The New Europe

Number 14, Spring 2008 The New Europe Michael Chertoff on cooperation in the War on Terror Alex Alexiev on Europe’s demographic demons Sally McNamara on the future of U.S.-UK ties Astrid Coeurderoy on French foreign policy under Sarkozy Ulf Gartzke on Angela Merkel’s international line Janusz Bugajski on the changing politics of “New Europe” B. Grgic & A. Petersen on a new European energy security strategy Peter Brookes on the logic of European missile defense Victor Mizin on coping with Russia’s nuclear arsenal Jamie Shea on the Atlantic Alliance’s enduring importance E. Wayne Merry on moving beyond NATO

Perspective J. D. Crouch II on missile defense, Russian politics & U.S. strategy toward Iran

Dispatches Gaming the U.S.-India nuclear deal Malaise and decline under Gordon Brown Retaking the initiative in Iraq

Book Reviews Michael Oren’s Power, Faith, and Fantasy

$7.95 US $12.50 CAN The Shia Revival by Vali Nasr 8 1 Eisenman et al.’s China and the Developing World Blindside by Francis Fukuyama et al.

0 7 4 4 7 0 5 7 8 8 2 6 www.securityaffairs.org Ilan Berman Editor

Tom Neumann Publisher Jim Colbert Associate Editor/Managing Editor Karla Jones Circulation Manager Jennifer Keech Graphic Design and Layout James P. Cetrone Web Development

Editorial Board Jonathan Kislak, Chairman; Amb. John Bolton; Dr. Stephen Bryen; Armeane Choksi; Adm. Leon “Bud” Edney USN (ret.); Hon. Jack Kemp; Dr. Joshua Muravchik; Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow USA (ret.)

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Inc., is an independent, non- profit, non-partisan, non-sectarian educational organization established in 1976 to fulfill a two-fold mandate: To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America’s security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of liberty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

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Manuscripts should be sent to: 1779 Mas- Advertising: Please contact the Editor, Ilan sachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 515, Washing- Berman, at ([email protected]) for ton, D.C. 20036. The Editor will consider information on availability and ad rates. all manuscripts received, but will assume Reprints and Permissions: Write The Jour- no responsibility regarding them and will nal of International Security Affairs, Reader return only materials accompanied by Services, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, appropriate postage. Facsimile submissions Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20036. Fax: will not be accepted. (202) 667-0601.

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in The Journal of International Security Affairs (ISSN 1532-4060) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JINSA. Number 14, Spring 2008

From the Publisher Tom Neumann 3

Editor’s Corner Ilan Berman 5

The New Europe

The Battle for Our Common Future Michael Chertoff 7 The stakes behind the West’s current struggle

Stumbling Toward Eurabia Alex Alexiev 11 Barbarians inside the European gates

Is the Special Relationship Still Special? Sally McNamara 21 Europe, the new challenge to U.S.-UK ties

Turning the Page Astrid Coeurderoy 29 Nicholas Sarkozy closes the book on the anti-American era in France

Berlin’s Best Hope Ulf Gartzke 35 Angela Merkel holds the key to a more constructive German foreign policy

Europe’s Rising East Janusz Bugajski 43 Eastern Europe and the Balkans between East and West

Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen 49 For Europe, real energy security means rolling back Russian influence—and focusing on the Caspian

The Case for European Missile Defense Peter Brookes 55 Why missile defense cooperation with Europe matters Russia’s “Nuclear Renaissance” Victor Mizin 63 Back to nuclear basics between Moscow and Washington

Debating NATO

Facing the Future Jamie Shea 71 The Atlantic Alliance needs to adapt to new security threats

An Obsolete Alliance E. Wayne Merry 79 NATO has long outlived its usefulness to America

Perspective

“Tough Choices Ahead”: An Interview with J. D. Crouch II 89 The former Deputy National Security Advisor explains the centrality of the “third site,” Russia’s resurgence, and U.S. policy toward Iran

Dispatches

NEW DELHI: The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation C. Uday Bhaskar 93

LONDON: Downing Street Blues Michael Gove 95

BAGHDAD: Winds of Change Joel D. Rayburn 98

Book Reviews

Looking Back to Look Forward Asaf Romirowsky 101 From Michael Oren, a masterful exposé of America’s experience with the Middle East

Turf War Ilan Berman 104 Vali Nasr’s partisan look inside the Shia-Sunni schism

Tracking the Dragon Randall G. Schriver 106 Eisenman et al. bring us closer to understanding China’s changing foreign policy

Expecting the Unexpected Adam Lovinger 109 A framework for addressing unforeseen catastrophes, courtesy of Fukuyama and company From the Publisher

The media leads the way. The people follow, and the politicians echo. That is the order of things today.

There used to be a time when the media prided itself on how objective and honest it was. It did not always succeed, but it at least seemed to try. Back then the slogan of the much-vaunted New York Times was “All the News That’s Fit to Print.” Today, that motto has become “All the News That We Choose to Print.” The Times is willing to select, place and formulate news language in a way unimaginable just 20 years ago. The goal is to persuade rather than to report.

Even the news industry’s conservative standard bearer, Fox News, is no longer what it used to be. It is not fair and balanced, just relatively so. It is an alternative to CNN and MSNBC, just like the New York Sun emerged as a necessary alternative to the New York Times and the Washington Times was a response to the Washington Post.

But the tragedy is that these are our main—and frequently our only—sources of information. The power of the media is so great that it can bring down or protect administrations. It can elect Presidents, Senators and Congressmen. Spare me your editorial endorsement; that is chump change compared to the support of those who put together the front page.

The media can determine foreign policy, and it can help to win or lose wars. It can bring about a recession, or it can bolster confidence in the economy.

In short, we live in a dictatorship of the media. It controls what we know, what we think, and what we buy. It is not Big Brother we have to fear so much as it is Citizen Kane. And if we are to be really free, we must lift the veil that blinds us.

With this in mind, please enjoy this copy of The Journal. We hope that, in some small way, it helps to lift that veil.

Tom Neumann Publisher

The Journal of International Security Affairs

Editor’s Corner

Europe, it has long been said, is America’s most important and enduring international partner. There is much to lend credence to this argument. After all, the political, cultural and military bonds between the United States and its allies across the Atlantic have persisted for centuries, reinforced by economic cooperation and strengthened by periods of shared conflict.

Today, however, those bonds are changing dramatically. Political divisions and demographic pressures on the Old Continent, transatlantic discord over the Iraq war, and diverging views of new international security threats have all impacted the relationship between Europe and America, and not for the better. All of which has led some, like conservative columnist Mark Steyn, to conclude that—when it comes to the War on Terror and other 21st century challenges— America is well and truly alone.

It is more than fitting, therefore, that we turn our attention to the political and strategic changes taking place in Europe, and their implications for the United States. Our coverage kicks off with a feature article by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, who outlines the scope of the common struggle against radical Islam. From there, the Center for Security Policy’s Alex Alexiev provides a comprehensive—and chilling—analysis of the demographic decline taking place on the Old Continent, and the concomitant rise of a radical, unas- similated Muslim political class there.

In her contribution, Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation explores the new threat to the historic Special Relationship between the United States and England: an increasingly assertive Europe. Astrid Coeurderoy of the European Foundation for Democracy, meanwhile, charts the rise of a new, more activist foreign policy in France. Georgetown University’s Ulf Gartzke does the same for Germany, outlining how German Chancellor Angela Merkel has reversed her predecessor’s populist, anti-American line.

For his part, Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explores the changing policies—and international postures—of the countries of “New Europe.” Two European experts, Borut Grgic and Alexandros Petersen of Slovenia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, contribute their recommendations for a new strategy for the continent’s energy security. The Heritage Foundation’s Peter Brookes demystifies the contours of the current debate taking place over European missile defense. And Victor Mizin of the Russian Academy of Sciences outlines the rationale behind Moscow’s recent nuclear resurgence—and what it means for Washington. Our treatment is rounded out by a debate between two esteemed experts—Jamie Shea of NATO and the American Foreign Policy Council’s E. Wayne Merry—over the continued relevance of the Atlantic Alli- ance in the 21st century.

The Journal of International Security Affairs With this issue, we are also pleased to introduce a new regular feature—one in which we solicit the “Perspective” of leading statesmen and policy experts on a range of contemporary national security and foreign policy topics. Our first interviewee is an auspicious one indeed: former Deputy National Secu- rity Advisor J. D. Crouch II, one of the principal architects of American missile defense policy. This edition of The Journal also features a trio of “Dispatches” from foreign experts from India, England and Iraq, as well as reviews of important works on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and Middle Eastern politics.

All in all, this issue of The Journal—like previous ones—offers a wealth of new critical thinking on some of the most important issues of the day. Thank you, as always, for taking part in the debate.

Ilan Berman Editor

The Journal of International Security Affairs The Battle for Our Common Future Michael Chertoff

ver the past year, the American public has been treated to a chorus of critics and skeptics who have downplayed the seri- Oousness of the threats we face in the post-September 11th world. Former government officials like Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski have accused the Bush administration of hyping the War on Terror in order to promote a culture of fear. Others deny that we are at war at all.

But based upon the words and deeds of the terrorists themselves, we are very much at war. In 1998, Osama bin Laden made an open declaration of war that ended with the command “to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military, in any country where it is possible to do it.” In the decade that has followed, bin Laden and his cohorts have done precisely that, plotting against the entire global system of security, safety and prosperity. Their efforts belie the scope of the current struggle. We are at war with an ideology that is every bit as fanatical and ruthless as that of fascism or commu- nism. Spread by a sinister network of cult-like entities that spans the world, this fanatical worldview sanctifies the torture and slaughter of innocents; it denies the dignity and humanity of its opponents; and it includes among those it targets mainstream Muslims who dare to reject its pseudo-religious message of intoler- ance and bigotry. From New York to London, from Madrid to Jerusalem, from Baghdad to Bali, this barbarous ideology has torn through nations, carving a bloody trail of death and destruction, leaving orphans and widows in its wake on nearly every continent.

The Honorable Michael Chertoff is the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. This article is adapted from Secretary Chertoff’s October 17, 2007, address before Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, the site of Winston Churchill’s famous 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech. Michael Chertoff

These extremists have proven Simply put, this is how ideologi- themselves quite capable of waging cal fanatics view the world. Whether the war that they have declared. it is Adolf Hitler or Josef Stalin, They have been helped in part by 21st Osama bin Laden or President Mah- century technology, which has pro- moud Ahmadinejad of Iran, for every vided even small groups with enor- fanatic, weakness is provocation. That mous capability for destruction and is why we must never fool ourselves damage. Radicals affiliated with al- into thinking that submissiveness is a Qaeda or the Taliban or other similar path to peace. extremist groups—from North Africa The United States has heeded to Iraq and South Asia—are fight- this counsel. Following 9/11, Presi- ing for, and sometimes achieving, dent Bush took decisive action, control of territory that they use to striking back against al-Qaeda in train, assemble advanced weaponry, Afghanistan, deploying our intelli- and perform experiments to develop gence assets across the globe, cap- ever deadlier ways of killing their turing or killing terrorists on nearly enemies, and over which they impose every continent, and partnering with their own vision of repressive law and our allies on shared intelligence seek to dominate local life. against this common menace. With- out such steps, the United States would have doubtless faced other, We are fighting a battle not equally devastating attacks over the only of armaments, but of past six years. ideas. And therein lies our But there is another element in this struggle that is as important as greatest strength. strength: resolve. In his day, Ronald Reagan counseled that the United States should be “[n]ot warlike, not And finally, through atrocities bellicose, not expansionist—but firm like the 9/11 bombings, the radicals and principled in resisting those who have demonstrated that they are quite would devour territory and put the capable of visiting consequences upon soul in bondage.” us every bit commensurate with war. Today, we can heed this advice Their goal is clear; what our enemies by preventing our foes from attaining want is “a dialogue with bullets and two monumental goals that they seek the ideals of assassination, bombing to achieve. and destruction.” These, of course, The first is the acquisition of weap- are not my words; they are from an ons of mass destruction, chief among al-Qaeda training manual. them nuclear weapons. Simply put, we The nature of our enemies and cannot allow such a capability ever to the ideological threat that we face pass into the hands of a global network brings to mind Winston Churchill’s of terror. For bin Laden and his fellow famous dictum, uttered in 1946 in ref- travelers are at war not just with Amer- erence to a different threat, the Soviet ica or the West, but with the values and Union, but equally applicable here: principles, the habits and institutions “There is nothing they admire so of modern civilization. These extrem- much as strength, and there is noth- ist ideologues aim to destroy the ing for which they have less respect modern world by unleashing the tools than for weakness.” of modern technology in the service

The Journal of International Security Affairs The Battle for Our Common Furture of a violent, medieval ideology. Make modern science, we have conquered no mistake: unlike rational foes that ancient diseases, we have freed we have faced in the past, including people from poverty and starvation, the Nazis and the Soviet communists, we have triggered the information this enemy, if it ever obtains a modern age, and we have made the world a nuclear weapon, has every intention of better and brighter place. using it. We are heirs to the age of reason, The second goal of our ideo- locked in a struggle for hearts and logical foes is to gain possession minds over this very matter, a strug- and control of nation-states. Just like gle whose outcome might well deter- the Nazis before they seized power mine the fate of our civilization and in Germany or the Marxists before this globe. We dare not walk away they took over in Russia, our enemies from this battle, and we cannot allow are seeking countries to conquer fanatics to drag parts of the world because they desire platforms from into a dark age of ignorance and fear, which they can launch other kinds degradation and servitude, disre- of attacks. As we know, al-Qaeda ran spect for women, and prejudice and Afghanistan through its surrogate, contempt for those with whom there the Taliban, and that malignant alli- is disagreement. ance is part of what made 9/11 pos- We are not in a battle against sible. Today, Islamic radicals seek religion, because as we have seen to recreate such a safe haven in in the lives of some of the greatest Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Somalia and men and women of our age, there elsewhere. And that is why we must is no necessary conflict between continue to work to ensure that they reason and faith. But we are indeed never acquire those platforms. in a fight for our future, and it is We are fighting a battle not this fight to which we must dedicate only of armaments, but of ideas. And ourselves. It is not a struggle that therein lies our greatest strength. Our will resolve itself easily. Like any enemies are animated by a fanatical other great ideological conflict, it ideology in which prejudice is lionized will require perseverance, attentive- instead of condemned, and solving ness, and faith in our own values. It disputes through bombings is viewed also demands that we never allow as the preferred path to achieving con- wishful thinking or complacency sensus. We, on the other hand, believe to overcome the kind of clear-eyed, in the power of reason, the great tough-minded approach embod- legacy bequeathed to us by our intel- ied by leaders such as Churchill lectual ancestors, including the forefa- and Reagan. So let us stand firm in thers of this country. In contrast to our defense of our society, our civiliza- enemies, many of them believed that tion, and our humanity. And may we when we look at the world through see the triumph of reason and free- reason, we’re not betraying faith in the dom in the hearts and minds of the Almighty, but are obeying a divine call people of every nation, everywhere. to pursue knowledge and truth wherever they lead. Through the liberation and exercise of reason, humanity has achieved more in the last three centuries than in all of its history. We have birthed

The Journal of International Security Affairs

Stumbling Toward Eurabia

Alex Alexiev

n the summer of 2004, in an interview little noticed outside the country, the prominent academic scholar of Islam Bassam Tibi predicted a future for Germany that many decried as provocative nonsense at the I 1 time. In ten years, Tibi said, Germany will be the scene of large running battles between police and gangs of marginalized Muslim youth, bringing cities like Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt to the brink of chaos. This will be the inevitable result, according to him, of a trend that is already visible. Muslims are not interested in integration. They are, in fact, obligated not to integrate by the radical Islamic ideology dominant in their communities, and live increasingly segregated in parallel societies. The main difference between 2004 and 2014, Tibi believed, would be that the highly marginalized Muslim population would have more than doubled to 10 million, sharia would have been gradually introduced in Germany and the Islam preached there would be even more radical and resemble Nazi totalitarianism.

Today, more than three and a half years later, a new study of attitudes among young Muslims by the German interior ministry would seem to confirm Tibi’s fears. According to the survey, 44 percent of respondents have fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, 50 percent believe that “Muslims who die in the armed struggle for the faith (Jihad) go to paradise,” and one in four is ready to engage in violence against non-Muslims.2

Alex Alexiev is vice president for research at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., where he focuses on Islamic extremism. He has over thirty years of analytical experience in the national security field with the Rand Cor- poration, Radio Free Europe, the Hoover Institution and the Hudson Institute. Alex Alexiev

Nor is such troubling evidence While this trend seems to char- unique to Germany. At about the acterize the entire developed indus- time the German study was being trial world to one extent or another, it released, the Bishop of Rochester, is especially pronounced in Europe, Michael Nazir-Ali, spoke of the exis- where it has become a continent- tence of Muslim no-go zones in Brit- wide phenomenon.5 Stated simply, ain, described as areas dominated European birth rates (known as by radical Islamic ideology where “total fertility rate,” or TFR) have people of different faiths report- collapsed to approximately 1.5 chil- edly face physical attacks. This phe- dren per woman in 1995 from nearly nomenon has been likened by Tory twice that rate three decades ear- shadow Home Secretary David Davis lier.6 What this means, in practical to “voluntary apartheid” by Muslims, terms, is that a sustained fertility “shutting themselves in closed soci- rate of 1.5 in a society leads to the ety, demanding immunity from criti- yearly loss of one-half percent of its cism.”3 And just a month earlier, in the population.7 The cataclysmic long- Paris suburb of Villiers-le-Bel, young term repercussions of such a devel- Muslim rioters for the first time used opment in Europe may be too far in firearms and Molotov cocktails to the future to worry us here, but there battle police in what was described are immediate and medium-term by some in the media as an “urban consequences to this phenomenon guerilla war.”4 that should be of grave concern. Are these troubling develop- With a fertility rate of just under ments part of an inexorable slide 1.5 percent for the past ten years, and toward the Islamization of Europe no realistic prospect of any improve- that will make Tibi’s dire predic- ment in the foreseeable future, tions reality? Or are they, as many Europe has an annual deficit of over have argued, the predictable result two million births to reach replace- of the long-term socio-economic ment levels. To the extent that the neglect, racism and discrimination continent’s population is increas- against Europe’s Muslims that could ing at all, it is mostly on account of be easily fixed with the proper poli- legal and illegal immigration. As cies? The answer to this question is of the smaller post-baby boom cohorts existential importance for the future reach childbearing age, this deficit of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and, will widen still further, contract- indeed, Western civilization itself. ing the native European population by anywhere between 100 and 150 The demographics million—or a quarter to a third of today’s EU-25 450 million—by mid- of twilight 8 The crisis now engulfing Europe century. This historically unprec- is euphemistically referred to in edented population implosion will scholarly papers as the “second demo- shrink Europe’s share of the world graphic transition.” What this innocu- population to barely four percent in ous term conceals is a phenomenon 2050 from 12 percent in 1950. unprecedented in human history, Unfortunately, the dire implica- namely the implicit refusal of large tions of this trend will not wait until societies in times of peace to produce mid-century to manifest themselves, babies in numbers sufficient to guar- but will start wreaking havoc with antee their long-term survival. Europe’s socio-economic prospects in

12 The Journal of International Security Affairs Stumbling Toward Eurabia the immediate future. This is because, Ageing societies thus place inordi- long before significant depopulation nate burdens on the public purse, begins to take place, low fertility while limiting consumption in the ushers in a pervasive ageing process marketplace and negatively affecting that ultimately renders the expensive the cost of labor, productivity, inter- but unfunded pay-as-you-go welfare national competitiveness, innovation systems of modern western societies and foreign and domestic investment. unsustainable. Demographers refer Ultimately, if and when such societies to this key dependency as the “poten- are perceived as moribund, as they tial support ratio” (PSR), usually inevitably will be, one can expect expressed in the ratio of individuals massive out-migration of capital, of working age (15-64) to the number companies and skilled individuals to of people of retirement age (65 and more attractive locales. It is unlikely over) in a given society.9 A more accu- that this process will run its course rate measure is the actual number of without major political upheavals, working individuals available to sup- because the logic of ageing wel- port each retired or disabled individ- fare societies requires ever greater ual through their taxes. transfers of wealth from the depleted Until the late decades of the 20th younger and poorer cohorts to the century, these ratios were tradition- more affluent and electorally power- ally very high even in western soci- ful “geezer” generations. eties, where the average age of the population remained under 30. But In the past half century or this is changing dramatically. By 2010, the number of elders (65 and over) in so the Muslim population France and most other EU countries in Western Europe has will outnumber people aged 0 to 14—a exploded from less than a development that has never happened before in recorded history. By 2015, quarter million in the early the 60-and-over cohort will represent 1950s to between 15 and more than a quarter of the population, 20 million today. And it is a and a decade or so later it will become rapidly growing population twice as large as the group aged 0 to 24.10 It is beyond question that with a that has also become projected nominal PSR of between 1.5 progressively radicalized. and 2 in 2030 and even earlier none of the EU countries would be able to There are, of course, a number sustain levels of prosperity anywhere of options Europeans have for miti- near the ones they enjoy today unless gating negative demographic trends their welfare systems are drastically before the population implosion reformed or dismantled. begins in earnest around 2020. All, Other less obvious but no less however, involve considerable pain serious economic consequences of and attitudinal change that could this trend will also begin affecting doom them politically. To keep the growth and prosperity in short order. potential support ratio from declin- Rapidly shrinking and ageing popu- ing, Europeans could, for instance, lations inevitably lead to decreas- raise the de facto retirement age ing demand for everything except from the current 58 years to 65 or healthcare and government services. 66, and/or increase the percentage

The Journal of International Security Affairs 13 Alex Alexiev of the working population in the EU and economic crises; rather, it is actu- from its current level of 62 percent ally making things worse. to the one prevailing, for instance, The problem with current immi- in Denmark (75 percent). That alone gration into the EU is very simply would add 32 million people to the the fact that much of it places addi- workforce.11 More drastic still (and tional burdens on the social welfare therefore even less likely) would be system rather than contributing to deep cuts in welfare and pension its improvement. This is the case, benefits and the privatization of pay- as will be explained in greater detail as-you-go pension plans. below, because most of the new arriv- Apart from these short-term als enter Europe either as part of the palliatives, there are only two pos- “migration chain,” i.e., family reuni- sible long-term solutions that could fication, “mail-order spouses,” etc., theoretically prevent the dire conse- or as illegal aliens. The vast major- quences of the demographic crisis ity in both categories lack job and discussed above from becoming a linguistic skills and do not join the reality—increasing the birth rate and tax-paying labor force in any signifi- immigration. And neither one is a cant numbers, but rather work in the likely panacea. underground economy or enlist in the On the first point, there is a welfare rolls. near-unanimity among demogra- While studies have shown phers that raising European birth clearly that present immigrant popu- rates to the replacement value of lations to the EU from poor countries 2.1 children per woman is virtually impose a net cost on their host soci- impossible in the short to medium eties, there is growing evidence that term (10-20 years), and problematic failed immigration and integration even in the longer term. Moreover, policies may present an even bigger even if replacement levels were to political challenge. The most seri- be achieved 30 years or more in the ous issue here by far is the exten- future, most of the negative demo- sive and ongoing radicalization of graphic and socio-economic devel- the burgeoning Muslim populations opments projected for 2050 will have throughout the European Union. taken place regardless. This leaves immigration, and The Muslim population here again the picture is troubling. explosion The official policy of virtually all EU Establishing even the basic facts governments is to discourage immi- about Europe’s Muslim populations is gration from outside the EU except often an arduous task because most for highly skilled professionals and a European governments, with the few other categories, such as family notable exception of Britain, seem- reunification and political asylum. ingly as a matter of principle, avoid Despite these restrictions, significant collecting or publishing most relevant legal and illegal immigration, esti- data of an ethnic or religious char- mated at over two million per annum, acter. Nonetheless, using a variety does take place and is the main of sources, it is possible to establish reason Europe’s population has not credible approximations of both the yet started declining. Unfortunately, absolute numbers and fertility rates it has not contributed to the amelio- of Europe’s Muslims. ration of the continent’s demographic

14 The Journal of International Security Affairs Stumbling Toward Eurabia

What is beyond dispute is that factor among key age cohorts in 20 in the past half a century or so the years or so is of huge political con- Muslim population in Western Europe sequence. And despite the lack of has exploded from less than a quarter definitive data, there are compelling million in the early 1950s to between reasons to believe that this could 15 and 20 million today. While that still indeed happen. represents only four to five percent of As already mentioned, most the EU-15 (370 million) population European governments provide sta- or three to four percent of the EU-25 tistics on neither Muslim fertility (450 million), it is a rapidly growing rates nor total populations. Nonethe- population that has also become pro- less, available data, however incom- gressively radicalized. plete, shows beyond much doubt that Most EU governments have 1) Muslims are dramatically younger avoided openly debating this issue, as a group, 2) have fertility rates that except for rhetorical flourishes about are two or even three times higher the need to integrate the Muslim than those of native Europeans, and minority, and have focused instead 3) are growing fast on account of on its implications for terrorism. legal and illegal immigration. Demographers and other experts, on Official British statistics from the other hand, have conjured up the the 2001 UK census show, for “Islamization” of Europe in the long instance, that 34 percent of the term or, conversely, the possibility estimated Muslim population of 1.6 that Muslim birth rates will fall in million was under 16 years of age, line with the native ones over time compared to approximately 20 per- and bring about a stable balance. Rel- cent of Christians, and over 70 per- atively little attention has been paid cent of the former were under 34 to the likelihood that the burgeoning years old, as compared to 40 percent Muslim communities, if radicalized of the latter. Less than five percent of and unintegrated, could have a dra- Muslims were aged 65 and over, com- matic impact on political stability in pared to 20 percent for Christians.12 Western Europe long before “Islam- Overall, in 2001 survey, the aver- ization” takes place. age age for Muslims in the United To understand the potential for Kingdom was under 27 years, while such an outcome, it is important to that of the white population was 38 first come to terms with some of the (and projected to be 40 by 2007).13 essential characteristics of the demo- The same or worse ratio is likely to graphic momentum and the nature of obtain in most of the other large EU the ongoing radicalization process of members, such as Germany, Italy European Muslims. and Spain, all of which have lower Perhaps the first thing that birthrates than Britain. needs to be pointed out is that dis- The youthful and more fecund cussions of whether or not Muslims Muslim population, coupled with a will become the majority of the pop- tradition of getting married young, ulation in Europe by the end of the accounts for dramatically higher 21st century are largely academic. growth rates.14 Though actual TFR However, the possibility that radical- numbers are not published, it is a fair ized Muslims who reject the Euro- assumption that they are high, prob- pean secular democratic order could ably between 2.5 and 3. This could become a dominant demographic be deduced both from the available

The Journal of International Security Affairs 15 Alex Alexiev

growth numbers for Muslims in some desh, India, Algeria, Indonesia and British towns and by the size of the elsewhere settled in Europe in the average Muslim household, which aftermath of decolonization. Then, as was reported to be 4.9 in 1991.15 Very European economies recovered from similar fertility rates are reported in war devastation, millions of “guest France, where according to figures workers” were recruited as cheap for 1999 provided by the French sta- labor for the booming economies of tistical agency, INSEE, the main Western Europe in the 1950s and Muslim national groups had birth beyond. These two waves of immi- rates as follows: Algerians—2.57, gration set the stage for today’s large Moroccans—2.97, Tunisians—2.90, Muslim diaspora communities. and Turks—3.21.16 Large-scale legal immigration Overall, the probable European was essentially terminated in most Muslim TFR of between 2.5 and 3.0 of Western Europe after the 1973 oil will result in a natural increase of embargo and the resulting economic the Muslim population of approxi- crisis, but it was replaced over time mately 1.5 to 2 percent per annum. by a different form of legal immigra- This corresponds to between 225,000 tion which is much more difficult to and 300,000 if the lower figure of 51 control and which has been widely million is used, and between 300,000 used and abused by Muslims to gain and 400,000 if the higher 20 million entry into Europe. figure is applied. This compares to Demographers have coined a the EU average TFR of 1.5, which, special term for this phenomenon: as mentioned, leads to a loss of two “chain migration.” It was first insti- and a quarter million people per year tuted in most Western European throughout the continent. countries as a humanitarian family reunification measure for the mostly single immigrants of the initial waves. The Old Continent is no In the meantime, as immigration for longer just a transit point for economic reasons has fallen off dras- terrorists; it has itself become tically, chain migration has become a breeding ground for all the most important method of gaining legal entry into the EU. The most manner of Islamic extremists commonly used approach is arranged and jihadists. or forced marriages, where Euro- pean-born individuals are married off The second factor contributing to partners back in the home coun- to non-native population increase in try. Not only is the new bride/bride- Europe has traditionally been legal groom allowed to join his/her spouse immigration. There have been two in Europe, but very often the entire waves of post-World War II large- family follows shortly, resulting in scale Muslim influx into Europe: multiple new immigrants. “post-colonial” and “guest worker” And, with the exception of immigration. The first involved the Hindus and Sikhs, the vast majority former citizens of the colonial pos- of arranged marriages are practiced sessions of Great Britain, France, the by Muslims. One German source Netherlands, etc., who qualified for estimates, for instance, that up to 80 immigration. This is how large num- percent of Muslim girls in a Ham- bers of people from Pakistan, Bangla- burg Turkish community enter into

