DOCSLIB.ORG

Restricting Presidential War Powers

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Restricting Presidential War Powers Presidential War Powers 1 Restoring the Balance: Restricting Presidential War Powers A controversy paper proposal for the 2013-14 CEDA season Dr. Kelly Young, Wayne State (OSOs) John Koch, Wayne State (Drones/UAV) Bruce Najor, Wayne State (Detention) Al Hiland, Minnesota (Covert Ops) Jacob Justice, Wayne State (Wiretapping) Brad Meloche, Wayne State (Preventive Intervention) Talya Slaw, Wayne State (UN/NATO Operations) Presidential War Powers 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3 I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..…………………………………………………5 II. The Status Quo and the Central Controversy A. The Status Quo & Uniqueness……………………………………………………………………………………….7 B. Stakes of the Controversy………………………………………………………………………………………………9 III. Mainstream options for policy change –Limitations/Restrictions on War Powers A. Statutory Limitations or Restrictions as a Mechanism……………………………………………………………….12 B. Broad Statutory Approaches to Restrict the Use of War Powers………………………………….16 C. Specific Approaches to Restrict the Use of War Powers 1. UAV/Drone Strikes…………………………………………………………………………………………..17 2. Offense Cyber Operations……………………………………………………………………………….25 3. Indefinite Detention………………………………………………………………………………………..29 4. Warrantless Wiretapping…………………………………………………………………………………39 5. DOD Covert Operations…………………………………………………………………………………..46 6. Approval for UN/NATO Action…………………………………………………………………………52 7. Unilateral Preventive Military Operations……………………………………………………….57 D. Critical Approaches to Limiting Presidential Powers 1. Local/National focus and critique of presidentialism……………………………………….62 2. Psychoanalytic/anti-capitalist analysis……………………………………………………………..64 3. Critical examination of the National Security State………………………………………….65 4. Critical interrogations of specific technologies/war powers…………………………...66 IV. Unique educational opportunities…………………………………………………………………………………………………….66 V. Core Negative Ground A. Leadership/hegemony DA…………………………………………………………………………………………….70 B. Terrorism Credibility DA……………………………………………………………………………………………….73 C. International Peacekeeping/Human Rights Enforcement DA……………………………………...74 D. Modeling Das……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….76 E. Politics DA…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….76 F. Counterplans………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..78 G. Negative Critical Arguments…………………………………………………………………………………………84 VI. Potential directions for wording papers……………………………………………………………………………………………87 VII. Recommendation of the authors…………………………………………………………………………………………………….92 Presidential War Powers 3 Executive Summary We know that there will be a number of excellent controversy papers offered for the 2013-2014 season. Careful consideration of these proposals is always difficult as the school year ends and summer camp work begins. We apologize in advance for submitting a rather lengthy controversy proposal. However, the length of this paper does not reflect the unmanageable size of the topic (indeed, the topic could easily be made to be rather narrow in scope if desired) but rather the wealth of excellent arguments and evidence that exist on this topic that would make it enjoyable for an entire season. We were rather exuberant in our desire to provide an in-depth discussion of this controversy. To assist you, we have streamlined our reasons to support this controversy here. The subsequent sections offer more depth and evidence of these claims. We propose that the 2013-2014 debate resolution examines the restriction of presidential war powers. • The controversy is timely but not too timely – the news is dominated by unchecked presidential war powers such as UAV drone strikes, warrantless wiretaps, and preventive war powers. However, in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, Congress and the Courts have abdicated their constitutional duties as checks to executive authority and allowed unconstrained presidential war authority in the fight against terror. As a result, there is little chance that the status quo will change any time soon and guarantees that the plan will make a significant change from the status quo. • Clearly defined controversy with clear uniqueness – Recent CEDA forums discussions of controversies and debate topics have maintained that controversy papers should require a large degree (or quality) of change by the affirmative, have solid uniqueness that does not allow the affirmative to argue that their change is similar to some action being taken in the status quo, and that there be a clearly identifiable “disadvantage to the resolution.” We believe this controversy paper includes all three of those elements. First, there is no chance that Congress or the Courts will limit the president’s war powers in the status quo, thus making the action taken significant and controversial. Second, there is a clear disadvantage to the topic – constraining presidential war powers undermines U.S. ability to respond to emerging rogue nation and non- state threats. Presidential War Powers 4 • It is a legal controversy without being solely a courts topic - Issues surrounding presidential constitutional authority as commander in chief implicate many of the most contested issues in constitutional law. As such, the controversy raises a number of important legal questions and requires students to engage legal literature to research the debate. However, what is nice about this controversy is that it does not have to be a courts topic. The advantage of this is that we can debate important liberal legal issues without having to debate Courts Politics, Legitimacy, or Activism DAs. