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AK2117-M1-2-001-Jpeg.Pdf STATEMENT OF NGANANI ENOS JOHN MABUZA 1. I am chief minister of KaNgwane and president of the Inyandza National Movement. The Inyandza National Movement is a political grouping which functions in KaNgwane. It has over two hundred thousand paid up members and recently won fify two out of fifty seven seats in the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. The Inyandza National Movement also has a youth section known as the Inyandza Youth Congress which has approximately thirty thousand members. These are in addition to the two hundred thousand paid up members to whom I have referred. The Inyandza Movement is a totally non ethnic movement open to all people with the rights to vote in KaNgwane. Approximately half the voters of KaNgwane are classified as Swazis. My movement is opposed to ethnicity as a basis for exercising political rights within South Africa and considers it to be divisive and an attempt by the government to weaken black opposition to its policies. My movement stands for a united South Africa in which the entire population regardless of race, colour or creed, should be entitled to universal franchise. It believes in the dismantling of the homelands and the destruction of apartheid. Although I am the Chief Minister of KaNgwane, the designated homeland of Swazi speaking South Africans, my constituency and I are not willing participants in the system. We reject the homeland policy and we are committed to the creation of a truly democratic society in South Africa. In my view this reflects the attitude of the majority of Black people who see the homeland policy as a peversion of the principal of democracy. The South African Government does not represent the majority of the population of the country and for that reason cannot claim political ligitimacy. 2 . My perception of the UDF, and I believe the perception within my constituency, is that it is a broad based and widely supported movement with considerable support within the Black community. It has a big constituency and is widely respected within KaNgwane. I myself have had discussions with leaders of the UDF and there has been no conflict whatever between my organisation and the UDF within KaNgwane. That does not mean that we necessarily agree upon all issues. For instance, it is a fundamental principle of UDF policy that there should be no participation in Government created structures. Page 2 We understand that attitude but have chosen to take a different path. For tactical reasons we have participated within the Government structures and have done so deliberately in order to frustrate the Government's attempts to turn KaNgwane into an independant homeland and denationalise the people who live there. Whilst the UDF does necessarily agree with our tactics they have shown an understanding for them. 3 . I am aware of the UDF's declaration and from my discussions with its leaders and my readings I have a general idea of its policy. The UDF's declaration addresses issues which are of fundamental importance to Black aspirations. Those issues are not the preserve of the UDF. They are shared by very many Black leaders and organisations. The UDF is an extremely important organisation in the anti apartheid camp and its leaders are respected leaders of the Black communi tee. What they say is no different to what many other people have said both before and since the founding of the UDF including myself and my party. The names of Mr. Molefe and Mr. Lekoto are known to me and I know of them to be respected leaders within the Black community. I also know of Mr. Tom Mantata who is also seen as a respected leader within the Black community. I had not heard the names of the other accused persons prior to being asked to give evidence in this case. 4 . The UDF is perceived within my constituency as a progressive organisation with an important role to play in bringing about political change. I believe that its leaders have a crucial role to play in bringing about peaceful change within our country and that the government should be talking to them instead of prosecuting them. They are an essential ingredient to the process of peaceful change that the majority of South Africans would like to see. They are of great value to our people and to the country outside of gaol. It will be extremely difficult to promote reconciliation within our country without the cooperation and active participation of such people. I consider it to be extremely harmful to the process of peaceful change and reconciliation to imprison such persons instead of talking to them. Sending them to gaol will prolong and delay the process of reconciliation and exacerbate the problems of the country. Page 3 5 . I personally regard the ANC as an important political organisation and an essential component of any attempts to resolve conflict within South Africa. I do not agree with its strategy of the armed struggle and I have made this clear both in my discussions with ANC leaders whom I have met, and in my public statements. My experience within my own constituency is that people living there do not approve of mines which explode and endanger lives. This notwithstanding, there is tremendous sympathy for the ANC and its cadres. They are generally regarded within my constituency as freedom fighters and not as terrorists. Deep down, people believe them to be heroes. And people who have risked their own safety in order to bring liberation to their people. In discussing violence and its causes one must not lose sight of the State violence against Black people. The apartheid policy is at the centre of such violence. It is imposed upon the Black people against their will and only a Black person living in a ghetto or in a bantustan can understand the extent and impact of such violence. People who have been forcibly removed from their areas of residence and dumped without chance of a job in a remote bantustan without proper facilities. People living in Black ghettos without adequate social or physical infra structure. People having to commute long distances to work and to leave their families behind them. People suffering under the influx control laws which made criminals of people seeking work. People hurt by the Group Areas Act. And generally who have been harmed by the multitude of discriminatory laws which exist within South Africa. At the heart of it all is a Population Registration Act which classifies people and predetermines their future according to such classification. White people who are insulated from what is happening within the Black communities do not perceive or understand the extent of the anger and suffering which have been provoked by these policies. In my view apartheid is a recipy for violence. Separation polarises people and gives rise to conflict particularly where the separation is identified with haves and have nots. It is inevitable in the history of the struggle for liberation that people will have turned to violence when all else fails. This is the perception of the Black community and the reason why Blacks perceive the ANC her people as freedom fighters and not as terrorists, particularly since June 1976 thousands of young people have left the country to join the armed struggle. Page 4 In my own speeches, whilst I have indicated my own opposition to the armed struggle, I have also said that I am not willing to accuse them for the decision that they have taken because I believe that they have acted in accordance with their convictions that nothing but the armed struggle will bring about change in this country. 6 . I have attended meetings of the youth within my own constituency. The youth sing freedom songs. These songs are part of the Black culture and reflect their yearning for liberation. At the youth congress meetings young people sing about Mandela and Tambo. I cannot and would stop them from doing this. Mandela is a national leader and a national hero. He is the embodiment of Black aspirations. Our youth regard him and the leaders of the ANC as leaders of the people and not simply as leaders of the ANC itself. If I attempted to stop them I would be trying to do the impossible. Although violent language sometimes is used in the songs that is fantasy and not reality. The people who sing it have not intention of taking up arms against the Government nor have they done so. 7 . In my view the Government's refusal to negotiate with the ANC has prolonged and will continue to prolong the conflict within our country. No credible leader within the Black community can negotiate with the government in the absence of the exiles and imprisoned leaders. I certainly will not negotiate with the Government behind the backs of these leaders. What is needed is a practical demonstration of a commitment to peaceful negotiations including the ANC. I believe that the violence will not stop for as long as the Government excludes the ANC from negotiations. Indeed fewer and fewer Black leaders are willing to talk to the Government. Recently I was one of only two Chief Ministers who would speak to Mr. Heunis about constitutional changes. The others declined to do so. Although I have shown a willingness to talk to the South African Government I do not agree with apartheid. I am totally opposed to it and to the institutionalised violence which keeps it in place. I believe that if the Government made a clear commitment to abolish apartheid and was willing to unban the ANC and involve it in a political process in South Africa, the violence would stop.
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