16 The Journal of International Security Affairs Stumbling Toward Eurabia enforced marriage,17 while in the Finally, the Muslim populations United Kingdom 67 percent of girls in Europe are augmented by large- between the age of 16 and 34 are scale illegal immigration, which may reported to have their marriages be the most important quantitative arranged by their parents. Overall, factor presently. Exact figures are not various studies have shown that a available, but various sources allow a clear majority of new immigrants from credible estimate of both the overall outside of Europe now arrive through number of illegal immigrants resid- family reunification. In the United ing in Europe and the yearly flows. Kingdom, which accounts for some There is, for example, considerable 10 percent of the total EU Muslim evidence that the unauthorized immi- population, for example, there were grant population in southern Europe close to 50,000 new arrivals via spou- (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and sal migration in 2001, most of whom Greece) alone exceeds the three mil- were Muslims.18 Muslim chain migra- lion mark. Italy, France and Portugal tion in all of the EU thus could be as have at least another million and a half high as half a million per annum, a immigrants between them. North- figure that exceeds the natural popu- ern Europe with Germany, Great lation increase. Britain and a few others with sig- Arranged or forced marriages nificant Muslim populations almost have yet another important effect certainly host another three million in that they act as a major barrier or so. And, given the very large size to assimilation in European soci- of this illegal immigrant contingent, ety. As political philosopher Francis it is reasonable to conclude that the Fukuyama has argued, and as the half a million new arrivals per year American immigration experience estimated by EU authorities is unre- confirms, rates of marriage outside alistically low. Rather, judging by the of one’s group “correlate strongly number of illegals apprehended by with both assimilation and upward border controls in various European mobility.”19 By controlling and limit- countries, the actual influx is at least ing their children’s marriage choices, twice as large. Muslim parents in Europe effectively Unlike political asylum, which is undermine their chances for integra- mostly a Muslim affair, illegal immi- tion and economic betterment, at a gration to Europe attracts people from significant cost to society. every corner of the world, from China The final quasi-legal immigra- to Latin America to sub-Saharan tion category that contributes signifi- Africa. Nonetheless, after the drying cantly to the growth of EU’s Muslim up of Eastern Europe as a major populations is political asylum. Grant- source of undocumented immigrants ing political asylum to individuals per- to the EU in the past few years, Mus- secuted in their native lands for the lims now make up a clear majority of political views they hold is, of course, the yearly influx of over a million. a noble and time-honored tradition All in all, natural increase, chain in civilized nations. Unfortunately, migration, asylum seekers and illegal European societies have allowed the immigration put together easily con- right to asylum to be widely abused tribute over a million to the growth by millions that have no legitimate of the EU Muslim population every claim to it and use it simply as another year, and that is probably a very convenient way of getting in. conservative estimate. The Muslim

The Journal of International Security Affairs 17 Alex Alexiev population is thus set to increase by major impetus from the multi-cultural at least 50 percent every decade, and dogmas that became the order of the will likely double from its current day in Western Europe in the 1980s level by 2020—and double again by and beyond. The “temporary” guest 2035. By that year (and possibly ear- workers were thus encouraged to lier), the majority of young people in maintain their separate ethnic, lin- most large European urban centers guistic and cultural identities and will be Muslims. organize separate sports and cultural Major demographic shifts are, of institutions, and even alternative labor course, nothing new in history. Nor union and political organizations. is the replacement of one dominant No government policy, however, culture with another on account of a has had a greater and more negative new demographic balance necessar- effect on those immigrants than the ily a cause for concern per se. Unless, “social market” policies that became of course, that new culture is domi- the norm in the EU. As the post-1973 nated by the hateful, obscurantist and oil crisis put an official end to the inherently violent Islamist creed that “economic miracle” post-war era in does not intend to coexist peacefully Europe, the welfare state policies with others. began to impose ever greater burdens on the economy in terms of gov- Radical Islam resurgent ernment intervention, rising payroll As with any complex socio- taxes and minimum wages and rigid political phenomenon, the radicaliza- labor laws designed to protect highly tion of European Muslims has been paid and pampered skilled and union- the result of a combination of politi- ized workers and punish the young cal, economic and social factors and and unskilled by making them unem- policies. The stage was probably first ployable. At the same time, generous set by the stubborn, if totally unreal- welfare checks, housing benefits, istic, belief of European governments child subsidies and free health care that the millions of Muslim “guest made it economically more attractive workers” they imported as cheap for many to do nothing rather than do labor were indeed guests, and were minimum wage jobs. Inevitably, this sooner or later going to go home vol- state of affairs bred resentment, alien- untarily. Thus, for many years, no ation and lawlessness. And as it did, European government entertained those with a distinct non-European the possibility of long-term settle- culture, like the Muslims, progres- ment for the immigrants, nor took sively decoupled physically and even elementary acculturation and emotionally from the larger society assimilation measures. around them. It is in these alienated That neglect, coupled with Euro- Muslim enclaves throughout Europe pean xenophobia and latent racism, that radical Islam found fertile soil for restricted the immigrants’ housing its siren call. options to dilapidated industrial areas This process of encapsulation, or public housing in large cities and which began in earnest with the preordained the emergence of Muslim second generation of Muslim immi- ghettoes. The ghettoization of the grants in the 1970s, coincided with Muslim immigrants and their pro- the coming of age of radical Islam in gressive isolation from mainstream the Middle East and South Asia. The European society received another next three decades saw the massive

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs Stumbling Toward Eurabia infiltration of radical Islamic influ- it is difficult to see how Europe can ence into Europe, spurred by an remain a modern democratic and influx of foreign radicals from groups secular polity. such as the Muslim Brotherhood and massive amounts of Saudi money.20 This alliance facilitated the takeover of British Muslim organizations, and helped erect a huge network 1. Astrid Maier, “Deutschland 2014: Musli- mische ‘No-Future Kids’ Werden Sich an of Wahhabi-controlled institutions, Deutschland Raehen,” Financial Times including over 1,500 mosques, 150 Deutschland, August 13, 2004. Islamic Centers, 202 Muslim col- 2. “Junge Muslime Neigen Zur Gewalt,” Han- leges and 2,000 Islamic schools.21 As noverische Allgemeine Zeitung (Hannover), December 12, 2007. a result, there is hardly a city of any 3. “Bishop Warns of No-Go Zones for Non- size in the West that does not have a Muslims,” Sunday Telegraph (London), Janu- Saudi-controlled institution preach- ary 7, 2008. ing extremism and spewing hatred 4. See, for example, “Police Say Paris Rioters Are Armed as Clashes Escalate,” Guardian against Western civilization and, (London), November 28, 2007. directly or indirectly, advocating its 5. For a concise and insightful overview of destruction. And in Europe’s increas- recent demographic trends worldwide see ingly isolated, impoverished and Nicholas Eberstadt, “Four Surprises in Global Demography,” Foreign Policy Research Insti- discontented Muslims, the Wahhabi tute Watch on the West vol. 5, no. 5, July 2004, message has increasingly found reso- www.fpri.org/ww/0505.200407.eberstadt. nance. The end result is by now pain- demography.html. fully clear: a pervasive radicalization 6. European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook 2004: The Statistical Guide to Europe (Lux- of European Muslims is taking place embourg: Office for Official Publications throughout Western Europe. of the European Communities, 2004), 48, The immediate repercussions http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/ of this troubling phenomenon are fuernkranz/eurostat_yearbook_2004.pdf. 7. This is exactly what has been happening in already visible. The Old Continent is Russia for several years. With a population no longer just a transit point for ter- of 143 million (20 to 25 percent of which is rorists; it has itself become a breed- Muslim) and a fertility rate of 1.3, that coun- ing ground for all manner of Islamic try has been losing 700,000 people per year on average. extremists and jihadists. With hun- 8. European losses are likely to be consider- dreds of European-born and -raised ably higher if one were to include Russia, extremists documented to have Ukraine and Belarus, which are projected already taken part in terrorist activi- to lose 30, 36 and 25 percent of their populations, respectively, for a total of over 60 ties in all the hotbeds of jihadism million. See United Nations Department of worldwide, this is and should be a Economic and Social Affairs, “UN World matter of serious concern. But the Population Prospects,” n.d., http://esa. more profound challenge posed by un.org/unpp/. 9. This number could be misleading however, the quasi-totalitarian Islamist ideol- at least as it applies to Europe, because most ogy now on the march within the EU Europeans currently enter the labor force is to Europe itself. For, if the kind of not at 15 but after 20 and retire not at the radical, uncompromising and vio- de jure retirement age of 65, but at a de facto retirement age of 58. lence-prone worldview currently on 10. Jean-Claude Chesnais, “The Inversion of display in Muslim ghettoes remains the Age Pyramid and the Future Popula- dominant among European Muslims tion Decline in France: Implications and as they become a majority of the Policy Responses,” Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Ageing Continent’s young, urban population, and Population Decline, United Nations

The Journal of International Security Affairs 19 Alex Alexiev

Secretariat, New York, October 16-18, 2000, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/popdecline/Chesnais.pdf. 11. D.A.Coleman, “Facing the 21st Century: New Developments, Continuing Problems,” Paper presented at the European Population Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, January 12-14, 2004. 12. See National Statistics Online, “Age and Sex Distribution: Muslim Population Is Youngest,” n.d., http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget. asp?id=955. The 2001 census was the first Brit- ish census which contained a question about religion, though answering it was not manda- tory in England and Wales, which in the view of some may have skewed the response. 13. See National Statistics Online, “Age/Sex Dis- tribution: Non-White Groups Are Younger,” n.d., http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget. asp?id=456. 14. According to the 2001 census, Muslims are five times more likely to be married by the age of 24 than whites. 15. Table 8.3 in M. Murphy, Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1996). 16. Cited in Laurent Toulemon, “La Fecondite des Immigrees: Nouvelles Donnees, Nou- velle Approche,” Population & Societes no. 400, April 2004. 17. A. Desselberger et al., “Integrationskrise: Vertraut und Fremd,” Focus (Munich), November 22, 2004. 18. Data from the UK Home Office, as cited in Coleman, op. cit. 19. Francis Fukuyama, “Our Foreign Legions,” Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2004. 20. According to official Saudi figures, between 1973 and 2002, the kingdom spent more than $80 billion to promote Islamic activities in the non-Muslim world alone. See “Saudi Aid to Developing World,” saudiinf.com, n.d., http:// www.saudinf.com/main/l102.htm, and “Saudi Aid to Developing Nations Exceeds SR281 Bil- lion,” Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), January 2, 2003, www.saudia-online.com/news2003/ newsjan03/news2.shtml. 21. Cited in Ain al-Yaqeen (Riyadh), March 2, 2002.

20 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special? Sally McNamara

merica has found its strongest, most enduring alliance in its Special Relationship with Great Britain. This relationship has been defined Aby consistent and recurring cooperation, systematic engagement, and enduring bilateral relations that emerged from common values and obvious interests. Mutual recognition of the value of democratic government, the rule of law, individual rights, and the market economy are combined with a single historical and cultural experience until 1776, continued cultural intermingling since then, and a common language. America and Britain, in other words, have a relationship of both “blood and philosophy.”1

However, there is now a third party in this marriage: Brussels. As scholar Douglas Johnson has noted: “The United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU) form a triangular relationship that simultaneously conditions and threatens the U.S.-UK relationship, as the UK must participate in European affairs.”2 How Britain navigates the Special Relationship while at the same time dealing with this increasingly assertive supranational body will have massive geopolitical consequences in the years ahead.

The ties that bind Over the years, the Special Relationship has faced repeated challenges, and always emerged unscathed. On occasion, each country has put its national

Sally McNamara is Senior Political Analyst in European Affairs at the Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. She formerly served as Director of International Relations for the American Legislative Exchange Council, and before that as Chief Parliamentary Aide to European Parliament member Roger Helmer. Sally McNamara interest above that of the other. But Americans and Britons actually mean these instances have not fundamen- something. What’s more, Britain and tally threatened the relationship. America are actually prepared to In their day, for example, Margaret defend these values—with military Thatcher and Ronald Reagan notably force if necessary. Common values disagreed over the U.S. invasion of mean something only if both parties Grenada, but still went on to cooper- are ready to defend them. It is signifi- ate fully in fighting—and eventually cant that Winston Churchill coined winning—the Cold War. the term “Special Relationship” in In fact, the Thatcher-Reagan 1946, after Britain and America had era demonstrates some of the most spilled horrendous amounts of blood enduring features of the Special Rela- and expended copious treasure in an tionship. Thatcher’s ability to be both unwavering defense of their shared a steadfast partner and cautionary values during the Second World War. critic of the United States was not The underlying traditions and simply a demonstration of her mas- history of cooperation between Brit- tery of statecraft; it was a testament ain and America essentially negate to the strength of the alliance itself. any short-term threat to this endur- Shared beliefs do not prevent quar- ing alliance. Indeed, while it was rels, even among allies. More often the French who proclaimed “Nous than not, however, they yield the right sommes tous Américains” in the result for both sides. Critics saw Rea- wake of 9/11, it is Anglo-American gan’s eventual support for the British political, cultural, military, and dip- liberation of the Falkland Islands as lomatic solidarity that has outlasted a departure from America’s long-held this initial show of strength from Monroe Doctrine. But Reagan came America’s Continental friends. to see that supporting Britain’s claim had greater merit and value than did Three’s a crowd supporting the existential, geographi- Today, however, the Special Rela- cal pull of Argentina. tionship faces a new challenge. The Today, the passivity that marked EU’s relentless supranational drive the Special Relationship in the post- has demanded a surrender of British Cold War era has given way to a period national sovereignty in areas such as of frenetic cooperation between the trade, the economy, and even defense. United States and United Kingdom in The institutional and political the War on Terror. The recurring pat- constraints demanded by further tern is of each finding the other a nec- European integration will severely essary, indispensable ally in times of limit Britain’s ability to make foreign need, regardless of left-right orienta- policy, especially in international alli- tion or prevailing political conditions. ance-making. In political, diplomatic, Ultimately, the Special Relation- and financial terms, no good has ship is so special because the shared come from limiting Britain’s geopo- values and common interests that bind litical outlook to the European conti- the two countries reach far beyond nent, and certainly no benefit can be the philosophical utopia of Euro- derived from deeper EU absorption pean Union (EU) elites dreaming of that limits Britain’s historical and a European superstate. The common proven links with the United States. political, diplomatic, historical, and But doing just that is very much on cultural values shared between the minds of European officials. Large

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special? parts of the EU policy agenda—such national treaties which are inimical as the Common Foreign and Security to U.S. interests. Under the recently- Policy (CFSP) and European Secu- signed European Reform Treaty this rity and Defense Policy (ESDP)—are phenomenon will get worse. Just as designed precisely as counterweights the EU has become an increasingly to American “hyperpower.”3 Since confrontational trade actor unafraid the collapse of the Soviet Union, the to square off against Washington, perceived need for another power to Europe will become more aggressive counterbalance the United States has in the foreign policy arena. consistently motivated advocates of In this regard, it is vital the European integration. U.S. recognize the value of its pre- The 2006-7 investigation by the existing bilateral partnerships. It is European Parliament into America’s equally vital that the United States rendition policy demonstrates the heed the warning signs about how frequently anti-American direction of far the EU actually is prepared to EU policymaking.4 The EU believes go in its effort to centralize foreign that supranational institutions like policymaking. In its desire to create itself and the United Nations should ‘One Europe,’ the European Security be the sole arbiters of the use of force and Defense Policy has already cre- and should determine the rules of ated duplicate security structures to engagement for both symmetric and NATO and threatens traditional alli- asymmetric conflicts. This think- ance-building by the United States. ing was further displayed by the Under such conditions, as Henry EU in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Kissinger notes, American interests Freedom, with powerful European will inevitably, even if unintention- nations, including France and Ger- ally, lose out: many, actively seeking to obstruct American foreign policy. EU acces- When the United States deals sion countries were even threatened with the nations of Europe indi- with delays to their membership for vidually, it has the possibility of 5 consulting at many levels and to supporting the war. It was a clear— have its view heard well before a and ominous—signal: Europe had decision is taken. In dealing with issued a direct challenge to a sover- the European Union, by contrast, eign foreign policy decision of the the United States is excluded United States in an effort to contain from the decision-making pro- American power. cess and interacts only after the Underlying this stance is a fun- event, with spokesmen for deci- damentally different global outlook: sions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States one that views “multilateralism as the has not participated at any level… 6 best means to solve global problems.” Growing estrangement between The EU believes that diplomacy America and Europe is thus trumps all other foreign policy tools in being institutionally fostered.8 addressing international threats, and sees economic sanctions and military Neither Britain nor America operations as “a last resort.”7 Brussels should view deeper EU absorption is likewise an enthusiastic proponent as preferable to Britain’s historic and of the International Criminal Court, proven links with the United States. global abolition of the death penalty, The EU’s foreign policy agenda, led the Kyoto Protocol and various inter- by the CFSP and an independent

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 Sally McNamara

defense identity, is clearly designed poll reveals similar sentiments, with to serve as a counterweight to Ameri- incredible hostility toward American can global leadership. Britain, for its actions on the world stage. An over- part, should no longer risk its endur- whelming majority of Britons disap- ing alliance with the United States to proved of American policy toward pander to anti-American sentiment in Iraq (82 percent), its treatment of Europe. Or, as Sir Winston Churchill detainees at Guantánamo and other so simply put it: “Never be separated prisons (76 percent), as well as other from the Americans.”9 issues, such as its approach to global warming (79 percent).13 Such hostility has been perpetu- The Special Relationship is so ated by a distinct public relations special because the shared values deficit. Neither Blair nor Bush prop- and common interests that bind the erly made the case for the fruits of two countries reach far beyond the the Special Relationship, which has in fact operated to mutual advan- philosophical utopia of European tage in this new era of transnational Union (EU) elites dreaming of a terrorism. Undoubtedly, the plots to European superstate. detonate liquid explosives on up to 10 transatlantic flights in summer 2006 were foiled only because of key trans- Popularity and principle atlantic intelligence exchange and Another major challenge to the cooperation. As Prime Minister Blair Special Relationship is posed by rising said at the time, “There has been levels of anti-American sentiment in an enormous amount of cooperation Britain. Favorable opinion toward with the U.S. authorities which has the United States has dropped from been of great value and underlines 83 percent in 1999-2000 to just 56 the threat we face and our determina- percent in 2006.10 The British press tion to counter it.”14 regularly ridiculed Tony Blair as No incident more ably illustrates President George W. Bush’s poodle, the depth and breadth of the Special and Blair’s successor and Her Majes- Relationship in comparison to the ty’s opposition have both jumped on illusory EU alliance than the 2007 the America-averse bandwagon. The Iranian seizure of 15 Royal Navy Conservative Party even went as far personnel. While Britain’s European as calling for Britain to adopt a less neighbors scurried to protect their “slavish” relationship with America.11 sizeable investments with Tehran Worryingly, anti-Americanism and refused to specify any retalia- is just as widespread among the Brit- tory measures in support of a fellow ish public as the political classes. In EU member, the United States gave a June 2006 YouGov Poll, just 22 per- Britain an unequivocal demonstra- cent of respondents thought current tion of its support, conducting its American policy was helping to make largest naval exercise in the Gulf the world a better place, while 65 per- since 2003.15 Through its deployment cent said U.S. policy was making it of aircraft and warships, America worse. And a whopping 74 percent effectively gave Britain a security of those surveyed thought American guarantee that it would stand shoul- actions were contributing to greater der-to-shoulder at any cost during instability in the Middle East.12 A 2007 this major international incident.

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special?

Both sides need to make the case ment of the UK’s procurement policy for the Special Relationship much demonstrates the gulf opening up more aggressively, demonstrating between the UK and the United the effectiveness and substantial States.18 North notes that two com- value of the close British-American peting and incompatible high-tech cooperation. Both sides could learn warfare systems are being developed from the golden days of Thatcher- by America and Europe, and points Reagan, as well as those of Winston out Britain’s systematic realignment Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, toward the latter. Procurement is each of whom regarded the other as abstract, technical, and politically an indispensable partner and all of nontoxic, rarely making the front whom made cooperation a politically pages, but this does not mean that a viable policy. wider political agenda is not at work. “For those who would seek to see a The muscle behind European army replace NATO,” Brit- the alliance ish Shadow Defense Secretary Liam A close and unwavering military Fox has observed, “defence procure- relationship goes to the heart of why ment offers the perfect means of undermining the Special Relation- U.S.-UK ties are so special. In his 19 seminal post-war “Sinews of Peace” ship by stealth.” speech, Winston Churchill said that The EU understands Churchill’s interoperable capabilities, personnel thesis very well. The European Secu- exchanges, and doctrinal commonal- rity and Defense College, established ity were the linchpins of the Special in 2005 for the exchange of key mili- Relationship.16 tary personnel among EU member But these ties are clearly under states, will be critical to fostering threat from the European Union’s shared camaraderie and doctrinal integrationist ambitions. Commenta- understanding of the EU’s approach tor Christopher Booker argues that to security and defense policy in the the integration of British military longer term. The development of per- arrangements into the European sonal and professional relationships Union represents a fundamental threat between British and American mili- to the current status quo between tary personnel has sustained the Spe- Washington and London: cial Relationship for many years, just as America’s International Military The nature of this new military Education and Training Program has relationship with her European been a successful tool of U.S. defense partners will make it increas- policy more generally. ingly hard for the UK either to fight independently or to cooperate militarily with the U.S. The EU’s relentless supranational That “special relationship” which drive has demanded a surrender of has been the cornerstone of Brit- ish defense policy from the time British national sovereignty in areas of the Second World War up to such as trade, the economy, and the recent U.S.-British coali- even defense. tion in Iraq will be at an end.17 With stretched defense budgets British academic Richard North and the enormous costs associated maintains that the “secret” realign- with modern high-tech weaponry,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Sally McNamara

defense expenditures must take The U.S. is Britain’s top destination on a more global character. As the for overseas investment. The UK is technological revolution rolls on, the equally America’s biggest trading interoperability of defense systems partner in services, and the top des- will likely become not just desirable, tination for its foreign direct invest- but essential to joint military efforts. ment. In fact, over the past decade, In this respect, jointly funded, the UK has accounted for around a interoperable projects which arbi- third of America’s entire overseas trarily exclude non-EU countries do investments in the EU. not make sense. In the age of digital However, the power of Brussels warfare, procurement decisions are to interfere in this strong relation- absolutely critical, but the EU has ship should not be taken too lightly. made them as political as they are As the largest trading partner of the strategic. With Europe’s dual desire EU as a whole, the United States is to create a stronger defense industrial greatly affected by the regulations base and to advance an alternate war- being churned out by Brussels. Fur- fare system, the procurement agenda ther centralization of power in Brus- has become skewed against sensible sels presents the U.S. with long-term military budgeting and toward the challenges in its economic relation- EU’s narrow agenda. ship with Europe. As EU military planners aggres- Firstly, European elites continue sively pursue an integrationist agenda, to dogmatically defend the European the Special Relationship will undoubt- social model against global competi- edly suffer as British independence as tion. For example, in February 2007 a military power (and buyer) is con- a group of nine EU member states strained. If Britain continues to relin- issued an open declaration calling quish the most critical elements of for stronger social, environmental, sovereign statehood to Brussels—the and work protections, which will right to military action and autonomous only serve to further sap economic foreign policymaking—the British gov- growth.20 As America’s biggest trad- ernment will become little more than a ing partner, the EU’s failure to enact local authority, either unable or unwill- free-market reforms and to reach ing to partner with the U.S. on military agreement on wide-ranging social- missions, even when they clearly serve ist provisions such as the Charter of Britain’s national interest. Fundamental Rights will automatically have a negative effect on the Neither Britain nor America U.S. economy. Secondly, the EU is acting as the should view deeper EU world’s greatest regulator. Research absorption as preferable to from Open Europe recently found the Britain’s historic and proven EU’s current body of law—the acquis links with the United States. communautaire—to be a staggering 170,000 pages long, over 100,000 of The economic case which have been produced just in the last 10 years.21 Günther Verheu- for the Partnership gen, European Commission Vice- It should not be underestimated President for Industry and Enterprise, how heavily the UK is invested in estimates that the cost of regulation the United States and vice versa. in the EU amounts to €600 billion, or

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special? about 5.5 percent of total EU GDP, contrasting with published estimates If Britain continues to relinquish from the European Commission stat- the most critical elements ing the trade benefits of the Single of sovereign statehood to Market to be just €165 billion.22 The Brussels—the right to military EU has a profound inability to undertake serious economic reform despite action and autonomous foreign numerous pledges to do so. Nor is policymaking—the British there any indication that it has a government will become little desire to do so. Indeed, the EU is now more than a local authority, taking its growth-sapping formula global. According to the International either unable or unwilling Herald Tribune, it is now the EU that to partner with the U.S. on determines the antitrust regime for military missions, even when big American companies.23 The EU’s control of member they clearly serve Britain’s states’ trade policies also places limits national interest. on the freedom of economically like- minded countries to the U.S., such as The Special Relationship dem- Britain, to fashion trade policies more onstrates that common interests can consistent with their bilateral inter- overcome past enmities and occa- ests. Britain generates 16 percent of sional conflict. Britain and America EU-27 GDP,24 and is one of just three have stood shoulder to shoulder in the EU countries whose working-age hardest of times and continue to enjoy population is set to increase in the the fruits of a solid relationship. As my next half century.25 Britain’s export colleague at the Heritage Foundation, markets inside the EU are shrink- Nile Gardiner, has stated, “The U.S.- ing while its export markets outside British alliance continues to operate the EU, including that of the U.S., as a strikingly successful partnership are growing.26 With its entrepreneur- of two great nations built on the solid ial Anglo-Saxon economic model, foundations of a common heritage, cul- 28 strong Commonwealth ties, English ture, and vision.” language and powerhouse financial This history suggests grounds capital, Britain is increasingly dam- for optimism for the future, in aged by Brussels’ excessive regula- spite of today’s considerable anti- tions and statist model. American feeling in Britain. The anti- Americanism of the 1980s gave way to Still special after the British- and American-led victory in the Cold War. The passivity of the all these years 1990s gave way to a post-9/11 period “We are with Europe, but not of enormous diplomatic and military of it,” Winston Churchill famously unity. Hostility and indifference are remarked in 1953. “We are linked temporary. The common interests but not comprised. We are associ- and values that drive the Special Rela- ated but not absorbed. And should tionship have proven enduring time European statesmen address us and and again. And, whatever the ups and say, ‘Shall we speak for thee?’, we downs, that is not likely to change. should reply, ‘Nay Sir, for we dwell among our own people.’”27

The Journal of International Security Affairs 27 Sally McNamara

1. Douglas V. Johnson II, “The U.S.-UK Spe- Address at Westminster College, Fulton, cial Relationship: Past, Present and Future,” Missouri, March 5, 1946, http://www.nato. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm. Institute Conference Brief, May 29, 2005, 17. Christopher Booker, “Foreword,” in Rich- www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ ard North, “The Wrong Side of the Hill: pdffiles/pub712.pdf. The ‘Secret’ Realignment of UK Defence 2. Ibid. Policy,” Defense Industry Daily, August 2005, 3. Former French Foreign Minister Hubert 2, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ Vedrine coined the word “hyperpuissance,” files/UK-EU-US_Wrong_side_of_the_hill_ meaning hyperpower, to define America’s def_4.pdf. political, military, and economic strength 18. North, “The Wrong Side of the Hill,” 30. after the Cold War. 19. Liam Fox, “Security and Defense: Making 4. See the work of the European Parliament’s Sense of the Special Relationship,” Heri- Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use tage Foundation Lecture no. 939, April 27, of European Countries by the CIA for the 2006, www.heritage.org/research/europe/ Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, hl939.cfm. www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/temp- 20. Honor Mahony, “Nine States Call for Revival com/tdip/default_en.htm. of Social Europe,” EUObserver.com, Febru- 5. Interview with Adam Daniel Rotfeld, ary 15, 2007. “Primum Non Nocere,” The Polish Voice, 21. “Just How Big Is the Acquis Communau- April 4, 2003, www.warsawvoice.pl/ taire?” OpenEurope Briefing Note, n.d., www. view/1892. openeurope.org.uk/research/acquis.pdf. 6. European Union, Delegation of the Euro- 22. Ibid. pean Commission to the United States, 23. Stephen Castle, “Ruling on Microsoft The European Union and the United States: Reflects EU’s Global Reach,” International Global Partners,Global Responsibilities, n.d., Herald Tribune, October 22, 2007, http:// http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusre- www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/22/busi- lations/EUUSGlobParts.pdf. ness/ruling.php. 7. Ibid. 24. “EFTA Countries Much More Prosper- 8. Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a For- ous Than Either the Eurozone or the UK,” eign Policy? (New York: Simon & Schuster, Global Britain Briefing Note no. 48, Novem- 2001), 57. ber 26, 2007, http://www.globalbritain.org/ 9. Churchill’s words to his non-Cabinet Min- BNN/BN48.pdf. isters upon his retirement, after his final 25. “The EU’s Demographic Anaemia,” Global cabinet meeting on April 5, 1955. Sir Martin Britain Briefing Note no. 47, November 23, Gilbert in Winston S. Churchill, vol. 8, “Never 2007, http://www.globalbritain.org/BNN/ Despair,” 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mif- BN47.pdf. flin and London: Heinemann, 1988) 26. “UK Exports: EU Market Fades, but Imposes 10. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Heavier Burdens Than Ever,” Global Britain Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Con- Briefing Note no. 44, November 3, 2006, http:// cerns over Iran, Hamas: No Global Warm- www.globalbritain.org/BNN/BN44.doc. ing Alarm in the U.S., China,” June 13, 27. Extract from article, “The United States 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display. of Europe,” Churchill Archives Centre, php?ReportID=252. Churchill Papers, CHAR 8/279. 11. William Hague, Speech to Conservative 28. Nile Gardiner, “The Myth of U.S. Isola- Party Conference, October 3, 2006. tion,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo no. 12. YouGov/Daily Telegraph, “Survey Results, Field- 558, September 7, 2004, www.heritage.org/ work: 26th-28th June 2006,” http://www.yougov. Research/Europe/wm558.cfm. com/archives/pdf/TEL060101010_3.pdf. 13. Program on International Policy Attitudes, “Global Views of the US,” January 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ pdf/jan07/BBC_USRole_Jan07_quaire.pdf. 14. “‘Airlines Terror Plot’ Disrupted,” BBC (London), August 10, 2006, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm. 15. “Blair Steps Up Pressure on Iran as US Moves In,” Times of London, March 28, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/middle_east/article1577489.ece. 16. Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,”

28 The Journal of International Security Affairs Turning the Page

Astrid Coeurderoy

ince the second half of the 20th century, an independent, U.S.-distant approach has driven French foreign policy. SUnder this “Gaullist line,” France has long aimed to position itself as the middleman in European and international politics.

