposite ends determining factor has been conducted. of Asia, but this is a fact which binds them Considering that it was not until after the Suez together rather than separates them. The vast crisis of 1956 when Japan started to become continent of Asia is their connecting link, and reliant on oil as a source of energy, available the consciousness of their Asian destiny is their scholarship ignores the nature and content of common thought." Japan's relations with Israel/Palestine over the David Ben-Gurion, 1 July 1952 [1] first half of the twentieth century and cannot be considered definitive.[4] Existing scholarship cannot explain what the then Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben- As a consequence, very little is known about Gurion, was referring to when he expressed where Japan stood in relation to this conflict these words in response to Japan's official between the time the United Kingdom issued recognition of Israel on 15 May 1952. The the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and attacked reason is simple. Japan's policy toward the the Suez Canal along with France and Israel in question of Israel/Palestine has, almost 1956. This essay illuminates the nature of exclusively, been analyzed and understood Japan's position on the question of along one line of reasoning: Japan's oil Israel/Palestine during this period and offers dependence on Arab countries. Proponents of insight into Ben-Gurion's allusion to "the this approach to understanding Japan's position consciousness of an Asian destiny" that linked on the Israel-Palestinian conflict cannot Israel with Japan. account for developments prior to the "Oil Shock" of 1973. According to their assessment, Between 1917 and 1956, Japan did not avoid the Nikaido Statement issued by Japan in taking a political stance on the question of November 1973, which endorsed the Israel/Palestine. Until Japan's defeat in 1945, Palestinian right to self-determination and its government endorsed the Zionist project supported the implementation of United and demonstrated a keen interest in learning Nations Security Council resolution 242, from Zionist forms of settler colonialism for represented the first instance when Japan Japan's own colonial projects in Korea and openly took a political stance on the question of Manchuria. However, following Israel's Israel/Palestine.[2] The best that scholars such independence in 1948 and the increased as Yasumasa Kuroda, Ikeda Akifumi, Katakura identification of Israel as a colonial presence in Kunio and Ben-Ami Shillony have to offer on anti-colonial Asia, Japan's position shifted to the period preceding 1973 are conjectures support Palestinian self-determination in the 1 3 | 3 | 0 APJ | JF hope that this would distance Japan from its colonies in East Asia and the Pacific that it own colonial association and eventually occupied during World War I. At the Paris reposition Japan as a leading country in Asia. Peace Conference of 1919, Japan recognized This analysis reveals that Japan's posture British policies in Palestine in return for British toward the Israel-Palestinian conflict is not only approval of Japanese control over the a matter of oil but also reflective of a colonial Shandong Peninsula in China. Chinda Sutemi, link between Israel and Japan. one of the delegates to Paris, was instrumental in making sure that the Treaty of Versailles had Japan, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and no provision for the return of former German Zionist Settlement in Palestine concessions to China.[7] Japanese authorities sanctioned the idea of Support for the Zionist project also existed establishing a Jewish national home in among influential Japanese intellectuals Palestine shortly after the British announced including Uchimura Kanzo (1861-1930), Nitobe the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Approval of Inazo (1862-1933), Tokutomi Kenjiro the Zionist project came as early as December (1868-1927) and Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961). 1918 when Japan sent an unofficial statement In his essay on the mandate system, Yanaihara of endorsement to E. S. Kadoorie, the defended the special protection given to the representative of the Shanghai Zionist Jews in their quest for a national home based Association, via the French Embassy in Tokyo. on his conviction that the Zionist case The message expressed the Imperial constituted a national problem deserving of a government's "pleasure of having learned of nation-state. the advent desire of the Zionists to establish in Palestine a National Jewish Homeland," and In the terms of the Mandate over Palestine, indicated that, "Japan will accord its sympathy there is a special provision to secure (hogo) the to the realization of your [Zionist] creation of a national home for the Jewish aspirations."