Department of Social Sciences and Security Studies The OODA Loop and Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-Grown Terrorism A Tactic of Asymmetric Warfare Jason Thomas This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Curtin University EMBARGOED UNTIL 2018 OR UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE April 2016 1 Declarations Candidate’s Declaration I, Jason Thomas, hereby confirm that this PhD thesis has been solely written by me, that it is a record of work carried out by me and has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 2012, at Curtin University of Technology. Date: 12 April 2016 Signature of Candidate: Supervisor’s Declaration I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Curtin University of Technology and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date: Signature of Supervisor 2 Abstract A central theme in the current terrorism phenomenon has been al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadi narrative and its ability to inspire home-grown terrorism. In the minds of generally young, unexceptional Muslim males and some Western converts to Islam, this narrative is recreated in the context of their own personal circumstances and networks. The predominant strategic models of terrorism are inadequate for critically analysing a phenomenon that is adaptable, dynamic, evolving and regenerative. Through the application of Colonel John Boyd’s Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act Loop (OODA Loop) as an adaptable, alternative strategic model of terrorism and case study research methodology, this thesis tested the theory that Salafi-Jihadi inspired home-grown terrorism is a tactic of asymmetric warfare. According to Boyd, defeating an opponent requires penetrating its OODA Loop. The case studies demonstrated al Qaeda’s strategy that transformed from the use of: i) unexceptional individuals from western countries, to avoid detection; ii) western domestic-planned attacks to overcome tactical challenges and to adapt to OODA Loop penetration; and iii) western domestic individuals with no known links to al Qaeda, inspired by the Salafi-Jihadi narrative. These case studies also provided examples of al Qaeda’s evolution into a regenerative brand, in a conflict where the whole world has become the battlefield, including within people’s minds. This includes securing the mindset of a borderless, interconnected community while Governments and their citizens fear the unpredictable, irreconcilable nature of home-grown terrorism emanating from within their society. Significantly, al Qaeda determined that inspiring home-grown terrorism, synthesising its Salafi-Jihadi narrative with the use of the internet to broadcast graphic and brutal acts of violence, and shifting from spectacular terrorism to ‘do-it-yourself’ attacks against soft targets in a Western urban environment, penetrates Western moral principles and its conventional view of warfare within a democratic construct. Penetrating the West’s moral principles is an important aspect of al Qaeda’s broad strategy. This research described the concept of al Qaeda manoeuvring within and exploiting Western moral and mental boundaries while simultaneously inspiring more a new generation of followers, as moral manoeuvrability. Further research could use this concept to understand how to exploit the Salafi-Jihadi narrative to force terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda and now the so-called Islamic State to fold back inside themselves and self-immolate. 3 Acknowledgements Firstly, it is important that I thank my primary supervisor, Associate Professor Anne Aly, for her guidance and patience in overseeing this thesis. I also respect her courage in publicly challenging the current discourse on terrorism. I am also very grateful for the supervision and faith in me from Dr Alexey Muraviev as Head of Department. Thanks must also go to Dr Mark Briskey who worked with me to see this PhD to the end. It was an honour and a privilege to have these academics as my supervisory team. I must also thank my wife, Fiona, and my three children, Alexander, Sophie and Amelia, for enduring this journey with me and helping maintain my belief in being able to complete this work. Thanks to my parents for their life-long encouragement. I also wish to thank my wife’s parents, Mary and David, who are always so supportive in my endeavours, including this thesis. I also need to thank some of my friends, in particular Wojciech Ozga, MAJGEN Jim Molan (Ret), Richard Laufmann, Kay Donehue, Neil Grimes, Assistant Commissioner Andrew Crisp, Superintendent Cindy Millen, Anita Addorisio, Paula Davey, Todd Stephenson, Steve Carvajal and Belinda Endress, who at important stages of my life and in the course of writing this thesis challenged me to be a better thinker and a better person. Finally, I would like to thank my friends currently serving or who formerly served in the Australian and United States military, law enforcement and Special Forces communities, whose courage, bravery and unquestioning service to our common goal of freedom, should never be forgotten. 