Religion and Values in a Globalized Era Ronald Inglehart Lowenstein Professor of Political Science and a research professor at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, he is co-founder of the Euro-Barometer surveys and director of the (surveying 97 countries and almost 90 percent of the world’s population). Engaged with changing belief systems and their impact on social and political change, his most recent books (co-authored are Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (2009); Democratization (2009); Modernization, Cultural Change and : The Human Development Sequence (2005); Sacred and Secular: the Thesis Revisited (2004); and Rising Tide: Gender Equality in Global Perspective (2003). He also co-edited Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999–2001 Values Surveys (2004) and Changing Values and Beliefs in 85 Countries: Trends from the Values Surveys (2008). A member of the editorial boards of eight scholarly journals, and formerly a consultant to the US State Department and the European Union, he has studied or taught in France, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Nigeria, and New Zealand. For more information: http://polisci.lsa.umich.edu/faculty/ringlehart.html and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org Roberto Foa Doctoral researcher at the Department of Government at Harvard University, he was in 2004 selected as Peter Martin Fellow at The Financial Times, and since 2006 has worked on designing the Social Development Indicators Project, an international study of social institutions, at the World Bank in Washington DC. He was coordinator for the 2007 World Values Survey in Rwanda, and has authored several papers and book chapters on topics of social capital, democracy, and economic development. In the past 30 years, has returned to in India, the Justice and Development Party in The apparent global politics. Disputes over religious issues, Turkey, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt return of religion ranging from abortion, to same-sex marriage, to have achieved genuine mass support. Follow- the wearing of headscarves in schools, have be- ing Kepel (1994) and Casanova (1994), we has led some come major areas of contention across Western explain the rise of religious parties and move- commentators to . Religious parties and movements ments in the developing world as the result of view theological have made striking electoral breakthroughs in a process of social mobilization, in which pre- fissures as countries such as India, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel, viously passive citizens are transformed into and established theocratic government in coun- democratic actors through a political discourse predictors of tries such as Iran and Afghanistan. The apparent rooted in popular notions of religious faith and international, return of religion has led some commentators to significance. As new movements have sought as well as domestic view theological fissures as predictors of interna- to challenge the secular liberal and nationalist conflict, with tional, as well as domestic conflict, with nations elites that guided these countries through their aligning into “civilizational blocs” that mirror post-independence era, religious discourse has nations the world’s major faiths1 (Huntington 1996). functioned as a means of engaging with new aligning into Why have religious identities and values urban social groups. However, against the “civilizational achieved such renewed prominence in the ear- “counter-secularization” hypothesis, we find no blocs.” ly 21st Century? One theory is that the return of evidence of any increase in religious identifica- religion reflects “de-” or “counter-” seculariza- tion, even in developing countries. The growth tion, as individuals have returned to religious rit- of religious movements is not a result of chang- ual and discourse as a means of navigating the ing mass beliefs and values, but rather a con- complexities of modern life (Berger 2005). The sequence of the entry of the masses into rise of Evangelical Christianity in Latin America, political life in countries where power was pre- Korea, and the United States, the reopening viously monopolized by secular elites. As such, of Orthodox and Catholic churches in the for- it may be followed by a similar decline in mass mer Communist bloc, and the growth of Islamist religious observance and values in future years, movements in the Middle East are all taken as under similar circumstances of affluence to evidence of this trend. As Huntington writes, those prevailing in late twentieth-century Eu- “the religious resurgence involved people return- rope, Australasia, and Northern America. ing to, reinvigorating, and giving new meaning to the traditional of their communities” The Decline of Religion and the Rise of (Huntington 1996: 96). Secular Values in the Western World In this chapter we advance an alternative view, which is that religious and moral issues Evidence concerning religious values, beliefs and have become steadily more contentious as a behavior can be drawn from the World Values result of the decline of religious authority and Surveys and European Values Study, a global in- values in the developed world. Since the 1960s, vestigation of socio-cultural and political change. adherence to traditional religious values has This project has carried out representative na- fallen sharply across Europe and North America, tional surveys of the basic values and beliefs of giving rise to a new set of norms based on indi- the publics in 92 nation states, containing in vidual freedom and self-expression, including total over 6 billion people or 90% of the world’s acceptance of abortion and divorce, tolerance of population and covering all six inhabited conti- homosexuality, and more progressive attitudes nents. It builds on the European Values Surveys, to women’s rights. As these views have become first carried out in 22 countries in 1981: a sec- increasingly mainstream, they have led to legis- ond wave of surveys, in 41 nations, was com- lative changes such as same-sex marriage, abor- pleted in 1990–91, a third wave of 55 nations tion on demand, and state-provided childcare. in 1995–6, a fourth wave of 59 nations in 1999– Such changes have provoked frustrated respons- 2001, and a fifth wave of 57 nations in 2005–7. es by socially conservative groups, such as the The World Values Surveys include some of the pro-life movement in the United States, Ireland, most affluent economies in the world, such as and Spain, as well as immigrant communities the US, Japan, and Switzerland, with per cap- 1 with conservative values in countries like France, ita incomes as high as $45,000; middle-in- The growth of international terrorism, Hindu Belgium, and the Netherlands. come industrializing countries such as South nationalism, and the reluctance of the Euro- pean Union to admit Turkey, a predominantly In the developing world, by contrast, reli- Korea, Brazil, and Turkey, with per capita in- Muslim country, are commonly viewed in sup- gious parties and movements such as Hindutva comes between $10,000 and $20,000, and port of this viewpoint.