Today, however, a new wind is now blowing on the Élysée. In his now famous August 27th speech, new French President Nicolas Sarkozy affirmed that French foreign policy “will be guided by French values and will above all protect French national interests.” But it has quickly become clear that Sarkozy envisions a more activist approach to a host of international issues—from European Union affairs to Franco-American affairs—than his predecessor. Administrations, they say, are defined as much by their supporting charac- ters as they are by their lead actor, and the Sarkozy government is no different. President Sarkozy has made clear that he sees a higher international profile for Paris—one involving a key role on most major international issues. It is not coin- cidental, therefore, that he has appointed as his chief diplomat Bernard Kouch- ner, a man with a reputation of getting the job done. A former volunteer doctor and founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, Kouchner is a human rights pioneer, and a champion of the policy of humanitarian intervention. Sarkozy’s selection of Kouchner for the post of Foreign Minister is emblem- atic of the changes under way in French foreign policy. France has embarked upon a new diplomatic line—one which, as Kouchner himself described to The

Astrid Coeurderoy works at the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD) in Brussels, where she is responsible for EFD’s activities relating to France. She previously worked at the French embassy in Vienna, Austria, and at the Council of Ministers of the European Union. She holds a Master’s in history from the Sorbonne, among other academic degrees. Astrid Coeurderoy

Economist, “is more than a change of erally hostile towards America, there style.” This new French realpolitik is can be little doubt that Sarkozy is pur- not simply a change in diplomatic tone; suing a more conciliatory and strate- the substance of French foreign policy gically compatible foreign policy line is changing. After forty years of offi- on a number of fronts. cially sanctioned pro-Arabism, anti- American sentiment and the Gaullist The Middle East desire to act as a balancer between Like his predecessor, President Moscow and Washington, Paris is now Sarkozy has signaled his intention focused on strengthening its relation- to maintain strong diplomatic and ship with the United States. economic ties with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. At A brand new day the same time, however, he has dem- Such changes are already afoot. onstrated a commitment to improv- Unlike his predecessor, Sarkozy ing and strengthening relations with clearly plans to achieve his politi- Israel, a country which was clearly cal objectives while strengthening maligned and neglected during former his country’s partnership with the President Chirac’s openly pro-Arab United States. Since taking office, tenure. He plans to do so by stepping he has begun taking stronger posi- up France’s role as an “honest broker” tions on issues that are key priorities in the Israeli-Palestinian peace pro- for the United States: Iran, the fight cess, supporting the creation of a Pal- against terrorism, the confrontation estinian state while simultaneously between Islam and the West, Russia, safeguarding Israel’s security. At the and China. same time, Sarkozy has been careful This change in attitude was evi- not to weaken France’s historic stand- dent during Sarkozy’s November ing in the Middle East, as indicated by 2007 trip to Washington. During his his January 2008 visit to Riyadh, Abu address to the U.S. Congress on that Dhabi and Doha. occasion, Sarkozy declared that: In Sarkozy’s view, a status quo in the region would only strengthen …the U.S. are [sic] one of the rare Hamas and other regional radicals, countries in the world with whom including Hezbollah. Accordingly, we did not fight…. Americans Lebanon and Syria are also major came to help us twice and we our- focal points of French foreign policy. selves helped them a long time ago. France, a long-standing friend of We share the same values, we are neighbors from the Atlantic side, Lebanon, is a strong advocate of its and they are the first economic, full freedom, independence and sov- military and monetary power… ereignty as envisioned in UN Secu- rity Council resolutions 1559 and Mr. Sarkozy reassured Congress 1701. And France has been playing that such improved relations will lead an active role in the dialogue among to much closer cooperation on a host Lebanese political forces during that of international issues, including country’s contentious selection of Iran’s nuclear program, the Middle a new president. Syria’s continued East peace process and Lebanon. interference in this process through And there are certainly reasons for intimidation and the actions of its optimism on that score. Despite his terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, have led domestic environment, which is gen- to growing frustration on the part of

30 The Journal of International Security Affairs Turning the Page senior French officials, resulting in increase, with additional deploy- the suspension of diplomatic relations ments specifically tasked with train- between Damascus and Paris. ing the Afghan army. Then there is Iran. Breaking with Chirac’s conciliatory approach Russia and Eurasia to the Islamic Republic, Sarkozy has The French government, like adopted an unequivocally strong most others in the West, is currently stance. With the backing of Foreign following the worsening domestic Minister Kouchner, he has made situation and rising authoritarianism clear that the emergence of a nuclear in Russia with significant concern. Iran is unacceptable to France. And During his state visit to Russia last while there have been no further October, President Sarkozy made a public elaborations of how France point of signaling his worries on that intends to tackle the current inter- score, meeting with representatives national impasse over Iran’s nuclear of human rights organizations and ambitions, Paris has traditionally pro-democracy activists. never hesitated to pursue hard-line As concerns Russia’s neighbors, policies when the country’s national French diplomacy is already dis- security interests were at stake. To tancing itself from former President be sure, this scenario is complicated Chirac’s era, during which commer- by France’s commercial interests in cial interests and security of energy Iran, and it remains to be seen how supply trumped the promotion of the balance between economics democratic reforms and respect for and national security will be struck. the rule of law. That policy had led to Overall, however, it is clear that the tolerance for Russia’s plans to main- French and U.S. positions on Iran are tain a belt of limited-sovereignty converging; France has become sig- countries on its border. France’s new, nificantly more assertive in its calls more principled stance became clear for sanctions (while also leaving open when, similar to other NATO coun- the option for negotiations should tries, it tacitly accepted the Bush Iran choose to comply with its inter- administration’s plans for a missile national obligations). defense deployment in Europe—an As for the crises in Iraq and effort regarded by Russia as an unac- Afghanistan, France is now unques- ceptable interference in its geopoliti- tionably playing a more construc- cal sphere of influence. tive role. On Iraq, while it has not changed its overall position critical Asia of the rationale and justification for Although France’s foreign policy the war, the French government is priorities are by and large “Euro- now advocating a policy that would Atlantic,” rising powers such as China help isolate extremist groups, launch and India are also receiving signifi- a process of national reconciliation cant attention. President Sarkozy’s and devise a plan for the withdrawal visit to China last November was an of foreign troops. In Afghanistan, indication that, in spite of his lack meanwhile, France has committed of familiarity with Asia, he under- more than 2,000 ground, naval and stands the strategic importance of air support troops to stability opera- the region. tions in the former Taliban strong- With China, the challenge will hold. And this number is poised to be how to reconcile France’s long-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 31 Astrid Coeurderoy standing commercial and economic Muslim world themselves. As part interests in the PRC with Beijing’s of this vision, he has introduced the systematic violation of fundamental concept of a future “Mediterranean human rights and the absence of Union,” which would bring together basic democratic institutions there. the European Union (particularly its During his state visit, President southern members) and Middle East- Sarkozy was all smiles and diplo- ern and North African countries. The matic niceties. But at some point, plan would be to establish a union France—like other democratic among the members based on four countries—will need to draw a line pillars: 1) environment and sustain- between commercial and national able development; 2) intercultural security interests and continuing dialogue; 3) economic growth and to support authoritarian regimes by social development; and 4) security doing business with them. of the Mediterranean region (including the fight against terrorism). Human rights and Africa For now, this partnership is only Given its long-running relation- theoretical. It is not at all clear how ship with the continent, it is no sur- Sarkozy’s envisioned Mediterranean prise that Africa remains an essential Union would work in practice, and priority of French foreign policy. As how it could work in parallel with Paris sees it, African development existing EU initiatives such as the can be achieved through a balance Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of economic prosperity and security. the European Neighborhood Policy. The current genocide taking place in But Sarkozy seems to believe that Darfur—as well as many other crisis such a “union” could play a role in areas in the region—represents heading off a potential confrontation a major obstacle to such develop- between Islam and the West. ment. In the case of Darfur, France Reactions from European has adopted an assertive diplomatic capitals (as well as Mediterranean approach designed to mobilize the countries themselves) have so far United Nations out of its current, been generally skeptical. The real- stalled position. The recent UN ity is that this initiative is seen very Security Council authorization of much as an alternative to Turkey’s the creation of a hybrid UN/African membership in the EU and a way of Union security force was a significant controlling illegal immigration from achievement for France, and one that Northern Africa. After all, President Paris hopes will spur other European Sarkozy has been quite explicit in countries to adopt a more activist role his belief that “we must see Europe’s in this and other crises. As the fore- relations with Turkey through this going makes clear, President Sarkozy Mediterranean Union” and his con- seems keen to restore a moral dimen- tention that “if Europe wants to have sion to French diplomacy. an identity it must have borders and, therefore, limits.” Islam and the West President Sarkozy’s priorities Europe include the promotion of an open- None of the above is to suggest minded and tolerant interpretation of that Sarkozy is not as invested in Islam, both within France’s Muslim Europe as his predecessors. France, communities and countries in the a founding member of the European

32 The Journal of International Security Affairs Turning the Page

Union, was and remains a staunch Nicolas Sarkozy has already distin- supporter of the “European idea.” guished himself. Like all of his pre- Paris is invested in maintaining its decessors, Sarkozy wants France to influence over key European policy become stronger at home and gain decisions and debates, such as those greater influence abroad. But the over the European Security and presidential rhetoric has changed: in Defense Policy (ESDP), agriculture his speeches, Sarkozy does not men- and transport. In view of its upcom- tion grandeur or gloire, both staples of ing six-month term of office as Presi- the Chirac-era discourse. Instead, he dent of the European Union, France uses “less ambitious” terms such as is going through a process of internal France’s influence and role. consultations aimed at developing President Sarkozy is certainly the vision for Europe’s way forward. a political risk-taker, and so far his Although the adoption of the revised gambles are paying off. As of this EU Constitutional Treaty last Decem- writing, just over 100 days since he ber was largely a success resulting took office, Sarkozy has managed from close Franco-German coopera- to persuade the European Union to tion, it is very likely that it will con- adopt a “simplified treaty,” given a tribute to France’s popularity during diplomatic push to peacekeeping its Presidency of the European Union efforts in Darfur, floated the idea of later this year. a “Mediterranean Union,” helped to And France has a clear vision free Bulgarian nurses on death row for Europe’s future. On security and in Libya, and issued a stern warn- defense, President Sarkozy is a vocal ing to Iran. And the French people advocate of Europe’s military inde- are taking notice. According to a pendence, and of the need for Europe recent survey by French pollster TNS to assume responsibility for its own Sofres, 71 percent of French citizens security. Together with immigration, think Sarkozy’s first 100 days have security and defense policies will be been positive, and three out of four among the priorities of the French approve of his view of France’s place presidency of the EU later this year. in the world. Sarkozy’s stance is very different from The message is unmistakable: that of Jacques Chirac, who viewed France is back. Under Sarkozy’s European defense as a means of rival- direction, France is moving beyond ing NATO and countering American the Chirac era and beginning to be power. Sarkozy, by contrast, is keen to taken seriously again on the interna- prove to the United States that Europe tional scene. To be sure, great chal- will remain an ally even if it becomes lenges lie ahead. But, at least for the militarily stronger and more indepen- moment, France’s new head of state dent. This approach is pragmatic; the appears to be up to the task. reality is that it will take Europe a very long time (if ever) to become militarily independent from the United States, and to develop its own “European” foreign and defense policies.

Moving forward In the few months since his election to the French presidency,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 33

Berlin’s Best Hope

Ulf Gartzke

ince taking office in November 2005, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has racked up an impressive foreign policy record. First and Sforemost, Merkel moved quickly to repair transatlantic relations with Washington, which had been badly damaged over the Iraq war under former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s Red-Green government. While European politicians on the Left have repeatedly resorted to anti-Ameri- can rhetoric as a crucial element of successful election campaigns, Ger- many’s conservative CDU/CSU parties firmly believe that strong political and security ties with the United States are an indispensable pillar of German foreign policy. And after Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac essentially turned 10 Downing Street and the Élysée Palace into lame-duck residen- cies, Chancellor Merkel’s early effort to reach out to Washington paid off, with her emerging as President Bush’s most important partner in Europe.

Second, Merkel decided to recalibrate Berlin’s approach vis-à-vis Paris. In sharp contrast to her populist predecessor, who had essentially outsourced German foreign policy to the French in the run-up to the Iraq war, Merkel made it clear from the outset that she would not be taken for a ride by Chirac and company. The same still applies, in principle, to current hyperactive French Presi- dent Nicolas Sarkozy, whose constant attempts to steal the political limelight from his German counterpart have caused marital strains in the much vaunted “couple franco-allemand.”

Ulf Gartzke is a Visiting Scholar at Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies in Washington, D.C. Ulf Gartzke

Third, Merkel adopted a tougher tic issues. Increasingly, it is clear that line toward Russia, not shying away the two political factions have radi- from criticizing Moscow’s aggres- cally different visions for Germany’s sive foreign policies and its nasty foreign policy. crackdown on political rights and press freedoms at home. In spite of More robust on Russia Germany’s growing energy depen- (and China) dence on Russia, Merkel dared to Political differences between the pursue a principled, values-based for- CDU/CSU and the SPD over how to eign policy, thus breaking with the best deal with President Putin’s Russia far-too-chummy “men’s friendship” are nothing new. Back in 2002-2003, that had developed between Gerhard German conservatives were already Schroeder and Russian President highly critical of then-Chancellor Vladimir Putin. Schroeder’s alignment with Paris and Fourth, Chancellor Merkel’s Moscow in opposition to the Iraq war. international leadership role was Subsequent attempts by Schroeder to further bolstered by the fact that form a “strategic partnership” with Germany held both the EU and G-8 Moscow were greeted with suspicion presidencies in 2007. During her six- by the CDU/CSU, which viewed the month stint at the EU helm, Merkel initiative as a dangerous departure paved the way for the new “Reform from Berlin’s long-standing Atlanticist Treaty” to replace the ill-fated Consti- posture. Schroeder’s glossing over of tutional Treaty, pushed through bind- the Russian government’s crackdown ing post-Kyoto CO reduction targets 2 on political rights and press freedoms for the 27-nation bloc, and even man- is also well documented. At one point, aged to stay cool in the face of harsh he even famously referred to the Rus- anti-German/anti-EU attacks by her sian leader and former KGB spy as a ultra-conservative populist neighbors “flawless democrat.” in Poland. Shortly before losing the early Up until now, these foreign policy general elections he called in 2005, accomplishments have offset a rather Chancellor Schroeder signed a land- lackluster domestic performance mark energy deal with President (complete with a derivative economic Putin to build the 750-mile Nord policy and growing opposition to her Stream offshore gas pipeline stretch- handling of internal affairs from the ing from Russia to Germany via the SPD). For better or for worse, Merkel Baltic Sea. Scheduled to become has been dubbed Germany’s “globe- operational in 2012, the pipeline trotting chancellor.” But this state of will transport Russian gas directly affairs is beginning to change. Ger- to Western Europe, thus bypassing many’s next general elections—to be countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, held by the fall of 2009—are loom- and Poland, with whom Moscow ing large on the political horizon. has had serious energy conflicts in Since the fall of 2007, German poli- recent years. The Polish government tics in general, and within Merkel’s in particular was outraged at the fact “grand coalition” in particular, has that neither Putin nor Schroeder had become noticeably more polarized. consulted Warsaw before signing Fundamental differences between the pipeline deal. Today, Germany the CDU/CSU and the SPD have already imports more than 40 percent sharpened, and not only over domes-

36 The Journal of International Security Affairs Berlin’s Best Hope of its natural gas from Russia, a share and was a key player in confronting that is bound to rise even higher in the Bush administration over Iraq— the coming years. Finally, Schroed- sharply criticized Merkel’s Russia er’s decision to become chairman of policy, charging that she seemed “to the Russian-controlled Nord Stream always look fearfully at how news- consortium after leaving office came paper headlines back home” would under a great deal of criticism at home view her relationship with President and abroad since it was widely viewed Putin. Merkel, of course, knows quite as an unprecedented, inappropriate well that a principled, values-based blurring of state and private affairs. foreign policy is supported by large Upon taking office, Chancellor segments of the German population, Merkel engineered a clear departure especially young people, women, and from her predecessor’s unabashedly the well-educated. These are all cru- pro-Moscow policies. As a gesture of cial demographics that traditionally goodwill, she made a point of inviting lean heavily towards the SPD/Greens Poland to connect to the Nord Stream and who could potentially swing the pipeline (although the offer was unfor- next elections in favor of Merkel’s tunately rejected by the populist Kac- conservative CDU/CSU parties. zynski administration in Warsaw). Merkel also adopted a tougher line vis-à-vis Moscow and decided to Increasingly, it is clear that the speak out against deteriorating politi- CDU/CSU and the SPD have cal conditions within Russia, as well radically different visions for as the continuing atrocities being Germany’s foreign policy. committed by the Kremlin’s proxies in Chechnya. During her official visits to Russia, Merkel made sure to meet In essence, the main thrust with prominent human rights NGOs of the SPD’s criticism of Merkel’s and dissidents in an effort to send a Russia policy has been that she pub- clear signal to Putin that she, unlike licly provokes and antagonizes one Schroeder, was not willing to look of Germany’s most important politi- the other way when it seemed conve- cal, economic, and energy partners nient and opportunistic. And in early in the pursuit of short-term domestic December 2007, Merkel, in striking political gain—namely, by holding contrast to French President Sarkozy, Moscow to naïve and unrealistically pointedly refused to congratulate high Western democratic and human Vladimir Putin on his party’s crush- rights standards. In the process, the ing “success” in the Russian parlia- argument goes, Merkel also directly mentary elections. The message was threatens Germany’s energy inter- clear: in Berlin’s view, the elections in ests precisely when Germany most Russia had failed to live up to proper needs reliable external suppliers. European standards. Merkel’s Asia policy, in particu- This confrontational approach lar with regard to China, has opened towards Russia is certainly not with- up another major foreign policy fault out its critics. At the SPD party line within the governing “grand convention in late October 2007, coalition.” Unlike her predecessors, foreign minister Frank-Walter Stein- Gerhard Schroeder and (to a lesser meier—who previously served as extent) Helmut Kohl, Merkel does Chancellor Schroeder’s chief of staff not view China exclusively through

The Journal of International Security Affairs 37 Ulf Gartzke the narrow prism of business, trade, that Berlin and the EU should opt and economic opportunity. To be for a much broader and more values- sure, German global players such as based foreign policy approach that Volkswagen, Daimler AG, and Sie- takes full account of Asia’s growing mens have been very successful in political and economic weight on the China for many years, and continue global stage. The Merkel government to heavily expand their manufactur- thus, in the words of the CDU/CSU ing and market presence there. At the paper, views China as both “a stra- same time, though, Merkel is argu- tegic challenge and an opportunity ably the first German chancellor who for Germany and Europe.” It clearly recognizes the growing economic, recognizes that the astonishing eco- political, and even military challenges nomic success of China’s authoritar- posed by the PRC. ian regime increasingly poses a new Political relations between Berlin ideological challenge to the West’s and Beijing suffered a major blow on paradigm of liberal democracy and September 23, 2007, when Merkel free markets. By strengthening Ger- became the first German chancellor many and Europe’s political and eco- ever to meet with the Dalai Lama. nomic ties with Western-oriented The Chinese government was particu- democracies in Asia, the CDU/CSU larly outraged by the fact that Merkel parties want to avoid the possibil- received the exiled Tibetan leader ity that a rising, authoritarian China at her official Berlin residence. The becomes the kind of powerful model message was unmistakable: while that other countries in the region and reaffirming her government’s contin- beyond feel tempted to follow. ued commitment to the “One China” Back home, this approach to Asia policy, the German Chancellor was is very popular. Meanwhile, parts of not willing to sacrifice her own politi- the SPD, as well as some opposition cal beliefs and principles on the altar politicians, have raised a chorus of of close political and economic ties objections to this “Americanophile with a rising China. foreign policy,” which they blame Just one month later, a strategy for “serious power-politic[s] conflicts paper on Asia prepared by the CDU/ between Russia/China, and Ger- CSU Bundestag group offered new many.” Instead, they advocate a more insights into the conservatives’ big- nuanced geopolitical positioning of picture thinking about the world’s Germany. This strategy is partly moti- most populous and most dynamic vated by traditional anti-American region. According to Dr. Heinrich left-wing reflexes. It is also, however, Kreft, a senior CDU/CSU foreign an attempt to prepare for the time policy advisor who helped shape when America’s “unipolar moment” key elements of the document, Ger- comes to an end. many’s Asia policy had been too narrowly focused on China and its Flashpoint: Afghanistan economic potential for far too long. In October and November 2007, By emphasizing the importance of respectively, the German parliament strong bilateral ties with other key voted overwhelmingly to extend the democratic countries in the region— Bundeswehr’s ISAF and OEF man- including India, Japan, South Korea, dates in Afghanistan for another Australia, and New Zealand—the year. While more than three-quarters new Asia strategy argues, in essence, of all MPs backed the continuing

38 The Journal of International Security Affairs Berlin’s Best Hope deployment of up to 3,500 troops abroad that German troops leave the and several Tornado reconnaissance “safe” parts of northern Afghanistan aircraft, they did so despite the fact to support terrorist-hunting opera- that the Afghanistan operation is tions in the South are misplaced. increasingly seen as a lost-cause mis- They play directly into the hands of sion with little moral legitimacy. In those who want a complete German fact, public opinion in Germany, military pullout. If Germany’s contin- like in Canada, has turned firmly ued military presence in Afghanistan against the ISAF/OEF missions, were to be perceived as the product with recent surveys indicating that of American pressure, the public two-thirds of all Germans favor an case for sustaining the German immediate military withdrawal. mission there would fall victim to For Chancellor Merkel and her left-wing demagogues waiting to conservative CDU/CSU allies, the play the potent card of latent anti- Bundeswehr’s bloody, seemingly Americanism. There already exists open-ended Afghan engagement is a widespread perception in Germany a potential political time bomb—one that the Bundeswehr’s Afghan deploy- with the power to blow up ahead of ment is, above all, part of President the next federal elections in 2009. Bush’s “global war on terror,” a.k.a. The domestic debate triggered by the neocon crusade. NATO’s January 2008 request to deploy several hundred additional German infantry troops as part of For Chancellor Merkel and her the Alliance’s Quick Response Force conservative CDU/CSU allies, the (QRF) in northern Afghanistan is Bundeswehr’s bloody, seemingly further proof that Afghanistan represents arguably Merkel’s biggest open-ended Afghan engagement foreign policy vulnerability. The SPD is a potential political time and the Greens are already stocking bomb—one with the power to up on election campaign ammunition, blow up ahead of the next federal arguing that the QRF mission there backed by the CDU/CSU is a “combat elections in 2009. mission” of a completely “new quality.” So far, only the post-Communist How can the Afghanistan conun- Left Party has called for the drum be solved? There are essentially Bundeswehr’s pullout. But many left- two options. The first one—politically wing MPs from the governing SPD tempting but strategically danger- party, and even some CDU/CSU leg- ous—would be for the governments islators, under strong pressure from concerned to cave in to public pres- their local constituents, are openly sures and pull out of Afghanistan. In critical of the Afghanistan mission. the short term, such a move, supported The Greens are divided, with some by large segments of public opinion MPs voting for the ISAF extension. in Germany, Canada, and elsewhere, Meanwhile, the free-market FDP would defuse a situation that could party, the CDU/CSU’s putative future potentially contribute to electoral coalition partner, is also increasingly defeat at the hands of disgruntled skeptical of the Afghanistan mission. voters who no longer believe in the Given this highly charged domes- moral legitimacy and military neces- tic political context, demands from sity of the Afghanistan intervention.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 39 Ulf Gartzke

The risk of this course of action is that stance ultimately carries huge poten- Afghanistan will once again become a tial political and military risks, both failed state, a haven for international at home and abroad. terrorists and drug lords, with potentially devastating consequences for Reading the political international security. tea leaves The second option is to go on the Despite having hit quite a few offensive and try to convince public political bumps in recent months, opinion at home that the military mis- Chancellor Merkel’s term in office has sion in Afghanistan is a cause worth already exceeded the expectations of fighting for. Germany, for instance, friends and foes alike. Today, Angela only narrowly escaped disaster in Sep- Merkel—once dismissed by hard- tember 2007 when a group of Islamic core conservatives as “the divorced, terrorists (including two German childless, Protestant woman from converts), who had been trained at former East Germany”—is fully in al-Qaeda camps along the Afghan- charge of the CDU/CSU camp. Going Pakistani border, were arrested before into the next election cycle, she faces they could set off massive car bombs no credible internal contender and is at the Frankfurt airport on the sixth recognized as the conservatives’ best anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. But vote-getter. After all, Merkel’s per- making the case for the Afghanistan sonal approval ratings have consis- mission directly is a risky strategy that tently been at or above 50-60 percent; demands brutal honesty and strong that is, much better than the figures political leadership. The harsh reality for the overall CDU/CSU-SPD “grand is that we are unlikely to successfully coalition” (30-35 percent). transform Afghanistan into a thriving As Germany approaches its next Western-style democracy. Rather, a general elections, which will most realistic litmus test should be to make likely be held in the fall of 2009, the sure that the country can never again CDU/CSU and the SPD will step up serve as a terrorist haven. efforts to accentuate the differences Finally, and most importantly, in their political stances, mobilize political leaders from the relevant their respective bases, and reach NATO countries can no longer afford out to potential swing voters. For the to remain silent about why fighting SPD, this will mean moving further to in Afghanistan is justified in terms of the left and continuing its anti-reform our core national security interests. drive. It likely will also continue to Even conservative critics agree that trend in an anti-American foreign for far too long Chancellor Merkel policy direction. The SPD knows very preferred not to take a strong stand well that its last-minute victory in the in Germany’s acrimonious Afghani- closely contested 2002 elections was, stan debate. For example, only in the above all, due to Chancellor Schroed- fall of 2007, after criticism of her fail- er’s opportunistic use of the pacifist, ure to visit the troops, did she finally anti-American card in the run-up to decide to go there. With al-Qaeda and the controversial Iraq war. Looking the Taliban on the rise in Afghani- ahead, opportunities for this card to stan and neighboring Pakistan, as be played again exist over Germany’s well as mounting public opposition in policy towards Russia—especially if Germany to the Bundeswehr deploy- somehow linked to the SPD’s strong ment, such a defensive and reactive

40 The Journal of International Security Affairs Berlin’s Best Hope opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe, which has been rejected by about 90 percent of the German population. The same is true for the Bundeswehr’s Afghani- stan mission, which is now opposed by two-thirds of all Germans. Grow- ing military losses there will increase calls for a swift pullout. If a Democratic administration takes over the White House in January 2009, life should get easier for Merkel and her CDU/CSU parties, as the Left will likely have fewer opportunities to follow its anti-American instincts. Furthermore, Merkel would receive a major domestic political boost if the next U.S. administration (Demo- cratic or Republican) were to agree to legally binding CO2 reduction targets. After all, the Chancellor’s international leadership role in tackling global climate change is extremely popular back home. For the conservative CDU/CSU parties, unlike the SPD, consistent and strong ties with the United States are an indispensable cornerstone of German foreign policy. In an age of Islamic extremism, rising Asian power, and the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, there can be no doubt that a unified transatlantic alliance is necessary to ensure that our fundamental values of democracy, freedom, and open economies prevail.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 41 The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Translating Ideas into Policy

Mission

To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America’s security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of liberty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

Founded 1976

1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW • Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036 Ph: (202) 667-3900 • www.jinsa.org • F: (202) 667-0601 Europe’s Rising East

Janusz Bugajski

redictions for much of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) nearly two decades ago, when the Soviet bloc was disintegrating, were basi- Pcally of two sorts. The “end of history” scenario envisioned rapid democratization and economic liberalism for the region as a whole. This, however, proved too optimistic a prognosis. The second scenario posited a “return of history,” a reversion to perpetual ethnic conflict and inter- state turmoil. But this ended up being too sweeping and pessimistic a forecast. Instead, the CEE has witnessed marked diversity, not only in the pace of domestic transformation and democratic consolidation, but also in differing approaches to national security and foreign policy.

