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Chrymereport.Pdf These Papers are published by Agenfor Italia. Founded in 1996 by eminent Italian researchers, Agenfor is an independent think-tank ba- sed in Rome, Rimini, Milano, Como, Lecco, Verona and Rovigo. Its interdisciplinary research on the Middle East and Security Policies is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Agenfor’s ambition – through its publi- cations, seminars and recommendations - is to make a useful contribu- tion to the decisionmaking process. Given the highly sensitive nature of the study, the research teams ob- served the strictest frameworks and security measures to ensure legal, safe and confidential data storage and retrieval. The anonymity of all interviewees was guaranteed, and assurances to this effect given to all who responded to or participated in the study. Disclaimer This study does not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of the European Commission or of Agenfor, nor are they bound by its conclu- sions. Copyright clause Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged and the following text accompanies any reproduction: this study has been produced by Agenfor for the Euro- pean Commission - Directorate Generale Justice Freedom and Secu- rity - CRYME JLS/2007/ISEC/551- Acknowledgements This report was authored by dr. Sergio Bianchi. The report also draws on direct contributions from the following indivi- duals: · Dr Issam Mujihed · Dr Nicola Giovannini · Avv.sa Malena Zinconi Fernandez · Dr Paolo Quercia · Dr Sergio de Vita I N D EX INTRODUCTION pag. 6 TERMINOLOGY AND SUMMARY 10 ABSTRACT 18 I. ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT BETWEEN FRIEND AND FOE 26 I.1 Radicalisation and violence 6 Fact box - The measures taken by the Italian Government after 11/9 56 Fact box - Spanish Legislation 58 Fact box - French Law 62 Fact box - The terrorism act 2006 70 I.2 Radicalisation and Islam 80 I. Jihad and Jihadism 8 II. CASE HISTORIES OF PENITENTIAL RADICALISATION 98 Jeff Fort 100 Nizar Trabelsi 100 Richard Reid and the Great Britain case 102 Josè Padilla 106 Allekma Lamari 106 Abdelrahman Tahriri 108 Gamal Ahmidan 108 Kevin Lamar James 110 Operation Hades 112 Bassam Ayachi 11 III. QUANTITATIVE DATA - RISK INDICATORS 116 III. 1- Italy: from logistics to the practice of terrorism 10 III. 2- Spain 162 III. -England 202 III. - France 28 III. 5- Belgium 256 IV. THE DE-RADICALISATION POLICIES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 278 V. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RADICALISATION 292 VI. RISK ELEMENTS AND NEW MODELS 18 VI 1. Homogeneity of registered data and service standard 18 VI 2. The Imams and Leaders 2 VI . Prisoners accused of crimes connected with terrorism. 6 VI . Inter-Institutional co-ordination 6 VI 5. “PREVENT”: a Good Practice for Europe 5 VII. CONCLUSIONS 60 Bibliography 78 I N D I C E INTRODUZIONE pag. 7 TERMINOLOGIA E SOMMARIO 11 ABSTRACT 19 I. L’ANALISI DELLA MINACCIA FRA AMICO E NEMICO 27 I.1 Radicalizzazione e violenza 7 Fact box - I provvedimenti del Governo Italiano dopo l’11/9 57 Fact box - La Legislazione spagnola 59 Fact box - La Legislazione francese 6 Fact box - Il terrorism act 2006 71 I.2 Radicalizzazione ed Islam 81 I. Jihad e Jihadismo 85 II. CASE HISTORIES DELLA RADICALIZZAZIONE PENITENZIARIA 99 Jeff Fort 101 Nizar Trabelsi 101 Richard Reid e i casi inglesi 10 Josè Padilla 107 Allekma Lamari 107 Abdelrahman Tahriri 109 Gamal Ahmidan 109 Kevin Lamar James 111 Operazione Hades 11 Bassam Ayachi 115 III. I DATI QUANTITATIVI QUALI INDICATORI DI RISCHIO 117 III.1- Italia: dalla logistica alla pratica del terrorismo 11 III.2- Spagna: le radici europee del jiadhismo 16 III.3- Inghilterra: l’integrazione difficile 203 III.- Francia: l’Islam come religione di maggioranza nelle carceri 29 III.5- Belgio: crocevia del radicalismo estremista? 257 IV. LE POLITICHE DI DE-RADICALIZZAZIONE NEL MONDO MUSULMANO 279 V. FENOMENOLOGIA DELLA RADICALIZZAZIONE 29 VI. FATTORI DI RISCHIO E NUOVI MODELLI 19 VI.1) Omogeneità dei dati di matricola e Standard di servizio 19 VI.2) Gli Imam ed i Leader 25 VI.) I detenuti per reati connessi al terrorismo 7 VI.) Il Coordinamento inter-istituzionale 7 VI.5) ‘PREVENT’: una Buona Prassi per l’Europa 55 VII. CONCLUSIONI 61 Bibliografia 78 5 INTRODUCTION The antidote to the venom of terrorism by Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati * Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Justice The tragedy of September 11th and the historic turning-point in international relations which followed this event has forced the West to start thinking from scratch about the policies of security. At the same time, it has become dramatically obvious that a new approach to the phenomenon of terrorism is needed. Terrorism has caused bloodshed in our history and in that of other European countries too. The last-ditch attempt of Italian ideological extremism is still linked to what is left of the Red Brigade and is now aggravated by the Jihad radicalisation with all its destabilising implications: religious contents based on a distorted