Religion and Values in a Globalized Era Ronald Inglehart / Roberto Foa 245 COUNTRY 1981 1990 1995 2000 2005 CHANGE, 1981-2005 As organized religion has lost its authority ARGENTINA 31 32 25 25 20 -11 over people’s lives and behavior, there has been a corresponding shift in attitudes towards reli- AUSTRALIA 28 - 17 - 14 -13 gious or moral issues, including attitudes to- CANADA 31 27 - 28 25 -6 wards abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and the FRANCE 11 10 - 8 7 -3 role of women in society. Since 1981, the World GREAT BRITAIN 13 14 - 15 16 3 Values Surveys have asked respondents to rate their opinion towards a range of moral acts and ITALY 32 38 - 40 32 -1 lifestyle choices, ranging from 1 (never justifi- JAPAN 4 3 3 4 3 -1 able) to 10 (always justifiable). In 1981, 30% NETHERLANDS 25 20 - 14 12 -13 of respondents in Western Europe and 43% of Americans responded that abortion was “never” SOUTH KOREA 31 21 15 30 31 0 justifiable; by 2005 these had fallen to 19% and SPAIN 40 29 25 26 16 -24 26%, respectively. In 1981, almost half (48%) SUECIA 6 4 4 4 3 -3 of Western Europeans and two-thirds (64%) of UNITED STATES 43 44 44 46 37 -6 Americans expressed a view that prostitution is “never justifiable”; by 2005 these were just a WEST GERMANY 19 18 14 16 14 -5 third (33%) and two-fifths (43%). MEAN CHANGE -6 A more comprehensive overview of these shifts can be gained from Table 2, which shows table 1 poorer agrarian societies, such as Rwanda, Ban- the full results for the percentage of respondents Frequency of Attending Religious Services gladesh, and Vietnam, with per capita incomes for whom abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and at Least “Once A Week”. of $400 or less. The most comprehensive cover- prostitution are “never” justifiable across the Source: World Values Surveys and European age of the survey is in Western Europe and North full 13 industrial and post-industrial societies for Values Study, 1981–2007. America, where public opinion surveys have the which data spans the full range from 1981 to the longest tradition, but countries are included from present day. The surveys show marked declines in all world regions, including many Sub-Saharan Sweden, Spain, France, Germany, and Argentina, African nations. The survey also includes the first with steady falls also evident in other countries. systematic data on public opinion in many Mus- In every country, attitudes to divorce became lim states, including Arab countries such as Jor- more accepting, and in every country but one dan, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as in Indonesia, (Japan) attitudes became more tolerant of pros- Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. titution. Large shifts also occurred in attitudes Since 1981, the World Values Survey has to homosexuality, such that by 2005 extreme asked respondents how frequently they attend homophobic sentiment was a minority view in church, mosque, or temple services, ranging almost every country including Argentina, South from once a year, to specific holidays, to once a Korea, and the United States. Finally, uncondi- month, to once a week, to more often than this. tional opposition to abortion fell in every country Table 1 shows the proportion attending religious except Argentina and Italy, such that in almost services at least once a week across 13 industri- all countries a majority could conceive of circum- al and post-industrial countries included in both stances where abortion would be permissible. the 1981 and the 2005–7 waves of the WVS, As moral attitudes and beliefs have become and the results demonstrate the steady decline more progressive, there has also been a steady of religious practice and belief across Western movement in the policy arena towards more le- countries in the late twentieth century. gal reform in areas such as divorce, abortion, Strong falls in churchgoing are evident across prostitution, and same-sex marriage. Among the Western Europe, particularly in Spain, the Neth- first areas of amendment were marriage and di- erlands, and Germany. Japan, Sweden, and vorce laws, which remained restrictive across France saw falls in religious attendance from southern Europe until the late twentieth cen- already low levels, so that by 2005 figures for tury, but were liberalized in Italy in 1970, Por- weekly participation had fallen to single dig- tugal in 1975, Spain in 1981, and Ireland in its, while moderate declines can be seen in the 1997. A second area is abortion, which is strong- United States, Canada, and Germany. Only in ly censured by the Catholic, Orthodox, and most South Korea and Great Britain were levels of at- Protestant churches, yet was legalized in Great tendance higher in 2005 than in 1981, though Britain in 1967, the United States in 1973, in both cases only by a small amount. France in 1975, and Italy in 1978. A third area

