Titel Why Didn’t Religion Disappear? Re-examining the Secularization Thesis

By Ronald Inglehart

Seminal thinkers of the 19th century from Marx and Weber, to Durkheim and Zusammenfassung Freud, predicted that religion would cease to be significant with the emergence Mehr Religiosität weltweit of industrial society. In recent years however, this thesis has experienced a sus- tained challenge. Critics claim it is time to bury the secularization thesis. Mit der Modernisierung von Gesell- schaften schwindet die Überlebens- It would be premature to do so. The critique relies too heavily on selected fähigkeit von Religionen, die durch anomalies and focuses too heavily on the United States (a striking deviant case) einen höheren Lebensstandard und rather than comparing systematic evidence across the full range of societies. das Aufkommen des Wohlfahrts- staats an Attraktivität einbüßen. This study draws on a massive base of new evidence generated by the four Aber die säkularisierten reichen Na- waves of the World Values Survey/European Values Survey, which has carried tionen machen einen immer kleiner out representative national surveys in eighty societies, covering all of the werdenden Anteil der gesamten world’s major faiths and including 85 percent of the world’s population. The Weltbevölkerung aus. Daher surveys in Germany and a number of ex-communist societies were directed by wächst weltweit die Zahl jener Hans-Dieter Klingemann of the WZB, with whom the author has worked Menschen, für die Religion bedeut- closely since 1974. sam ist. It is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so. Nevertheless, the concept of secularization captures an impor- tant part of what is going on. This article presents a revised version of secular- ization theory that emphasizes the extent to which people have a sense of ex- istential security – that is, the feeling that survival can be taken for granted.

The feeling that survival is uncertain has shaped the lives of most people throughout most of history, and the need for a sense of reassurance in a highly uncertain world, has been a key factor underlying the mass appeal of religion. As this need diminishes, a systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs tends to occur. The need for a sense of assurance in face of existential insecurity is not the only motivation underlying religion.

Throughout history, philosophers and theologians have turned to religion in seeking answers to the meaning of life. But for the vast majority of the popu- lation, the prime appeal of religion was that it helped them cope with existential insecurity. During the 20th century in nearly all post-industrial nations church attendance has declined markedly. The United States remains exceptional, showing much higher rates of church attendance, and higher emphasis on religion, than is found in almost any other advanced industrial society (though ranking far be- low most pre-industrial societies).

Theories of Secularization

But despite clear evidence of secularization in rich nations, the world as a whole has not become less religious. Two things are true:

(1) The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving to- ward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless, (2) the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s popula- tion. Though these two propositions may initially seem contradictory, they are not, as we will demonstrate.

The idea that the rise of a rational worldview has undermined the foundations of faith in the supernatural, the mysterious, and the magical predated Weber,

WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 105 September 2004 7 but was strongly influenced by his work. Leading sociologists advanced the ra- tionalist argument farther during the 1960s and 1970s, arguing that the rise of science and technology rendered the central claims of the Church implausible in modern societies, blowing away the vestiges of superstitious dogma.

Weber viewed the mysterious as something to be conquered by human reason. The dazzling achievements of medicine, engineering, and mathematics – and the material products generated by the rise of modern capitalism, technology, and manufacturing industry during the 19th century – reinforced the idea of mankind’s control of nature. The division of church and state, and the rise of secular-rational bureaucratic states and representative governments, displaced the rule of spiritual leaders, ecclesiastical institutions, and hereditary rulers claiming authority from God.

According to Weber, industrialization brought the fragmentation of the life- world, the decline of community, the rise of bureaucracy, and technological con- sciousness – all of which made religion less arresting and less plausible than it had been in pre-modern societies. But if a rational worldview generates wide- spread skepticism about the existence of God, then those societies which ex- press most confidence in science might be expected to prove least religious; in fact, as data from the World Values Survey demonstrates, exactly the opposite is true: today, the advanced industrial societies in which secularization is most advanced, show the lowest levels of confidence in science and technology – far lower than those found in low-income societies.

