CHAPTER V I I I riiiiiAT'f 01* At the beginr.ing of the year 17^ i the third and the last phase of the first imglo-Maratha War started. In this phase the war was not limited to the conflict between the British and the larathas only. Due to the quadruple a lli­ ance among the Peshwa, the Nizam, 'Audhoji Bhonsale and Haidar id i, ttxe nnglo-i^aratha Aar became an all-India war, which was fought in the Konkan, Gujrat, Karnatak, Central India and Orissa. By the end of 1761, the hostilities between the Marathas and the British stopped temporarily. In August 17^1, peace negotiations between the two parties began, which after prolonged discussions and hot debate, >iltimately resulted in the conclusion of the treaty of Salbai in 1752, bringing to an end the first Anglo-Mar a th a ..ar which lasted for eight years from 17/i^ to 1782. It would be interesting to study the various circum­ stances leading to the opening of peace talks between the British and the Marathas culminating in the iYeaty of Salbai. The quadruple a llia n c e Ahich came in to e x iste n ce at the end of the year 1779, brought all the major Indian powers together a g a in st the B r it is h . The B r it is h mi<?ht then was not equal to the task of confronting four enemies on different fronts sim u lta n e o u sly . T his com pelled them to bow down and sue f o r pe^ce. On the Konkan front, the Peshwa*s army adopted the 327 328 policy of assaults and raids avoiding pitched battles with the enemy. By cutting off the line of communication and supplies of the British troops in their rear, the Peshwa’s commanders not only compelled general Goddard to abandon his plan of carrying an expedition to Pune but also rendered his position on the Borg;hat untenable and helpless. U lti­ mately, he had to retreat below the Ghats. But in his retreat ScVrtt _ also the tiarac,has inllicted on him losses, i’he counter­ offensive launched by the larathas after Goddard’s retreat to Panvel further added to the financial difficulties of the Bombay Government. As the ‘iarathas carried fire and sword up to the region of /iahim, the Brivish suffered from an acute shortage of money, food-grains and other supplies. If the British m ilitary position in the Konkan was bad, it was none too good in northern India. No doubt the British troops under Camac and .luir registered some notable triumphs over the ^larathas. They captured the important fort of Gwalher by surprising it and gave a set-bnck to i-ahadaji»s prestige. Besides, Colonel Goddard demonstrated to the native powers during his long march from Burhanpur to Surat that the British arms could penetrate any part of India at their w ill on the strength of their disciplined well-trained infantry and powerful artillery. In spite of these military feats, the over-all situation in :orth India did not offer bright prospects to the British int> rests. They were not able to score a single decisive victory against their fo rm id ab le opponent, /la h a d a ji iihinde. Ahen T'^lahadaji took 329 command of his ariny in ,>.al^via in his own hands, the British forces werfe moving towards the plains of i>ironj, Mahadaji attacked the British forces, defeated them and compelled them to take shelter in the fortress of Shivpuri Kolaras, nearly 75 miles from Gwalher.^ In this fort the British defended themselves strongly and Mahadaji could not dislodge them from that site. If it appeared difficult for Mahadaji to capture the fortress of Shivpuri by frontal attack, it proved equally difficult for the English to involve the Marathas into a pitched battle and score a victory over them, ganiml kSv5 of the Marathas soon marie the British realise that it was futile and a mere waste of time in pursuing the flying bands of the .Marathas. Mahadaji was hoping that once the Peshwa’s forces drove away Goddard's forces from the Sorghat, he might be able to secure reinforcement from the i’une quarters. It was certain that after his military posi­ tion was improved, he could win over to his side local allies and the patronage of the Mughal Emperor at Delhi^ I'dahadaji could not have been blind to the growing unpop«jlarity and hatred for the English in north India, which was soon to explode in the fmous Chet Sing incident, which nearly cost Warren Hastings his life . Mahadaji had kept corres­ pondence with the local chieftains in the nntai'veda. When the quadruple alliance was in progress, Divakar- pant Ghorghade, the Diwan of ^^udhoJi Bhonsale of Nagpur, had promised Nana Phadnis of an invasion of Bengal. To fteep this promise ^4udhoji sent a large army under Chimnaji Bhonsale and 330 Bhavani Kalo towards Bengal, Though