246 THE MULTIPLE FACES OF GLOBALIZATION is prostitution, which since being banned in many COUNTRY DIVORCE HOMOSEXUALITY ABORTION PROSTITUTION countries during the nineteenth century, has been 1981 2005 1981 2005 1981 2005 1981 2005 decriminalized and regulated in Australia since ARGENTINA 30 17 69 30 49 55 68 43 1992, in Denmark since 1999, in the Nether- lands since 2000,2 in New Zealand since 2003, AUSTRALIA 16 6 41 22 30 18 35 24 as well as Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, and the CANADA 19 9 51 21 38 26 50 40 US state of Nevada. Capital punishment has been FRANCE 13 9 47 15 21 15 45 42 outlawed in phases across most Western coun- GREAT BRITAIN 14 7 43 21 30 20 46 31 tries, with a freeze on executions giving way to a comprehensive legal prohibition across the Eu- ITALY 21 19 63 51 30 39 69 58 ropean Union.3 And finally, same-sex marriages JAPAN 21 5 52 24 31 15 65 67 have been given full legal recognition across a NETHERLANDS 19 11 21 16 29 20 27 21 number of Western countries, beginning with the SOUTH KOREA 33 18 63 45 31 30 65 50 Netherlands in 2003, followed by Spain and Can- ada in 2005, and Sweden in 2009.4 SPAIN 28 8 56 10 50 17 58 23 Western societies have therefore undergone SWEDEN 10 1 39 4 16 3 55 41 an uneven process of societal liberalization since UNITED STATES 22 6 65 33 43 26 64 44 the 1970s that has encompassed sexual, repro- WEST GERMANY 30 17 69 30 49 55 68 43 ductive, and lifestyle freedoms. While elites such as judges and parliamentarians have often been the initiators of legislative change, these reforms which though a largely secular society, only dis- table 2 have largely been supported by mass beliefs and established the Lutheran church in 2000. In the Percentage of the Population Saying Selec- values. There is no better reflection of this than United Kingdom, where the Church of England ted Acts are “Never” Justifiable. the fact that changes to the law have often been remains the established church, blasphemy laws Source: World Values Survey y European Values Study, 1981–2007. confirmed through popular referenda, as was the were officially abolished in 2008, following pre- case with divorce law in Ireland, civil unions in vious reform through the Criminal Justice Act of Switzerland, or abortion in Portugal. Moreover, 1967 (which legalized profanity) and the 1998 there have been remarkably few instances of Human Rights Act.5 In the Netherlands the gov- policy reversal, and several cases where refer- ernment is currently considering repealing its enda intended to roll back a parliamentary law blasphemy laws, though these have not been ap- were defeated at the ballot box (for example Italy plied since the 1960s; in most other European regarding divorce law in 1974, Switzerland con- countries blasphemy laws remain on the books, cerning abortion in 1978 and 1985). but are similarly disregarded by the courts or di- 2 Concurrent with the widened acceptance of rectly contradicted by free speech legislation. A In the Netherlands, a loophole allowed pros- titution activity throughout the twentieth cen- liberal attitudes regarding lifestyle choices, there case brought against the Danish author of the tury, but the trade was only fully legalized and has also been a consolidation of secular norms Mohammed cartoons, for example, was rejected regulated in 2000. regarding politicians and public life. The separa- on grounds of freedom of expression.6 Finally, in 3 tion of religion from politics is the defining at- most European countries religious leaders have This occurred in Sweden in 1972, France in tribute of the secular state, and in both the 2000 no consultative role in government, as has been 1981, Italy in 1994, and Britain in 1998, and the 2005 Values Surveys, representative the case in centuries past. In one last exception when abolition of the death penalty was at the same time made a criterion for membership samples of the public were asked regarding their to this rule, the United Kingdom, there are 26 of the European Union, and thereby also en- extent of agreement with the statement that “re- bishops who continue to sit in the House of acted across all new accession states. ligious leaders should not influence the govern- Lords, though the House of Commons has voted 4 ment.” In the countries of the European Union, in favor of abolishing all unelected members and To date, legislation permitting same-sex partner- on average 70% of respondents agreed with this faces resistance only from the Lords itself. ship has also been completed in six US states. view, including 76% of Swedes, 85% of Danes, At the same time as religion has lost its privi- 5 and 82% of French. The widening acceptance leged position within the state, and its corre- An ironic application of these laws occurred of secular norms has led to corresponding insti- sponding legal protections, Western societies in the 1980s, when Muslim groups had at- tutional changes, in particular the reform of blas- have incorporated immigrant groups for whom tempted to bring a case against Satanic Verses author Salman Rushdie: the case could not phemy legislation, and the disestablishment of the public expression of religious identity, the be pursued, as the laws only related to the the church. The majority of European countries ability to educate children religiously, and main- Anglican Church and not to Islam. have now removed their state religion, for ex- tain practices such as arranged marriage, re- 6 ample Spain where the Roman Catholic Church main very important. The response has been However there are several European excep- remained the official faith until 1978; Italy, an attempt to “fit” such newcomers into the tions where blasphemy laws remain in vigor, where this was true until 1984; and Sweden, mould of the secular system: for example, by notably in Greece and in Ireland.