[5] Explicit endorsement came in people. Although … in practice this is an January 1919 when the Japanese ambassador exception to the principle of equal opportunity to Great Britain, Chinda Sutemi, sent an official for all nations and the open door policy, as letter to Chaim Weizmann the president of the Stoyanovski has argued, the purpose of the British Zionist Federation declaring in the mandate system is to guide a people or a group name of the Emperor that, "the Japanese that for various reasons has not been able to government gladly takes note of the Zionist attain autonomy or independence. As such, aspiration to extend in Palestine a national securing the establishment of a national home home for the Jewish people and they look for the Jewish people is in no way inconsistent forward with a sympathetic interest to the with the mandate system outlined by the realization of such desire upon the basis League of Nations.[8] proposed."[6] "The Zionist movement," claimed Yanaihara, "is Japan's interest in supporting the Zionist cause nothing more than an attempt to secure the in Palestine was not unrelated to Japan's right for Jews to migrate and colonize in order alliance with the British. The Anglo-Japanese to establish a center for Jewish national Alliance, signed in 1902, represented the culture."[9] foundation of Japanese diplomacy until 1922. By sanctioning the British mandate and Zionist An expert in colonial policy at Tokyo University, settlement in Palestine, Japan sought Yanaihara was interested in promoting Zionist endorsement for its claims to former German forms of settler colonialism as a model for 2 3 | 3 | 0 APJ | JF Japan to emulate.[10] This idea was made December of 1938, two thousand Jews had explicit in his article Shion Undo Ni Tsuite (On arrived and three thousand more were the Zionist Movement) published while he was expected over the next several months. By professor of colonial policy in the Department 1940, Japanese occupied Manchuria was host of Economics at Tokyo University and advisor to 17,000 Jewish refugees, most coming from to the Japanese government.[11] As Japan's Eastern Europe. settler colonial projects advanced with increasing vigor in Korea and Manchuria in the The Japanese government did not go as far as 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese government, certain Japanese officials would have liked, and particularly the Manchukuo government, which was to create a "new Jerusalem in also demonstrated an interest in cooperative Shanghai."[14] However, they did adopt what modes of agricultural settlement similar to Rabbi Marvin Tokayer, who served the pre- those documented by scholars such as World War II Jewish congregation in Tokyo, Yanaihara in Palestine. In some cases, specific called the Fugu Plan. references were made to the Zionist project. In 1936 for instance, the Chosen Sotokufu This Fugu Plan was framed by Yasue, Inuzuka (Government General of Korea) published a and other sympathetic diplomats to utilize research paper entitled, The Reasons Why those Jewish refugees in Manchuria and Jewish Agricultural Emigration to Palestine Will Shanghai as a quid pro quo in return for Succeed. This report specifically referred to favorable treatments accorded to them. cooperative agricultural settlements as the Japanese official quarters expected American "brightest example" behind the establishment Jewry to throw all its influence on Japan's side of a Jewish national home.[12] A high-level to eventually make U.S. Far Eastern policy report advising the Japanese government as it more pro-Japanese or at least neutral, and if initiated plans for mass emigration to things went well, even to entice Jewish capital Manchuria in 1936 also included references to which was badly needed for the industrial the case of Zionist settlement in Palestine with development of Manchuria. [15] special mention of the ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs as a scenario to avoid.[13] Japanese notions that the Jews could somehow improve Japan's standing in the West were That a number of influential Japanese based on very questionable stereotypes that intellectuals, policy makers and institutions emphasized a secret Jewish power source in referred specifically to Zionist forms of Europe and America and particularly appears cooperative agricultural settlement as a model to have ignored Hitler's policies of Jewish that Japanese should emulate is significant. extermination and genocide. Notably, one of This is because the connection illustrates the the main proponents of the Fugu Plan, Yasue fact that certain Japanese interpreted the Norhihiro, was responsible for translating The Zionist movement as a colonial enterprise that Protocols of the Elders of Zion into had parallels with, and/or practical application Japanese.[16] for, Japan's colonial expansion on the continent.