these two men proceeded towards Bengal via Orissa, the invasion of Senjeal never materialised as Mudhoji was bribed iia. 15 lakhs by Governor General *arren Hastings for withdrawal of his forces. Accordingly, Mudhoji withdr. w his forces by acceoting the bribe. Though the expedition of rhlmnaji and Bhavani Kalo did not achieve anything positive, it had the negative effect of keeping Warren Hastings in fear and anxiety as long as 2 Mudhoji»s army was on the march. trom the beginning of 17B0 t ill the .Tiiddle of 1781^ warren Hastings was constantly in the fear of the Bengal invasion by lihonsale’s troops as he failed to understand the motives behind Mudhoji*s outward professions of friendship and sending an army in the direction of Bengal. Hastings’ anxiety is clearly expressed in his private writing (Hastings Despatch) when he argues and justi­ fies his payrr»nt of Rs. 16 lakhs to the Bhonsale. "If the troops of Ghiranaji had been driven to this extremity, a war must inevitably have ensued with the Government of Berar, more daagerous to our possessions in Bengal than in any in which we have ever been engaged since our acquisition of the 3 Dewanny." Out of this fear Hastings paid Rs. 16 lakhs to Mudhoji but this payment resulted in financial difficulties for the British, a result which finally made Hastings confirm his idea of starting peace negotiations through any channel. fhe greatest pressure was brought to bear on the English by Haidar's attack on --.adras. Haidar was a party to the quadruple alliance of 1779-80. Remaining true to his word 331 given to his allies, the Peshwa, the Nizam and Mudhoji Bhonsale of Nai?pur, Haidar started his camoaign against the British in July 17^0. He swooped down the Arcot district, laid waste Tanjore, carried fire an<j sword throughout the Malabar coast, defeated Colonel Bailie and knocked at the very doors of Madras. Haidar’s well equipped westernised Infantry and the hoards of his horsemen shook the very foun­ dation of the British power in India. The spectacular victories of Haidar compelled the British to divert some of their forces from the north and western India to the south. It was not so much the aratha str??ngth but Haidar’s striking power which reduced the B r it is h p re ssu re on i».al4wa and the western ghats. This was one of the major factx>rs which made the British think of a truce with the *4arathas. As the East India Company had started a war on three fronts simultaneously, it soon began to feel the resulting economic strain, iven after seizing the Islands of Sashti and V a sa i from the jjJarathas, the Bombay Government was not able to balance its budget, which was the main aim of the Bombay Council in starting the war against the larathas. The Council, for meetirjg its war expenditure was relying more and more on the over-drafts issued and sent by the Calcutta Governraent. So long as Haidar had not taken part in the war, the Calcutta Government could successfully meet the financial needs of the Bombay Govermrtent. But with the sudden entry of Haidar into the war, the expenses of the Calcutta Governuient increased. i*or raising additional battalians and bribing 332 d if f e r e n t '-oaratha rulers like Mudhoji 3honsale, Hastings had to withdraw additional money from the Government treasury. Besides, the -Adras Government was on the ver?e of financial bankruptcy due to the mismanagement of Governor fturabold. The Calcutta Government had to send financial assist^: to the .'iadras Government. This brought a tremendous burden on the treasury of the Calcutta Government. I*he Charter Acts as well as the foul raethods adooted by Hastings in extorting money from the Begurus of Ayodhya and Chet Sing are an indica­ tion of the deteriorating financial position of the Sast India ^-orapany in India. Shortage of nosoney was another important factor which compelled the British to discontinue the war with the yarathas. There were certain other reasons, apart from the above realities, which forced Hastings to negotiate with the Marathas. The Court of Directors had becOEue very anxious for establishing peace in their Indian settlement. They were constantly pressing che Governor General to conclude the war. As early as April 11, 17B1, they issued clear instructions to the Calcutta Govermaent that a peace with the '^aratha Governinent was to be concluded at all events and the war was to be carried from the Bombay coast into the dominions of Haidar Ali.^ A wave of popular opinion surged forward among the !?n;;lishtaen in i^ondon th a t the East In d ia uomoany should * hold nothing beyond their present possessions in India.