Religion and Values in a Globalized Era Ronald Inglehart / Roberto Foa 247 100% sassination in the Netherlands on religious grounds of Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005, and the passing in 2006 AFRICA 90% of an incitement to religious hatred law in the United Kingdom. The results shed light on an UNITED STATES important aspect of the dynamics between reli­ gious traditionalists and secular liberals. In ev­ 80% ery country, a majority spoke out against such INDIA LATIN AMERICA a ban, and in favor of freedom of speech, yet among the sub­sample who identified as “reli­

70% gious,” the majority was in favor in four of the six countries. Notably, support for a ban was EASTERN EUROPE also the majority option among Muslim respon­ WESTERN EUROPE dents. There is therefore a fundamental value 60% difference between religious and non­religious respondents, reflecting the clash between the new value consensus of Western societies, and 50% the traditional values and beliefs of minorities and religious conservatives.

Sacred and Secular: the Role of 40% Religious Mobilization Proportion of the Public Considering Themselves a “Religious Person”

If a secular­liberal consensus appears to have EAST ASIA 30% taken hold in Western democracies, many would argue that such values are in retreat in the devel­ oping world. Since the 1970s religious parties have risen to prominence in Turkey, India, and 20% many Arab countries, while theocratic regimes YEAR 1981 1990 1995 2000 2005 have been established in Iran and in Afghan­ figure 1 banning wearing of the hijab, a form of Islamic istan. Several countries have introduced reli­ Proportion of the Public Considering Them­ dress, which was prohibited along with other gious provisions to their constitutions, such as selves a “Religious Person,” by Year. displays of religious identity in French schools Pakistan, which established Islam as the state – “East Asia” includes China, Japan, South in 2004, as well as being restricted in eight religion in 1973, and Bangladesh, whose parlia­ Korea, and Vietnam. German states and several Belgian municipali­ ment amended the constitution to make Islam – “Western Europe” includes Austria, Bel­ ties; by banning forced marriage, as occurred the state religion in 1988. These amendments gium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great in Norway in 2003 and Belgium in 2006; or have had widespread legal ramifications, in par­ Britain, and West Germany. by instituting “civic education” classes of the ticular where they have brought the introduction – “Eastern Europe” includes Hungary, Po­ kind now required of new Dutch citizens. Such of Shari’a provisions outlawing blasphemy, pun­ land, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and East Germany. moves have typically provoked resistance and ishing adultery by stoning, and establishing fixed – “Latin America” includes Argentina, Brazil, resentment among conservative migrants, who penalties (such as hand amputation) for a range Chile, and Mexico. view them as an indignity and an encroachment of petty crimes. In addition to legal changes, – “Africa” includes Nigeria and South Africa. on their cultural rights. However, where the de­ there has been a rising tide against Western mands of a secular liberal society to protect indi­ culture across the Middle East and South Asia. vidual rights and freedoms conflict with cultural Young women in Arab universities and cafes can practices that infringe such norms and obliga­ be seen making increasing use of the hijab, while tions, there is an irresolvable dilemma. public commentators in the Arab press openly Just such an important value conflict is high­ call for struggle against Western culture, media, lighted by the European Values Surveys of 2000, and entertainment (Dale 2003; Najjar 2005). in which members of the public in six countries Does this wave of religious politics reflect a were asked whether they would be in favor of newfound religious commitment among the pub­ restricting publications that offend religious sen­ lics of non­Western societies? Since 1981, the sibilities, or whether they would uphold freedom Values Surveys have asked respondents wheth­ of speech. This is an issue that has become er they consider themselves to be “religious,” highly sensitive in recent years following the as­ “non­religious,” or “a convinced atheist,” and

248 THE MULTIPLE FACES OF GLOBALIZATION these data allow us to examine trends in religios- 100% ity in the developing world. While there are many different measures of religiosity, including fre- quency of prayer, religious attendance, or one’s AFRICA personal belief in God, if religion has become 90% more salient in people’s political and social lives, self-identification as religious certainly ought to MIDDLE EAST have risen. Figure 1.0 shows the proportion of SOUTH asia UNITED STATES respondents across seven regions of the world 80% who describe themselves as religious, drawing WESTERN EUROPE upon data from 12 countries in Western Europe, four countries in East Asia, six countries in East- LATIN AMERICA ern Europe, four countries in Latin America, and 70% two countries in Africa, plus the United States and India, which are included here individually. EASTERN EUROPE While the proportion of the religious has grad- ually risen in East Asia and Eastern Europe, it 60% has fallen or fluctuated randomly in India and Latin America. And while the proportion identi- fying as religious is very high across almost all regions of the world, a level of around two-thirds 50%