4 Table of Contents Declaration of Original Authorship ii Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv List of Tables & Diagrams 7 Abbreviations 8 Chapter 1 – Introduction 9 1.1 The OODA Loop and Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-Grown Terrorism 9 1.2 Definitions and Conceptualisation of Key Themes 11 1.2.1 Terrorism 11 1.2.2 Home-Grown Terrorism 13 1.2.3 Asymmetric Warfare 15 1.2.4 Structure and Organisation of the Research 17 1.2.5 Significance and Contribution of the Research 20 Chapter 2 - The Boyd Cycle - Observe Orientate Decide Act Loop 22 2.1 Introduction 22 2.2 An Overview of COL. John Boyd (1927 – 1997) 25 2.3 Lessons from Others on Boyd 28 2.4 Energy Manoeuvrability, Manoeuvre Warfare and the OODA Loop 33 2.5 A Discourse on Winning and Losing 40 2.6 Deconstructing the OODA Loop 44 2.7 The Origins of the OODA Loop 48 2.8 The Essence of the OODA Loop 53 2.8.1 Observe 56 2.8.2 Orientate 58 2.8.3 Decide 63 2.8.4 Act 68 2.9 Conclusion 72 Chapter 3 -The Strategic Model of Terrorism and AQ’s Methodology 74 3.1 Introduction 74 3.2 A Strategic Model of Terrorism 75 3.3 The OODA Loop as a General Strategic Model 82 3.4 Theoretical Approaches to Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-grown Terrorism 85 3.5 AQ - Leaderless Network or Top-Down Direction? 89 3.6 The Strategically Adaptable AQ Brand 93 3.7 Salafi-Jihadism and the Prophetic Brand of AQ 97 3.8 Conclusion 107 Chapter 4 - Application of the OODA Loop & Case Study Methodology 109 4.1 Introduction 109 4.2 Aim of the Research Using Case Study Methodology 110 4.3 The Case Study: Subject of an Inquiry 110 4.4 Single or Multiple Case Studies 113 4.5 Case Study Research in the Field of Terrorism 114 4.6 Criticisms of Case Study Methodology 117 5 4.7 Different Kinds of Case Study 120 4.8 The Application of Case Study Methodology Used for this Research 123 4.9 Case Study Selection Criteria 125 4.9.1 Context 125 4.9.2 Characteristics 129 4.10 The OODA Loop – Unit of Analysis 134 4.11 Three Key Case Studies of Salafi-Jihadi Inspired Home-grown Terrorism 135 4.11.1 Case Study 1 – The Australian Case of Jack Roche 136 4.11.2 Case Study 2 – 7 July 2005 London Transport Network Attack 139 4.11.3 Case Study 3 – 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing 141 4.12 Conclusion 144 Chapter 5 -The Case Studies 146 5.1 Introduction 146 5.2 Case Study 1 - The Australian Case of Jack Roche 147 5.2.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 152 5.3 Case Study 2 – 7 July 2005 London Transport Network Attack 156 5.3.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 164 5.4 Case Study 3 – 15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing 168 5.4.1 Case Analysis using the OODA Loop 177 5.5 Conclusion 176 Chapter 6 -Case Analysis 180 6.1 Introduction 150 6.2 Inside the OODA Loop and the Mindset of Contemporary Terrorism 180 6.3 OODA Loop and the Current Terrorism Phenomenon 188 6.4 Boyd’s Law and the Concept of Moral Manoeuvrability 193 6.5 The Performative Power of the Single Act of Violence 200 6.6 DIY Home-grown Terrorism and Soft-Targets 203 6.7 Conclusion 206 Chapter 7 – Conclusion 208 7.1 Summary of Research & Discussion 208 7.2 Key Findings and Contributions 213 7.2.1 The OODA Loop as an Adaptable Strategic Model of Terrorism 213 7.2.2 Current Terrorist Phenomenon – A Different View on War 215 7.2.3 Bypassing OODA Loops 217 7.2.4 Moral Manoeuvrability 218 7.2.5 Dynamic Evolving Tactics – The Power of the Single Act 220 7.3 Application of the Research 221 Bibliography 223 6 Tables Table 2.1. Boyd’s Combined Lessons on Winning, re-drawn from slide 7 of Patterns of Conflict 49 Table 4.2. Summary of Military Theorists and Wars from Patterns of Conflict 117 Table 4.3. Summary of Kinds of Case Studies Defined by Academic Authors 121 Table 4.4. Forms of Research 123 Table 4.5. Design for the Case Study Approach Used in this Research 125 Table 4.6: Summary of Selection Criteria 132 Figures Figure 2.1. Boyd’s Drawing of the OODA Loop from The Essence of Winning and Losing 54 Figure 2.2. A Boyd Quiz 71 Figure 6.3.