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Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iv RECOMMENDATIONS vi PART ONE: THE STATE OF PLAY 1 One: Australia – Our Evolving Approach To Countering Terrorism 2 Two: The Threat Environment 10 Three: Performance Of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Arrangements 14 PART TWO: OUR RESPONSE 21 Four: Leadership And Coordination 22 Five: Countering Violent Extremism 30 Six: Resourcing Pressures 36 Seven: National Terrorism Advisories 43 ANNEX: ABBREVIATIONS 48 REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM MACHINERY Executive Summary • There are an increasing number of Review of the Commonwealth’s Australians joining extremist groups counter-terrorism arrangements overseas. The Commonwealth has strong, well-coordinated • There are an increasing number of potential counter-terrorism (CT) arrangements. Overall, terrorists, supporters and sympathisers in these have been quite successful – although the our community. Martin Place siege and the stabbing of police in • There is a trend to low-tech ‘lone actor’ Melbourne raise questions. attacks which are exponentially harder to disrupt: there may be no visibility of • Many plots – some quite major – have been planning and no time delay between intent disrupted. and action. • There have been 35 prosecutions and 26 • There is now an intergenerational convictions. dimension, with the families of known • There has been no large scale terrorist terrorists increasingly radicalised and attack on Australian soil in the post-2001 involved. period. The three fatalities within this period • The international forces driving terrorist all happened in the Martin Place siege. ideology and capabilities are stronger, and The two terrorist attacks in that period – the extremist narratives have increasing appeal stabbing of two policemen in Melbourne and the in the Australian community. Martin Place siege with its two tragic victims – were • Terrorists are using sophisticated carried out by individuals who planned and acted technologies and methodologies to stay alone. Crimes planned like this are, by nature, under the radar. always extremely difficult for police and security agencies to prevent. • Terrorists are now adept at exploiting social media to distribute polished propaganda In the years since 11 September 2001: products. Reflecting this environment, there is an increasing • many more departments and agencies requirement for early disruption of terrorist plans to have been drawn into the CT effort. best ensure public safety. This comes at the cost of Coordination is better than ever securing sufficient evidence to prosecute. • new legislation has been progressively introduced to provide the legal tools to • This leaves potential terrorists at large. It prosecute terrorists and better disrupt also erodes trust, confidence and support to terrorism relationships with at-risk communities. It may also undermine public confidence in • modest efforts to counter violent extremist national security agencies and the ideology and to promote community Government generally. cohesion are now underway. Winning many battles – but not the war The rising tide of terrorism Despite improvements in CT capability, a terrorist The threat of terrorism in Australia is rising and it is attack is possible. All of the terrorism-related becoming harder to combat. metrics are worsening: known numbers of foreign fighters, sympathisers and supporters, serious investigations. We are not ‘winning’ on any front. iv | DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM MACHINERY The Martin Place siege and the Melbourne attack 7. strengthen further cross-agency leadership on police are examples of a global trend: we face and coordination by designating a National CT an increasing number of potential terrorists who are Coordinator as the Government’s leading hard to detect and often willing to attack using advisor on CT quickly implemented, low-tech tactics. 8. develop a COAG strategy to counter violent extremism, increasing Australia’s national Responding to this worsening threat picture, on 4 August 2014 the Government boosted funding to commitment to this work CT activities. National security agencies are 9. better manage increasing resource pressures significantly bolstering their capabilities to detect by tightening priorities and lessening the and disrupt the threats we face. burden of the efficiency dividend on some areas of national security agencies Every dollar must be spent wisely. We face a new paradigm that demands ever more careful 10. improve our communication with the public on prioritisation. National security agencies must come CT threats by introducing a single threat level together seamlessly around shared priorities. system to improve usability and to give the public more meaningful information. A restructure or reshuffle of national security agencies is not the answer. But more must be done to strengthen cross-agency coordination and leadership. Whatever we do, there is no short-term solution to our evolving terrorist challenge. It is almost inevitable that we will have more terrorist attacks on Australian soil. Long term, we must put a greater effort into reducing – rather than managing – the pool of terrorists, their supporters and sympathisers. The community is key. To counter violent extremism we must work with our at-risk communities. We must build resilience to terrorist ideology and assist individuals to disengage and de-radicalise from violent extremist beliefs and influences. Future direction To combat the challenge most effectively, we need to: 5. acknowledge that we have entered a new, long-term paradigm of heightened terrorism threat with a much more significant ‘home grown’ element 6. further improve and broaden the scope of our national CT strategy to provide a clear direction to the national security community and to improve our cooperation with at-risk communities DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET | v REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM MACHINERY Recommendations Leadership and coordination 1. The Government, in close consultation with states and territories through the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), develop a new national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy which appropriately coordinates and balances our efforts to counteract the various threats we face, including from home-grown lone actors and radicalisation in our community. 2. The Government implement the following arrangements to provide strong, clear and co-ordinated leadership to ensure agencies respond effectively and appropriately to terrorism: a. designate a senior official as the National CT Coordinator. b. establish a Senior Executive Counter-Terrorism Group (Executive Group), chaired by the National CT Coordinator, to set the strategic direction for the Commonwealth’s CT efforts. c. mandate that the Australian Counter-Terrorism Centre draw together policy and operational agencies, including secondees from the states and territories, to work together closely on operations, policy challenges and capability development. Community cohesion 3. The Government significantly boost Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) activities: a. seek COAG agreement to a new national CVE strategy for endorsement in 2015, increasing Australia’s national commitment to this work b. the Attorney-General bring forward a proposal as part of this effort with options to: i. establish and expand community and public-private partnerships to better reach at-risk or radicalised individuals ii. expand Commonwealth efforts to address the causes of violent extremism in Australia. c. the Attorney-General lead development of a strategy to counter the reach of extremist narratives in Australia. 4. The Attorney-General’s Department coordinate across government to develop a strategy for managing the controlled return of Australian foreign fighters, subject to the Government’s imposition of stringent, individually-tailored terms and conditions on returnees. vi | DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET REVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM MACHINERY Resourcing pressures 5. The Government adjust