is consistent with the highly secular norms and Proportion of the Public Considering Themselves a “Religious Person” EAST ASIA legal institutions found in contemporary Europe. Unfortunately insufficient time-series data 40% exists to be able to include the Middle East in Figure 1, which is the region that much of the “resurgence of religion” argument concerns. Nonetheless, it is possible to pool the data col- 30% lected from the Middle East during the 1999– AGE 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 2001 and 2005–7 waves of the Values Surveys in order to gain a sense of the degree of inter- tional comparison, therefore, we break down the figure 2 generational value-change occurring within the cross-sectional data into 10-year birth cohorts. Proportion of the Public Considering Them­ region, and thereby to make inferences regarding When religious participation is analyzed by selves a “Religious Person,” by Age Cohort. changes over time. Social scientists often look birth cohort and by region, as illustrated in Fig- – “East Asia” includes China, Japan, South at intergenerational differences as evidence of ure 2, the gradual disengagement of young- Korea, and Vietnam. long-term patterns of change, as through the so- er generations from religious identification is – “Western Europe” includes Austria, Bel­ gium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, cialization process, each birth cohort may adopt brought into focus. Interestingly, the results also Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great beliefs and values that persist through the life- suggest no rise in religious identity in the coun- Britain, and West Germany. cycle. For example, those growing up in the West tries of the Middle East, where the young are – “Eastern Europe” includes Hungary, Po­ land, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and East during the 1960s may be likely to adopt from a steadily less likely to identify as religious than Germany. young age more liberal attitudes regarding drug- the elderly. In this regard, the intergenerational – “Latin America” includes Argentina, Brazil, use, sexual morality, and military involvement pattern appears remarkably similar to Europe Chile, and Mexico. – “Africa” includes Nigeria and South Africa. overseas than their parents, as a result of having or the United States, where a similar pattern of taken part in the student movements that cul- youthful non-observance can be seen. While this minated in the 1968 protests (Inglehart 1971, trend could be interpreted as a life-cycle effect, 1977). While from a mere cross-section it is not with individuals facing an inherent tendency to possible to disentangle generational from life- become more religious as they grow older, the cycle effects that alter attitudes as individuals pattern in Africa and India casts doubt on this move from youth to middle-age and then retire- association, as in these societies the young are ment, there is strong evidence that most values barely less religious than the old. And in West- are learnt early in life, in the family, school and ern Europe and North America, we know from community, so that the enduring values of dif- the time-series evidence that there is a gradual ferent birth cohorts can be attributed mainly to secularization process underway, and this is con- their formative experiences in childhood and sistent with the generational trend seen here. adolescence. For the purposes of intergenera- Together, these facts hold out the possibility that

Religion and Values in a Globalized Era Ronald Inglehart / Roberto Foa 249 there may be an incipient process of seculariza- to unite opponents to the governing party or elite, tion occurring in the Middle East, rather than the in many of these countries—including Iran, Tur- religious resurgence that is typically described. key, India, and Israel—the mobilizing If it is not a resurgence of religious identifi- best able to form a coalition between the new cation that explains the rise of religious identity urban middle class and the urban poor was that politics in India, Central Asia, and the Middle rooted in the religious beliefs and practices of East, how do we account for the breakthrough of the population, albeit infused with a twist of na- movements such as India’s Hindutva, Turkey’s tionalism, in the cases of India and Israel. Justice and Development Party, or the Iranian Since the 1970s, therefore, the first genera- Committees of Islamic Revolution? We believe tion of secular political elites that governed during that an answer to this question must be found, the first decades of the post-war era in countries not in mass beliefs and values, but rather in such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey, and