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these arguments, they have a tendency to dominate legal debate topics. Our proposal allows us to access the educational benefits of a legal topic without having to debate the typical set of generic legal strategies. Presidential War Powers 5 “…comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country” – Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, 1952. I. Introduction On March 7, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) began a 13-hour long filibuster of President Obama’s nomination of John Brennan as head of the CIA. The purpose of the filibuster was to “dra[w] attention to deep concern on both sides of the aisle about the administration’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in its fight against terrorists and whether the government would ever use them in the United States.” 1 While the filibuster eventually ended and Brenan was successfully nominated, Paul’s efforts received somewhat surprising bipartisan praise, especially from conservative and libertarian critics and civil-liberties-minded liberals and progressives. For example, Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR), praised Paul for his “fight for an important ideal” 2 ACLU senior legislative counsel Christopher Anders was hopeful that the filibuster was “part of Congress reasserting its constitutional role of checks and balances between the president and the Congress. For too long on national security issues we’ve had congress out to lunch.” 3 Anders highlights the central controversy surrounding the Obama administration’s use of UAVs and definition of “enemy combatants”: the ever expanding scope of presidential war powers. While Anders holds out hope that this act will restore the constitutional checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches over national security and war powers, several trends suggest that this rare congressional criticism against the deployment of executive authority will not be sustained. For instance, senior GOP leaders such as Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) quickly rebuked Paul, arguing that expansive presidential powers are necessary for the president to effectively fight the War on Terror. 4 This response is not surprising, as it continues a long trend of Congress abdicating its Constitutional responsibility in restraining excessive presidential power. 5 In the last four decades, over 100 military actions were taken by the president without significant congressional 1 Ed O’Keefe and Aaron Blake, “Paul’s filibuster in opposition to Brennan, drone policy ends after nearly 13 hours,” Washington Post, March 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rand-paul-conducts-filibuster-in- opposition-to-john-brennan-obamas-drone-policy/2013/03/06/1367b1b4-868c-11e2-9d71- f0feafdd1394_story.html 2 Z. Byron Wolf, “Rand Paul Wins Applause From GOP and Liberals,” ABC News, March 7, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/rand-paul-wins-applause-from-gop-and-liberals/ 3 ibid 4 Richard Stevenson and Ashley Parker, “A Senator’s Stand on Drones Scrambles Partisan Lines,” New York Times, March 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/us/politics/mccain-and-graham-assail-paul-filibuster-over- drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 5 Peter Irons, War Powers: How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked the Constitution, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005. Presidential War Powers 6 opposition 6, leading noted historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to contend that the growth in presidential national security and war powers occurred “as much a matter of congressional acquiescence as of presidential usurpation.” 7 As former U.S. senator and Secretary of the Navy, Jim Webb notes in 2013, congressional abdication of its role in balancing ever expanding presidential powers has grown worst overtime and is in clear opposition to the Framers’ intent: Jim Web , “Congressional Abdication,” National Interest, March-April 2013 , http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138?page=1
Load more

Recommended publications
  • N:\Spaul\Newsrel\Anti-Terrorism\Finton Release
    Acting United States Attorney Jeffrey B. Lang Central District of Illinois FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: SHARON PAUL THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 PHONE: (217) 492-4450 www.usdoj.gov/usao/ilc/ ILLINOIS MAN ARRESTED IN PLOT TO BOMB COURTHOUSE AND MURDER FEDERAL EMPLOYEES -- Vehicle Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public -- SPRINGFIELD – Acting U.S. Attorney Jeffrey B. Lang of the Central District of Illinois and Karen E. Spangenberg, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI, Springfield Division, today announced that Michael C. Finton, a.k.a., “Talib Islam,” has been arrested on charges of attempted murder of federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) in connection with a plot to detonate a vehicle bomb at the federal building in Springfield, Ill. In his alleged efforts to carry out the plot, Finton ultimately dealt with undercover FBI agents and confidential sources who continuously monitored his activities up to the time of the arrest. Further, in his alleged efforts, Finton drove a vehicle containing inactive explosives to the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in Springfield and attempted to detonate them, according to a criminal complaint filed today in the Central District of Illinois. The arrest of Finton is not in any way related to the ongoing terror investigation in New York and Colorado. Finton, 29, a resident of Decatur, Ill., is charged in the criminal complaint with one count of attempted murder of federal officers or employees and attempted use a weapon of mass destruction. If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of life in prison.