Today, the Central Europeans, the Baltic states, and the countries of the eastern Balkans are almost all fully institutionalized Europeans, having attained both NATO and EU membership. But their responses to new security challenges, and their evolving roles in those two key international institutions, are all distinctly different. In fact, the CEE region no longer forms a unified bloc of states. Instead, a dividing line has emerged between the wider Baltic region and that of Central Europe. The former, which includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, feels more vulnerable to pressures from Russia. As a result, it has become increasingly assertive in trying to focus EU policy eastwards, and has voiced greater commitment to the transatlantic relationship and a strong American role and pres-

Janusz Bugajski is Director of the New European Democracies project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Janusz Bugajski

ence in Europe. These countries have economic issues with those of its attempted to mobilize support within neighbors, its regional partners, the EU for a more effective “Eastern and the West European (WE) capi- Dimension” that goes beyond the tals, and gauging the impact on tentative European Neighborhood broader EU interests and on transat- Policy (ENP) adopted so far by the lantic relations. Those that see more EU, which keeps the former Soviet immediate security threats in their satellites at arm’s length. neighborhood, or feel that the older Regardless of partisan coloration, EU capitals will not sufficiently these governments are preoccupied defend the interests of new mem- with curtailing Russian expansion- bers, tend to be more Atlanticist. ism. To this end, they have sought to They view the U.S. as more capable engage more closely with the remain- of providing political and security ing Eastern European states that are assistance. Others, however, toe a most vulnerable to pressure from more nuanced line, responding to Moscow. They favor enlarging both domestic public sentiment that is not NATO and the EU eastward. And well disposed toward foreign mili- they are adamant about keeping the tary engagements or the perceived U.S. closely engaged in European loss of national sovereignty. affairs, especially as a counterweight to an increasingly assertive Russia. The new shape of By contrast the latter, Central European security European, group—which includes Much like the rest of Europe, the Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the CEE countries now face new security Czech Republic—has adopted a more threats and complex foreign policy circumspect position in its “eastern” challenges, ranging from ethnic ten- policy. Its governments are more sions and mass migration to orga- focused on deepening EU integration nized crime, international terrorism, and pursuing economic development. weapons proliferation, and energy As a result, Central European pri- insecurity. (Some also view the lack of orities consist of minimizing defense political stability, state weakness, and spending, merging into the EU main- insufficient international integration stream, and discarding any significant among their neighbors as latent secu- foreign policy ambitions of their own. rity threats.) But in many respects, their most serious security challenge The Central-Eastern European lies in devising cohesive and complementary policies that bridge the divi- (CEE) region no longer forms a sions between the U.S. and the EU. unified bloc of states. Instead, In the wake of the September 11th a dividing line has emerged terrorist attacks, the U.S. has focused between the wider Baltic region intensively on global security threats. The EU, by contrast, has been preoc- and that of Central Europe. cupied closer to home, with its own institutional enlargement and integration. The results have been pro- Increasingly, each CEE capital nounced; the countries of the EU are carries out its own calculus, weigh- increasingly ambivalent concerning ing specific national interests on what global role they should play on a range of political, security, and

44 The Journal of International Security Affairs Europe’s Rising East the world stage, and at what cost. Not and security policy. Some CEE capi- surprisingly, the Continent has seen tals worry that their interests would a significant decline in support for be ignored by the larger WE states, strong American leadership in world a fear that has reinforced their Atlan- affairs in recent years. ticism. Not surprisingly, there is con- This does not mean that Europe cern in many corners about the drive does not have global ambitions. Far by some on the Continent to bypass from it; many Europeans would very NATO and duplicate its military much like for the EU to develop into structures through the development a major power largely independent of autonomous military forces. of the United States. But, as a prac- But this push for a separate tical matter, very few are willing to and distinct European Security and increase defense spending in order to Defense Policy (ESDP) is not with- realize such a goal. out its appeal. Even the staunchest CEE countries have been deeply Atlanticists in “New Europe,” such affected by this trend. Although most as Poland, have increasingly begun are, in the main, more pro-American to view ESDP as an opportunity of and Atlanticist than their counter- sorts, the chance to create a credible parts in Western Europe, public European pillar and prevent the re- opinion and political positions have nationalization of European security unmistakably begun to shift in a more policy. The emerging EU defense Eurofocused direction. structure has therefore been supported in Poland and other CEE states Expanding continental as a means of creating a more effec- institutions tive partner for the U.S. The central Two forces—European acces- premise has been that the EU should sion and NATO enlargement—play acquire greater military power and a pivotal role in this regard. With cohesion in order to be able to cooper- regard to the former, the CEE states ate more effectively with Washington. bring much to the table. Provided the To this end, Warsaw has backed the accession process goes as planned, creation of the post of EU foreign min- the coming years could see the emer- ister and endorsed the development gence of a coherent set of new EU of the Union’s security strategy. It has states that remain strong Atlanticists. also become more open to the idea of This, in turn, will aid in Europe’s enhancing the EU’s autonomous plan- transformation into a politically cohe- ning capacities and has supported the sive, economically competitive, and creation of a European planning cell strategically vital region that can at NATO Headquarters. complement and work together with Officials do not see these initia- Washington to confront a long list of tives as a duplication of NATO, but common challenges. as a form of complementarity. The The EU remains a work in prog- key, from the CEE perspective, is ress, however, and its final shape the development of a cohesive Euro- and structure cannot be easily pre- pean foreign and security policy that dicted. A central debate in the CEE supplements NATO, rather than com- has revolved around the future of EU petes with it. integration and the contours and con- None of this is to say that NATO tent of the Union’s emerging foreign has become irrelevant. To the contrary, NATO enlargement is seen

The Journal of International Security Affairs 45 Janusz Bugajski in the CEE as a practical method to Opposition to the initiative has reinvigorate the transatlantic link emerged from all sides. Some neigh- and create a larger pool of interop- boring EU states claim that the erable countries. NATO expansion deployment of such defenses is unnec- has also given Washington additional essary—and even provocative. Others voices of support within NATO’s deci- contend that missile defenses for the sion-making process. Nevertheless, Continent, if and when they are built, whenever the American-European should be constructed with the consen- relationship has become troubled, the sus of all NATO states. Russia, mean- new Alliance members have found while, has accused the United States themselves caught between Ameri- of launching a new effort to neutralize can and EU expectations. its nuclear capabilities and to encircle The reduced role of NATO it, and has placed growing pressure since 9/11 has been greeted with on Eastern Europe to back away from some concern in several CEE Washington’s planned deployment. capitals, which fear that the orga- The CEE states therefore find nization may become lame and inef- themselves caught in the middle of a fective without American resolve. new international confrontation. Both During the military operations in Warsaw and Prague seem to favor the Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, U.S. missile defense system, calculat- it quickly became clear that the U.S. ing that it could entail stronger secu- attached little value to collective rity guarantees from Washington. Alliance decision-making. This led However, a prolonged period of nego- Polish and other officials to warn tiations lies ahead before radar sites against NATO turning into a mere will be deployed in the Czech Repub- “toolbox” for the U.S. in its varied lic and missile batteries positioned in security missions—a development Poland. And in the meantime, rising that would relegate the Alliance to public skepticism about the strategic the role of a reserve force for Wash- utility of missile defense is visible in ington, and eliminate it altogether both countries, as is local concern as a serious security player. over the international repercussions of their participation. Caught between missile defense and a hard place Russia, rising Another contentious issue is that As the foregoing suggests, the of missile defense. Over the past two biggest challenge to Europe and years, Washington has gone public transatlantic ties might just come with plans to place components of its from the east, where the past several emerging missile defense system— years have seen the reemergence of designed to defend against possible an increasingly assertive—and bel- attacks from Iran or other rogue ligerent—Russia. states—on the territory of Poland and Europe has struggled to formu- the Czech Republic. Under plans now late an appropriate approach toward being discussed among Washington, this trend. The Baltic group has been Warsaw and Prague, Poland would at the forefront of those states that become the site of anti-missile inter- seek a more activist policy toward ceptors, while the Czech Republic Moscow. Polish spokesmen believe would house early warning radars. that the Union should show greater concern over anti-democratic tenden-

46 The Journal of International Security Affairs Europe’s Rising East cies in Russian politics. The Baltic with Moscow. In response, they have governments also seek a more con- tried to limit Russian dominance on certed NATO response to counter a number of fronts, most prominent persistent provocations on the part among them energy policy. CEE of the Kremlin (such as violations of capitals have backed alternative sup- Baltic airspace and attempts to desta- plies and routes for gas and oil from bilize incumbent governments there). the Caspian Basin as a way of reduc- CEE capitals have been particularly ing dependence on Russia, and have concerned that Russia is seeking to vehemently opposed the construc- create fractures in the EU by pursu- tion of the new Nord Stream pipeline ing differing approaches toward the by Germany and Russia that would WE and the CEE countries and using bypass Poland and the Baltic states. its bilateral ties with the former to undermine the latter. Drawing the CEE closer As of yet, however, no common In theory, all of the countries EU strategy has emerged toward geographically and politically defined Russia. A contingent of older EU mem- as European states are candidates for bers, including France and Germany, EU membership. And all, apart from has been apprehensive about provok- Belarus and Russia, view their acces- ing disruptive conflicts with Moscow sion to the EU as a strategic objective and is willing to overlook both nega- and priority. However, the EU has tive trends in Russia’s domestic poli- not yet set post-Soviet states such tics and Moscow’s confrontational as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia foreign policies. The priorities for on an accession track through asso- Paris, Berlin, and Rome in particular ciation agreements, as it has with the have centered on guaranteed energy Western Balkan countries. Warsaw provisions, a growing Russian market and other CEE capitals have pushed for their exports, and foreign poli- to have the status of these countries cies that do not create conflicts with upgraded as a stepping-stone to even- Moscow. In their view Russian politi- tual EU entry. cal stability, strong central control, The European Neighborhood and territorial integrity helps ensure Policy (ENP), devised in 2003 as a European security regardless of the “Wider Europe” concept, lays the state of democracy within Russia and groundwork for closer cooperation Moscow’s relations with its immedi- between the EU and its neighbors. ate neighbors. EU leaders have underscored the CEE states have not been so importance of the ENP in promoting sanguine. They have watched with democratic reform, the rule of law, and increasing trepidation as Moscow institution building. They contend that pursues a neo-imperialist policy in the economic arena the ENP helps toward several neighboring countries. to deepen trade relations, enhances Poland and the three Baltic countries financial and technical assistance, pro- in particular consider themselves motes participation in EU programs, frontline states facing growing secu- and gives each country a link with the rity challenges to their east. None of Union’s internal market. these governments are supportive of And yet, despite the ENP, the Russia’s membership in either the EU EU has displayed a reluctance to con- or NATO, and are suspicious about template further enlargement. With close organizational partnerships the recent slowdown in EU economic

The Journal of International Security Affairs 47 Janusz Bugajski growth, political and public support and these vulnerable states will suc- for further institutional expansion cumb to negative Russian influence has weakened. Paris, for instance, has and regional insecurity. announced that any future member Moscow, meanwhile, has dis- would need to be approved by a played a determination to undermine French referendum—a decision that NATO, EU, and U.S. influence in what could delay or derail the accession it considers to be its primary sphere of various states. The debate in sev- of interest in the “post-Soviet space.” eral other EU states, meanwhile, has It has accused a number of Western focused on the limits of EU expansion governments of undermining Rus- and a search for an acceptable defini- sian national interests and plotting to tion of Europe’s ultimate borders. stage a “colored revolution” in Russia The European Parliament has itself along the Ukrainian and Geor- been more outspoken. In March gian models. 2006, it endorsed a report recom- mending that all countries bidding A new role for for membership should be given a “new Europe” “European perspective,” which would All of this should matter a great include a “privileged partnership” deal to Washington. American inter- until entry is secured. Nonetheless, ests require dependable and pre- some CEE leaders see this as noth- dictable partners within the EU and ing more than a stall tactic on the NATO. Such allies would help pre- part of an EU uncertain about their vent the EU from developing into a inclusion. And they worry about the potentially hostile bloc that might creation of durable dividing lines oppose U.S. policies on several for- between themselves and the rest of eign policy fronts. It is therefore in the Eastern Europe, which they claim U.S. national interest to have a coher- would seriously damage inter-state ent and united set of European allies relations, undermine economic devel- that can complement the projection opment, obstruct structural reform, of American political authority, eco- encourage Russian revanchism, and nomic strength, and military power. unsettle a wider region. The challenge for Washington Indeed, Poland and the Baltic is to transform the EU into a partner countries have sought to generate that complements U.S. strategic goals a more intensive focus on Ukraine, rather than obstructing or diverting Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia in from them. And here, the countries both the EU and NATO. They are of the CEE are poised to play a pivotal firm supporters of both NATO and role. In the new post-post-Cold War EU expansion, and advocate greater world, where Russia and the West efforts to provide embryonic democ- now confront each other in numerous racies with a sufficient incentive arenas, from the status of Kosovo and and momentum to pursue exten- the missile defense shield to the future sive reforms to reach EU standards. of the OSCE, the CEE states are both Warsaw and several other CEE capi- the objects of Russia’s assertive policy tals, for their part, have asserted and new tools by which Western that the EU and NATO must provide nations can counter it—harnessing a clear message of openness to new NATO and the EU in the process. European members. Otherwise, the momentum for reform may expire

48 The Journal of International Security Affairs Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen

n the first month of 2008, Russia’s state-controlled natural gas mono- poly, Gazprom, ticked off two more European countries that will rely almost entirely on Moscow for their everyday energy needs. On Janu- I th ary 18 , Russian President Vladimir Putin, accompanied by his anointed successor, Gazprom chairman Dmitri Medvedev, pressured the government in Sofia into signing an energy deal with Russia and providing its backing for the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Bulgaria, and further into Europe, undercutting EU- and U.S.-backed plans for a pipeline from Turkey. Then, a week later, Serbian President Boris Tadic, accompanied by his prime minister, visited Moscow and signed on the dotted line, allowing Gazprom to acquire a 51 percent stake in Serbia’s national oil company (NIS). The ambitious move not only strengthened energy links between the two Slavic nations, but bolstered ties between the two most vocal opponents of independence for Kosovo.

Such developments highlight the stark reality now faced by decisionmakers in Brussels and other European capitals. They must choose between the status

Borut Grgic is Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Alexandros Petersen is Program Director of the ISS Caspian Europe Center in Brussels. Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen quo, energy overdependence on an Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slo- assertive Moscow, or a new future: vakia. This dangerous dependence, alternative routes from alternative moreover, is on the rise as coal, lig- sources, such as the Caspian region. nite, peat and other sources are pro- The situation is dire. Europe’s gressively depleted. substantial—and growing—energy Given Moscow’s recent assertive needs have made its leaders chroni- foreign policy moves, such as claim- cally unable to resist the lure of ing the North Pole and flying nuclear Russia. Not just Bulgaria and Serbia, bombers to Scotland and Guam, as with their traditional ties to Russia, well as the Kremlin’s track record but Germany, Italy, France, Austria, of using energy for political gains Greece, Hungary and Slovakia have against Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor- all been seduced by the siren song of gia, Ukraine and EU-member Lithu- easy energy from the Kremlin. Some ania, one would think that European have argued that these governments decisionmakers would be rushing to cannot be blamed for arrangements ameliorate the continent’s overde- that facilitate heating and light for pendence on Russia. Indeed, a recent their citizens. But it has become abun- poll by the German Marshall Fund dantly clear that these deals come at a found that 59 percent of Europeans steep cost: the unity of the EU itself. “expressed concern about Russia’s Every exclusive bilateral deal with role as an energy provider,” while 56 Russia jeopardizes another European percent “expressed concern about state and countless commitments to Russia’s behavior toward its neigh- interdependence. Every agreement bours.”1 But as a practical matter, that increases the continent’s depen- little is being done to decouple Europe dence on Moscow weakens Europe’s from this energy embrace. geopolitical leverage and undermines The government of Chancellor the European project itself. Revers- Angela Merkel in Berlin, for exam- ing this trend requires that Europe ple, seems unable to provide the lead- develop a coherent and effective strat- ership that could stem Gazprom’s egy for improving its energy security. march into Europe, even though the majority of Germans are wary of Rus- Gazprom’s march sia’s approach to neighboring states. into Europe Her government is still moving ahead Overdependence on any country with plans for the Nord Stream gas for key energy supplies is unwise, pipeline, agreed to by her predeces- but the EU is uniquely vulnerable in sor, Gerhard Schroeder, and Presi- this regard. It is the world’s great- dent Putin. This exclusive project est energy importer, and the largest would bypass the Baltic countries consumer without significant energy and Poland, and has drawn protests reserves. European countries depend from Finland and the Scandinavian on Russia for their oil consumption, countries for being environmentally anywhere from 30 percent for Bel- questionable. Never mind that a few gium to 85 percent for Bulgaria, with weeks before Schroeder stepped the figure always far higher than the down as Chancellor in order to chair next largest source. For gas, they are the board at Nord Stream’s Gazprom- dependent from 32 percent (for Italy) controlled construction consortium, to 100 percent for Bulgaria, Estonia, the German government guaranteed $1 billion of the project’s costs. Never

50 The Journal of International Security Affairs Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace mind also that Schroeder’s boss is a place not only to pit the states of the former Stasi officer who worked with continent against one another, but to Mr. Putin while he was stationed in geographically split Europe in two Dresden with the KGB. through a line that stretches from Gazprom has been busy on other Bulgaria through Serbia, Austria and fronts as well. For some time, it has Italy. Such a cordon of energy depen- been attempting a takeover of Hun- dents, with Hungary and Greece gary’s MOL energy company. Simul- as extra fortification, could prevent taneously, it has pursued Austria to the flow of energy from alternative accept a deal to create a Gazprom hub sources through Turkey into the within Europe at Baumgarten. EU, effectively cutting the member- The deal with Serbia was a state aspirant off from the Union, and masterful illustration of the nexus diminishing its prospects as a cross- between geopolitics and energy that roads for Europe’s energy imports is central to Gazprom’s activities from the south and southeast. in Europe. Gazprom paid 400 million euros for a majority stake of a Brussels fiddles as national company valued at 2 billion, Moscow divides no tender, no transparency, and no questions asked—not even by the EU. and conquers Plus, Moscow knows that the value of To be fair, the EU Commission NIS will only increase if Serbia joins has since at least 2005 acknowledged the EU, despite the section of the deal the dangers involved in facilitating that required Serbia not to upgrade Gazprom’s continental ambitions. NIS refineries to European standards European Energy Commissioner for another five years. While we can Andris Piebalgs, along with Commis- not be certain of the final arrange- sion President Jose Manuel Barroso, ments, the draft deal included the has called on the governments of stipulation that Gazprom would have European member-states to “speak the right to a 51 percent stake in all with one voice” when confronting Kremlin-controlled energy inter- gas infrastructure in Serbia, with 3 access to 100 percent of its capacity. ests. However, not only has their In return, Moscow seems merely to advice fallen on deaf ears in some have reinforced its empty vow to veto of Europe’s most powerful capitals, any UN resolution recognizing Koso- they themselves have failed to push vo’s independence. harder for unified rhetoric and syn- These and other steps consti- chronized action. While, for the most tute a concerted and holistic strat- part, the EU Council sets the agenda egy on the part of the Kremlin, one and the Commission implements it which Russia in Global Affairs editor as best it can, Barroso and his depu- Fyodor Lukyanov has described as ties have not played the important follows: “Wherever possible, it is coordinating role needed to enact necessary to increase Russia’s pres- a strategy to ameliorate Europe’s ence in Europe, either inside the EU energy security woes. Instead, while or in countries that have a chance Mr. Putin was shaking hands with to join.”2 Connecting the dots from the Bulgarians and Serbs, the Com- here is easy. In pursuing this strat- mission was busy setting overly- egy, Gazprom, and thereby Russia’s ambitious targets for member-states leadership, is putting the pieces in to curb their carbon emissions.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 51 Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen

Make no mistake, the vibrant hand in hand with Brussels’ environ- discussion now under way in Europe mental priorities. about the continent’s carbon footprint and reductions in the use of fossil The scramble for fuels is immensely positive, for both the Caspian ecological and practical reasons. If In the scramble for the energy- the Commission’s minimum target is rich Caspian, meanwhile, Europe met, and 20 percent of the continent’s is in last place. Despite the fact energy is produced from renewable that Europe’s need to diversify its energy sources by 2020, Europe will energy imports is more acute than have gone a long way toward better- that of America or China, Europe ing its energy security. But Brus- lags behind both—and all are trying sels still lacks a unified approach for to catch up to Russia in securing addressing the energy problem of energy reserves under the Caspian today—Gazprom’s policy of divide seabed and in surrounding Azerbai- and conquer within Europe—as jan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and opposed to that of tomorrow. Uzbekistan. The greater Caspian Aside from Gazprom’s expan- region holds the world’s third largest sionist and overtly geopolitical activi- reserves of hydrocarbon energy. Yet, ties, it is in the interests of European despite the fact that Russia, with its decisionmakers to be fully aware of own vast reserves, taps this energy exactly who is in charge. While Gaz- and sells it to Europe at more than prom is not entirely state-owned, its double the domestic price, the EU individual investors do not present has neglected to act in its own inter- a brighter picture, nor do they con- est in the region. trol the majority share. Take Suley- Turkmenistan, isolated for almost man Kerimov, Gazprom’s largest two decades under the rule of Sapar- private stakeholder. The “Sage of murat Niyazov, the self-styled Turk- Dagestan,” one of Russia’s notori- menbashi (leader of all Turkmen), is ously criminalized republics, is also experiencing an awakening of sorts known as “Russia’s richest civil ser- under his successor, Gurbanguli Ber- vant.” Among other troubling activi- dimukhammedov. The country’s vast ties, the Duma deputy—who owns gas reserves under the Kara-Kum a 4.5 percent stake in the energy desert, estimated at anywhere from giant—has been implicated in the 4 2 trillion to 20 trillion cubic meters, Iraqi Oil-for-Food scandal. are being targeted by Russian and Further inroads by Gazprom, in international energy companies, other words, will not lead to a Euro- mostly American. China is also heav- pean energy sector of the kind poli- ily involved in this game, possessing cymakers in Brussels seek: devoid of the only on-land gas drilling license, corruption, depoliticized and properly and offering to sign contracts com- regulated. Indeed, no Russian energy mitting to 30 years of energy imports enterprise operating today meets from the former Soviet republic. And these criteria. But Gazprom and its while Russia views and acts in the many subsidiaries are worse than region as if it were its backyard, Ber- most, known for some of the indus- dimukhammedov has inched toward try’s most egregious environmental the West. The Turkmen leader practices and lacking the kind of cor- made a point of visiting Brussels in porate social responsibility that goes

52 The Journal of International Security Affairs Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace

November, and has begun to improve directly from Georgia to Romania ties with Azerbaijan in an attempt across the Black Sea, should be sup- to restart regional action toward a ported as well. Every effort should Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. be made to develop independent The current Slovenian EU Presi- European access to the Caspian dency has the vision and tools to plant energy market. But these projects Europe’s initial stake in the Caspian will only be commercially viable if scramble. Dmitri Rupel, Slovenia’s alternative sources in the Caspian foreign minister, who is heading the region are cultivated. presidency, and Danilo Turk, the country’s new president, are both A new Caspian experienced diplomats who can bring strategy for Europe important skills to the table in orient- If it acts now, Europe is in many ing EU priorities toward the Caspian. ways best placed to engage the region. However, if action is not taken imme- Not only are the energy-rich govern- diately, the EU could risk attempting ments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and too little too late. Such was the case (increasingly) Turkmenistan eager to in the 1990s, when a similar scramble develop “multi-vector” strategies that ensued for Azerbaijan’s initial energy provide them with several foreign offerings. Through a major and multi- policy options, but Europe is often faceted diplomatic effort that involved mentioned as the favored choice in close partnerships with Azerbaijan, this context. Russia’s shadow is one Georgia and Turkey, the U.S. was that Caspian states would gener- able to realize the so-called pipe- ally prefer to avoid, but have a hard dream of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil time doing so. China presents inter- pipeline and its sister project for gas, esting economic opportunities, but the South Caucasus Pipeline. Despite is politically incompatible. And the its relative inaction in spurring the U.S., for better or worse, is seen as a endeavor, Europe has benefited tre- somewhat discredited and distracted mendously—indeed, more than the actor—fumbling between promises U.S.—from the alternative routes of empowerment and dissonant criti- generated as a result. Yet it does not cism about governance. While Iran seem to feel the need to repeat that wields some influence in ethnically- successful exercise. linked Tajikistan, its ambitions in It would do well to do so with the region do not match its capabili- a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to ties. And while Turkey’s involvement Turkmenistan and an enhanced is positive, it is viewed in the region oil exchange with Kazakhstan. An first and foremost as the gateway to effort of similar vigor is needed Europe. Despite its organizational to realize Nabucco, from Turkey weaknesses, therefore, the EU has through Bulgaria, Romania and an opportunity to step into the Cas- Hungary to Austria and the rest of pian utilizing its strengths: dialogue, Europe. The Nabucco project is per- soft power, investment and develop- haps the most relevant for Europe ment—not to mention a major market this century. Other ideas, such as for energy exports. reversing the existing Ukrainian However, to do so, European Odessa-Brody pipeline and extend- decisionmakers must approach the ing it to Gdansk, as well as the White region in a coordinated fashion. Stream project that could bring gas

The Journal of International Security Affairs 53 Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen

So far, the Caspian Sea’s western These steps should not be shore, the South Caucasus, has been undertaken as a matter of European engaged largely through the Euro- benevolence. Rather, Europe needs pean Neighborhood Policy, while the Caspian to ameliorate its overde- the eastern shore, Central Asia, has pendence on Russia and strengthen had contact with the EU through the continental interdependence. Euro- TACIS development program and pean decisionmakers cannot afford the German Presidency’s Central to ignore the reality that Russia’s Asia strategy. Not only have these increasingly assertive foreign policy approaches not gone far enough, they behavior is a manifestation of its self- have been configured in such a way image as an “energy superpower,” or as to unnecessarily split the region. that Europe’s indolent facilitation of The stakes are high. While indi- that status progressively undermines vidual energy reserves in Azerbaijan its leverage and unity. If Europe does or Kazakhstan at first glance do not not commit collectively to a Cas- seem overwhelming, the Caspian pian-centered strategy, the continent region as a whole presents a major will gradually splinter, and only one energy source to rival Russia, Iran aspect will unite all its states—depen- and even the Gulf states. The EU, dence on Gazprom and the Kremlin supported by key member-state gov- leadership for the stuff of life: fuel for ernments, must therefore develop cooking, heat in the winter, and light a Caspian-centered policy for the in the dark. region. Practical steps to be taken now could include immediate consultations by the Commission with former U.S. diplomats and Azerbaijani, Geor- gian and Turkish officials involved in 1. German Marshall Fund of the United the realization of the “world’s biggest States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, “Transatlantic Trends 2007: Key Findings,” energy project,” the aforementioned n.d., http://www.transatlantictrends.org/ BTC pipeline, in the face of enor- trends/doc/Transatlantic%20Trends_all_ mous Russian and Iranian pressure. 0920.pdf. Such discussions could yield insights 2. As cited in Brian Whitmore, “Russia: Gazprom’s Advance into Europe Contin- into how to create new momentum in ues,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the construction of the Nabucco and January 25, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/ Trans-Caspian pipelines. The Coun- featuresarticle/2008/01/f2269a3e-1135- cil also could launch a task force 4c4b-add3-6951838b6aa7.html. 3. As cited in Anne-France White, “Barroso Calls of experts on EU-Caspian energy for Strong EU Energy Policy,” theparliament. dialogue in order to ensure that the com, November 20, 2006, http://www. EU stays competitive amongst other eupolitix.com/EN/News/200 6 1 1 / interested parties. The EU could also ae62ded5-0e8a-4327-a1c5-4b7e15a6bc3c.htm. 4. Jules Evans, “A Rollercoaster Ride with collapse its special offices for Central the Caucasian Billionaire,” The Specta- Asia and the South Caucasus into one tor (London), February 24, 2007, http:// department: the EU’s Special Envoy findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_ for the Caspian region. Finally, Brus- 200702/ai_n18632496. sels and the states of Europe can position themselves in the Caspian as the most qualified brokers to achieve the regional “synergy” currently pursued by the EU in the Black Sea.