Moreover, the Weberian interpretation emphasizes cognitive factors that tend to be irreversible and universal: the spread of scientific knowledge does not dis- appear in times of crisis or economic downturn. If it were the dominant cause of secularization, we would not expect to find fluctuations in religiosity linked with varying levels of security – but we do.

A related explanation for secularization was offered by Durkheim’s theory of functional differentiation in industrialized societies. By the 1950s this perspec- tive had become the predominant sociological view. Functionalists argue that religion is not simply a system of beliefs and ideas; it is also a system of rituals and ceremonies that help sustain social cohesion and stability.

But in industrialized societies specialized professionals and organizations, dedi- cated to healthcare, education, social control, politics, and welfare, replaced most of the tasks once carried out by religious organizations. Stripped of their core social purposes, religious institutions play greatly diminished roles. If this thesis is correct, one would expect that religion should have declined most in affluent societies that have developed extensive welfare states, such as in Swe- den, the Netherlands and France – and indeed much of the evidence is consist- ent with this account.

Yet in recent decades growing numbers of critics have expressed reservations about the core claims of the functionalist interpretation, pointing to a resur- gence of religiosity evident in the success of Islamic movements and parties, the popularity of Evangelicalism in Latin America, ethno-religious bloodshed in Ni- geria. Traditional secularization theory is now widely challenged and the sup- ply-side school of rational choice theorists that emerged in the early 1990s, has become the most popular alternative. This school assumes that the public’s de- mand for religion is constant, and focuses on how conditions of religious free- Religion will not disappear through- dom, and the work of competing religious institutions, actively generate its out the world. Rather, the world as “supply”. a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever Religion Important in Agrarian Societies before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s The earlier view was that pluralism eroded religious faith, destroying the un- population. Economic development questioned power of a single pervasive theological faith, sowing the seeds of reduces the need for religion but skepticism and doubt. Drawing on the analogy of firms struggling for custom- rich societies contain a dwindling ers in the economic market, supply-side theory assumes the opposite. Its core share of the world’s population. proposition is that vigorous competition between religious denominations has

8 WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 105 September 2004 a positive effect on religious involvement. The more churches, denominations, creeds and sects compete in a local community, the harder rival leaders need to strive to maintain their congregations.

This school argues that the continued vitality of religious beliefs and practices in the United States reflects strong competition among many religious institu- tions. By contrast, where a single religious organization predominates through government regulation and subsidies, it encourages a complacent clergy, just as state-owned industries and corporate monopolies generate inefficiency and lack of innovation in the economic market. Thus, the state-subsidized churches of Northern Europe have produced an unmotivated clergy and an indifferent pub- lic.

Nevertheless, after more than a decade of debate, the supply-side claim that religious pluralism fosters religious participation remains in dispute. It has dif- ficulty accounting for the relative vigor of church attendance in Southern Eu- Ronald F. Inglehart [Foto: Marc Schelewsky] ropean countries where the Roman Catholic church has a near-monopoly. Ronald F. Inglehart, born 1934 in Moreover, evidence from the World Values Survey demonstrates that religious Milwaukee, Wisconsin (U.S.A.), is belief is far more intense in Islamic societies than in the highly pluralistic United professor of political science and States. program director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of The publics of almost all low-income countries – Islamic or non-Islamic, and Michigan. His research deals with religiously monolithic or pluralistic – place more emphasis on religion than changing belief systems and their does the American public. The dominant factor seems to be economic devel- impact on social and political opment, rather than market competition. Regardless of how one measures it, change. He helped found the Euro- religion tends to be much more important in agrarian societies than in industrial Barometer surveys and directs the or postindustrial societies, as Figure 1 demonstrates. World Values Surveys. Inglehart has been a visiting scholar at the WZB We propose an alternative interpretation, linked with the fact that rich and poor on several occasions, most recently nations around the globe differ sharply in their levels of development and so- the summer of 2004. cioeconomic inequality, and thus in their levels of existential security – the feel- ing that one can take survival for granted. Economic development has signifi- cant consequences for religiosity; sharply rising levels of economic resources, interacting with the emergence of the welfare state, reduces the need for reli- gion. Virtually all of the world’s major religious cultures provide reassurance that, even though the individual alone can’t understand or predict what lies ahead, a higher power will ensure that things work out.