    [Show full text]
  • Borderless World, Boundless Threat:Online Jihadists and Modern
    BORDERLESS WORLD, BOUNDLESS THREAT: ONLINE JIHADISTS AND MODERN TERRORISM A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Spencer O. Hayne, B.A. Washington, DC November 19, 2010 Copyright © 2010 by Spencer O. Hayne All Rights Reserved ii BORDERLESS WORLD, BOUNDLESS THREAT: ONLINE JIHADISTS AND MODERN TERRORISM Spencer O. Hayne, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Justine A. Rosenthal, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The online jihadist community represents a new phenomenon in the global spread of Islamic radicalism. Many terrorism experts largely ignore the fact that the Internet is more than just a tool for established terrorist organizations—it can be a platform for the evolution of the jihadist social movement itself. While the majority of this movement’s members are casual supporters of a global Islamist jihad against the West, a number of the community’s members have already proven willing to take their virtual beliefs into the real world through terrorist acts. Many of these terrorists have attracted significant media attention—Jihad Jane, the Christmas Day Bomber, the Fort Hood Shooter, the attack on CIA agents in Afghanistan, the Times Square Bomber, and a number of other “homegrown” terrorists. The individuals perpetrating these terrorist acts are as diverse as they are dangerous, presenting a significant challenge to counterterrorism officials and policymakers. This study profiles 20 recent cases of online jihadists who have made the transition to real-world terrorism along a number of characteristics: age, ethnicity, immigration status, education, religious upbringing, socio-economic class, openness about beliefs, suicidal tendencies, rhetoric focus, location, target, terrorist action, offline and online activity, and social isolation or the presence of an identity crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • STINGS, STOOLIES, and AGENTS PROVOCATEURS: EVALUATING FBI UNDERCOVER COUNTERRORISM OPERATIONS a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty
    STINGS, STOOLIES, AND AGENTS PROVOCATEURS: EVALUATING FBI UNDERCOVER COUNTERRORISM OPERATIONS A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Joseph Bertini, B.A. Washington, DC April 15, 2011 Copyright 2011 by Joseph Bertini All Rights Reserved ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 Literature Review............................................................................................................. 3 Background Information .................................................................................................. 4 Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 13 Analysis.......................................................................................................................... 17 Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................................. 30 Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 36 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 44 iii I. Introduction After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dramatically
    [Show full text]
  • Combating Terrorism: the Role of Law Enforcement
    Disclaimer The authors, editors, and the research staff cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this publication. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions associated with this report. Copyright © 2016 by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies directed by Professor Yonah Alexander. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced, stored, or distributed without the prior written consent of the copyright holder. Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203 Tel. 703-562-4513, 703-525-0770 ext. 237 Fax 703-525-0299 [email protected] www.potomacinstitute.org www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org www.iucts.org Cover Design by Alex Taliesen THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES Combating Terrorism: The Role of Law Enforcement Table of Contents Professor Yonah Alexander................................................................................................................... 1 Michael Braun ........................................................................................................................................... 9 Sgt. Mark Landahl .................................................................................................................................. 14 Captain Dave Martin ...........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001
    CORPORATION THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Learn more about the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation occasional paper series. RAND occasional papers may include an informed perspective on a timely policy issue, a discussion of new research methodologies, essays, a paper presented at a conference, a conference summary, or a summary of work in progress. All RAND occasional papers undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.
