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The Concept of Personhood in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

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The Concept of Personhood in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects The onceptC of Personhood in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Colin J. Hahn Marquette University Recommended Citation Hahn, Colin J., "The oncC ept of Personhood in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl" (2012). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 193. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/193 THE CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL by Colin J. Hahn, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2012 ABSTRACT THE CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL Colin J. Hahn, B.A., M.A. Marquette University, 2012 This dissertation attempts to articulate the concept of personhood in Husserl. In his research manuscripts, Husserl recognized the need for a concrete description of subjectivity that still remained within the transcendental register. The concept of personhood, although never fully worked out, is intended to provide this description by demonstrating how the embodied, enworlded, intersubjective, and axiological dimensions of experience are integrated. After briefly outlining the characteristics of a transcendental phenomenological account of personhood, this dissertation outlines the essential structures of personhood. The person, for Husserl, includes the passive dimension with the instinctive and affective dimensions of subjectivity, which become sedimented into habits, and the worldliness of subjectivity that provides a background horizon for the subject’s actions. However, the full concept of personhood does not yet emerge in the passive sphere. The active dimension of position-taking acts, especially with respect to the loved values that make up one’s vocation, is what constitutes the person as a unity of intentional activity, history, and striving, and makes it possible to speak about the transcendental person, as opposed to merely the transcendental subject or ego. Because the person lives in a community with others, the choice of a vocation can be subjected to critical scrutiny on the part of the community, and the community itself ought to critically reflect upon its own telos. After outlining the structures of personhood, this dissertation argues that there is a teleology running from the lowest dimensions of passive experience all the way up to the highest ideal of a person and his or her community. This teleology is ultimately a teleology of reason, and it reveals the philosophical task of living a life that can be absolutely justified. This dissertation concludes by describing the person as an entelechy of reason, which captures the teleological striving of reason inherent in Husserl’s concept of personhood. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Colin J. Hahn, B.A., M.A. It is clear that intersubjectivity is one of the most important aspects of human experience, according to Husserl, and that is no less true of my experience in writing this dissertation. First and foremost, I have benefitted from the feedback and support of my dissertation director, Dr. Sebastian Luft. Throughout the entirety of my graduate career I have learned and grown from our conversations, and I would not have become the philosopher I am today without his help. I am extremely grateful for his mentoring and friendship, and I hope this dissertation lives up to his high expectations. It has been a privilege to work with each of the members of my dissertation committee. I sincerely thank my second reader, Dr. Michael Monahan, for his uncannily insightful and formative comments throughout my graduate career, and for carrying that same exceptional level of mentoring into his review of the dissertation. I also would like to thank Drs. Andrew Tallon and Hanne Jacobs for their service on the committee; both of them helped me to think through significant issues within Husserl and provided helpful suggestions for this project. This dissertation could not have been completed without substantial research from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Dieter Lohmar, Director of the Husserl-Archiv at the Universität zu Köln, for allowing me to work at the Archives for the 2008–2009 academic year, to Marquette University and ii the Cyril E. Smith family for the Smith Family Fellowship that generously supported my work at the Archives financially, and to Prof. Dr. Ullrich Melle, Director of the Husserl-Archief te Leuven, for permission to cite from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts. I also thank Dr. R. Philip Buckley for permission to quote from his draft translation of the Kaizo articles, which will appear in Husserl: Collected Works from Kluwer. My colleagues at Marquette University have provided invaluable support throughout my years in graduate school. I would like to specifically thank Dr. Noel Adams, Daniel Farmer, Chad Kleist, Dr. Melissa Mosko, Dr. Melissa Shew, Trevor Smith, Dr. Nancy Snow, Dr. James B. South, Margaret Steele, Dr. Theresa Tobin, and Dr. Pol Vandevelde, as well as the members of the Feminist Philosophy Reading Group. All of them have made a substantial impression on my philosophical career; I am lucky to have learned from, and worked with, each of them. I have many friends who have encouraged me during this dissertation. There is no way I could list all of them, but I hope that I have made my appreciation clear to each of them personally. One individual deserves particular mention as an exemplar of friendship, and so I extend my gratitude to Rebecca Brodie Olson. The last set of thanks is reserved for my family. I cannot begin to express how much your support has meant throughout the years. This dissertation would not have been possible without you. To my parents: thank you, for everything. This dissertation is dedicated to you. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................................. i A NOTE ON CITATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS ............................................................................. vi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PERSONHOOD ............................. 1 §1. The Problem of the Person in the Philosophical Tradition ................................ 4 §2. Analytic Approaches to Personhood ......................................................................... 10 §3. Husserlian Phenomenology .......................................................................................... 18 A. Intentionality .......................................................................................................... 19 B. Transcendental–Phenomenological Reduction ....................................... 21 C. Genetic Phenomenology .................................................................................... 27 §4. Literature Review of Other Husserlian Accounts ................................................ 31 §5. Structure of the Dissertation ........................................................................................ 37 CHAPTER 2. INSTINCTS AND HABITS IN THE PERSON ..................................................... 41 §6. Revealing Instincts through the Ontological Way ............................................... 42 §7. The Transcendental Function of Instincts .............................................................. 48 §8. The Passive Concretion of Subjectivity .................................................................... 56 §9. The Sedimentation of Instincts into Habits ............................................................ 65 §10. Teleology of Instincts .................................................................................................... 69 CHAPTER 3. THE WORLDLY ENVIRONMENT OF THE PERSON ..................................... 78 §11. Husserl’s Concepts of World ...................................................................................... 79 §12. Horizons and the Lifeworld ....................................................................................... 86 §13. Cultural Horizons and Traditional Norms ........................................................... 92 §14. Homeworld and Alienworld ...................................................................................... 99 §15. The Worldliness of the Person ............................................................................... 106 iv CHAPTER 4. THE VOCATION OF THE PERSON ................................................................... 113 §16. Position-Taking Acts .................................................................................................. 114 §17. The Problem of Love .................................................................................................. 120 §18. Absolute Values as the Foundation of Vocation ............................................. 123 §19. Encompassing the Whole Life ................................................................................ 127 §20. Constituting the Unity of the Person ................................................................... 132 §21. The Regulative Ideal of a Vocation ....................................................................... 138 CHAPTER 5. THE COMMUNITY OF THE PERSON .............................................................. 147 §22. The Social Dimension of Personhood ................................................................
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