Iran the weakening position of the secular political have seen their position overturned by religious elites that led these countries to independence. parties and movements. In India, the “Congress WVS data shows that societies such as Turkey or system” that united lower-caste groups and the India have always been fundamentally religious, urban sector began to fall apart in the 1960s as and remain so. However, they were ruled in their caste minorities broke away to form indepen- early years by secular elites trained in the insti- dent parties, and the private-sector urban middle tutions of the former colonial powers, such as class gradually swung behind the Hindu nation- Jawaharlal Nehru of India or Zulfikar Ali Bhutto alist BJP party. In Pakistan, the secular Zulfikar of Pakistan, or emerging from the ranks of the Bhutto lost power to a coup d’état by the more officer corps, such as Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, conservative General Zia Ul-Haq, who proceeded who brought with them the secular principles to declare Islam as the country’s state religion, to learnt in the colleges of Oxbridge or the training the pleasure of the country’s clerical and feudal barracks. As most of the population remained classes. In Israel, a secular consensus around poor, agrarian, and politically passive, during the socialist policies of the Labor Party persisted the first years of independent rule secular elites from 1948 to 1977, but was shattered by the suc- were able to impose Western models of secular cess of Likud in drawing middle-class Sephardic governance, such as the secular constitutions and “Russian” voters to a harder form of Zionist that were initially implemented across the re- nationalism. In Turkey, conservative parties with gion, with little social opposition.7 a strong religious undercurrent repeatedly won In the late twentieth century, however, these democratic elections between 1950 and the pres- societies underwent a fundamental shift in so- ent, only to be overturned by military coups; the cial structure as they urbanized, witnessed the Justice and Development Party has remained in spread of mass literacy and higher education, power until now not due to the electorate but the and saw a shift from agrarian to commercial and emasculation of the military. Finally, in Iran, an industrial employment. The formation of new absolutist monarchy supported by the Western urban commercial classes outside of the tradi- powers rapidly collapsed once the iron fist of the tional support base for the secular elite—the Shah loosened its grip, giving way to a full-scale Congress system “vote banks” of India, the mil- social revolution that swept away all vestiges of itary and bureaucracy in Turkey or Iran—thus secular government. 7 opened up a field within which new parties and Though these outcomes reflect a remarkable Of the secular constitutions initially written movements could mobilize support among blossoming of religious politics, it is important for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and India, groups frustrated by widespread corruption and to remember that secular norms and institutions only India and Turkey retain their secularity clauses. Pakistan adopted Islam as its state their exclusion from government patronage net- never had widespread public support in these religion in 1973 and Bangladesh in 1988. works. Supporters of Islamic revolution in Iran countries (Gellner 1993). The hegemony of sec- Israel is an interesting case, as the Procla- and the Turkish Refah (welfare) and AK parties ular elites and institutions was largely an after- mation of Independence declared a “Jewish State” in 1948, yet did not clarify whether came not from the peasantry but from the urban effect of Western colonial influence, and as such this was a reference to ethnicity or religion. middle strata, including the student movement, were unlikely to last more than a single genera- An Israeli constitution was intended but never the merchant class, and both trade union and tion: insofar as we have survey data available, it written, in part because of controversy sur- rounding this issue. The (legislative) laws of industrialist groups. The same is true of the vot- shows that religious identities and values are the Israeli state are used to enforce generally ers who helped the Indian BJP to electoral vic- widespread in developing countries, and have minor religious restrictions, such as Saturday tory in 1996 and the Israeli Likud party to its always been so. It is thus not surprising that as closing (Sabbath) and rules against sale of pork products, though decisions concerning electoral breakthrough in 1977. While Marxist, soon as mass, democratic politics had taken root the latter are devolved to the municipal level. nationalist, and liberal movements all competed it led immediately to what Huntington termed