    [Show full text]
  • Drones: the Power to Kill
    Drones: The Power to Kill Alberto R. Gonzales* ABSTRACT After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the Bush Administra- tion began the use of unmanned armed aerial drones to pursue targets in Af- ghanistan and Pakistan. The Obama Administration has continued this policy, expanding it to pursue substantially more targets in Yemen and new ones in Pakistan. This Article analyzes the Obama Administration’s proce- dures for placing American citizens on the list of targets for drone strikes and proposes additional measures that Congress and the President can take to en- sure that the procedures comply with constitutional guarantees of due process. This Article uses Supreme Court precedents on enemy combatant designations and trials as a source of due process standards. It argues for the following steps: (1) the establishment of an “enemy combatant” definition specific to drone targets; (2) a requirement that the President notify Congress of any po- tential U.S. citizen target and of any executed strike; (3) verification, immedi- ately before the strike, that the American target continues to meet the definition of enemy combatant; and (4) the opportunity for an advocate of the target to challenge the classification before a neutral decisionmaker. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................. 2 I. A BACKGROUND ON DRONE STRIKES AND AL-AULAQI ............................................. 4 A. Use of Drones as Weapons Against Terrorism ...... 4 B. The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi ...................... 8 II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DRONE STRIKES ........ 17 A. Defining “Enemy Combatant” ...................... 17 B. The President’s Authority in Times of War .......... 19 C. Due Process Rights of American Citizens in Times of War .............................................
    [Show full text]
  • SIGINT for Anyone
    THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S JIHADISTS THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S About This Perspective The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign, and there is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. The United States has invested significant resources in THE ORIGINS OF preventing terrorist attacks, and authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots. This Perspective identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11 involving 178 planners and perpetrators. Eighty-seven percent of those planners and perpetrators had long residencies in the United States. Only four of them had come to the United States illegally, all as minors. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity, and vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist AMERICA’S terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight. Jenkins JIHADISTS Brian Michael Jenkins $21.00 ISBN-10 0-8330-9949-3 ISBN-13 978-0-8330-9949-5 52100 C O R P O R A T I O N www.rand.org Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE C O R P O R A T I O N 9 780833 099495 R PE-251-RC (2017) barcode_template_CC15.indd 1 10/17/17 12:00 PM Contents Summary of Key Judgments ..................................................................................1 The Origins of America’s Jihadists .........................................................................3 Appendix .............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Confronting an Uncertain Threat: the Future of Al Qaeda and Associated
    Confonting an Uncertain Threat an Uncertain Confonting a report of the csis homeland security and counterterrorism program and the csis transnational threats project Confronting an Uncertain Threat the future of al qaeda and associated movements 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Project Directors Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Thomas M. Sanderson Nelson and Sanderson Nelson Project Coordinators Ben Bodurian David Gordon Project Senior Advisers Arnaud de Borchgrave Juan C. Zarate September 2011 ISBN 978-0-89206-667-4 Ë|xHSKITCy066674zv*:+:!:+:! a report of the csis homeland security and counterterrorism program and the csis transnational threats project Confronting an Uncertain Threat the future of al qaeda and associated movements Project Directors Rick “Ozzie” Nelson Thomas M. Sanderson Project Coordinators Ben Bodurian David Gordon Project Senior Advisers Arnaud de Borchgrave Juan C. Zarate September 2011 About CSIS At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel- ops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Terrorist Threat
    REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GROUP i PETER BERGEN AND BRUCE HOFFMAN SEPTEMBER 10, 2010 ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT Executive Summary Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. Al-Qaeda‟s ideological influence on other jihadist groups is on the rise in South Asia and has continued to extend into countries like Yemen and Somalia; al-Qaeda‟s top leaders are still at large, and American overreactions to even unsuccessful terrorist attacks arguably have played, however inadvertently, into the hands of the jihadists. Working against al-Qaeda and allied groups are the ramped-up campaign of drone attacks in Pakistan, increasingly negative Pakistani attitudes and actions against the militants based on their territory, which are mirrored by increasingly hostile attitudes toward al-Qaeda and allied groups in the Muslim world in general, and the fact that erstwhile militant allies have now also turned against al-Qaeda.
