Gen Y Jihadists: Preventing Radicalisation in Australia
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STRATEGY Gen Y jihadists Preventing radicalisation in Australia Anthony Bergin, Michael Clifford, David Connery, Tobias Feakin, Ken Gleiman, Stephanie Huang, Grace Hutchison, Peter Jennings, David Lang, Amelia Long, Clare Murphy, Simone Roworth, Rosalyn Turner, Samina Yasmeen About ASPI June 2015 ASPI’s aim is to promote Australia’s security by contributing fresh ideas to strategic decision‑making, and by helping to inform public discussion of strategic and defence issues. ASPI was established, and is partially funded, by the Australian Government as an independent, non‑partisan policy institute. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence. ASPI’s publications—including this paper—are not intended in any way to express or reflect the views of the Australian Government. The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote public debate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue. Important disclaimer This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person. Cover image: Armed Australian Federal Police officers are seen after new security directives are instigated at Parliament House in Canberra, 23 February 2015. AAP Image/Mick Tsikas. Gen Y jihadists Preventing radicalisation in Australia Anthony Bergin, Michael Clifford, David Connery, Tobias Feakin, Ken Gleiman, Stephanie Huang, Grace Hutchison, Peter Jennings, David Lang, Amelia Long, Clare Murphy, Simone Roworth, Rosalyn Turner, Samina Yasmeen June 2015 © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2015 This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, Universities, and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge. First published June 2015 Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ASPI Level 2 40 Macquarie Street Barton ACT 2600 Australia Tel + 61 2 6270 5100 Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 [email protected] www.aspi.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au Facebook.com/ASPI.org @ASPI_org Gen Y jihadists : preventing radicalisation in Australia / edited by Peter Jennings. ISBN: 9781925229080 (paperback) Series: Strategy (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) Islamic fundamentalism--Australia. Radicalism--Australia. Terrorism--Australia--Prevention. Terrorism--Government policy--Australia. Other Creators/Contributors: Jennings, Peter, editor. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 320.5570994 CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 5 Introduction CHAPTER 2 7 The Australian experience CHAPTER 3 31 Jihad in the West CHAPTER 4 37 Australia’s policy response CHAPTER 5 51 Policy recommendations APPENDIX 1 57 REFERENCES 64 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 71 CONTRIBUTORS 72 4 GEN Y JIHADists: Preventing radicalisation in Australia A supplied image obtained 8 March 2015 shows CCTV vision of two teenage brothers suspected of trying to fly to the Middle East to fight. Sydney Airport officials seen with the two brothers. © AAP Image/ Sydney Airport. ASPI STRATEGY CP HA TER 1 Introduction In May 2015, the Australian Government estimated that more than 100 Australians were fighting for terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. At least 24 had died fighting (Lewis 2015 p.79), more than 30 had returned to Australia and there were 160 people ‘supporting terrorist organisations from Australia’ (Australian Government 2015a). Since the terrorism threat level was raised to ‘high’ in September 2014, 23 people have been charged as a result of eight counterterrorism operations (Brandis 2015c). In each case the police argued that urgent pre-emptive action was needed to disrupt plans for staging terror attacks in Australia. The Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney in December 2014 and the stabbing attack on two police officers in Melbourne in September 2014 tragically showed that terrorist acts could take place on Australian soil. The government estimates that ‘The number of high-risk terrorist threats being monitored by security agencies has doubled in the last year and is now around 400’ (Australian Government 2015a). This paper examines the scope and nature of terrorism in Australia and assesses the policy response. We explore the threat of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism and offer policy recommendations to counter that threat. Using a dataset of extremist jihadists constructed by ASPI, Section 2 examines specific themes and issues that affect Australia and profiles some of the individuals who have advocated or become violent Islamists. Section 3 provides an overview of terrorist attacks in the West since 2010 and of Western ‘foreign fighters’ in the Middle East. Section 4 assesses the Australian policy response to date, and Section 5 offers policy recommendations. We don’t propose that the government create large new structures or make increases to the budget beyond what has already been provided—many of the recent government policy responses, although reactive, provide the right authorities and levels of funding. Our recommendations focus on taking new approaches with existing organisations or reinforcing old approaches that have proved effective. Governments should avoid over-reaction, which terror groups hope to provoke. We focus instead on the importance of better communication and cooperation across government and society as a whole. Australian law defines a terrorist act as ‘an act or threat, intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause by coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government or the public. This action must cause serious harm to people or property, create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, or seriously disrupt trade, critical infrastructure or electronic systems’ (NCTC 2011). For this study, we define violent Islamist extremists as people who have adopted views associated with Islamist extremism and are willing to support or commit terrorist acts. Groups or individuals described as ‘Islamist’ often have very different aims and views about how those aims might be realised. Some militant Islamists endorse violence to achieve their aims, but many Islamists do not. Islamist extremism is characterised as an ideology that’s based on a distorted interpretation of Islam. Islamist extremists deem Western intervention in Muslim countries as a ‘war on Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’. They aspire to impose a caliphate: a global Islamic state governed by their interpretation of sharia as state law, rejecting liberal values such as democracy and the rule of law. We use the term ‘jihadist’ because it has become a common way to describe supporters of extremist Islamist violence, but we recognise that jihad also connotes a sense of legitimate inner spiritual struggle for many Muslims. 6 GEN Y JIHADists: Preventing radicalisation in Australia Why and how do people who live in Australia become violent Islamist extremists? What processes do they go through to radicalise and what can be done about it? A commonly used description of the radicalisation process highlights four stages: pre-radicalisation, self-identification or conversion and identification, indoctrination and finally jihadisation (or commitment to action). Although there mightn’t be a single terrorist profile, we note three shared characteristics often found in people who radicalise: • A sense of injustice or humiliation—Terrorists often explicitly justify their attacks as an appropriate response to a perceived injustice against a group of people, who aren’t necessarily related to the terrorists. • A need for identity—Individuals who don’t feel a sense of identity may be searching for a defining purpose or goal in life (Neumann 2007). • A need to belong—Prospective terrorists find a sense of belonging in their association with terrorist groups or causes (Crenshaw 1988). Spiritual mentorship and social network bonds are also important factors. Terrorists don’t go through a radicalisation process in isolation. A study of UK and US homegrown terrorism cases found that around 20% had a spiritual mentor who provided guidance during radicalisation and justification and approval for violent action. Social networks and interpersonal relationships are vital for recruitment into terrorist organisations (Sageman 2004). The increased number of English language websites advocating jihad assists radicalisation and the production of homegrown terrorists. When no physical mentor or social network is available individuals can find support online, along with a sense of purpose, identity and belonging. The role of religious ideology is more controversial