THE FIRST ANGLO-MARATHA WAR THIRD PHASE (1779-1783) Chapter VII - THE SsiGOND BORGHAT BXPSDITION (1781) For geographiciO., rtfargncts^ » •« Map Nog. Xb W 1 9 . attached at the beginning of this chapter, bttween pp. 251«2^2. nlso see Mao No. 12. attached at the beginning of chapter V. between p p . 15^-155. M A P NO. 16 SECOND BORGHAT EXPEDITION (l78l)- ^UTES OF march of the TWO ARMIES DlSPOSlT»OK OF THE MARATHA TROOPS CAMPIN& GROUND ROUTE OF THE BRITISH ARMy UP TO KHANPALA ^^^ESCARPMENT [ h ^ = HARJPANnr PHADKE i RBj: PARASHURAMBHAU [t h I- TUK0J{ HOLKAR p a t w a r d h a h M AP NO. 17. M A I N C A M P euMMtT or BORGHAT SRITJSH THE MARATMA6 POaiTtONS a d v a m c e g u a r d GODDARD'S MAIN .OP THE MARATMAS C PArWARDHAN , pwaDke CAMP p a n a s c a h d — wCL»tAR JCtHl ^ KWANDALAv h o r o n h a 3 (SOO FT ■V a 6ovE « E A U E V ' E U •\ REAR BASE OF GODDARD aeCOND BOFX3HAT EXPEOm ON C17ai) SECTION F IR S T T A C T I C A L PL>swN O F T H E M A R A T H A S 9 c /M .e : i^s 2HICKS KHOPOLI QFRONTAU ATTACK O N THE ENEMY- FE8-I7«t ;> V4te~lGHT IN FEET / eUMKlT CF 5CRGHAT CGCDDARD'S BAJIPAHT CAMP) ✓ HAf?lPANT n P^IADK E ' w - MSU > I. lADVANr.e: > «,-t-20CXJ' ^ sl mp o ! ) / / /S»» - « *A i ■ -w- ^UART> OF THE MARATHAe Tu k .0J! PO&ITtOKJS < k A R L £ HOiKAfff MAtM CAN-P <0R0nH4' r C F T M E A N M A R A T H A ^ . KNOPOU F^ACaWUr'* ATH RA O CREAR BASE OF eODDARD> V PAT-WARDHAN ^ ec55> ' - - _ ^ \ • BATTLE GPCUWD ----------------^ MAP NO. f8. SECOND BORGMAT EXPEDITION C t783 ) :5 e:c o n d t a c t ic a l p l a n or t h e m a r a t h a s JCFLAKK ATTACKS ON TWt! REAR.” OF TWE ENEM Z) a V ?A T H A TROOPS O K ___ .FLAKKS u n d e r PHADKE] IT^LKAR AND PATWARDHAN . CHHPTH.R VII THE. SECOND BOicQHAT B.XPSDITION The reduction of the Vasai and Arnala forts having been realized, the territorial ambitions of the Court of Directors in Ifcestern India were fully accomplished. Now it was high time lor the Bombay Council to come to terms with the Pune Government. Such a gesture would have relieved them of the unnecessary expenses of the war with the i^arathas and they could have diverted their armies to Madras, where Haidar All had wroiight havoc on the British forces. The very existence of the British at I^adras was on the brink of des­ truction. But the sober thought of negotiating witti the Marathas did not appeal to the Select Committee of the Bombay Government. On the 12th December 1 7 ^ , Governor Hornby submitted his plan to the Committee, in which certain instructions were given to Colonel Goddard regarding the future policy to be adopted towards the Pune Government, nccording to the Governor's plan, Goddard was to be irecommended immediately to acquaint the Pune Court, that if it was convinced of the superiority of the British arras due to the fall of the fort of Vasai, and were desirous of peace on equitable and moderate a terms, he was still ready to enter into^treaty with them on that subject. At the same time Goddard was to support his offer with such movements of his army as might seem most likely to enforce the acceptance of it, still keeping in 252 253 view the main object of the campaign - the complete reduction of the Konkan. It was not unlikely that Nana might acceot the offer of a treaty with a view to gaining time. This could be known only by the subeeouent events. However, Nana would reap no advantage from it. Whether Nana meant peace or only procrastination, Goddard should draw his advantage from his acceptance of the treaty. Goddard wa& to move hie army immediately to the southeast without remaining at Vaaai, because his prompt nK>vements would tend to confound the .iarathas and improve their impres­ sion regarding the British arms, made by the fall of Vasai and Arnala. Goddard, however, was not to be in a hurry but was to show himself before the ‘iahuli fort^ (Thane district), 2 3 Bahiravagad, Shetgad, and all the way along the foot of the Ghats, to the southward, where there were a line of forts just below the Ghats, He was to summon the commandants of these forts to surrender, but was not to allow himself to be detained by such as were absolutely inaccessible and seemed determined on resistance, Goddard was to capture only such places and forts which could be taken easily after sending the summons to surrender. Small places were not to be en­ couraged to hold out for a long time, because then the