    [Show full text]
  • Anti- Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans
    Anti- Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans DAVID SCHANZER SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY DUKE UNIVERSITY CHARLES KURZMAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL EBRAHIM MOOSA DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION DUKE UNIVERSITY JANUARY 6, 2010 Project Supported by the National Institute of Justice This project was supported by grant no. 2007-IJ-CX-0008, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. — 2 — Table of Contents Executive Summary.......1 Introduction.......4 Part 1. Homegrown Terrorism: Rhetoric and Reality.... ..6 Part 2. Muslim-Americans’ Anti-Radicalization Activities.....18 Part 3. Conclusions and Recommendations.....40 About the Authors.....46 Acknowledgments.....47 Endnotes.....48 Appendix: Muslim-American Terrorism Offenders, 2001-2009.....53 Sidebars Research Site Profiles.....12-16 North Carolina Terrorism Arrests.....17-18 “I Called the FBI”.....23-24 “Venting Sessions”..........26 “We Monitor Our Masjids”..........27 “What Will Harm Them, Will Harm Us”..........35 “We Are Not Against America”..........36 Charts Age..... 10 Citizenship Status.... .11 EtEthnicity.... .11 Incidents..........11 Executive Summary PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT Low Numbers of Radicalized Muslim-Americans. Although the vast majority of Muslim-Americans reject In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, radical extremist ideology and violence, a small number 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere of Muslim-Americans have radicalized since 9/11. In around the world, a key counterterrorism concern the eight years following 9/11, according to our project’s is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in count, 139 Muslim-Americans committed acts of ter- the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • American Muslim Extremists: a Continuing Threat to Jews
    American Muslim Extremists: A Continuing Threat to Jews Updated: April 24, 2013 Introduction Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, an alarming number of Americans motivated by radical interpretations of Islam have been involved in terrorist plots and conspiracies in which Jews and Jewish institutions have been targeted or considered for attack. Many other American Muslim extremists arrested or convicted of a wide-range of terror-related charges have expressed similar hatred of Jews and Israel. Approximately 250 American Muslim extremists, including legal residents, have been arrested on various terror-related charges, ranging from bomb plots to providing material support to terrorists, since 9/11. About half of those arrested are U.S.-born, and roughly one quarter are converts to Islam. While most of the plots in the U.S. have been foiled by law enforcement before they were carried out, the number of conspiracies and plots targeting Jews and Jewish institutions demonstrates the ongoing threat posed by American Muslim extremists motivated by hatred of Jews and Israel. For example, Ahmed Ferhani, a legal resident from Algeria, and Mohammad Mamdouh, a naturalized U.S. citizen awaiting trial, were arrested in May 2011 for plotting to attack a synagogue in New York City. According to authorities, the two targeted Jews in order to advance their radical ideological goals. Reading a prepared statement in Manhattan Supreme Court, Ferhani declared “I repeatedly discussed…my anger towards Jews based on what I believed and perceived to be their mistreat- ment of Muslims throughout the world. I intended to create chaos and send a message of intimida- tion and coercion to the Jewish population of New York City, warning them to stop mistreating Muslims.” Two years earlier, three American Muslim converts and one Haitian national allegedly plotted to attack synagogues in the Bronx and to shoot down airplanes at a military base in Newburgh, New York.
    [Show full text]
  • The American Terrorist
    Terry Oroszi, EdD Boonshoft School of Medicine, WSU Intelligence Analysis Career Training Program, WSARC The Dayton Think Tank, Dayton, OH Briefing: This research identifies the attributes of an American terrorist by studying the patterns within 34 demographic variables and exploring their correlation with the motivation to commit crimes related to terrorism. We believe that such an understanding will help to halt the recruitment of American citizens by instructing concerned parents, coaches, teachers, and family members how to quickly identify a person that is susceptible to radicalization and how to intervene. Studies conducted 20 years ago have identified some markers by examining international terrorists: single, male, early 20’s, university education, and from an affluent middle or upper-class family (Russell, 1977; Jenkins, 1980, Dingley, 1997). This study confirms the previous findings and expands upon them by examining 519 U.S. citizens convicted of crimes related to terrorism. Additional characteristics scrutinized include the location of residence, crime and imprisonment, religion, organizational alliances, race, heritage and path to citizenship, field of study and occupation, social status, military experience, mental health, marriage and family, conviction, punishment, and target. We endeavor to continue identifying the common traits of terrorists and the social circumstances that render a person susceptible to radicalization and prime them to commit acts of terrorism. By creating a well-sourced and researched list of behaviors we offer methods for community-based curbing of radicalization. Briefing: This research identifies the attributes of an American terrorist by studying the patterns within 34 demographic variables and exploring their correlation with the motivation to commit crimes related to terrorism.
    [Show full text]