54 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Case for European Missile Defense Peter Brookes

fter seemingly endless rounds of talks with its Polish and Czech counterparts about fielding a missile defense Asystem in Europe, the United States made some progress in early February when Warsaw and Washington jointly announced they had reached an agreement—in principle—to move forward with the deployment of ten interceptors in Poland.

The devil, without a doubt, is in the details. The Poles are pushing for a deal which includes American support for bolstering their air defenses (likely in the form of PAC-3 batteries), a reflection of their fears of rising Russian animosity. (The Czech Republic also has to come to agreement with the United States, but will likely move in concert with its Polish neighbors.) With Iran continuing to enrich uranium, the possibility of “loose nukes” in Pakistan, and a spate of ballistic missile tests (by Russia, China and Iran, among others) over the past year, the announcement of an agreement is undoubtedly good news. Concluding a deal this year will serve to bolster transatlantic security and protect the United States and Europe from the growing threat of long- range ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads they may carry. But this deal will not go unopposed. Public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic is shaky, NATO member countries are not fully on board, and the Russians will continue their vociferous opposition. The Kremlin has not been shy about expressing its opinion that a European missile defense system is a serious threat to Russian interests. Indeed, days before the Warsaw-Washing-

Peter Brookes, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, is a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense. Peter Brookes ton deal was announced, almost as if grams. The most likely candidates anticipating a breakthrough in talks, for making that happen are North a top Russian general said Moscow Korea (both missiles and nuclear) or may restructure its military presence the remnants of the Pakistani A. Q. in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, Khan nuclear proliferation network. which borders both Poland and Lithu- According to the Pentagon’s ania, in response to missile defense Missile Defense Agency (MDA), if plans for Eastern Europe.1 This is the green light were given today by sure to rattle nerves in the region. all concerned to break ground for the Eastern European missile defense American angst sites, the earliest the system could be Despite the Kremlin’s growl- fully operational would be 2013.4 The ing, the Bush administration sees inking of final agreements and likely the deployment of a missile-defense American congressional debates over system in Poland and the Czech funding will only push that timeline Republic—also known as the “third out further. site”—as critical to blunting the grow- Indeed, the ballistic missile and ing worldwide ballistic missile threat, nuclear proliferation trend, in gen- protecting the homeland and defend- eral, is not positive. Ten years ago, ing its European allies. Indeed, as there were only six nuclear weapons President George W. Bush said in a states. Today there are nine. Twenty- speech at the National Defense Uni- five years ago, nine countries had versity in late October: “The need for ballistic missiles. Today, 27 do. Con- missile defense in Europe is real and cerns about Iran’s programs will only I believe it’s urgent.”2 exacerbate the situation, as coun- But it is also a race against the tries—especially those in the Arab clock. The recent U.S. National Middle East—seek to balance Iran’s Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the rise. Of course, none of these argu- supposedly dormant state of Iran’s ments are likely to convince the Rus- nuclear weapons program notwith- sians of the need for missile defenses standing, the American intelligence in Eastern Europe. community believes Iran could have an intercontinental ballistic mis- Russian reluctance sile (ICBM) capable of striking the Russian-American relations since United States by 2015.3 (Notably, the fall of the Berlin Wall have not the NIE’s findings are the subject really changed all that much. During of considerable debate at home and the Cold War, the security relationship abroad; if its critics are correct, an was characterized as one of mutually Iranian missile could be mated with assured destruction (MAD). Today, it’s a nuclear warhead by this time as still MAD—but now the relationship is well.) These estimates, of course, do one of mutually assured distrust. And not take into account the possibility nothing is making Russia’s ties with of a Manhattan Project-like effort by the United States or Europe more sus- Iran, which could decrease the time picious—and contentious—than the needed to reach initial operating simmering disagreement over Wash- capability for either the missile or ington’s plans to deploy anti-missile nuclear program. Nor do these dates capabilities in Eastern Europe. take into account outside assistance, Although the Kremlin agreed to which might accelerate both pro- move beyond the Cold War strategic

56 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Case for European Missile Defense balance of power with the signing Fort Greely to counteract the still- of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russian evolving North Korean nuclear and President Vladimir Putin has had ballistic missile threat.) a significant change of heart about missile defenses, especially those of The Bush administration sees other parties. Indeed, Putin drew par- the deployment of a missile- allels at an October European Union (EU) summit between the plans for defense system in Poland and the an Eastern European missile shield Czech Republic—also known as and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the “third site”—as critical to which saw the two sides go to the blunting the growing worldwide brink of nuclear war.5 A day later, the commander of the Russian Stra- ballistic missile threat, protecting tegic Missile Forces, Col. Gen. Niko- the homeland and defending its lai Solovtsov, warned that Moscow European allies. could restart the production of short- and medium-range missiles on short Possibly more fearful of the notice if directed, raising fears of radar, which Moscow believes could rising major power tensions.6 give NATO intelligence on Russian Russia strongly objects to the maneuvers and weapons testing, U.S. proposal to install a high-tech X- Putin suggested to Bush last spring band radar in the Czech Republic and that the United States and Russia deploy ten ground-based intercep- share an early-warning radar at tors in Poland, claiming the defensive Gabala, Azerbaijan, instead of build- missile system would cause an “arms ing the Czech radar. But the leased, race” and turn Europe into a “powder Soviet-era facility will not even come keg.” The Kremlin also insists the close to matching the American limited system would undermine radar’s tracking capabilities, accord- Russia’s nuclear deterrent, despite ing to expert estimates. the fact that a Russian land-based Putin has also suggested the nuclear strike on the United States United States put its Eastern Euro- would not be launched on a trajectory pean missile defense interceptors over Poland, but would fly toward its in Iraq or Turkey instead of East- American targets over the North Pole, ern Europe. As well, Russia recom- or Iceland and Greenland, depending mended that the United States target on the targets. Iranian missiles using U.S. Navy In fact, according to the MDA, Aegis-class ships, equipped with the the proposed kinetic kill vehicle des- upgraded SM-3 missiles. (The latter ignated for deployment in Poland is is, in fact, a viable option. On the simply not fast enough to catch a Rus- positive side, there are fewer politi- sian land-based ICBM in a tail-chase cal-military issues like basing to deal scenario. These interceptors, there- with, since U.S. Navy ships would be fore, would have no capability against operating in international waters. But Russia’s sea- or air-based deterrence there are technical questions about capabilities. (Interestingly, at the the capabilities of current intercep- time, Moscow did not object to the tors, concerns about ship deployment U.S. decision six years ago to deploy schedules, and, of course, no lack of missile defenses at California’s Van- parochialism within the U.S. Depart- denberg Air Force Base and Alaska’s ment of Defense.)

The Journal of International Security Affairs 57 Peter Brookes

Not getting any traction on those European unease offers, Putin made another counterof- All of this political jousting over fer while with Bush in Maine in early missile defense is having an effect July: a regional missile defense with on the security debate in Europe, a radar facility in southern Russia especially in Poland and the Czech under the control of the NATO- Republic, as well as within NATO. In Russia Council. In October, Defense Poland, domestic public opinion is not Secretary Robert Gates made his entirely convinced about the need for own rejoinder, offering that the East- missile defense. The Poles are less ern European system would not be enamored with America than they activated until the United States and were previously, partly as a result of Russia could agree that an Iranian the protracted conflict in Iraq. They threat existed. (Hearing howls of also question the threat emanat- protest from inside the Beltway about ing from Iran, nor do they want to leaving U.S. national security to Rus- be dragged into a dust-up between sian discretion, Washington has since Washington and Tehran. backed away from that idea.) Not surprisingly, the Polish national security establishment— Russian anxiety about the worried about taking a ration of Russian wrath without appropriate Eastern European missile compensation—wants to extract all it shield is more likely about can from the United States for allow- the placement of the system ing the placement of interceptors on Polish soil near Slupsk on the Baltic in what it perceives as its coast. Although positive about closer old stomping grounds than defense ties with Washington, and any real strategic concerns. by extension NATO, Warsaw has not been subtle about wanting deal “sweet- eners” in exchange for hosting the Making matters worse, Moscow missiles. The Poles have expressed has threatened to vacate a number of interest in PAC-3 and THAAD mis- arms control treaties on account of the sile-defense systems, defense mod- missile defense facilities in Eastern ernization assistance and more Europe, including the Intermediate- intelligence-sharing, among other Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Con- issues. Poland is already the larg- ventional Armed Forces in Europe est recipient of U.S. military aid in (CFE) accords. It made good on its Europe, but it has lingering concerns threat to leave the latter in Decem- about the commitment of the NATO ber 2007. The INF Treaty may be the Alliance to its defense should Russia next to fall. want to play rough (not surprisingly, Yet despite the proposals, coun- considering the Polish experience terproposals and threats of vacat- with its British and French allies in ing treaties, neither Washington nor World War II). Moscow seems willing to abandon The X-band midcourse radar its position for—or against—the in the Czech Republic, to be located planned Eastern European sites. But in the Brdy military district near a it’s not just about the United States former Soviet base west of Prague, is and Russia. not without controversy either. While the ruling government supports the

58 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Case for European Missile Defense missile defense radar, concerns exist among the Czech public, especially Moscow will try to make missile about the system’s environmental defense a wedge issue to divide and health effects. Czech opposition Europe, undermine NATO and parties are calling for a national ref- weaken transatlantic relations, erendum on the issue—and for the European Union and NATO to play all while carving out a sphere of a larger role in European missile political and military influence defense plans. for itself. NATO has generally considered the talks among Washington, Warsaw But Russian anxiety about the and Prague to be bilateral issues, and Eastern European missile shield is has chosen not to interfere. Indeed, more likely about the placement of in general, NATO has expressed sup- the system in what it perceives as its port for missile defense in Europe, old stomping grounds than any real especially against short- and medium- strategic concerns. The supposed range missiles. NATO Secretary threat from missile defense could General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated also provide a convenient excuse for after the April North Atlantic Coun- the $200 billion defense build-up the cil meeting: “There is absolutely a Russian military is now undergoing shared threat perception between the following years of abject neglect of allies. Allies all agree that there is a 7 the once-mighty Red Army. Not even threat from ballistic missiles.” Sub- taking into account the sea and air sequently, at a meeting of NATO’s legs of its strategic nuclear triad, the 26 defense chiefs in June 2007, the Kremlin should realize that the cur- Alliance agreed to assess the politi- rently configured system could not cal and military implications of mis- deal with a massive Russian nuclear sile defense in Europe in a report due 8 assault on the United States. in February. The NATO summit in It is likely the Kremlin will try Bucharest this spring could therefore to leverage public sentiment in East- be a key meeting for missile defense ern Europe and NATO countries to on the continent. get impressionable, democratically- While NATO is actively study- elected governments to back down ing short- and medium-range ballistic on missile defense. Moscow will also missile defense programs for Europe, try to make missile defense a wedge France and Germany have expressed issue to divide Europe, undermine concern about the deployment of assets NATO and weaken transatlantic rela- “in theater” that are not controlled by tions, all while carving out a sphere NATO. The European Parliament has of political and military influence also asked for a say on missile defense. for itself. Worst of all, Russia might Europeans fear that missile defense deepen its nuclear cooperation with will provoke Moscow on other thorny Iran, beyond building and fueling issues, such as Europe’s energy secu- Iran’s Bushehr reactor, as a bargain- rity, which is heavily dependent on ing chip against missile defense. Russian natural gas, or on the ques- Notably, both Putin and Russian tion of Kosovo’s independence from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Serbia, which the Kremlin opposes, made trips to Tehran in October and on future NATO expansion (e.g., within weeks of one another. It was Ukraine and Georgia).

The Journal of International Security Affairs 59 Peter Brookes

the first visit of a Russian leader to likely on the path to becoming one, Iran since Stalin met with the Allies the chance that these weapons will in Tehran in 1943. Military sales, be used against peaceful nations is a such as the highly-capable S-300 troubling but very real possibility. air defense system, have also been Every state has an undeniable recently rumored to be in the works, right to self-defense—and it only adding to previous deals for Russian makes sense that all reasonable, equipment. necessary steps are taken to protect It appears the Russians will do all one’s national security. It is even more they can to prevent the deployment of logical if the capability is emerging to missile defense in Eastern Europe— do so, as witnessed by over 30 suc- maybe all of Europe. Although hope cessful missile defense tests to date may spring eternal, it is unlikely an by the United States alone. As these increasingly confident Kremlin is tests have shown, hitting a bullet with going to change its position. a bullet in the atmosphere, or even in space, is in fact possible. Hosting a transatlantic But even though rogue states like North Korea and Iran are good exam- missile defense system will ples of the need for missile defense deepen, and further unify, today, developing and deploying such the security relationship capabilities is not about the missile or between European NATO a weapon of mass destruction threat from a single country, or even sev- members, especially Poland eral. Rather, missile defense is about and the Czech Republic, and protection from these weapons no the United States, enhancing matter where the threat comes from, now or in the future. our mutual national security There are other advantages to against external threats from fielding a missile defense system in ballistic missiles and weapons Europe for the United States, too. of mass destruction. Hosting a transatlantic missile defense system will deepen, and further unify, the security relationship between Best defense European NATO members, espe- In recent years, the United States cially Poland and the Czech Republic, decided that leaving itself deliberately and the United States, enhancing our vulnerable to any weapon system or mutual national security against exter- state, as it did during the Cold War, was nal threats from ballistic missiles and foolish. And rightfully so. Deliberate weapons of mass destruction. And vulnerability can lead to perceptions despite the range of concerns about of weakness, inviting provocation or missile defense, it should be empha- aggression from another nation or sized that missile defense is a defen- transnational actor. In addition, being sive—not offensive—weapon. Indeed, perceived as weak and vulnerable the dominant design of the missile can lead a potential adversary to use defense interceptor warhead does threats, intimidation, “blackmail” or not even contain an explosive charge; coercion to achieve its objectives. In traveling at 15,000 miles per hour, it a day when North Korea is a nuclear destroys the missile warhead by the weapons state and Iran is still very sheer force of the collision. Therefore,

60 The Journal of International Security Affairs The Case for European Missile Defense the idea that missile defense is an In the end, it is clear: missile offensive system, as many have sug- defenses will improve America’s gested, is patently false. In a way, mis- security, and that of Europe, against sile defense is like an umbrella; it is the growing challenge of ballistic only needed if it rains. missiles and their unconventional This means that missile defense payloads. It is high time the Ameri- threatens no one. Missile defense cans, Poles and Czechs strike a only undermines the capability of final deal for deployment, enhanc- one country to threaten or attack ing both transatlantic ties and our another with its ballistic missiles. common security. The idea that the deployment of missile defenses in Europe will provoke an attack against Poland, the Czech Republic or any country that hosts them (including the United King- 1. “Russia May Restructure Forces in Kalin- dom or Denmark, which have missile ingrad Region in Response to U.S. Missile Defense Plans,” Interfax-AVN (Moscow), defense radars) is a canard meant to January 30, 2008, http://www.interfax.ru/ encourage passivity. Defensive sys- e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11955882. tems do not provoke attack. It is vul- 2. President George W. Bush, Remarks before nerability or weakness that invites the National Defense University, Washing- ton, DC, October 23, 2007, http://www. attack, not resolve and strength. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20 The United States—and others— 071023-3.html. have made it clear to Russia that mis- 3. Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, “Current sile defense does not threaten Russian and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement before the security. Talks have emphasized that Senate Armed Services Committee, March missile defense is part of an expanding 17, 2005, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/ effort in Europe to counter the grow- Testimonies/statement17.html. ing ballistic missile threat—wherever 4. Patricia Saunders, “Missile Defense Pro- gram Overview,” presentation before the 4th it may come from. Of course, Russia International Conference on Missile Defense, should not expect to have a veto over Washington, DC, June 26, 2007, 14. European or American security—nor 5. “At EU Summit, Putin Evokes Cuban should that right be surrendered by Missile Crisis,” Associated Press, Octo- ber 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/ the United States or Europe. Indeed, articles/ap/2007/10/26/europe/EU-GEN- Moscow would do better to turn with EU-Russia-Summit.php. its protests toward Tehran and Pyong- 6. “Russian General: Country Can Quickly yang, capitals that are driving the Resume Intermediate-Range Missile Production,” VOA News, October 27, need for missile defense because of 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/ their growing offensive ballistic mis- archive/2007-10/2007-10-27-voa9.cfm?CFI sile capability. Moreover, some secu- D=13418917&CFTOKEN=27693554. rity analysts have speculated—though 7. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, press conference after reinforced cautiously—that the successful deploy- meetings of the North Atlantic Council and ment of such effective defenses may the NATO-Russia Council discussing missile one day convince countries like Iran defense, Brussels, Belgium, April 19, 2007, and North Korea that their pursuit of http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/ s070419a.html. missiles and weapons of mass destruc- 8. “NATO Agrees on Missile Defence Way For- tion should be abandoned as futile ward,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization endeavors. Mutually assured destruc- News, June 14, 2007, http://www.nato.int/ tion or massive retaliation should not docu/update/2007/06-june/e0614a.html. be the only policy options.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 61

Russia’s “Nuclear Renaissance”

Victor Mizin

hese days, Kremlinologists are once again immersed in the persistent post-Cold War question of “who lost Russia.”1 What- Tever one might think about the future course of Russia, now emerging from its much-touted presidential elections, it is obvious that the Kremlin is bent on restoring the country’s image as a great power on a par with the United States and Europe.

In this calculus, nuclear weapons matter a great deal. The conventional wisdom in Moscow is that Russia, “rising from its knees” in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of its citizens, must be a strong, independent great power with a foreign policy of its own. Not surprisingly, the country‘s leadership is overtly promoting the modernization of its strategic weapons potential—a capability which is increasingly perceived in Moscow (and elsewhere) as the major facilitator of an independent role in global affairs. This is being done primarily for domestic or PR considerations. But Washington’s foreign and military policies also play a significant part in the Kremlin’s stratagems.

Fear and loathing in Moscow Russian experts and politicians today harbor a great deal of suspicion regarding Washington’s intentions.2 They claim that since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has pursued an aggressive policy toward the “post- Soviet states”—one aimed at encircling Russia with military bases, deploying

Dr. Victor Mizin, director of studies at the independent Moscow-based Insti- tute of Strategic Assessments, is currently a Leading Research Fellow with the Center of International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Victor Mizin

missiles on its borders, toppling allies with Europe and the United States in Central Asia, and inciting inter- should be seen in this context. nal turmoil in the Commonwealth This domestic urge has influ- of Independent States (and Russia enced Moscow’s attitudes toward itself) through “orange revolutions” weapons procurement and nuclear fomented by U.S.-backed “pro-democ- issues. It may be tempting to disre- racy” groups. This perceived policy, gard Russia’s recent moves toward according to Russian officials, is a “strategic modernization” as mere reflection of American power that has insignificant bluster. After all, the gone unbridled for too long. As Rus- United States still can assuredly dis- sian President Vladimir Putin put it in suade a nuclear attack from Russia, his landmark 2007 address in Munich, and is largely immune to any conceiv- “The unipolar world, in which there is able Russian strategic threat. Yet, one master, is… pernicious not only a closer look suggests that Russia’s for all those within this system, but recent moves are part of a more pro- also for the sovereign itself because it found shift in the country’s military/ destroys itself from within.” It is also strategic priorities. a state of affairs that “stimulates an In recent times, Russia has arms race” in response.3 suspended its obligations under Russian commentators have the Treaty on Conventional Armed been quick to take up this call, blast- Forces in Europe (CFE) and threat- ing the “unilateral and illegitimate ened to walk out of the Intermediate military actions” of the United States, Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Perhaps its “uncontained hyper-use of force,” the most telling sign of Russia’s new, and its “disdain for the basic princi- more confrontational strategic pos- ples of international law.” Moscow’s ture, however, has been the resump- spin doctors tend to ignore the fact tion in August of last year of “combat that the West, in turn, is repulsed by patrol” by Russian bombers in the the rollback of democracy that has vicinity of NATO airspace. Naval taken place in Russia. vessels from Russia’s Black Sea and Northern Fleets have also resumed Russia’s efforts to boost their patrol missions in international the power and reach of its waters. And the tempo of Russian military exercises has risen, with nuclear forces are of even some of the largest taking place greater significance than within the framework of the Russian- the more public displays of and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Russian rising might. Cooperation Organization. These serve as overt reminders that Russia It is clear, moreover, that the anti- seeks a return to global status. Just as Western campaign in Russia is only in importantly, they appear to be wildly its early stages, and will be raging for popular with a Russian public craving several more years to come. Its lon- a great-power role for their country.4 gevity is a reflection of the fact that In this vein, Russia’s efforts anti-Western orientation has become to boost the power and reach of its the main ideological line of the cur- nuclear forces have been less con- rent Russian regime. Moscow’s recent spicuous. But they are of even greater moves away from Western values and significance than the more public the deterioration of its cooperation displays of Russian rising might.

64 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia’s “Nuclear Renaissance”

Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Strategic Nuclear Forces were among Putin has endorsed an extensive the principal casualties of the coun- strategic rearmament plan, worth try’s imploding economy. $200 billion over the next seven years, and entailing massive, unprec- Nuclear forces are the pride edented procurement of advanced weaponry (including a new genera- of the inferiority-complex- tion of advanced ballistic missiles).5 stricken Russian military. So This expansion is already under way; the revitalization of Russia’s official defense procurement by the nuclear triad is enormously Russian state jumped from approximately $2 billion in 2000 to $7.5 bil- significant from both a practical lion in 2005 and $9.5 billion in 2006. and an ideological perspective. Nuclear Russia, This is not to say that Russia’s resurgent strategic modernization plans are Nuclear forces are the pride of without their setbacks. While the the inferiority-complex-stricken Rus- “Topol-M” has been the only strategic sian military. So the revitalization of nuclear weapon added to Russia’s arse- Russia’s nuclear triad is enormously nal since the end of the USSR, its rate significant from both a practical and of production and commissioning has an ideological perspective. Indeed, fallen substantially behind schedule. Russia’s focus on such capabilities is Indeed, the planning and construction consuming a significant part of the of Russia’s missiles was and is rather country’s defense budget, while the chaotic and jerky. The R-30 “Bulava,” conventional arsenal of the Russian or SS-NX-30, a naval version of the army remains decrepit and declin- land-based Topol-M ICBM, is expe- ing. Russia’s armed forces received riencing protracted difficulties, and just 31 T-90 tanks in 2003; by way of will not be deployed any time soon. comparison, during the same period The building of the nuclear-powered 310 such tanks were exported to submarine “Yury Dolgoruky,” the India alone.6 first boat of Russia’s new Borey 955- In contrast, tactical nuclear class strategic nuclear submarines, is weapons have received considerably also far behind schedule. more attention from the Kremlin. So Yet there is no mistaking that have Russian efforts to defeat U.S. work on these projects is more inten- missile defenses, the latter through sive than ever. Russian elites have the development of a maneuverable become fixated on U.S. plans to hypersonic missile with an unpre- deploy a third missile defense site in dictable flight trajectory (a multiple Europe, and are actively working to warhead version of Russia’s advanced counteract this development. Most “Topol” intercontinental ballistic mis- Russian specialists now concur that sile is also allegedly being developed). the European basing site will become These efforts, fueled by skyrocketing an integral part of America’s nuclear revenues from the global sale of oil capability, and therefore will pose a and natural gas, stand in stark con- direct threat to Russia’s national secu- trast to the situation that prevailed at rity. In response, Moscow has threat- the end of the 1990s, when Russia’s ened to retarget nuclear missiles on Europe, and the Russian public in

The Journal of International Security Affairs 65 Victor Mizin

general is wholeheartedly supportive much on established relations with of the Kremlin’s vocal opposition to the West, where their monies are U.S. “encirclement.” On the whole, secured and where their families the official propaganda campaign reside or vacation, to sever their links now under way against U.S. missile with American and its allies. defense is reminiscent of those of the mid-1980s, portraying belligerent Forging a new nuclear American actions as the cause of a relationship new arms race. This, then, is the current state of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, Russian officials have a tendency in which dialogue may be continuous but is mired in mistrust, suspicion to portray their shipments of and mutual recriminations. Both sophisticated weaponry and dual- countries remain locked in their Cold use items to states such as China, War military postures, and mutual India, Iran and Syria as legitimate assured destruction (MAD) continues to be an underlying premise of transactions carried out in Moscow-Washington ties. compliance with nonproliferation Should Russia’s discomfort and export control norms. But regarding its loss of military superpower status be taken into account, the rationale for these ties is not or simply ignored? How can the strictly economic. United States and Russia move from “nuclear parity” or “stability” toward a new strategic framework in which All of which is highly significant. Moscow will become a reliable ally It suggests that Russian generals still of the West? These questions will view a nuclear war with either the undoubtedly animate the next Ameri- U.S. or NATO as theoretically pos- can president’s approach to relations sible and consider the latter their with Russia. The answers may differ, main strategic adversaries. On a very depending upon the inhabitant of 1600 basic level, then, nothing has really Pennsylvania Avenue, but one thing is changed since Soviet times. clear: the United States cannot simply Luckily, the next cold war is ignore Russia. It is and remains a not quite upon us. Moscow does not major global player, by virtue of its have the necessary clout to control nuclear status, its permanent mem- its half of the world. Some national- bership in the United Nations Secu- istic impulses aside, neither does it rity Council, the sheer vastness of its now have an ideology fundamentally resources, and its remaining strate- antagonistic to the capitalist West. gic capabilities. The segment of the Russian strate- In many respects, the issue of gic arsenal still targeting the United missile defense holds a number of States and NATO has dwindled con- the answers U.S. policymakers seek. siderably over the past decade-and- At its core, Moscow’s current opposi- a-half, and will be further reduced in tion comes from the perception that the years ahead, either as a result of U.S. efforts are in essence transient, bilateral agreement or through the and reversible. Once the Kremlin simple attrition of hardware. And is finally persuaded that U.S. mis- politically, Russia’s elites depend too sile defenses are in fact inevitable,

66 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia’s “Nuclear Renaissance”

Russia—despite its objections—will to assume greater responsibility in abide by (and perhaps even partici- joint disarmament programs, and pate in) American efforts, sanction- eventually start investing substantial ing some kind of limited deployment funds of its own in such efforts. As a of strategic defenses. practical matter this means that, like Beyond this détente over missile so many other issues in contempo- defense, however, additional steps are rary Russia, the fate of disarmament needed. Nuclear weapons naturally depends directly on the status of will continue to play an essential role domestic reforms. After all, a gov- in the military doctrines and political ernment in Moscow that is commit- undertakings of both countries, as ted to pluralism and accountability well as those of other nuclear powers. is more likely to be a stable security What is needed is a new, coher- partner—including on issues of pro- ent doctrine of “collaborative, non- liferation and nuclear disarmament. provocative nuclear defense” built What is needed, therefore, are prag- around three main pillars. matic suggestions for U.S. decisionmakers about how current GP/CTR Disarmament programs—from chemical weap- There is a more or less stable ons destruction to the much-touted bipartisan consensus in the United “nuclear cities initiative”—could be States regarding the usefulness upgraded, and how new initiatives of the “Global Partnership” (GP) could be created to assist Moscow in nonproliferation initiative and its neutralizing the imminent dangers predecessor, “Cooperative Threat from its WMD–related assets and Reduction” (CTR), the so-called industries. Nunn-Lugar programs in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent Ultimately, the choice is Russia’s States. Both Congress and succes- to make. It can continue as sive presidential administrations are fully aware of the importance of the a semi-capitalist “clone” of continuation of these efforts as part of the USSR, complete with what former Defense Secretary Wil- Bolshevik-style policy patterns. liam Perry has termed “defense by other means.”7 Nevertheless, there Or it can become a “normal,” is a certain reluctance to extend the authentically democratic state scope of CTR beyond its traditional and ally of the West. bounds. And many U.S. policymakers have supported the notion that Domestic energy development such disarmament assistance should Such a revitalized nonprolif- be linked to changes in Russia’s poli- eration partnership could facilitate cies on a number of domestic and Russia’s own civilian nuclear revival. foreign policy issues. The result has Nuclear industry is one of Russia’s been inertia on a number of impor- commercial trump cards; Russia cur- tant GP/CTR projects, which have rently controls about 40 percent of fallen victim to a lack of funding and global reprocessing capacities. But political support. domestic utilization of nuclear power Under the plan envisioned by for energy generation has lagged policymakers in Washington, Russia behind the times. President Putin in the future will gradually begin