252 THE MULTIPLE FACES OF GLOBALIZATION “indigenization”: a movement towards religious lems” it is nonetheless “better than any other 88% of respondents recidivism and cultural revivalism (Huntington form of government.” In countries across the in the Middle 1996). world, including the Middle East, Africa, and Thus, just as Western countries have typically South Asia, large majorities agree with this point East felt that moved towards secular policies and institutions of view. 88% of respondents in the Middle East democracy is the through legislative votes and popular plebiscite, felt that democracy is the best means of exercis- best means of ironically in developing countries, deseculariza- ing power, similar to the proportions in Western exercising power, tion has likewise occurred through the same Europe (93%) and the United States (90%). means of democratic participation. Such is the Publics in non-Western societies, therefore, by similar to the “democracy paradox”: as non-Western societies and large agree with the view that elections, ref- proportions in adopt liberal-democratic institutions, it is fol- erenda, and representative government should Western Europe lowed by the rise of illiberal movements and the form the basis of political life and government. (93%) and the implementation of illiberal policies. In Afghani- However, very divergent views exist regarding the stan, the newly elected government of Hamid functioning and outcomes of democratic rule, United States Karzai approved a constitution in 2004, which and in particular regarding the role of religion (90%). had been drafted in consultation with the coun- in public life. The World Values Surveys also try’s Loya Jirga, declaring Islam as the country’s asked respondents how “essential” they thought state religion, instituting the Hanafi code of a range of institutional norms were as charac- Shari’a law, and rewarding apostasy with capital teristics of democracy, ranging from respect for punishment. In Iraq, a referendum in 2005 also civil liberties, to the ability to hold referenda, to replaced Hussein’s secular 1990 constitution more eclectic provisions, such as religious me- with a document instituting Shari’a as the na- diation or military monitoring of the government. tional law. In Sri Lanka, the introduction of de- Respondents were given a list of attributes, and mocracy allowed Sinhalese nationalists to gain asked to rate these on a scale from 1 to 10, with power in 1956, and Buddhism to be declared 10 indicating that it is “an essential characteris- the country’s official religion in the 1972 consti- tic of democracy” and 1 that it is “not essential.” tution. In Bangladesh, it was a parliamentary vote In three of the five Islamic societies in which in 1988 that made Islam the state religion, and this question was asked, the majority of respon- though opposition parties opposed the decision dents leaned toward “having religious authorities at the time, they subsequently changed their po- interpret the laws” as “essential” for democracy, sition so as not to alienate conservative Muslim as indicated by a response in the range from voters. In Turkey, the popularly elected AK party 6 to 10.8 By contrast, in Western Europe only has begun implementing desecularization poli- 10.1% of respondents took this view, while in cies, including the lifting of the university head- the United States, only 14% did so. Meanwhile, scarf ban in 2007 and a proposed introduction respondents were asked regarding the impor- of prayer sections in public schools, following in tance in a democracy of “women having the the footsteps of the Democratic Party of the same rights as men,” a question that touches 1950s and the Welfare Party of the 1990s (whose upon an important point given the historical de- attempts at those times were vetoed by the mili- nial of women’s suffrage in many countries, and tary). In Iran, the establishment of an Islamic continuing legal provisions that systematically Republic in 1979 was the result of a social revo- treat men and women differently, such as when lution that saw massive popular participation, and giving testimony in Shari’a courts. In Iraq, the though its subsequent democratic politics are one Arab democracy in the sample, respondents constrained by the religious hierarchy, even re- were divided between 57% who felt that equal formist politicians today do not question the role rights were an element of democracy, and 43% of Shi’a Islam as the country’s official religion, who leaned against this view. In Western Eu- the use of Shari’a law, or the need for moral cen- rope, by contrast, 94.2% of respondents on av- sorship. In Western societies, liberty and democ- erage answered that equal rights were essential racy advance together. In the religiously to their conception of democracy. Clearly, there conservative societies of the Middle East, South are sharp divergences in how cultural traditions Asia, and Africa, this is not obviously so. interpret the basic principles of representative 8 A good illustration of this point is to be found government, and many non-Western societies in The three Islamic societies were Iraq, Indo- in data from the Values Surveys, which since the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia have a nesia, and Malaysia, where the figures were 56%, 54.9%, and 57.2%, while the other two 1981 have asked respondents whether they be- conception of civic representation that differs cases were Burkina Faso and Mali, where the lieve that though democracy “may have its prob- fundamentally from the Western model. figures were 24% and 47.9%, respectively.

