Space Safety Magazine
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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SPACE SAFETY Space Safety © Issue 8 Summer 2013 Magazine The Pedestrian Cause of a Spectacular Crash Water-filled Helmet Ends EVA: The Close Call of Luca Parmitano Space Walker: The Story of Astronaut Jerry Ross Space Safety Summer Magazine 2013 Index 3 Rising Up, Aiming Down 14 Moving Towards a Ghana Space Agency 17 Under Pressure: A Brief History of Pressure Suits - Part 3 20 Space Walker: The Story of Astronaut Jerry Ross 24 Assessing the Aviation Risk from Space Debris and Meteoroids 4 Water-filled Helmet Ends EVA: The Close Call of Luca Parmitano 8 Space Situational Awareness 26 Chris Hadfield - A Space Oddity Sharing for the 21st Century 28 The Cosmonaut, an Intimate and Fantastical Voyage into the Soviet Space Program 6 The Pedestrian Cause of a Spectacular Crash 11 The Nixon Administration 30 Announcing the Journal of 7 Gil's Corner and Shuttle Safety - Part 1 Space Safety Engineering Summer Space Safety 2013 Magazine© Issue 8 Space Safety Magazine INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Editor-in-Chief Editorial Board and FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF Koninklijke Bibliotheek, SPACE SAFETY Andrea Gini Scientific Committee n. 12042639 19/12/2012 Tommaso Sgobba ISSN: 2214-0379 Managing Editor Michael Listner Merryl Azriel Joseph Pelton IAASS www.spacesafetymagazine.com International Association [email protected] Deputy Editor Executive Secretary for the Advancement of Phillip Keane Maria Fischer Space Safety Postbus 127 www.iaass.org 2200AC Noordwijk Deputy Manager The Netherlands Carmen Victoria Felix News Editor Matteo Emanuelli The Space Safety Magazine is a joint publication of the ISSF Copy Editor International Association for International Caitlin DeLatte Advancement of Space Safety Space Safety (IAASS) and the International Foundation Creative Director Space Safety Foundation (ISSF) www.spacesafetyfoundation.org Kristhian Mason Cover pictures: Artist conception of the various elements, both space and ground based, of a space situational awareness system. – Credits: ESA Central Region of the Milky Way - Credits: NASA, ESA, SSC, CXC, and STScI 2 Space Safety Editorial Summer Magazine 2013 Rising Up, Aiming Down that had been installed upside down. The paper trail led to a technician respon- sible for the assembly of the hardware. The improper installation apparently re- quired some considerable physical effort in a location difficult to access. The tech- nician’s supervisor and a quality control specialist, who were supposed to check upon completion of the installation, both signed the assembly log to indicate that they had done so. The investigation team identified deficiencies in the instal- lation instructions and in the mechanical design of the hardware. How is it possible that a technician fails to perform an operation that has been repeated successfully hundreds of times over several decades? Rus- sian technicians and engineers need to abandon their traditional attitude of seeking and maintaining jealous own- Assembly of a Proton rocket. – Credits: Pavel Kolotilov, Wikimedia ership of technical knowledge, and of guarding their mastership – the “secrets n the past two years, almost at regular created a 40 by 25 meter crater with a of their trade” – as a safe-conduct and a intervals, we received recurrent news depth of up to five meters. personal asset. Iabout the failure of a Russian rocket The broader cause of this and, indeed, Knowledge must be managed and launch. A few weeks ago, on July 2, a all Russian rocket failures of recent years transferred by means of specifications three-stage Proton-M took off from Bai- is the frequent inadequacy and disparity and procedures which are maintained konour Cosmodrome. The rocket started of the quality control system of the myr- through an effective system of non- veering off course right after leaving the iad companies involved in the manufac- conformances, reporting, and corrective pad, deviating from the vertical path in turing of space hardware. It is a problem actions. Furthermore, critical process various directions and then plunging to that will require a vast cultural revolution procedures need to be revalidated by the ground nose first less than 40 sec- to resolve. means of modern techniques like Pro- onds after liftoff. The fragmenting and The Russians started paying attention cess FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects still thrusting vehicle crashed approxi- to quality as early as 1961 when a decree Analysis), to ensure that effective means mately 2.5km from the launch pad. The on “measures to improve military tech- of human error prevention are in place. immediate safety concern was the 600 nology” laid the basis for institution of Re-establishing independent military tons of fuel: unsymmetrical dimethylhy- quality control by the military to improve inspection of space hardware is not drazine, a toxic chemical compound that the reliability of space