The Journal of International Security Affairs 67 Victor Mizin

is now seeking to correct this defi- liferation and export control norms. cit, launching an ambitious program But the rationale for these ties is not to raise the share of nuclear energy strictly economic. Under the ideologi- in Russian total energy consump- cal banner of “multipolarity,” Moscow tion from the current 16 percent to is promoting its own network of alli- 25 percent by 2030. The reasons are ances, for the purpose of offsetting pragmatic; by 2015, experts say, Rus- current U.S. “unilateralism” and shor- sian oil and natural gas supplies will ing up its position vis-à-vis the West. decline significantly, necessitating There is no question that this new forms of energy. To achieve this arrangement has commercial appeal goal, however, Russia must build 40 in Moscow. After all, most of the criti- additional reactors to supplement the cal WMD-linked technologies and 23 active now. And that requires from sophisticated weaponry sought after $30 to $40 billion in additional fund- by rogue states were in fact produced ing—financial assistance that could, or designed in Soviet times. The under the proper circumstances, negligible “production cost” of such come from the United States. items makes them continuously competitive on the global market.8 Thus, for comparatively minor sums, rogue What is needed is for Washington states can obtain usable Soviet-vin- to show respect for Moscow’s tage weapons—or worse. The rev- growing international clout, and enues generated as a result of such its status as an equal—or almost sales are substantial, and have led some Russian officials to conclude equal—geopolitical partner. The that trade with rogues (even at the key is persuading the increasingly risk of a major international scandal) independent-minded Kremlin is worth the risk. All of which has that acting as a “good cop” does bred a domestic climate inhospitable to U.S. nonproliferation initiatives. not automatically mean that it is Ultimately, the choice is Rus- carrying the water for Washington. sia’s to make. It can continue as a semi-capitalist “clone” of the USSR, complete with Bolshevik-style policy Nuclear transfers patterns. Or it can become a “normal,” Many of Russia’s military and for- authentically democratic state and eign policies still smack of traditional ally of the West. But the United States Soviet attitudes. This is especially can facilitate Russia’s choice by offer- evident in Moscow’s external partnering a “bailout” package of sorts to the ships. Though promoting good rela- Russian leadership—one that com- tions with Western states is vital for pensates Kremlin elites for the loss Russia’s economic interests, Moscow of their clientele in Damascus and has tended in practice to tilt toward Tehran. Such a strategy would require countries of proliferation concern. the United States to do three things: Russian officials have a tendency to portray their shipments of sophisti- 1. To actively engage Russia in polit- cated weaponry and dual-use items to ical dialogue and practical pro- states such as China, India, Iran and grams/projects to promote global Syria as legitimate transactions car- nonproliferation, specifically with ried out in compliance with nonpro- the goal of thwarting attempts of

68 The Journal of International Security Affairs Russia’s “Nuclear Renaissance”

global terrorism to gain access to among them a recognition of its the still unsecured WMD-related global importance. Because of its assets of the “post-Soviet space.” growing international stature, Russia is unlikely to be content with the 2. To promote collaboration between role of a “tutored undergraduate,” or U.S. companies and their Rus- accept any kind of financial buyout. sian/CIS partners in the defense/ Rather, America and its allies will space/high-technology sectors need to work with, and adapt to, Mos- as a way of more closely monitor- cow’s growing international pres- ing—and influencing—compli- ence. This will not be an easy thing ance with nonproliferation norms. for the West to do, because of Rus- sia’s imperial past as well as its ambi- 3. To enforce accountability on the tions for the future. But on a number Kremlin should it engage in ques- of fronts, chief among them those of tionable proliferation practices by nuclear security and strategic stabil- “naming and shaming” suspect ity, the benefits of a more pragmatic Russian entities and prosecut- approach would be substantial. ing any WMD-related assistance given to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah or rogue states like Iran and Syria. 1. See, for example, Dmitri K. Simes, “Losing Russia:The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” Learning to live Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007. with Moscow 2. Sergei Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to the As the foregoing makes clear, Future?” Russia in Global Affairs no. 4, Octo- ber-December 2007, http://eng.globalaffairs. Russia could surely play a special ru/numbers/21/1147.html. In Lavrov’s words, role in world affairs if the proper con- influential political forces on both sides of the ditions are present. What is needed Atlantic apparently want to launch a discussion is for Washington to show respect about whether or not to “contain Russia.” 3. Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Munich Confer- for Moscow’s growing international ence on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, clout, and its status as an equal—or February 10, 2007, http://www.kremlin. almost equal—geopolitical partner. ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/013 8 _ The key is persuading the increas- type82912type82914type82917type84779_ 118123.shtml. ingly independent-minded Kremlin 4. Simon Tisdall, “How Putin Could Be Head- that acting as a “good cop” does not ing for a Fall,” Guardian (London), October automatically mean that it is car- 3, 2007. rying the water for Washington. 5. Michael McFaul, “New Russia , New Threat,” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2007. Indeed, for Moscow, a more con- 6. Anatoly Tzyganok, “Gosoboronilluziya Pod- structive international stance toward menila Gosoboronpokaz (State Defense issues such as nonproliferation is Illusions Substitute for State Defense Pro- politically prudent. It has the power curement),” polit.ru, November 11, 2005, http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2005/11/11/ to mend bilateral relations soured in zakaz.html. recent months by Russia’s assertive 7. William J. Perry, “Defense in an Age of foreign policy as Washington transi- Hope,” Foreign Affairs, November/Decem- tions to a new—and potentially very ber 1996. 8. See, for example, Vitaly Shlykov, “Potemkin different—presidency. Complex,” Itogi no. 14 (Moscow), June 12, 2002. Russia would obviously expect rewards for its good behavior—chief

The Journal of International Security Affairs 69

Facing the Future

Jamie Shea

reserving international security in the 21st century is harder than it was in the 1990s. In those days, following the collapse of Pthe Berlin Wall, the international system as a whole seemed to be moving towards democracy and a free-market economy, even if it was ridiculously premature to proclaim “the end of history.” The problems which inevitably arose from time to time were not that difficult to manage. Intervening in the Balkans, for instance, was really a matter of political will. Once the NATO allies had overcome their hesi- tations about using air power against Milosevic in Bosnia and later on in Kosovo, military victories were achieved relatively quickly. In short, the NATO allies had the power to determine outcomes, even if common vision and will were often lacking. There were no major countervail- ing forces willing and able to frustrate the policy goals of the Alliance.

But the 21st century is shaping up to be very different. America and Europe’s leverage over world events is not what it used to be. Western man no longer rules the world, and the Western model is no longer seen as the only one to be followed. The United States is overburdened both economically and militarily. Europe, meanwhile, still lacks global reach, despite almost two decades of enlargement and internal political integration. The classical West still has intrinsic advantages: its creativity and power to innovate, as well as the sophistication

Jamie Shea is Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General. In that capacity, he is responsible for advising and assist- ing the Secretary General, senior NATO management, and the North Atlantic Council in addressing strategic issues facing the Alliance. He writes here in a personal capacity. Jamie Shea of its economies, financial markets security challenges rather than for and societies. But it can no longer national prestige or self-assertion. dominate through power or example There are two simple lessons that alone. At the same time, Asia is on the NATO allies need to draw from the ascent; four of the world’s top ten this unsettling new world. The first companies are now Chinese. And, is that what in the 1990s was strate- since the impact of the sub-prime gically desirable has today become a lending crisis on the Western finan- strategic imperative. NATO must be cial system, we have been only too united and stay united in pursuit of its happy to accept over $69 billion from core objectives. Unity will not always the sovereign wealth funds of China, guarantee success, but division will Japan and the Gulf States to recapital- always guarantee failure. It therefore ize our leading investment banks. is no surprise to see the United States There is no evidence that a mul- and Europe now working overtime to tipolar world has to be one of balance put a multitude of differences—over of power diplomacy and competing the Iraq war, the Middle East peace military blocs. But it would also be a process, international terrorism and mistake to rely on globalization and climate change—behind them and economic interdependence alone to reinvigorate the transatlantic relation- uphold world order and peace. His- ship. Thus, in its final months, the tory teaches us that with economic Bush administration is pursuing peace power eventually comes military in the Middle East, compromising power. This year alone, China plans to on climate change, and softening its deploy 15 rockets and launch 17 sat- stance on Iran. In return, its counter- ellites and again to send astronauts parts in Europe are gradually sending into outer space. This comes on top of more forces to Afghanistan, moving its successful test of an anti-satellite towards recognition of the indepen- weapon against an inactive meteoro- dence of Kosovo, and signaling their logical satellite last year. Russia too is readiness to contemplate additional rapidly increasing its defense spend- sanctions against Iran. These developing and fielding new generations of ments tell the story; the United States nuclear weapons. Both countries are and Europe are the closer to strategic also pursuing a more active and vis- convergence today than at any time ible naval presence beyond their ter- over the past decade. ritorial waters. We can also see other The second lesson that the emerging international actors who are NATO allies are drawing from the acquiring the technological and scien- global diffusion of power is that they tific base to project significant strate- need to have a better and clearer gic power in the 21st century. What grasp of their common priorities, and is clear is that military power is also then devote resources to meeting diffusing globally, even if it is doing them. The past few years have seen so less rapidly than economic power a large number of missions but often and individual wealth. The key chal- without either the commitment or lenge of Western diplomacy will be the resources to be successful. The to recognize the new status of these United States has committed the bulk emerging (or, perhaps more accu- of its forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, rately, re-emerging) major powers but whereas the Europeans have focused persuade them to use that military on the Balkans, Zaire or Chad, or and economic power to solve common supporting the UN in Lebanon or

72 The Journal of International Security Affairs Facing the Future in responding to calls by NATO in Europe, enlarging its membership Kosovo and Afghanistan. All these to include a number of formerly commissions assuredly have their stra- munist countries, and linking up with tegic or humanitarian justification; organizations such as the United but competing for the same scarce Nations, the African Union, the World assets, such as helicopters, transport Bank and the European Union. aircraft and engineering units, is a NATO, moreover, has recog- recipe for strategic incoherence and nized that this process of transfor- runs counter to the principle that as mation is not a one-off effort, but a power becomes scarcer, it has to be continuing process of adaptation to a used more selectively. rapidly changing environment. This said, each phase of history brings New priorities its own specific challenges, which Clearly, we are heading towards an organization like NATO needs to a multipolar world, where the West overcome if it is to be able to move on no longer holds a premium on geopo- to the next phase of its evolution suc- litical power. Less well understood is cessfully. At the moment, there are how to ensure that that world is one four specific goals for NATO that will where common problems are tackled dominate the agenda at the Alliance’s collectively, and the future of human- next summit meeting in Bucharest at ity is seen as more important than the the beginning of April. parochial interests of the nation-state. First and foremost, NATO has to Multipolarity without multilateralism get its mission in Afghanistan on the could well mean a return to the com- right track. It is the most demanding peting alliances and balance of power and ambitious that the Alliance has diplomacy of the 19th century. ever undertaken, and one which the Now more than ever, America and United States in particular is watch- Europe need an institution through ing closely. which to build a transatlantic consen- At the same time, NATO has to sus on how they are going to tackle finish the job in the Balkans. This the macro-challenges of the 21st cen- entails inviting more countries of that tury. That organization is NATO. region to join its ranks, and putting Indeed, on both sides of the Atlantic the others on the path to integration we can now see signs of efforts to into both NATO and ultimately the reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance. European Union. This issue is very This focus makes good sense; after much a holdover from the 1990s, but all, it is much easier to transform an the current tense situation in Kosovo existing organization than to invent a demonstrates the perils of NATO dis- new one. engagement and stalled integration, But NATO’s future relevance which could foster a relapse into ethnic cannot be based on the mere fact that violence and quests for partition. it exists. Institutions are not just net- Another key challenge for the works or meeting places; they have to Alliance is to embed itself firmly produce more than the sum total of into the operational structures of the their parts and find answers to press- international community, something ing challenges. This is why, over the which NATO experts call “the com- last two decades, NATO has under- prehensive approach.” In contrast to gone a major process of transforma- the Cold War, when it depended only tion, deploying its forces beyond on its own membership to maintain

The Journal of International Security Affairs 73 Jamie Shea forward defense and nuclear deter- and reconstruction will take at least rence, NATO can no longer carry out 20 years. In Afghanistan, it could its missions alone. To be sure, NATO take as long—or longer. Afghanistan can send forces to the Balkans or is also one single strategic theater, Afghanistan. But if it cannot persuade and NATO has responsibility for the United Nations or the European every part of it. Therefore all allies Union to undertake civil reconstruc- must be willing to take on all of the tion, it risks becoming bogged down jobs required, whether they involve in those places for a very long time. counterinsurgency or humanitarian So NATO has to be able to cooper- relief. At the moment, it is too easy ate closely with these other organi- for individual allies to develop their zations, and to avoid turf fights and own image of Afghanistan based on arguments over who leads. whether they have troops in a quiet Finally, an activist posture spot or in a more dangerous location. abroad depends on greater security If NATO is to be successful, it must at home. NATO cannot stay on the not only be able to generate the nec- sidelines as new threats (including essary forces to go to Afghanistan terrorism, proliferation, cybercrime but make sure that it is able to rotate and energy politics) emerge. Quite them. It is much easier for an ally simply, allied nations will not send to take on a commitment if it knows troops to the Hindu Kush if they feel that it will be replaced in six months that NATO is not doing enough to to a year by someone else and not be defend them at home. This means left stuck with a mission indefinitely. that NATO has to get back to basics Allies need also to lift the caveats on and to its core Article 5 business of the deployment of their forces, which protecting its populations. currently dictate that commanders do not have the full use and benefit A chance for renewal from even the limited number at their 2009 will mark the 60th anni- disposal. The only viable exit strat- versary of NATO, and the moment egy is a sustainable Afghan National when the new U.S. administration Army and Police able to hold the Tal- is expected to recommit to the Alli- iban at bay and provide security to ance in a ceremonial summit. But if the local population. This means that this is to be a moment which equips the European Allies need to invest NATO for the next 60 years, rather much greater resources in training than merely recalls the successes of and education, a task which currently the past, the Alliance will have had to is being performed overwhelmingly have made significant progress in the by the United States alone. four key areas identified above. How The real issue, however, concerns can this be achieved? the “comprehensive approach.” There With regard to Afghanistan, is too widespread a perception that NATO has to be clear to its publics Afghanistan is NATO’s task, and that that its commitment is long term, other international organizations can and that there is no quick fix if we follow different priorities elsewhere are to avoid a relapse of the country in the world. But soldiers are not civil into its pre-9/11 status as the world’s servants in uniform and NATO is principal terrorist training camp. not a development agency. As in the Even in more benign environments Balkans, it needs the involvement of such as the Balkans, stabilization the UN to develop the economy and

74 The Journal of International Security Affairs Facing the Future local institutions, and it needs a much Bucharest will provide major encour- larger EU element in training the agement for them to stay the course, police. The proposed appointment by notwithstanding a more assertive the UN of a new High Level Represen- Russia and even if it is difficult at tative for Afghanistan is an encourag- the moment to give a time-frame for ing sign that this message is finally when they will be able to join either getting through. Rather than follow NATO or the EU. different priorities and timelines, the Kosovo is and doubtless will international community must coor- remain a difficult issue, all the more dinate better and work as one team, so because not all NATO allies are just as our populations need to under- convinced of the wisdom of recog- stand that Afghanistan is not a “war nizing its declaration of indepen- of choice” in a faraway place but a dence. In the short run, lancing the country that is directly linked to their boil in Kosovo will produce new ten- own security. sions, not only between Serbs and Accomplishing the second task, Kosovars but also between Serbia stabilizing the Balkans, should be and many NATO countries. But the easier. If the Bucharest Summit current status quo is untenable; to agrees to extend membership invi- date, uncertainty over Kosovo’s ulti- tations to Croatia, Albania and the mate status has nurtured and sus- former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo- tained ethnic disputes throughout nia, it will be a powerful message that the region. Building a new state in the West is not suffering from enlarge- Kosovo and focusing the energies of ment fatigue, and sees enlargement Kosovars on real domestic reform as a security gain rather than a risk. rather than gaining independence Already, the prospect of a new round will need a long-term commitment. of NATO enlargement is encouraging The next challenge, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro making sure that NATO has the to ask for new forms of partnership right networks of relationships to with the Alliance. Moving the entire operate effectively, is also something region towards Euro-Atlantic integra- that should be solvable. The interna- tion is the best way to convince Serbia tional community cannot be effective that retreating into sullen national- if NATO allies speak with one voice ism over Kosovo is a political and eco- in the North Atlantic Council and nomic dead end. another in the European Union Coun- It would also be a potent signal cil. It does not make sense for 21 NATO for countries further afield, such as nations that belong to the European Ukraine and Georgia, that NATO’s Union to designate Afghanistan as a open door is truly open—something life-and-death issue for the Alliance which could help the forces of reform but then not even mention it in their maintain the upper hand in those EU Summit Declarations. This type places. Ukraine and Georgia have of “strategic schizophrenia” does not been through much domestic turbu- reflect the fact that NATO and the lence of late, but both have recently EU have complementary assets, the held elections which have restored former stronger militarily and the democratic reformist governments latter more endowed financially and that are now considering participa- in terms of civic reconstruction. tion in NATO’s Membership Action Fortunately, and despite more Plan. So an ambitious enlargement at than a few jokes in Brussels about

The Journal of International Security Affairs 75 Jamie Shea the NATO-EU relationship’s being a 15 percent of the forces deployed on “frozen conflict,” the two organiza- NATO’s missions are from partner tions do seem to be moving closer countries. They see NATO as a reli- together. The EU will shortly take able partner which offers them par- over from the UN in overseeing civil ticipation in commands and planning administration and police reform in in exchange for their contribution. At Kosovo, which will necessitate much a time when the world is fragment- closer contacts with NATO. More- ing politically, the ability of NATO over, the willingness of new French to develop these partnerships and President Nicolas Sarkozy to bring move them into a permanent relation- France closer to NATO and encour- ship based on interoperability and age a closer NATO-EU dialogue sug- common training can be a rare bridge gests that this growing proximity has builder across religious, ethnic and the potential for lasting political close- even political dividing lines. ness. What will be essential, however, The final task—the need for will be to give NATO and the EU in NATO to be rebalanced—takes us future a common base of assets, such back into difficult territory. Coun- as forces, headquarters, key enablers tries that do not feel secure at home like transport, aircraft and helicop- will be reluctant to engage their ters, and deployable civil and military troops abroad. A few years ago, personnel. Currently NATO and the many analysts believed that the only EU are duplicating each other far too purpose of NATO after the Cold War much in developing their own sepa- would be as an organizer of expedi- rate military structures—a luxury tionary missions to manage crises that the defense taxpayer should no abroad or rebuild failed states. longer be willing to accept. Living safely within their borders, The news also looks more posi- our populations did not see NATO tive on the NATO-UN front. NATO as necessary for homeland defense. and the United Nations are currently But this situation has changed dra- negotiating a declaration on coopera- matically in recent years, in the wake tion that could be ready by Bucha- of energy cut-offs and power failures rest. The UN also is increasingly in Europe, crippling cyber attacks in turning to NATO for help in Africa or Estonia, a resurgent Russia and the to handle humanitarian emergencies high visibility given to Iran’s nuclear such as after the earthquake in Paki- and missile programs. stan three years ago. Missile defense is the most As these signs suggest, the Alli- immediate issue in this regard, ance has been highly successful in given that the United States has developing a network of partnerships already entered into negotiations that now extends across the globe. with Poland and the Czech Repub- When NATO meets with its partners lic, two NATO members, about at the Bucharest Summit, the Heads deploying radar and interceptors on of State and Government of over 60 their respective territories. Initially countries and from four continents Washington had excluded the Alli- will be around the table, including ance from its direct bilateral deal- from Japan, Australia, New Zealand ings with these countries, but has and Singapore. The latter countries recently decided that NATO is its all contribute to NATO’s mission in preferred forum for taking the mis- Afghanistan; indeed, today nearly sile defense issue forward. In the end

76 The Journal of International Security Affairs Facing the Future it is better to discuss security issues Continued relevance within established structures than Whenever the issue of the rel- to invent ad hoc formats which could evance of an institution comes up, the give rise to suspicions and misun- first impulse of observers is to make derstandings. This is in and of itself comparisons with the organization’s another forceful argument in favor of immediate competitors. This is often NATO’s continuing relevance. But a false comparison; international the Alliance also needs to do more organizations have their intrinsic to recognize the future likelihood strengths and weaknesses and their of proliferation threats and reaffirm comparative advantages. That said, the indivisibility of Allied security. If relevance is not a permanent state a missile defense shield in Europe is of affairs. Nor is it preordained by not only technically feasible but also nature or politics. It derives from politically desirable, the solution whether an organization is handling has to be a NATO one covering all important business and providing Allies. At the same time, a clear mes- a concrete product that moves the sage of NATO’s renewed interest world forward. The key questions, and commitment to arms control and therefore, are as follows. First, is an offer to Russia to consult on the NATO engaged in stabilizing crucial future shape of the non-proliferation areas of strategic importance for the regime could help to lead the current security of the West? And, second, is highly sensitive political discourse it acquiring the tools that it needs to over missile defense in Europe in a do these missions successfully? positive direction. If we look at what NATO has been Of course, it is one thing to define able to achieve in the Balkans and credible policies for meeting new Afghanistan, despite the daily diffi- security challenges; it is quite another culties and occasional setbacks—and to develop the military capabilities to what it has learnt from these experi- meet those challenges. Capabilities ences—the answer to both questions are the core business of NATO, and is “yes.” To be sure, NATO has always here the Alliance will need to do a had, and will always have, its critics. better job of improving the usability But the proper method by which to of its forces for new operational com- judge NATO is on its merits, as well mitments. From common funding for as its utility. And on that score, the deployable infrastructure and com- Atlantic Alliance is unequivocally munications to greater investments moving in the right direction. in expeditionary forces, the Alliance and its members must do more. For- tunately, the case for a robust military reorganization is more salient than ever. For the foreseeable future, European countries will live with the paradox that military deployments and strategic risks are going up while their respective defense budgets remain static or even decline. As such, NATO’s value as a practical defense problem solver will be a test of its credibility.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 77

An Obsolete Alliance

E. Wayne Merry

t is axiomatic that nothing in government is so long lasting as temporary measures. Policies, programs and appropriations initi- Iated to respond to a transitory issue take on lives of their own, spawning institutions which not only outlive their purpose but themselves create new problems to justify their continued existence.

On the international stage today, the most egregious example of this principle is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An alliance created in response to the devastation of the Second World War in Europe and the onset of the Cold War is now approaching its seventh decade, two generations beyond the restoration of Europe’s economy plus a large measure of European unity and a full generation beyond Gorbachev’s acceptance of failure in the Cold War. Over the years, NATO has turned its back on its inherently defensive and conservative origins to become a shameless hustler after engagements to justify its own perpetuation. Rather than defending European territory or deterring threats to North Atlantic interests, NATO has followed with a vengeance the advice of Manfred Woerner, its Secretary General in the early 1990s, that it “must go out of area or go out of business.” A cynical American might still accept NATO as a useful complement to other international engagements, except that NATO has become a net liability to the United States and one this country need no longer sustain. NATO’s contributions to our interests are more apparent than substantive, while the costs of our transatlantic welfare program remain huge. Worst of all, NATO

E. Wayne Merry is a former State Department and Pentagon official and now a Senior Associate of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. He writes here in a personal capacity. E. Wayne Merry subordinates American power and often defers). The Alliance is, there- influence to European interests and fore, conservative in the most precise preferences under the false rubric of sense of the term: it is a mechanism for “shared values.” sharing risk. The Treaty is not expan- sive in either purpose or geographic What is an “alliance” application (so-called “out of area”). anyway? Those who want NATO to play an Any discussion of NATO should ever-increasing role as global police- begin with clarity about what it man or intervention force should, if is. NATO is an alliance, based on they are honest, seek renegotiation the Treaty of Washington of 1949. under Article XII to give the Alliance It began as an alliance should, in these additional functions and obtain response to the real and shared secu- ratification by national legislatures. rity requirements of its members, A “global NATO” without such treaty and undertook mutual obligations to revision is nothing short of a silent assure their interests. Unfortunately, political coup d’état, and a clear dem- the words “alliance” and “ally” cur- onstration that its supporters care rently are employed without preci- little about legal constraints, whether sion or even meaning. An alliance is international or American. a concrete undertaking of states in a Sadly, recent transatlantic “dia- defined context to do certain things logue” has trended in the opposite if required. The best alliances (albeit direction. NATO is now routinely not all) are codified in treaties, so portrayed as a mechanism to combat there can be reference to what its pur- global warming, for international law poses are—and are not. The Founders enforcement, as a substitute for other of the American Republic were rather international treaties (such as that on fussy in this regard, wishing to spare the nonproliferation of nuclear weap- this country the frivolous and often ons), and for a variety of humanitarian secretive deals among monarchs purposes. A case in point is a recent which engendered almost unending study by the International Institute inter-state violence in the Europe of of Strategic Studies, whose Euro- their day. The North Atlantic Treaty pean and American authors explicitly was the product of difficult and pro- advocate an almost unlimited agenda for “the transatlantic alliance.”1 The tracted negotiations (the record of which is now largely declassified) and authors use the term “alliance” inter- was subject to serious scrutiny and changeably with “partnership,” “rela- debate by the United States Senate tionship” and even “solidarity.” These before achieving ratification. are not the same thing, however, and The Washington Treaty is purely to treat them as synonymous warps defensive; nothing in it can legitimize rational policy debate. use of force other than in response to a direct attack against its members. Any war will do Article V, contrary to popular myth, Conflating the Alliance with does not even commit its members other transatlantic issues is perni- to the use of force. The Treaty is not cious, but it has deep roots. NATO a substitute for U.S. constitutional lost its basic raison d’être years ago, prerogatives, nor for the role of the as Europe’s need for American troops Security Council under the United ended long before the Cold War did. Nations Charter (to which the Treaty The European members of NATO

80 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Obsolete Alliance collectively dwarfed the Soviet Union was not endangered. Managing the and Warsaw Pact within a generation Balkan mess was therefore appropri- of the signing of the Treaty. However, ately a job for Europe, not NATO. proposals for a reduction in American The ensuing “hour of Europe” forces, such as from Senator Mike was a sad display of bickering and Mansfield in the early 1970s, elicited indecision, with poor appreciation of near-hysterical denunciations from Balkan realities and faulty application European governments which, with of force in a fraught political environ- few exceptions, had never met even ment. (Europeans who gloat over our their rather modest military obliga- mismanagement in Iraq might recall tions to the Alliance. their own in Bosnia.) However, the However, NATO really went off capacities of the European powers its rails with the Soviet collapse, which were more than adequate to the task. left it without threat or legitimate Sadly, after decades of deference purpose. Although by logic NATO to the United States on almost all should have voluntarily followed the things military, the Europeans were Warsaw Pact into history, the survival unwilling (not unable) to muster the instinct which unites amoebas and force necessary to restrain fifth-rate bureaucracies prevailed. NATO took Balkan powers. What the Europeans on a mentor role for the militaries of did want, as one of their diplomats its former adversaries, prepared to bluntly put it, was “American blood become a peacekeeping strike force, on the ground” in Yugoslavia.2 They and expanded inexorably eastward. wanted Americans to do the dirty In doing so, it exacerbated inter-state work, again. tensions with Russia, rather than ame- Supporters of NATO rejoiced liorating them. There was almost no at the opportunity to demonstrate debate as to whether the United States its continuing “relevance.” They even had a legitimate security role ignored the lack of legal authority for in post-Cold War Europe, or if it was the Alliance to intervene in Balkan not time for Europeans to reassume ethnic fighting (although some gov- responsibility for their own continent. ernments, notably that of Germany, For NATO, the collapse of Yugo- did require parliamentary approval slavia was a gift from heaven. The for their respective roles). While the largest European state which had misuse of NATO in Bosnia was bad sat on the fence during the Cold War enough, the ensuing conflict over ironically supplied the rationale for a Kosovo was much worse. An Ameri- Cold War alliance to become an inter- can president took the United States national peacemaking force, some- to war with a foreign state (Serbia) thing its founders never conceived which had not attacked or threatened and the U.S. Senate never would have us, and proclaimed legitimacy for ratified. The fighting in the western doing so not in the Constitution nor Balkans certainly challenged Europe in the United Nations Charter, both of in many ways (such as refugee flows), which do contain applicable author- but it did not threaten its security— ity, but in the North Atlantic Treaty, at least not as defined by Article V. which does not. More to the point, the Yugoslav wars The public relations rationale for did not compromise the security of NATO’s first actual use of force was the United States at all. Whatever our even more inverted than the legal humanitarian concerns, the Republic legerdemain. On both sides of the