and exploited use of the Koran together with its international ramifications of groups and movements. The Agenfor Italia study and the CRYME project (Criminal Rehabilitation of Young Muslim in Europe) sound out the reality of prisons which are revealed as being highly dangerous breeding grounds for fundamentalism and for out-and-out recruitment of new adepts in the army of terror. The global dimension of the phenomenon needs a strategy which is able to transcend national fences. A strategy which must involve not only Governments but all citizens beginning with the Islam community which must be defended from generalisation and dangerous criminalisation of the mass. Our country has contributed to the elaboration of a European policy able to prevent and repress the spreading of the vicious seeds of Jihadism and update this policy with decisive and coherent action. In the Italian penitentiary institutes the risk of proselytism with a final aim of armed combat is a fact, and this is why it is continually monitored. The prisoners who practice the Islamic faith are almost 18% of the whole prison population: 24 thousand out of 65 thousand of which 80 were directly involved in crimes related to terrorism. A problem within a bigger problem is the overcrowding in prisons. To solve this emergency the government has proposed to create 47 sectors and 8 new institutes which all together can hold 80 thousand prisoners. 6 INTRODUZIONE L’antidoto al veleno del terrorismo di Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati Sottosegretario di Stato alla Giustizia La tragedia dell’11 settembre e la svolta epocale nelle relazioni inter- nazionali che a quell’evento è seguita ha imposto all’Occidente di ri- pensare dalle fondamenta le politiche per la sicurezza. E, allo stesso tempo, ha reso drammaticamente evidente la necessità di un approc- cio nuovo a un fenomeno come il terrorismo, che pure ha sanguinosa- mente segnato la storia del nostro come di altri Paesi europei. Ai colpi di coda dell’estremismo ideologico, in Italia ancora legati a quel che resta delle Brigate Rosse, si è aggiunta, infatti, la radicalizzazione jihadista con tutte le sue destabilizzanti implicazioni: il contenuto reli- gioso, basato su una lettura distorta e spesso strumentale del Corano insieme con la ramificazione internazionale di gruppi e movimenti. Lo studio dell’Agenfor Italia ed il progetto CRYME (Criminal Rehabili- tation of Young Muslim in Europe) opportunamente scandagliano una realtà, quella carceraria, che si è rivelata pericoloso bacino di coltura per il fondamentalismo e per il vero e proprio reclutamento di nuovi adepti dell’esercito del terrore. La dimensione globale del fenomeno impone una strategia capace di supe- rare gli steccati nazionali. Una strategia che coinvolga non solo i Governi, ma tutti i cittadini, a partire dalla comunità islamica che va messa al riparo da generalizzazioni e pericolose criminalizzazioni di massa. Il nostro Paese ha dato un importante contributo all’elaborazione di una politica europea capa- ce di prevenire e reprimere il diffondersi della mala pianta del jihadismo ed a quella politica oggi informa la propria azione con coerenza e decisione. Negli istituti penitenziari italiani il rischio di un proselitismo finalizzato alla lotta armata è concreto e, proprio per questo, costantemente mo- nitorizzato. Basti pensare che i detenuti di fede islamica sono quasi il 18% dell’intera popolazione carceraria: 24 mila su circa 65 mila, ottan- ta dei quali per reati direttamente associati al terrorismo. Un problema all’interno di un problema più vasto, quello del sovraffollamento del sistema carcerario. A questa emergenza risponde il piano straordinario varato dal governo che si propone di creare 47 padiglioni e 8 nuovi istituti in modo da portare a 80 mila unità la capienza complessiva. 7 However, as the in-depth report of Agentor Italia illustrates, it would be a mistake to face fundamentalism solely with repression. What our country is doing and the innovative experience already gained in other European States which are documented in this report, are based on the knowledge that the fake Jihad prophets must be singled out and fought by all of us, a duty which must involve society and the moderate Islam with which there has always been productive dialogue. This is the main road to take if we want to achieve reciprocal respect, peaceful religious and different cultural co-existence which have always belonged to the genetic code of European history. 8 Ma, come documenta in modo esaustivo il rapporto dell’Agenfor Italia, sarebbe sbagliato ricondurre la questione del fondamentalismo ad una dimensione esclusivamente repressiva. Il lavoro che si va facendo nel nostro Paese e le esperienze innovative già avviate in altri Stati europei e documentate in questo studio, muovono dalla consapevolezza che i falsi profeti della Jihad vanno individuati e combattuti con un impegno collettivo; impegno che sempre più coinvolga la società civile e quel- l’Islam moderato col quale è in atto da sempre un dialogo fecondo.
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