systems. The core the right answer to the current quality can be absorbed through the skin, and of their approach, however, was a cap- problems of the Russian space indus- dinitrogen tetroxide, an inhalation and illary network of technical surveillance try. Inspection is not prevention, and contact hazard causing edema and skin activities performed by military inspec- PREVENTION is the essence of modern burns. Toxic clouds began drifting over tors. This was exactly the opposite of QUALITY CONTROL! the Kazakh plains following the crash. what was being done in the same years The Cosmodrome was evacuated and in the US, where military inspections the inhabitants of Baikonour were in- were basically dismantled in favor of the structed not to leave their homes, to de- institution of independent quality assur- activate air conditioners, and tightly close ance services by manufacturers, with all doors and windows to avoid intake of emphasis on prevention. In 2009 the in- contaminated air. In the following days a dependent military oversight of Russian total area of 13,100m3 had to be treated launcher production was disbanded with detoxifying chemical solutions and each company had to establish its The rocket slammed into the ground un- own quality assurance capability. der full thrust, thus creating a catastroph- The Proton’s failure was caused by Tommaso Sgobba ic risk for launch personnel. The impact some critical angular velocity sensors IAASS President 3 Space Safety News Summer Magazine 2013 By Merryl Azriel Water-filled Helmet Ends EVA: The Close Call of Luca Parmitano hose watching the live feed of EVA-23 from outside the Interna- Ttional Space Station (ISS) on July 16 may be forgiven for not realizing that they were watching the worst Extravehic- ular Activity (EVA) accident in ISS history. The calm, professional response of both those on orbit and in Mission Control be- lied the gravity of the situation as astro- naut Luca Parmitano, on just his second spacewalk, faced mortal danger when a substantial leak filled his helmet with wa- ter. In the unforgiving vacuum of space, removal of his helmet would have meant an even quicker death than drowning or choking on the inexorably building water climbing over his face. Progression of the Incident “How much can I sweat, though?” Parmitano asks when considering possible sources of the fluid in his helmet just before the EVA was terminated. – Credits: NASA VA-23 began at 11:57 AM UTC, 13 Eminutes ahead of schedule, with Mission Control didn’t think the cooling and Fyodor Yurchikhin converged on astronauts Chris Cassidy and Luca Par- system was likely; the astronauts consid- him with towels. There was water every- mitano heading out of the Quest airlock. ered bodily fluids. By 1:05 PM, it didn’t where. Parmitano emerged looking very They split up, with each astronaut’s first matter what it was: Mission Control made shaken, as well he might. In a press con- two tasks going well. At 12:47 PM UTC, the call to terminate the EVA. “There is ference a few hours later, lead spacewalk Parmitano reported feeling wet on the some [water] in my eyes, and some in my officer Karina Eversley reported that if back of his head. He continued his work, nose,” Parmitano said before losing the the situation had warranted they could aware that this wasn’t the first time an ability to communicate entirely. “It feels have expedited reentry even further; astronaut encountered this issue. One like a lot of water.” With Cassidy’s help, but there is no question that this was particular suit used on three EVAs dur- Parmitano made his way back to the air- a close call. ing STS-129 and STS-130 manifested lock. At 1:17 PM Parmitano’s eyes, ears, reduced audio quality when the wearer and nose were covered in water and his felt dampness around the ear cups; yet, mouth was only free because he kept Investigation and post-EVA analysis in those cases found drinking. Unable to speak, Parmitano let no water in the affected area and the is- Cassidy know he was ok by squeezing his Repercussions sue was attributed to condensation. But hand – and waited as Cassidy cleaned up by 12:54 PM it became clear that Parmi- the equipment. fter taking some deep breaths, tano’s issue went well beyond conden- After a slightly expedited repressuriza- Athe ISS crew got to work examin- sation. After visual assessment, Cassidy tion procedure, the internal hatch opened ing Parmitano’s Extravehicular Mobility reported seeing approximately 500 ml at 1:37 PM. The rest of the ISS crew waited Unity (EMU), designated 3011, for the of water centered at the back of Parmi- just inside to help with Parmitano’s expe- most likely culprits. They were able to tano’s head, but creeping forward. Sus- dited doffing procedure. At 1:38 PM astro- quickly rule out some suspects, but the pecting the drink bag may be to blame, naut Karen Nyberg got Parmitano’s helmet leak, probably located somewhere in Parmitano eliminated that source by the off and cosmonauts Pavel Vinogradov the primary life support system (PLSS) simple expedient of drinking the bag dry.