The Journal of International Security Affairs 81 E. Wayne Merry

Atlantic, the Kosovo war was justified a national—rather than regional— as a way to preserve NATO’s “cred- basis, with vast duplication, overlap ibility.” Ponder that logic: a defensive and waste of resources. Many Euro- alliance initiates a non-defensive war pean “militaries” exist more for pres- to give itself legitimacy, or at least tige and domestic job creation than the appearance of viability. In short, for force projection. Indeed, the very NATO bombed Belgrade to show concept of projecting military force that it could bomb. The rationale remains toxic in many European for war was weakened still further countries and in almost all politi- by the scare tactics and inflation of cal parties of the left. In Germany, the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, conscription actually supplies more where brutal villains abounded young men to the national health pro- on both sides, and because NATO gram through alternative service than ignored far more pressing humani- it sends to the armed forces.3 While tarian crises elsewhere. the much-vaunted “European pillar” These precedents are frighten- of NATO can tabulate more soldiers, ing. Where, now, is the limit to what tanks and airplanes than we, the effec- may be justified under the rubric tive whole of Europe’s forces remains of NATO? What prevents a future much less than the sum of its parts. American president from initiating The American security contri- war via NATO for almost any pur- bution to Europe is not free, and the pose, anywhere? The implications for balance is clearly in Europe’s favor. our republican form of government Europe absorbs more security from are daunting. the United States than it contributes. European elites are well aware of the benefits they enjoy from NATO NATO lost its basic raison d’être and of the transfer of wealth which years ago, as Europe’s need for the American working class through American troops ended long its taxes and sons provides to the before the Cold War did. European middle and upper classes. Whenever there is American discussion of closing or reducing U.S. Allies, auxiliaries or facilities or deployments in Europe, the European reaction is negative hangers-on? and couched in terms of money, not However, critics might protest, security. The Americans provide a does not NATO greatly enhance low-cost service which frees Euro- American power in the world? Is not pean public funds for more popular NATO, as some have expressed it, a programs, such as subsidized health “toolbox” for the United States to sup- care and opera. So, when Europe- plement our own forces? The record ans acclaim the “shared values” of on both scores is decidedly mixed. NATO, it may be the value of Ameri- Europe remains a net security can manpower and defense spending consumer from America. Despite the they enjoy sharing. large forces maintained by the Euro- As there is no credible military pean states and the existence of some threat to Europe now or on the hori- excellent units, their collective secu- zon, NATO justifies itself through rity quotient is fairly modest. Euro- “out-of-area” operations, although pean militaries remain organized on the Treaty is explicitly limited to

82 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Obsolete Alliance

“the North Atlantic area.” Under the gent in many parts of the country. “NATO as toolbox” concept, Euro- This happened because the United peans should be useful auxiliaries States did not follow through on its for America’s non-European engage- initial military success, but diverted ments. However, experience shows into a “nation-building” mission of the “toolbox” is not always Washing- dubious utility. Had the United States ton’s to employ—and may not contain concentrated on its limited initial the appropriate tools anyway. goals in Afghanistan, the local popu- After all, an alliance is only as lation might reasonably have seen good as its performance in a crisis, its self-interest as linked to ours. A and NATO has shown several times prolonged occupation by foreigners, it can stymie American efforts to by its very nature, must eventually mobilize European support. Even exhaust its welcome. during the halcyon days of the Cold War, our European allies refused U.S. requests to use our NATO bases The American security or even to overfly their territory contribution to Europe is not when the issue involved the Middle free, and the balance is clearly in East (i.e., the 1973 Arab-Israeli war Europe’s favor. Europe absorbs and the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya). U.S. forces labored under allied more security from the United restrictions even on routine opera- States than it contributes. tions which might offend Europe’s southern neighbors. Nor did the Ironically, NATO participation United States receive NATO support in Afghanistan has contributed to in either Persian Gulf war, although a this failure. The offer of European number of members participated on forces encouraged American policy- a national basis. European govern- makers to turn away from the pursuit ments refused U.S. efforts to involve of al-Qaeda and its local allies—a job NATO because operations against that should have been the top prior- Iraq were not covered by the North ity of the U.S. defense establishment Atlantic Treaty. The lesson is clear: until achieved. Sadly, however, U.S. Europeans can and do say “no” when operations in Afghanistan quickly Washington wants to use NATO for assumed secondary importance to purposes they do not share. preparations for the Iraq war, and were starved of specialist personnel A model not to follow and key resources during critical Afghanistan is often portrayed months of the campaign. It is difficult as the acid test of the “new NATO,” to believe Washington would have and in perverse ways it is. Afghani- done this had it not expected NATO stan was appropriately America’s war, to pick up the slack. While European not Europe’s. We had been attacked governments certainly did not seek and pursued our attackers to their such an outcome, the practical effect refuge. Washington did not want to of NATO engagement in Afghani- remake Afghanistan, but to destroy stan was to allow the United States to al-Qaeda. Over time, however, objec- fumble in that conflict, at incalculable tives have shifted. Today, bin Laden long-term cost. and his senior associates remain at Many European units deployed liberty, while the Taliban is resur- to Afghanistan contain high-quality

The Journal of International Security Affairs 83 E. Wayne Merry

personnel who have done excellent pices. In reality, many of the deploy- (and often heroic) work. However, the ments fell short of commitments and governments which sent them were have operated under national rules of always more interested in influenc- engagement which severely restrict ing Washington than in transforming their utility on the ground. None- Afghanistan. (Whether the latter is theless, the policy was a success, in possible or even desirable is another that it is cheaper to send a few men issue entirely.) Indeed, the very invo- to Southwest Asia than to replace cation of Article V for the first time the huge American security subsidy after 9/11 was highly dubious, as of Europe. That some Europeans the Treaty obviously envisages an serve in Afghanistan with distinction attack by a state, rather than a ter- cannot obscure the ulterior motives rorist group. Many previous attacks which sent them there. on European territory by Palestin- ian groups had not provoked NATO’s Thinking the eminently retaliation on Middle Eastern coun- thinkable tries sheltering them. Nor was Article What would a post-NATO Euro- V invoked in response to IRA attacks pean security system look like? in the United Kingdom, including one Would it not revert to the endemic in 1984 which almost killed much of conflict of previous centuries with- the British government including out an American ordnungsmacht to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher enforce peace, or might it not fall prey (and the Alliance did not contemplate to Russian domination? Neither fear occupying Ireland). reflects reality. European integration, while Having encouraged and imperfect, has effectively eliminated shielded the process of armed conflict among its participants, while almost the least militarized European unity, America should power in the Western world today not now worry that Europe is is once-menacing Germany. That a unable to live in peace. How unified Germany threatens none of Europeans would then choose its neighbors and feels threatened by none of them is a great historic to transform NATO into a achievement, for which the United European regional security States can rightfully assume some system is entirely for them to credit. Whatever its shortcomings, the European Union is unlikely to collapse decide, not for us. if American uniforms were no longer on the continent. Having encouraged What made the terrorist attacks and shielded the process of European of September 2001 different for unity, America should not now worry NATO was concern by Europeans that Europe is unable to live in peace. that American attention would turn How Europeans would then choose away from them. The goal for Euro- to transform NATO into a European pean governments was to “prove” regional security system is entirely NATO’s continuing worth to increas- for them to decide, not for us. The leg- ingly skeptical Americans. The solu- atees of Talleyrand, Palmerston and tion was modest national contingents Bismarck are up to the job. in Afghanistan under NATO aus-

84 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Obsolete Alliance

The principal security con- today those have been replaced by cern for many Europeans is Russia. oil and gas. To the evident surprise Yet Russia, though in a resurgent of many Europeans, Russia’s leaders nationalist phase, is incapable of employ their limited national assets major military adventures. Behind as means of influence and geopolitics the glitter of oil and gas wealth is a rather than as strictly commercial country with 170 deaths per 100 live undertakings. This demonstrates births (the corresponding figure for only that Europeans, who often like Italy is 103/100).4 The twin crises to lecture Americans about dealing of demographics and health are the with Moscow, still see what they want central challenge for Russia in this to see in Russia. Europe will face con- century, even if its leaders have their tinuing challenges in dealing with eyes fixed on restored greatness. No Russia on energy issues, but three country can be expansionist with a realities are clear. First, NATO is of fertility rate at half of replacement, a no use in that calculus; there is noth- rapidly shrinking conscription pool ing in the Alliance arsenal that can of young men weakened by endemic affect hydrocarbon pipeline routes, childhood vitamin and calcium defi- throughput, price or availability. As ciencies, and an economy based an American labor leader once said, largely on commodity exports. It is you cannot dig coal with a bayonet. noteworthy that little of the oil and Second, Europe has none to blame gas money amassed by the Krem- but itself for its difficulties with lin in recent years has gone to the Russia. The European Union dwarfs Russian military, or is planned to. Russia by any relevant index, but can The Russian Army has not even only exercise its strategic weight if it replaced the conventional equip- does so united. This is a European, ment and munitions it expended in not a transatlantic, task that Europe Chechnya, while the planned con- must face up to. Third, global energy struction of new strategic missiles markets are changing rapidly. Russia and submarines will result in a still will decline as a petroleum exporter faster decrease of the country’s while its piped natural gas exports nuclear deterrent force than took will face real competition in price place under the tenure of Boris Yelt- and availability from liquefied gas. sin. The Russian Air Force must To be sure, Russia is and will remain worry not only about aging aircraft a problem for Europe, but not one but even more about aging pilots, of mass armies or nuclear intimida- while all the armed services con- tion. The appropriate responses to tinue to hemorrhage young officers Moscow now and for the foreseeable and officer cadets, who correctly future are political and economic, foresee a life of penury in uniform. not military. As a military power, then, Russia is in a position to saber-rattle toward its former Soviet possessions, but European purposes in NATO not much more. are clear: to subordinate To be sure, Russia does have American power and resources other instruments of national policy. to their interests and to Whereas in the late nineteenth century it was said in Russia that it had maintain a mechanism by which only two friends, its army and navy, to constrain the United States.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 85 E. Wayne Merry

The dubious value were it not so shameless. European of “values” elites do not share American values What purpose, then, does and never have. This is true of both NATO now truly serve? According the political right and left. America to its adherents, the Alliance is a represents a rejection of European mechanism for exporting democ- values, which revolve around inher- racy and a vehicle for “shared ited national identities and a social values.” The signatories of the 1949 order defined by inherited social Treaty would surely have reacted to classes. America is a created nation such rhetoric with incredulity. The (many Europeans deny we even are member states vary widely in their a nation, or could be), revering indi- forms of democracy, but all share vidual liberty and opportunity, and basic rule of law and citizen rights. rejecting class warfare as unneces- While such concepts warrant wider sary and destructive. The European application in the world, recent right always detested America as a experience casts doubt whether threat to the legitimacy of their neo- they can be successfully promul- feudal privileges and inherited status. gated at gunpoint. Modern militar- The European left dislikes the Ameri- ies are good for a number of things, can experience because it challenges but persuading other cultures to their faith in social revolution and the emulate our own is not one of them. class struggle. The popular American In any case, America’s military has notion that our country was widely commitments far beyond its reduced admired in Europe in the past is false. force structure. If this country is to Europeans as individuals have often have armed forces able to fight and done so, and many have chosen to win our wars (which inevitably will join us. But Europe as a whole, and come again), we need to let them elites especially, long disliked and concentrate on that ultimate task. feared America as inimical to their own way of life and their centrality in world affairs. Europeans embraced Whether superpower or America when they needed us, not hyperpower, the United States to emulate us. That many Europeans does not possess limitless power. today, especially among the best- educated, define themselves in anti- We need not maintain a foreign American terms is a reversion to an obligation just because we did so historic norm, rather than a depar- in a very different past. ture from it. NATO was a continuation of European rhetoric about “values” Europe’s need for American power to to justify NATO plays on enduring prevent its own systemic collapse. In American gullibility. The underlying two World Wars (both of European message is “you should support and origin) and the Cold War (the product subsidize our security, doing tasks of European ideologies), Europe could we are quite capable of if we chose to not bring order out of chaos without spend the resources, because thereby imported power. Europeans sought to we together are spreading American harness American resources to serve ‘values’ around the world.” One could European interests. In the First World admire the cleverness of this gambit War, French and British military and political leaders planned to use our

86 The Journal of International Security Affairs An Obsolete Alliance troops in their own force structures bilities. Any reasonable assessment and were genuinely shocked when of the century ahead indicates our informed the Americans intended to future is more likely to be linked with fight under their own flag and com- the emerging destinies of Asia than mand. European leaders in both wars of Europe. It is noteworthy that our conceived of the United States as image is significantly more favor- comparable to their own colonies and able in most Asian societies than in dominions, albeit larger and richer. European ones; there is a basic affin- For them, America was an exten- ity between Asian countries and our sion of Europe and a replacement own, if we can recognize it. Even for deficits of European manpower the American demographic is shift- and money. Despite greatly altered ing away from European origins at a circumstances, this basic perception rapid pace, making America increas- remains: America is (or should be) ing a global nation of nations. Euro- essentially European and the servant peans hate this trend, for it foretells of Europe. Americans see their coun- an America that will cease to feel the try and themselves in quite different historical European affinities from terms, however. Certainly, the United which they profit so much. States has been a European power for most of the past century, but it is not Security is the most a European country, society or culture. America is not European, and fundamental aspect of public there the “shared values” rationale affairs, and European unity for NATO dies. can never become fully mature until Europeans An America able to say “No” provide it for themselves. European purposes in NATO NATO is not a vehicle for are clear: to subordinate American European security integration; power and resources to their inter- it is an impediment to it. ests and to maintain a mechanism by which to constrain the United States. Whether a European policy The transatlantic relationship judgment may be wise in any par- (“relationship,” not “alliance”) will ticular case is largely irrelevant. The doubtless remain of immense impor- subordination of American policy is tance to the United States. Europe and a clear infringement of our national North America are linked by a dense sovereignty and freedom of policy web of economic and other ties which choice. If our policies are ill con- remain robust and are likely to thrive ceived or executed, it is our respon- for generations to come. Together sibility to rectify them, rather than we constitute something like half to surrender our judgment to that of the global economy and most of the Europe, whose historical record is developed world. However, economic hardly one that bears emulation. relationships do not require military Europe today is inward-looking ties to flourish. To believe they do is and regional in ambition, while the Cold War thinking, not supported by United States (for better or worse) either American or European history. has global interests and responsi- No other country defines its external economics as inexorably linked

The Journal of International Security Affairs 87 E. Wayne Merry to military deployments and alliance can never become fully mature until obligations. America need not and Europeans provide it for themselves. should not do so. NATO is not a vehicle for European Whether superpower or hyper- security integration; it is an impedi- power, the United States does not ment to it. possess limitless power. We need America remains the global not maintain a foreign obligation leader in many fields including mili- just because we did so in a very dif- tary power, but that is a national asset ferent past. It is often noted that better husbanded than expended. America possesses much more of Our armed forces need replenish- the world’s wealth than our share ment and a wiser choice of commit- of its population, but rarely is the ments. European security is one liability side of the ledger shown. military burden America can and Today, the asymmetry of America’s should lay down. global security obligations in comparison with those of other centers of wealth and power is striking. Our commitments are excessive, both when gauged against our capacities and the benefits accrued to the 1. Dana H. Allin et al., “Repairing the Damage: Republic. Obviously, some global Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Con- burdens come with a global role, sensus,” International Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper no. 389, October 2007. but there must be reasonable limits 2. Private conversation with the author, 1996. based on a sober assessment of 3. See, for example, “Defense Econom- national interest and of the capaci- ics Reform IV: Budgets and Expenditure ties of other countries. Choices in the Post Cold War,” Conference sponsored by the Conference Center of the After almost a century of carry- George C. Marshall European Center for ing Europe’s water, it is time to stop. Security Studies and the NATO Econom- The Washington Treaty obligated this ics Directorate; Wildbad Kreuth, Germany; country to NATO for 20 years (Article September 15-18, 2002. 4. M. G. Field, “The Health Crisis in the Former XIII); thus, for almost four decades Soviet Union: A Report from the ‘Post War’ our role has exceeded our commit- Zone,” Social Science and Medicine 41, no. 11 ment. Europe is more than capable of (1995), 1469-1478. looking out for itself and maintaining security in surrounding areas, including the Mediterranean and Black Seas plus much of Africa. Europe has the institutions, talent, technology and finances to manage the security of its corner of the planet. If (as seems likely) Europe does not choose to play a broader global security role, that is probably just as well. A provin- cial Europe is not a bad thing. What is not sustainable is that a restored Europe should remain a security pro- tectorate of the United States. Secu- rity is the most fundamental aspect of public affairs, and European unity

88 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective

“Tough Choices Ahead”: An Interview with J. D. Crouch II

r. J. D. Crouch II served from January 2005 to May 2007 as Deputy National Security Advisor to President George W. DBush. Before that, Dr. Crouch served as the U.S. Ambassa- dor to Romania, where he worked to expand democracy in Eastern Europe, increase cooperation between the United States and Roma- nia in the global war on terror, and foster Romania’s incorporation into Western security institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Earlier, from August 2001 through October 2003, Dr. Crouch served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

On February 2, 2008, he spoke with Journal associate editor Jim Colbert about missile defense, the challenge of Russia and the future of U.S. policy toward Iran.

One of the Bush administration’s most significant achievements since taking office in 2001 has been to move the United States closer to being defended from ballistic missile attack. You were one of the principal architects of the administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001, and of the capabilities that the United States has begun to put into place since then. What do you see as the major missile defense milestones of the past seven years?

Obviously, the most important thing was to move beyond the Treaty, and to do so in a way that did not create a crisis in our relationship with Russia. That was effectively achieved, if you look at the date of the withdrawal announcement and the subsequent announcement by President Putin that, while they were not happy with it, they were going to continue to reduce their nuclear forces. This gave lie to the argument that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would return us Perspective to an arms race situation with the Russians, and took a lot of potential political sting out of the decision, both here and abroad. Most importantly, it liberated the engineers and scientists who had been working on missile defense under the ABM Treaty from having to work around its various restrictions—some of them clearly articulated, some of them ambiguously so. That lifting of constraints has enabled us to do things in a rational way and increase the effectiveness of our defenses. Another major accomplishment was the decision to begin a deployment of initial capabilities. The most significant aspect was that it forced the United States to think through the command and control arrangements for missile defense, and to begin to get the military involved in the operational aspects. It conceptually broke through the barrier that we had on strategic missile defense; until then, it was essentially a research and development program, and therefore not really taken very seriously within the uniformed military. The assigning of Strategic Command to the overall missile defense mission, and its integration into the mission sets for Northern Command and Pacific Command, were all important developments. These efforts have been quite controversial. In particular, the administration’s recent attempts to enlist Poland and the Czech Republic as partners in a European basing site have become the subject of considerable debate abroad—including within the European Union. How important is European participation to American missile defense efforts? The so-called “third site” envisions the placement of a small number of interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. These could be used to protect the United States from potential ICBM-range systems, particularly those emanating out of Iran. But it also would be able to protect Europe from ICBM-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems emanating either from Iran or other sources, although not Russia. From a strategic standpoint, this closes a gap in our coverage, and begins to provide the West with some leverage over Iranian missile systems, which continue to be fielded and tested. So, from a technical standpoint, as well as a strategic/military standpoint, it has value. But it is, again, a very modest deployment, and certainly not something that is capable of threatening the Russian Federation, nor should it be viewed as such. Despite the rhetoric out of Moscow these days, this is not a system that would have any capability against their strategic deterrent. At the political level, it is quite important that the United States be seen as being deeply involved with—and able to be an ally of choice for—European nations. Right now, the Iranian ballistic missile threat may seem theoretical to Europeans. But if, in fact, the day comes when the development of the follow- on “Shihab” systems puts European capitals under threat, the situation would likely be very different. One can imagine a very stressful situation if Iran were able to directly threaten America’s closest allies, and the United States would either not be able to defend them or only able to threaten retaliation. Now that the “third site” has been announced, it is critical that the United States go forward with it. A lot of our European allies who have spoken out in favor of the deployment are expecting us to. But the controversy is there; it is there principally because the Russians have seen an opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and our allies. Unfortunately that resonates with some in Europe, particularly in a post-Iraq environment.

90 The Journal of International Security Affairs Perspective

You mentioned Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned the Bush administration’s plans and taken a number of confrontational strategic steps in response, including withdrawing Russia from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty last year. Is a modus vivendi with the Kremlin on missile defense really possible?

The Russians are going to act in their own interest. That means there are areas where we can cooperate with Moscow, and where we in fact are cooperat- ing. But there are also areas where we are not going to be able to cooperate. For example, the Russians have pegged their decision on the CFE Treaty to the “third site.” Yet if somehow that were to go away, the Russians would not, in fact, reverse their decision. They had been complaining to us about CFE Treaty limitations long before there was any decision to deploy a “third site.” Indeed, the Russians have not been in compliance with that agreement for years. Their withdrawal, therefore, is in fact a de jure representation of what they had been applying de facto for the past decade, back into the Clinton administration. While there may be political cover for the Kremlin to argue it is withdrawing from the CFE Treaty or taking other sorts of actions as a result of missile defense, the reality is that Moscow sees the deployment as an opportunity to drive a wedge between us and our allies. As long as they see it that way, there is very little prospect of cooperation on missile defense. The United States has offered extensive cooperation with the Russians in a wide variety of different areas relating to missile defense. We have tried to put every possible hors d’oeuvre on the table, just to see what Moscow might be interested in. There are probably some in Russia, perhaps in their military-industrial complex, who are interested in the technical aspects of such cooperation. But the overriding political imperative not to cooperate with the United States on strategic missile defense seems to have won the day, and probably will continue for as long as President Putin and his hand-picked successors are in power.

Speaking of Russia, it is no secret that relations between Moscow and Washington have grown increasingly frosty over the past two years. U.S. officials have repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the growing authoritarianism of the Putin government, as well as its neo-imperialist impulses toward the countries of Eastern Europe and the “post-Soviet space.” What changes do you see taking place in Russian foreign policy, and what challenges do they pose for the United States in the years ahead?

What we are seeing is not so much a change in Russian policy as its enable- ment as a result of Russia’s return to the status of a fairly wealthy country. I am not of the view that Russia is going to try to recreate the Soviet Union. But the jury is out on that, and we will have to see what direction Moscow finally takes. There’s probably a position somewhere in the Russian political spectrum that would like to do that. The current group in power is not quite that ambitious, however. What they are trying to do is to ensure that they blunt any further NATO expansion, weaken the Atlantic Alliance by driving wedges between the United States and our European allies—and among them, as they have successfully done between Eastern Europe and Central and Western Europe. We will no doubt continue to see that kind of activity. But this is not a return to the Cold War. Russian policy does not have the ideological component that it did during the Cold War. It does, however, have its own set of challenges and dangers that we are going to have to manage.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 91 Perspective

It is a key reason why the United States has to stay engaged in Europe, stay engaged in NATO, and continue to develop the political, diplomatic and military capabilities to remain the ally of choice. Moving forward on the “third site” is an important element of that.

Finally, Iran. The new National Intelligence Estimate(NIE) on Iran issued by the U.S. intelligence community this past December—with its key judgment that Iran halted its work on nuclear weapons development in 2003—has ignited a heated debate at home and abroad about Iranian capabilities and intentions. Can you put the NIE in strategic context?

If you look closely at the Iran NIE, what it really says is that there are three major aspects to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. One of those was the weapon design capability, which the drafters claim to have evidence was frozen at some point in 2003. But they do not say at what state weapons design was frozen, whether we would know if it were unfrozen, or how long it would take if it were unfrozen to complete the work. They also go on to say that the crucial piece that the Bush administration has been worried about, the so-called “long pole of the tent” in developing nuclear weapons—that is, the capability to create fissile material either through uranium enrichment or through the creation of pluto- nium—continues, and probably will be expanded. In other words, the thing we worry about most, and the thing that is the hardest to do in the development of nuclear weapons, is continuing. The third thing we are seeing the Iranians continue to develop is delivery systems—particularly missile systems—for these capabilities. So the NIE leaves a lot of questions unanswered. However, the administration’s concerns about Iran are not just related to its development of nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime—as distinct from the Iranian people—is a key enabler of terrorism throughout the Middle East. This includes suborning democracy in Lebanon through its Syrian allies. They have been supporting destabilizing terrorist activities in Iraq, which have helped fuel the cycle of sectarian violence there. And they have been the principal supporter in recent years of obstructionist elements that try to keep a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement from emerging. So there are lots of reasons to be concerned about the authoritarian and expansionist ideology of Iran. You mate that up with the potential to have a nuclear weapon, and it is clear why the concern is there.

Nevertheless, post-NIE, the White House will be waging an uphill battle in crafting a comprehensive, multilateral approach to Iran. What is the Bush administration’s strategy likely to be in the months ahead, and what role does Europe play in it?

Clearly, the political fallout from the NIE is going to make it more difficult to hold together any anti-Iran coalition. You are going to continue to see the U.S. trying to work with our European partners on Iran, but it is going to be in a more difficult context. It is going to be more difficult for the IAEA to be a willing and helpful player in this context as well. But it was going to be hard anyway; several resolutions have increased sanctions on Iran, yet these do not seem to have worked. There are some pretty tough choices ahead, in other words, either for this administration or the next one.

92 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation C. Uday Bhaskar

NEW DELHI—The proposed civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States is now some 32 months old. Since it was first floated by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, it has roiled Indian politics in an unprecedented manner, becoming a lightning rod for opposition parties to give voice to their views about the United States, nuclear weapons and Indian foreign policy. At one point in late 2007, it seemed as if the Congress-led UPA (United Pro- gressive Alliance) coalition government in New Delhi might even fall, with Left parties threatening to pull out over the “operationalization” of the deal. As of this writing, the nuke deal hangs on by a slender thread. Indian officials remain committed to the agreement, but are quick to point out the difficulties associated with it. “No, I have not given up,” Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee told a reporter in January. “We are working on how we can proceed… of course time is running out… but one cannot help it. Either you lose majority (by going ahead with the deal)… and if a government loses majority, nobody is going to have an arrangement with a minority government.” Therein lies the crux of the current problem. The two communist parties in India are vital for the UPA coalition in the Indian parliament’s 543-member Lok Sabha (Lower House). In the May 2004 elections, Congress won just 145 seats, while its main rival, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) obtained 138 and the two communist parties secured a combined 53 seats. Logically, therefore, Congress has been forced into an uneasy political partnership of necessity. The inherent ideological tensions in this alliance came to the fore when the nuclear deal began to gain traction. The agreement is radical and innovative; it

C. Uday Bhaskar is the former Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. In 2005-2006, he served on the Government of India’s Task Force on Global Strategic Developments. Dispatches seeks to revive the long-estranged bilateral relationship between India and the United States by transforming the central bone of contention between them—the nuclear nettle—into an area of potential cooperation. As part of the deal, India would be accorded exceptional international status, staying outside the NPT and retaining a modest nuclear weapons program, even as some of its nuclear facilities were brought under IAEA safeguards. In return, the U.S. would facilitate India’s admittance into the global civilian nuclear loop. This was as “win-win” as it could possibly get for the U.S, for India, and for global nuclear security. But in order for the arrangement to be realized, many complex steps had to be taken—beginning with a change to existing U.S. law that prohibited any nuclear commerce with India. This was perceived to be a nearly impossible task, given the strong non-proliferation constituency within the United States. But the Bush visit to New Delhi in March 2006 provided the necessary political push, leading to the passage of the Hyde Act nine months later. The next step was the mutually acceptable conclusion of a “123” agreement between the two countries. Again, domestic critics on both sides felt that this was not possible. But in a highly commendable, albeit protracted, set of negotiations, officials from both sides were able to come to terms on such a deal. When the draft text was formally announced, the political opposition in India became more strident. While the text of the 123 agreement was fair to both sides, the BJP and Left parties took strong exception to certain provisions, including those that established penalties on India for future nuclear testing, and the implication that an important secondary goal of the deal was about “containing” China. The BJP concerns have been curious. In its day, the NDA government—of which the BJP was a major part—had carried out the May 1998 nuclear tests while simultaneously improving relations with the U.S. The result was a ground- breaking new bilateral strategic dialogue called the NSSP (Next Steps in Stra- tegic Partnership). But now, with the Congress-led UPA having negotiated the best possible deal to end India’s nuclear and technological isolation, the BJP has changed its tune. Its objection is ostensibly about forfeiting India’s right to test again and the constriction of India’s strategic autonomy—neither of which is valid from an objective standpoint. For their part, India’s two communist parties—while formally part of the UPA coalition—have used the same arguments, and added a new one: that the deal would lead to a growing proximity to the “imperial” power, the U.S. Such a state of affairs is at complete variance with the political ideology of the Left, which prefers a closer relationship with Iran and China over a rapprochement with America. Here, the political orientation appears reminiscent of the decades of the Cold War, with the Indian Left firmly anti-American and pro-Chinese in its ideological orientation. What is clear is that the principal opposition to the realization of the nuclear deal stems from the inflexible position adopted by two of India’s major political parties in recent months. Their intransigence has everything to do with their respective political differences with the Congress party. Yet there is still reason for cautious optimism. Indian public opinion in the main is supportive of improved ties with the U.S. And, at the end of the day, there is hope that this may compel India’s bitter political rivals to establish some sort of modus vivendi.