Religion and Values in a Globalized Era Ronald Inglehart / Roberto Foa 253 Conclusion separated and public institutions made free of religious ritual or affiliation. Over the course of At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the the twentieth century, religious attendance de- world appears to be dividing into two camps. On clined across most Western societies, and during the one hand are the secular societies of Europe, the late twentieth century moral restrictions were North America, and developed East Asia, where liberalized in areas such as divorce, prostitution, the state is separated from religious life, social abortion, and same-sex marriage. While there are attitudes have become more accepting of wom- some remaining areas where further liberaliza- en’s rights and alternative lifestyles, and legis- tion is possible, for example, the use of recre- lative changes have relaxed restrictions against ational drugs, the key legislative changes were prostitution, abortion, and divorce. When mi- introduced in the 1970s and “moral issues” re- grants who do not share Western norms and val- main contentious only in outlier countries, such ues enter these societies, they are expected to as Poland or the United States, where adherence accept rules regarding secular education, toler- to traditional religious edicts remains important ance of sexual minorities, and women’s rights, among some groups in society. or face legal barriers and punishments. On the On the other hand, in non-Western societ- other hand are the societies of the Middle East, ies secularization has stumbled at the first step. Africa, and South Asia. In these countries secular Secular constitutions were introduced during constitutions have often been rewritten, public independence, demarcating the political realm opinion remains firmly devout, and religious laws from the spiritual, but this separation has prov- have increasingly come into force. While reli- en unsustainable in the absence of a significant gious identification has not necessarily strength- non-religious population, and the acceptance of ened in such countries during recent decades, secular liberal norms among the general popu- the mobilization of the masses into political life lace. In some states such as Turkey and India has brought religious movements to parliament the secular constitution remains in force, though and government, overturning the secular institu- in most other Middle Eastern and South Asian tions that Western-educated and Western-backed countries this is no longer so. A number of coun- leaders introduced during the early post-inde- tries in the region continue to be run by secular pendence period. Arab nationalist regimes; however, religious par- In the coming decades, will this gap between ties and movements such as the Muslim Brother- sacred and secular worlds widen further, or will hood may eventually overturn the status quo in there by contrast be a new process of conver- countries ranging from Egypt, to Jordan, to Syria gence? In answering this question, it is useful or Tunisia. Meanwhile, in Turkey, it is conceivable to distinguish between two different kinds of that the military establishment proves unable to secularity, namely, secularization of the state stem the pressure for political reform, and the and secularization of the individual. The first of country adopts a constitutional settlement that, these, state secularity, is the differentiation of if not similar to Iran, may at least resemble the secular spheres, such as the bureaucracy and more moderate religious laws in Israel. If a de- the market, from religion. By this definition, Tur- marcation between the religious, political, and key or India may be considered secular (by virtue private spheres is to develop in this region of of their constitutional arrangements), though the world, it is unlikely to follow the Western neither has a secular culture. The second form, pattern of the secular state being succeeded by individual secularity, is the decline of religious the secular society, but will instead have to begin practices and beliefs, such as prayer, attending from the secularization of society and only then religious services, or following religious stric- proceed to broader institutional reform. tures. This is the form of secularization that pre- What prospect is there for such a transfor- vails, to varying degrees and extents, in parts of mation to occur? We have seen that religious Western Europe, Asia, and the Americas, though identification appears to be lower among younger is comparatively rare elsewhere. generations in the Middle East, though this find- In the West secularization has spread to both ing remains inconclusive at present. Despite the domains. Starting the eighteenth century in rollback of secular institutions, it is possible that France and the United States, and extending these societies may eventually undergo a process to the late twentieth century with the official of intergenerational value-change, similar to that disestablishment of the church in Italy, Spain, observed in Western countries since the 1960s, or Sweden, religion and politics were officially with younger generations eventually rejecting

254 THE MULTIPLE FACES OF GLOBALIZATION the conservative norms of the elders and em- ment and self-realization. Yet the pace of social bracing a new set of values based around indi- change is glacial, and any evidence that we have, vidual rights and alternative lifestyles. In theory, such as the intergenerational value differences the economic development of the Arab countries, in the Middle East, remains inconclusive. Even led by the Gulf States, and the entrenchment of assuming a process of cultural change is under- a democratic culture based around free expres- way, these societies are beginning from starting sion and the exchange of ideas, ought to lead points that are far removed from the social con- eventually to a transformation in social attitudes, sensus that prevails in the Western world, and as individuals de-emphasize traditional values as a result conflicts over religious values are in favor of values emphasizing personal develop- likely to remain an enduring feature of our world.

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MARTIN PARR Ω india, goa, 1993

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