This belief reduces stress, enabling people to shut out anxiety and focus on coping with their immediate problems. Without such a belief system, extreme

WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 105 September 2004 9 Fotos stress tends to produce withdrawal reactions. Individuals under stress, need S. 11 oben: Pfingstritt in Kötzting (Foto: rigid, predictable rules. They need to be sure of what is going to happen be- L. Kucharz); S. 11 unten: Pilger baden im cause their margin for error is slender. Conversely, people raised under condi- Ganges (Foto: AP); S. 12 oben: Betendes tions of relative security have less need for the absolute and rigidly predictable Kind in Malaysia (Foto: C. Naundorf); rules that religions provide. S. 12 unten: Mädchen in der Kirche (Foto: E. Wodicka); S. 13 oben: Schrein des Imam More People with Traditional Religious Views Ali in Nadschaf (Foto: AP); S. 13 unten: Bud- dhistische Mönche in Thailand (Foto: AP); But, while rising levels of existential security lead to secularization, seculariza- S. 14: Meditierender Mongole (Foto: tion has a dramatic negative impact on fertility rates. Thus, rich societies are C. Naundorf); S. 15: Buddhistische Mönche becoming more secular but they are becoming a diminishing part of the world’s (Foto: AP) population. By contrast poor nations remain deeply religious – and display far alle Fotos: Süddeutscher Verlag Bilderdienst higher fertility rates and growing populations.

One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or any- thing that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interacting trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious.

Evidence from 80 societies indicates that due to rising levels of human security, the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving to- ward more secular orientations. “Modernization" (the process of industrializa- tion, urbanization, and rising levels of education and the transition from agrar- ian to industrial and postindustrial society) greatly weakens the influence of religious institutions making religion subjectively less important in people’s lives.

Within most advanced industrial societies, attendance at religious services has fallen over the past several decades; and religious authorities have largely lost their authority to dictate to the public on such matters as birth control, divorce, abortion, sexual orientation and the necessity of marriage before childbirth. Sec- ularization is not taking place only in Western Europe, as some critics have claimed; it is occurring in most advanced industrial societies including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada. Even in America, there has been a lesser but perceptible trend toward secularization; the trend has been partly masked by massive immigration of people with relatively traditional worldviews (and high fertility rates) from Hispanic countries – and by relatively high levels of eco- nomic inequality; but when one controls for these factors, even the U.S. shows a significant movement toward secularization.

Nevertheless, it would be a major mistake to assume that religion will eventu- ally disappear throughout the world. The world as a whole now has more peo- ple with traditional religious views than ever before – and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population.

Rich societies are secularizing but they contain a dwindling share of the world’s Zu den folgenden Bildseiten population; while poor societies are not secularizing and they contain a rising share of the world’s population. Thus, modernization does indeed bring a de- Was ist der Sinn des Lebens? emphasis on religion within virtually any country that experiences it, but the percentage of the world’s population for whom religion is important is rising. Andacht, Gebet, Innerlichkeit, Freude, Hoffen auf Er- leuchtung und Erlösung – Ob allein oder in Gemein- schaft, immer mehr Menschen in aller Welt suchen Ant- There is one more twist in this complicated story. Although the established re- wort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens. Etablierte ligions are losing the allegiance of the public throughout advanced industrial Kirchen verlieren ihren Einfluss auf die Gläubigen gerade society, evidence from the Values Surveys indicates that from 1981 to 2001, a auch im Alltag: bei Geburtenkontrolle, Scheidung, Ab- growing percentage of the public in virtually all of these countries spent time treibung. Industrialisierung, Verstädterung und Bildung thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. Organized religion is losing its tragen dazu bei, religiöse Institutionen zu schwächen. grip on the public, but spiritual concerns, broadly defined, are taking on grow- Reiche Gesellschaften werden weltlicher, aber sie um- ing importance. fassen immer weniger Anteile der Weltbevölkerung. Und dennoch: religiöses Interesse wächst weltweit. Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004

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