94 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

Downing Street Blues Michael Gove

LONDON—Normally, when politicians make predictions, events conspire to make them look foolish. But there was one forecast from a politician in 2007 which has been uncannily accurate. Presciently, precisely and painfully so. Interviewed on the BBC at the beginning of last year, British minister David Miliband reflected on the unpopularity of the then Prime Minister, and tried to suggest that unpopularity was just a feature of incumbency. In a year, he predicted, people would be saying, “Wouldn’t it be great to have that Blair back because we can’t stand that Gordon Brown.” Less than a year later, Miliband is Foreign Secretary, sitting at Gordon Brown’s right hand, and both find their government mired in unpopularity, barely at the level in the opinion polls which marked Blair’s nadir. And what makes their position all the more tragically ironic is the casual assumption, previously held by so many in their party, that a simple change in personnel at the top and a new direction in foreign policy would be the basis for a political revival. In the waning days of Blair’s term, the standard view on the Left chalked Labour’s unpopularity up to his support for the Iraq war. And the breaking point for many in the party, when they began openly to agitate for Blair’s removal, came when he showed sympathy for Israel when it was attacked by Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. Blair’s fall is thus seen as intimately linked with his positioning on foreign affairs. And the expectation within the Labour party and the broader Left was that Gordon Brown would win back popularity by charting a different course. Brown, for his part, has responded to this trend. From the moment he took over, he sought to signal a different direction in foreign policy, one which explicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the criticism of Blair from the Left. So Mark Malloch Brown, a United Nations functionary who had been sharply critical of Blair over Iraq and Lebanon, was made a Foreign Office minister. His new Cabinet colleague Douglas Alexander, freshly appointed to the post of International Development Secretary, flew to Washington to give a speech in which he was critical of using “military might” rather than alliances as a measure of achievement. The speech was interpreted, understandably, as a further distancing of the new Brown team from the Bush doctrine. True, Brown panicked when the speech was reported in particularly negative terms, and authorized a briefing in which Alexander was slapped down. But Alexander was only reflecting Brown’s own inner instincts, as the world saw later when Brown himself visited the U.S. for his first summit meeting with Presi- dent Bush. In place of the personal warmth of the Bush-Blair relationship, the new British premier opted for a rigidly impersonal approach. This passionless

Michael Gove is a member of the UK Shadow Cabinet and a columnist for the Times of London. He is the author, most recently, of Celsius 7/7: How the West’s Policy of Appeasement Has Provoked Yet More Fundamentalist Terror—And What Has to Be Done Now (Phoenix Press, 2006).

The Journal of International Security Affairs 95 Dispatches take on the “special relationship” was supposed to signal to the British Left that Brown shared their distaste for the cowboy in the White House, while also reas- suring middle England that he nevertheless knew how to maintain a function- ing working relationship with the world’s largest power. But the impression left in most people’s eyes was of a man who, having coveted leadership all his life, now seemed incapable of giving a lead. Whereas Blair’s Atlanticism was born from conviction, Brown’s seemed wholly shaped by calculation. And it is calculation, of a peculiarly inept kind as it happens, which has marked all of Brown’s other foreign policy positions. On Iraq, his principal aim has been to signal to domestic opinion his willingness to bring troops home as quickly as possible. So anxious was Brown to communicate that message that he tried to overshadow the Conservative Party Conference by making an announcement on troop reductions, only for subsequent analysis to show he had misled the public about the real level of withdrawal to take place. Because Brown has been so fixated on the electoral front, he has failed to effectively articulate the importance of Iraq to the broader war against Islamist terror. And, by making his sole metric of success the speed with which he can draw down troops, an unflattering comparison can be drawn with the series of successes, in reducing casualties and containing al-Qaeda, secured by the U.S. “surge.” On the other principal front of the War on Terror, Afghanistan, he has been scarcely more impressive. Just before Parliament broke for the Christ- mas recess, Brown’s team suggested that he would be willing to “talk to the Taliban.” But when Brown actually made his statement to the House of Com- mons, no such offer of negotiation was made. Presumably, Brown had been told in the interim that going public with a desire to talk peace, while British troops were in the midst of intense warfighting, would only signal to the Tal- iban a fatal lack of resolve at a crucial time. Nevertheless, press reports at the end of 2007 claimed British officials are already negotiating with the Taliban. If correct, this would cast doubt not only on the prime minister’s trustworthi- ness, but on his judgment. The West’s enemies have developed a sophisticated understanding of when, and how, leaders lack the resolution for the long struggle against jihadist violence. And it is striking, in that respect, how poorly Brown compares with his predecessor in his understanding of how to show steel in response. Whereas Blair understood, and explained clearly in his speeches, the ideological roots of Islamism, Brown has never given a proper explanation—of the kind his office demands—of the nature of the jihadist threat. This is true even though, after terrorist attacks were thwarted during his first weeks in office, Brown had the perfect platform to outline the totalitarian nature of the ideology, which can make killers out of doctors. He chose, however, to retreat behind tired old boilerplate. Indeed, in a perverse sense, the policy positions adopted by the Brown government may be furthering jihadi interests. Brown argues consistently that it is through addressing material poverty that terrorism can be beaten. Addressing global poverty is indeed an urgent issue. But Brown’s analysis risks playing into the jihadist narrative that their cause is sustained by global injustice. Given how far Brown has traveled from the Blair position on foreign affairs, and done so with such little electoral benefit to show for it, perhaps it is worth

96 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches reassessing the Blair legacy. Rather than failing abroad, perhaps it is the failure of the Labour government to keep Britain competitive, the books balanced and the public services improving which has led to unpopularity at the polls. And while Blair was leading on foreign policy over the last few years, was it not the brooding figure in the Treasury, Brown himself, who was happy to style himself “domestic overlord”? Gordon Brown may soon find, therefore, that the record which finally sinks Labour is not his predecessor’s, but his own.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 97 Dispatches

Winds of Change Joel D. Rayburn

BAGHDAD—Most change in Iraq is incremental. For those of us working here in Baghdad, engrossed in the day-to-day details of a particular portfolio, change doesn’t really register until we step back and mark where we are against where we began. My own frame of reference dates from December 2006, when I first visited Baghdad just a few weeks before the President announced the decision to “surge” U.S. forces into Iraq to deal with a security situation that was spin- ning out of control. Baghdad was on the verge of a sectarian civil war that Iraqi politicians seemed powerless or unwilling to halt, while Anbar province was in the grasp of a potent insurgency. The mood at MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy was bleak, and a sense of resignation prevailed among the strategists and staff. Against this backdrop, the current situation in Iraq seems remarkable. The past year has seen a dramatic improvement in Iraq’s security: deaths among Iraqi civilians and Coalition troops last month were about 80 percent lower than in December 2006. Notably, the situation has improved the most in the areas that were worst in December 2006. The formerly hellish Anbar province now sees fewer than two attacks of all kinds on any given day, while Baghdad, where Coalition troops and Iraqi forces once discovered dozens of corpses each morn- ing, now sees fewer than a half dozen successful attacks on an average day. This reduction in violence has allowed a return to something approximating normal life and routine commerce. For Iraqis, Baghdad and Anbar no longer feel like war zones, and simple survival is no longer the order of the day. The Coalition, meanwhile, now tackles problems with an energy that was missing in late 2006. No single factor explains these changes. The Coalition, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi people, and the enemy all played a part. The arrival of 30,000 additional U.S. troops in Iraq during the first half of 2007 was absolutely critical to the reduction in violence. Even more important, though, was that Coalition leaders chose to employ them, and all of our forces, differently: rather than concentrating on large bases, our troops moved into Iraq’s neighborhoods and stayed there in order to secure the population for the first time since this war began. Meanwhile, once the final “surge” brigade arrived last June, Coalition and Iraqi troops launched a campaign to seize al- Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI’s) sanctuaries ringing the city of Baghdad. The months since have seen al-Qaeda brought under unceasing pressure in these areas, some of which had not been patrolled by Coalition or Iraqi forces for several years. Since the “surge” truly got under way last summer, AQI’s leadership cadre has been pushed further and further from the capital, its strategy derailed. We should also remember that the “surge” was not just a Coalition affair: the Iraqi government deployed an additional 100,000 soldiers and police in 2007.

Maj. Joel D. Rayburn is an analyst for the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I). None of the views expressed herein represent those of the Department of Defense or any of its offices or agencies.

98 The Journal of International Security Affairs Dispatches

This has made a huge difference on the battlefield, and the Iraqi security forces will grow even further in size and capability over the coming year. In southern Iraq in particular, the growth of the Iraqi Army and police is enabling the Iraqi government to assert increasing control in key cities that have long been under the sway of militias. Perhaps the most significant development of the past year, however, is that the Iraqi people collectively rejected the extremist groups that brought the country to the brink of civil war. Repulsed by AQI’s brutal tactics and nihilism, Sunni Arabs turned against al-Qaeda in large numbers, forming local volunteer groups that are now working with Coalition and Iraqi forces to deny AQI the sanctuaries it requires to operate. After a rampage of almost five years, al- Qaeda has discovered it cannot resist the phenomenon of local people helping to establish and maintain their communities’ security. At the same time, Shi’a Arabs throughout Iraq were repulsed by the thug- gery of Shi’a extremists operating under the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) banner. In a seminal moment last August, elements of JAM attacked government forces standing guard over a religious festival in the holy city of Karbala. Publicly shamed by this outrage, Moqtada al-Sadr ordered a “freeze” on JAM activities that has continued to this day, and which has helped to greatly reduce attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces. None of this means that the war is over yet. The progress we’ve seen is not irreversible. A still-dangerous al-Qaeda in Iraq is desperately attempting to reestablish a base in northern Iraq, and this means there is hard fighting ahead for the Coalition and the Iraqi government. Similarly, Shi’a extremists continue to target Iraqi government leaders and officials in an effort to dominate the Iraqi state, and they must be dealt with if Iraqis are to have a real chance at living under the rule of law. The coming campaign against these threats will have a great bearing on whether the Coalition is able to further reduce its presence in Iraq beyond the already-planned reduction of the five “surge” brigades. Perhaps the best hope for Iraq is that the Iraqi people seem to have made a psychological shift. Weary of war, they grab hold of any opportunity to assert Iraqi unity, such as the Iraqi soccer team winning the Asia Cup, or people cel- ebrating Ramadan in the streets without fear of car bombs for the first time in years. Now the Iraqis look to their government to do its part by translating what has happened in Iraq’s neighborhoods into political reconciliation at the national level. We in the Coalition look for the same, and we use every tool at our disposal to encourage, cajole, and warn our Iraqi partners to change the old zero-sum Iraqi political culture. But a national compact is not going to materialize over- night. Five years of experience in Iraq instructs us that the Iraqis will need our sustained commitment to get where we want them to go. Remember: most change in Iraq is incremental.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 99

Book Reviews

Looking Back to Look Forward Asaf Romirowsky

Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and ship with the Middle East since the Fantasy: America in the Middle American Founding. In the process, it East: 1776 to the Present (New systematically and effectively demol- York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 672 pp. ishes the myth that U.S. involvement in the Middle East is a modern phenomenon. Instead, as Oren illustrates, The enormity of September 11th, the the entanglements of the Middle East massive scale of destruction and loss stretch as far back as the Barbary brought about by calculated suicide Wars of the early Republic. hijacking and a desire to kill for the From then through the current sake of killing, forced America to quandary in Iraq, Oren argues, three open its eyes and take a closer look at themes have dominated every Ameri- the Middle East. More than any other can encounter with the Middle East. single event over the past few decades, The first is “power,” defined by Oren as 9/11 has been responsible for generat- military force and economic influence. ing questions about the nature of U.S. The second is “faith,” and the clash involvement in the region. between a deeply Protestant Republic That involvement is anything and the Muslim Middle East. The last but new. Michael Oren’s latest book, is “fantasy”: the misperceptions and Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America deceptions about the region that have in the Middle East: 1776 to the Pres- inspired so many Americans, from ent, delves into America’s relation- businessmen to presidents.

Asaf Romirowsky is the Manager of Israel & Middle East Affairs for the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia, and an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum. Book Reviews

Some may be skeptical of this the Iraq Petroleum Company, mark- triumvirate. But those that are face ing a turning point for American the daunting task of finding another business in the region. Some eight unifying theory for America’s decades later, U.S. involvement in involvement in the region. After all, the Middle East has come to revolve the U.S. consistently has provided ever more closely around this most the Middle East with advanced tech- precious of commodities. nology, democracy or mediation for Over the years, the fantasy peace, and supported a Jewish state notion of the Middle East as the as something that is both desirable romantic culture of veils and flying and sustainable. carpets became so ingrained in There are some foreign policy American pop culture, fashioned minimalists who would like to believe by stories like A Thousand and that hatred towards America, as One Arabian Nights and Holly- well as American involvement in the wood blockbusters such as “Indi- Middle East, began when George W. ana Jones” and “Hidalgo.” But, as Bush came to office, and that it will Oren explains, this fascination depart with him. Nothing could be is hardly new. It has been over further from the truth. Thanks to a century since the Middle East Oren’s research, we learn that the made Mark Twain famous when notion of American support for the his collected dispatches from the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine Holy Land, The Innocents Abroad, was already being discussed in 1844, became the biggest bestseller in put forth in a best-selling book enti- America in the late 1800s. “It sold tled Visions of the Valley that called more books than the Bible,” Twain for the United States to spearhead characteristically quipped. an international effort to establish a The United States emerged as modern Judean state. The book was a force to be reckoned with in the authored by one Professor George Middle East during the early twen- Bush, a direct ancestor of two later tieth century. But, says Oren, the American presidents bearing the three lenses—power, faith and fan- same name. This sentiment was also tasy—continued to apply. According reiterated by Abraham Lincoln, who to him, Woodrow Wilson’s ambiva- in his day said that “restoring the Jews lent reply to Arab and Zionist calls for to their national home in Palestine... self-determination after World War I, is a noble dream and one shared by Harry Truman’s rapid recognition of many Americans.” Thus, support for Israel three decades later, and every a Jewish homeland represents one of American reaction to a predicament the basic—and most enduring—ele- in the Middle East, from Suez in 1956, ments of America’s engagement with the 1967 Six-Day War to the Islamic the region. mayhem in Iran in 1979, were all Others highlight the 1920s, viewed through one of these prisms. when the American people became This history matters a great deal. enamored with oil and demanded In order for America to become a equal access to this precious com- better and more effective actor in the modity in the Middle East, then con- Middle East, it needs to understand trolled by the French and British. how the region has played a definitive Consequently, the U.S. government role in shaping American identity. obtained a 23.75 percent share in The creation of the U.S. Constitution,

102 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews the making of the U.S. Navy, and the composition of the Star Spangled Banner all bear the indelible mark of America’s encounter with the Middle East. And today, in the era of global terrorism and America’s response to it, our ties to the region will only continue to increase. As such, Oren’s is an indispensable work, one that brings vital historical understanding to how Washington interacts with that most turbulent of regions—and provides insight into how to establish a more stable and durable U.S.-Middle East relationship.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 103 Book Reviews

Turf War Ilan Berman

Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How explains. “The two sects parted ways Conflicts within Islam Will Shape early in Muslim history, and each the Future (New York: W. W. views itself as the original orthodoxy.” Norton & Company, 2007), 287 pp. The resulting bloody rivalry has shaped centuries of Muslim politics from Asia to the Levant. It has been nearly five years since But The Shia Revival is intended to President George W. Bush stood on be much more than simply a reference the deck of the USS Abraham Lin- work—and therein lies the problem. coln and announced the end of major “Where you stand depends on combat operations in Iraq. During where you sit,” the old proverb sug- that time, the United States has gests, and Nasr’s is a case in point. gotten a first-hand education in the Himself a Shiite and the son of a complex ideological and religious prominent Islamic scholar, the author frictions that simmer below the sur- is convinced of his sect’s moral and face in the Muslim world. And while intellectual superiority, as well as the the Bush administration’s “surge” righteousness of its will to power. has now helped the Coalition regain Nasr’s narrative plays heavily on the the initiative in the former Ba’athist positive role of the Shia in Middle state, it has become abundantly Eastern politics as champions of clear that if Washington and its allies modernity and democracy. By con- hope to maintain—and, better yet, trast, he paints a damning portrait of to expand—their influence in the Sunnis, accusing them of the brunt of region as a whole, they still have a Islamic fundamentalism plaguing the great deal to learn about what makes world today. its inhabitants tick. The starkness of this depiction Along comes The Shia Revival, requires a bit of creative license. After Vali Nasr’s masterful survey of the all, the one country commonly rec- politics of Shia identity. Part history ognized as the world’s leading state tome, part theological primer, The Shia sponsor of international terrorism is Revival is an indispensable glimpse the one at the epicenter of the Shia into what most Muslims know well revival: the Islamic Republic of Iran. but Westerners all too often do not: Nasr’s narrative, however, minimizes the internal divisions within Islam, the destabilizing role that Iran has and the historically marginalized role played on the world stage since the of the Shia in Muslim politics. “The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini estab- divide between Shiism and Sunnism lished the Islamic Republic in 1979. is the most important in Islam,” Nasr Of course, Nasr cannot completely

Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, is Editor of The Journal of International Security Affairs.

104 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews disregard the Islamic Republic, but sees it, the interests of the United his minimalist approach seems for all States and those of the Shia are inex- the world to be the product of neces- tricably intertwined, as encapsu- sity. Quite simply, Nasr needs to lated by his highly-dubious assertion downplay the pernicious nature of the that “War on America is now war on militant movement now in power in Shiism, and war on Shiism is war on Tehran because it poses a challenge America.” The not-so-subtle message to his portrayal of Shiites as pristine, is that the West should stop worrying quietist underdogs. and learn to love Pax Irannica. Naturally, this tends to color Such a prescription may be music Nasr’s depiction of Iran’s role in to the ears of Iran’s ayatollahs. But to regional instability. In his telling, the American policymakers, now strug- relationship between al-Qaeda and gling to retain strategic leadership Iran is one of unequivocal antago- in one of the world’s most turbulent nism. The truth, however, is a good regions, it is a recipe for marginal- deal more complex. While there is ization and decline. Simply put, an certainly no love lost between Tehran America that acquiesces to—and and the bin Laden network, they can accommodates—the regional pri- and have cooperated in the past. macy of Iran cannot be a credible Thus, al-Qaeda’s late, unlamented champion of the struggle against rad- lieutenant in Iraq, Abu Musab al- ical Islam. Zarqawi, took refuge in Iran multiple And that is precisely what times between the start of Operation makes the Shia revival, and The Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and his death Shia Revival, so problematic. Nasr in mid-2006. And there are still, by all has undoubtedly done observers of accounts, a number of high-value al- the region a major service by chron- Qaeda targets under “house arrest” icling and demystifying the sec- in Iran—where anecdotal evidence tarian schisms now visible in Iraq implies they are residing quite com- and beyond. But his conclusion, fortably. All of which suggests that, that the political ascent of the Shia for all of their strategic and sectarian (and, by extension, of Iran) should differences, Iran and al-Qaeda are be embraced unequivocally, is too not nearly as distant as Nasr makes simplistic by half. That it advocates them out to be. such an approach suggests The Most problematic of all, however, Shia Revival is not only a chronicle are the policy prescriptions woven of the partisan clash of ideologies subtly throughout The Shia Revival. taking place within Islam; it is an Nasr’s argument is clear and unmis- example of it. takable. The rise of the Shia is an inexorable force, a causal factor in the changing politics of the turbulent Middle East. For him, this is a benign—indeed, beneficial—turn of events. “The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and jihadi activism within the region,” Nasr writes. Perhaps this is because, as Nasr

The Journal of International Security Affairs 105 Book Reviews

Tracking the Dragon Randall G. Schriver

Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham addition, China has greater capabili- and Derek Mitchell, eds., China and ties and a widening “toolbox” available the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy to it in its pursuit of its foreign policy for the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, goals. The net effect is that China is NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 232 pp. choosing deeper engagement and involvement with the outside world, and is increasingly effective at pro- In their 1967 classic folk-rock song, moting its interests, even in instances Buffalo Springfield sang the verses, where its interests clash with those “There’s something happening of the United States and other estab- here; What it is ain’t exactly clear.” lished powers. Such are the sentiments of many What is not clear—perhaps even U.S. policymakers when analyzing to its leaders themselves—are Chi- the so-called “rise of China.” The na’s intentions once it has acquired “something” we know to be happen- power and influence. Yet such ing is the emergence of China onto knowledge is essential for crafting the world stage—a development that a sophisticated and effective U.S. our own National Intelligence Coun- policy. Simply put, Washington cil opined “is similar to the advent of needs clarity regarding both China’s a united Germany in the 19th cen- capabilities and its intentions as Bei- tury and a powerful U.S. in the early jing comes into its own. 20th century, and will transform the Now, thanks to China and the geopolitical landscape with impacts Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy potentially as dramatic as those in for the Twenty-First Century, we have the previous two centuries.” some help on that score. Edited by We also know that associated China scholars Joshua Eisenman, with China’s emergence is a rapidly Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitch- changing Chinese approach to for- ell, China and the Developing World eign policy. PRC leaders have shed the is an important foundation for help- principles upon which Deng Xiaoping ing assess China’s actions over the shaped China’s foreign policy in the last several years in a number of key modern era—principles such as “bide regions around the globe. our time, build our capabilities” and Perhaps it is the case that most “never take the lead.” Today, China published volumes are the end result pursues its interests through more of a great deal of hard work. Even creative and proactive diplomacy. In so, China and the Developing World

Randall G. Schriver is a founding partner of Armitage International, an international business and strategy consulting firm. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and before that as Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.

106 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews stands out as a remarkable effort, for particularly helpful in the absence several reasons. of hard data. To understand “influ- First, it should be recognized ence” in foreign policy terms is to that achieving a clear understand- understand sources of leverage, and ing of Chinese foreign policy and the relative influence of countries vis- strategic intent—and articulating à-vis others. By virtue of examining those findings in a straightforward China’s activities region by region manner—can be highly problematic. (and in many cases, country by coun- The Chinese government remains try), as well as placing these develop- opaque and suspicious of outsiders, ments in proper historical context, and thus is reluctant to be transpar- we now have a tool for assessing the ent about such matters. China does trend lines associated with China’s not publish an official national secu- emergence as a more influential rity strategy, nor does it even have a global actor. national security council to articulate Finally, the editors should be such a strategy. Furthermore, Chi- applauded for building a volume nese leaders are often in the business around contributing authors who of purposefully obscuring the actual can all be described as “young schol- intent behind their actions. Thus, the ars.” When it comes to China, there effort is not simply one of mining data is great merit to seeking such voices and sifting through it; a keen analyti- from the “new generation.” After all, cal eye is also needed in order to exer- China’s emergence presents us with cise “oversight” on the data collection the defining challenge for the genera- and ensure results are not tainted by tion to come. As such, it is a subject Chinese manipulation. that deserves the attention of the Second is the political envi- best and the brightest who are in the ronment associated with the topic earlier stages of their academic and addressed in the book. Today, the policy careers. “rise of China” is a hotly debated In many ways, then, China and issue in policy and academic circles, the Developing World is the start of and often elicits as much emotion as a larger conversation. Eisenman, it does objective reasoning. China Heginbotham, Mitchell and the watchers eagerly consume every volume’s contributing authors leave new offering, and in short order will plenty of room for further research. declare a book as being “pro-China” Indeed, they themselves note that in or “anti-China.” China and the Devel- order to understand the net effects of oping World defies such easy catego- China’s emergence, one will need to rization. It is dispassionate, objective, observe and track them over time. and unassailable in its analysis. The The U.S. government seems to editors and contributing authors have agree. “China faces a strategic cross- found the razor-thin strip of middle road,” the Pentagon noted in its 2006 ground between the “China bashers” annual report to Congress on Chi- and the “panda-huggers,” and given nese military power. “It can choose a us just the facts. pathway of peaceful integration and Third, China and the Developing benign competition. China can also World is one of the first books to give choose, or find itself upon, a pathway us a clear story line regarding China’s along which China would emerge influence in the developing world. to exert dominant influence in an Discussing the “rise of China” is not expanding sphere… the future of a

The Journal of International Security Affairs 107 Book Reviews rising China is not yet set immutably on one course or another.” Books like China and the Developing World are an important resource for American policymakers seeking to determine exactly which option Beijing is lean- ing toward.

108 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews

Expecting the Unexpected Adam Lovinger

Francis Fukuyama, ed., Blindside: How to LPHI uncertainties comes at a wel- Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards come time, given the varied nature in Global Politics (Washington, D.C.: of looming potential threats we face: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 198 pp. WMD attacks on cities, catastrophic climate change fallout, or even mass destruction caused by an asteroid’s Over the past few decades, forcing hitting Earth, among others explored events, strategic surprises and wild by the authors. cards have exacted a heavy toll. Edited by Francis Fukuyama, The near-instantaneousness of Pearl Blindside features such high-profile Harbor, 9/11, and some natural disas- contributors as Anne Applebaum, ters—as well as the “slow surprise” Eliot Cohen, Josef Joffe, Walter Rus- of HIV/AIDS, which circled the globe sell Mead and Itamar Rabinovich. for nearly fifty years before being rec- It begins by offering a theoretical ognized as a pandemic—all serve as framework explaining why anticipat- examples of the certainty of uncer- ing and preparing for blindside events tainty in global politics. has historically proven so difficult. Yet, until recently, when the U.S The first problem has to do with was blindsided by such low prob- getting present-day decisionmak- ability high impact (LPHI) events, ers, faced with a host of quotidian there was little debate about how gov- exigencies, to take seriously certain ernments could prepare for similar potential LPHI events. If told some future occurrences. “Acts of God,” as potentially catastrophic event has a they are often dubbed, have histori- low probability of occurring, officials cally been deemed both unstoppable tend to do little or nothing—even and impractical to plan for. if such an event would prove cata- Blindside: How to Anticipate Forc- strophic, should it take place. The dif- ing Events and Wild Cards in Global ficulty of convincing decisionmakers Politics is an insightful and thought- that a surprise is even possible, much provoking effort to engage—and to less getting them to imagine what can predict—the problems faced by deci- be done in response, is even more dif- sionmakers and analysts confronted ficult when such scenarios challenge by uncertainty. It is also an attempt conventional wisdom. to offer some sound suggestions on Second, even if this first hurdle is what may practically be done to pre- overcome, the investment needed to pare ourselves for future such events. hedge against LPHI events is expen- This contribution to the growing lit- sive. Since policymakers, financiers erature on the nature and impact of and politicians—particularly those on

Adam Lovinger works in the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. None of the views expressed herein represent those of the Department of Defense or any of its offices or agencies.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 109 Book Reviews two- and four-year election cycles— vailing worldviews, cognitive biases, are under great psychological and long-held mental models and self- institutional pressure to maximize interest. These cognitive frailties the impact of their limited resources prevent early recognition of blindside for near-term gains, the case for allo- events with consequences encapsu- cating resources for low-probability lated by George Orwell’s observa- catastrophes is a hard sell. tion that “sooner or later a false belief The third difficulty derives from bumps up against solid reality, usu- the fact that decisionmakers tend to ally on the battlefield.” be biased in one direction or another, Fourth, even if decisionmakers depending upon their profession. A decide that something must be done crucial causal factor underlying the to head off LPHI catastrophes, the act 1997 East Asian financial crisis, for of preparing for such events—much example, was a widely held false sense less allocating resources to deal with of security generated by high returns them—potentially exposes them to and market confidence, which lulled ridicule and lost votes. As the authors investors into complacency regard- point out, over the past 20 years many ing basic economic fundamentals. In “well-known commissions” predicted the U.S., this optimistic bias is aided that terrorists would attack the World by the moral hazard of government Trade Center again, airplanes could policies which allow financial institu- be used as weapons, and Osama bin tions to fully benefit from profitable Laden would orchestrate attacks on markets while enjoying protection the symbols of U.S. power. But poli- from too hard a fall should things not ticians and bureaucrats responsible work out as hoped. This view is also for such matters predictably focused found among politicians, who express their attention elsewhere rather than a bias toward optimism and confi- expend limited resources to prevent dence when faced with ambiguity, some unlikely future catastrophe. downplaying risks they cannot con- Finally, this negative incentive trol and portraying risks as nothing structure is compounded by the prob- more than challenges to be overcome ability that even if a particular LPHI through skill and determination. event is planned for, and action is Conversely, pessimistic world- taken ahead of time to head it off, no views are often held by government political credit will be forthcoming. If bureaucrats, particularly those work- President Bush had invaded Afghani- ing in national security positions. stan to prevent 9/11 before it hap- There, accurately predicting positive pened and destroyed al-Qaeda, the events largely goes unrewarded while U.S. would likely be even more ridi- failing to anticipate negative develop- culed internationally, while voters, ments is punished, particularly by egged on by Congress, would likely Congress and the press. Perhaps no seek retribution at the polls for the other organization is as institution- Administration’s warmongering. The ally prone to such biases as the intel- end result is a type of “tragedy of the ligence community, which harbors a commons” effect, where no planning very human tendency—masterfully is usually done. elucidated some years ago in Roberta From there—with the use of case Wohlstetter’s landmark book Pearl studies as diverse as national secu- Harbor: Warning and Decision—to rity, finance, energy, and health—the find intelligence consistent with pre- book moves on to focus on recom-

110 The Journal of International Security Affairs Book Reviews mendations for planning for, and mitigating the fallout from, blindside events if and when they occur. The volume’s conclusions are clear and helpful. LPHI events—particularly strategic surprises—often exhibit recognizable signs, may be identified before they arise, and thus mitigated as long as appropriate resources are expended throughout the process. These findings should be heart- ening for officials in Washington. They suggest that, despite the myriad challenges involved in doing so, getting decisionmakers to focus on— and plan for—blindside events could help make them not so unexpected after all.

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