Opérations Militaires : Entre Prise De Risque, Solidarité, Souveraineté Et « Entrée En Premier » André Dumoulin Chercheur Au Centre D’Études De Sécurité Et Défense
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o SÉCURITÉ & STRATÉGIE N 121 VEILIGHEID & STRATEGIE Août 2015 Opérations militaires : entre prise de risque, solidarité, souveraineté et « entrée en premier » André Dumoulin Chercheur au Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense supérieur royal Institut ii Une version électronique du présent document est disponible et peut être téléchargée gratuitement sur notre site internet : www.irsd.be Les vues exprimées dans ce document sont celles de son auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles de l’Institut royal supérieur de défense, de la Défense ou du gouvernement belge. Vous pouvez adresser vos questions, commentaires ou remarques quant à ce document à l’adresse suivante : Directeur du Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense Avenue de la Renaissance, 30 1000 Bruxelles Ou par courriel : [email protected] ISSN : 0770-9005 Opérations militaires : entre prise de risque, solidarité, souveraineté et « entrée en premier » André Dumoulin Chercheur au Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Institut royal supérieur de défense Centre d’études de sécurité et défense Avenue de la Renaissance 30 1000 Bruxelles Image de couverture Exercice Hot Blade 2014 Source : Agence européenne de défense (http://www.eda.europa.eu) – image extraite de la médiathèque Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos /eudefenceagency/14537791699/in/album-72157645720175065). Executive Summary Military operations in general and operations associated with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) of the European Union or within NATO can only be analysed if four criteria are taken into account in the very early stages: the solidarity among participating states and their multinational forces, the weight of sovereignty and of the restrictions related to military and political risk-taking, the issue of risk-taking and, finally, the capacity to enter first the intervention areas. Obviously, the level of commitment is closely linked to the vital or non- vital nature of national interests, the organisational dimension (alliances, multinationality) that always is in the second circle of solidarity. Therefore, it is necessary to define the sociological, thanatological, military, political, media and techno-doctrinal factors affecting, in whole or in part, the highly sensitive dimension of risk-taking during missions and operations. As a result, the consequences are multiple as well: privatisation of security, phased commitments, disconnection in an asymmetrical game in mirror with the use of drones, the subtle erosion of the warrior archetype, which is miles away from films like Saving Private Ryan or Fury, the discrepancy as to the value of the lives to defend, and the renewed awareness of post-traumatic stress disorders. To complicate matters further, legal and political concepts of solidarity and assistance are “adjustable” and can raise numerous questions on their interplay during missions and operations outside alliances. In that case, where are the solidarity automatisms, the automatically-granted supports, and the sacrifices shared in managing out-of-area crises? How should the establishing of both the rules of engagement and, most importantly, the national restrictions on the use of force in a multinational environment (caveats) be interpreted when the issues are not vital but require however a military presence? What is the actual weight of the national cultures, are they assets to or curbs on the “multi- nationalisation” of the external interventions which should be effective and legitimate? What about the sovereignty in this shared area, knowing that the concepts of power, third countries of strategic importance or Soft Power Plus are also involved? Power is fundamental, and the fact that it can be expressed in different ways tends to make postures, expectations, perceptions more complex. Notwithstanding, the doctrinal and media perception of the entry force concept refers to a posture discrepancy between states with respect to external commitments, the imposed or undergone schedules, as well as the dimension reactivity and projection, leading to both a capacity and a risk-taking gap between allied states. However, multinationalism, joint engagements, and shared risk-taking will remain central in the future. Consequently, what should the balance be between the voluntary states acting as entry forces, other more reluctant states, free-riders and states that ultimately follow after initial resistance. These four politico-strategic and psycho-sociological parameters should nowadays be addressed in parallel before being linked. They could explain any country’s posture, the political constraints, the limits on commitments and the permanence of the “zero casualty” or, more accurately, the “least casualties” myth. Therefore, this study takes a global approach, through numerous examples, to these different elements in order to improve the understanding of the issues related to the present and future missions and operations. It also defines the future priorities that will need to go through, inter alia, the construction process of a shared European strategic thinking, a better knowledge of the national security culture of EU and NATO member states and the necessity to make progress in multinational cooperation given the fact that it is often by bilateral or regional agreements that trust is built up, through sharing a proud sovereignty and risk-taking in solidarity. x Table des matières Executive Summary ............................................................................................ ix Table des matières ............................................................................................... xi Acronymes et abréviations ................................................................................ xiii Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 a. Agir seuls dans l’urgence ? ................................................................. 1 b. Susciter la solidarité européenne ........................................................ 3 c. Prise de risque et dernier mot national .............................................. 5 d. Vers un patriotisme européen ? .......................................................... 7 Paramètres pluridimensionnels associés à la prise de risque ......................... 9 La pluralité des facteurs ..................................................................................... 11 a. Facteurs sociologiques et thanatologiques ....................................... 11 b. Facteurs militaires ............................................................................ 19 c. Facteurs politiques ............................................................................ 25 d. Facteurs médiatiques ........................................................................ 29 e. Facteurs technologiques et doctrinaux ............................................. 37 f. Caractère vital ou non vital .............................................................. 40 g. Conséquences .................................................................................... 46 Paramètres pluridimensionnels associés à la solidarité et à la souveraineté ...................................................................................................... 59 Définitions des concepts de solidarité et d’assistance ........................................ 61 a. Les clauses de solidarité et d’assistance : les zones d’ombre ........................................................................................... 61 b. Les règles d’engagement ................................................................... 77 c. Le poids des cultures nationales en multinational ............................ 82 d. Notions de souveraineté .................................................................... 84 La capacité à entrer en premier et le facteur « temps » ................................ 91 Notions de réaction rapide .................................................................................. 93 h. Outils européens en matière de réaction rapide ............................... 93 i. Le pouvoir « d’entrer en premier » ................................................... 99 j. Interactions temporelles .................................................................. 103 k. Des avantages de la multinationalisation ....................................... 107 Conclusions et recommandations .................................................................. 115 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 117 Recommandations ............................................................................................ 121 Annexes ............................................................................................................ 125 Annexe 1 : Grille d’analyse des politiques nationales de défense de Murray et Viotti ....................................................................................... 127 Annexe 2 : Cérémonie d’hommage rendu : allocution du président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy (Fréjus, 27 août 2010) ..................... 131 Bibliographie ................................................................................................... 135 Ouvrages, monographies et études ................................................................... 137 Articles de revues, de presse spécialisée et sites