Bombay Company would find the Vasai campaign an unprofitable business, i^hile Goddard was advancing, he was to keep in view an expedition to une and b o long as this idea lasted, the Company should have leisure for effecting its real purpose of completing the reduction of the Konkan, 2 H as the Marathas would hardly descend the Ghate with their main army, but would orobably reserve it for what they would think a ourpose of infinitely greater consequence, the defence of their caoital Pune and expect to meet the British with advantage in the Deccan far superior to any, they could U hope far below the Ghats. Brigadier General Goddard, who was at Vasai when the Bombay Council formulated its plan, did not entirely agree with it. He argued that although the mode recommended by the Bombay President was generally grounded upon the princi­ ples of the plan before the opening of the Vasai campaign, it did not pay sufficient attention to tne situation in which the f’iaratha Government was placed after the fall of Vasai and the advantages the British could reap from it. One of the objects in the reduction of the Vasai fort was to open passage for the British to attack the Marathas in the very heart of their empire and in the neighbourhood of their capital itself, Goddard did not prooose to penetrate into the Deccan. It was his firm opinion that all inferior pursuits should be laid aside and that with all the force the Bombay Company could collect, their first military effort should be of securing passes into the Deccan, »h«4i_j»4rfeifver^ they advance or continue to aci^ on the defensive,as might be found most expedient, according to Goddard’s opinion, it was evident that the point on which the Bombay Government ought to be most solicitous was a peace upon honorable and advantageous terms and it was equally obvious that the attainment of this 255 end could be hoped by a prosecution of the most vigorous and active Measures and carrying the terror of the British arms as near the Maratha'capital as possible, without risking too far the safety of t^e troops or end?ingering their equip­ ments . It was upon the above principle that Cloddard proposed that the Bombay army should be immediately eraoloyed in taking possession of the Borghat. ticcording to him, by this action the Bombay Government would be able to avail itself of many advantages that might hereafter occur. These advantages were that iihinde and Holkar, the principal *>'iaratha aardars had been detained in i^^alwa and Gujrat respectively; that there was io^>robability of any assistance being afforded to the Pune Government by the foreign states, especially the French, whose policy was always hostile to the British; that Haidar M i would find sufficient en^loyment in the Karnatak for all his forces and that both Nizam Ali and Mudhoji Bhonsale would not risk exposure of their own territories to the British attacks by sending a large number of x;roops to the assistance of the Peshwa. Ooddard entirely concurred with the Bombay President's idea that the main object of the caa^aign against the Marathas ought to be not only the complete reduction of the Konkan but also an honorable conclusion of t^e war. However, Goddard further argued that this object could not be so readily expected to be fulfilled by pursuing the mode recommended by the Governor of confining the military 256 operations within the Ohats and reducing the numeix)u8 forts dispersed throughout the Konkan, most of which were built on high hills. They could not be taken by a regular con­ ducted as&ault, but by surprise strategem. i’his mode of warfare, harassing and destructive as it must be to the troops, would include a heavy expense to the Company, far in excess to the worth of the place when acquired, i’his would cause unnecessary delay in the military operations without bringing the war nearer to the conclusion. a I s o it would not bring any advantages in the Konkan, which would compensate for the sufferings and expense that the Company vjould have incurred therein, Goddard, therefore, submitted his own plan of operations to the Bombay Council on the 19th December 1 7 ^ . He suggested that the fiouncil should immediately make the Pune Court acquainted with its readiness to enter into a treaty with them on equitable and moderate terms of peace in the manner recorarnended by the President.